§ THE MARQUESS OF CREWE rose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he can make any statement on the political and military situation in Persia, and on the responsibilities at present undertaken by His Majesty's Government in that country.
§ The noble Marquess said: My Lords, I understand that the Foreign Secretary has unfortunately been detained for a few minutes, but I will not postpone making the few observations with which I desire to preface my Question. I should like to express my thanks to him for his readiness to make a statement on this important subject. Such a statement, I think it will be generally agreed, is fully due, if not overdue. In ordinary circumstances and in normal times the condition of affairs in Persia and the part which this country is playing there would have been the subject of discussion, I have no doubt, in both Houses of Parliament. But in these strenuous and crowded days even a topic like this, involving as it does the employment of not a few thousands of 265 His Majesty's troops, is liable to sink into comparative insignificance.
§ Perhaps I may be permitted to remind your Lordships of what, in the comparatively recent past, our interests in Persia have been conceived to be. The House will remember that we entered into an Agreement with Russia whereby two spheres of influence were constituted in Persia, the Northern being allocated to Russia down to Ispahan, and the Southern being British; and it was the categorical statement by Governments of both Parties that our desire in entering upon such an Agreement, far from involving any desire to compromise the independence of Persia, was intended to support and maintain that independence. Our direct interests in Persia were of two kinds, and hinged upon somewhat different considerations. So far as Northern Persia is concerned we admitted—fully admitted—that in some respects the Russian interests exceeded ours. The near proximity of the Persian border to what were then the outlying provinces of Russia constituted a reason for a special interest to be taken by Russia in them. But, of course, it has to be remembered that for the best part of one hundred years the eyes of India have been fixed on the Indian North-West Frontier with the feeling that, behind Afghanistan and behind Persia, there rested tile vague and continual menace of a possible advance of Imperial Russia still further east. Some of us thought of late years that the eyes of India were somewhat unduly fixed upon these assumed dangers of a Russian advance and of Russian intrigue dangerous to the Indian Empire. But those considerations have been materially changed by the events of the last five years. As regards Southern Persia our interests may be regarded as more direct. It was considered altogether impossible that the Persian Gulf should become subject to any European influence but ours. We were on friendly terms with the various Arab chiefs and sheikhs of Northern Arabia and up the Persian Gulf to Mohammerah, and we considered that our interests, and especially the interests of India, were definitely concerned with the maintenance of order on the coasts of the Persian Gulf.
§ Such was the situation up to the time of the outbreak of war. I am not going to attempt to detail all that has happened in Persia since those days. We were actively concerned in the earlier years of the war in Southern Persia, and considerable forces proceeded from India for the maintenance 266 of order in the south. Of late the centre of interest has been transferred to Northern Persia owing to the entirely new condition of affairs which now obtains on the Persian frontier. The change following the Russian Revolution and what it is not an exaggeration to describe as the break-up of Russia led at a quite early stage after the war to the establishment of the independent republic of what had formerly been the Russian province of Azerbaijan. That republic was recognised by the Supreme Council in January, 1919—getting on for two years ago. Its career so far has been somewhat chequered. It has been described as a Bolshevist Mussulman Republic—certainly at one time; and the description that one has heard of the state of affairs at Baku has been deplorable, both from the point of view of this country and from the point of view of the country itself. Baku had been occupied shortly before the conclusion of the war by a joint force of Germans and Turks, hostile of course to us, and prepared to threaten any interests which we have in Persia, and liable, of course, thereby to endanger order in Persia itself.
§ Since then in that district the situation has been very confused. The knowledge of it that has reached us has been partial and imperfect. The German and Turkish forces, of course, withdrew as part of the terms of the Armistice, but the whole of Azerbaijan, as I understand, has been considered to be under definitely Bolshevik influence from that day to this, and it has been thought necessary to employ a not inconsiderable force of His Majesty's troops from India in guarding the Persian frontier from apprehended assaults from that quarter. That has been the situation until quite recently. But a few days ago —I think it was on November 11—in another place the Prime Minister stated that he hoped for the early withdrawal of our forces from the North-west frontier of Persia. The force has been described as consisting of some 3,600 troops. I am not sure whether they are all Indian, or whether they are partly British troops. They have been under the command of two very distinguished officers, General Ironside and General Dickson, and they have succeeded, as far as we know, in holding their own and performing the duties required of them in that quarter. But no doubt the noble Earl will be able to inform us what the intentions of His Majesty's Government are with reference to that particular force.
267§ Then, as your Lordships know, Persia and ourselves have joined in an Agreement, and upon that also I have no doubt the noble Earl will be able to give us some information. The terms of the Agreement have been published, but it has not so far been ratified, and the Persian Parliament, the Mejliss, has not been summoned in order to ratify it. Whether that was because the Parliament would not ratify it, or for some other reason, I have no doubt again the noble Earl will be able to inform us. That non-ratification has been ascribed by some in part to another incident which has affected the military position of Persia —namely, the disbandment of the force of so-called Cossacks which has for long existed in one form or another in Northern Persia; a force, that is to say, composed, as regards the rank and file, of Persians, but commanded and officered by Russians. That force quite recently has lost its Commander and all the Russian officers, a hundred or so, who were responsible for it. That, I take it, is not a subject of regret to His Majesty's Government, or to anybody else, if they succeed in finding a Persian Commander who is able to manage a force of this kind and a sufficient supply of native officers who can take the places of the Russians who acted as officers before. Perhaps the noble Earl will be able to tell us whether such a conclusion involves, at any rate in the first instance, the employment of a number of British officers to take the places of the former Russians; whether it is contemplated that a certain number of officers should be so lent, and, if so, for what period. It has been assumed, as I said, by some that there is a certain connection between these two things, and that the non-calling together of the Mejliss for the purpose of confirming the Anglo-Persian Agreement was, at any rate in part, due to the break-up of this Persian-Cossack force. I understand, however, that this has been denied. There again I have no doubt the noble Earl will be able to inform us whether there was any foundation for that report.
§ What we should be particularly anxious to know is, Do the Persian authorities now expect His Majesty's Government to go on affording them regular military protection? What is the aim and intention of His Majesty's Government after the withdrawal of this particular force from the North-west frontier of Persia? Does that mean that the force will be withdrawn altogether from Tehran and the neigh- 268 bourhood, and that we shall once more confine our military intervention, so long as any takes place, to what was formerly regarded as the British sphere. Perhaps also the noble Earl will be able to tell us what in his opinion is the weight of risk of an attack from Baku, or from that side, upon the Persian frontier by the Russian Bolshevik forces; and, assuming such an attack could be made, how far he considers that the resources of Persia unaided can be expected to counter it.
§ As your Lordships know, there is not an inconsiderable quantity of useful military material in Persia, although it has often happened that the particular Persian forces which have had to repel aggression have failed to come up to the mark. On the other hand, there are tribes such as the Bakhtiari, of whom we used to hear so much a few years ago but whose name has not appeared lately, which constitute a military element in the country that could be relied upon at any rate for courage and some degree of military efficiency. If Persia is to stand alone it is quite clear that the military elements in that country must have a chance of being reorganised and of obtaining a higher degree of efficiency than, so far as we know, they have recently been able to acquire.
§ I should also like to ask the noble Earl how far our position in Persia and the question of rendering military assistance to Persia hinges upon our position in Mesopotamia? How far does the position which has been assigned to us there, and which we are endeavouring to fill, affect the necessity of our maintaining a material hold upon the situation in Persia? It is of course, clear that just as in a game of chess the advance of one pawn may expose the player to an attack not merely from the immediate neighbourhood of that particular piece but from the distant ends of the board, so it may be that the holding of particular military positions further west in Asia may, in the opinion of those qualified to judge, leave a flank exposed in a manner which needs sonic special guarding and further military occupation than would otherwise be necessary. I say without hesitation that if it be the fact that our position in Mesopotamia makes it more necessary for us to keep a military force in Persia, it is a strong and additional argument against the maintenance of our position in Mesopotamia. I have no doubt that the noble Earl will be able to 269 tell us how far such a supposition is justified.
§ My noble friend Lord Bryce is not able to be present to-day, and his asked me to invite the noble Earl to tell us something if he can about a matter which is not precisely, I am afraid, within the four corners of my Question, but at any rate is akin to it and has a definite bearing upon it—namely, the present position of the Armenian Republic at Erivan. It cannot be regarded as entirely alien to this question, and if the noble Earl is able to say a few words about it it will be advantageous, because if it should be the fact that a Turkish or hostile Russian influence is to be established over the whole region of the Caucasus the position of Persia and our interests so far as they are connected with Persia must be in some degree affected.
§ I have, I fear, detained your Lordships at some length. I have ventured to ask a number of questions to which I hope the noble Earl will be able to reply. I trust that he will also be able to repeat that the object of His Majesty's Government is still to secure and maintain the independence of Persia, and so far as possible to relieve us—and in particular thus to relieve India from the necessity of direct interference with Persian administration—of the presence of British troops in that country.
§ I noticed the other day, in the course of a long statement by the Aga Khan, that this distinguished gentleman, himself be it remembered a Persian and not an Indian, urged His Majesty's Government to enter so far as possible into frank and honest relations with the whole Persian people. I take it that this means that, so far as the nationalist movement in Persia is really a popular nationalist movement and not merely a cloak for revolution supported from outside and conducted not by patriots but by self-seekers—that so far as the Persian nationalist movement is genuine, His Majesty's Government should be able to support it. No one supposes that Persia can become straight off a popularly or democratically governed country in the sense in which Western countries are. But that does not mean that His Majesty's Government ought to rely solely upon the support and the efforts of Persian magnates who are naturally bound up with the old state of things and may be presumed like most people to consider their own interests to a considerable extent, but that they should endeavour to secure the aid of, and in turn support, the best elements of the 270 country who desire to approach more closely to a popular form of government, so far as that is compatible with the general genius and spirit of the Persian people. I beg to put to the noble Earl the Question which stands in my name.
§ LORD LAMINGTONMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Marquess upon having put this Question and asked for information on several points which have been rather hidden from us during the last few years. In his opening remarks he referred to the Anglo-Russian Convention, and stated that by it the integrity and independence of Persia were safeguarded.
§ LORD LAMINGTONYes. I hold quite a different view, and I know that the Persians themselves take the opposite view to the noble Marquess. It may be that the Convention did something to preserve the independence of Persia, because Russian aggression at that time was very menacing and no one could be sure what steps Russia might not take in Northern Persia. Therefore the Convention may have been a preventive or a modification of what would have been the results of a strong Russian policy. At the same time there can be no doubt that our prestige and the affection hitherto entertained for us by the Persians were very previously affected, not so much because they considered that we had any intention of impairing their independence (so far at least as Southern Persia is concerned), but they regretted that we should be allied in any degree with a country that no doubt many times had the idea of acquiring a strong interest in Northern Persia. The result is there has been an aftermath of suspicious feelings entertained by the Persians towards this country. That I think is very unfortunate.
Last year we had the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which was very happily conceived and put through by the noble Earl the Leader of this House. But unfortunately that has not been ratified. The noble Marquess said that the Mejliss had never been summoned. Technically speaking, that is not correct. They had been summoned, and after the General Election they went to Tehran and remained there six months. But they never met together as a Mejliss. The reason for that I am ignorant of, but I think it is unfortunate, 271 as regards the ratifying and putting into force of this Agreement, that something could not have been done to secure a meeting of Mejliss in order to ratify this Agreement. At all events it would have been better to clear the air so that we might know exactly what was the feeling of the Persian people towards the Agreement. Moreover, it might have been possible to modify it so as to make it harmonise with the general feeling of Persia, and get it ratified. Great expectations have been raised in Persia in regard to what might follow if that Agreement were acted upon. People thought that the reform of justice and of the police would be carried out, and that the whole of their social life would be benefitted. All this has been put aside, and consequently disappointment is now entertained as to the value of that Agreement, and suspicions have been renewed that perhaps we were not disinterested in wishing to secure Persia's independence. I am certain that the object of the noble Earl the Leader of this House is to have a strong and independent Persia. That would be the best bulwark possible for the defence of India. That has been his policy throughout, and I am sorry that better results have not followed from the Agreement that he framed.
There has just been circulated an Agreement with regard to our Commercial Convention of 1903. This Agreement was put through at the beginning of this year. One Article of that Agreement—Article 10 —I saw to-day. In regard to this matter also I think considerable disappointment was felt in Persia. The prices in that country are very high, as they are elsewhere in the world, and it was hoped by the new tariff that prices would be reduced, particularly in regard to one item—sugar. Exactly the reverse has been the case, and this for Persia very important commodity is made more expensive. Therefore the people are greatly disappointed and have taken umbrage at all the clauses of the Agreement which has just been put through. I desire to refer particularly to paragraph 10. This states that an annual sum of 5 per cent. of the total net revenue of Customs should be allotted for the purpose of improving the port accommodation of Persia, there by giving greater trade facilities. I suggest that we might go one step further. Might it not be possible to get the Persian Government to agree to a certain sum being allotted for the improvement of the roads from Bushire to Shiraz?
272 The noble Marquess stated how closely linked up are the fortunes of Persia with Mesopotamia. Our position in Persia depends so much upon what we are going to do in Mesopotamia. No doubt it is advisable that we should withdraw from Mesopotamia after having constituted a Government that can look after the interests of the country. But there is one proviso. Persia is only accessible by three main routes. One is from the north by the Caspian and Resht; the other route is from Baghdad through Tehran; and the other by Bushire to Shiraz. We cannot do much in regard to the Caspian; it is important, therefore, supposing that by any chance the Baghdad and Tehran route were closed, that the other main artery from Bushire to Shiraz should be open, and also, in order to give every facility for trade, that the road from Bushire to Shiraz should be put in good order for traffic. That, I understand, would take only a very small sum. I would ask the noble Earl whether, when this Customs Agreement for the purpose of improving the port accommodation is under consideration, he would not also take into consideration the advisability of asking the Persian Government to allot a definite sum for the purpose of securing proper communication between the heart of Central Persia and Bushire, which is the only real port in the Persian Gulf.
The noble Marquess also referred to the subject of General Starosselsky and his commanders, who had left the Cossack forces. It would be interesting to know what is the intention of His Majesty's Government in respect of this. Personally I hope that they would see fit to appoint British officers, not permanently necessarily, any more than in the South Persian Rifle Force. I understand that there they have now about 5,000 or 6,000 men certainly still under the British officers but the British officers are being gradually withdrawn, also the non-commissioned officers, and Persian officers of quite good capacity are taking their place. I do not see why it should not be possible therefore to extend that system to the Cossack force in the North. I trust that no fear or suspicion of the people here that we are going to organise permanently the military forces of Persia will prevent His Majesty's Government agreeing to this step.
I conceive there is a possibility that we can now at this moment set up a really 273 friendly, strong and independent Persia. What effect the recent developments which have resulted in the overthrow of General Wrangel's Army will have on the Bolshevik forces I do not know. But I understand that all classes of the Persian people at the present time, although they may at one moment have been suspicious of our intentions, have the greatest possible dread of the advance of any Bolshevik force and are quite content that we should maintain troops in Northern Persia to prevent any successful advance on the part of the Bolsheviks. I trust, therefore, that the noble Earl will take every possible step to disarm the Persian mind of any idea, that we wish to do anything to injure permanently their independence.
§ LORD SYDENHAMMy Lords, Persia unfortunately is one of those "Eastern dynasties" of which Gibbon wrote that they "present an unceasing round of valour, greatness, discord, degeneration, and decay." Persia has passed through this cycle, and it is her decay that is the main cause of all our present difficulties and her own. It is very hard to realise now that less than seventy years ago we were at war with Persia because troops of the Shah had taken Herat aryl threatened Afghanistan, with which country we have since been twice in conflict. In 1878, a little more than twenty years later, we were apparently willing to hand over Herat to the Persians. It was quite inevitable, when the Trans-Caspian Railway reached Kushk Post on the Afghan frontier after closely skirting the border of Khorassan, that there was danger of absorption of North Persia by Russia. As your Lordships will remember, Khorassan was the Province from which Skobeleff proposed to draw his main sources of supply for the invasion of India.
Since that time, so far as I have followed the question, it has been our object, and we have done our best, to uphold the integrity of Persia and to safeguard at the same time our special interests at the head of the Gulf and on the Mekran coast. For that reason we have sought by loans, advice, and the organisation of gendarmerie to do all we can to secure the stability of the Persian Government and to maintain internal peace and order in Persian affairs. That was the object of our Agreement with Russia, to which the noble Marquess referred, defining a sphere of influence for Russia in the North and a sphere of influ- 274 ence for ourselves in the South with an intervening neutral zone, which I thought was very badly traced at the time between those two spheres. I am afraid that Agreement has now lapsed as the result of the war, but the effect of that Agreement was necessarily to bring us into much closer relation with Persian affairs and to invest us with many new responsibilities with regard to Persia, and also to give prominence to various railway schemes which were discussed in your Lordships' House on May 25, 1914. I said at that time that I "did not know anything more unsatisfactory and even melancholy than the present condition of affairs in Persia." I am very much afraid that those conditions are even worse to-day than they were then. The railway projects, and even the road projects, have naturally been in abeyance during the war, and our main preoccupation, I take it, throughout the war has been to combat hostile intrigues and to assist in the maintenance of order and in the checking of brigandage which so easily arises in Persia. There was a gendarmerie officered by Swedes which I believe proved unsatisfactory on account of German influences. Then there was the organisation of the South Persian Rifles by Sir Percy Cox, which has done valuable work. Last year there was the Agreement drafted by the noble Earl himself which was intended only to help us in guiding and assisting the Persian Government to a position of strength and stability. I am afraid that Agreement has not been signed.
Now we are face to face with a new and unexpected problem. I imagine that no one or hardly any one realised that one effect of the war would be to cause a ferment throughout the East. That might not have happened but for the great effort of the Germans to strike at the British Empire through our Eastern commitments, and later on the tremendous exertion of the dictators who seized power in Russia and proceeded to flood the East with agents and propaganda and to invade Persia herself. We have little information as to what has happened or is happening in the North-west corner of Persia. So far as I understand the situation, General Ironside with 3,600 men is operating from Kasvin, and he stands alone between the Bolsheviks and Tehran. After the dissolution of the Persian Cossacks no other organised body, I believe, remained at the disposal of the Persian Government to avert the certain anarchy which would 275 be created in Persia if the Red Army and the Red propaganda found their way into the heart of the country. I believe that the ports of Baku and Enzeli are not closed during the winter. Therefore, unless General Ironside can deal effectively with the Red forces, the menace to Persia I am afraid must remain. But if anyone can effectively deal with the situation I believe that General Ironside is that man. Whether, as has been suggested, any other Red forces can be brought to bear in the North-west corner of Persia I do not know, but the appalling catastrophe which has befallen General Wrangel's force will no doubt stimulate the military ambitions of Trotsky Bronstein. Resht, I understand, is the headquarters of the Red force at the present moment. Resht is nearly 300 miles from Kermanshah, which is again about 200 miles from Baghdad, so that our position there is not by any means a satisfactory one from the military point of view. Nevertheless, I feel that it is quite impossible for us to withdraw the protection that we are now giving to Persia in spite of the cost, and in spite even of some measure of risk. Whether or not we ought to have gone so far afield as Baku and Meshed I am not certain; but at the present moment that question does not arise.
We are now placed in the position, as I understand it, of being the sole guardians of the independence of Persia, which is seriously threatened by the Bolshevik Government. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in this House on January 21, 1918—
We desire Persia to remain neutral during the war and to retain her complete independence after the war.I am quite certain that that plain declaration of policy holds the field to-day.There is one other consideration to which I must refer. Our prestige in the East has lamentably declined in late years, and if we were now to abandon Persia to her fate a great deal of what is left might be destroyed. When the prestige of a Great Power declines in the East it is astounding how many unexpected enemies crop up on all sides. I feel quite certain that His Majesty's Government will not leave Persia at the present time to the fate that has overtaken Bokhara and to all that that would involve. There is one feature in the situation which I confess I find it very difficult to under- 276 stand. We are at open war with the Soviet Government in Persia, the most aggressive Government that Russia has ever had, and the Government which has shamefully ill-treated our prisoners at Baku. At the same time we seem to be engaged in interminable negotiations with this very Government in London. If Herr Rosenfeld had never been permitted to come to this country until Persia had been evacuated by the Red troops, or if his successor and the large staff now in this country were to be deported until that event had taken place, it is possible that Persia might be saved from the anarchy which is threatened without the necessity of maintaining a British force so far away from its base as that of General Ironside. If that were possible it would be a very great relief to us in a position which is not free from grave embarrassments.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON)My Lords, I do not at all dispute the opening statement of the noble Marquess that a pronouncement by His Majesty's Government upon the question of their Persian policy is due to the Houses of Parliament, and I am grateful to him for having given me the opportunity of making it this afternoon. As usual, we have had in this House a number of speeches on this question of moderation and of authority. The speech of the noble Marquess took the form, in the main, of a number of courteous inquiries. I counted them off as they fell from his lips, and believe that the total was something like twenty. Some of these were conundrums, military as well as political, to which I am not certain that I am altogether qualified to reply. But I will do my best to answer the great majority of his questions and of those put by the two subsequent speakers.
To one question of the noble Marquess I must ask his pardon if I am not in a position to give an answer. Speaking for Lord Bryce, who is not here, he asked me to hook on to this discussion on Persia a statement about the position of the Armenian Republic at Erivan. Greatly interested as we are in that topic its connection with the Motion on the Paper and with Persia is very remote, and I have too much respect for the House to set the bad example, as its Leader, of deliberately violating our Rules of Debate, too often more honoured as they are in the breach than in the observance.
277 The questions of the noble Marquess were put, as I have said, with his customary moderation, but I do not conceal from myself that the same questions have been put elsewhere in tones of ouch greater suspicion. I have seen the question asked, "What is the meaning of our having British forces or Indian forces on or near the Caspian? Why should our Generals and our men be at Kazvin? What is the real story about this Cossack Division?"—a question which was put to toe directly by Lord Lamington. "Why have we forces in Northern Persia at all? What is the interest in these parts of the world of the British taxpayer?" These are, I am ready to admit, quite fair and legitimate questions, to which it is the duty of the representative of the Government to give a reply.
Some critics go even further, and in their anxiety to prove that the Government are guilty of some sinister motive describe our Persian policy as one of wild and reckless adventure and of spread-eagle Imperialism over the wastes of Central Asia. "Have we not enough to do at home?" they say, "Why bother about Persia?" Incidentally I have noticed in some quarters that our policy in that part of the world is described as an act of dementia on my own part, dragging after me a body of reluctant colleagues. I am not at all disturbed at any such reference to myself. For something like thirty years I have been closely connected with the polities of Persia, and if at any time I had been inspired by any lack of regard for the independence or integrity of that country I hardly think I should have been honoured, as I have been, during the whole of that period with the confidence of successive Persian Ministers and statesmen.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONOn the contrary I believe—I say it in no tone of vanity—that they regard me as a true and consistent friend of their country. Such I have always endeavoured to be, and such, believe me, my Lords, is the motive which has inspired my recent action
Passing away from that, which is; perhaps, hardly worthy of attention, may I say this? It is unfair to assume at any moment that an important branch of policy, even of foreign policy, is the work of any individual Minister. The respon- 278 sibility for that policy is that of the Government as a whole; and I almost shrink from telling your Lordships the number of hours that have been spent by the Cabinet during the past six months only—and I might extend it over a longer period—in discussing the question of what our political and military engagements in Persia ought to be.
I welcome the opportunity of making this statement to-night. There is nothing whatever to be concealed by His Majesty's Government. I think I can truthfully say that at no time have I ever attempted to conceal anything in reply to Questions which have been put to me in your Lordships' House. It has been my duty to make many speeches both to Parliament and the public upon the matter; and not only to the questions that have been addressed to me to-day am I prepared to reply, but I shall be ready at any moment to give further information to noble Lords on any point which my observations this afternoon may leave obscure.
May I begin by one general observation which underlies the whole situation? It is this. I ask your Lordships to remember that the situation in Persia is the direct and inevitable sequel of war. The war has left upon us its aftermath of obligations, from which we are only slowly extricating ourselves, not in Persia alone, but in other parts of the world. Look at Europe at the present moment. Does anybody imagine that it is the normal or will be a long continued condition of affairs that we have to keep British troops at Danzig, for instance, or in the Rhineland? Does anybody assume for a moment, because we have troops there, that we have designs upon the independence of those countries? Far from it. The House and the public know perfectly well that they are obligations which we cannot escape, that we have not only to seek peace but to make it and to ensure it. Just in the same way as in many parts of Europe we have been provisionally compelled to accept military responsibilities of this character, so in the Eastern parts of the world the same is found to occur.
It has often been my duty in your Lordships' House to point out the obvious proposition that the war did not end automatically with the conclusion of the Armistice in November, 1918. On the contrary, large parts of the world have been almost as actively engaged in war since as they were before. Russia has 279 been and is at this moment in a continuous state of war. We have had ourselves a very troublesome war in Mesopotamia from which we are happily now emerging. France has had her war in Syria; Asia Minor and the Caucasus have been for two years since the Armistice in a state of almost chronic warfare. Two of the principal Treaties—that with Turkey and that with Hungary—still remain unratified. And do let us remember when we discuss the matter that the world has not yet reverted to pre-war conditions. Therefore do not judge us entirely—because you will judge us falsely if you do—by pre-war standards.
These propositions which I submit to you apply to the East even more than they do to the West, and for this reason—that the upheaval there has been, if possible, greater than in the Western hemisphere. The once tranquil East has been shaken with prodigious convulsions. Two great Empires, those of Turkey and Russia, have simultaneously disappeared; and, just as we were piecing together the scattered and disordered fragments, there appeared upon the scene, as indicated by the noble Marquess, the disturbing, the shattering force of aggressive and powerful Communism, known to us as Bolshevism. Is it to be supposed for a moment—it has not, I am glad to say, been supposed in either of the speeches to which I have listened—that we welcome, or would prolong for an hour longer than is necessary, the conditions which I have described? What conceivable satisfaction can be derived either by a Foreign Minister or a War Minister in this country from keeping British troops—or Indian troops, for the matter of that—at Mosul or Kazvin? Every instinct of expediency and of economy points to the reduction, and, as soon as may be, the withdrawal of such forces. But only the smallest knowledge of Eastern affairs and of history is required to know that such a withdrawal cannot be abrupt. These countries are in a state of wild commotion. We have no right to replace commotion by chaos. The highways of the East are strewn and littered with the débris of the recent war. And if there falls upon us, as is too often the case, the task of being the scavenger, at least give us time to carry out that duty. We are doing it much more quickly than some of our critics suppose, and I shall be in a position in the course of my remarks to show you that in the case of Persia, in 280 particular, there has been a curtailment of our commitments and a withdrawal of our forces on a scale which seems as yet to be unrealised by our critics in this country.
I said just now that the present position is really the aftermath of war. And in order to enable your Lordships to understand how it is that we have reached this point you will perhaps permit me to indulge in a slight historical retrospect, in the course of which I shall be able to answer most of the questions which have been addressed to me by your Lordships this afternoon. When the war broke out in 1914 the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1907 was still in existence. That Agreement, which we owe to Lord Grey of Fallodon and to the Government of which he was a member, had been framed with excellent intentions. It was designed to put an end to the incessant friction and rivalry between the British and Russian Governments at Tehran, and to give a better chance to an independent Persia. But I concur with those two noble Lords who referred to that Agreement that, though excellent in intention, it was disfigured by great faults. I remember, almost on the first occasion that I had the honour of addressing your Lordships, I occupied something like an hour of your time in pointing out what in my judgment they were pointing whether the Agreement was good or bad, at any rate it had two unfortunate consequences. In the first place, by dividing up the country into so-called "spheres of influence," it aroused the incurable suspicion of the Persian Government and the Persian people, who saw in it an ill-concealed scheme of partition of their country between Russia and ourselves. And, in the second place, the suspicions were to some extent justified by the policy and action of Russia, who proceeded to act as though she were a dictator in the Northern parts of Persia included within her sphere.
Accordingly when the war broke out and we were found in close alliance with Russia the suspicion and ill-feeling which had been aroused by her action in Persia was, perhaps not unnaturally, passed on to us. Persia was nominally neutral, but her sympathies really lay in the earlier stages with the Central Powers. Her sympathies and weakness were equally exploited by the Persian Government of that day. German agents moved hither and thither in Persia carrying their in- 281 trigues far and wide, even up to the Afghan border. Turkish armies, seizing the opportunity, crossed the western border and invaded large portions of Persian territory. Anarchy and disorder prevailed in most harts of the country. The Tehran Government was feeble and hostile. Persia might at any moment in these circumstances have become an active and dangerous theatre of war. Simultaneously, if you will bear it in mind, our forces were advancing in Mesopotamia to Baghdad, while on the other side of Persia it was part of our duty to protect the Afghan border. We would not afford in these circumstances to let Persia become a new theatre of war. The whole of our policy was devoted to steadying the situation in Persia; hence it was, as one noble Lord mentioned, that we took over control of the South Persia Rifles from the Swedish officers who had signally f tiled in their task, and endeavoured, with the consent of the Persian Government, at least to secure that some measure of order should prevail in the Southern parts of the country.
After a while a new danger supervened. I allude to the period of the war when the enemy forces were in the ascendant, and we were more than doubtful if the victory would ultimately be ours. The Turks and the Germans both appeared in force in the Caucasus. They occupied the entire belt of country from the Black Sea to the Caspian; they held Baku; they threatened the invasion of Central Asia; they menaced Tehran. This was a danger to Mesopotamia, to North Persia, and to Afghanistan. It was in these circumstances, after our occupation of Baghdad, that the first military force under General Dunsterville was pushed forward from Baghdad on what is known as the Hamadan road in the direction of Kazvin and the Caspian. This was done in order to close the North-Western door of Persia, which at that time might have been broken open at any moment by a combined force of Germans and Turks, or by either acting independently.
Simultaneously on the other side of Persia—on the North-Eastern side—the Government of India sent a mission accompanied by a small number of troops under General Malleson to Meshed. They were to guard the North-Eastern door, and, as far as possible, to encourage the Turcomans in the resistance which they were offering to the Common enemy and to keep peace on the Persian border. It 282 seems now to be quite forgotten—I do not know whether it was realised at the time —that there was a serious danger that the Germans and the Turks, either separately or in combination, might cross the Caspian, seize the Trans-Caspian railway, and advance right to the borders of Afghanistan in the neighbourhood of Herat. It was for this object that Colonel Malleson and his men remained for some time in that part of the world. Down in the South of Persia the South Persian Rifles, to which I alluded just now, were confronted with the danger of a formidable rising in the mountain country between Shiraz and the sea. It was with no small difficulty that Sir Percy Sykes, who commanded the force, was relieved, and for that purpose a rather large force was sent, upon the advice of the Indian Government, to Bushire.
Such was the now almost forgotten sequence of events in Persia in the early and troublous stages of the war. This policy of activity on our part, pursued as it was with unwearying patience and with great ability by the various officers and forces who represented us, was successful. The danger was overcome; the Turks and Germans were thrown out of the Caucasus; Khorasan was preserved; the danger to Afghanistan was removed; Persia was freed from her enemies. At this stage she definitely realised what we had done for her and her attitude changed from doubtful amity or open hostility to sincere friendliness. At that time there was in power in Persia a Minister known as Vossug-ed-Dowleh, speaking with great experience and authority for his countrymen. Simultaneously we sent out from Baghdad to Tehran the most capable official with knowledge of the East whom we could supply. I allude to Sir Percy Cox, now grappling, as I think and hope, successfully with our difficulties in Mesopotamia. Be it remembered it was by no means his first experience in Persia. For something like twenty years his life had been spent in contact with Persians in the neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf. Upon his arrival in Tehran the Minister Vossug-ed-Dowleh addressed overtures to us to enter into a friendly Agreement with the Government he represented.
I need not waste two minutes here in defending the proposition—because I am sure no one will dispute it—that Persia is an important British interest. That has 283 been the policy of every British Cabinet for over a hundred years. It has been the policy that has been announced from this Table over and over again by successive Foreign Ministers—Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne—and, in another place, by Viscount Grey of Fallodon, then Sir Edward Grey. A peaceful Persia, a stable Persia, a friendly Persia, and an independent Persia have been corner stones of British policy. They were the basis of the Anglo-Persian Agreement which we now commenced to negotiate with the Persian Government. One or two questions were asked me about that Agreement. It has been laid before Parliament and its general terms are no doubt familiar to your Lordships. We made no attempt in that Agreement to compromise the independence of Persia in the smallest degree. On the contrary, we categorically and expressly re-affirmed and guaranteed it. What we did try in the Agreement to do was to provide Persia with the means and instruments by which that independence could be secured. We offered to assist her in creating an independent, national military force of her own, giving her expert military assistance in the organisation of that army. We sought to purify her internal administration and to give her a scheme of sound finance. We aimed at opening up communications and developing the resources of the country. At the same time as we were concluding the Agreement we gave to Persia, as a sequel to it, a loan of £2,000,000 guaranteed upon the Customs and other revenues of the country, and we provided also for a revision of her tariff, certain to be very greatly to her advantage. That, in a sentence or two, was the pith and substance of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, and I recall—I do not think any of your Lordships will dispute it—that that Agreement was received with general interest and sympathy in this country.
There was no attempt to suggest anything in the nature of a British Protectorate over Persia. We never thought of going to the League of Nations to ask for a Mandate for Persia. We preferred to treat her as a friendly and independent State in a position of equality with ourselves, and I remember very well that at the time the distinguished gentleman whose views have been quoted to-night, the Aga Khan—who has expressed himself in the newspapers in some doubt as to our present Persian policy—told me that 284 he regarded the Anglo-Persian Agreement as a model of what such an Agreement between a great European Power and an Eastern State should be. It was said at the time that this Agreement ought to be sent to the League of Nations for its approval. We were under no obligation to do this, because the Agreement had been concluded before the Treaty of Peace had been ratified and before the Council of the League of Nations was in concrete existence. Nevertheless, I was entirely willing from the start to act upon Article 18 of the Covenant of the League. There was nothing we had cause either to be ashamed of or to conceal, and from the start I pressed the Persian Government, and the Persian Foreign Minister in particular, most earnestly to take early steps to submit the Agreement to the Persian Parliament in order to obtain that support of the popular elements in the country to which one of the previous speakers referred as so necessary. If the Persian Parliament rejected the Agreement there would be no need to go to the League of Nations. If, on the other hand, they accepted and ratified it, clearly it would go to the League of Nations with redoubled strength.
Soon after the conclusion of the Agreement the Shah came to England, and your Lordships may recollect that lie more than once gave expression to the most cordial acceptance of the Agreement. We then proceeded to take steps, at the instance of the Persian Government, to put it into execution. A Military Commission, under General Dickson, who was chosen by the Persian Government for the purpose, was sent out to examine, along with Persian colleagues, the military situation in Persia, and to prepare a scheme for the creation of the uniform Persian military force which both of us had always had in view. They spent some time upon this work in Persia, and their Report was presented in April of the present year. Again, in pursuance of the Agreement we sent out to Persia an able Treasury official, Mr. Armitage Smith, to act as head of the Financial Commission for the reorganisation of Persian finances. Two consulting engineers went out to Persia in an advisory capacity, and a Persian railway syndicate was formed for the survey of essential railway lines in different parts of the country.
At this juncture, on the return of the Shah to Persia, there occurred one of 285 those political vicissitudes to which even more stable countries are sometimes exposed—I mean there was a change of Ministry. Vossug-ed-Dowleh, the author of the agreement, fell from power, and a new Ministry under a Minister known as Mushir-ed-Dowleh, representing what I suppose may be called the Opposition, perhaps the more nationalist party, came into power and decided upon a somewhat different line of policy from their predecessors. They preferred to treat the Anglo-Persian Agreement, the initial steps in the execution of which I have just described to your Lordships, as in suspense until the consent of the Mejliss, or Parliament, had been obtained. I thought myself that it was rather a pedantic and foolish policy on the part of the Persian Government to deny themselves the enormous advantages of the Agreement by which they had already begun to profit. But that was their business, rather than ours; and so anxious were we to obtain the approval of the Mejliss that we acquiesced in the policy, provided only that the Parliament was itself summoned at an early date and the Agreement submitted to it. We wanted this, both because it has been our constant desire, to reduce our commitments in these parts of the world and to start Persia with alt independent military force to defend her own frontiers and also because we wanted to ascertain clearly and definitely whether Persia desired the assistance proffered to her in this Agreement. If they preferred to stand alone, we had no objection but if they decided to accept and ratify the Agreement, then we were prepared to join them in loyal co-operation. Accordingly we declined to continue our financial assistance for more than the four months which we were told was required for the summoning of the Mejliss, and we pressed that the Parliament should be convened and the Agreement submitted to it within that period. Moreover, hearing that the Persian Parliament was not unlikely to suggest certain modifications in the scheme of the Agreement—for instance, the introduction of a time limit—we expressed our ready willingness to consider any such proposal. That is the situation until the other day when a fresh and independent crisis, to which I will allude in a moment, occurred.
Let me revert to the military position in Persia, because all the while you have two facets of the Persian problem, no doubt closely connected but each moving on 286 rather independent lines. You have the political aspect of the case and also the military aspect, dictated partly by political but much more by military considerations. I spoke just now of the two forces that in the early stages of the war we had been compelled to send to Persia in the South and in the North-east corner at Meshed. If these forces had been sent or were kept there in any spirit of hostility to the Persian Government, that Government would assuredly have petitioned for their removal. But over and over again it was the Persian Government that pleaded for their retention, these pleas being urgently backed up by our representatives in the country. Nevertheless, so anxious were we to diminish our expenses and to accelerate the moment at which Persia could stand alone that we decided to withdraw by stages the whole of our forces from Southern Persia and also from Meshed, leaving only a Consular escort which existed at that place for our representative in the days before the war. We ran some risk in doing so, but nevertheless we decided to incur the risk because we did not feel justified, in a state of peace, in an indefinite continuance of responsibilities which had been thrown upon us in time of war. Therefore both of these forces were withdrawn.
Meanwhile, as I hinted just now, a new and different situation had arisen in Northwest Persia. Had Germany or Turkey been the only enemy, as they were at the early stages of the war, we might, after the defeat of these two enemies, have retired altogether from North-west Persia, just as I have described our withdrawal from Bushire and Meshed. But with the defeat of General Denikin a new power appeared in the Caucasus and upon the Caspian. These were the armies of Bolshevist Russia. They appeared against us in the Caucasus; they threatened Batum, they descended on Azerbaijan and set up a Soviet Republic there, to which the noble Marquess referred, incidentally imprisoning in circumstances of great and unpardonable cruelty our unhappy nationals, who have only within the last few days been rescued from that imprisonment by our efforts. The ice having melted in the mouths of the Volga they also came down with their ships and acquired the naval mastery of the Caspian. They at once proceeded to initiate a propaganda for setting up a Soviet Republic in Northern Persia. They landed at Enzeli and occupied Resht. They en- 287 deavoured to organise a local rebellion against the Persian Government at Tehran. Here was a new and unforeseen menace. At the very moment when we were looking forward to the acceptance, or, if they so preferred, the rejection, of the Anglo-Persian Agreement by the Persian Parliament, we found the Persian capital, the Persian throne and State, menaced by a new foe, and our small force of some 3,600 men at Kazvin the sole effective barrier against this Bolshevist menace, and, if it were persisted in, the disappearance of the Persian State.
The Bolshevist menace had this further reaction. The noble Marquess asked me whether I could make a pronouncement upon the degree to which the military position in Mesopotamia is dependent upon the military position in Persia; in other words, whether for the security of our position in Mesopotamia it is essential to keep forces on the line from the Persian frontier to Kazvin. That is a question on which I have not the military knowledge or authority to enable me to reply, but on the general proposition I can say this, that at the moment that this Bolshevist invasion occurred the fear that if they broke through there would be a serious and dangerous reaction upon our position in Mesopotamia was widely and authoritatively entertained, and undoubtedly one of the reasons for which we were compelled at that stage to retain our forces in Northwest Persia was the peril that would have ensued to our Mestopotamian position had they been withdrawn.
I am drawing near to the present position. But here again only a few weeks ago, in this theatre of incessant and recurrent surprises, occurred another change unforeseen by any of us in this country. I have stated that our forces on the line from Hamadan to Kazvin were there for the general defence of the situation in its broadest aspects. They had never been sent there by us to fight the Bolsheviks in Persia or anywhere else. That was neither our policy nor our intention. The defence of the Northern Province of Persia against Bolshevik invasion was entrusted to the Cossack Division to which more than one speaker has referred, a force some thousands strong—consisting of Persians known as Cossacks because they wore something similar to a Cossack's uniform—organised many years ago, and officered ever since by Russians. This 288 force, which was engaged for some time in resistance to the Bolshevik movement on the Southern shores of the Caspian, was under the command of Colonel Starosselsky. We suddenly heard that this officer and his colleagues had, in their military operations against the Bolsheviks, retired before greatly inferior Bolshevik forces without any attempt at sustained resistance; that the commanding officer was himself engaged in a violent anti-British propaganda in Persia, and that he was more than seriously suspected of very extensive peculations at the cost of the Persian Government. It was impossible to regard the continued presence of this officer and his Russian colleagues, representing, as your Lordships know, the old régime, as anything but a menace both to Persia and to ourselves in that part of the country, and it was these considerations that only a few weeks ago decided the Shah to dispense with the services of so dangerous an ally.
This decision on the part of His Majesty was strongly supported by General Iron-side, who had only recently gone out to Persia with a great reputation for clear-headedness and capacity. He was at the time in command of the British forces at Kazvin, and he earnestly recommended that the opportunity should be taken of getting rid of these incompetent and treacherous men, and of reorganising the Cossack Division under the British officers belonging to the Military Mission who had been for some time in Tehran, and were still waiting for the further stage of the proposals resulting from the Anglo-Persian Agreement. The noble Marquess, I think, spoke of General Dickson as being either in command or in partial command of the British forces at Kazvin. That is not so. General Dickson was the head of the Military Mission, and he and some of his officers being available on the spot were put in control of the Cossack Division, which had lost its Russian officers in the circumstances that I have described. The Prime Minister, however (Mushir-ed-Dowleh), was unwilling to act upon the advice of the Shah and resigned, being succeeded by another Ministry, which has only been for a short time in Office. This narrative, which I thank your Lordships for having listened to so patiently, brings us down to the present day.
The position, therefore, at this moment, is as follows. Following my division of 289 the subject into its political and its military aspect, let me in a sentence try and tell your Lordships how I view it in both respects. Firstly, as regards the political aspect. The Persian Government has been told by us that, tired with these long delays, we expect the Mejliss, the greater portion of the members of which have been elected and are I believe available in or near to Tehran, to be summoned in the ensuing month, and the Anglo-Persian Agreement to be submitted to it before the commencement of the new year. If the Persian Parliament accepts the Agreement, subject to such modifications as I indicated a little while ago, we shall do our best to help them through. I confess that for my own part I regard this as the sole possible guarantee for the continued stability of Persia, and I can scarcely imagine any Persian Government, Parliament, or group of men, acquiescing in any other position. But that is not for me to say. In that ease, if the Agreement be accepted, it will be presented by us under Article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to the Council of the League, and the provisions which I described earlier, and which were in course of coming into operation six months ago, will have a renewed existence. If, on the other hand, the Persian Parliament declines to accept the Agreement, the Persian Government must take its own course. We shall have done our best to help them, and if they are unwilling to accept our assistance the responsibility must be theirs.
The military aspect of tie case is this. Having acquiesced in the dismissal of the Russian colonel and his fellow officers, we have accepted temporary responsibility for the officering and organising of the Cossack Division in the manger that I have described, subject to repayment in clue course by the Persian Government. This force is the only Persian force that we can look to for the protection of the Northern Provinces and the North-west frontier of Persia. It is the only force capable in existing circumstances of providing a nucleus for the new Persian Army which we desire to create. If it succeeds, we shall have done our best to enable the Persian Government to escape the blow that has been aimed by the Bolsheviks at both its capital and its national existence. If it fails, we shall have done our best and must relinquish the task. As regards our own forces at Kazvin, the Persian Government have been told ex- 290 plicitly that they cannot rely upon the indefinite continuance of our forces in that part of the country, and that we shall be surprised if we are able to prolong our military position there beyond the spring. That is the present situation.
I think that I have demonstrated to your Lordships that on the military side we have already withdrawn our forces from Southern and from North-eastern Persia, and have placed a limit to the continuance of our military responsibilities in the North-west. On the political side we have made our position equally clear. The new Persian Government is, I believe, one of advanced liberal tendencies. It represents those popular elements to which the noble Marquess referred. I think its members belong to the party of what are called the Young Democrats in the Persia of to-day. They have our sympathy and support because, grave as are the difficulties of Governments here, believe me, my Lords, they are not to be compared, as any of your Lordships with Eastern experience will know, with those that arise in Eastern countries in a state of internal convulsion and weakness as a result of war. They have our earnest sympathy in their endeavours, but it rests with them to determine the orbit in which Persia desires that she shall henceforward move. If they desire the faithful execution of the Anglo-Persian Agreement they may rely upon us to play our part; but if they prefer to pursue their own course and to trust to their own resources, we cannot place any obstacle in their path. The responsibility will be theirs and not ours.
I hope that in these remarks I have at any rate convinced your Lordships that in our Persian policy there has been no element whatsoever of wild and reckless adventure such as has sometimes been ascribed to us. On the contrary there has been a deliberate and carefully-thought-out plan, in a position of constant and kaleidoscopic change, to solve the Persian problem in a manner consistent, not so much with British interests—though naturally we have not forgotten them—as with the continued national existence and independence of Persia herself. I do not grudge the responsibilities that have been entailed and the heavy expenditure that has been incurred by this country if, in the chaos that menaces the whole of the Eastern world, we can enable a single Mahomedan State of great traditions and possessing 291 a long and friendly connection with Great Britain to maintain its integrity, its frontiers, and its independence. But, my Lords, it must be a. two-sided and not a one-sided obligation, and if Persia is unable or unwilling to play her part we cannot out of mere altruism indefinitely continue ours. It is in fact for Persia herself, always with our help and assistance, to decide her own destiny.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, I have no desire to detain the House, but I do not like to let the debate close without thanking the noble Earl for the very full and lucid statement which he has made in reply to my Question. I can assure him that we are most grateful for the pains he has taken to cover the whole ground; and I think I may say that, generally speaking, what he has said will be taken as reassuring by many of those who, from ignorance of the facts and of all the circumstances, have felt some doubt as to the action of His Majesty's Government in this matter. Perhaps I may say that it seemed to me that the noble Earl made out a thoroughly strong case in favour of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, but I thought that he regarded with some anxiety the prospects of that Agreement in the Persian Assembly. I sincerely hope that when that body meets it will give to this contract friendly consideration, even if there may be criticism on some minor points such as those which the noble Earl has mentioned. What I venture to hope is, assuming some difficulties are made and certain points which the noble Earl and the Government flay consider material are the subject of 292 comment and possibly of objection, that His Majesty's Government will not be too prompt to close the discussion altogether, but will endeavour to persuade the Persian Government to carry on negotiations, to suggest modifications, and to arrive if possible at some definite conclusion. For us to break off altogether with Persia on the ground of even material objections to this particular Agreement and to wash our hands of the affair altogether and say, "You must look after yourselves," might have the effect, one would fear, of driving Persia into the arms of some of her least desirable advisers. I hope, therefore, that the noble Earl will exercise the patience which the occasion may demand in pursuance of those objects which we were so glad to hear him categorically state, namely, the maintenance, by our advice and where necessary by material asistance in money, of the independence and the integrity of Persia.
§ [From Minutes of November 15.]