§ LORD SYDENHAM rose to call attention to the Papers regarding hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether the text or the purport of the letter "handed to the Afghan delegate" by Sir H. Grant on the 9th August had been previously seen and approved by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, I fully deserved the correction which the noble Earl the Leader of the House administered to me last week, because I neglected to ascertain whether any Papers in connection with the Afghanistan question had already been laid on the Table of the House. I have since had an opportunity of studying the Papers which have been laid, and I find the information in them distinctly inadequate, and in some respects very disturbing. The Proclamation of the Viceroy to the Afghan people is not included, nor is there any hint of what actually passed at the Rawal Pindi Conference, although the Indian newspapers were able to publish the opening address of our representative and the very insolent reply of the Afghan delegate. Among the sixty-seven documents there are only four communications from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, and only two are of importance. Of these, there is one which approves the selection of our representatives at the Conference, and most wisely makes the suggestion that a military officer should be added as adviser. I do not know whether that suggestion was ever carried out, though I think it was most excellent. The other 143 conveys the approval of the letter written by the Viceroy to the Amir in connection with the Conference, and again there is wisely appended the addition of the words "His Majesty's Government will not allow any modification of the Armistice terms."
§
I can find no indication that His Majesty's Government transmitted any expression of their wishes in regard to the terms of peace, or even that the terms of peace were submitted to them before being finally agreed, and that is my reason for raising this question to-day. No one can be more opposed than I am to undue interference with the Government of India, but in such a vital matter as the Treaty with Afghanistan it is clear that the view of His Majesty's Government must prevail. This is not only a question for the India Office; it is also quite as much a question for the Foreign Office. In these Papers I find much interesting and illuminating information, and there are one or two points which I wish to bring to your Lordships' attention. In the first place there was full warning that the Amir intended, as soon as he could, to get rid of all supervision over his foreign relations. In a most flamboyant Proclamation which he issued to his people the Amir said this—
It is the eternal will of the unchangeable Creator—exalted be His glory—that all hardships and oppression may be removed from the heads of your nation, and that Afghanistan may be protected from the mischief of enemies of the faith and of this country. O Nation with a nice sense of honour. O brave Army.
He then declared that it was his intention that—
the Government of Afghanistan should be internally and externally free—that is to say, that all rights of government that are possessed by other independent Powers of the world should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan.
Further than that, the Secretary of State received on April 25 the following telegram from the Viceroy—
British Agent at Kabul reports: 'In Durbar held 13th April Amir made speech in which he declared Afghanistan free internally and externally, and he personally made this fact known to me particularly. He has appointed a certain Muhammed Wali Khan as Afghan Safir to Bokara; latter is about to leave. Am informed by reliable sources that question of appointment of Safir to Persia is under consideration.'
When, in May, it became quite clear that the Amir meant wantonly to attack us there was strong reason to believe that his action was inspired from enemy sources,
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and that his object was directed to shaking himself free from the obligations imposed upon his father.
§ Your Lordships will remember that the imposition of the restrictions upon the foreign affairs of Afghanistan was enforced after the war of 1879–80 and the deposition of Shere Ali, which was caused by his reception of a Russian mission at Kabul. I think I am right in saying that the subsidy was not connected with this condition, but was granted in order that Abdur Rahman might be able to consolidate his position as Ruler. That subsidy has been going on ever since, and was increased in 1893, but latterly it has not been drawn by Habibulla Khan, because he wished it to be understood probably that he could draw on the Government of India whenever he liked and was not therefore the recipient of a dole; or it may be he thought he would like to have a reserve fund, in case he found himself in difficulties and was obliged to quit his kingdom.
§ Now I come to the Treaty which was signed at Rawal Pindi, more than 100 miles inside the frontier of India. There were good reasons why the Treaty with Germany should not be signed on German territory, but it is not easy to see why the Afghan Treaty should not have been negotiated and signed on Afghan territory, say, at Jallalabad. In the East such things never pass unnoticed. But that is not the whole of the story, as previous to the negotiation of the Treaty the Afghans had violated the terms of the Armistice; and from information published this morning it appears that during the negotiations at Rawal Pindi and since the Afghans were actually occupying Wane, well within our border. I sincerely hope that that information is false, because it will be remembered that in the Papers it is stated that the Viceroy expressly declared that no negotiations would take place while a single Afghan soldier remained on British territory.
§
On August 9 the Viceroy repeated to the Secretary of State a telegram in which Sir Hamilton Grant reported the full text of the Treaty. There are five articles ill that Treaty, the substance of which was lucidly explained by the noble Earl last week. He also said at that time that "only the first stage in these proceedings had so far been enacted." Article 4 lays down that—
The British Government is desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so
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long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are, on their part, sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan Mission after six months for the discussion and amicable settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis.
I am afraid that the recent actions of the Amir do not hold out much hope of that happy state of things being brought about.
§ As early as May 23 the Viceroy reported that the Amir had sent a "subservient" letter to "the honoured President of the Russian Republic," saying that in raising the Standard of Bolshevism Russia had earned the gratitude of the whole world. There is also an ominous request for a pamphlet on Bolshevism in the Koran promised by Barakatullah, a notorious Indian conspirator, at one time professor at the University at Tokio and subsequently a prominent member of the very dangerous Ghadr Party in San Francisco. This man accompanied a party of Germans and Austrians who arrived at Kabul in 1916, and I believe has been there ever since. From this Paper it appears that 100,000 copies of his pamphlet, translated into Persian and Hindustani, were ordered for distribution. It was also stated at the same time that the Amir had written, but not then sent, letters to Japan, Turkey, France, and the United States; and in less than three months since the signing of the Treaty the Amir has sent an embassy to the Bolshevist Government at Moscow, and emissaries to stir up trouble in Turkestan. Therefore it looks as if Afghanistan might become a dangerous focus of Bolshevist propaganda in the East, and that will add to our troubles in India.
§ The North-west frontier was never so disturbed as it is at this moment since the great tribal war of 1897. As we heard lately the Mahsud Waziris are on the warpath, and it is certainly open to belief that the Amir has deliberately stirred them up to action; but I ought, in justice to the Amir, to point out that the Treaty lays no obligation whatever upon him not to tamper with the tribes, although such a provision was inserted in the terms of the Armistice. As the noble Earl stated the other day, Article 2 withdraws the permission to import arms through India into Afghanistan, but as there are now manufactories 146 of small arms and machine guns in Kabul itself, and as there must be a large quantity of arms available from other sources, I do not think that this Article is of much value to us.
§
The Treaty having been signed on August 8, and communicated to the Secretary of State on August 9, a second telegram was sent to the Viceroy on the same day. I am afraid that I must read that telegram because it is really of first-class importance. The telegram is as follows:—
My telegram of to-day. Sir H. Grant reports that after signature of Peace Treaty he handed Afghan delegate following letter: 'You asked me for some further assurance that the Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan in external or internal matters. My friend, if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care you will see that there is in it no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me that the Government of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla Khan, agreed to follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain in matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan—without reserve. I have therefore, refrained from pressing this matter of which the Treaty of Peace contains no mention. By the said Treaty and this letter, therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been cancelled by this war.'
At that point, my Lords, the White Paper stops abruptly. I think that your Lordships will feel that some further information is required. You will also note that the telegram which I have quoted is merely a repetition from the Viceroy of a report from Sir Hamilton Grant, and there is really nothing to show the authorship of this most important letter, or whether the terms received the previous sanction either of the Government of India or of His Majesty's Government.
§ It may be that this concession which was demanded by the Amir three months earlier was inevitable. I do not know whether that is the case or not, but it is surely very unfortunate from the point of view of our whole position in the East; and as unfortunate in my humble opinion is the fact that we took no guarantees, such as the occupation of Dakka or Jellalabad, for the execution of the terms of this Treaty. I fear it is now clear that the Afghans are widely proclaiming that they were victorious in the campaign which they forced upon us after a peace of nearly forty years. From what I hear from India, 147 it seems that they are also boasting that they have obtained an amnesty for the tribesmen on our frontier. From this White Paper it may well be inferred that the fateful letter which I have quoted was drafted by Sir Hamilton Grant alone, and that seems to me quite impossible. Therefore I think it would be very undesirable that such an impression should ever prevail. On February 16, 1908, the noble Earl the Leader of this House made a most powerful speech in condemnation of the five Afghan articles in the Anglo-Russian Convention. From that speech I am encouraged to think that he will not entirely disagree with what I have attempted to say this evening, and I hope that your Lordships will think that the grave importance of these matters justifies me in raising them again to-day with the knowledge I now possess and the knowledge that I ought to have possessed last week.
§ LORD ISLINGTONMy Lords, I would like to ask the indulgence of your Lordships' House while I make a few observations in connection with the Question asked by my noble friend Lord Sydenham, with which I desire closely to associate myself. I feel that Lord Sydenham is fully justified in raising a second debate on this matter; indeed, I think it is one of such vital importance that in doing so he is rendering a great public service. Last week he spoke under the disadvantage of not having had the opportunity of perusing the White Paper. I must myself plead guilty to a similar omission. But having now read this Paper I share with him curiosity mingled with apprehension both in regard to the contents of that Paper and in regard to some of those points which were not fully dealt with last week by the noble Earl who leads the House, and also in regard to the information that I, along with your Lordships, have been able to derive from the public Press.
No one conversant to any degree with the Indian frontier and its ever-present dangers to the security of India can regard a vital change in the Treaty arrangement between Great Britain and Afghanistan with anything other than the deepest possible concern. No one who has read carefully the White Paper can do so, I think, without entertaining in his mind a certain sense of humiliation coupled with deep apprehension for the future of that Territory. By a series of treaties in the 148 past with former Rulers of Afghanistan, whilst we have instituted and ensured for Afghanistan its integrity and internal independence, we have at the same time necessarily for our own security claimed certain specified conditions which control the external policy of that country with foreign Powers. This proviso originated when we placed Abdur Rahman on the Throne close on forty years ago. This undertaking was loyally complied with by him during his reign, and equally loyally complied with by his successor, Habibulla, during his reign until his unfortunate assassination last year. The British Government was obliged to enter into this undertaking, and it did so in no arbitrary or tyrannical spirit, but solely in the cause of Indian defence and security. This was recognised and accepted by those two great Rulers of Afghanistan all through the period of their reign. The geographical position of Afghanistan, the peculiar condition of its people, the condition also of temperament and character of the varying and diverse frontier tribes which lie between Afghanistan and our frontier of India, one and all constitute an imperative necessity on our part to make sure, as far as a Treaty could do so, not only that Afghanistan should remain quiescent and peacefully inclined to us, but also that outside and hostile Powers should be precluded from entering into alliance with that country with the object of stirring up aggression with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes against our borders and so threatening the security of India. It was for these reasons that this Treaty was instituted, and, as I say, loyally abided by. No one, I think, has been a more prominent or consistent advocate of that policy than my noble friend who leads this House. No one knows the dangers that may arise by a weakening of that policy better than he does. It has been a settled policy, accepted and loyally adhered to for a period—and a very crucial period—of upwards of thirty-five years, and owing to its existence it has been instrumental in evading a great war with Russia in the past and has maintained for us in their entirety during that period our borders free from outside aggression.
What do we find now by a perusal of the White Paper? First, we read in a serial story of the unwarranted attack and invasion of our territory by the new Ruler of Afghanistan—a war entered into by him unprovoked, without the slightest excuse of 149 premeditated or aggressive action on our part. And we go on in that Paper to read how with promptitude this invasion was dealt with by our troops—dealt with in such a way that it resulted in a very few weeks in the Amir suing to the Viceroy and the Government of India for an armistice. The White Paper then goes on to describe in a series of letters from Amanulla, the present Amir, to the Viceroy—letters which may be characterised as both offensive and impudent in the extreme—how the Amir attempted to haggle over the terms laid down for the armistice.
Those letters are replete in every line with a tissue of misrepresentations to baulk and to evade compliance with the terms of the armistice. To read those letters, without knowing the facts of the case, one might almost believe that we had been the offenders and that the Amir and Afghanistan had been the victors. The replies by the Viceroy exhibit a tolerance and forbearance which, I think, are hardly compatible with the circumstances under which the Amir sued to the British Government for an armistice. And, finally, we read the agreement which is come to, that delegates from the respective countries should meet to consider the terms of peace at Rawal Pindi, and of the meeting of these delegates at that place resulting, as it does, in the Treaty described by my noble friend and appearing in the White Paper in Paragraph 66, consisting of five articles. I agree with my noble friend that Article 2, which withdraws the privilege enjoyed by the Amir of importing arms, ammunition, and warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan will, in view of the subsequent part of the Treaty which I will allude to in a moment, be of very little avail.
I will not delay your Lordships by dealing with these Articles in the Treaty. I will come to Paragraph 67 in the White Paper which appears at the end as a kind of afterthought, and is the letter which has been read by my noble friend by Sir Hamilton Grant, and handed to the Afghan delegates. In this letter clear information is given to the Amir of Afghanistan that the abrogation of all former treaties is to be undertaken on the part of the British Government, and emphasis is laid on the complete liberty in external policy for that country which is to be granted by the British Government in the future. There is nothing in the White Paper to indicate that this very important decision is a 150 definite decision by His Majesty's Government. One is almost led to suppose that it cannot be so because, if your Lordships will read on page 34, you will see that the arrangements for the armistice were referred home and were assented to by the Government, coupled with an important amendment which was embodied in those terms.
What my noble friend asks in his Question is—Was this Peace Treaty, and more especially this addendum to the Peace Treaty by Sir Hamilton Grant, the considered decision of the Cabinet and a definite instruction from home, or was it a decision come to in India without the sanction of His Majesty's Government? A matter of this extreme gravity fraught with potential trouble in the future deserves, I think, an explicit reply and explanation by His Majesty's Government. If our arms had suffered serious reverse in this war, or even defeat, I can hardly imagine terms entered into or extracted of a more subversive character to our interests and security in India in the future, especially in the times in which we are living now, than those which have been laid down in this addendum under No. 66 of the White Paper. I think, indeed, that a strong case must be made by His Majesty's Government for having come to such a decision and for having cancelled so settled an undertaking between Afghanistan and Great Britain as that which is indicated in this addendum.
It was said by my noble friend last week that freedom for external relations must now be established to comply with the doctrine of self-determination. How can the cancellation of an undertaking of this character coincide with the principles which underlie the League of Nations? The principles of the League of Nations are, by the common assent of all countries, to use every endeavour and to take all possible steps to ensure peace throughout the world. How can you expect peace with a Ruler of this temperament as he has shown himself in these past months, free to ally himself with any and all of those various exasperated enemies of Great Britain that are to be found throughout the Far East to-day? How can you hope for centres on our borders such as Kabul, Guzni, and Kandahar to remain peaceful influences with the western gate of Afghanistan open to the intrusion of all those enemies who will be only too glad to take advantage of the temperament of a hostile Ruler to 151 introduce intrigue and conflict on our borders?
At least I should like to hear from my noble friend when he replies to this Question that some provision has been made which has not been indicated in this Paper to secure our position against these possible and probable hostile elements finding their way to those strategic centres upon our borders, some provision to ensure at any rate warning and preparation for our people who are guarding that most vulnerable and important border of India. I will not say more except to repeat that this Treaty with the addendum is to my mind one of very grave importance; it is one in regard to which I cannot help feeling the deepest apprehension, and I think my noble friend has been fully justified in raising the question and in asking His Majesty's Government to tell him and the public the reasons which led them to conceive this most important undertaking in regard to our relations with Afghanistan.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL CURZON OF KKDLESTON)My Lords, under cover of a Question which is in itself confined to a definite and a narrow issue, my noble friend Lord Sydenham has favoured your Lordships' House with his views upon the case in its more general aspect, and has told us what he thinks about the arrangement that has been come to between the Government of India and Afghanistan. I do not for one moment complain of my noble friend for doing so, partly because it is the immemorial custom in this House to make a Question on a narrow issue the peg upon which to hang a speech of a larger and more important character; and partly because, owing to the mischance that happened the other day, we did not then have the advantage of hearing the views of my noble friend upon a point on which he is so well qualified to advise us. He has stated those views this afternoon with the moderation and the force which we always associate with his deliveries in this House. He has been followed by my noble friend Lord Islington who also has dealt with the larger rather than with the narrower issue, and whose language about the agreement I think I do not exaggerate if I say has indicated a spirit of almost unbroken condemnation. The noble Lord is entitled to hold and to express those opinions; I only regret that he has not found a more favourable opportunity 152 for doing so. A House which consists of certainly not more than twelve persons is hardly the place in which to arraign, even with the authority of my noble friend, the policy of His Majesty's Government; nor, again, does it provide a fitting opportunity for the spokesman of the Government to reply. As a matter of fact I did make a speech of considerable, perhaps undue, length upon the matter a week ago, and it was not my fault that the two noble Lords who have taken part in this discussion had unfortunately not seen the Papers upon which they were anxious to comment. I saw that I was on that occasion, perhaps deservedly, censured in the newspapers for taking the matter with undue seriousness and for occupying too much of your Lordships' time. I really cannot consent, therefore, having made a speech of some length upon the subject last week, either to repeat it or to make another now. If at any time any noble Lord—the noble Lord, for instance, who has just sat down—desires on a serious occasion and in a House better qualified by its numbers to listen to him, to raise the question, I shall be happy to meet him. All I can attempt to do to-night is to answer the Question on the Paper and to deal with one or two points which were mentioned incidentally by the two noble Lords who have preceded me.
The noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, asked why the Viceroy's Proclamation was not included in the Papers. There was no reason whatever why it should not have been. Had the importance been attached to it here which the noble Lord has done, it certainly would have been included. Perhaps it ought to have been included, but it was not a matter to which we at this end attached any particular moment. The next point he made was this—I think I dealt with it last week—that the Papers as circulated did not contain any account of what passed at Rawal Pindi between the delegates of the Government of India and the Afghan representatives. Quite true; and no one knows better than my noble friend how undesirable, and indeed impossible, it would be in the East any more than in the West (because the same conditions prevail here) to relate stage by stage what passes in a discussion between two parties who are desiring to come to a peace agreement. I certainly could not subscribe to the doctrine that either now or at any time in the future should we 153 hold ourselves bound to disclose to the public the details from day to day of those negotiations as they went along. Similarly my noble friend pointed out—again with truth—that the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy's Government has, with rare exceptions, not been included. I think I gave the answer to that a week ago, and it is this—that we regard this matter, so far as it has at present gone, as only the first stage in a business that is not yet completed. The matter has to be resumed at a later date. In what form it will be resumed, whether at the end of the six months or later, it is as yet too early to predict; but I think it is most undesirable, and will probably have a most deleterious effect upon the negotiations when they are resumed, if at this stage we lay correspondence upon the Table between the Government here and the Government of India dealing with all the shades of opinion expressed—possibly differences of opinion—which will be fastened upon by the Amir and the Afghan Government for reasons of their own.
Another point was made by Lord Sydenham. He asked why was the Treaty signed at Rawal Pindi; why did not we go to Jellalabad or to Dacca and sign it there? To go to Jellalabad would have involved military operations of a very serious character; and they would have had consequences that would not have been confined to the signature of this Treaty alone, but might have compelled us to take over the Government of Afghanistan. Be it remembered that it was the Amir who sued for the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of terms, and it was his proposal that the meeting should take place at Landi Kotal or at Peshawar. The Viceroy replied—I think with justice—that he must insist on the negotiations taking place at Rawal Pindi; and if you ask why I say "with justice," I reply that I use the words for two reasons. In the first place, I think it marked the position assumed and the victory claimed by the Government of India much more strongly to insist on your opponent coming to you and receiving the terms that you laid down to him in your own territory than that you should go to his territory. Secondly, speaking from my own experience I recall so well in my last year in India the extreme difficulty and inconvenience that arose from supervising the operations of a Mission in Afghanistan itself. The Dane Mission went to Kabul to conclude the last 154 Treaty with Amir Habibulla Khan, and I remember the many delays which resulted from the effort to communicate with our representative, very often days elapsing before we could get a reply. At Pindi, where the negotiations took place in immediate telegraphic contact with the Government of India and therefore with the Government at home, the inconveniences were reduced to a minimum. I think my noble friend is wrong, if he will allow me to say so, in attributing to the selection of that place the particular character that he did.
My noble friend Lord Islington made a point which, I think, is historically not quite accurate. He was pointing a contrast between the present position under which, by virtue of the concluding document in this White Paper, we have ceased to exercise control over the external relations of Afghanistan, for reasons and in circumstances which I explained a week ago, and he said, "What a contradiction of the old system when you had Sovereigns (Amir Habibulla Khan, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan) perfectly loyal to their obligations, faithfully observing the terms of their engagements." Surely the noble Lord, from his connection with the India Office, knows that that was not altogether the case as to what has passed in days gone by in the external relations of the Amir. Do remember this—that that control was acquired, and was retained, by us in the main as a protection against Russia. No one will dispute that that was the menace that was feared, and it was the fact that Russia—a powerful, aggressive, and imperialistic force on the other side—threatened Afghanistan that compelled us to assume the conduct of the external relations of that country. Now, equally, no one can deny that that danger has, at any rate for the present, disappeared, and that, even if Russia be revived, it is not likely to be revived in a form, at any rate not within the lifetime of any of us, that is likely to be as menacing to India or its safety as was the former Russian menace.
As regards the loyal adherence to their obligations of the two previous Amirs, is not my noble friend aware that our engagements did not prevent the Amirs Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibulla Khan from being in constant communication with Russian officials? Is he not aware that during the recent war deputations 155 both from Germany and from Turkey arrived at Kabul and were entertained by the late Amir, whose loyalty he eulogised not undeservedly? Is he not aware that Amir Habibulla Khan concluded a Treaty with the Germans?—very likely with his tongue in his cheek (I am quite prepared to believe that) but he did conclude a Treaty with them. Therefore it comes to this—in the first place, that your engagements, to which we are told the Sovereigns remained so loyal, did not prevent subterranean communications from going on; and, in the second place, that your safety lay, not in the terms of your Treaty nor even in the actual technical fidelity with which they were or were not observed, but lay in your confidence in the loyalty of the man. That was our strength with Habibulla Khan, and when he received the Germans and the Turks no one was less disturbed that my noble friend because in the last resort he believed that Habibulla Khan was on the right side, as he was. Believe me, it is the personal equation, much more than the written word, that counts in these cases. Do not let my noble friend be too ready to assume that we have gone from a good state of affairs to a bad state of affairs before these negotiations reach a further stage and we are told what is to succeed the status quo ante.
The only other point which remains for me to deal with is the Question on the Paper. That I can answer in a sentence. The letter of Sir Hamilton Grant, which is printed last in the Paper, and which no doubt was composed by him in the first place, was previously seen and approved by the Government of India and was telegraphed by them to the Secretary of State in this country for sanction. His Majesty's Government, deferring to the urgent representation of the Government of India that an assurance to the Afghans such as that contained in the letter was essential to the conclusion of Peace negotiations, and having regard to the conditions of the Treaty itself, explained by me last week, decided not to withhold their assent.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, after what has fallen from the noble Earl who leads the House I have no desire to enter at any length into this important subject. He has not exactly complained, but he has explained how it has come about that the debate on this subject has assumed a curious and piecemeal character, owing 156 to the fact that my noble friend on the cross benches, Lord Sydenham, had not, on the occasion when he raised the matter before, seen the White Paper which has been the main subject of discussion to-day. I so far sympathise with the noble Lord that I was in the same position. I also had not seen that White Paper, and I cannot help observing this—that in view of the fact (as I think I am correct in saying) that the Paper appeared on the pink document which reached us with the Parliamentary Papers just about the time of the adjournment of the House for the summer holidays, I think it is somewhat unfortunate that this particular Paper was not rather more seriously treated and circulated as a matter of course to your Lordships, instead of being only placed on the list of those which can be procured if desired—placed in the same category, in fact, as some of the minor Papers regarding food production and kindred subjects.
As regards the character of the debate, the noble Earl has suggested that at some future time it may be desirable to have a discussion of a more full dress character, to be, we hope, attended by more than a dozen members of your Lordships' House in view of the gravity of the subject. I have no doubt that my noble friend on the cross benches will consider at some future time whether it will be wise to raise a discussion in a more formal way, or some other member of the House may desire to do so. It is, therefore, I think perhaps slightly unfortunate that the whole business has not been more categorically considered than has been possible in this two days discussion, in view of the important individual speeches which have been made.
The main point of the noble Earl's contention, as I understand, is that it is undesirable, if not impossible, to enter into close detail regarding these negotiations, because the negotiations can only be regarded as the first stage in a series which is to be continued and concluded later on. Even agreeing or admitting that that is so, the noble Lords who have raised this question have, I think, the right to ask whether, up to the point which has already been reached, anything has been done to compromise those further discussions so as to place India and this country in a disadvantageous position when the future negotiations proceed. I gather from the noble Earl that he does not think that is so, and that at any rate no harm has been done. But Lord 157 Sydenham and Lord Islington take the view that British interests have been somewhat seriously compromised already by the concessions that have been made in the letter of Sir Hamilton Grant which has been read.
On the particular point of the place where the first negotiations were held, I think the noble Earl made a good defence for the selection of Rawal Pindi for that purpose. It seemed to me that the arguments he used—facility of communication as compared with any place within the Afghan border which could have been chosen—carry weight, and that the Viceroy was presumably right in making the selection he did. The matter is, of course, one of convenience on the one hand and prestige on the other; and if the Government of India think that their prestige in no way suffered by the selection of an important military post like Rawal Pindi for that purpose, I should not be prepared to dispute their opinion.
On the matter of external relations, regarding which I think it must be admitted that the announcement that they are to be no longer regarded as a special concern of the British Empire came as something of a cold douche to a great many people, the noble Earl again put up a bold defence. I take it that it comes to this, that control over those relations is not worth maintaining, for two reasons. In the first place, because the "Russian thunder cloud," which used to hang so threateningly over the North-West Frontier may be said to have entirely dissipated so far as any one can foresee, owing to the change of Government in Russia and presumed changes of policy; and, in the second place, because really, in fact, you could not maintain the alleged control, and it was not possible to prevent active negotiations taking place and agreements being arrived at between the Rulers of Afghanistan and foreign, and possible hostile, countries.
I confess that this does not seem to me to be a complete answer. I do not think it necessarily follows that a rule or law ought to be abrogated because in some cases it may be evaded or disobeyed. When this matter is discussed again we shall expect some further reasons from His Majesty's Government, and in particular from the Government of India, as to why it has been thought wise or necessary to depart from a practice which cannot, I conceive, 158 be considered, during the last two reigns of friendly Afghan Sovereigns, to have conferred any disability or serious deprivation of power upon Afghanistan. There may be further reasons in addition to those which the noble Earl has mentioned, and we should all desire, I am sure, to suspend our judgment on the subject pending further discussion; but I cannot pretend that my mind is entirely satisfied by the explanation of the noble Earl. I hope therefore, with him, that the whole subject will be more fully and formally discussed at some future and not very distant date.
§ LORD SYDENHAMMy Lords, may I say, in defence of my suggestion that Dakka should have been the place of negotiating, that there is now a good motor road to Landi Kotal, and that Dakka is not so inaccessible as it used to be.