Lords Sitting of 4 November 1919

Preamble
The House met at a quarter past four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.

HOUSE OF COMMONS AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (QUALIFICATION OF CLERGYMEN) BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD CHARNWOOD: My Lords, in my opinion the part of this Bill to which any large practical importance attaches is Clause 2. This clause proposes to remove the disqualification by which at present ministers of religion generally are debarred from serving on the councils of ordinary boroughs, though they are allowed to serve on the councils of county boroughs, metropolitan boroughs, and a number of other local government bodies. On that part of the Bill I am not without hope that your Lordships will unanimously agree with me.
But I have thought it right to include in Clause 1 of this Bill the removal of the disqualification which now debars persons in Holy Orders, whether in England or Ireland, and ministers of the Established Church of Scotland, from sitting in the House of Commons. That is a matter which would not be likely to affect a very large number of individuals; nevertheless, it raises a far more difficult point than that which arises with regard to the municipalities. Perhaps your Lordships will allow me to state what is the actual position of the law in this matter and its history, so far as I understand it. The original disqualification of clergymen from being members of the House of Commons did not rest, it is evident, upon any idea that that position was incompatible with their spiritual functions. That is evident, because Bishops are and always have been members of your Lordships' House; and not only that, but there are other members of this House who happen to be in Holy Orders and sit here.
The reason why the clergy were not allowed to sit in the House of Commons was simply that the House of Commons was not their taxing assembly. The
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clergy taxed themselves through their own assembly of Convocation. At the time of the Restoration that arrangement lapsed—I am not precisely aware how, because there was no Statute on the subject—but from the time of the Restoration owards, Convocation has not taxed the clergy and Parliament has done so. It does not seem to have occurred to any one at the time that with that change the reason for disqualifying clergymen for seats in the House of Commons fell to the ground; and though I am told that in the course of the eighteenth century one or two clergymen did sit in the House of Commons without objection being made, yet it would be conceivable from the law that they were debarred from doing so.
Eventually in 1801 the matter was settled by Parliament when the Rev. John Horne Tooke, a learned but turbulent person, was returned for the celebrated borough of Old Sarum. Objections were raised to his taking his seat, and after several discussions an Act was passed declaring that it was the existing law that clerks in Holy Orders were disqualified, and providing means by which the law could be enforced. The discussions on that occasion were not very important. There was no consideration of whether it was a desirable thing in itself that clergymen should be excluded from the House of Commons. The ground was simply taken that the existing Constitution ought not at that time to be tampered with, and Mr. Horne Tooke did not take any very wide ground of principle in opposing this measure against himself. His case was that for practical purposes he had long ceased to be a clergyman. He had obeyed his father in taking Orders, and since then had obeyed nobody else. And, in his own phrase, he pleaded that thirty years of quarantine were a sufficient guard against the infection of his original character as a clergyman. He proceeded further in the debate to give various illustrations, as I take them to have been, of the efficacy of the way in which he had been disinfected of that taint, as I think he would have regarded it. And he concluded his last speech on the subject by drawing the attention of the House of Commons (with what relevancy I cannot conceive) to the interesting question of the celebrated swine of Gadara, entering at some length On a computation, derived from some divine, as to the probable number of devils which had entered into each individual swine,

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the resulting number, I think, being between 1½ and 1¾ devils per pig. So the discussion on his part of the case against the Bill was one of mere frivolity and amusement.
I shall not say a word further about those discussions or the origin of the matter, because I do not think that the considerations which appealed to Parliament then would appeal to us very forcibly now. And were it simply a question of general principle I should rather expect your Lordships to agree with me that a clerk in Holy Orders or a minister of the Church of Scotland should not, as such, be debarred from entering the house of Commons if he could find a constituency, any more than any other class of British citizen. But there is, of course, this practical difficulty. A great number of clergymen have, of course, benefices with duties attached, but they are not in a position comparable to officers in the Army who on active service are debarred, I suppose, from sitting and voting here—at least some are—because their position is something like that of a freehold with duties annexed to it, and there is under the present system, I suppose, no ecclesiastical authority (I speak under correction) which can adequately compel a beneficed clergyman to attend to the duties of his cure. That is a practical difficulty in this matter. I will return to it in a moment.
I would first remind your Lordships that there are a good many clergymen who do not come under any such category, who, in fact, are not engaged in parochial work at all, whether as beneficed clergy or as curates. There are, to begin with, the clergy of the now disestablished Church of Ireland who remain under this disqualification. There are also a good many clergymen of distinction who, through ill-health or some other accidental cause, at some period of their lives have been led to relinquish their parochial duties for some years, with the result of not returning to them, who still desire—and why should they not?—to exercise the office of a clergyman in public worship and in preaching, and who, are debarred from entering Parliament should they wish to, unless they first take the, to my mind, most repugnant step of divesting themselves of Holy Orders. There are also men like secretaries, often in Holy Orders, of important religious and philanthropic societies; and, finally, there is that extremely large class of clergyman
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whose ordinary professional duties are not parochial at all, but are those of schoolmasters or teachers of some sort. There are, in short, a great many clergymen to whom the objection to which I have referred does not apply.
I understand that a certain number of these gentlemen feel that it is an unfair inequality cast upon their profession that they should as such be debarred from being Members of Parliament; and in principle, without putting the importance of the matter too high, I must say my sympathies go very heartily with them. To my mind there is something repugnant in anything which in principle unnecessarily marks off the clergyman as a man apart. There is a sentence in a letter of Wordsworth's in which he protests that it is a very mistaken idea that, in order to spiritualise the clergy, you should in some way dehumanise them. I object very much, simply as a matter of principle and of sentiment, to anything which in any way might seem to mark the clergyman as being in some way less than a man. Therefore on grounds of general principle the proposal that Holy Orders should not in themselves be a bar to election appeals to me strongly, and I had no hesitation, at the request of a number of clergymen, in including the first Clause in this Bill.
Now briefly as to the position of the beneficed clergy. When I introduced the Bill in the form in which it stands I must say I was inclined to think that the question would not arise. I do not think that a man who forsook his parish duties to become a candidate for Parliament would stand the remotest chance of being elected by any British constituency whatsoever. I understand, however, that the most rev. Primate, who will follow me, takes a different view, and thinks the point is one of some practical importance, and I need hardly say that I bow altogether to his authority. At this time, when we are all anxious to do everything possible to remove hindrances to the work of the Church of England and to remove even apparent scandals, I think it would hardly be right to put on the Statute Book legislation by which there would be the possibility that a man drawing his stipend and neglecting the spiritual interests of his parishioners should obtain a further stipend of £400 a year by mismanaging their temporal interests. That would be a scandal, and

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I should be willing to accept any Amendment which would shut out the actual holder of a benefice. At the same time I am not perfectly sure what the terms of such an Amendment would have to be. Therefore I would conclude this subject merely by saying that I hope your Lordships will allow this Bill to go into Committee, and I will undertake not to put it down till sufficiently late to allow the matter to be well considered by the most rev. Primate and other right rev. Prelates. I myself should hope that the Bill will emerge from the Committee retaining at any rate the principle that Holy Orders themselves should not be a bar to election.
By the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, not only Clerks in Holy Orders but the regular ministers of all dissenting congregations were debarred from serving as mayors or members of borough and city councils. I have not looked into the grounds for that legislation, nor do I think it matters; because, whatever the principle was, it has long since been abandoned. As I said, on ordinary county councils, on the London County Council, on county borough councils, on urban district councils, on rural district councils, on parish councils, on boards of guardians, and so forth, clergymen are free to serve, and are often very valuable members of those bodies. The right rev. prelate the Bishop of Birmingham, who had hoped to be here this afternoon but who I understand is delayed, was, as some of your Lordships remember, the mayor of a metropolitan borough; and instances occur to me of other distinguished clergymen who have served in that capacity in municipal work in London, or in county boroughs in the north, and who have now become deans, for example, of cathedral cities which are not county boroughs, and who consequently find themselves barred from putting their municipal experience at the service of their present local authorities.
These two or three cases may not sound a very great matter, but I want to remind your Lordships that there are in this country numbers of urban district councils which tend in the course of time to become, municipalities, and I think it is a matter of some importance that whenever those councils become incorporated any clergyman who happens to be on the municipality becomes excluded from it. Certainly in my part of the world there are
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a number of little boroughs and urban district councils in which it is of really practical importance to sound local government that the clergy should be eligible. In a great many of the towns to which I allude the only persons with a wide knowledge of the world—with the sort of knowledge that your Lordships, for instance, would bring to bear on local government—the only educated and disinterested gentlemen in point of fact concerned with sound municipal government, very often are the parsons of the places. In a large number of cases it is a distinct handicap to local government that these gentlemen are excluded from borough councils. On that point I shall expect the sympathy of your Lordships. As to the other matter I myself have a very open mind as to what should be done in Committee, and I do not desire the Committee stage to be taken unduly soon. In these circumstances I ask your Lordships to give the Bill a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Charnwood.)
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY: My Lords, we are all grateful, I am sure, to the noble Lord for the extremely clear and lucid way in which he has stated what are the facts with reference to both of the branches of the proposal he makes—namely, his suggestion that the clergy should no longer be debarred from sitting in the House of Commons, and that where they are now debarred from sitting on local authorities the bar should be removed. The noble Lord feels—I admire, respect, and agree with all that he says upon the subject—that there are strong reasons why the knowledge which the clergy inevitably and happily possess on a great mass of public affairs in this country should be made available as widely as possible with regard to the work of the Legislature and of local bodies. In that I entirely agree with him, though I myself do not feel that the proposal that he makes is one which would best conduce to that end.
There is a remarkable passage in the Life of Cardinal Manning. Towards the end of his life he made memoranda, subsequently published, as to the contrast or likeness between the position of the clergy of the Church of England and the position of the clergy of the Church of Rome in this country, and he draws an interesting

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distinction between them on this point. He says that the clergy of the Church of England are throughout their lives and from the nature of their work constantly abreast of public affairs and take an interest in them in a way which is not attempted or accomplished by the clergy of the Church of Rome. He adds, "It is to our disadvantage, and to the clear advantage and gain and credit of the clergy of the Church of England." That corresponds with what a totally different witness, Mr. Charles Booth, told us—namely, that there was no set of men from whom he obtained so much information, and who were able to give that information so readily and on so large a scale, as the clergy of the Church of England. Throughout my ecclesiastical public life I have endeavoured on every side to press on the clergy, and on the public too, the duty of the clergy to be thus abreast of what is happening in our public life, to bear their full share in it, and to keep themselves in every way in touch with the social and educational movements, and so on, going on in our parishes.
I mention this only lest it should be thought that when I criticise (as I do criticise) the proposal to remove the bar which keeps the clergy from the House of Commons, it is because I doubt whether their knowledge or their competence would be useful in many respects if they were actually in the House of Commons. I believe that no small part of the gain which the public gets from the knowledge that the clergy have of these affairs, no small part of the influence which the clergy can exercise in regard to social matters of this kind, is due to the fact that they are outside the ordinary rut of partisan controversy and political strife. If we once say that, with a view to entering the House of Commons, the parish priest is to become a candidate under this or that Party, to be a member of the organisation which is promoting this or that political partisanship, and, if elected, to find himself the victim of Party organisation, Party Whips, and the rest, he is finding himself also of necessity—supposing the duties of Parliament and of his Party to be physically compatible—placed in contradistinction with the side taken by some of his parishioners. I believe that the strength of the clergy lies in their interest in these matters being independent of the partisan organisation and arrangements which are essential for the due
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discharge of membership of the House of Commons.
The noble Lord has referred to two of the occasions upon which this subject has been discussed in Parliament during the last 120 years. He mentioned the debates which took place on what is called the Home Tooke matter in 1801, when this gentleman's case was discussed fully in Parliament, and an Act passed which for the first time as a specific Statute debarred the clergy from sitting in the House of Commons. I think that my noble friend did rather less than justice to the importance and interest of those debates. They are reported at quite exceptional length. The debates of that period and the speeches delivered by Lord Thurlow and others are extremely interesting. They are not the least interesting because of the extraordinary view that is expressed as compared with what people think to-day about people being in Orders at all. It was gravely argued at one time that what was called being ordained put a man in a peculiar position; that ordination was a mere ceremony and the man ordained stood in no different position from that of the man not ordained, in any respect whatever. There was a bluntness and straightforwardness in this attitude which reads curiously, not only in the light of what we think, but in the light of the debates which took place long afterwards.
Seventy years passed, and in 1870 the Bill (to which the noble Lord has alluded) was passed, by which clergy who no longer desired to continue to discharge the duties of their office could withdraw from that office altogether, and retire from the ministry. I am not saying at all what bearing that Act has ecclesiastically or canonically, or how far it is necessary that I should touch now on the view that could be fairly taken in Church law and canon law as to the ineffectiveness of such a withdrawal from Orders on the part of individuals. But, as regards the law of the land, it is clear that a man can, if he choose, set himself free from any of the obligations or disqualifications which lie upon him in consequence of his having been ordained. Not a few of those who have taken advantage of the Act did so because they had ceased altogether to hold the opinions which they held when they were ordained, because they had come to regard themselves as in no way qualified

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for the ministerial work which they desired to lay down—a work which some of them even treated with some scorn in the laying of it down. Men who have taken advantage, either on this ground or on others, of that Act have, of course, many times sat in the House of Commons. There has been, at any rate, one member of His Majesty's Government who was originally ordained. There are many other men, including Mr. Thorold Rogers, prominent in the House of Commons, who have been in Holy Orders to start with and who have taken advantage of the Act.
The debates which then took place are as different as possible from those of 1801, because then everybody admitted that to be in Holy Orders meant something quite different; that it was not a mere ceremony or outward form, but that it marked for the man ordained responsibilities and obligations which lay upon him in the most solemn sense and from which certainly he could not free himself without the very great care that the Act lays down. Ten years later an attempt was made to pass just such a Bill, as regards the House of Commons, as is now submitted by the noble Lord, and another debate took place in the House of Commons in 1881, in which Sir William Harcourt was prominent, and other speakers bore their part in it. To contrast the view then taken with that which had been taken eighty years before about the manner and character of ordination to the ministry is an instructive comment, and it is worth any one's while to look at it. This is not an appropriate place to dwell in detail on the subject.
I venture to think that the real answer to the proposal now made—and that proposal, of course, is that a man, while retaining the full obligations of the ministry to which he was ordained, shall be also able to sit in the House of Commons—is this. Let a man read the ordination service of the priests; let him see what is said there about the devotion of the man's life to the particular purpose for which he is set apart, the nature of the devotion, the way in which the thoughts of the whole man are to be given up to that man's work, what the work is to consist of, and how he is to carry it through; and then compare that with the position which lays upon him the ordinary obligation to sit day by day in the House of Commons, dealing with matters which I will not say are outside the very high moral responsibility, even the
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religious responsibility, that lies upon any man there, but are wholly outside a number of the characteristics to which at his ordination he devoted his life.
I cannot myself be a party to a measure which should invite and encourage clergymen to regard it as compatible with the purpose for which they had been originally ordained—a purpose which, presumably, they desire still to carry on—to accept a position in the House of Commons with its emoluments and the obligations which are there laid upon one. That is the view I take. While, as I shall show in a moment, I am entirely in favour of the second part of the Bill, I would go so far as to suggest that the whole of the first clause should be left out. I do not say that there is anything terrible in the thought of such a thing being made law. If it had been the law already, I am not prepared to say that I should have striven to get it removed now, but for us to take the step to-day to remove the disability which now lies on a man who is ordained, would to my mind be only justified if you could show that it was in response to a strong, persistent, legitimate and widespread demand.
When this kind of subject comes up I am generally the recipient of a very large correspondence from one side or the other from all parts of the kingdom. On this subject I have received one postcard. That is the sole communication which has reached me with regard to this Bill, except from my noble friend himself, who, with his accustomed courtesy, has kept me informed of all he wants to do. Only one postcard have I received, and I confess I should require to have some indication of a wider interest than that in the subject before I felt justified in doing something which, while its result would, I believe, be very small, would have the effect and the appearance of a sort of demonstration of a specific kind which I should feel to be unfortunate and contrary to the principles that I hold.
It may be said, either in this House or outside, "If you think that the clergy should not sit in the House of Commons or be elected thereto, what about the Bishops in the House of Lords?" That is a very easy argument to use. The two positions do not seem to me to be in the least degree parallel. I have spoken of reasons why I should specially object to plunge the clergy of our parishes into the controversial disputations which precede,

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accompany, and follow election to Parliament, or into positions in which they would find themselves if they were in Parliament. A Bishop does not submit himself to a constituency with an election address, taking one side or the other in the Parliamentary controversies of the day. Happily, he does not find himself tied to a party organisation of any kind, and, while it is an open question whether Bishops should sit in the House of Lords, it at all events does not really connect itself clearly—my noble friend did not in the least endeavour to connect it—with what he desires to bring about in the House of Commons. I am quite aware that it is an open question whether Bishops should sit here at all. If the question were ever discussed, I should have something to say about it, and I think I could show that there are some advantages in the Bishops having the seats which they have held even for a longer time than the predecessors of most of those who are temporal Peers in this House. But that is not in question to-day. All I am anxious to make clear is that I am not in the least blind to the possibility of raising that point, as a debating argument, outside the House rather than in it probably, about the proposal which the noble Lord has made, and that I am perfectly prepared to meet it by showing that the two things do not run on all fours in any degree at all.
On the whole, then, I am distinctly against the first clause of the Bill. I see no real demand for it. Looking at the matter historically I do not find that there has been any period when it has been really widely desired, and I believe that at this moment there is even less wish for it on the part of the clergy at large than there might have been a good many years ago. It is true to say that there are plenty of clergymen who have not their time fully occupied and that they might spend it much better in Parliament. That is an argument, however, for uniting our parishes (a policy I am in favour of) but it is not an argument for suggesting that they should join one Party or another in a candidature for the House of Commons and give up their time entirely to that duty. Presumably, if they were honest men, they would have to give up most of their time, to the detriment undoubtedly of their work in the smallest parishes— work to which they have been definitely and with great solemnity assigned.
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If the Bill is read a second time with my consent it will be because I hope that Clause 1 may be afterwards wholly omitted. As to Clause 2, I do not desire to see that omitted. It is by a kind of accident that persons in Holy Orders or regular ministers of dissenting congregations are disqualified from some municipal bodies. If you will go back to the debates on this question you will find that it is hardly possible to say there was any deliberate intention that they should be permanently barred; only in a kind of haphazard wav were they barred. There are certain offices which they can hold. They can sit as mayors of boroughs, and the right rev. Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham was for some years mayor of one of the London boroughs. The Principal of St. Mark's College, Chelsea, is Mayor of Chelsea. But there are some offices they cannot hold, and it is often a real loss that men possessing peculiar qualifications cannot at this moment take part in some of our local work. It is a disqualification which I believe arose accidentally, and which I think ought certainly to be removed. The objections I have spoken of in regard to Parliament do not apply in the least. They would be engaged in the local life and work of the parish and borough; would not be obliged to give up any of their parish work or belong to any political organisation. The objections, therefore, which stand across an efficient discharge of his parochial duties if he were a member of the House of Commons do not apply when a clerk in Holy Orders is a member of a municipal corporation, district council, or the rest. The second clause of the Bill seems to me to be of real value, while the first clause would be rather insignificant in its consequences. Not many clergymen would be elected. I do not think the best men would desire to stand, and we should not find a great accession of gain to the House of Commons by the few men who might possibly be elected.
If the noble Lord goes to a Second Reading I should be prepared to support the Motion on the clear understanding that Clause I will be deleted in Committee. I desire to thank the noble Lord again for the clear and considerate way in which he has put the whole matter before the House, and the readiness that he expressed to accept large modifications after he has heard what your Lordships may have to say on the Bill.
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT PEEL):My Lords, the object of Clause 1 of this Bill is to enable persons who have been ordained to the office of priest or deacon or are ministers of the Church of Scotland to be eligible to sit in the House of Commons. It repeals the House of Commons (Clergy Disqualification) Act, 1801, which now disqualifies them for being so elected. The argument of the most rev. Primate applied only to the Church of England. We have not heard any views yet as to the ministers of the Church of Scotland; and if this first clause is entirely deleted, obviously both Churches would be affected. My noble friend has reminded us that by the Clerical Disability Act, 1870, the disqualification imposed by the Act of 1801 ceased to apply when a person had relinquished in due form his office of priest or deacon in the Church of England.
The second clause of the Bill seeks to remove the disqualification now attaching to clerks in Holy Orders, and for this purpose it repeals Section 12 (1) (b) of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. That particular section provides that a person shall be disqualified for being elected to, or for being a councillor of, a municipal borough by reason of being in Holy Orders or a regular minister of a dissenting congregation. This applies also to aldermen. It is rather curious that there is no such similar disqualification for county councils, metropolitan borough councils, urban and rural district councils, boards of guardians, and parish councils. By subsection 2 of the Local Government Act, 1888, it is expressly provided that clerks in Holy Orders and other ministers of dissenting congregations shall not be disqualified for being elected as councillors. You really have three classes of persons—first, those who are deliberately disqualified from sitting on county councils; secondly, the other bodies as to which there is no disqualification; and, thirdly, there is the borough council disqualification which the noble Lord seeks, by this Bill, to remove.
The most rev. Primate has drawn a great distinction between the Party action which a man might have to take if he were in Parliament as against local councils. I suggest that he has taken rather too picturesque a view of the entire absence of Party feeling on many of the county and borough councils. If he will consider how keenly the last election in London has been
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fought for the borough councils he will hardly contend that a man could get on these councils and not necessarily belong to a Party. I have had a good deal of experience on the London County Council, and I am speaking with full knowledge of the extent to which ministers of religion have been on that body and have taken sometimes extreme Party action. As regards the attitude of the Government on this Bill, they leave the matter entirely open to the House. I may add that, as far as I know, the Government have not received even a single postcard on the subject.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

AFGHANISTAN.
LORD SYDENHAM LORD SYDENHAM rose to call attention to the Papers regarding hostilities with Afghanistan, 1919, and to ask His Majesty's Government whether the text or the purport of the letter "handed to the Afghan delegate" by Sir H. Grant on the 9th August had been previously seen and approved by the Government of India and by His Majesty's Government.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I fully deserved the correction which the noble Earl the Leader of the House administered to me last week, because I neglected to ascertain whether any Papers in connection with the Afghanistan question had already been laid on the Table of the House. I have since had an opportunity of studying the Papers which have been laid, and I find the information in them distinctly inadequate, and in some respects very disturbing. The Proclamation of the Viceroy to the Afghan people is not included, nor is there any hint of what actually passed at the Rawal Pindi Conference, although the Indian newspapers were able to publish the opening address of our representative and the very insolent reply of the Afghan delegate. Among the sixty-seven documents there are only four communications from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, and only two are of importance. Of these, there is one which approves the selection of our representatives at the Conference, and most wisely makes the suggestion that a military officer should be added as adviser. I do not know whether that suggestion was ever carried out, though I think it was most excellent. The other

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conveys the approval of the letter written by the Viceroy to the Amir in connection with the Conference, and again there is wisely appended the addition of the words "His Majesty's Government will not allow any modification of the Armistice terms."
I can find no indication that His Majesty's Government transmitted any expression of their wishes in regard to the terms of peace, or even that the terms of peace were submitted to them before being finally agreed, and that is my reason for raising this question to-day. No one can be more opposed than I am to undue interference with the Government of India, but in such a vital matter as the Treaty with Afghanistan it is clear that the view of His Majesty's Government must prevail. This is not only a question for the India Office; it is also quite as much a question for the Foreign Office. In these Papers I find much interesting and illuminating information, and there are one or two points which I wish to bring to your Lordships' attention. In the first place there was full warning that the Amir intended, as soon as he could, to get rid of all supervision over his foreign relations. In a most flamboyant Proclamation which he issued to his people the Amir said this—
"It is the eternal will of the unchangeable Creator—exalted be His glory—that all hardships and oppression may be removed from the heads of your nation, and that Afghanistan may be protected from the mischief of enemies of the faith and of this country. O Nation with a nice sense of honour. O brave Army."
He then declared that it was his intention that—
"the Government of Afghanistan should be internally and externally free—that is to say, that all rights of government that are possessed by other independent Powers of the world should be possessed in their entirety by Afghanistan."
Further than that, the Secretary of State received on April 25 the following telegram from the Viceroy—
"British Agent at Kabul reports: 'In Durbar held 13th April Amir made speech in which he declared Afghanistan free internally and externally, and he personally made this fact known to me particularly. He has appointed a certain Muhammed Wali Khan as Afghan Safir to Bokara; latter is about to leave. Am informed by reliable sources that question of appointment of Safir to Persia is under consideration.'"
When, in May, it became quite clear that the Amir meant wantonly to attack us there was strong reason to believe that his action was inspired from enemy sources,
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and that his object was directed to shaking himself free from the obligations imposed upon his father.
Your Lordships will remember that the imposition of the restrictions upon the foreign affairs of Afghanistan was enforced after the war of 1879–80 and the deposition of Shere Ali, which was caused by his reception of a Russian mission at Kabul. I think I am right in saying that the subsidy was not connected with this condition, but was granted in order that Abdur Rahman might be able to consolidate his position as Ruler. That subsidy has been going on ever since, and was increased in 1893, but latterly it has not been drawn by Habibulla Khan, because he wished it to be understood probably that he could draw on the Government of India whenever he liked and was not therefore the recipient of a dole; or it may be he thought he would like to have a reserve fund, in case he found himself in difficulties and was obliged to quit his kingdom.
Now I come to the Treaty which was signed at Rawal Pindi, more than 100 miles inside the frontier of India. There were good reasons why the Treaty with Germany should not be signed on German territory, but it is not easy to see why the Afghan Treaty should not have been negotiated and signed on Afghan territory, say, at Jallalabad. In the East such things never pass unnoticed. But that is not the whole of the story, as previous to the negotiation of the Treaty the Afghans had violated the terms of the Armistice; and from information published this morning it appears that during the negotiations at Rawal Pindi and since the Afghans were actually occupying Wane, well within our border. I sincerely hope that that information is false, because it will be remembered that in the Papers it is stated that the Viceroy expressly declared that no negotiations would take place while a single Afghan soldier remained on British territory.
On August 9 the Viceroy repeated to the Secretary of State a telegram in which Sir Hamilton Grant reported the full text of the Treaty. There are five articles ill that Treaty, the substance of which was lucidly explained by the noble Earl last week. He also said at that time that "only the first stage in these proceedings had so far been enacted." Article 4 lays down that—
"The British Government is desirous of the re-establishment of the old friendship that has so

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long existed between Afghanistan and Great Britain, provided they have guarantees that the Afghan Government are, on their part, sincerely anxious to regain the friendship of the British Government. The British Government are prepared, therefore, provided the Afghan Government prove this by their acts and conduct, to receive another Afghan Mission after six months for the discussion and amicable settlement of matters of common interest to the two Governments and the re-establishment of the old friendship on a satisfactory basis."
I am afraid that the recent actions of the Amir do not hold out much hope of that happy state of things being brought about.
As early as May 23 the Viceroy reported that the Amir had sent a "subservient" letter to "the honoured President of the Russian Republic," saying that in raising the Standard of Bolshevism Russia had earned the gratitude of the whole world. There is also an ominous request for a pamphlet on Bolshevism in the Koran promised by Barakatullah, a notorious Indian conspirator, at one time professor at the University at Tokio and subsequently a prominent member of the very dangerous Ghadr Party in San Francisco. This man accompanied a party of Germans and Austrians who arrived at Kabul in 1916, and I believe has been there ever since. From this Paper it appears that 100,000 copies of his pamphlet, translated into Persian and Hindustani, were ordered for distribution. It was also stated at the same time that the Amir had written, but not then sent, letters to Japan, Turkey, France, and the United States; and in less than three months since the signing of the Treaty the Amir has sent an embassy to the Bolshevist Government at Moscow, and emissaries to stir up trouble in Turkestan. Therefore it looks as if Afghanistan might become a dangerous focus of Bolshevist propaganda in the East, and that will add to our troubles in India.
The North-west frontier was never so disturbed as it is at this moment since the great tribal war of 1897. As we heard lately the Mahsud Waziris are on the warpath, and it is certainly open to belief that the Amir has deliberately stirred them up to action; but I ought, in justice to the Amir, to point out that the Treaty lays no obligation whatever upon him not to tamper with the tribes, although such a provision was inserted in the terms of the Armistice. As the noble Earl stated the other day, Article 2 withdraws the permission to import arms through India into Afghanistan, but as there are now manufactories
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of small arms and machine guns in Kabul itself, and as there must be a large quantity of arms available from other sources, I do not think that this Article is of much value to us.
The Treaty having been signed on August 8, and communicated to the Secretary of State on August 9, a second telegram was sent to the Viceroy on the same day. I am afraid that I must read that telegram because it is really of first-class importance. The telegram is as follows:—
"My telegram of to-day. Sir H. Grant reports that after signature of Peace Treaty he handed Afghan delegate following letter: 'You asked me for some further assurance that the Treaty of Peace now offered by the British Government contains nothing that interferes with the complete liberty of Afghanistan in external or internal matters. My friend, if you will read the Treaty of Peace with care you will see that there is in it no such interference with the liberty of Afghanistan. You have informed me that the Government of Afghanistan is unwilling to renew the arrangement under which the late Amir, Habibulla Khan, agreed to follow the advice of the Government of Great Britain in matters affecting the external relations of Afghanistan—without reserve. I have therefore, refrained from pressing this matter of which the Treaty of Peace contains no mention. By the said Treaty and this letter, therefore, Afghanistan is left officially free and independent in its affairs, both internal and external. Furthermore, all previous treaties have been cancelled by this war.'"
At that point, my Lords, the White Paper stops abruptly. I think that your Lordships will feel that some further information is required. You will also note that the telegram which I have quoted is merely a repetition from the Viceroy of a report from Sir Hamilton Grant, and there is really nothing to show the authorship of this most important letter, or whether the terms received the previous sanction either of the Government of India or of His Majesty's Government.
It may be that this concession which was demanded by the Amir three months earlier was inevitable. I do not know whether that is the case or not, but it is surely very unfortunate from the point of view of our whole position in the East; and as unfortunate in my humble opinion is the fact that we took no guarantees, such as the occupation of Dakka or Jellalabad, for the execution of the terms of this Treaty. I fear it is now clear that the Afghans are widely proclaiming that they were victorious in the campaign which they forced upon us after a peace of nearly forty years. From what I hear from India,

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it seems that they are also boasting that they have obtained an amnesty for the tribesmen on our frontier. From this White Paper it may well be inferred that the fateful letter which I have quoted was drafted by Sir Hamilton Grant alone, and that seems to me quite impossible. Therefore I think it would be very undesirable that such an impression should ever prevail. On February 16, 1908, the noble Earl the Leader of this House made a most powerful speech in condemnation of the five Afghan articles in the Anglo-Russian Convention. From that speech I am encouraged to think that he will not entirely disagree with what I have attempted to say this evening, and I hope that your Lordships will think that the grave importance of these matters justifies me in raising them again to-day with the knowledge I now possess and the knowledge that I ought to have possessed last week.
LORD ISLINGTON: My Lords, I would like to ask the indulgence of your Lordships' House while I make a few observations in connection with the Question asked by my noble friend Lord Sydenham, with which I desire closely to associate myself. I feel that Lord Sydenham is fully justified in raising a second debate on this matter; indeed, I think it is one of such vital importance that in doing so he is rendering a great public service. Last week he spoke under the disadvantage of not having had the opportunity of perusing the White Paper. I must myself plead guilty to a similar omission. But having now read this Paper I share with him curiosity mingled with apprehension both in regard to the contents of that Paper and in regard to some of those points which were not fully dealt with last week by the noble Earl who leads the House, and also in regard to the information that I, along with your Lordships, have been able to derive from the public Press.
No one conversant to any degree with the Indian frontier and its ever-present dangers to the security of India can regard a vital change in the Treaty arrangement between Great Britain and Afghanistan with anything other than the deepest possible concern. No one who has read carefully the White Paper can do so, I think, without entertaining in his mind a certain sense of humiliation coupled with deep apprehension for the future of that Territory. By a series of treaties in the
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past with former Rulers of Afghanistan, whilst we have instituted and ensured for Afghanistan its integrity and internal independence, we have at the same time necessarily for our own security claimed certain specified conditions which control the external policy of that country with foreign Powers. This proviso originated when we placed Abdur Rahman on the Throne close on forty years ago. This undertaking was loyally complied with by him during his reign, and equally loyally complied with by his successor, Habibulla, during his reign until his unfortunate assassination last year. The British Government was obliged to enter into this undertaking, and it did so in no arbitrary or tyrannical spirit, but solely in the cause of Indian defence and security. This was recognised and accepted by those two great Rulers of Afghanistan all through the period of their reign. The geographical position of Afghanistan, the peculiar condition of its people, the condition also of temperament and character of the varying and diverse frontier tribes which lie between Afghanistan and our frontier of India, one and all constitute an imperative necessity on our part to make sure, as far as a Treaty could do so, not only that Afghanistan should remain quiescent and peacefully inclined to us, but also that outside and hostile Powers should be precluded from entering into alliance with that country with the object of stirring up aggression with Afghanistan and the frontier tribes against our borders and so threatening the security of India. It was for these reasons that this Treaty was instituted, and, as I say, loyally abided by. No one, I think, has been a more prominent or consistent advocate of that policy than my noble friend who leads this House. No one knows the dangers that may arise by a weakening of that policy better than he does. It has been a settled policy, accepted and loyally adhered to for a period—and a very crucial period—of upwards of thirty-five years, and owing to its existence it has been instrumental in evading a great war with Russia in the past and has maintained for us in their entirety during that period our borders free from outside aggression.
What do we find now by a perusal of the White Paper? First, we read in a serial story of the unwarranted attack and invasion of our territory by the new Ruler of Afghanistan—a war entered into by him unprovoked, without the slightest excuse of

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premeditated or aggressive action on our part. And we go on in that Paper to read how with promptitude this invasion was dealt with by our troops—dealt with in such a way that it resulted in a very few weeks in the Amir suing to the Viceroy and the Government of India for an armistice. The White Paper then goes on to describe in a series of letters from Amanulla, the present Amir, to the Viceroy—letters which may be characterised as both offensive and impudent in the extreme—how the Amir attempted to haggle over the terms laid down for the armistice.
Those letters are replete in every line with a tissue of misrepresentations to baulk and to evade compliance with the terms of the armistice. To read those letters, without knowing the facts of the case, one might almost believe that we had been the offenders and that the Amir and Afghanistan had been the victors. The replies by the Viceroy exhibit a tolerance and forbearance which, I think, are hardly compatible with the circumstances under which the Amir sued to the British Government for an armistice. And, finally, we read the agreement which is come to, that delegates from the respective countries should meet to consider the terms of peace at Rawal Pindi, and of the meeting of these delegates at that place resulting, as it does, in the Treaty described by my noble friend and appearing in the White Paper in Paragraph 66, consisting of five articles. I agree with my noble friend that Article 2, which withdraws the privilege enjoyed by the Amir of importing arms, ammunition, and warlike munitions through India to Afghanistan will, in view of the subsequent part of the Treaty which I will allude to in a moment, be of very little avail.
I will not delay your Lordships by dealing with these Articles in the Treaty. I will come to Paragraph 67 in the White Paper which appears at the end as a kind of afterthought, and is the letter which has been read by my noble friend by Sir Hamilton Grant, and handed to the Afghan delegates. In this letter clear information is given to the Amir of Afghanistan that the abrogation of all former treaties is to be undertaken on the part of the British Government, and emphasis is laid on the complete liberty in external policy for that country which is to be granted by the British Government in the future. There is nothing in the White Paper to indicate that this very important decision is a
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definite decision by His Majesty's Government. One is almost led to suppose that it cannot be so because, if your Lordships will read on page 34, you will see that the arrangements for the armistice were referred home and were assented to by the Government, coupled with an important amendment which was embodied in those terms.
What my noble friend asks in his Question is—Was this Peace Treaty, and more especially this addendum to the Peace Treaty by Sir Hamilton Grant, the considered decision of the Cabinet and a definite instruction from home, or was it a decision come to in India without the sanction of His Majesty's Government? A matter of this extreme gravity fraught with potential trouble in the future deserves, I think, an explicit reply and explanation by His Majesty's Government. If our arms had suffered serious reverse in this war, or even defeat, I can hardly imagine terms entered into or extracted of a more subversive character to our interests and security in India in the future, especially in the times in which we are living now, than those which have been laid down in this addendum under No. 66 of the White Paper. I think, indeed, that a strong case must be made by His Majesty's Government for having come to such a decision and for having cancelled so settled an undertaking between Afghanistan and Great Britain as that which is indicated in this addendum.
It was said by my noble friend last week that freedom for external relations must now be established to comply with the doctrine of self-determination. How can the cancellation of an undertaking of this character coincide with the principles which underlie the League of Nations? The principles of the League of Nations are, by the common assent of all countries, to use every endeavour and to take all possible steps to ensure peace throughout the world. How can you expect peace with a Ruler of this temperament as he has shown himself in these past months, free to ally himself with any and all of those various exasperated enemies of Great Britain that are to be found throughout the Far East to-day? How can you hope for centres on our borders such as Kabul, Guzni, and Kandahar to remain peaceful influences with the western gate of Afghanistan open to the intrusion of all those enemies who will be only too glad to take advantage of the temperament of a hostile Ruler to

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introduce intrigue and conflict on our borders?
At least I should like to hear from my noble friend when he replies to this Question that some provision has been made which has not been indicated in this Paper to secure our position against these possible and probable hostile elements finding their way to those strategic centres upon our borders, some provision to ensure at any rate warning and preparation for our people who are guarding that most vulnerable and important border of India. I will not say more except to repeat that this Treaty with the addendum is to my mind one of very grave importance; it is one in regard to which I cannot help feeling the deepest apprehension, and I think my noble friend has been fully justified in raising the question and in asking His Majesty's Government to tell him and the public the reasons which led them to conceive this most important undertaking in regard to our relations with Afghanistan.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (EARL CURZON OF KKDLESTON): My Lords, under cover of a Question which is in itself confined to a definite and a narrow issue, my noble friend Lord Sydenham has favoured your Lordships' House with his views upon the case in its more general aspect, and has told us what he thinks about the arrangement that has been come to between the Government of India and Afghanistan. I do not for one moment complain of my noble friend for doing so, partly because it is the immemorial custom in this House to make a Question on a narrow issue the peg upon which to hang a speech of a larger and more important character; and partly because, owing to the mischance that happened the other day, we did not then have the advantage of hearing the views of my noble friend upon a point on which he is so well qualified to advise us. He has stated those views this afternoon with the moderation and the force which we always associate with his deliveries in this House. He has been followed by my noble friend Lord Islington who also has dealt with the larger rather than with the narrower issue, and whose language about the agreement I think I do not exaggerate if I say has indicated a spirit of almost unbroken condemnation. The noble Lord is entitled to hold and to express those opinions; I only regret that he has not found a more favourable opportunity
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for doing so. A House which consists of certainly not more than twelve persons is hardly the place in which to arraign, even with the authority of my noble friend, the policy of His Majesty's Government; nor, again, does it provide a fitting opportunity for the spokesman of the Government to reply. As a matter of fact I did make a speech of considerable, perhaps undue, length upon the matter a week ago, and it was not my fault that the two noble Lords who have taken part in this discussion had unfortunately not seen the Papers upon which they were anxious to comment. I saw that I was on that occasion, perhaps deservedly, censured in the newspapers for taking the matter with undue seriousness and for occupying too much of your Lordships' time. I really cannot consent, therefore, having made a speech of some length upon the subject last week, either to repeat it or to make another now. If at any time any noble Lord—the noble Lord, for instance, who has just sat down—desires on a serious occasion and in a House better qualified by its numbers to listen to him, to raise the question, I shall be happy to meet him. All I can attempt to do to-night is to answer the Question on the Paper and to deal with one or two points which were mentioned incidentally by the two noble Lords who have preceded me.
The noble Lord, Lord Sydenham, asked why the Viceroy's Proclamation was not included in the Papers. There was no reason whatever why it should not have been. Had the importance been attached to it here which the noble Lord has done, it certainly would have been included. Perhaps it ought to have been included, but it was not a matter to which we at this end attached any particular moment. The next point he made was this—I think I dealt with it last week—that the Papers as circulated did not contain any account of what passed at Rawal Pindi between the delegates of the Government of India and the Afghan representatives. Quite true; and no one knows better than my noble friend how undesirable, and indeed impossible, it would be in the East any more than in the West (because the same conditions prevail here) to relate stage by stage what passes in a discussion between two parties who are desiring to come to a peace agreement. I certainly could not subscribe to the doctrine that either now or at any time in the future should we

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hold ourselves bound to disclose to the public the details from day to day of those negotiations as they went along. Similarly my noble friend pointed out—again with truth—that the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy's Government has, with rare exceptions, not been included. I think I gave the answer to that a week ago, and it is this—that we regard this matter, so far as it has at present gone, as only the first stage in a business that is not yet completed. The matter has to be resumed at a later date. In what form it will be resumed, whether at the end of the six months or later, it is as yet too early to predict; but I think it is most undesirable, and will probably have a most deleterious effect upon the negotiations when they are resumed, if at this stage we lay correspondence upon the Table between the Government here and the Government of India dealing with all the shades of opinion expressed—possibly differences of opinion—which will be fastened upon by the Amir and the Afghan Government for reasons of their own.
Another point was made by Lord Sydenham. He asked why was the Treaty signed at Rawal Pindi; why did not we go to Jellalabad or to Dacca and sign it there? To go to Jellalabad would have involved military operations of a very serious character; and they would have had consequences that would not have been confined to the signature of this Treaty alone, but might have compelled us to take over the Government of Afghanistan. Be it remembered that it was the Amir who sued for the cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of terms, and it was his proposal that the meeting should take place at Landi Kotal or at Peshawar. The Viceroy replied—I think with justice—that he must insist on the negotiations taking place at Rawal Pindi; and if you ask why I say "with justice," I reply that I use the words for two reasons. In the first place, I think it marked the position assumed and the victory claimed by the Government of India much more strongly to insist on your opponent coming to you and receiving the terms that you laid down to him in your own territory than that you should go to his territory. Secondly, speaking from my own experience I recall so well in my last year in India the extreme difficulty and inconvenience that arose from supervising the operations of a Mission in Afghanistan itself. The Dane Mission went to Kabul to conclude the last
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Treaty with Amir Habibulla Khan, and I remember the many delays which resulted from the effort to communicate with our representative, very often days elapsing before we could get a reply. At Pindi, where the negotiations took place in immediate telegraphic contact with the Government of India and therefore with the Government at home, the inconveniences were reduced to a minimum. I think my noble friend is wrong, if he will allow me to say so, in attributing to the selection of that place the particular character that he did.
My noble friend Lord Islington made a point which, I think, is historically not quite accurate. He was pointing a contrast between the present position under which, by virtue of the concluding document in this White Paper, we have ceased to exercise control over the external relations of Afghanistan, for reasons and in circumstances which I explained a week ago, and he said, "What a contradiction of the old system when you had Sovereigns (Amir Habibulla Khan, and Amir Abdur Rahman Khan) perfectly loyal to their obligations, faithfully observing the terms of their engagements." Surely the noble Lord, from his connection with the India Office, knows that that was not altogether the case as to what has passed in days gone by in the external relations of the Amir. Do remember this—that that control was acquired, and was retained, by us in the main as a protection against Russia. No one will dispute that that was the menace that was feared, and it was the fact that Russia—a powerful, aggressive, and imperialistic force on the other side—threatened Afghanistan that compelled us to assume the conduct of the external relations of that country. Now, equally, no one can deny that that danger has, at any rate for the present, disappeared, and that, even if Russia be revived, it is not likely to be revived in a form, at any rate not within the lifetime of any of us, that is likely to be as menacing to India or its safety as was the former Russian menace.
As regards the loyal adherence to their obligations of the two previous Amirs, is not my noble friend aware that our engagements did not prevent the Amirs Abdur Rahman Khan and Habibulla Khan from being in constant communication with Russian officials? Is he not aware that during the recent war deputations

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both from Germany and from Turkey arrived at Kabul and were entertained by the late Amir, whose loyalty he eulogised not undeservedly? Is he not aware that Amir Habibulla Khan concluded a Treaty with the Germans?—very likely with his tongue in his cheek (I am quite prepared to believe that) but he did conclude a Treaty with them. Therefore it comes to this—in the first place, that your engagements, to which we are told the Sovereigns remained so loyal, did not prevent subterranean communications from going on; and, in the second place, that your safety lay, not in the terms of your Treaty nor even in the actual technical fidelity with which they were or were not observed, but lay in your confidence in the loyalty of the man. That was our strength with Habibulla Khan, and when he received the Germans and the Turks no one was less disturbed that my noble friend because in the last resort he believed that Habibulla Khan was on the right side, as he was. Believe me, it is the personal equation, much more than the written word, that counts in these cases. Do not let my noble friend be too ready to assume that we have gone from a good state of affairs to a bad state of affairs before these negotiations reach a further stage and we are told what is to succeed the status quo ante.
The only other point which remains for me to deal with is the Question on the Paper. That I can answer in a sentence. The letter of Sir Hamilton Grant, which is printed last in the Paper, and which no doubt was composed by him in the first place, was previously seen and approved by the Government of India and was telegraphed by them to the Secretary of State in this country for sanction. His Majesty's Government, deferring to the urgent representation of the Government of India that an assurance to the Afghans such as that contained in the letter was essential to the conclusion of Peace negotiations, and having regard to the conditions of the Treaty itself, explained by me last week, decided not to withhold their assent.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, after what has fallen from the noble Earl who leads the House I have no desire to enter at any length into this important subject. He has not exactly complained, but he has explained how it has come about that the debate on this subject has assumed a curious and piecemeal character, owing
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to the fact that my noble friend on the cross benches, Lord Sydenham, had not, on the occasion when he raised the matter before, seen the White Paper which has been the main subject of discussion to-day. I so far sympathise with the noble Lord that I was in the same position. I also had not seen that White Paper, and I cannot help observing this—that in view of the fact (as I think I am correct in saying) that the Paper appeared on the pink document which reached us with the Parliamentary Papers just about the time of the adjournment of the House for the summer holidays, I think it is somewhat unfortunate that this particular Paper was not rather more seriously treated and circulated as a matter of course to your Lordships, instead of being only placed on the list of those which can be procured if desired—placed in the same category, in fact, as some of the minor Papers regarding food production and kindred subjects.
As regards the character of the debate, the noble Earl has suggested that at some future time it may be desirable to have a discussion of a more full dress character, to be, we hope, attended by more than a dozen members of your Lordships' House in view of the gravity of the subject. I have no doubt that my noble friend on the cross benches will consider at some future time whether it will be wise to raise a discussion in a more formal way, or some other member of the House may desire to do so. It is, therefore, I think perhaps slightly unfortunate that the whole business has not been more categorically considered than has been possible in this two days discussion, in view of the important individual speeches which have been made.
The main point of the noble Earl's contention, as I understand, is that it is undesirable, if not impossible, to enter into close detail regarding these negotiations, because the negotiations can only be regarded as the first stage in a series which is to be continued and concluded later on. Even agreeing or admitting that that is so, the noble Lords who have raised this question have, I think, the right to ask whether, up to the point which has already been reached, anything has been done to compromise those further discussions so as to place India and this country in a disadvantageous position when the future negotiations proceed. I gather from the noble Earl that he does not think that is so, and that at any rate no harm has been done. But Lord

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Sydenham and Lord Islington take the view that British interests have been somewhat seriously compromised already by the concessions that have been made in the letter of Sir Hamilton Grant which has been read.
On the particular point of the place where the first negotiations were held, I think the noble Earl made a good defence for the selection of Rawal Pindi for that purpose. It seemed to me that the arguments he used—facility of communication as compared with any place within the Afghan border which could have been chosen—carry weight, and that the Viceroy was presumably right in making the selection he did. The matter is, of course, one of convenience on the one hand and prestige on the other; and if the Government of India think that their prestige in no way suffered by the selection of an important military post like Rawal Pindi for that purpose, I should not be prepared to dispute their opinion.
On the matter of external relations, regarding which I think it must be admitted that the announcement that they are to be no longer regarded as a special concern of the British Empire came as something of a cold douche to a great many people, the noble Earl again put up a bold defence. I take it that it comes to this, that control over those relations is not worth maintaining, for two reasons. In the first place, because the "Russian thunder cloud," which used to hang so threateningly over the North-West Frontier may be said to have entirely dissipated so far as any one can foresee, owing to the change of Government in Russia and presumed changes of policy; and, in the second place, because really, in fact, you could not maintain the alleged control, and it was not possible to prevent active negotiations taking place and agreements being arrived at between the Rulers of Afghanistan and foreign, and possible hostile, countries.
I confess that this does not seem to me to be a complete answer. I do not think it necessarily follows that a rule or law ought to be abrogated because in some cases it may be evaded or disobeyed. When this matter is discussed again we shall expect some further reasons from His Majesty's Government, and in particular from the Government of India, as to why it has been thought wise or necessary to depart from a practice which cannot, I conceive,
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be considered, during the last two reigns of friendly Afghan Sovereigns, to have conferred any disability or serious deprivation of power upon Afghanistan. There may be further reasons in addition to those which the noble Earl has mentioned, and we should all desire, I am sure, to suspend our judgment on the subject pending further discussion; but I cannot pretend that my mind is entirely satisfied by the explanation of the noble Earl. I hope therefore, with him, that the whole subject will be more fully and formally discussed at some future and not very distant date.
LORD SYDENHAM: My Lords, may I say, in defence of my suggestion that Dakka should have been the place of negotiating, that there is now a good motor road to Landi Kotal, and that Dakka is not so inaccessible as it used to be.

CONSTABULARY AND POLICE (IRELAND) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and to be printed.
RATS AND MICE (DESTRUCTION) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and to be printed.

PRIVATE BILLS.
[From Minutes of October 30.]
GOSPORT AND ALVERSTOKE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL.
AMMANFORD GAS BILL.
Report from the Committee of Selection that the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Swinton and Mexborough Gas Board Bill and other Bills do form the Select Committee for the consideration of the Gosport and Alverstoke Urban District Council Bill and the Arainanford Gas Bill; read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bills.

WATER PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and referred to the Examiners.
House adjourned at six o'clock.