Lords Sitting of 13 February 1919

Preamble
Several Lords—Took the Oath.

FOREIGN OFFICE AND RUSSIAN AFFAIRS.
VISCOUNT TEMPLETOWN: My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government—(1) If the Foreign Office have a permanent official in charge of Russian affairs, what is his name, and how many senior officials there are in the Russian Department who have a personal knowledge of that country and who can speak the Russian language; (2) what official position Mr. Gregory holds in the Russian Department of the Foreign Office.
THE CONTROLLER OF THE PRISONERS OF WAR DEPARTMENT (LORD NEWTON): My Lords, Lord Curzon, being unable to be present this afternoon, has requested me to reply for him. The permanent official in charge of the Russian Department of the Foreign Office is Mr. Gregory. Mr. Gregory is an extremely competent and capable official, and I think that no one who has any acquaintance with his work will be likely to differ from that opinion. Amongst other things he is an admirable linguist, although so far as I know he not acquainted with Russian, but there are gentlemen employed in the Department who are extremely well acquainted with that language and with Russia. They include one gentleman who was born in Russia of British parents, and who knows Russian as well as his native tongue. It is, perhaps, hardly necessary for me to add that it is not the Russian Department of the Foreign Office which is responsible for the policy of the Government towards Russia, but it is the Secretary of State.
VISCOUNT TEMPLETOWN: Will the noble Lord give me the name of the official who is so well acquainted with Russian?
LORD NEWTON: The particular official to whom I refer is Colonel Allen.

TERRITORLALS IN THE EAST.
LORD HARRIS LORD HARRIS rose to call attention to the proposed retention of certain Territorial units in the East over the approaching hot weather, and to ask whether this is unavoidable.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I desire to call attention to the case of certain Territorial units now in India, who apparently, from the communiqué that we saw in the papers some ten days or a fortnight ago, it is contemplated should remain there for another hot weather. I am referring to Territorial units who were in the First Line—that is to say, who promptly volunteered in 1914 for foreign service. They are men who showed their patriotism and their recognition that it is the duty of every man to be prepared to defend his country in arms by service before the war, and who on the invitation to take up Imperial service in foreign parts promptly responded by volunteering and were therefore put into the First Line. A certain number of these units were sent to France, and therefore they are entitled to the Mons medal even before it was extended to 1915. Some were sent to Egypt, some did not leave England till 1916, and thus have not got any special decoration. But those to whom I particularly refer were sent to India, I think in October, 1914, and incautiously, unfortunately, they were assured, I believe on very good authority, that not many months would elapse before they were brought further West. That has not eventuated, and those battalions are still there.
As your Lordships remember, the Territorial Force before the war was not viewed in some quarters with great favour. They were not supposed to be very reliable. I think, however, that we may take the assurance of Lord French, who has publicly acknowledged that those First Line Territorial units whom he had under him saved the situation so far as France is concerned. And I take it that there is very little distinction as regards efficiency—there is certainly none as regards patriotism—between those various units who undertook imperial service. They went to India, and there they have been for more than four years. Apparently it was intended by the communiqué to which I refer to keep these units there for another hot weather. I submit that that is a serious hardship upon these officers and men who behaved so gallantly and so patriotically at the early stages of the war, and before the war. I hope that a more sympathetic view may be taken, and that some arrangements may be made to relieve them before the hot weather comes on. Some of them have seen service. I can only speak of those with whom I am best acquainted. The

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Buff units saw service near the barren rocks of Aden. Others took part in an action So violent as that of the defence of Kut, with the result. that nearly the whole Weald of Kent was in mourning. So they have done their service out there. Others, I dare say, have had no chance as units of serving on a field of battle. They may have sent drafts, and I believe at this moment two of those units are serving in Siberia. I do not know that the sympathy for which I ask can be extended to all the units, because I take it they have been filled up from time to time by drafts, and the men of those drafts may not have the same claim to consideration as the old Territorials of 1914 who went out with the First Line units in that year. They may not have been all Territorials, and their service may have been very much less than that of the men of those units who went out in 1914.
What I am asking is whether it would not be possible in the case of the officers and men of the units which went to India in 1914, and who are there still, to send reliefs. We are late in the troop season, I admit; still, I do not think that the climate of India now is too severe for drafts to arrive. These men deserve special consideration from the State, having regard to what they undertook before the war, and what they undertook immediately war broke out. Can they not be given special consideration, and may not relief be afforded in order that they may be sent home before the hot weather?
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT PEEL): My Lords, I can assure my noble friend that this question of the relief of the Territorials in India is a matter which has been very carefully and sympathetically considered by the Army Council even among all the very pressing and urgent problems which are now engaging their attention. My noble friend realises, of course, the absolute necessity of maintaining our garrisons in India, and he is also familiar with the difficulties of moving troops to and fro from India during the hot weather. Assuming, therefore—and of course we must assume it—that our garrison cannot be reduced in India beyond a certain point, the question is, Who will replace, or who can replace, those Territorial units, or the men belonging to those Territorial units (for, as my noble friend very justly says, they have been reinforced by drafts and
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from sources other than Territorial) if those units are moved from India at the present time?
I will deal very briefly, at the desire of my noble friend, with the sources from which those units can be replaced. The only source from which they can be replaced, in the main, is the new after-the-war Provisional Army. There is a certain number of men left from the old Army with more than two years' service. Certain elements from among them, as individuals possibly, or as drafts, could go to replace those Territorials. But as all those men are entitled to two or three months' furlough before they serve in the New Army it is quite obvious, I think, that the date for their organisation and readiness to start front this country would be too late for them to undertake that voyage and to replace Territorial units in India. There are other difficulties of a technical nature connected with the rank of those men and other matters which I need not go into in detail, though they reinforce the difficulty.
Then there are the other men who are enlisting from the existing Army for two, three, or four years—which is the other element in the after-the-war Provisional Army. These men have also the same advantages as the men I have just referred to—that is to say, they are entitled to their leave for the New Army, according as they, enlist for two, three, or four years. Again, it would be impossible to organise these men and to send them out to India while the weather still makes it possible for us to do so. Then we come to the Armies in Egypt, Palestine, and Salonika. After going into that question very carefully it is found that the men who will be left after the pre-1916 men have been demobilised will be such a small, or comparatively small, number that they will only be sufficient to provide the necessary garrisons of occupation in Palestine, Egypt, Salonika, and other, places in the Near East, during the Armistice and until Peace is signed. Those are really the only sources from which troops could be obtained to replace these Territorials, and therefore I am afraid it is not a. question of our desire—it is a question really of the impossibility of sending reliefs, before the autumn season comes on, for these Territorials for whom my noble friend pleads.
I should like to set before my noble friend what can be done, and is being done,

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to diminish the number of these Territorials in India. The present strength of the British troops of the Army in India is roughly 85,000 men, including Regulars, Territorials, and New Army. Of that force about 33,000 are Territorials. An arrangement has been made to withdraw from that force some 20,000 unfit men. They will be drawn, of course, from all the British units in India, and then, in connection with another arrangement, a further 5,000 will be withdrawn. These reductions will leave the number of Territorials in India at something between 23,000 and 25,000 men—a considerable reduction, as my noble friend, I think, will admit.
But there are other schemes now being considered for a further reduction. if those schemes mature it will be possible to reduce the number of Territorials in India to 20,000 men. Moreover, as regards these new dispersal drafts, if this scheme comes into effect instructions will be given that they should be composed as far as possible of Territorials. My noble friend alluded also to the Territorial regiments in Mesopotamia, and he cited, I think, one special regiment which had done very good service in Mesopotamia. I hope my noble friend realises that these Territorial units that are in Mesopotamia, being ex hypothesi units that joined before 1916, will be demobilised and will come back to this country because they are not required for garrison there. So that what I am saying applies to Territorials in India, while the units In Mesopotamia will be demobilised.
I think I have stated already to my noble friend that he must not go altogether by the number of Territorial units in India, because there have been drafts made to those units which are composed of other than Territorial forces, and therefore you must not merely multiply the number of the Territorial units by the strengths in order to arrive at the number of Territorials now in India. I should like to add this—though I do not say it is any compensation necessarily for having or remain in India—that the Territorial units who do so remain will, of course, receive the bonus granted under the new Royal Warrant.
But, bearing in mind the difficulties into which the Army Council is put as regards the relief of these Territorials, I should like to state on behalf of the Secretary of State how very high is the
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appreciation in which they hold the services of these Territorials. They fully realise what a contribution the Territorials made to the security of the State when they came forward and volunteered, as they did, for foreign service in 1914, and what a contribution they have made also to the security of India and to the relief of other forces by maintaining the garrisons in that country. They have, of course, not had the thrill and movement of great campaigns; they have not had the opportunity, as my noble friend says, of earning the honours and rewards which their brethren have had in Mesopotamia, in France, and in other parts of the world; they have had rather the common round and the duller task of duty, and they have performed it in a way that has earned general admiration.
Though it is no consolation, no doubt, to these gallant men, I think that we, their friends, may congratulate ourselves on this—that at least the bulk of these men will return to their country and their friends in good health and strength, and, moreover, during the period that they may have to spend in the hot weather in India they will have good cantonments and other advantages to maintain them in good health. Thus I am afraid that I cannot, except in what I have said, give full satisfaction to my noble friend, except as regards the reduction of the numbers of the Territorials. But I think they ought to feel that their case is by no means neglected or unconsidered, and that their services receive on all hands—particularly from the Army Council and the Secretary of State—full recognition and thanks.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, my noble friend who has just spoken has certainly said something which may be of comfort to the Territorial Force in India. Not only has he spoken in very just and proper terms of appreciation of the great services which they have rendered, but he has also assured my noble friend (Lord Harris) that there will be a substantial reduction in the numbers of the Territorials left in India. Yet there is one point which, if I mistake not, my noble friend Lord Harris made to which my noble friend Lord Peel did not reply—namely, that there must be still in India a certain number of men belonging to the Territorial Force who went out originally with their battalions. I do not suppose they are

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more than a comparatively small proportion of the actual numbers there at the present moment, but their case is certainly and particularly hard, because they went out under an impression, if not with an absolute Pledge—a pledge which it is no blame to the Government that they could not keep an assurance that they would be back at home within a few months, whereas they have been kept out four years. What I think my noble friend Lord Harris asked, and what I would press upon the Government, was whether, in deciding on the numbers of Territorials to be left in India, they have borne in mind the specially hard case of these particular individuals. I should have thought it possible, without unduly depleting the garrison in India, where, there were men who had gone out originally and been the recipients of this pledge, to have made an exception in their favour, and, if possible, brought them home. The interests of the State and the security of India must, of course, stand first; and I am sure that none of your Lordships would wish to say a word which would embarrass the Government in the matter; but we think that the case of these men is a very hard one, and if the Secretary of State will take it into consideration perhaps something will be done.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I should like to say a word in support of the case laid before the House by my noble friend Lord Harris. I happen to be in a position to know the feeling which prevails in some of the Territorial battalions that have been in India since the beginning of the war. There can be no doubt that their case is a very hard one indeed; and I was glad to observe, from the reply made by Lord Peel, that His Majesty's Government themselves really feel that it is a hard ease and will do all that they possibly can to mitigate it. We must all be aware, of course, that there are considerable difficulties in providing the necessary reliefs; but I trust that the case of these battalions will not be lost sight of. They showed very great gallantry and alacrity at the beginning of the war, and it is really hard that they should not receive some measure of indulgence.
I should like to read to your Lordships, if I may, a few sentences from a letter which has reached me from a very gallant officer in command of one of these Terri-
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torial battalions. He writes from India, and says—
"When is our demobilisation coming, I wonder? This picking men of various trades to send home is causing endless dissatisfaction. It is no fault of anyone's that the battalions retained in India were not. sent to a front."
They feel that very strongly; they were quite ready to go to the front if they had had the chance.
"It is simply the fortune of war. Eight fine line battalions are in the same box. The men at the fronts have had opportunities of leave, etc., but these men of ours have been leading the deadly monotonous lives incidental to soldiering in the plains in India. We have lost a number during the past hot weather, and I am afraid if they are kept here for another the mortality will be great."
Then with regard to what Lord Peel said as to privileges in the way of leave, and so forth, my correspondent writes—
"They do not even get their full time in the hills as there is generally a disturbance amongst these—"
A word is missing there—
"revolutionary Bengalees, and our men have to be hastily recalled. The Government are making a big mistake in attempting to apply the same system of demobilisation in India as in France."
That is a feeling which I believe is deeply ingrained amongst the officers and men of these battalions, and I very earnestly hope that the War Office will take it into their consideration.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, by leave of the House I may, perhaps, say a word with regard to what the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, said in connection with the men who went out earlier. The noble Marquess said that some special advantage in demobilisation should be granted to them. I think what he said implied that there were a good many of these 33,000, and possibly of the smaller number, who had gone out later. That is not so. The men of whom I have been speaking all went out in the early stages of the war; and I think I am right in saying that in 1916 and subsequently all the drafts that went out were not Territorials but were composed of other troops which went out either to units in India or to fill up gaps in the Territorials units there.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Those are not reckoned as Territorials?
VISCOUNT PEEL: No. Therefore the men for whom the noble Marquess speaks

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really constitute the great bulk of those men, and this makes it more difficult to exercise any particular selection amongst them May I be allowed to say also that I have a special sympathy for these men, because I myself was very nearly one them. it was only by the fortunate accident that the Commander-in-Chief in India at that time preferred a Regular Cavalry regiment to the Yeomanry regiment which I commanded that I am not there now. However, I will represent strongly to the War Office what has been said by the noble Marquess.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, with the leave of the House I should like to add a word. As to the original Territorials who went to India, my noble friend says that some 8,000 to 10,000 may be able to come home by reduction of establishment
those who are unfit; so that if these men who went out first are amongst the fit they will not have as good a chance of being demobilised as the physically unfit. I hope my noble friend will bear that in mind.
As I am permitted to say another word I should like to mention one other thing; it is not in my Question, but I referred to the fact that these units had no chance of the war decoration which their comrades who happened to be chosen for France had; and, owing to the extension of the Mons Star to 1915, their comrades who went to other parts of the war line have an advantage over them. I therefore respectfully submit for the consideration of my noble friend, who might be disposed to present it to the Army Council for His Majesty's gracious consideration, whether the old Territorial who volunteered for the war in 1914—whether he went to India, or to France, or to Egypt, or anywhere else, or was not sent abroad until 1916 (he displayed the same; patriotism;he always had done his duty by serving in a military unit, serving his country before the war and preparing himself for the war) whether he is not entitled to some consideration for a special decoration?
VISCOUNT PEEL: In answer to the noble Lord's first point, of course among the further reductions which I suggest as possible, and which I hope may be effected, clearly in that case the healthier members might have good opportunity of coming back. The question of the unfit men referred to the earlier reduction of which I spoke. As to the question of a special
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decoration of Territorials who had agreed to foreign service on the outbreak of war, and who, owing to accident of position rather than anything else, have not obtained the '14'–15 Star or any other decoration, that is now being considered, I may say sympathetically considered I do not want to suggest that it can be done, but the matter is being thoroughly looked into.
LORD NUNBURNHOLME: May I ask whether it is intended to keep these Territorial battalions in India after peace has been declared?
VISCOUNT PEEL: That, I am afraid, will depend upon when peace is declared. It is obvious that if peace is declared in July it will not be possible to bring them back until the usual trooping season.
LORD NUNBURNHOLME: May I take it that they will be brought back at the first available opportunity after the trooping season recommences
VISCOUNT PEEL: We hope that by that time the New Armies, or, if the term preferred, the new Provisional Armies, will be ready, and the men in question will be among the first to be brought back.

ALLIED FORCES IN NORTHERN RUSSIA.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE rose to ask whether His Majesty's Government are able to give the House any information as to the position of the Allied Forces at Archangel and Murmansk, and the steps which have been taken or will be taken to ensure their safety.
The noble Marquess said: My Lords, before I put my Question I desire to assure my noble friend, who I understand will reply for the War Office, that I have no desire to press him for any information which in the opinion of His Majesty's Government cannot be properly or conveniently given at the present time; but of this I am quite sure, that I am not the only member of your Lordships' House who feels very considerable anxiety with regard to the position of the Allied Forces at Archangel and in Northern Russia.
I am rather encouraged to approach the subject because of the frankness with which it was handled on Tuesday night by the noble Earl who leads the House, and

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who took us very completely into his confidence in regard to the manner in which His Majesty's Government proposed to approach the Bolshevist problem. My noble friend dwelt eloquently upon the repulsive features of Bolshevism, upon the dangerous spread of the movement all over Russia, upon the ghastly events which have everywhere followed in its train, and he treated us not less frankly when he came to examine the possible alternative modes of dealing with Bolshevism. He made, I thought, a very strong case to show that, it was quite impossible for this country, at this time of day, to set out on the task of suppressing or extirpating Bolshevism or establishing some alternative form of Government to take its place in Russia. I agree with that view. I do not believe that at this moment such a task could be attempted without putting an altogether intolerable strain, not only upon the military and financial resources of this country, but upon the temper of the nation. Lord Curzon spoke with equal frankness as to the possibility of another alternative—the alternative of doing what I think Lord Milner called scrambling out of Russia and leaving things to take their own course there. The adoption of that course would have been, to my mind, one involving a great humiliation to this country and a very heartless desertion of those who have stood by us.
My noble friend found himself then driven to the only other alternative, the alternative which His Majesty's Government have determined to adopt—namely, that of arranging a meeting between representatives of the Allies and representatives of the different groups and communities in Russia, including, of course, the Bolshevist groups, at an island in the Sea of Marmora. My noble friend must have known—we must all have known—that this decision would come as something of a shock to most of us, but I am quite prepared to confess that I, at any rate, am not able to suggest any other procedure. A good deal of doubt has been expressed as to whether what is going to be done expresses a recognition of Bolshevism. I confess I do not think it matters very much what particular words we use in connection with this business. What really matters are the facts of the case, and the facts of the case are that we are, I understand, committed to the policy of meeting these Russian delegates and discussing with
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them the possibility of arrangements for a general peace in Russia.
I may be told that all this is not very relevant to the question of Archangel. But I think it is. I believe we shall all be extremely rash to build our hopes too strongly upon the prospects of the Prinkipo negotiations. We are not yet assured that they will ever take place. In order that they may take place we shall have to collect, from a number of quarters, a very motley crowd of representatives, whom it will not be possible to get together in a very short space of time. The discussions, if they take place at all, are sure to be lengthy, and assuming that they lead to an acceptable conclusion it will take some time to carry out and enforce any terms with regard to which agreement may be arrived at. The Prinkipo Conference, as I have said, may never meet. If it does meet it may possibly fail, and in considering this Archangel problem I think this is a consideration of which we ought not to lose sight. Meanwhile events in Russia are moving fast, and some of them are, I must say, to my mind extremely disquieting.
The position at Archangel is obscure, but we gather that there must be about 25,000 Allied troops there or in that part of Northern Russia. In putting this Question I am not going to inquire how we came to be entangled in the Archangel occupation at all; how we became, to use the words of a distinguished member of His Majesty's Government, "mixed up" in the fighting which took place there. But the position of this Force, whatever its numbers be, has, I understand, been a defensive position, and the military operations which have taken place have, I understand, led to that Force withdrawing to the north and nearer to Archangel itself. A few days ago we read of a successful raid by the defenders, but that raid does not seem to have been a very considerable operation, and it was probably a defensive rather than an offensive engagement. One would like very much to know in these circumstances what is the strength of the Archangel Force; whether it is well equipped and supplied; and whether it is sure of a renewal of supplies should they become necessary. Archangel is, I believe, a wooden town and therefore extremely vulnerable. The port is not an ice-free port, and the occupants of the place are, during a great part of the year, cut off from the rest of the world
I feel quite sure that most people would desire to terminate the situation at Archangel as soon as possible if it can be terminated upon honourable terms. I put down this Question particularly with the object of making a suggestion to His Majesty's Government. I would like to ask them, if they contemplate as possible and as likely to produce satisfactory results a Conference in the Sea of Marmora between the Allies and the Bolshevists generally, whether that policy might not be applied on a smaller scale, and whether it would not be possible to have something of the nature of a conference between the particular group which is concerned with military operations in Finland and the representatives of the Allies. It seems to me that the difficulties of a large and comprehensive scheme of pacification involving the whole of Russia must be extremely formidable. Might not the difficulties be less if the question, instead of being approached in a wholesale fashion, were to be dealt with in parts and by sections? Russia, we were told a few hours ago, covers an area nearly as big in Europe as one-half of Europe and nearly as large as one-half of Asia in Asia. We know that the whole country is in a chaotic and disorganised state, and it seems to me obvious that a general scheme of pacification must be a lengthy enterprise and must present the most formidable difficulties. We are inviting to the Conference representatives of every organised group that is now exercising, or attempting to exercise, political control anywhere in Siberia or within the boundaries of European Russia. That is a serious enterprise. These people may or may not come to the Conference. They may not come at all; they may not come with a sufficient mandate, and they may not be able to agree when they get there. I think there is a great deal to be said for making, perhaps as an alternative to this colossal scheme of negotiation, a much smaller attempt which would concern only those parties who are specially interested in the case of Archangel. The adoption of the smaller scheme need not at all stand in the way of the larger scheme if the larger one proves practicable.
I observed that the Prime Minister alluding to this question a few hours ago, suggested that in dealing with the Bolshevists we were to do what the Government of India is in the habit of doing when it has to deal with a turbulent and trouble-
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some frontier tribe. In that case, says the Prime Minister, there are negotiations with the turbulent tribe; an arrangement is come to, and a punitive expedition is avoided. I would make one remark upon that analogy. In the case of the trouble with the frontier tribe the representatives enter upon the negotiations with the knowledge that if the result is not satisfactory the punitive expedition is there in the background. I confess I do not see how any punitive expedition in this case is going to get rid of Bolshevism in Russia. But there is another blemish in the analogy. When a turbulent tribe gives trouble on the Indian frontier it is very usual to send to the head men of that. tribe and to endeavour to make an arrangement with them, but you send only for the representatives of that one particular tribe. I have never heard of a case in which, when trouble was given by a single tribe, the whole of the frontier tribes from the Khyber Pass to the Baluch frontier were invited to come down and talk business with the Indian authorities.
There is, however, one feature in the Indian case which is, I think, applicable to the case that I am endeavouring to discuss. In the Indian case one of the weapons which the Government of India. employs, very often with the greatest effect, to bring about a satisfactory conclusion is the threat to stop supplies. If you are able to tell tribesmen that they shall not be allowed to emerge from their mountain valleys into the plains of India or to receive the goods that they want from Indian territory, you have a very powerful lever which you can apply to them. I am not sure that in this case of Archangel you could not employ a very similar lever. What I gather is happening throughout the greater part of Russia at this moment is that the population are in dire need of food supplies. As long ago as the month of November last Mr. Hoover, whose authority upon these questions will not be disputed, estimated that there were in Northern Russia some 50,000,000 of people who were cut off from supplies and inaccessible on account of the chaotic condition of anarchy into which the country had fallen. If we were in a. position to tell these people that we could help them with the supplies they want, at any rate that we would oppose no difficulty in the way of their reaching the starving people, I believe we might produce a very considerable impression upon them.
What strikes one when one reads the accounts of these most unsatisfactory operations in Northern Russia is that probably neither side knows quite exactly what they are fighting for. I think something would be gained if the kind of negotiations which the Government have in view could take place on a smaller scale locally, and if we were able to make it clear to these people that what we require is the safety of those who have befriended us, that we are not out to impose any form of government of our own choice on the Russian people and, above all, that we have no desire to starve the population of Russia. I cannot help believing that if such negotiations could be begun we might find it possible to put an end so far as Archangel is concerned to a situation which, I must say, seems to me to be most unsatisfactory, and which fills me with very considerable misgivings in regard I to the future.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, the noble Marquess has raised, as I think he will himself admit, some larger questions than those suggested by his Notice on the Paper. I am rather sorry that these questions were not raised in the presence of the noble Earl the Leader of the House, who would have replied to them as dealing with foreign affairs, because I naturally find it difficult, representing the War Office in this House, to give the noble Marquess any answer to such extended considerations. In fact, I should be rather trespassing on the province of my noble friend if I dealt with these questions. I would only suggest to the noble Marquess that the possible conversations at Prinkipo, to which he has alluded, would be between the representatives of the Allies and all the different organised elements and forces in Russia, whereas such a negotiation as he suggests at Archangel would, I suppose, only be between the representatives of the Allied Powers and the Bolshevist forces who are fighting against them in that district. I am, of course, unable to deal with the question generally now. As to the points raised more specifically in the Notice on the Paper, I think I have already intimated to the noble Marquess that if he would be good enough to put the Question down for some date next week I should be able to give him much fuller information on the subject than I can at present; and if he is disposed to follow that course I think it would be much more advantageous to the House.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, it seems to me that the House has some reason to be grateful to the noble Marquess for having asked this Question, which simply attempts to fill up a gap that was left in the very full and candid statement made by the noble Earl who leads the House in the debate on the Address. Although I call quite understand that the noble Viscount opposite may not be in a. position to reply fully, yet the Question was on the Paper—I have no doubt the noble Earl who leads the House is detained elsewhere by some other business—and I venture to suggest that it might have been in the power of His Majesty's Government and their representatives on the Front Bench to supply us at this early stage in the session with an answer to practically the first Question on foreign or military affairs, placed on the Paper by so responsible a member of your Lordships' House as the noble Marquess.
The question raised is one of very real importance. We are told that negotiations are impending are likely to take place, between some representatives of the de facto Government in Russia and ourselves, possibly also between representatives of other Governments or other interests in Russia, although so far as one can gather from the public Press all those have so far declined to join in the proposed conference. Therefore it appears to us that the country might find itself in the position of carrying on negotiations in the South and carrying on military operations in the North with the same people. That appears to be the position as one can estimate it from what we see in the newspapers.
The noble Marquess mentioned, from the wealth of his experience, the interesting parallel which was drawn by the Prime Minister in another place between what sometimes occurs between the Government of India and the tribes on the Northwest Frontier But the parallel which comes to my mind, as to the position in which we shall find ourselves, is the more significant one of what took place some twenty years ago when the European Legations were beleagured in Pekin. I dare say your Lordships may remember that at that time violent and dangerous attacks upon the Legations and upon the places where the various representatives were gathered together alternated on the part of the Chinese Government with over-

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tures of apparent friendship. I remember reading that on one occasion, after a particularly violent attack, the Dowager Empress of China sent a polite message to the besieged Legation conveying the condolences of the Imperial House with the Italian Minister on the assassination of the King of Italy. On a different occasion I remember that after another attack carts of vegetables were seen to be approaching, and it was shown that they had been sent by the Chinese Imperial Government because it was believed that the Legations were getting short of fresh supplies. That paradoxical position would appear to be created in Russia between ourselves and the Bolshevik Government, if at the same time negotiations were proceeding in the Sea of Marmora and fighting was going on in the neighbourhood of Archangel; and what the noble Marquess suggested regarding the desirability of some kind of local communications, as well as those large-scale negotiations which apparently are contemplated in the Island of Prinkipo, must be all the more enforced, it seems to me, by the fact that we do not really know how far the central Bolshevik Government exercises direct influence upon all the local manifestations which take place. It seems to me, therefore, that His Majesty's Government might well consider whether some local approaches of the kind which the noble Marquess has indicated might not accompany the larger negotiations of which we have heard. I will not attempt to pursue the matter further now, because, as the noble Viscount has candidly told us, His Majesty's Government would prefer to postpone the giving of any further information on the subject, but I repeat that I am very glad the noble Marquess raised it.
LORD WEARDALE: My Lords, before the noble Earl addresses the House, I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that I most cordially thank the noble Marquess for having raised this question so early in the course of the session. It is one of paramount importance, and, as all those who, like myself, have some knowledge of the country about which we are speaking know, it must be approached with the utmost caution. It is one of the most difficult problems with which one has had to deal, and I am afraid that the rather piecemeal inquiry with reference to the Archangel expedition is hardly sufficient for our purpose. I hope, therefore, that
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an opportunity will be given to us at a very early stage of discussing the whole question of our attitude with regard to the Russian people. The Archangel expedition is not the only military expedition in which this country is engaged in Russia. We have, I believe, forces in Siberia. We have naval forces, as we know, in the Baltic. Some naval ships only a few days ago were bombarding some seaport towns on the Esthonian coast; consequently it is insufficient, in my judgment, to deal with the question of Archangel alone. We must reconsider our attitude as a whole with regard to Russia.
I only wish to make a few remarks on this question, and I do so with very great diffidence, because I know how difficult it is. In the first place, I think it has been shown that military intervention, at all events in the way in which we have approached it, has been a mistake. It has only had the effect of inciting the Russian people themselves to take up a hostile attitude towards all neutrals, or friendly intervention on the part of the Allies. The Russian people have been led, and are being led, by the Bolshevik authorities in Russia to regard all our acts as aggression upon Russia as a whole. It has drawn them together. It is not undermining, I am sorry to say—because I am no friend of the Bolshevik administration, Heaven knows—the authority of Bolshevik administration. What we have to do is to adopt a policy which will attract the sympathy of the people of Russia as a whole. I admit that it is a very difficult problem, but the only way in which I think it can be approached is very much on the lines indicated by the noble Marquess, by showing that we are prepared to help them, to bring them aid of all kinds, particularly food, at the present moment of terrible suffering. It could be done and it should be done, not only through Archangel, but at other points more convenient, perhaps, for the proper feeding of the people of Russia.
I think that it should be shown to the people of Russia that we are. not desirous of interfering in the least degree with their internal affairs; that we have no desire to impose upon them some régime to which perhaps the majority may be opposed; that, in short, we are entirely free from all suggestions of that kind, and are only anxious to approach them in a most friendly spirit, and to give them the fullest oppor-

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tunity of settling their own form of Government. If we can bring that home to them by some process on a very large scale of sympathy and support, we shall do more to bring about the regeneration of Russia than by any armed enterprise. Taking that general view of the situation, I hope that an opportunity will be given to us on an early occasion of hearing what the intentions of the Government are, giving this House an opportunity of thoroughly discussing the subject and of placing it, as I hope, in a better and truer light before the people of Russia as a whole.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (THE EARL OF CRAWFORD): Your Lordships can have any opportunity that you may care to take next week to discuss this matter. I only wish to say to the noble Marquess opposite that I think he does my noble friend some injustice in what amounted to a censure at his being unable to answer this Question.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I must protest against the noble Earl's interpretation of what I ventured to say. I simply called attention to what appeared to be the utterance of something like censure by the noble Viscount on the noble Marquess for having brought this Motion forward to-day.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I hope I did not err in saying what I did. Certainly the last thing my noble friend did was to censure the noble Marquess sitting on the bench below the gangway. I merely want
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to explain that the Notice only appeared on the Paper this morning. Lord Lansdowne was informed by my noble friend that he could not give any adequate reply to it to-day. My noble friend assumed—indeed, anybody reading the Notice would assume—that it was purely a War Office Question as to the safety of the troops at Archangel and Murmansk. My noble friend and I, and others, thought the Question referred to the forces at our command there, and to their equipment and revictualling, and so on. My noble friend was not in a position to reply to it to-day. He has given notice that early next week he will have all these particulars ready, and will make such reply as he can. The debate has developed into a first-class one on foreign affairs, in which my noble friend is not versed, and without notice of which it is impossible for him to reply. Next week we shall be warned, and no doubt Lord Curzon will be glad to give a full answer from that point of view.

MESSAGE FROM THE KING.
His Majesty's Answer to the Address of Tuesday last reported by the Lord Steward (V. Farquhar) as follows—
"I have received with great satisfaction the loyal and dutiful expression of your thanks for the Speech with which I have opened the present session of Parliament."
House adjourned at twenty minutes before six o'clock.