§ EARL BEAUCHAMP rose to call attention to the recent interference by the Colonial Office with the rights of natives in British West Africa to dispose of their agricultural produce in the open markets of the world; to ask what other Powers if, any, have imposed similar restrictions, and what effect such action will have upon obligations of this country under the General Act of Berlin or under any more favoured nation clauses, or under any treaty or engagement; and to move for Papers.
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The noble Earl said: My Lords, already since this Notice appeared on the Order Paper His Majesty's Government have in one material point altered their policy in regard to native rights in British West Africa, but the export duty of £2 per ton remains, and it is for this reason that I raise the question. The first stage in this policy was taken when in 1916, as a war measure, Mr. Bonar Law appointed a committee on oil seeds and kernels under the chairmanship of Sir Arthur Steel Maitland. The Committee was composed of Departmental officials, margarine manufacturers, palm oil merchants, a representative of the shipping interest, and Mr. Thomas Wiles, M.P., for Islington, who issued a Minority Report. It is noticeable and regrettable that there was no direct representative of the natives upon this Committee, which reported in the sense no
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doubt desired by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. I quote the following paragraph which contains the gist of their recommendations, but which I hope your Lordships will notice was not signed by Sir Frederick Lugard or Sir Hugh Clifford—
The imposition at an early date in the several West African Colonies of an export duty of not less than £2 per ton on all the palm kernels exported from British West Africa, the duty to continue during the war and for five years afterwards, and to be remitted on all kernels shipped to and crushed in any part of the British Empire. If a duty of £2 per ton be found insufficient to divert the trade to this country, the amount should be raised until the duty is adequate to effect its purpose, and this determination should be made clear from the outset.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPI have not the reference with me. I think it is one of the summaries. Your Lordships will note that there is no guarantee that the £2 per ton is a maximum, or that it might not be raised at any time it appears good to the Secretary of State. After June 1, 1916, and before the White Book was in the possession of Parliament, without any discussion in the House of Commons Mr. Bonar Law issued instructions to the Governors of British West Africa to prepare legislation giving effect to the majority recommendation. The Legislative Ordinances appear to have passed through the local Legislative Councils of Sierra Leone and Nigeria without any difficulty because they were recommended on the plea that it was a necessary war measure against Britain's enemies. In the Gold Coast, however, the proposal met with vigorous opposition, and when it was before the Legislative Council in November, 1918, it was opposed unanimously by all the white and coloured unofficial members. Only the official members of the Council voted in favour. It was open to Sir Hugh Clifford to use his official majority to force the measure through, but this he refused to do and referred the matter to Downing-street for instructions. The whole subject was then postponed until the departure of Colonel Guggisberg in October, 1919. The Ordinances postponed through opposition and various other difficulties, coupled with the fact that the blockade had rendered the measures superfluous, were brought into effect on October 20, 1919, by Proclamation. I should be much obliged if the Government can give me any information 223 in regard to the Gold Coast Legislature in this connection, having regard to the fact that the unofficial members in November, 1918, refused to pass the Ordinance. Has it been passed in spite of their protest?
About October 20 certain unknown difficulties occurred, and there is some reason to believe that the Colonial Office had discovered at the last moment that the proposals as set forth in the Ordinances were impracticable, and steps were hastily taken, with the help of the British Food Controller, to reinforce the Ordinances. Instructions were sent to West Africa to prohibit the export of vegetable oil seeds except upon this basis—10 tons of kernels to competitors for every 90 tons of kernels sent to British manufacturers of margarine and cake; 20 tons of ground nuts to competitors for every 100 tons to British manufacturers of salad oil and margarine, and 100 tons of copra to competitors for every 100 tons to British manufacturers of margarine and cake. The kernels therefore appeared to be doubly protected.
The Indian Government was invited to adopt the same method with reference to ground nuts, but refused to do so. Will the Government produce any Papers on this point? The provision which had been imposed in the latter half of October was revoked, I understand, on December 2. We are all accustomed, my Lords in these days to bad administration by Government Departments. In this case I think we are entitled to some explanation from the Government why these instructions were given and why they were suspended? Surely nothing can be worse in administration than to change your policy so often.
Your Lordships will not be surprised if those of us who are interested in the question view action of this kind with particular suspicion. We do not believe that the object is the retention of foodstuffs specially needed in the British Isles; but we do believe that the result will be to consolidate the financial position of a privileged, but small group, of British manufacturers. The plea that additional and exceptional security against competition is necessary for the manufacture of margarine and cattle cake has some light thrown upon it by the issue of the prospectus of the "Jurgens Group," and Levers, and also various other crushers and oil cake mills. They show such a handsome profit that I do not think it is very necessary to do anything more to assist them.
224 But apart from questions of this kind, international questions are involved affecting treaties with several Powers. Questions arise whether or not France has (she has now a system of licences) already contravened the General Act of Berlin, also what will be the attitude of America in regard to cotton seed under the Treaty of 1815, whether if other British Colonial territories are involved France will retaliate still more effectively and in some more permanent form. There is also the question as to whether if Belgium retaliates we have the right to object, and, if not, what happens to British capital sunk in the Belgium Congo for the expansion of the palm, kernel, and oil industry. I venture to read a letter received by the antislavery society from a firm in Lagos. They say this—
In view of the interest which your society is taking in the question of the special £2 per ton Export Duty now levied on palm kernels shipped to foreign countries from British West Africa, the following extract from a recent letter received from a native of Warri, who is an agent of ours, will interest you: 'The Government has abolished the general bond in connection with the export of kernels, and has ordered that a separate bond must be executed for each shipment of 50 tons or above. On any shipment below 50 tons no bond is allowed, but a deposit of on every ton so shipped has to be paid to the Custom Department, this duty to be refunded, of course, after a landing certificate shall have been produced by the exporter here. It is unfair of the Government to saddle shippers at this end with such responsibility.' The glaring injustice of such regulations is apparent. The larger exporters are allowed by the Nigerian Customs to give a bond to cover this duty, but the small shipper, be he native or European—And, of course, generally speaking he is a native—is debarred from giving a bond, and obliged to pay the duty, for which it is in the highest degree improbable that he will become liable, and which duty will only be returned to him, then without interest, on his producing the landing certificate from the port of discharge for the consignment.That is to say, the money which he deposits is locked up without bearing any interest to him until he gets back his landing certificate, say from the port of Bristol, or whatever may be the place to which the goods are consigned. The letter goes on to say—This certificate it will probably take him six months to obtain. For this landing certificate the charge is 5s. Customs fee and 5s. for clerical work entailed, so that a shipper who makes say fifty small shipments of 5 tons each incurs charges as follows, as compared with his more favoured competitors:—
| 50 Landing Certificates 10s. | £25 |
| 10 per cent. Interest for say—six months on £500, being a deposit of £2 per ton Export duty on 250 tons | £25 |
| Allowing six months for obtaining the Landing Certificate. |
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Beyond this he is deprived of the use of £500 of his small capital locked up on deposit with the Customs. The duty in itself is serious enough, but if such regulations as these are to be inforced to aggravate it, the effect on the small shipper will be that he will be quickly squeezed out of the trade. Considering that apart from a few chartered ships practically nearly every ship loading, at any rate at Nigerian ports, belong to Messrs. Elder, Dempster & Co. and that the itinerary and port of discharge of every ship is perfectly well known to the Customs Department, it is surely extraordinary that either bond or deposit of the duty should be required in respect of palm kernels exported by these steamers when they are cleared for the United Kingdom.
I hope very much that, in view of the well-founded complaint which is voiced in this letter, His Majesty's Government, if they are determined to retain this duty, may at any rate be able to offer seine relief to the small merchants and traders in our West African Colonies.
There is another, but. I agree smaller, point on which I should be very glad to have the opinion of the Government. Your Lordships will see that this ordinance, even in the West African Colonies affects partly these goods when in this country. How far is it possible for an ordinance in the West African Colonies to affect goods while in this country? The refund is not made until after the goods have been in this country for some time, and I should have thought it would have been' necessary there should have been legislation in this country in order to cover goods while within the limits of the United Kingdom.
But the most important issue at stake appears to be the departure front British Colonial policy, because this dictated policy implies a proprietary right of the Mother Country in the internal vegetable resources of the Dependencies. It has hitherto been a cardinal principle of British administration that the right to collect or dispose of virgin vegetable produce belonged exclusively to the native possessors of the soil. Indeed, this was the basis of the British protest against the Congo scandal. The Congo system reposed upon a claim that the virgin produce of the Congo forests, which the native alone could gather, was primarily the property of the Belgian Government, which could dispose of it at will to financial syndicates. The Congo 226 system was in its inception beneficent, but it developed into pernicious exploitation.
The new British policy cannot be compared in degree with that of the Congo, but a similar principle is at stake, namely, the right of the natives of the Dependencies to gather produce which only the natives are capable of gathering, and then to sell the products with out, disabilities in the open market. It is believed that this is the first time that the British Colonial Office has attempted to issue directions for the sale of the native produce almost exclusively in our markets. In this connection it is important to know that the Belgian Government has lately reasserted its determination never again to expose the peoples under its care to the dangers which arise from the combination of commercial interests and executive powers in the same hand.
I should like to point this out to His Majesty's Government. As I understand the Treaty of Berlin imposes upon Belgium certain conditions with regard to duties on palm kernels exported from anywhere inside the Congo Basin. If we allow financial duties of this kind to be imposed in our Colonies, how would it be possible for His Majesty's Government to protest against Belgium if she follows our example. We shall not be in a position, having once abandoned the high principles which have actuated the British Empire until the present time, to refuse to Belgium permission to do the things which we are doing ourselves. It seems to me it would be very curious treatment of the gallant Ally to whom we owe so much. It seems to me that in this matter the action of the Government has weakened our position before the world in regard to the matter of native rights. I can imagine that something might be made of the position of tin. Tin also is a product of these West African Colonies, but I think I may point out one very essential difference which exists between tin and these palm oil kernels. Palm oil kernels are a product of native labour. Tin is almost entirely the result of development by white men; the mines are financed from this country, they are largely worked by white labour, and therefore are in a very different position from the natural native resources of the West African Colonies.
This seems to me to be a curious result of an attempt at Imperial Preference, the object of which was to bind the British
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Empire together. One of the first attempts to put it into operation has produced the unanimous opposition of the unofficial members of the Gold Coast Legislature. The finer policy seems to me to have been indicated by the speech which was made by the late Mr. Joseph Chamberlain in November, 1896, which I shall venture to quote to your Lordships—
We, in our Colonial policy, as fast as we acquire new territory and develop it, develop it as trustees of civilisation for the commerce of the world. We offer in all these markets over which our Flag floats the same opportunities, the same open field to foreigners that we offer to our own subjects, and upon the same terms. In that policy we stand alone, because all other nations, as fast as they acquire new territory—acting, as I believe, most mistakenly in their own interests, and above all, in the interests of the countries they administer—all other nations seek at, once to secure the monopoly for their own products by preferential and artificial methods.
I wish that His Majesty's Government would revert to the principles indicated by Mr. Chamberlain in this connection. The Committee, it will be observed, admit (you may observe it in the White Book, page 23, paragraph 2) that there would a "risk" but they say that the "risk" of injustice to the native is "worth taking" in view of the "object" of the duty. I venture to say, on the other hand, that no risk is worth taking if it means danger to the natives' rights for the benefit of the traders of this country.
May I refer your Lordships to an admirable article which appeared in The Spectator of December 6, and which puts this point forcibly. It said—
If by our Ordinance we are depriving the natives of the right to get the best price they can for their product then we are failing in our duty as trustees to the natives of West Africa.
This is surely a most serious departure from the traditional policy of the British Empire which has been entered into by His Majesty's Government without any public discussion. I am glad to have had this opportunity of bringing it before your Lordships this afternoon, when I hope a full and free discussion may take place. Although I suppose that it is too much to hope that His Majesty's Government may indicate a reversal of their policy, I do trust that they may be able to indicate that they will take such steps as will ensure that the rights of the natives are properly safeguarded and looked after. I beg to move.
THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURYMy Lords, I feel somewhat presumptuous in standing up to speak even for a few moments on this subject. It is a very technical subject, and a very difficult one, and I do not desire to plunge either into the problems of palm kernels or into questions of conceivable preference and the like that are involved in the policy which has been described. The reason that I venture to ask for a few moments' attention is this. Ten years ago I was to the fore essentially in the question of the Congo and its administration, and all the troubles which we then went through. I was practically compelled, not against my will but with my will, to bear a prominent part, and I know that a superficial reading of the literature on this subject—and it can be for me only superficial unless I were able technically to go into the small details—leaves with me an immense whiff of something like the very thing that we were then denouncing in the Congo. I say an "immense whiff," for I think it is very possible that the noble Earl who replies on behalf of the Government may be able to show me and others that we are under a misapprehension.
As it looks to me on the surface of the matter it is something like this. We are now almost for the first time—I hope it is for the first time—departing from the principle which we have throughout endeavoured to lay down that although a European country and above all our own country may take over the trusteeship, control and guidance of a country belonging really to a native people in Africa, we do it with the view of benefiting that people and of making that country when developed a better place not for shareholders at a distance primarily but for the people of the country itself. That we feel was violated entirely in what took place in the Congo ten years ago, and that is what I hope we shall not find is being violated in what is now being done in regard to these West African products. The danger is that what is developed is developed simply for the interests of the concessionaire or the shareholders and not for the benefit of the country and its people, and that seems to me to be bad. At its best such a policy is practically incapable of being worked satisfactorily in the end. Unless we can see that our trusteeship for the child races of the world in the development of the products which they must produce, and which are derived from land belonging to 229 them and can only be produced by their handiwork and their toil, and unless we can see that that production, if it be successful, is going to result finally in gain to the country from which these products are derived and only indirectly to those who are developing it for the purpose of profit we shall fail I think in the way in which we transact our business.
I venture to interpose now because I want to be assured by His Majesty's Government. It is upon that point only that I desire to say this word, but it does seem to me a vital one. If our principles are to be maintained the world over, we must administer a country for the benefit of the simpler races or the child peoples as we like to call them, and not do it merely for the gain of those who administer it because the investment is a sound one. We must act primarily for the advantage and ultimately for the improvement in every sense of the peoples on whose behalf alone it is that we have a right to be there. That seems to me to be a fundamental principle stretching far back into the very roots of the administration of Colonial and other Dependencies which are inhabited by races other than our own. It is because I cannot help feeling some alarm as to the tendency of what is here described that I ask an assurance from His Majesty's Government on the subject.
§ LORD EMMOTTMy Lords, any one who feels as strongly as I do that this recent new departure of His Majesty's Government is a very dangerous one must be grateful to the most rev. Primate for laying down the broad line of the chief objections which those of us who are critics feel about it. Indeed. I think that we are grateful to my noble friend Lord Beauchamp for bringing this matter forward this afternoon. Very often the request for Papers is a mere formality in this House to give the chance of a reply at the end of a debate, but in this case I think that the demand for Papers is justified in itself.
Why is it that after three and a-half years of vacillation this duty has suddenly been put on in October of 1919? What is the real story of what happened in the Gold Coast? I think that some of the circumstances are tolerably well known. General Grey, a man who rendered such extraordinarily valuable assistance to General Maude in his advance on Baghdad 230 that he was specially mentioned in The Times in their account of the affair and praised for what he had done, took his first leave by going back to the Gold Coast Colony. When there he found that this question was before the Legislative Council and he felt so strongly about it that he led the opposition to it, and the opposition was so strong that Sir Hugh Clifford, a most experienced governor, absolutely refused to override the unofficial minority and referred home for instructions. That occurred, I think it is public knowledge, in November, 1918. Why is it that the unofficial minority is overriden after what happened then? Again, what is the reason of the recent restrictions as to quantity, which my noble friend described? What is the reason these restrictions were put on a day or two before the new duty was imposed, and why were they suddenly removed? So far as I know anything of the circumstances, there was no shortage of oils and fats in this country at the time—October, 1919—these restrictions were put on, and I am confirmed in that by seeing in a paper that was handed to me this morning quite unexpectedly called The Margarine and Allied Trades Journal. In an issue of November that journal, in regard to the importation during September of oils, seeds and other goods, said that the increase in that importation was simply astonishing. There cannot, therefore, have been any shortage in October, and I want to know what were the real reasons for these restrictions which have now been removed.
I desire now, however, to speak on the question of principle. It cannot be denied that the object aimed at by this £2 duty on palm kernels to other than an Empire destination is for the purpose of giving an advantage to the trade of Great Britain. May I read a paragraph from the Report of the Joint Committee on the India Bill which seems to me to have a direct bearing on the principle which we are discussing this afternoon. It is said in the paragraph—
Nothing is more likely to endanger the good relations between India and Great Britain than a belief that India's fiscal policy is dictated from Whitehall in the interests of the trade of Great Britain. That such a belief exists at the moment there can be no doubt. That there ought to be no room for it in the future is equally clear.What does that mean? It means, I think, undoubtedly that it is contrary to sound policy to dictate the fiscal policy of the countries we govern in the interests of our 231 own trade. And it is so contrary to sound policy that in the case of India the mere suspicion that it exists is to be removed and India is in future to have the right to arrange her own taxation and to tax the import of goods from this country if she chooses to do so in defence of her own industries. This palm kernel duty is a flagrant violation of the principle of which I speak. I thought that was a self-evident proposition. There is no pretence anywhere in this Report that the duty is for the benefit of the natives. It was imposed on the fiat of the Secretary of State against the wishes of the Colonies. It was carried in the Gold Coast by the action of the official majority at a time when the new Governor had been appointed—I forget whether he had arrived or not—and when an old, experienced Governor had left.This country is so absorbed in other important matters that I am very much afraid that the importance of this particular question is not fully realised. I make no apology for appealing to fundamentals in regard to it. History tells us the story of great Empires that have risen and passed away. The great Empire of Rome was destroyed largely owing to slavery and the exploitation of subject races. More than a thousand years later the great overseas Empire of Spain fell through similar causes. But one had hopes that the British Empire had learnt by experience and found a better way of dealing with native races which would have given it a longer term of life. We began with our Colonial Empire as these other Empires began, but we were taught a sharp lesson by the American colonies and we learned a good deal from it. Later we purged ourselves of the curse of slavery by a somewhat heroic action, the paying of an enormous sum of money at a time when we were almost as overburdened with debt as we are to-day. We learnt how to deal with the Dominions by giving them autonomy on the basis of the famous Durham Report of 1840. We followed with the other Dominions, and the notable case of South Africa, whose statesmen—not of our blood and men who were fighting against us only a few years ago—have stood by us so splendidly in this war, is a justification of that policy.
On the whole, even in the last years of the Company and since the days of the Company we have ruled India in the interests of her people as we conceived 232 them. And in Queen Victoria's reign what the Spectator described in the article to which my noble friend has alluded as "the principle of trusteeship" had, I thought, been finally accepted in this country as regards our Colonial Empire. Trusteeship involves the principle that native races are to be governed for their own interests and not exploited for the benefit of our trade. When I went round the Dominions with a Parliamentary party in the autumn of 1913 I very often took the opportunity of explaining in the Dominions what our colonial policy was as regards those parts of the Empire that were not self-governing. I did it for obvious reasons, and I found that it was often listened to with the greatest interest. I should be ashamed to go round now, with this £2 kernel duty, and try to tell the same story. Indeed, the confidence placed in what the British people have done in the past is almost pathetic at the present time when there are derelict portions of the world left by this great war, many of which are clamouring to come under the ægis of the British Empire. That is a great tribute to the justice and unselfishness of our rule in the past.
Is all this to be changed? Is the war to start a new era of selfish exploitation of native races for the benefit of the people here at home? If so, I am sadly afraid that the Empire, already dangerously large, will soon fall to pieces, owing to the trouble and difficulties that will be created. You may think I am exaggerating and tearing a passion to tatters. All I can say is that I am saying what I honestly believe, and I am not at all exaggerating consciously. To me the new principle involves the exploitation of native races for our own interests, to which I object. It is an absolute reversal of the policy of the last sixty or seventy years. I believe that, if it is continued, it will prove to be a policy of ill-omen to all of us. It is no use saying this is such a little thing it really does not matter. The recommendation of the Committee—and it is endorsed by the then Secretary of State in his Dispatch of June 1, 1916—is that if the £2 duty proves inadequate it is to be increased. It is quite futile to say, as Colonel Amery said in another place, that he did not understand that the native producers will lose in any way. Of course they will lose.
I admit that trade is at present abnormal, and one needs to be very careful how one 233 uses market quotations unless one knows all the details and everything connected with them. But I had some prices sent to me without any solicitation. I have had them checked and I quote them because I believe they are correct. On September 2, weeks before the new duty or the restrictions were put on, palm kernels to Antwerp were quoted at £44 10s. a ton, and to Liverpool at the same time £43 15s. On the 18th, a month before the duty, they were actually quoting for Antwerp £41 10s. and for Liverpool—a rather high price—£42. Quotations of course vary. On October 29, nine days after the duty was imposed, the price was £41 to Antwerp, £39 to Liverpool—just the £2 difference. On November 24 to Antwerp £44 10s. on November 25, to Liverpool £39—there is the difference of the duty, plus the other restrictions on the destination. Also, on December 11 I am informed the price of Congo kernels in this market was £12, of West African kernels £37 10s., and I am told that the difference was because of the restriction in the one case and the absence of restriction in the case of the other.
I do not want to attach too much importance to isolated figures, but I beg you to look at the matter from the other point of view. Supposing a duty for export to other than Empire destinations were proposed for the cotton and woollen manufactures of this country. What would the manufacturers of Lancashire and Yorkshire say as to the effect on prices? Again, take our self-governing Dominions. Is it conceivable that Australia should put on a similar duty as regards wool; or—to take a case more exactly analogous—the case of India, is it conceivable that India would put a similar duty on copra? on ground nuts, on linseed, or on cotton? Incidentally, she was asked to put on restrictions—not a duty—as regards ground nuts and copra and contemptuously refused to have anything to do with it. It needs no argument that when you restrict a market prices will tend to fall. And a more unconvincing a argument I never read than on pages 22 and 23 in this Report. I am surprised that Sir Frederick Lugard should have agreed as it is stated he did agree, to what is there stated.
I have made inquiries about this Report. One member who sat on the Committee told rue that the Report was drawn under the impression that the war was soon coming to a close. I can hardly conceive that this 234 was the case; but at any rate anyone who reads the Report will see that it is based entirely on the belief that Germany was going to be in a position at the end of the war to carry on the competition that she carried on before the war. The only reason given for this proposal is the fear of German competition. I must now read one or two passages from the Report to prove my point. Here is one—
But while this is so, the Committee are still convinced, from the evidence before them, that the bulk of the trade will revert to Germany in the absence of specific measures to the contrary. On this point the Committee are quite clear. The trade will not have become sufficiently rooted in this country by the end of the war to overcome successfully the competition which it will then have to meet.Another passage says—The question is one between this country and Germany. For many years before the war, German traders in British Colonies in West Africa, as throughout the rest of the world, have enjoyed—and abused—British hospitality. Just as German trade has been fostered by the German Government, so German traders have in their turn been the political instruments of that Government. When the war is over, they may be expected to return and carry on trade, as before, if they are allowed to do so. Already discussion is taking place in Germany as to the reorganisation, when peace returns, of her commerce and industry 'in anticipation of a fresh war.'One other short passage—It must be remembered that there is an appreciable danger of State aid on a lavish scale being used in Germany to, retain such an industry as palm kernel crushing, and the British Colonies concerned must be prepared to adopt a resolute policy if they are to avert the danger of the trade returning to its pre-war channel. The Committee, therefore, have suggested a tax of £2 per ton as a tentative measure. If it proves inadequate it should be raised.Those passages prove that the only reason for the suggestion made in the Report was the fear of German competition.The Committee sat from the autumn of 1915 and reported in May, 1916; and obviously they thought that Germany was going to be left in the position in which she was before the war when the war was over. They could not have anticipated that Germany would suffer the greatest defeat known in history. They imagined that Germany was going to be in a position to offer financial aid to this one industry on a lavish scale. They worked on the hypothesis that the trade had not obtained a sufficient root in this country to run by itself. But since that time we have been crushing in this country. We have been 235 bringing to this country from 250,000 to 300,000 tons a year, and crushing almost the whole of it here. The trade has become organised, and new works and machinery have been put down for the purpose. We are told that palm kernel oil is the best oil for edible purposes—for the manufacture of margarine. We know that the manufacture of margarine has enormously increased in this country and that the demand for it is very much greater than it was. But if the case for the temporary protection of an industry here had been sufficiently strong to justify such a grave departure from sound procedure as is here indicated—a thing which I personally deny—the whole case is shattered by the out-turn of the war. The Germans have been turned out of West Africa, their property sold, and the whole trade is in non-German hands. So far from Germany being in a position to resume, her traders have gone, her shipping has vanished, and her financial resources are such that she cannot pay any in-indemnity for some time to come. It is impossible to dream that Germany can give subsidies on a lavish scale to an industry like this. Indeed, if we are to have any indemnity from Germany at all we must allow her to re-start her industries. Whatever case could have been made early in 1916 for this action has now entirely disappeared. As I have said, I do not think that our case was good enough to justify it; but, whatever case there was has now entirely gone.
I agree with my noble friend opposite that the case of tin is not a real precedent. Tin is an article which is irreplaceable. The whole mining of tin is arranged by white prospectors, run by white capital under white supervision, and with the assistance of white engineers. The tin is brought here for the white man's needs. Palm kernel collection is absolutely and purely a native industry. Personally I do not defend the case of tin; I dislike the principle as regards tin; but it does differ almost toto cœlo from the case of palm kernels. The effect of the palm kernel duty is felt by the natives, but the effect of the tin duty is not.
Let me say one or two words about the positive reasons against this proposal. Palm kernels are not a monopoly. France in her Colonial Empire raises 40,000 to 50,000 tons a year; the amount that can be produced in the Belgian Congo is, of course, enormous. It is not a monopoly of 236 this country; but even if palm kernels, as such, were a monopoly, the uses to which they are put can be attained by half-a-dozen or a dozen other oleaginous commodities. Copra has a much larger oil value than palm kernels, and it is practically as good for all edible purposes; and nowadays by the advance of science the process of hydrogenation makes it possible to use whale oil and linseed oil, and so on, and they are being used on the Continent for making a quite good margarine. If all the palm kernels produced in the world had come to Great Britain before the war broke out they would not have provided more than about one-quarter of the oil we ourselves used at that time, to say nothing about France, Germany, America, and the other great countries of the world. As far as I can see, the total quantity of oil produced from palm kernels to-day supplies only one twenty-fifth or one-thirtieth of the whole oil requirements of the world.
Therefore in these circumstances, as palm kernels can be practically replaced by other commodities, the only effect of the lower prices for palm kernels in this market is to tend to raise the prices of other things which compete with it. The British Empire has nothing like a monopoly of vegetable oils, and as to animal fats it is very deficient. America has the great supply. America produces cotton-seed oil and animal fats; the Argentine gives us vast supplies of linseed; the Dutch Colonies give great quantities of copra; the French Colonies give palm oil and other oleaginous commodities, and Belgium has a vast supply of palm kernels and other oleaginous material. What does this mean? It means that other countries have means of retaliation on us even with regard to the matter of oil. France has most closely watched our manœuvres in this matter—I have documentary proof of that if I had time to give it to the House. They have translated the whole of our White Paper; they have translated and put into its proper logical form the evidence given. That they have taken the trouble to do this, shows how interested they are in the matter. Therefore we may be sure that the highly protectionist and scientific people interested in this industry are taking note of the matter. It may be said by the Government that the General Act of Berlin prohibits a preferential duty in the basin of the Congo. That is correct. It may also be said that the Anglo-American Com 237 mercial Treaty dating as far back as from 1815, and still, I believe, in force, prohibits a differential export duty being put on the products of America which are sent from America to British territory in Europe. That also is perfectly correct. But these treaties are not laws of the Medes and Persians; they may be denounced; they probably will be denounced if we are foolish enough to go on with a policy of exasperation such as this seems to me to be.
Another aspect of the question has been alluded to by my noble friend—namely, the unfairness between different classes of natives, and between small traders and large traders. In the mandated territory—the new territory that comes to us of former German Colonies—no such differential duty can be imposed by the terms of the mandate. Therefore the naives of those former German Colonies are now able to sell at the best price they can obtain in the open markets of the world, while the natives of our own Colonies, who stood by us so loyally during the war, are unable to do so. How can we expect contentment in our old Colonies when an unfairness so gross and palpable as that is, being perpetrated? Sir Frederick Lugard and the Committee knew nothing about that matter when they brought up their Report.
Then as to the large traders and the small, I think I ought to tell your Lordships that I am a director of the Niger Company, but I am not in any way speaking on their behalf; I am simply expressing my own views. I say that it is unfair that a great company like that should be able to give a bond instead of money for the quantity of palm kernels that the export, where a small trader, whether native or European, sending less quantities than 50 tons has to provide cash for the purpose. I say it is grossly unfair.
To whom does this advantage enure? I believe it comes to the manufacturers and the crushers. I do not think it goes to the consumer, because the oil market of the world is a great international market, and you will not, by protecting a certain quantity of oil producing raw material in one particular country, lower the general price of oil in the world. But you do lower the price of the raw material which you bring here, and therefore I think the profit enures to the manufacturers and crushers.
Mr. Bonar Law, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1916, in speaking 238 of the Report of the Committee in the House of Commons, suggested that the objectors to the idea of the new duty—for it was not then in existence—were influenced by manufacturers. I presume that the Margarine and Allied Trades Journal, which is a new production to me—it happened to be placed in my hands today—speaks for some of the manufacturers. It is a highly protectionist journal, and this appears in the issue for November—
Palm kernels, ground nuts, copra, to be protected for our use. If the £2 per ton is not yet imposed, the policy of prohibition has been accepted.The information on which they rest their pæan of joy is obviously out of date. But it shows the spirit in which this matter is regarded by some of those who are supposed to represent the manufacturers.I apologise for having detained your Lordships so long. I trust that I have done something to show, in the first place, that this new duty exploits the native of West Africa in our old loyal Colonies—not in the new mandated Colonies—for the benefit of the manufacturer here; in the second place, that it is not needed against Germany, and it also Would be ineffective if it were needed because they would equally well buy other things; in the third place, that it is foolish for this country to set an example of an expert duty, because it is provocative of retaliation; and in the fourth place, that the trade is quite profitable here at the present time and there is no need for protection at all. In conclusion, I say that if protection is necessary, in Heaven's name let there be protection by subsidy or some other rational measure, and not by the mean and un-English policy of exploiting the native races for the benefit of our traders at home.
§ VISCOUNT BRYCEMy Lords, there is only one point to which I desire to call your Lordships' attention, in addition to what has been said by my two noble friends and the most rev. Primate. It was alluded to in passing by my noble friend Lord Emmott, but I think it deserves separate attention. It is to be found in the Covenant of the League of Nations. In the provision for Mandates in Article 22 of the Covenant there is a paragraph which prescribes the treatment which is to be given to natives. It begins—
Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee—239 Then a number of points to be guaranteed are specified: freedom of conscience and religion, and so forth—and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.The point of that, of course, is that in the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which we and the other signatory Powers have recently assented, there is a principle that in the territories of native races which are to be administered under a Mandate equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of every member of the League are to be given. That is a principle to which we have just set our hands, and which very likely may have been introduced in deference to what has been, on the whole, our traditional policy. Nigeria is not subject to a mandate. These territories were already ours, and they will not come under the Mandate. But there is the principle. Is it right for us, having recently affirmed that principle, to deviate from it in this particular case and to refrain from giving equal opportunities simply because we happened to have Nigeria already? I think that is inconsistent with the line of policy we have taken; it would not be fair, and would be very likely to give rise to attempts at evasion on the part of other countries.My noble friend Lord Emmett referred to the possibility that there might be retaliations. So also where there are other countries enjoying Mandates, if they see that in one of our Colonies we are not observing the principle which is laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, they might be inclined to evade and find excuses for a departure from that policy of equal opportunities. It has been the policy which we have followed out for many years. It was enunciated in that quotation from the speech of Mr. Chamberlain which my noble friend Lord Beauchamp read to the House. It is a sound principle in the interest of the natives themselves. It is one which has been vindicated by our practice during many years, and it would be a very great pity if, in a case like this, where any possible benefit to British trade is, of course, infinitesimal, we attempted to set an example of deviating from it.
THE CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER (The EARL of CRAWFORD)My Lords, I must thank my noble friend Lord Beauchamp for having given me very 240 specific notice of the points he wished to raise, and I think I shall be able to answer them with one exception, upon which I have not a complete note. But I confess that I was not prepared, upon the comparatively narrow issue formulated in my noble friend's Question, with an answer to what in effect is a general debate on Free Trade and Imperial Preference, dealt with by Lord Emmott. But I will deal, though I fear in rather a perfunctory manner, with some of the matters which have been raised, notably by the contribution made by the most rev. Primate.
In the first place, let me say that this is not a new matter. It has not just been settled, as Lord Emmott tells us, after years of vacillation. This question first came up soon after the war began, in the time of Mr. Asquith's Government. The policy was settled under Mr. Asquith and by Mr. Asquith's Government, and it was not settled or agreed to by that Government until it had been submitted to the closest scrutiny by a large and carefully-constructed Committee. Eleven out of twelve members of that Committee who were in England at the time the Report was signed, gave their adhesion to this policy. I emphatically deny that it was with the object of consolidating the position of a privileged and small group of British manufacturers. I forget which of the noble Lords said that, but those are the words I took down from the lips of one of your Lordships. That was not the object of the Inquiry. Far from that being the case, it could not have been the object of the Inquiry, because when the Inquiry took place there were no manufacturers of these kernels to speak of in this country. The industry practically did not exist here, so that there could have been no question, at that time at any rate, of consolidating any advantages for British manufacturers.
No; I must ask your Lordships to go back to the position as it was in 1915, and to think perhaps a little less of the British manufacturers and of British trade, about whom we have heard so much this afternoon, and to think a little more about the actual, concrete hardship of the producers of these goods in Africa. Before the war, from a variety of reasons, including a skilful manipulation of tariffs, Germany had virtually acquired a monopoly of this crushing industry. The war came and shipments to Germany had to stop. The export of these goods, so far as the pro 241 ducers was concerned, practically came to an end. Prices which had been remunerative to the producer in Africa disappeared altogether. There was a collapse. Prices, which are to-day £20 a ton, fell to the disastrous figure of £9 a ton in 1915, when the export to Germany stopped.
It was with a desire to help the Colonies, and not for the mean and gross motives which Lord Emmott ascribes to these three successive Governments—primarily with a desire to help the Colonies to find an alternative market for the produce—that the Colonial Office was led to enquire into the subject. They were driven into this Inquiry, and where an industry, a producing or exporting industry, has fallen into the hands of one monopolist importer, the greatest service you can render to that production is to find an alternative destination for the goods. And, as I say, an Inquiry, a most careful and meticulous Inquiry, was accordingly held by the Colonial Office, and action was taken.
What has been the result of that? Lord Emmott said that in 1916 the Committee reported in the belief that the war was going to come to an end shortly, and he quoted two or three sentences which showed that the Committee thought that the attitude of Germany in this commercial matter was of paramount moment. I agree that there were people in 1916 who thought the war was going to come to an end quickly, but whether the war came to an end quickly then or not, or whether, shortly or remotely, Germany is going to re-enter the market for palm kernels, the effect of that series of Ordinances has been that a new market has been created for these goods which did not exist before the war.
§ LORD EMMOTTMay I ask the noble Earl which Ordinances?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI use the word "Ordinances." It may be the wrong word to use—the action under which this duty is imposed.
§ LORD EMMOTTBut it was only imposed on October 20 of this year.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDThe absence of shipment to Germany, as the noble Lord is aware, ceased with the war.
§ LORD EMMOTTOf course.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDThen, when the Inquiry was held, a recommendation was made that this differential duty should be imposed. On the strength of that guarantee, we were able to build up an industry in this country; and, therefore, as I say, we have got in this country—and I think it also applies to British Dominions as well—plant and equipment, which did not exist before the war, which represent a potential consumer of these African products, and which (in other words) gives the producer of palm kernels an alternative, and a second; market. That, I say, is an invaluable asset to the producer of these palm kernels. Supposing this had not been done and in the course of time Germany had been able to revive the virtual monopoly she held over these goods, the producer would have had only one market. The most rigid and the most immaculate Free Trader cannot object to an alternative market being given to the producers of goods. It carries with it competition, cheapness, a variety of assets which I know are highly valued by Free Traders.
What was the practical result? When this Report was issued and when it was accepted by the Government, the assurance was there by given to manufacturers here that for the remaining period of the war, and for I think a period of five years after peace was declared, or ratified—I forget which—this differential duty should be allowed to continue. On the strength of that assurance plant has been set up in this country, and in large quantities. There has been a considerable development here at home of the crushing industry. I do not know whether it is wrong to point out, or wrong that it should have occurred, that this has resulted in increased employment of people in this country; or that a second result is that the output of margarine in this country has been considerably increased. Lord Emmott might argue that owing to the manner in which these two results have been obtained, these things are to be deplored.
I will therefore turn to the third result—namely, that the grower and collector and the man who does the preliminary cleansing of this fruit in Africa have gained enormously by the fact that during the war we have set up this industry, and have been able to take scores of thousands of tons for 243 crushing, and thereby have been able to pay a remunerative figure which, without that, they could not possibly have received. This is said to be a great departure from British policy. Natives, we are told, have complete freedom in handling the national products of their soil. Lord Emmott insisted upon this in a most gloomy fashion, predicting in effect the end of the British Empire in consequence of this action on our part. I hope to-morrow morning, if I may say so with perfect good humour, that he will read through his speech and make a schedule of the epithets and terms of obloquy with which he has assailed all those who support Imperial Preference.
§ LORD EMMOTTI must beg the noble Earl's pardon. I did not deal with the question of Imperial Preference at all; I never mentioned the term. I was dealing with this matter and pointed out why it was against public policy. The noble Earl accuses me of hurling epithets and terms of obloquy against those who believe in Imperial Preference. I said nothing to justify that remark.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI am delighted to hear it. I should have said "Preference within the Empire." I am glad to think that those epithets were not directed against those who advocate preferential duties within the Empire. But there are ample precedents for this. Lord Beauchamp was, I think, rather painfully conscious of the tin precedent. He said that tin is very different from palm kernels. Of course it is. He said that palm kernels were produced by native labour and that tin in Asia was not. That, in effect, is what he said. It is not the case, of course. There are many of your Lordships who know the Straits Settlements and who know how tin is produced and smelted there. I undertake to say that no white labour is employed except in its superior direction and control.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPI never said a word about Asia. It never entered my mind.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI am speaking of the Straits Settlements. It is a distinction between the Straits Settlements in Asia and Nigeria which is in Africa. The principle is exactly the same. Native labour is used for producing tin just as much as it is used for clearing palm kernels. 244 I say that there is ample precedence for this. Export duties have existed for years and years. It is a perfectly recognised form of public income in these Dependencies. It exists in Nigeria, in the Gold Coast, and in Sierra Leone. Let me here answer the question which Lord Beauchamp asks about the Gold Coast. He is quite correct in what he said, and I merely state this in order to confirm his statement. The Ordinances imposing a differential export duty on palm kernels was passed by the Gold Coast Legislature by nine votes to eight by the use of the official vote, all the officials voting for the Ordinance and all the non-officials against it. I do not think it applies to a very great degree to palm kernels, but I am not sure about it. I think the Gold Coast places an export duty on other products of its own country, such as cocoa.
§ LORD EMMOTTDifferential duties?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDExport duties. The articles in particular in West Africa are palm oil, cocoa, and one or two other items. In the Malay Straits it is tin and rubber. Lord Emmott referred to the preferential duties on tin from Nigeria. These were actually proposed (not merely export duties, but preferential export duties) under the régime of Lord Harcourt, and I believe they are in actual force to-day.
There is one other precedent which, I think, should be quoted. Lord Emmott said that the India Government contemptuously refused to do something of the kind in relation to copra. I should like to inform him that in July last the Government of India itself proposed that an export duty should be imposed in India of 15 per cent. ad valorem on hides and skins, but that a rebate of two-thirds of the duty should be made in the case of bides and skins tanned within the British Empire. The legislation imposing this duty has actually been introduced. There again is not exactly a precedent but an ample example that these things can be done by Governments which are concerned with the interests of great native populations.
Lord Beauchamp also put two further questions. He asked what effect such action will have upon obligations of this country under the General Act of Berlin or under any most favoured nation clauses? I think there must be a little misappre- 245 hension about that. He rather illustrated it by referring to the General Act of Berlin and its relation to the Congo Basin. I am informed that the British West African Colonies are not bound by the free trade provisions of the General Act of Berlin since they are outside the Basin of the Congo. Therefore they are completely free to do this, and such action can apparently have no effect under the General Act of Berlin because it does not apply to them. I desire also to inform the noble Earl that no most favoured nation clause of the Treaty, nor any other Treaty engagement, gives any foreign power a right to object to the preferential export duty on palm kernels in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, or Gambia. That particular point therefore should not cause any diplomatic difficulty.
I am afraid I cannot answer the question which Lord Bryce put to me. I do not carry the text of the group of clauses of the League of Nations in my mind, but if I understand him aright he said that every country had agreed that there should be complete free trade in all Colonies or Dependencies where there were large native populations.
§ VISCOUNT BRYCENo I did not say that. I intended distinctly to say that we were not bound, as regards Nigeria, by the passage in the Covenant of the League of Nations. What I said was that we have declared it as a principle which ought to apply to any African colony which comes under a mandate. It does not apply to Nigeria because it is a British Colony already and does not come under a mandate. We have asserted this principle in the case of all African Colonies that do come under a mandate, and it seems a pity that we should depart from the principle in the case of this Colony of our own.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDPerhaps I had better not embark on a discussion of this kind, as I have not examined the subject; but I should be much surprised to learn that the American Government, for instance, has thus tied its hands about the Philippine Islands, France about Madagascar, Spain about her interests in Morocco, or Holland with regard to her interests in Java; or, indeed, how far it is compatible with adherence to that clause to impose preferential railway duties, or preferential dock, harbour, and freight duties, or systems of through rates, which seem to me just as good as preferential duties. Still 246 Lord Bryce must understand that I never forecasted a technical question of that kind, but I will make sure that my right hon. friend Colonel Amery, who is in charge at the Colonial Office during the absence of Lord Milner in Egypt, shall have his attention drawn to this particular clause.
I have detained your Lordships longer than I had intended, but I desire to refer to what fell from the right rev. Primate. May I say that I heard his speech with some surprise. He used the phrase that the name of the Congo is associated with atrocities and systematic misgovernment. He spoke furthermore about our trusteeship for the child peoples of the world, and the danger that the development of these colonies should be in the interests of concessionaires. I discussed this general question on two occasions with officers of the Colonial Office, and I asked them what further points, other than those raised by Lord Beauchamp's Question, were likely to be raised by subsequent speakers, and these public Officers told me this that and the other on which they desired me to be prepared to answer, but I confess it was never suggested to me that this action on the part of the Government was susceptible to so grave a construction as was put upon it just now.
I do, however, recall now one thing which was told me at the Colonial Office a day or two ago, namely, that—whether it was one colony in particular or the four colonies in general I have forgotten, but at any rate in our West African Dependencies—there has recently been a very severe loss of revenue owing to drastic action being taken by the authorities, with the cordial assent of the Colonial Office, to reduce the trade in strong liquor. I was told that the income which will be derived from these duties will materially contribute to make good these losses, and I was also told that it will probably be used also for the erection of schools.
I demur to the statement by Lord Emmott that this is selfish exploitation. I, at any rate, should not be ashamed to talk to any fellow subjects of mine in His Majesty's Dominions as to the action of the Government in this matter. I do not admit that there has been any dishonesty of purpose on our side, and I refuse to accept the indictment of Lord Emmott of our motives, or to admit aspersions which I regret are so widespread, so uncompromising, and as 247 I think so unfounded. This policy has been considered throughout not merely as an aspect of the German imbroglio of 1915, not merely in order to establish a new and a useful trade in this country, but in the interests of these African Colonies which have always been to the front in the Colonial Office here. I believe that their motives in pressing this forward—three or four Secretaries of State for the Colonies in succession—have been purely honourable, and I believe it will be really beneficial to the Colonies concerned.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, this question would naturally have been dealt with by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and I have no doubt that the noble Earl opposite regrets that Lord Milner is not here to make a reply to my three noble friends who started the debate; but your Lordships will, I am sure, agree that the noble Earl, who is labouring under considerable physical difficulties which we all deeply regret, has made a careful study of the subject, and, so far as the facts of the case admitted, has dealt fully with the indictment which was made by my noble friends, and on particular points by the most rev. Primate. The subject, of course, can be approached from two different points of view, and has two different aspects. There is the question upon which the noble Earl became indignant in his closing sentences, as to whether the natives are being fairly and properly treated according to the old traditions of the British Empire, under these Regulations. Further, there is the question of the fiscal side of the matter, and as to how far this particular action on the part of His Majesty's Government involves au approach to a protective system.
So far as the interests of the natives are concerned, this is in one respect no new subject to me, because when I was at the Colonial Office, a number of years ago, on more than one occasion British firms endeavoured to secure monopolies for palm nuts in different West African colonies. The attempts at that time dealt less with the question of palm kernels, which are used for the extraction of the finer oils, than with the outer shell of the palm, which is used for the production of the coarser kinds of oils, which are not edible oils. The reason which actuated us at that time, and I think my successor at the Colonial Office also, in refusing those lucrative monopolies, which no doubt would in a sense have encouraged trade, was that it was im- 248 possible to feel that under them the interests of the natives could be sufficiently safeguarded. I do not think the noble Earl alluded to, or at any rate he did not attempt to explain, the fact that in the particular Colony of the Gold Coast the unofficial members of the Legislative Council were unanimous in opposing the imposition of these duties, which were forced on the Colony by the action of the official members, who, being official members, have to vote as they are instructed by the Government.
I confess that I cannot feel satisfied, after hearing the reply of the noble Earl, that there has not been on this side of the question some departure from the ancient custom which was so well defined by Lord Beauchamp and by Lord Emmott and also by the most rev. Primate—that of regarding ourselves as primarily in such matters the guardians and trustees of the interests of the native races inhabiting our Colonies and Dependencies. The two conceptions of Empire have been fully explained by former speakers, the opposite conception to that which I have mentioned being the utilisation for commercial purposes of Colonies inhabited by what have been considered in the past inferior races. The history of our Indian Empire in the past is by no means entirely free from the taint of such a conception, and it was, as everybody knows, the danger of that sort of thing which early in the nineteenth century caused the political control of India to be taken from the East India Company, and which finally placed India under a special Department of its own in this country. One cannot help feeling that in Colonies which are Crown Colonies but are more strongly represented on the native side and are consequently more vocal, this particular step could not have been taken. In such a Colony as Ceylon or Trinidad it would have been impossible to take the steps against the wishes of the unofficial members which I understand Sir Hugh Clifford was compelled in the long run to take at the Gold Coast.
I pass from that side of the question to the commercial side, to which the noble Earl devoted the greater part of his speech. I understand that he maintained that it was part of the work of the Government to which I belonged—
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI was speaking of the Government before the Coalition. I was under the impression that the noble Earl was speaking of Mr. Asquith's Government before the Coalition. The Government in which I had the pleasure of being a colleague of the noble Earl is then considered to have been responsible for the adoption of the principle upon which this action is founded. I do not know whether the noble Earl desires to imply that this action is in conformity with the decisions of the Paris Conference. I think that perhaps he may, because, as we know, at that Conference different political action in relation to trade was laid down to be taken during the war and was foreshadowed for an intermediate period after the war, and finally for the future, generally speaking. It is important to remember what was alluded to by Lord Emmott—that in 1916, although all the Great Powers and the small Powers represented at the Paris Conference were fairly confident of victory, yet we could not at that time venture to foresee so complete a victory, ending in an entire political and economical break-up of Germany, such as that which rather more than two years later took place. It was quite possible then that even though we obtained the victory which would close the war it would be by no means in its economic aspect a victory such as crowned the year 1918, and the Resolutions of the Paris Conference for which I was partly responsible—I was one of the three representatives of the Empire there—were founded on the possibility that Germany at the close of the war aught still be, although beaten in the field, economically very powerful and able to carry on in various fields a rivalry with us in which in some respects she might enjoy even greater advantages than she had possessed before the war.
That possibility has entirely disappeared by common consent—I think even by the consent of those who shake their heads most dolefully about the possibilities of renewed German aggression. This being so, it is not safe to found upon what happened then—before the Battle of the Somme as it was—or upon what happened at the Colonial Office at that time, arguments for the taking of new action at this time, or even for the maintenance of action which may then have been necessary as a safeguard. The noble Earl adduced a number of cases in which export duties are imposed in Colonies and Protectorates, and he might have added that they are some- 250 times imposed here. A former Government proposed for a time an export duty on coal from this country, and we all know that export duties in themselves are thoroughly recognised means of raising revenue, although they ought to be imposed with extreme caution because their effects are uncertain; and it is also the fact that unless the country in which the duty is imposed possesses a monopoly, or at any rate a qualified monopoly, of the article the subject of the duty, the duty will not be paid by the foreigner but, like so many other duties, will be paid by the consumers of the article in the country itself.
But the point is surely in this case, not whether it is expedient or reasonable to raise revenue in the West African Colonies by means of an export duty, either upon tin or upon any other product., but whether the imposition of this particular duty inflicts a hardship upon the inhabitants of the country. The noble Earl has tried to show that it does not. He has taken the bold line of saying that the duty is imposed from a desire to assist the Colonies. How you can assist these West African Colonies by limiting the market to which their products can be sent, I confess, passes my comprehension.
The noble Earl's argument (as I understand it) is that, unless the duty had been imposed, margarine factories would not have been set up in this country or in other parts of the Empire, and that now there would be a smaller market for palm kernels than there is, if the duty had not been imposed. I greatly question whether that contention can be sustained. In the first place, there was a growing tendency in this country to manufacture margarine before there was any question of imposing the duty; and, again, the country which has been the principal and most successful manufacturer of margarine, namely Holland, is also subjected to this disability, with, I conceive, the probability of reducing the consumption of palm kernels there. In fact, it is not easy to separate this contention of the noble Earl's from—I going to say almost the mechanical use of the old Protectionist arguments with which we have been so familiar ever since the subject had a new birth in the year 1903. And when the noble Earl said that, according to the best of his recollection, when Lord Harcourt was at the Colonial Office a preferential duty on some Imperial product was imposed, I 251 confess I should be very glad to know what that product could have been. I certainly never heard of such a duty.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI appear to have said that under the régime of Lord Harcourt, whom I believe to be a Free Trader of irreproachable virtue, an export duty on Nigerian tin of a preferential character was seriously proposed. I do not know whether he put it into force, but it was seriously discussed under his œgis.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI can only say that, as a colleague of my noble friend, it was never discussed within my hearing, and I cannot help thinking that, if it was discussed in his, he must have refused to assent to it.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEHowever, I pass from that. I am quite certain that the noble Earl is convinced from the information which is before him that something of the kind took place.
The only other point on which I desire to say a word is regarding the possible infraction of the Berlin Act, as to which the noble Earl pointed out with perfect accuracy, I believe, that these Colonies—Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Gold Coast—not being in the Congo basin, did not fall within the ambit of that Act, and that therefore there can be no infraction of its provisions as regards them. That is precisely on all fours with the point that was raised by my noble friend Lord Bryce with regard to the League of Nations, in which he pointed out that these, not being mandatory territories, did not fall under the stipulation laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations. But in both cases the point is that if you take this action, so different from that imposed by the Berlin Act, or recommended by the League of Nations Covenant, we are stultifying ourselves as an Empire and removing, or doing away with, the old traditions which have so fortified our Imperial position.
The point surely is this. We have now for 150 years held a worldwide Empire. It 252 was considerable before that, but for that period we have held a worldwide Empire, through the control of which we might have earned the hatred of the whole world and have come to be regarded as a public enemy to civilised Europe. There has been, no doubt, some jealousy of us, and we have been habitually regarded as a rather hypocritical nation. But we have never earned that sort of dislike which, if we had used our imperial position worse, we might so easily have incurred. And, above all reasons, that is due to the fact that our ports have been open and all countries have been able freely to trade in them, and have had the freest use of the products of our great Colonies and Dependencies. If there is to be a departure from that rule, particularly at the time when we are endeavouring to take the lead in setting up the League of Nations, we place ourselves, as I venture to think, in a most unhappy position in the face of Europe and of North and South America, and we cannot be surprised if, in spite of all our sacrifices and the part we have played in the war, we are regarded with suspicion, if not with actual dislike, by all the Powers with whom we have to deal commercially or otherwise.
§ VISCOUNT CHAPLINMy Lords, I am inclined to apologise for taking part in a debate in which I did not hear the mover of the Resolution. On the other hand, I should be very sorry if my noble friend opposite who is in charge of this debate should not be told by some one, at all events, that he has in the speech that he has just made, the hearty support of, I believe, a good many noble Lords on this side of the House and of a great many other people outside. Quite apart from the Paris Conference, it is not so very long ago that the principle of Imperial Preference was announced as accepted by His Majesty's Government by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the other House. This announcement led to a dinner being given by prominent Tariff Reformers and advocates of Imperial Preference in this country, and among those who were present was one of the most distinguished members of your Lordships' House—namely, my noble and learned friend, the Lord Chancellor. Indeed, the Lord Chancellor made what was called "the speech of the evening" upon that particular occasion. Therefore, that the noble Earl should be flouted and attacked from two different parts of the 253 House for the acceptance of that principle, and for stoutly maintaining it, is something to which I could not submit without saying a word or two in his defence, and in confirming my complete support of everything he has said.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPThe noble Earl who responded for His Majesty's Government was good enough to satisfy me in nearly every particular. There is, however, one Paper to which I shall refer in one moment, but before I do that may I make a comment upon the noble Earl's reference to the speech made by the most rev. Primate? He told us, as I understood, that in preparation for the debate to-night he was good enough on two occasions to consult the officials of the Colonial Office with regard to everything that might possibly be said upon this question, but that they never suggested to him that the rights of the natives or the interests of the natives would enter into this discussion.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDNo, not at all. Really that is not fair. My noble friend must not say that. I asked, "On what case shall I be attacked apart from that of which Lord Beauchamp has given me notice?" and they told me a variety of things—Lord Crewe has referred to one and Lord Emmott to others—but it did not occur to them that this action laid them open to the imputation made by members of this House that the rights of the natives had been disregarded and still less that the natives had been badly treated.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPI accept that. May I ask the noble Earl whether he will transmit to the Colonial Office this aspect of affairs which has been discussed in more than one newspaper and is an impression which is commonly held by a number of people outside your Lordships' House? Will be insist that the Colonial Office shall consider the matter from the point of view of the interests of the natives themselves, and how far this differential duty bears hardly on them? May I beg that the noble Earl at the same time will point out to them that in this country, where the differential duty exists, the natives get a lower price for their produce than they get for the produce which they send to other countries? It seems to me that if they consider those figures it will be difficult for them to come to any other conclusion 254 except that the differential duty causes a loss to the native producer, and in so far it very harmfully affects his existence in the British Protectorates? I hope that this point of view will be put before the Colonial Office, and, perhaps, on some future occasion, we may be favoured with their views on that aspect of the matter.
The other point to which I wish to allude is this. As I understood the noble Earl, this question is no new one; it has been considered for a long time; from the moment when the war broke out it was obviously a question which had to be dealt with. The result of it has been that this Ordinance was promulgated in the month of October, 1919. In the meantime, without the help of this Ordinance a large and thriving industry has been set up. If this large and thriving industry has been set up in the course of those, years, I do not quite understand how it is that this differential duty was necessary on October 20, 1919.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPIt may be due to the assurance. The noble Earl said something about an assurance. Might we have that assurance laid upon the Table of the House, because that seems to me to be a matter of very serious importance? If the noble Earl would agree to lay that assurance on the Table of the House I will with draw my Motion for the production of Papers.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI understand that an assurance was given by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons, in public; probably in the first Official Statement on this subject by a Secretary of State, which, I think, must have been in August, 1916. That is my impression. If I am correct in this, the assurance, of course, is public property. Lord Beauchamp also asked that I should get some Indian Papers. I will inquire about those Indian Papers, but I do not really know what they are. I think that I gave him information about which he obviously did not know—namely, the preferential treatment accorded by India in the question of hides. I imagine that the noble Earl will be less interested in the discussion of India on the question of oil seeds, and palm oil, and so on, because in the case of hides the Government of India has conceded the propriety of this preferential duty. I will make inquiries 255 and see if there are any relevant documents which can be laid. When I say "laid," I mean that I will submit them to Lord Beauchamp first, and ask him whether he thinks it necessary to go to the expense of having them printed.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPI am obliged to the noble Earl. I shall be glad to see the documents with regard to hides as well as those with regard to seeds. The point about which there is some difficulty is the assurance. If it is a public assurance it certainly will not be necessary to lay it upon the Table of the House. May I take it that if there is an assurance of any other kind the noble Earl will lay it upon the Table of the House?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORDI will undertake that a complete statement shall be made as to the justification of my remark that an assurance has been given. What form that assurance took I will endeavour to find out.
§ EARL BEAUCHAMPI am much obliged to the noble Earl, and I am willing to withdraw my Motion.
§ Motion, by leave, withdrawn.