HL Deb 16 April 1919 vol 34 cc361-80

Clause 1, page 1, line 24, after subsection (2) insert:

Provided that, before an order under this section is made applicable to soldiers of the regular or territorial forces of the Crown who had enlisted prior to the fourth day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen, the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than fourteen days during which that House is sitting, and if either of those Houses before the expiration of those fourteen days presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft, or any part thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, without prejudice to the making of any new draft order.

The Commons disagree to this Amendment:

Because it is consequential on the previous Amendment to which they hare disagreed.

In the event of the House not insisting upon the latter Amendment, EARL STANHOPE had given notice that he would move the following Amendment in lieu of the Amendment to which the Commons have disagreed: Provided that, before an order under this section is made prolonging beyond the fifteenth day of October nineteen hundred and nineteen, the service of soldiers of the territorial forces of the Crown who had enlisted prior to the fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than fourteen days during which that House is sitting, and if either of those Houses before the expiration of those fourteen days presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft, or any part thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, without prejudice to the making of any new draft order.

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT PEEL)

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons Reasons be now considered. I think it will be more convenient for your Lordships, as I see that my noble friend has on the Paper an alternative Amendment, if I make my statement after he moves his Amendment.

Moved, That the Commons Reasons be now considered.—(Viscount Peel.)

EARL STANHOPE

My Lords, I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to the reasons why the Commons have disagreed with the Amendments that you made in this Bill, and I think that in a very few words I can show that the reasons given are totally inaccurate, and that it is not this House which has a misconception of the Bill and of the facts but the other House, and particularly the Secretary of State. I confess that I was rather disappointed not to have heard my noble friend opposite in regard to this Bill, because, much as I admire his powers in debate, I think he has seldom had a more difficult task in debate than the one which faces him this afternoon. When he spoke on the Second Reading of the Bill he told your Lordships of the hardships which the Regular Army had undergone, and he put that forward as a reason why they should not be held under the operation of this Bill. But when the Bill gets to another place the Secretary of State proceeds to say that the Regulars are held under other terms of enlistment, and that actually they are much harder and longer than the terms of enlistment of those under this Bill.

Now, my Lords, what are the facts? It is quite true that in regard to the Infantry and Cavalry the terms of enlistment with the Colours are seven or eight years; but with regard to other parts of the Army they are very considerably less. For instance, the drivers in the Royal Engineers and Army Service Corps enlist for two years. The sappers in the Royal Engineers and the supply men of the Army Service Corps, the R.A.M.C., and the Foot Guards enlist for three years with the. Colours and nine years with the Reserve. In all those cases the term of service is less than that of those under this Bill, and has proved to be less. than that of those who enlisted for the period of the war, which has after all been a good deal more than three years. Therefore, when the House of Commons disagrees with the Lords Amendment because the Regular Army is serving under an attestation of longer duration than those under the Bill, your Lordships will see that the statement is totally inaccurate. In regard to the question of their being different in character, I should like to know what the difference is. When a man enlists in the Army he goes wherever he is ordered. He serves on a battle front or becomes part of a garrison according to the circumstances of his particular unit. The difference in character of the service given by these two sets of men cannot possibly be defined by simply describing them as being in the Territorial Force or any other part of the Army. As your Lordships know, there are in Mesopotamia men of the Regular Army and of what is called the "Kitchener" Army, as well as men of the Territorial Force. Therefore, their services in that particular area have been identical.

With regard to the second Amendment, the House of Commons, very wisely I think, merely disagreed to the Amendment because it was consequential on the previous Amendment. That again, I think I can show to your Lordships, is not the case, because all I have to do, in order to make the second Amendment independent of the first, is to move to leave out the two words "Regular or" in line 2 as it appears on the Paper. The whole of the rest of the Amendment, as your Lordships know, deals entirely with the Territorial Force. If I cut out the words "Regular or" in the second Amendment which was agreed to by this House, that Amendment has nothing to do with the first and is not consequential upon it. I have placed on the Paper a different Amendment because, if your Lordships agree to approve of what the other place has said, in spite of its inaccuracy, I think I should be meeting the Government better by proposing the Amendment which appears On the Paper.

We are all quite aware that it is impossible to bring back men from Mesopotamia and India at present, and that it is impossible to bring them back throughout the hot season. The point of the Amendment is that, so soon as the hot season is over, the men would have to be brought hack and demobilised, unless the Government show cause for holding them in India or elsewhere. Therefore state that if they desire to retain the men of the Territorial Force who enlisted prior to the commencement of the war longer than October 15, His Majesty's Government should place an Order on the Table of the House.

The difference between my view and that of the Government is this. His Majesty's Government state that they desire to bring back the Territorial Force, and I have not the least doubt that they intend to bring them back if it is convenient to do so. I want the Territorials brought back unless the Government show that that is impossible. The reason I put in that an Order should be made is this. Every one knows that there is nothing a Government Department hates more than to have to give reasons why it cannot do such and such a thing, and I am quite convinced that if we call on the War Office or any other Department to say why they are not going to bring back the Territorial Force in the middle of October, or, if you like, at the end of October, we shall find that the Territorial Force is brought back; but, if we do not, it is very likely we shall find that, the Ministry of Shipping may say that they have no shipping to spare because they have to take back, possibly, American troops, who have not had a single winter in the trenches and have not been more than two years from home. They may say they have to fetch freight from the other end of the world, and that shipping will not be available to bring back the Territorials from Mesopotamia and India and other places. If the Order has to be made, I am convinced that the Secretary of State for War and my noble friend and those who work under them will ensure that shipping is available and that the men are available, and that they will do everything in their power to avoid haying to come to this or the other House to ask that the men should be detained. Therefore, this is ensuring that the men are brought back.

I should like to quote to your Lordships the pledge given by the Secretary of State in another place. We are told that the Secretary of State and ray noble friend have given many pledges on this subject, and that they ought to be sufficient. What is the great pledge? It is this— I hope that the Territorials will be released at the end of the present year; that at least nine out of ten will then be brought home. After all, that is only a pio us aspiration. First of all, it is merely "I hope"; secondly, only "nine out of ten''; thirdly, it is only proposed that they should be brought back at the end of this year; fourthly, nothing is said about the tenth man who, apparently, may be held as long as His Majesty's Government desire. I venture to think that is really no pledge at all. It is far from being sufficient to satisfy the Territorial Force and those who have done their service in distant parts of the Empire during the past four and a half years.

I know it is said that the Territorial Force Association has, so far, made no great objection to the relation of the Territorial Force to this Bill. That may be the case, but I am quite sure it is not going to continue to be the case. When my noble friend meets them on May 1 next he may find that their views on this subject will be considerably stronger than perhaps have been expressed in the past. I may point out, in regard to transfers in Clause 2, that there is a differentiation as against the Territorials, who may be transferred from one corps to another after the termination of peace, while that cannot be done with any other part of His Majesty's Forces. So, too, in regard to this clause. Those who served in the Regular Army will be excluded from the operation of this Bill, and that, after all, is my reason for not entirely trusting to the Army Order. The Territorials, however, will not be excluded from the measure. We are told that the Army Order is to be sufficient for them, although it is insufficient for the Regular forces. I am entirely in the hands of your Lordships, but I do suggest that, unless we get much better reasons than we have been given, your Lordships should consider whether the Amendment which I wish to move should not be insisted upon and put into the Bill.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD BIRKENHEAD)

The Question is that the Motion moved by the noble Viscount—that the Commons Reasons be now considered—be agreed to.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

VISCOUNT PEEL

If it meets with your Lordships' approval, I will move that the Lords do not insist on the first Amendment. That will clear the way for the noble Earl's Amendment.

Moved, That this House Both not insist upon the Amendment in Clause 1, page 1, lines 18 to 20.—(Viscount Peel.)

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

We are agreed in accepting the decision of the House of Commons on this Amendment, and we will take the discussion upon my noble friend's Amendment.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

VISCOUNT PEEL

I now move that your Lordships do not insist on the second Amendment.

Moved, That this House doth not insist upon the Amendment in Clause 1, page 1, line 24.—(Viscount Peel.)

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

We shall all agree with that, and then move the insertion of our own words.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

EARL STANHOPE

I beg to move the Amendment which stands in my name.

Amendment moved, in lieu of the Amendment to which the Commons have disagreed.— Provided that, before an order under this section is made prolonging beyond the fifteenth day of October nineteen hundred and nineteen, the service of soldiers of the territorial forces of the Crown who had enlisted prior to the fourth day of August, nineteen hundred and fourteen, the draft thereof shall be laid before each House of Parliament for a period of not less than fourteen days during which that House is sitting, and if either of those houses before the expiration of hose fourteen days presents an Address to His Majesty against the draft, or any part thereof, no further proceedings shall be taken thereon, without prejudice to the making of any new draft order.—(Earl Stanhope.)

VISCOUNT PEEL

I am much obliged to your Lordships for assenting to this course, because it is the most convenient one, and it enables the issue to be taken more clearly on my noble friend's Amendment. The real question before us is the position of the Territorial Force in India. On that point I do not think there is any difference of opinion in any quarter of the House. We are all anxious to bring back the Territorials at the earliest possible date we can from India. There is no difference of opinion at all on that, and therefore what we are dealing with now is really a matter of detail.

There has been much discussion of the services of the Territorials, and a great and proper tribute has been paid to them by many noble Lords in this House who are fully competent to speak on the subject. One recognises that there are a large number of your Lordships who, either as Lords Lieutenant, or Presidents and Chairmen of the different Territorial Associations, have a peculiar interest and also a peculiar knowledge of the conditions governing that force. I think I may be allowed to say that the Government and the War Office are not one whit behind noble Lords in their appreciation of these services. I have expressed as strongly as I can on two previous occasions their sense of the great services rendered by the Territorials, and especially by those who have spent these long years in India. I want, as emphatically as I can, to repeat that statement, and to say on behalf of the War Office and the Government that we do most fully recognise the devotion and the services these men have rendered to the Empire.

I should like to remind your Lordships that these Territorials about whom we are speaking are due for demobilisation under the Army Order; only those who have been called up for service subsequent to January, 1916, are to be retained. Therefore, not only the Territorials who enlisted before the war but also those who joined afterwards, in 1914 and 1915, are all free to be demobilised, and will be demobilised at the earliest possible opportunity. The only reason why these men are still in India is the physical impossibility of relieving them. As I have explained already to your Lordships, it was not possible to relieve them in December and January because there were no troops to relieve them, and the garrisons of India must, of course, be retained. Then intervened the hot weather, but it is the determination of the War Office that the Territorials in India shall be the first men to be relieved when the new Armies are organised. Really, therefore, there is no issue between us at all, except this—that my noble friend has expressed some dissatisfaction, or some lack of confidence in the Government and the War Office, and suggests that the time for which these men should be retained, instead of being left to the authority under the Bill, as it is now, should be under an Order, which should be laid on the Table of the House, and should not be operative until it has lain on the Table of the House for fourteen working Parliamentary days. My noble friend has to some extent altered the Amendment as it went down to another place.

The only Order that could be made (if my noble friend gets his way) prolonging the service of the Territorials, without being laid on the Table of the House, would be up to October 15. I will explain why it is physically impossible to bring back these Territorials by October 15. The trooping season only begins in the first week in October; therefore the earliest date at which the first of these Territorials could sail from India would be October 5 or 6. It is obvious, first of all, that they could not be all brought back before October 15, and it would be futile to make an Order because it would have to be followed by another Order—

EARL STANHOPE

I am quite prepared to put the date later, if that would suit the noble Viscount.

VISCOUNT PEEL

—which would have to be made immediately prolonging the service of these Territorials to some specific date later in the year. That Order would have to be made at once, because the operation of the present Military Service Acts comes to an end with the ratification of peace, and as the ratification of peace must be an uncertain date—and as the Order would have to lie on the Table of the House fourteen Parliamentary working days before ratification—you would have to lay it on the Table immediately.

What would happen supposing you take the date suggested and do not lay the Order on the Table of the House immediately. You would be able to make your Order until October 15, but, owing to these physical difficulties, you must make the subsequent Order at some period before October 15. You must make it some time in July whilst the House was sitting, because of the long period it has to lie on the Table of the House. In July you would not be able to say for certain what the shipping position would be in October. It is impossible to do so, and if you wait until a later period, say September, when the House is not sitting, the Order would not be operative at all. Was it really suggested that you should summon both Houses of Parliament to do nothing for fourteen Parliamentary days simply in order that they may have an opportunity of presenting an Address if they desired against the Order? That is clearly im- possible. Then you could not wait until the period of October, because you would rim this tremendous risk—that the Order would not be operative, that the ratifications would be signed, and that there would be no control at all of these Territorials in India. Therefore I submit that my noble friend's Amendment is not a very practical one.

Moreover, these releases from the Army are going on, as your Lordships know, at a great pace, and all this is being done under Administrative Order. Why then put one Administrative Order into a Bill, and let all others, go scot-free. May I make this suggestion? Suppose that we did get some such date as October or September or whatever it may be, and supposing there was—I do not suggest there may be—some difficulty in India suddenly arising? Is it really wise to say that an Order which might be retaining the Territorials just embarking should not be valid for thirty days? Is not that a duty which really ought to be thrown upon the Executive? There might be all sorts of serious difficulties which one almost shudders to contemplate arising under these conditions. Therefore I invite the House to accept the assurances which my noble friend was given in another place, and which I have given on more than one occasion here, that it is the determination of the Government and the War Office to release, these men at the first opportunity that it is physically possible to do so and that shipping can be obtained to bring them back.

May I call your Lordships' attention also to what happened in another place. I think it is usually the case when your Lordships desire to insist upon some Amendment that it is because you receive at any rate some considerable measure of support in another place. The proposals of my noble friend—and his present proposals are really only a slight alternative and modification—received no acceptance and no support whatever in another place. The statements of my right hon. friend were accepted there absolutely. Your Lordships, of course, can do precisely what you like, but I think it is my duty to point out that there was not a single dissentient voice raised in the House of Commons against the proposals of my right hon. friend. I ought to say further that the proposals of my noble friend—very similar indeed to those he has at present on the Paper—were only carried by five votes in your Lordships' House, so that my noble friend is really asking your Lordships to insist upon an Amendment which was unanimously rejected in another place, and was only carried by a majority of five votes here.

I respectfully ask your Lordships not to press this Amendment further. We may all agree that the debate itself has been a valuable one, because it has given the opportunity for your Lordships to show that great interest in the Territorial Force which we all know that this House takes. We know that your Lordships have great experience of this Force, and that you are ever ready and have a particular right to speak on its behalf, and that you have shown, by the interest which you have taken in this matter, to the Territorials in India and at home that your Lordships' House is ever mindful of the interest of the Territorials.

THE DUKE OF NORTHUMBERLAND

My Lords, as the noble Viscount. who has just sat down has based his argument largely on what occurred in another place, I should like to point out that the arguments which were used there, which may or may not have been good ones, were totally different from those which the noble Viscount has used in your Lordships' house. The two arguments used in another place were—first, that used by the Secretary of State for War, who emphasised the distinction between soldiers of the Regular Army and soldiers of the Territorial Force by saying that soldiers of the Regular Army are serving under attestations longer in duration and of a wholly different character from those of persons included in the scope of the Bill. I do not quite know what that means, because there does not appear to me to be any reason why a soldier of the Regular Force should be specially favoured. His period of service might have expired in August, 1914. The Territorial might have enlisted in July, 1914, and his period of service would not expire for another four years. Why you should favour the soldier of the Regular Forces rather than the Territorial I do not know. In any case it appears to me to be extremely undesirable to draw this distinction between the Regular and the Territorial. The one principle that we have had dinned in our ears since the beginning of the war is that there is no distinction at all between the two Services; yet the moment war comes to an end the first thing that happens is that the Government makes the conditions of service for the two totally different, placing the Regulars on one footing and the Territorials on another.

The second argument used in another place was one which I believe is due to a complete misapprehension. It is that if my noble friend's Amendment were allowed to pass it would have the effect of retaining Territorials in India after the ratification of peace who would not be under military control. But such a contingency as that could be perfectly avoided. I think it is beside the point altogether; at any rate, the noble Viscount has never made use of any such argument in your Lordships' House. His arguments are totally different, from those which he said influenced the House of Commons. I think that it is not wholly irrelevant to point out that the arguments used in another place really need not be given such serious consideration by your Lordships.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, I am not quite sure that the elaborate references to what passes in another place are altogether convenient, because, as none of us were there, it is rather difficult for us to tell exactly what did take place.

VISCOUNT PEEL

My noble friend quoted first.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

I hope that my noble friend will not object to my method of advancing my argument. If you are to discuss the relations between the two Houses on these occasions, I think that it is not immaterial to remind your Lordships of the circumstances under which another place were called upon to consider your Lordships' Amendments. There has, of course, been the usual crowd of business at the end of this part of the session—the usual hurry under which these matters are decided under the control of His Majesty's Government. The Amendments of your Lordships were taken to another place and considered there the very same evening that the Bill passed through this House. I do not know whether even the House of Commons had your Lordships' Amendments printed in their hands. I am quite sure that they could not have had very much time to consider them, because we disposed of the Bill about half-past five or six o'clock, and the Commons dealt with it before they went to bed. I do not think, therefore, that my noble friend the Under-Secretary is justified in laying too much weight upon what he called the unanimous opinion of the House of Commons. They had not the opportunity of considering our Amendments; I doubt even whether they had ever seen them.

All these things, of course, are rather complicated. Let me say that in the first place. In the second place, let me say a word as to the dates. I think that your Lordships must have noticed what stress the noble Viscount laid upon the date "the fifteenth of October." I think that if you cut out the arguments which he founded on October 15 you would have cut out the greater part of his speech. That argument was, of course, effectually demolished by the respectful interruption of my noble friend who sits behind me, and who said, upon the question of date, that he was perfectly willing to accept any reasonable date which might be suggested by His Majesty's Government. Of course, if it turns out on discussion that October 15 is a little too soon, let the Government suggest a day. If they do not I shall be quite ready to suggest a later date myself. And supposing we suggested November 15 or November 30, then exit the greater part of the Under-Secretary's speech—it entirely disappears. I always think that when a speaker relies upon a detail of that kind it shows that he really is conscious that his case is not a particularly strong one.

If we turn from this mere question of dates—which, as I have shown, is quite insignificant, a mere matter of adjustment—then what is the substance of my noble friend's argument? In the first place, the plea put forward that the Regulars were not placed in a better position than the Territorials as the Bill passed through the House of Commons is not accurate. It may be true of a great many of the Regulars, but it is not true of all of them. There are a large number of Regulars who will be better treated in this respect and have greater privileges than the Territorials. That is the first, inaccuracy in the arguments of His Majesty's Government—an inaccuracy used in both Houses of Parliament. It is not the case that there will be a great number of Regulars who will be in a better position than the Territorials, I quite admit, but a certain number of them will be.

The next point which my two noble friends behind me urged—and it is very important—is the variety of argument that is used by the Ministerial speakers. When this Bill was before your Lordships on a former occasion great reliance was placed by the Under-Secretary upon the hot weather. He said, "You cannot bring troops through the Red Sea in the hot weather; therefore your Lordships' Amendment will not do." We are very reasonable people. We were quite conscious that the hot weather had to be considered. That is why the elastic provision was put, into the Amendment as it left your Lordships' House; but, in case that elastic provision is not sufficient, my noble friend Lord Stanhope has now altered his Amendment and prevented its becoming operative until the hot weather is over. It may be that October 15 may not be quite early enough, but in principle he has made it elastic. Then exit the second argument of the Under-Secretary. First of all the date argument has gone; then the hot weather argument has gone.

And if we have demolished both those arguments, what is left of the Government ease? Supposing we provide in your Lordships' House an Amendment which is not open to the argument that we are bringing Territorial troops back through the Red Sea in the hot weather, why should the Government any longer resist the Amendment? In the previous debate the Government had no other argument. Now there is another argument. The Under-Secretary has now found that there may be other reasons besides the hot weather which may keep the Territorial troops in India. There may be. It is quite possible there may be some serious Occurrence in India which might make it necessary to keep the Territorial troops there, apart altogether from the question of hot weather, but that contingency is abundantly provided for in my noble friend's Amendment. Because at the date that we are now considering—that is, in the autumn—your Lordships' House and the other House of Parliament will certainly be in Session, will have been in session for many weeks, and if there was really a difficulty in India the Government have only to lay the Order on the Table of the House, or indeed, if it was a real difficulty, they have only to propose emergency legislation which, of course, your Lordships' House would pass, probably in one day, and so would the other House. So that really there is nothing in the argument at all. It is empty. There is nothing in the argument of the date because we are prepared to modify it; there is nothing in the argument of the weather, because we have avoided it; and there is nothing in the other argument, because Parliament would easily provide for it if the contingency which the noble Viscount hinted were to arrive.

Then what is the reason why the Government object to the Amendment? Why are they so unwilling? Why should not we say, on behalf of the Imperial Parliament, to the Territorial Force who have been kept in India under these circumstances of great hardship, "We give you a statutory right to return unless the emergency is such that both Houses of Parliament agree that you should be detained." Because that is what my noble friend's Amendment said. Is that an unreasonable thing to do? The noble Viscount says, "Oh, we have provided for all that in the Army Order." Well, these Army Orders are capable of modification, and even while this Bill has been going through Parliament the process of modification has been obvious. First of all they were to come, back as soon as the hot weather permitted it. Then, as the authorities of the War Office began to consider the matter, they were not quite sure that they could bring them back so soon as that: they were gradually modifying their opinion. And so, when the Secretary of State came to speak in another place he did not speak any longer of the hot weather only; he said that he would engage to bring back most of the Territorials by the end of the year. What weather? The middle of the winter, And not all the Territorials, but only nine out of ten. You observe the process of disintegration in the policy involved in the Army Order already beginning. That will go on and on, of course.

We have no guarantee except the guarantee of the good faith of His Majesty's Government, who no doubt will do their best to keep their word. But, of course, none of us who are familiar with the method of Public Offices are ignorant that the pressure put upon Parliamentary chiefs by all sorts of departmental difficulties is so great that when it comes to the point they allow themselves to be persuaded that the situation is so formidable that they must stretch their powers to their utmost limit. And so it may easily turn out that one man out of every ten, according to the Secretary of State's phrase—or more perhaps—will be kept not only beyond the hot weather, not only beyond the end of the year, but up to the full limit of April 30; and, as far as I read the Bill, it may be three months later before these Territorials are actually discharged from active service.

I have made the case as well as I can; I hope the House will not think I have made it with too much emphasis. But I would make an appeal to the Government. After all, let them realise—what I am sure I realised and what we all realised when we spoke on the Second Reading of the Bill—that the Bill is a very unpopular Bill. Of course, it is a very unpopular Bill—a Conscription Bill: that does not prevent its being a good Bill, but it is a very unpopular Bill. We did our best to support the Government on the Second Reading. We did so at the time when we thought the Government would be well advised if they would mitigate it in every way they could. My noble friend Lord Stanhope, who is an expert in these matters, has come forward and suggested a mitigation, and the Government are adamant; they will not make the least concession. In face of the opinion of the country, in face of the obvious desire of the country to do everything they can to mitigate the hardships of conscription, the Government will not make any concession. I am sure they are wrong. I suggest that they might say to us that our fears are unnecessary; that as a matter of fact the most sanguine expectation of the Government as to the return of these men will be carried out to the letter; that if it mitigates any kind of apprehension in the country as to the fate of the Territorials, of course the Government will be the first to consent to it. They can always keep these men ultimately if the two Houses of Parliament consent to their doing so; and in a case of real emergency both Houses of Parliament—certainly your Lordships' House—would do that. I invite the Government to make a concession. Let them do that which will do them no harm and which will be a guarantee to the country that they, equally with ourselves, have the greatest regard for the susceptibilities of the Territorial Force, and do their best to make a necessarily unpopular Bill as palatable as it can be.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

My Lords, I have not the same right as some of your Lordships to intervene in this debate, because I am neither the President nor the Chairman of the Territorial Association of the county of which I am Lord Lieutenant, But I am in frequent touch with the Territorial Association, and I also take a special interest in this particular subject, because at the time when these Territorials went out to India I was Secretary of State for India and I was in daily conversation with Lord Kitchener on the subject. I know very well how unwillingly he sent them, feeling the hardship to both officers and men of being sent off from their homes, as they were, at such short notice; but it was recognised by them and by the country generally that it was absolutely necessary to call back the trained British troops from India and to replace them by these Territorials.

Now after these long years of great hardship to them—the greatest hardship, as I think, to those who have had to do what is practically garrison duty in India, very often in the plains in the hot weather, during all these years; greater upon these than upon the smaller number who went to Mesopotamia—this further hardship has arisen. I need not discuss all the circumstances, because they have been so fully explained by the noble Earl and the noble Duke who have pressed this question. It simply comes to this. We are invited, and the Territorial Force generally is invited, to say, "Will you not trust the War Office and the Army Council on this matter without having the position ensured by an Amendment such as that of the noble Earl?" I think the simple answer is that on this particular question the Territorial Force are not prepared to trust the War Office. They, of course, place all due belief in the assurances made here by the noble Viscount (Lord Peel), and in the other House by the Secretary of State. They would readily admit that both the noble Viscount and the right hon. gentleman will do all that they can, recognising the hardship on these particular troops, to get them home some time during the next cold weather. But circumstances may arise which will make that difficult. I have always looked on the noble Viscount as one of the most adroit debaters in your Lordships' House, but I think he showed less than his usual skill in laying the stress he did on the possibility, or even the probability, of some untoward circumstances which would necessitate the further de tention of these troops. That is, of course a possibility. And, as the noble Marquess (Lord Salisbury) has explained, if a real necessity were to arise, both the troops themselves and those who speak on their behalf would recognise the necessity of their retention there even longer.

But there are such things as false alarms. There are headlines in the newspapers alleging disturbances, and possibly exaggerating them. What these men and their friends may well feel is the possibility that some scare may arise which will offer a quite plausible excuse to detain them still longer in the East, assuming which is quite possible—that, either for reasons of transport or from the difficulty of supplying reliefs, it may be really inconvenient to return them here during the course of the next cold weather. Nobody knows what dimensions the New Army will reach by that time. The Secretary of State in the House of Commons a day or two ago gave a most forlorn picture of the present figure of recruiting; and it is conceivable that the argument might be used that, until a sufficient number of trained troops of sufficient age are ready to go out to India, those men must remain there a little longer. Because it has to be borne in mind that the New Army is being furnished with very young recruits, and, as we all know, men cannot be sent out to India until they have reached a certain degree of maturity.

It really comes to this, that the Territorial Force does not feel that Whitehall is very friendly towards it it may be an unfounded belief—and that being so, surely it is, as the noble Marquess has said, worth while for the Government to strain a point., and even to sacrifice what they may conceive to be their dignity in a matter of this kind, in order to reassure those who feel deeply on such a matter as this. I cannot think it is worth while for His Majesty's Government to stand out on a small, and not indeed material, point of this kind; and I therefore join in the appeal which the noble Marquess who spoke last has made. It is always unpalatable to me to get into any sort of collision with the House of Commons. When I came down here this afternoon my hope was that I should be able to support His Majesty's Government on this matter; bat the arguments that have been used have convinced me that it would be wise for His Majesty's Government to assent to the Amendment of the noble Earl, Lord Stanhope, and I shall certainly support him if it comes to a Division.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, lest it may be supposed that the Government is guilty of any disrespect to the noble Marquess who spoke last and to the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, who made a very forcible speech, I have been asked to say a word. I would wish to clear away one misconception. Let no one suppose that it could ever be the reason which has prevented the Government from assenting to the argument so forcibly put forward by Lord Stanhope that it was any question of dignity. In dealing with the case of a most meritorious and deserving section of the Army—men who have spent years in a most trying climate, without the glamour and glory of war and yet suffering the trying separation from their families—to think of dignity in such a connection would be folly and worse. Whether the Government are right or wrong, I hope your Lordships will do them the justice of believing that the last consideration by which they would be guided in such a matter would be any consideration of false pride.

I hope in a very few sentences that I may be able to satisfy your Lordships that there is a case on the merits. The Amendment as it is framed adopts as the pivotal date October 15, and I think there is a general recognition that the adoption of that date would be quite impossible. It would be quite impossible for the simple reason that, having regard to the conditions of climate, which are well known, the shipments could not commence till a date which would be almost October 15, and your Lordships know enough, after so long an experience of war, as to be generally aware of the immense collection of transports and the enormous organisation that is required before so large a number of troops can be moved. The real question is not one of date, but a broader question. It is whether any case exists to-day which would make it wise for your Lordships to prescribe any date. That is really the broad question; and let me state why I think your Lordships would not be well advised, unless there is a real case of suspicion, to prescribe a date. In the first place Lord Salisbury said, with reference to the speech of the Secretary of State in another place, and Lord Stanhope made a similar statement, that any pledge given by him was wanting in explicitness, and he said, in the second place, that it only referred to nine out of ten of the Territorials, and that it was wholly lacking in the quality of adequate assurance in the matter of date.

I think it would be very unfortunate if your Lordships proceeded to a Division, if a Division became necessary, with the slightest misunderstanding as to the attitude of the Government, and at the risk of repetition, and having authority to do so, I assure your Lordships that there is nothing equivocal, there is no reservation of any kind, in the attitude of the Government, and that when my right hon. friend said, as he did, "nine out of ten," he was of course guarding himself against what everybody in the least familiar with military matters knows must be a necessary reservation, because every unit loses one man in ten who is detailed for staff work or other special contingencies. My right hon. friend not only did not intend that there should be any real reservation, but in using a proportion so high as nine out of ten he meant that every Territorial soldier whose service was not imperatively required in the Forces would be returned under the circumstances of which he spoke.

Lord Salisbury added another observation. He said that the pledge which depended upon the continuance of the hot weather had disappeared. Really it was not so. I read the speech of my right hon. friend most carefully, and there was nothing in the whole of his observations which in any way attenuated the clear pledge which he and the noble Viscount had already given—namely, that there is no consideration at this moment which prevents the Territorial Army from being brought home except the existence of the hot weather, and that the moment the hot weather ends, at the beginning of October, every conceivable effort will be made by the Government, who regard it as a paramount consideration of honour, to return them to this country at the first possible moment.

My Lords, I make this explicit assurance, and having made it with authority I think I am entitled to ask your Lordships whether any case has arisen which would justify your Lordships in putting upon the Government a date, when the War Office tell us there are administrative difficulties, which in their judgment are very considerable, in the adoption of a date. Your Lordships have the representatives of the Government saying in this House, and telling you that they do so with the consent and authority of the Army Council and of the Secretary of State, that they regard it as an obligation of this character, that the moment the climatic conditions are such that large bodies of troops can safely be brought over to this country the task will be commenced and will be carried out with all the resources of shipping at the disposal of the Government.

I have told your Lordships that circumstances may arise which at present are unknown to us. Who knows what may happen? Who knows whether at the particular date both Houses may be sitting? The whole issue which now divides the Government from its critics is whether it is wise at the last moment to insist upon a date, when we have been told with all the emphasis of which the Departments concerned are capable that the intention of the Government and of the War Office is such as I have indicated. Although I agree with Lord Salisbury that it is not always a convenient process to consider in detail what occurred in another place, because it is not always what is said that is immensely important (there are very often atmospheric conditions), still, making due allowance for such conditions, this is true—that I think four or five soldiers spoke in another place and all of them had considered this matter, and all said in plain language that they were under deep committance to the Territorial Force in India, and were satisfied with the case made out and the assurances given. Therefore I do earnestly suggest to your Lordships that, haying received an assurance so explicit, you may well be content with the powerful protests which have been made in this House, which are much stronger than those which were made in another place, and which no Government can disregard.

On Question Amendment negatived.