A LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

HL Deb 19 March 1918 vol 29 cc476-510

LORD PARMOOR rose to move to resolve—

That this House approves the principle of a League of Nations and the constitution of a Tribunal, whose orders shall be enforceable by an adequate sanction.

The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I should like to emphasise at the outset that my Resolution deals with the principle of a League of Nations, and does not purport to deal with matters of detail. There were two reasons why I put my Resolution in the form in which it stands—first, because I think logically we have to consider the question of principle before it is worth while to consider matters of detail; and, secondly, if the two had to be considered together, I am afraid I should have to encroach for quite an unwarrantable time on your Lordships' patience.

The question in my Resolution, has, I think, been discussed, and discussed several times, in almost every country, both by statesmen and by these who are specially interested in the science or practice of International Law. I am sure I may say this without contradiction, that the result of that discussion has shown that there is a vast margin of instructed opinion in favour of the principle contained in my Resolution. As far as I can gauge opinion, it comes to this—that we have suffered and are suffering from what I may call international anarchy, and that the time has come when we should put a more settled order in place of the existing international anarchy, founded on the restraint which comes from the recognition of mutual obligation as between one country and another. The principle, as I should put it, is that ordinary restraint means freedom as between nations when properly adjusted, as it is recognised to be the only basis of true freedom as between individuals in any particular country.

We know, too, that there is much talk of reconstruction after the war, but I put it to your Lordships that the first measure of reconstruction which will be necessary after the war will be international reconstruction. I will go further, and say that unless you have some process of international reconstruction, bringing with it a degree of stability and permanency in the peace conditions, there is not much hope of the principles of national reconstruction of an industrial and social kind being carried into successful effect. In other words, we want an era of peace after the war if the various nations are to recover from the difficulties and losses of the long period of warfare through which they have gone.

I think the shortest way is to quote a statement of principle from the League to Enforce Peace, which was founded in America. I quote it for this reason. Ex-President Taft is the president of that Association, and it has been supported in the fullest way and in the fullest terms by President Wilson, whom I regard as the protagonist in favour of the principle to which I am asking your Lordships' assent. This was said at a meeting— Right-thinking men of every land resolved within a week of the tragedy of the present war that it should never be repeated if they could help it. Then the statement goes on to say that "It was inevitable"—I ask your Lordships' special attention to these words— It was inevitable that some sort of creative action should follow … that would provide something which would take the place of slaughter in settling some, if not all, future international disputes. The creative action there referred to was the creation in America of a League of Nations, under the name of a League to Enforce Peace.

Of the many statesmen who have spoken in favour of this principle, none has spoken more constantly or more fervently than President Wilson. The principle of the Resolution is, in truth, a restatement in a different form and different words of the original objects for which we undertook the burden and duty of this great war. I think I may say that we, as a people, desired whole-heartedly and with practical unanimity to put an end to an arrogant militarism, and at the same time to enforce a recognition of an adequate standard of international right and justice. I think that is stating quite fairly what had the whole-hearted and practically unanimous approval of us all at the commencement of the war. Certainly, as far as I am concerned, I did and do give it my most hearty assent and approval. If that is the desire, fairly stated, I ask your Lordships this question, Is there any other way in which it is probable that these results can be obtained except under the principle of a League of Nations? I must express my belief that there is no other way in which these aspirations can be realised. So that, in my opinion, the principle that I am advocating may, at any rate from one point of view, be regarded as a restatement of the principles which practically permeated all of us when the war broke out. The alternative—the only alternative that I can see—is to go back to the doctrine of force as the only element in international relationship—force, which enshrines, of course, the doctrine of the Balance of Power, a policy not founded on any principle but on the desire to see how much you can get, which I consider a backsliding in principle as regards matters of international relationship and international intercourse.

Perhaps I may real a small extract from a German paper, Vorwarts; because I think it is of advantage to read foreign papers, particularly when so much of our thought is given to foreign relationships, and because I believe it puts rather cynically what I have suggested. Vorwarts says this— Each country sees nothing but light on its own side, nothing but shadow on the other; but amidst the general talk of lasting peace and reconciliation between the peoples there is the question in the background—What shall we get out of it? My desire, as a result of this war, is not that the nations should consider "What shall we get out of it?", but that they should bring forward a principle which I believe contains the foundation of a permanent peace based on right and justice in international relationships—that is to say, the principle which is contained in the idea of a League of Nations.

Let me now try to define in a sentence what is involved in the principle of a League of Nations. I would define it in this way. The principle of a League of Nations involves the acceptance of a common public law imposing upon nations the obligation of mutual restraint in international relationships. Or, in other words, to bring about a system of mutual legal obligation between nations as now exists in different countries as between individuals. The result would be, in my view, to secure as far as practicable the maintenance of a stable international order and to solve without resort to war—which is at the present time the only resort known—matters of international dispute. Matters of international dispute, of course, are certain to arise, just as matters of dispute arise between individuals in any given country; but as a system of common law has solved what otherwise would be violence and force between individuals, so it is the hope of those who are advocating the principle of a League of Nations that a similar system, without resort to force or violence, might deal with at any rate a large number of disputes which now cause friction and trouble in international intercourse. It is the old contrast which is common enough in the history of the world. There is the claim on one side of an ordered liberty based on the recognition of a mutual obligation of restraint. That is what the League of Nations desires to bring about. Whereas, on the other hand, there is the unrestrained influence of violence and force which always comes to the front unless you have some tribunal which can decide between the claims and disputes of rival nations or of rival individuals.

In bringing forward my principle I do not believe for a moment what is sometimes stated—namely, that this is the last war we shall have in the world. I think a view of that kind is purely Utopian. If I thought that, it would not be of so great importance whether the principle which I am advocating was adopted or not. I need hardly tell your Lordships that there is nothing novel in the principle of a League of Nations. It was rejected in the time of Grotius, who was at once the earliest and the greatest of our international lawyers, and who insisted—and that is part of the form of my Resolution to-day—that no League of Nations could be effective unless it were enforceable by an adequate sanction. But I will give one quotation from a later thinker of great eminence, Kant. I give it, again, in order to avoid any necessity for repetiton. Speaking of States in their relations to one another, Kant said— There can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from the lawless conditions which war implies than by States yielding up their savage lawless freedom, just as individuals have done, and yielding to the coercion of a public law. There is no reason why that principle should not be made effective; and I hope to point out later that there are great reasons why a principle of this kind should be brought to the front under the present conditions.

Kant goes on to say that he "regarded the want of a common public law amongst nations as barbarism, the negation of civilisation, and the brutal degradation of humanity." I do not think that those words are too strong; and if they were not too strong in the time of Kant, certainly the conditions of the present warfare have emphasised every particular to which Kant called attention. Let me give two illustrations of what I mean. The noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, in his historic speech, called attention to what he properly termed "the prostitution of science." Now, what does "the prostitution of science" mean? It means the application of scientific research to invent engines of human mutilation or destruction. I do not think that "the prostitution of science" is too strong an expression to use of a tendency of that kind. Take the case of poisonous gases. One of the most terrible and monstrous horrors in this war has been the introduction of poisonous gases. Those who have seen soldiers suffering from the effects of poisonous gases will have no difficulty in corroborating what I say. But, after all, we are only at the outset of inventions of that kind; and there is no reason why science might not develop these poisonous gases to an infinite extent, and to the common degradation and loss of all humanity. The more one thinks of the present outlook surely the more certainly one feels that, unless some new system of international relationship is brought about, there will be no limit to the destructive or mutilating power of the inventions of modern science.

I will take one other illustration. In old days armies were at war and not nations. Now warfare means the clashing of armed nations, with the result that one of the most humane principles established under the ancient principle of what I must call International Law—because many of these principles unfortunately are now disregarded by a somewhat brutal enemy—has been obliterated. One of the most important of these principles was the distinction, in the cause of humanity, between a combatant and a non-combatant. That distinction has practically been obliterated. Take the case of aeroplanes. It does not seem to matter whether you bomb fortresses or open towns, whether you bomb open cities or fortified camps; and I do not think it can reasonably be doubted that if in the time of Kant humanity demanded some interference with the violence and force of war, modern science and conditions have more than emphasised the objections which he so forcibly stated.

Now the difficulty which stands in the way of accepting the principle which I ask your Lordships to affirm must be fairly stated. I am not now dealing with difficulties of detail, because that is no part of my Resolution at the present time, but there is a difficulty in principle which I think ought to be met and which I desire to anticipate in case it should be raised as against the principle of my Resolution. It is this. That you cannot have any League of Nations without some interference with the sovereign rights of individual parties. Unless a League of Nations did, in some respects at any rate, restrain the rights of individual sovereignty it would be ineffective, and I do not deny that there is a strong school of thought which would object, and strongly object, to any interference with the rights of individual sovereignty which particular nations enjoy. That doctrine has been carried further in Germany than in any other country. In fact, it has been carried to the extent of a State worship. It has been carried to the extent of saying that as regards international relationship no morality, and no Christian morality, ought to prevail at all, and that the reign of force should be supreme. The result of a principle of that kind is to justify any brutality which you may desire, provided only it is to the advantage of the particular State.

Having stated, I think fairly, the principle that may be raised against the principle of an International League, my answer to that is that the statement of that principle is one of the strongest arguments in favour of some form of international restraint under a League of Nations. If you assume for a moment, as I am willing to assume, that nations approach one another on the basis that they ought not to be influenced in international relationship by moral conditions of any kind, but only by conditions of force, it appears to me you make in the strongest way a case for some restraint and coercion to which they shall be bound to submit in the cause of order and humanity. This extreme form of State sovereignty is a matter historically of somewhat modern growth, but it has been developed to an extreme form in the case of Germany—an example which certainly I hope none of your Lordships will desire to follow as regards the brutality of their action in certain operations of this war. At the same time, however, that the principle of sovereignty has been exaggerated there have been introduced methods of palliating the consequent disadvantages.

Let us take the nineteenth century as an example. There were 471 international disputes in the nineteenth century favourably submitted to decision by arbitration. I am not one of those who think that arbitration is the best form of tribunal, but whether it is so or not it is certainly a remarkable fact that at the same time as the doctrine of national sovereignty was growing there grew side by side a tendency to bring disputes to arbitration. I recollect reading of the submission of the "Alabama" claims as between this country and America. There were many people who prophesied at that time that the whole virility of the country would he sapped by submitting a question of that kind to arbitration. The arbitration went through, and was not in favour of the case put forward by this country, but I will ask whether your Lordships would not come to this conclusion, that that arbitration largely conduced to the good feeling between this country and America, which is one of the most potent factors in the history of the progress of civilisation in the world at this moment. I know of no case where arbitration has led to the disasters which have been prophesied. I think in every case you have got rid of what otherwise might have been a most difficult international dispute, to the advantage of both parties and to the friendship of both in the long run.

I may say one word further whilst I am referring to the United States of America. They and we form the two great Anglo-Saxon communities of the world. They and we have carried the principle of the rule of law and the supremacy of law further than any other country. They and we have put our legal systems substantially on the same basis—the old common law principles which prevail in England—and what I hope is this, particularly having regard to the work which is going on at this time both in this country and in the United States, that it may be to the glory of those two countries that by joint effort they may bring to fruition a League of nations on the best principle and on the soundest foundation. I see the President of the League of Nations in this country, Lord Shaw, who I hope will address your Lordships at a subsequent stage, and I am sure he will corroborate me in what I say, that the co-operation of principle and thought in this country and the United States on this subject has enabled the principle to be carried further and in a more effective manner than either country could have done without the assistance of the other.

There are three underlying principles to which I want to call your Lordships' attention. They are not matters of detail, but they are conditions of an effective League of Nations. I do not say that we shall all agree as regards all of them, but we must approach them and consider them. In the first place there is some difference of opinion as to whether or not the Central Powers should be members of the League. I put before your Lordships this consideration. If the object of a League is to be a restraint on the violence and force of nations, it is all-important that those nations should be included from whom you may possibly anticipate violence and force in the future. If you are to have a peace founded on a League of Nations—that is to say, a peace that gives some guarantee for its permanency—it appears to me to be all-essential that the Central Powers should come under an obligation that can be enforced against them if necessary by an adequate sanction. Of course, if they will not come in, I know no way in which force can be used in a matter of that kind, but I do say with all the earnestness that I can that if you desire to find in a League of Nations a guarantee against the outbreak of war in future, you must bring within the restraint of that League those from whom you most fear the repetition of violence and force. Really, that is the answer to what is often said as regards a premature or an immature peace. I understand that a premature or immature peace means a peace that is only likely to last for a short time, a peace where you leave outstanding matters of difference which are likely to cause fresh outbreaks of violence and war. If that is so, the answer is, by the restraint of an adequate sanction, not to leave it to any nation to bring about a condition of war in future, and to place it under the restraint of a mutual obligation which will make its action in that respect practically impossible. I recollect again, if I may refer to it, that in the letter written by Lord Lansdowne great weight was thrown on the League of Nations as a protection against the possibility of a re-outbreak of war, because you would have a system by which you could place adequate restraint upon offending nations.

Secondly, I think it is quite clear that you must have some system of what is called relative disarmament. In other words, any individual nation must not be sufficiently strong to menace the force of the whole co-partnership. In every speech that I have seen and in all the literature that I have read—I think I have read the literature of every country upon this point—it is recognised that there must be some system of relative disarmament in order that a League of Peace may be effected. It may be said that that is not likely to be brought about. My Lords, I believe there never was a more favourable time than the present moment—I will not say the present moment, but in the conditions after the war—to bring about a state of a relative disarmament. For this reason. All countries after the war will need all their financial resources for industrial and social reconstruction. The condition of exhaustion will be such that it will be almost impossible for them to keep up their armaments at the old height at which they were kept before the outbreak of war. I know that there is a view that you might keep up the expenditure on armaments by repudiation of loans or of interest on loans. I regard that as an unthinkable proposition among civilised countries, and, therefore, if nations are to recover from the extreme financial exhaustion which must certainly follow the end of the war, one of the only means of economy, so far as I can see, will be a measure of relative disarmament, and I do not think any statesman in any country has taken any objection to the general application of that statement.

The last of the conditions is this, that all schemes, however carefully drawn, will be utterly ineffective without you have an adequate sanction. You find I use that phrase in the terms of my Resolution—"whose orders shall be enforceable by an adequate sanction." Of all forms of adequate sanction which have been suggested, personally I admit I am in favour of that which has been put forward by the American League. It appears to me to be simple and effective, and I will ask your Lordships' permission to allow me to read quite shortly a passage from the Memorandum of the American League to Enforce Peace, in order to show what the adequate sanction there suggested is. It says— The signatory Powers— That is, the Powers who are signatories to the League— shall jointly employ diplomatic and economic pressure against any of their number that threatens war against a fellow-signatory without having first submitted its dispute for international inquiry … awaited a conclusion, or with at having in good faith offered so to submit it. That is the first stage that if a fellow-signatory does not submit an international dispute to the accredited tribunal, then the other members of the International League should bring to bear all diplomatic and economic pressure. Then the question arises, suppose pressure of that kind is ineffective? They go on to state what in their view should be the form of coercive sanctio— They shall follow this forthwith by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually goes to war or commits acts of hostility against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be dealt with as provided in the foregoing. I see no reason, my Lords, if you seek to impose a measure of restraint, of mutual obligation, why you should not enforce that obligation in the last resource by an appeal to arms. It appears to me quite certain that an appeal to arms under these conditions would be infinitely less disastrous to the cause of humanity and of right than the outbreak of a European war such as we are undergoing at the present moment. You would have a smaller area, you would have more concentrated warfare, and it is almost certain that if such a war broke out it would he settled in a comparatively short period. At the same time, I should like to say that if you have an international tribunal you will have the gradual growth of precedent and authority. You will not have it in the first instance. You never do have it in the first instance when courts are constituted; but as you have that gradual growth of precedent and authority, so do I believe that the necessity for resort to force would be quite an exceptional and unusual necessity.

I think I have explained what I have called the principle of the Resolution which I am asking your Lordships to accept. I have tried to do it with precision and in as short a space as possible; it is not for me, at this stage, to enter into any matters of detail. Let me give, in conclusion, the final considerations. How far, if there had been a League of Nations in operation, would it have had an influence in preventing the outbreak of the present disastrous war? That is the first question one naturally asks. As regards the condition of Europe at the time of the outbreak of the present war, I will quote one passage of what was stated in eloquent terms by the late Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, when he was speaking at Dublin. He was speaking of the approval of the principle of a League of Nations as a method of dealing with the difficulties which existed in Europe at the time of the outbreak of war, and this is how he described those difficulties— Such a state of international relationship, without any solid foundation, ethical or political was bound by its very instability to stimulate naval and military activity, and on one felt secure. Taking that to be a clear statement of the conditions of Europe at the outbreak of war, what would have been the effect of, or what would have been the assistance to be given by, a League of Nations had it been in operation? I desire to make three statements. The first is that many of the questions which in the aggregate led to the friction from which we had the outbreak of war could have been settled on the principle of mutual obligation in an authoritative manner; or, in other words, they would have been dealt with and settled. I think an eloquent testimony on that point, as to what might have been done, is to be found in the disclosures of the late German Ambassador to London, disclosures which are worthy of all study, for we see the unfortunate conditions under which, when there is a state of international anarchy, you may have a sudden outbreak of war. Secondly, if you had had a League of Nations you would have had a period of delay for consideration before war could have broken out. I do not know whether your Lordships recollect the statements made by the noble Viscount, who was then Sir Edward Grey, and at the head of the Foreign Office. He made every possible effort a statesman could make in order to secure sufficient delay to see if matters could not be settled. But it is too late to attempt to create machinery at the last moment; you want the machinery in operation and ready to hand, and that is exactly what a League of Nations would have provided. And, as regards the third point, suppose there had been a measure of relative disarmament, what would have been the effect of that? It would have been utterly impossible for any country to have taken the aggressive attitude which Germany did if you had had armies of the number only which would have been possible under a measure of relative disarmament. It would have been impossible, if you had had a League of Nations, for the outbreak of war at all; there would have been full opportunity of settling the matters in dispute, and there would have been a delay, which would have allowed statesmen to promote conciliation before the actual mobilisation of the conflicting forces.

On the other hand, what is the probable influence of a League of Nations on the question of a settlement after the war? I think no one has emphasised the close connection between the acceptance of a settlement and the principle of a League of Nations more closely than President Wilson and the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne. I do not venture to say in his presence what Lord Lansdowne has already expressed, and every one who has studied this question knows the reiterated views of President Wilson. They have both advocated the principle of a new international order, founded on the broad principles of international right and justice, and guaranteed under international sanction. It may be said that those words are vague. I suppose that is inherent in a statement of principle, but, as I understood it, these principles which these great statesmen have advocated are to be found in recognising the rights of peoples and are not to be found in the secret treaties of Governments. I do not care whether the treaties of Governments may be those made between Germany and Russia, or whether they are secret treaties, which I regretfully understand have been entered into at various periods during the present war. It is the rights of peoples, and not the secret treaties of Governments, that we must follow if we are to have an international order based on international right and international justice.

I confess, personally, that I am equally opposed to what is called a defeatist peace as against the Allies, or a punitive peace as against the Central Powers. I agree with the statement made by Prince Metternich many years ago when he said, "You may have a permanent peace or a punitive peace, but you cannot have both at the same time." I look on the permanent peace as far the more important, and a permanent peace, if it is to be really a permanent peace, must be on a fair consideration of mutual obligation and mutual restraint in the future. If I might express my hope, and the hope of many other people, our hope in the future depends on a new order of international relationship in which a common measure of right and justice is guaranteed to all peoples alike, irrespective of the power or force which they have at their command, and that this common measure of right and justice should be placed under the safeguard of a League of Nations, supported by effective and adequate sanction. That is the principle which I hope your Lordships may accept, and I beg to move the Resolution which stands in my name.

Moved to resolve, That this House approves the principle of a League of Nations and the constitution of a Tribunal, whose orders shall be enforceable by an adequate sanction.—(Lord Parmoor.)

EARL LOREBURN

My Lords, I promised my noble and learned friend that I would second his Motion, and I do so with great pleasure—with increased pleasure because he has fully dealt with the subject and has left me very little to say. I would like, however, to say one or two things. After this war is over I believe that the best safeguard for humanity in the future lies in two innovations, one of them being quite within the power of the Government of this country and any other country, and that is to place all foreign affairs under direct Parliamentary control. I do not for a moment say that all secret diplomacy can disappear. You would not get communications or confidences from other nations if they knew that they were at once to be published on the housetop. But the system which prevails in the United States of America, by which there is a Committee to deal with foreign affairs who have the means of knowing all the most secret transactions (of course under seal of confidence), who can remonstrate with a Minister, who can warn the Minister, and who can prevent him and his own few confidants from being the sole repositories of most vital information, is necessary if we are to remain in permanent peace hereafter. It seems to me that the experience of this war shows it. Every one agrees— at least I have never met any one who did not agree—that the Foreign Secretary in 1914 was sincerely desirous of peace. He was, I am quite sure. But experience has shown that good intention and desire for peace is not always enough, and in my view, if this nation is to be a self-governing nation in regard to the foreign relations which are so vital to us, it must be that Parliament shall insist as it easily can upon a direct control, and upon the right to know everything in its Committee, the right to check or to warn—not to administer but to warn—and if need be to inform Parliament. That is the first thing that I think has to be done, and I will say no more about it.

The second thing which I hope for is a League of Nations—that is to say, some machinery by which the different nations of the world, to use the language of President Wilson, shall be in a general concert one with another. I do not mean an occasional concert; I mean that they shall have a status towards One another, acknowledged and recognised by them all, by which they should be able to exchange views, and, more than that, by which they should be able to use pressure and stress one upon the other so as to prevent the outrageous exercise of power. I am perfectly well aware—everybody must be who has read anything upon this subject—that there are very great difficulties to which it would be quite idle to shut our eyes. There is the difficulty of getting adequate sanction; there is the difficulty that, whatever machinery you erect, its validity must be dependent upon the faithful observation of treaties. Now the faithful observation of treaties is not a thing to which we have been much accustomed of late. Everybody knows these difficulties. However solemn the treaty may be, you can never be sure that it will be observed.

I notice that the idea of a League of Nations has been accepted almost everywhere. President Wilson insisted upon it, and I think I am right in saving that last December Mr. Asquith, who was Prime Minister when the war broke out, said that that was the one purpose for which we were fighting. Without accepting completely this view, it is quite certain that it is most eagerly desired by every one in this country—by Ministers and the public and by everybody else. A great many people say it is not practicable. I do not know. There are reasons why we should not be despondent in regard to that. In the first place, we cannot—we are too near it at the present moment—realise the frightful amount of suffering that is being caused all over the world to many, many nations, to civilians as well as soldiers, and to neutrals as well as to belligerents. Does anybody doubt that the impression that will be left by the horrible suffering that is being caused by this awful war will be quite beyond any impression that has hitherto been made in human nature so far as we know history? I think that it is very difficult to know what the feelings will be. There are tens of millions of men coming back to their homes in different parts of the world after having undergone the experiences of which all of us have heard from the wounded men and from officers. It will effect a psychological revolution in the nations. These men will communicate their experiences to their friends and relations, their fathers and mothers and wives, and it is quite certain that a frame of mind will be created, not in this country only but in all countries that have suffered, to which there is no parallel in history. That is a look-out which well may encourage us not to be too despondent.

But there is another. People will begin to ask, What is the alternative supposing that the condition of international anarchy that proceeded this war continues after the war is over? Has any one estimated what it means? It means a more mighty armament by land, by sea, under the sea, and in the air. It means the further prostitution of science—two thousand years after the Message of Peace was sent to the world—which ought to be devoted to up lifting and not to destroying the human species, or going as far as the nations concerned can for that purpose. It means constant work of scientific men, of mechanics, of vast industries in the country devoted solely to the purpose of preparing destruction for the future. How there can be any prospect of industrial progress or of success, or of the realisation of those social dreams that we used to harbour in the days before the war, I really do not in the least know, unless, as President Wilson said, some sort of power is obtained. Everybody in this country would gladly see it done. The only doubt is whether it can be done. Our enemies, the German and Austrian Governments, have expressed their anxiety in the same way. I do not invite your Lordships to accept at face value all that they say, but this I think is clear. They are perfectly conscious that they cannot afford to brush aside without notice, and, at all events, without apparent compliance, the language that has been used by President Wilson. Therefore, when I look at that, I feel some comfort. And remember also how in past history so many things that have been thought at the time to be ideal have turned out to be very real, and perhaps even more real than things which were of more substance.

I will not trouble your Lordships further, but my noble friend referred to the letters which my noble friend Lord Lansdowne wrote to the paper, and to the effect which I hope they will have. I need hardly say I entirely agree with what was said. I am persuaded that those documents will be famous in history, and that they will contribute, as I trust and pray that they may contribute, towards the end of this war. But will my noble friend, if he will permit me to call him so, who leads the House allow me to make an appeal to him to leave the League of Nations, the arrangement for these things in the future, out of the question until peace comes. I know there are difficulties. I know some of the difficulties are due to no fault of his. There may be, and probably are others of which I do not know. But I know that this war has lasted far too long already, and I appeal to the noble Earl that he will leave unexplored no avenue, however uninviting it may appear at first sight, that may lead toward the ending of the agony of Europe.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, we shall no doubt, before this discussion proceeds much further, have a statement from His Majesty's Government. I look forward to that statement with very sanguine hopes. I will not go as far as to say that I expect my noble friend who leads the House to tell the noble and learned Lord who moved this Resolution that he is only forcing an open door, and that His Majesty's Government agree with him as to the ideal which he desires to pursue. But, even if the noble Earl who leads the House cannot go as far as that, I feel sure that he will say nothing to discourage the noble and learned Lord, and those who think with him, from further exploring the interesting question to which he has addressed himself this evening.

I have never concealed my belief that in a prospect which for all of us must be full of sadness and anxiety the most hopeful feature is that to which the noble and learned Lord has pointed this evening. But of course, I realise—and who cannot realise?—the immense difficulty of the enterprise which he seeks to support. It is not possible to deal with those difficulties thoroughly in such a debate as this; but I think, in spite of them, that it is not difficult to arrive at some measure of agreement as to the broad principles which we ought to keep in view.

Let me, in the first place, say what I certainly do not mean when I talk of a League of Nations. I do not mean a coalition of Powers against another coalition. That would only be a perpetuation of the condition of things which we desire to see ended. Nor. again, do I mean merely an increased resort to arbitration. The noble and learned Lord told us in his speech that in the nineteenth century there had been 471 arbitration treaties. That is an achievement of which I think the country may well he proud. Every one of those treaties has been a step in the right direction, but arbitration stops short of what some of us desire to obtain. I venture to think that a League of Nations has two essential features. The first of them is this. I think it must be open to all, and must, if possible, comprise all the important Powers. It may, of course, not be easy to effect such a comprehension, but in my view no League of Nations would really be complete and effectual until it included virtually the whole of the more important Powers. The second essential is, I think, this, that your League must be armed with executive powers—powers sufficient to secure unquestioning obedience to its decisions. There are three forms of pressure which can be applied to a recalcitrant country. There is moral pressure, resort to conciliation; there is economic pressure, which implies the denial of facilities or opportunites which any country may desire to have, but which it may be impossible to accord to it; thirdly, there is the pressure which can be exercised by material coercion. And here, again, I say that in my view no League of Nations will be completely efficacious until it is able to apply pressure in all these three different forms. If the League were able to apply pressure in those different shapes. I think we might say with confidence that, on the most favourable assumption, it would be in a position to guarantee the peace of the civilised world; and, on the least favourable assumption, it would be in a position to secure delay, opportunities for discussion, opportunities for conciliation, which in a great many cases would be effectual to avoid the threatened danger.

I am sanguine enough to believe that the omens are at this moment entirely favourable to the creation of such a League of Nations. There is, I believe, a large measure of agreement in principle in all countries with regard to the desirability of such a League. Our own public men have, I think, nearly all of them, intimated their conviction that, such a League is desirable. Mr. Balfour. I know, has announced it as his ideal an ideal which, he added, would not be complete unless the League was armed with executive powers. Lord Robert Cecil has said that in his opinion it was the only thing worth struggling for. Let me quote in addition what was said a few days ago by the Prime Minister in the remarkable speech which he then addressed to the Free Churches. In describing the aims which he was pursuing, he added— … the aim, above all, of making sure that war shall henceforth be treated as a crime punishable by the law of nations. As society is bounded together for the punishment of oppression, of murder, theft, fraud, and all kinds of wrong and injustice inflicted by one individual upon another, so nations shall be banded together for the protection of each other and the world as a whole, against the force, the fraud, and the greed of the mighty. Those are strong words. I earnestly hope that they may prove to have been inspired by the true spirit of prophecy. French public men, unless I am mistaken, have stated distinctly their approval in principle of the idea of a Society of Nations, with guarantees for peace by general agreement.

But by far the most hopeful of the favourable omens is the way in which the United States are interesting themselves in this proposal. I agree with what was said by the noble and learned Lord (Lord Parmoor) in his opening remarks as to this. I do not think it would have been too much to say that, without the adhesion of the United States, the consummation of this idea would have been altogether beyond reach. I say that, both on account of the great moral weight which the United States bring with them in support of this proposal, and also because the United States are able to bring a material backing, which I do not believe any other Power in the world could bring, in support of a policy of this kind. Considering the great world trade of the United States, I do not think I exaggerate when I say that there is no country which could use the economic weapon of pressure with the same effect that the United States could use it if they so desired. President Wilson has on more than one occasion intimated plainly that in his view it would be a proper thing to refuse admission to the Partnership of Nations to any nation which continued to disturb the peace of the world; and he has indicated clearly that, in such untoward circumstances, it might be impossible to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the partnership to a real peace. There you have the two ideas. In the first place, the exclusion from the international pact of a Power which would not fulfil its conditions; and the idea of economic pressure by the denial of commercial intercourse to such a Power.

Something was said—I think by the noble and learned Lord who moved—as to the possibility of obtaining the adhesion of the Central Powers, Germany and Austria, to such a League. I am most-anxious not to put my case too high, but I believe that I am right in saying that both in Germany and in Austria one public man after another has been ready to announce the readiness of his Government, ultimately at any rate, to participate in such an international movement as this. I know, of course, that these announcements have been accompanied by reservations. It has been said that nothing can be done until after the war: that the Powers in question must be satisfied as to the manner in which the League will be composed. That, I have no doubt, is so. But they have at the same time put on record their readiness, at the proper time, to co-operate in setting up such a League.

It has been sometimes objected that there would be no object at all in admitting Germany to membership of such a League because Germany has, upon occasions with which we are familiar, flagrantly violated her treaty engagements. The charge is a perfectly legitimate one. There is the case, with which we are all familiar, of the violation of Belgian territory. There is the more recent case of a disregard of pledges in regard to the portions of Russia which Germany is now occupying. And I can well understand the feeling of those who say that, as Germany has shown herself ready to shake herself free from international obligations in the past, so she will no doubt shake herself free from international obligations in the future. But let me point this out. In this case nobody proposes to rely upon a German pledge or a German signature. The essence of the proposal is that the Powers which are to be admitted to membership of this League will, to some extent, part with their sovereign rights, and enter into a compact which will bind them jointly and severally to conform to whatever code of International Law is laid down by the League itself. I cannot help believing that, if a League of this kind were set up with the power of pronouncing what would in effect be a sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away from its obligations, you would have a material guarantee for the maintenance of peace unlike anything which we have yet been able to imagine.

May I be permitted to express my entire agreement with what Lord Loreburn said—I think it was Lord Loreburn—as to the difference which it might have made in the summer of 1914 if an organisation of this kind had been in existence? I suppose most of us have studied the course of events in Europe during the memorable days which preceded the outbreak of war. I think it is the most pathetic, the most tragic, chapter of history which it is possible to conceive. There were many people at that time who sincerely desired to maintain peace; many people, not only amongst us and those who are now our Allies, but amongst the Central Powers. I have not a doubt of it. On the other hand, I think we now see clearly evidence of a sinister conspiracy to force war at any price. There was a period of distraction; every Chancellory in Europe was strained to the breaking-point; Sovereigns and Ministers were telegraphing or telephoning to one another; there was clamour and confusion, and under cover of that confusion the persons who were working for war pursued their sinister ends, and pursued them, as we all know, successfully. I believe, with my noble and learned friend behind me (Earl Loreburn) that if there had been at that time the kind of international body which some of us desire to set up, you would at all events have had priceless opportunities for delay and discussion which might have given the peacemakers the chance which was actually denied to them at the time. I should certainly desire to see the Central Powers included in the League amongst other reasons for this, because Germany has always been in the past, as Lord Grey well describes her, "the great anarchist of Europe." She has always played for her own hand, always taken short cuts, always sought to evade peaceful discussion; and I say that if you could yoke Germany in the harness of an organisation of this kind I believe you would do more to get rid of Prussian militarism than by any other conceivable means.

I wish to make my meaning clear upon one point. Of course, quite apart from the question of a League of Nations, there must be a settlement of outstanding disputes before this war can be brought to an end, and I am not for a moment suggesting that I would accept the formation or the assent of any Powers or any group of Powers to the policy of an International League as a substitute for a satisfactory territorial settlement. But this I do say, that the settlement is necessary as a preliminary to the setting up of a League, and that the settlement will not be complete and will be shorn of half its value unless you have not only an arrangement of territorial claims but an arrangement with regard to the machinery by which peace will be maintained in the future.

As I said a moment ago, I do not conceal from myself the immense difficulties that lie in the way of the realisation of this dream, if you like to call it a dream. You have to consider, for example, how the International Court is to be composed, and how the different Powers are to be represented on it. You have to consider the question of procedure, and the classification of the questions which might be referred to the Court or Courts. But I say, do not let us be deterred by these difficulties. I will mention 'one difficulty this evening, and it was, I think, mentioned by my noble and learned friend. I think he rather suggested that in his view it was essential that there should not only be a League of Nations but that there should be some understanding as to disarmament. I think he used the expression "relative disarmament." Although I share his views upon that point I am not in entire agreement with him. I believe that this question of disarmament is one of enormous difficulty, and I think it would be a mistake to link the question of disarmament too closely with that of a League of Nations. I will tell my noble and learned friend why I am timid on this question of disarmament. I cannot conceive how it should be found possible, so to speak, to ration the different members of such a League in such matters as the number of men they might keep, the number of guns, of ships, of submarines, and of mines, because all these things hold together, and I think that problem will tend to become more and more difficult as scientific invention proceeds and the machinery of offence and defence becomes more varied and more elaborate.

I came across, the other day, a statement which seemed to me to bear rather upon this question. After the Seven Years' War Kaunitz, the Minister, went to Frederick the Great with a proposal for disarmament. It sounds now rather a fantastic proposal, because the suggestion was that Commissioners should go to the different capitals, attend the annual reviews and count the actual men on parade, and see that there were not too many present. I do not think that kind of census would be quite satisfactory to-day. At any rate Frederick the Great rejected the proposal, and I do not think—I speak subject to correction—that subsequent attempts at international disarmament have carried people very far; but I do think that the acceptance of the policy of an International League would have a very important reaction upon the question of armaments. My impression is that the democracies of the world are sick of the burden of heavy armaments, and that if there were found means of reasonably assuring international peace you would find that disarmament would follow almost automatically. I think one result would certainly occur, and that would be that the Powers would agree to give up some of the more horrible and inhuman methods of warfare to which the combatants have come to resort during the present war—I mean such things as attacks upon unarmed vessels and unarmed towns, and the use of poisonous gases, to which we have been driven by the bad example of our adversaries.

Then one other difficulty. It may well be asked, How are we going to set up a League of Nations? How are we going to begin? Here is an extraordinarily complicated and delicate piece of machinery. It is inconceivable, I am afraid, that it should be set up while a great war is raging; but there are intermediate stages which I think must occur to everyone. There is the possibility of preliminary agreements, of the settlement of some questions, of the acceptance of principles upon which other questions are to be decided. I always read the Prime Minister's speeches with attention, and I notice that he hardly ever makes one without referring to what he describes as "the great Peace Conference" which is to sit at the conclusion of the war. In one of his last speeches he described it as "the Great Peace Conference which is to ripen into the League of Nations." I do not at all object to that suggestion, which seems to me to be one which might very well be followed up.

I will say only one other thing before I sit down. If we are told that this is an unattainable dream, I am inclined to reply with a question. I say, If we are not to look forward to the realisation of this dream to what are we to look forward? Are we to travel again along the old road which we have been travelling of late years, past the same forlorn milestones, travelling the same weary stages? Are we still to have periods of unrest, periods of suspicion and intrigue, periods of sullen hate until at last there comes the crisis and the collision, provoked by people who desire, for interested motives, that the peace of the world should be broken? And are we to have the same kind of internecine struggles as that which is now going on—struggles ruinous to the combatants and calamitous to the whole world, which is impotent to put an end to them? And are these internecine struggles to continue until one adversary or the other has been crushed to the ground, so crushed, that is, that he will submit to any terms, no matter how humiliating, that might be dictated by the victors?

My Lords, this war has taught the world something of the cost—I do not mean the money cost—which these internecine struggles involve, and of their difficulty, and there may be another revelation in store for the world. If we are simply to revert to the old order of things, may the victors in this war not find that when they have beaten their foe to his knees they are still very far from the accomplishment of the object with which they have set out?—I mean the object of saving their children and grandchildren from a recurrence of the catastrophe which has fallen upon us in our time. I should like your Lordships to consider from that point of view whether any crushing of an adversary can be regarded as a final crushing, and I would like, in order to illustrate my meaning, to remind the House of a very well-known episode in the history of Europe. After the battle of Jena, Prussia was crushed by her adversary; she was deserted by her allies; she had accepted at Tilsit the terms imposed upon her by the two Emperors; she had been compelled to surrender territory and to pay a large indemnity; she had been disarmed; and she was treated with every possible contumely during the years that followed. But in 1814 Blucher was marching into Paris. That is a good illustration of the absence of finality in these crushing defeats.

The moral of all this is that success in the field is not a guarantee, cannot be a guarantee, of permanence. It may give you a breathing space, but it cannot give the world a permanent and secured relief from the ills from which we have been suffering. I believe myself that there is only one way in which you can obtain such a permanent relief. It is the way to which my noble and learned friend has pointed in his speech to-night. This is not, as some people would have you believe, the baselesss fabric of a vision. It is not a mere mirage which will fade as you advance towards it. I believe that what some of us think we see in the distance is the outline of a real Promised Land. I earnestly hope that we shall see to it that we get there.

LORD PARKER

My Lords, I sympathise, and I think the House generally sympathises with the object which my noble and learned friend had in view in making this Motion, and I find myself also in much sympathy with what has fallen from Lord Lansdowne, especially in this respect. It seems to me that the only thing we have to look forward to is ultimately something n the nature of a League of Peace, and I hope to show presently that that is the natural development of International law. One thing only I fear, and that is that the movement in favour of the League of Nations runs some risk by reason of the fact that its advocates are in somewhat too great a hurry. They are devoting their attention to the details of the superstructure rather than to the stability of the foundations. Impressed by the fact that municipal law is administered by legal tribunals based ultimately on organised force, they set themselves in the first place to evolve schemes for international tribunals and an international police force. I think they forget that every sound system of municipal law, with its tribunals and its organised police, is a creation of historical growth having its roots in the far past. It is supported in reality not so much by organised force as by that sense of mutual obligation and respect for the rights of others which lies at the root of, and forms the foundation of, those settled rules of conduct among individuals which alone make law and order in the community possible. At the present day, a law may perhaps be defined as "a rule of conduct generally observed, and exceptional deviations from which are punished by tribunals based upon force," but certainly the last part of this definition would have been inapplicable in earlier stages of our history. And I think a little consideration will show that even at the present day, though tribunals based upon force may deal with exceptional deviations from a general rule of conduct, no tribunal and no force is of any avail at all when once the exceptions are so numerous that the rule cannot be said to be generally observed.

I should like to go to the root of this matter. What we are all aiming at is the prevention of war. According to the war philosophy current amongst some writers in Germany, this is quite impossible. War, they say, is the result of tendencies so ingrained in human nature that they may he considered as biological laws; nor in their opinion is war really contrary to the higher interests of humanity. The worthiest and most virile nation will, they say, survive each struggle, and ultimately establish a World Empire in which a permanent peace, for the first time, will become possible, and in which law and order, literature and philosophy, art and science, will have their best chance, and man, the individual man, will attain his highest perfection. I believe this theory to be scientifically unsound, but it will serve no useful purpose to deny that it has some plausibility. The tendencies on which it is based are real tendencies which have been, and are, playing a considerable part in the history of nations. In order to combat such tendencies we must know exactly what they are and how they work, and if I shall not be wearying your Lordships I should like to illustrate that point by one or two references to facts in legal history.

Social life, communal life as it is called, is obviously quite impossible unless each member of the community can count, with more or less certainty, on the action of his fellows under circumstances of every day occurrence. The first step, therefore, in the development of law is the establishment of "customary rules of conduct," a breach of which will disappoint, and give rise to a grievance, on the part of the person who is injured by the breach. One branch of the history of law concerns the growth and development of these customary rules of conduct, and another concerns the growth and development of remedies for their breach. It is with the latter branch that I am now concerned.

There is no doubt that the most primitive remedy for a breach of customary rules of conduct lay in the direction of self help. The injured party, aided perhaps by his family and his friends, exacted forcible reprisals. Those members of the community who were not immediately concerned stood aloof and observed neutrality. Public opinion, it is true, soon gave rise to certain general precepts as to how and to what extent reprisals ought to be taken. The old law of "an eye, for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" gave way to a customary tariff regulating the compensation which might be exacted for loss of life and limb, but behind these precepts there was nothing but public opinion. Individual force as a remedy for wrongs is of uncertain efficacy; it may be that the wrongdoer is stronger than the party injured. This gave rise to the tendency for the weak to attach themselves to the strong, becoming their retainers, surrendering a portion of their own independence for the sake of the protection the strong could afford, and increasing their lords' strength and resources. I remember in one of Stevenson's novels, the scene of which is laid in this country during the Wars of the Roses, the advice given by an old retainer to the youth who had to make his way in the world was summed up in the phrase "See you get good lordship." And we find, in fact, a number of powerful lords, each preserving peace among his own retainers and each maintaining an armed force, nominally for the purpose of defence, but which could, quite as easily, be used for aggression whenever interest or ambition might so dictate. It was not until one of these lords gained supremacy over the others that a universal peace, a universal system of law and order, became possible throughout the realm. Then the peace, theretofore maintained by each powerful lord, merged in the King's peace, and we find traces of this in the fact that in legal processes wrongs are still charged as "contrary to the peace of our lord, the King."

If you turn to international relations I think you will find precisely the same tendencies at work. Such communal life as exists between nations is based, and must be based, upon customary rules of conduct. These customary rules are dignified by the name of International Law, but there is no remedy for their breach otherwise than by war. During a war those nations not immediately concerned remain neutral. There may be general precepts—we know there are—purporting to regulate what is, or what is not, lawful to belligerents; what they can, or what they cannot, do. There is nothing but public opinion behind these precepts, and they may be easily disregarded in the stress of war. War, again, is an uncertain remedy; it inflicts as often as it redresses a wrong. Victory is generally on the side of the big battalions; hence you get international competition in armaments though they may be used for aggression as well as for defence. Hence, too, arises the growing conviction among smaller nations, that the weak nations cannot stand alone. They must get "good lordship"; they must attach themselves to the stronger, must surrender to them a portion of their independence for the sake of the protection which the stronger nation can afford them. Wars result, and on this line of development it is clear that International law, as an instrument of peace, can have no permanency. It may bridge over the intervals during which nations are weary of war or are preparing for the fray, but when war breaks out it will be disregarded, and it will vanish altogether when one nation has attained superiority over the others, established a World Empire, and founded universal peace. Such are some of the considerations which are put forward in support of the German War philosophy, and to some extent they account for the excesses of Prussian militarism. No rule of International Law, no dictates of humanity, must be allowed to stand in the way when the object is to increase the power and enlarge the borders of the German Empire. Those who submit may be spared, but those who arrogantly resist must be destroyed. Belgium is intended as an object lesson. Let the weak nations accept the German lordship; so will Germany at last attain the Empire of her dreams, and establish a permanent peace, a pax Germanica.

If we find in the history of law tendencies such as these which give plausibility to the German war philosophy, I think that we can also find tendencies, or at any rate a tendency, which points to the possibility of the development of international relations along different lines. There have been periods in the history of nations when in the absence of legal tribunals, in the absence of any organised police force, the sense of mutual obligation, which as I have said lies at the root of every legal system, has been so strongly developed that an act of violence done to the person or property of one member of the community has been resented as a wrong to all its members. In such a case neutrality is impossible. It is a disgrace, a crime. The hand of every man is against the wrongdoer. He becomes an outlaw. No one may feed him or succour him, or assist him to escape. Every one must join in his arrest and punishment. The remedy is still force, but force administered not by an individual but by collective action. This strong sense of mutual obligation, leading to a wrong to one being considered as a wrong to all, has played a considerable part in the history of law. To it we owed in this country what is known as the "hue and cry," long regarded as an effective deterrent against crimes of violence. From it arose on the other side of the Atlantic that system of communal justice which, however rough and ready, contributed so largely to the establishment of law and order in the western parts of the American Continent. From it legal tribunals and an organised police will readily develop. Without it no reign of law is possible.

I agree with what was said by the noble Marquess who last addressed the House, that there are abundant signs that international relations are approaching a new stage. I think that new stage is the stage of the "hue and cry" in English municipal law. The last three years have shown us that war is a danger which may well be fatal to our common civilisation. Neutrality has become increasingly difficult. Those nations which at first desired to remain neutral have been one after the other dragged into the fray. The neutrality of others is secured only by fear. If we can once make it clear that in future there will be no neutrality the danger of war will be minimised, because its risk is increased. Many think that Germany would not have embarked on the present struggle had she not counted on British neutrality, but it is almost certain that she would not have done so had she been fully convinced that both this country and the United States and others would have fought against her.

As soon as the risk of war becomes great, nations will begin to settle their differences by other means. Arbitrations may be resorted to, possibly International Councils or International Conciliation Boards may be made use of; but tribunals in the ordinary sense of the word—legal tribunals for the administration of International Law based upon an organised international force—are very different matters, which must be left, in my opinion, to grow out of that sense of mutual obligation which is beginning to exist amongst nations. If we attack that part of the problem at first, I have very serious fears that the whole structure which we are trying to build may fall about our ears. Probably if any dispute now arose between ourselves and any other great nation, say the United States of America, the nations in difference would easily arrive at some means of settling the dispute otherwise than by war, whether by a tribunal ad hoc or in some other way. It is a very different matter to ask great nations in the present day to agree beforehand to submit disputes of whatever nature to the arbitrament of a tribunal consisting of representatives of some two dozen or three dozen States, many of whom may be indirectly interested in casting their votes on this side or on that.

The point I really wish to emphasise is this. Hitherto the efforts of those to whom war is hateful have been directed on the one hand towards laying down rules for the conduct of belligerents in order to make war less dreadful and more humane, and on the other hand to laying down rules for the benefit and advantage of neutrals. What is the result? There is hardly a provision of The Hague Conventions or of the Convention of Geneva touching the way in which war may be properly waged which has not, so far as Germany is concerned, proved a dead letter. There is hardly a rule or precept of International Law concerning neutrality which Germany has not infringed. I venture to say that the labour which we have expended in formulating such documents as many of The Hague Conventions and the unratified Declaration of London has for the most part been labour thrown away. The true line of development lies, not in regulating the hateful thing, but in bringing about conditions under which it becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible, not in consulting the selfish interests of neutrals but in abolishing neutrality. Murders would increase if the murderer could count on the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of humanity.

It appears to me that the first steptowards the League of Nations is to recognise that it must be formed on the lines that I have suggested, and then along those lines to come to an agreement, or rather to formulate main points on which we and our present Allies could at the present moment agree. I believe that an agreement constituting a League between our Allies and ourselves at the present moment, showing what we really mean by a League of Peace and how we propose to constitute it, might be a potent influence in itself in bringing a bout a peace with the Central Powers. I believe that the Central Powers look with suspicion whenever we talk of a League of Peace. They think that there is something behind it, and that it is to be a coalition against them. For that reason I agree that the Central Powers should not be permanently excluded from the League of Nations. But while war lasts, until we know its result, until we know whether the principles that we are going to adopt ourselves will be adopted by the Central Powers after the war—how they Will deal with the provinces which they have at present apparently annexed, how they will deal with other problems with which we shall be concerned—it is almost impossible to say that they ought to be allowed to join a League formed with the intention of preventing war. The benefit of such a League would be entirely displaced if it admitted into its ranks nations who were not bona fide committed to its principles.

I do not know whether I have wearied your Lordships, but seeing or thinking that this was the only practical way of dealing with the question, I have devoted sometime to outlining an agreement for the constitution of such a League, leaving out what I considered to be the dangerous points, such as the constitution of international tribunals or an international police force, leaving out the question of disarmament, and confining myself to those points on which an agreement could at present be made between ourselves and our Allies. I do not know whether your Lordships would desire me to outline that agreement to the House. It may serve as the basis of a discussion, or possibly the noble Earl who leads the House may consider that it would be better to leave details for further consideration. But, if your Lordships will allow me, I should like to call attention to the various lines on which I think such an agreement might be made.

1. (1) First of all, it appears to me that all the members of the League should recognise that war, from whatever cause, is a danger to our common civilisation, and that international disputes ought to be settled on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms.
2. (2) Each of the members of the League ought, I think, to join in a joint and several guarantee of every other member of the League against any act of war on the part of any nation which is not a member of the League. This follows, of course, the analogy of the municipal law to which I have referred. Everybody who is a member of the community joins in pledging himself against an attack from outside.
3. (3) For the purposes of these clauses it will be necessary to have a careful definition of what amounts to an act of war, and this definition ought, I think, to include the laying of mines in the open highways of the sea, or damage done to the ships or property of a member of the League upon the High Seas.
4. (4) It may be necessary also, for the purposes of the earlier clauses, to define the territorial boundaries of the members of the League, leaving any disputed points for the decision of boundary commissioners.
5. (5) Every member of the League should agree, whenever a dispute arises with any other nation, to take all reasonable steps on the lines of the First Hague Convention or otherwise for the settlement of the matter in dispute by peaceable means and on the principles mentioned in the first clause—those of right and justice.
6. (6) If the Council of the League, constituted as hereafter provided, determined 507 by special resolution that, having regard to the nature of the matter in dispute, any member of the League has refused, or for a period of, say, twelve calendar months failed, to take such reasonable steps as contemplated in the preceding clause, the member so refusing or failing should forthwith cease to be a member of the League.
7. (7) In the case of a dispute between a member of the League and a nation which is not a member of the League the Council should have power by special resolution to determine that the former has taken, while the latter has refused or failed to take, reasonable steps for the settlement of the matter in dispute by peaceful means, and that as from the date of such resolution the latter nation should be deemed to have committed an act of war against the former nation.
8. (8) Any member of the League who is guilty of an act of war against another member of the League should be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the League immediately before the commission of such act.
9. (9) Every member of the League who is guilty of an act of war against a nation which is not a member of the League, without having obtained such resolution as mentioned in the 7th Clause, should be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the League immediately before the commission of such act.
10. (10) If an act of war be committed by any nation against a member of the League, the Council of the League should forthwith notify the fact to the other members of the League, and thereupon every member of the League should (a) break off diplomatic relations with the nation guilty of such act; (b) prohibit and take effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between itself and the guilty party; and (c) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its territory. The obligation of this clause should be expressed to continue until the guilty nation has compensated the party injured to the satisfaction of the League.
11. (11) Certain members of the League specified in the schedule, and to consist of the chief Military and Naval Powers, should further agree, if required to do so by the special resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty nation shall have accepted 508 terms, including compensation for the party injured, which shall be approved by the Council of the League.
12. (12) If, in the fulfilment of the obligation under either of the two preceding clauses, any member of the League is likely to suffer, or actually suffers, undue hardships, the Council of the League should have power, by special resolution, to suspend such obligation, either wholly or in part, and either permanently or temporarily, or to award compensation, to be contributed by the other members so as to secure equality of sacrifice. In any event, any member of the League should endeavour, by according special trade facilities or otherwise, to mitigate any undue hardship on other members.
13. (13) If, in the opinion of the Council of the League, any nation not a member of the League is pursuing a policy or course of conduct likely to endanger the maintenance of peace, the members of the League should by united diplomatic action, or, if so recommended by special resolution of the Council, by means of economic pressure, endeavour to secure that such policy or course of conduct be abandoned.
14. (14) With regard to the Council of the League, each member of the League should nominate one member of the Council. For an ordinary resolution there should be required only a majority of the Councillors present at voting. But for a special resolution there should be required not only a majority of the members present and voting but a majority of the councillors representing those members of the League mentioned in the schedule, upon whom will fall the burden of any warlike proceedings.
15. (15) The Council of the League should meet at regular intervals, and it should be their duty to consider and report at least once annually on all matters which in their opinion are likely to lead to international disputes and to suggest how such matters should be dealt with.
16. (16) All international agreements to which any member of the League is a party should be expressly made without prejudice to the obligations of the agreement constituting the League, and should be promptly communicated to the Council of the League.
17. (17) Each member of the League should agree in its elementary schools and other schools to inculcate as far as may be the desirability of settling international dis- 509 putes on principles of right and justice and not by force of arms; and should explain the nature and the constitution of the League and the circumstances and objects under which, and for which, it has been formed. No member of the League should allow the use in such schools of literature tending to arouse hostility towards, or suspicion of, any other nation.
18. (18) Every member of the League should accord to every other member most-favoured-nation treatment in the matter of tariffs. This should be, however, without prejudice to preferential tariffs between various parts of the territories of any member of the League.
19. (19) Each member of the League should agree to afford to the ships of every other member of the League free access to its ports and harbours for the purpose of trade or for obtaining bunker coal and provisions; but this should be without prejudice to the payment of the usual dock and harbour dues, and without prejudice to any regulations as to the coasting trade.
20. (20)—This, the last, is the most important provision—The Council of the League should have power by special resolution to admit as a member of the League any nation not originally a party thereto, provided that the Council of the League is satisfied in each case that the nation proposed to be admitted bona fide accepts the principles on which the League is founded and bona fide intends that international disputes to which it is a party shall thereafter be settled by peaceful means in accordance with right and justice as distinguished from force of arms.

I think I may claim—at any rate, I venture to claim—that an agreement on those lines would have the following advantages. No member of the League could go to war, while still retaining membership, without the approval of the League. No member of the League could remain neutral in a war approved by the League. Every member of the League will be guaranteed against an act of war from outside by all the force of the League. Every member of the League would have certain economic advantages; most-favoured-nation treatment in the matter of tariffs, shipping, and trading facilities. To every member of the League the freedom of the seas, in any legitimate sense of the word, would be secured. On the other hand, no nation could permanently be excluded from membership, and in course of time we could hope that every nation would join. When that occurred, armament, as the noble Marquess said, would tend to decrease, and nations would find some other way of settling their disputes. Possibly international tribunals might begin to arise. But meanwhile we should have a Council of Nations charged with overlooking the peace of the world, and united with the power of bringing economic pressure to bear on any one who endangered it. International morality, principles of right and justice in international affairs, would be taught in our schools. The sense of mutual obligation which lies at the foundation of all law would be thus strengthened, and upon that foundation we might ultimately arrive at that system of judicial tribunals in international matters—with organised force to see to the execution of the decrees arrived at—such as noble Lords who have already addressed the House so ardently desire.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON)

My Lords, I believe there is still quite a number of noble Lords of great authority who wish to take part in this debate; and inasmuch as the hour is somewhat advanced, and a Royal Commission has been waiting for some time to come to your Lordships' House, I would venture myself to move the adjournment of the debate, taking advantage of its resumption, although it may be some time from now, to give such a reply as I can on behalf of His Majesty's Government to the various questions and appeals that have been addressed to me this evening.

Moved, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Earl Curzon of Kedleston.)

On Question, debate adjourned sine die.