HL Deb 06 March 1918 vol 29 cc307-24
LORD BERESFORD

My Lords, I rise to call attention to the serious losses of vessels conducting traffic between Great Britain and Ireland; and to move a Resolution. I must apologise for bringing this subject forward at so late an hour, but it is of such vast importance that I think it my duty to do so. I wish to refer to the serious losses on the trade route between England and Ireland, and to call attention to the fact that the loss of these steamers is affecting the food supply of our country to a very considerable degree. The submarine attacks are increasing and the position is becoming more perilous and getting worse every day. The reason is that there is no efficient defence. I do not blame the Admiralty for that. We went to war with about 500 destroyers and a large number of cruisers and small craft short, and we are suffering for that now. From October 12, 1917, to March 2, 1918, in the waters from Arklow to Bardsey Point and from the Boyne to the Mersey there were forty-four attacks by submarines, out of which twenty-five ships were lost in these seas, and 700 lives were lost. Two of these ships went down with all hands, and there was a patrol ship lost as well.

Then I would refer to the hospital ship "Glenart Castle." There are 153 of the people on board who have not been accounted for, and I hope the noble Lord in his reply will tell me if anything has been heard of them. I know there was in one of the boats that got away a medical officer named Young, who was one of the best boat-sailers and handlers of boats that I know, and if there had been any possibility of those boats getting to the shore he would have managed it. There were two more ships sunk the same day. There is intense anxiety among the relatives about the "Glenart Castle" particularly, and I hope the noble Lord can say whether any of those people have turned up.

It is generally supposed in the West that these vessels have been put down by spies. I have been down to Swansea and Cardiff lately, and there is a general sentiment there that there are a large number of aliens knocking about there who ought not to be allowed in those docks. Sir Edward Nichol, who was examining officer there for two and a half years, says he is well aware that there are spies there, and, at any rate, there are a large number of aliens who are allowed in the docks, and I do hope that will be stopped. There is no doubt that many vessels have been put down by information given by some persons, aliens or others.

Then there was the "Beechley," the tank ship torpedoed on February 23, and I call attention to the fact because the escort left this ship, as is done on many other occasions when the ships have been torpedoed almost immediately afterwards. It has occurred three or four times, but I want to call attention to the behaviour of the captain of the "Beechley." He gave no order to fire, the ship was given one hour's grace, which is most unusual, he gave no order for lowering the boats, and he was eventually taken prisoner in the submarine. I think full inquiry should be made as to those circumstances and as to what induced the captain to do anything so apparently futile and so careless as he has been accused of doing. I believe on the same day that that ship was lost five other ships were sunk—that is between last Saturday and last Monday. At any rate I know three were, the "Carmelite," the "Pemmern," and the "Kenmare," and I see just now on the tape that a 17,000 ton ship has been sunk in the same waters and forty-eight lives lost.

There is profound distrust and bad feeling getting about with regard to the management of the patrol. That should he explained. Holyhead is a continual procession of torpedoed crews. There was one torpedoed off the Smalls—another was torpedoed in the same place under the same conditions, the escort leaving her and she being torpedoed shortly afterwards. The "Apapa" was sunk coming from the East Coast of Africa—another ease where the destroyers had just left her after escorting her. She had two torpedoes sent at her, and there were 100 people drowned, including women and children—all in those waters.

With regard to food I will give a few of the food ships sunk. There was the "Cork," which had on board 156 cattle, 360 sheep, 139 pigs and 230 tons of food stuffs. There was the "Adela" with 400 cattle and 200 sheep, and there were others. Then there was the "Alfred Read" which was sunk with forty lives lost, sixteen being pilots—an examination ship. I think it is necessary to mention all these ships because they were all lost in the same waters. "Mexico City" and "Cresswell" were both sunk on February 5, and there were line survivors picked up by the "Leinster." The City of Cork Steamship Company commenced the war with seventeen vessels, they have built two, making nineteen—now they have only got five. I do not say that some of these vessels have not been commandeered but a large number have been lost, and that again affects the food supply of this country. It also affects the coa1 supply of Ireland, for they want 7,000 tons a week for the railways. The Irish ports are continually closed and the stores are rotting there.

Since the appointment of the Shipping Controller matters have been a great deal worse, simply because it is not clear whether the Admiralty or the Shipping Controller controls these shipping routes. We have started convoys for the ocean-going routes, but we have no convoys for the coast-wise routes. I think that should be undertaken as soon as possible. We should have convoys for the coast-wise routes, particularly in these seas. May I ask my noble friend if, when a convoy is lost—we have got to lose convoys in this war, but we have lost singularly few—the Government will at the same time publish the immense number of ships that we have convoyed over safely. That would be a very wise thing to do, because the public get very distressed when they see a convoy put down. I do not think the management is good with regard to the traffic in those seas. I agree that we must have a head centre, and the sole man responsible is the Admiral at Cork. But I think there ought to be independent men, that is, men who can close the ports and control the whole of the traffic. There ought to be a Naval officer at each one of these ports who is independent of the Admiral and reports what is done to the Admiral. In many cases the ships are delayed at ports, in many cases the ports are closed by order from outside, and not by order of the people at the ports. That is very confusing, and leads to delay, and to so many of the accidents that have occurred.

Another point that I should like to call attention to is that there are no escorts for the mail steamers. There are escorts for the cargo boats, but none for the mail steamers, excepting those which carry Americans, and there is only one of those steamers gunned. Every one of them ought to be gunned as soon as possible; it was asked for some time ago and refused. There was only escort for the mails from December 28 to January 8, although the Chief Secretary promised that there should be an escort for those mails. But the escort was taken off after the date I have named. I want to know who overbore the Chief Secretary, because this is very important. The "Leinster," one of the mail boats, has been nearly sunk, and if one of these mail ships is sunk there is an enormous loss of life. They have been missed several times—very close shots both ahead and astern—owing to the dexterity and seamanship of the captains, but they ought to have an escort, in view, of the enormous loss of life if they were blown up.

We have got thirty-one routes now. There were originally forty—we have taken nine off. Out of those thirty-one routes across the Channel there ought to be sonic, method of concentration where an escort is ready to take a convoy over. It may be difficult, but I feel satisfied that you would save those ships. The delay might be irksome, but it would be a better system than the one we have now. We are losing these ships so fast that if we go on at the present rate we shall have no cross-Channel traffic at all over the Irish Sea. I should like these ships concentrated at points to receive their escort and be convoyed over, and all mail ships should have an escort at once. It is better to delay the mail and have an escort than to lose the ships, as we are doing now.

It is impossible to speak of the loss of ships in the Irish Sea without speaking of other questions which are affiliated with it. One is the tremendous losses we have had in our shipping since the war began. I am not going to mention now the total of Allied and neutral slipping lost, because the Germans would at once double it, and then it would look as if we were going to starve. We are not going to starve, and there is no reason for pessimism. I have asked three or four times in this House, and three or four times in the other House, that we should have a better detailed list and more publicity with regard to our losses. The Weekly Return is most misleading; it tells the public nothing definite. They get cheered up one week and depressed the next week. If they are told the truth they will know exactly how matters stand.

I would not, of course, say anything that would help the enemy, but I wish to put on record something which will help our people to know the facts. I am going to take the latest losses and not refer to what has occurred before the date I shall give. From February 1 to the present time, British shipping has been lost at the rate of over 7,000 tons a day. That sounds enormous, but you have to add to that the losses of neutral and Allied shipping (which really is feeding us at the moment), and that means an addition of over 2,000 tons a day. It is a very serious proposition; but bad as that is, it is really very much better than it has been. Some of our losses, especially those of last April, were colossal. The First Lord is justified, in my opinion, in saving that the curve of losses is better, and that the curve of destruction of the submarines is better—both in our favour. I do not think that the enemy, whatever they do, will starve us; but I want to point out the necessity for using every possible endeavour to bring to the notice of the country the fact that more shipping is necessary for our life. The building of ships is at present not nearly making up our losses. We are now about 4,000,000 tons short of what we had at the beginning of the war. What I complain about that the output of shipping has gone Lack lately. The reason for that going back should be a matter for a public inquiry. I believe myself that the output has been considerably affected by the 121 per cent. extra in wages that was given. Those who did that did not understand the difference between time-work and piecework. The piece-workers are now doing all they can to get on to time, because of the higher pay in proportion to the work done. A good piece-worker will do in twelve hours what a time-worker will do in twenty hours; so that your Lordships can see how the country is losing by the present method.

Another reason why I want this question of our losses ventilated, and the truth told to the public, is that the Germans enor- mously exaggerate our losses. They double them. We have heard a good deal about propaganda to-night. In my opinion, the Germans have won what they have won in this war a great deal more by propaganda than by the sword. They certainly won the Russian war by propaganda; and their methods in that connection had a bad effect in Italy and in France, and they are now doing their best to bring about a bad their effect in this country. To their own people the Germans are magnifying our losses; therefore our Government should publish what we are actually losing and what we are doing to make up for our losses. I believe that shortly we shall turn the corner and be making up our losses, but at present we are not doing that.

Mr. Barnes made a very alarming state the other day. He told the truth when he said that our output in January was less than half the output of the month before. We must remember that the United States programme is not coming up to expectations. They spoke of 6,000,000 tons in the year, but I do not believe that they will do more than 2,500,000 tons; and I am certain that the millions of tons that we were promised in this country are not likely to be forthcoming. Once more I wish to expostulate against optimistic speeches by Ministers. The First Lord made a hard-featured, honest speech yesterday, and my noble friend Lord Curzon made an optimistic speech; but the worst of all was the Prime Minister, who said that we should put out four times the output in 1917 that we put out in 1916; but he did not say that we built only 500,000 tons of shipping in 1916 as against nearly 2,000,000 tons in 1913.

I think we are going to work in the wrong way to fill up the gap which has been made. I will take first of all the standard ship. The idea of a standard ship was an excellent one, but why not carry out the idea in its entirety? The utilisation of the standard ship is lost in the following manner. I am informed that one firm had on a slip a ship, which we will call a standard B ship. This ship was first changed to standard A; then changed to an oil tanker; then changed back to standard A; and finally changed back to an oil tank again. Look at the enormous expense incurred, and the whole utility of standardising a ship lost, by such proceedings. Then, again, there are different ships of different standards on the same slip. Those who know anything about a slip know that the ships are only a short distance apart; and if you have ships of different standards, say, A, B, and C, you defeat the object of standardisation; you have men working with different angle-irons, different scantlings, different plates, and different rivets; whereas, if you do what you ought to do, let the shipowners choose the particular standard to be laid down and allow them to build nothing else but that, an enormous improvement would be effected. By having different standard ships on the same slip you upset the whole of the working routine.

There is another thing in connection with standardisation—namely, the shortening of double-bottoms, which is reducing cargo space and necessitating enormous extra expense for decking which need not be incurred. From the truck to the keelson everything is altered with regard to the standardised ship. The whole routine of the yard is altered; the tools are altered, as are the overhead cranes, angle-irons, and rivetting appliances. They are also putting back the reverse angle under this system. I might explain that the reverse angle is a system of building which was employed about thirty years ago, and necessitates double rivetting. Why these things are being done, no seaman can understand; and it certainly is not the way to increase our output of ships. I object also to the national yards. Anybody who knows anything about a slip knows that it takes eight months to build one and another seven months before you can get a ship water-borne off the slip. Men have been taken away from other yards, and material has been taken away, and the whole system is bad; and if once we get or continue Government control of shipping, good-bye to shipping, for all will be ruined. It will kill the individual energy and enterprise which has made our great shipping interest.

I will ask my noble friend once more if he will do his best to get an Inquiry of a public character into why the output of shipping has decreased at the present moment, which is the greatest crisis of the war. We are fighting for our lives now, and depend entirely upon shipbuilding. I would ask my noble friend if he will answer the points to which I have referred—namely, standard shipbuilding, national yards, and also how it is that the output has been threatened and decreased lately, and what is the reason for it. Further I would ask him again if he will seek out some method of publishing a better Return and making more public to the country the actual state of our losses and how we are filling them up by shipbuilding.

THE LORD BISHOP OF BANGOR

My Lords, I feel that I must ask the patience of the House not only on account of the lateness of the hour but also because of the fact that when such a person as myself ventures to take part in a debate which one would naturally think ought to be confined to those who have proper technical knowledge, you may very well say that this is a difficult problem and men who have made a life study of naval strategy and devoted their best attention to it ought not to be hampered and bothered by the criticisms and suggestions of people who cannot know anything about it. I plead this, however, in excuse, that when things are going very wrong it is sometimes worth while for those who are trying to put things right to ask the advice of those who are living on the spot.

If I may quote an example, I think in September of the first year of the war the Lord Privy Seal drew attention to the unsatisfactory state of things on the coast of Scotland. Just in the same way I would wish to draw attention to what is said by the people on the spot. You must remember that they look at things from quite a different perspective to the generality of the public. The generality of the public reads the return of ships sunk by submarines. They are grieved if they find the number going up and pleased if they find it is going down. But the people whose anxieties I am now trying to voice occupy something like a first-aid position just behind the fighting line. The crews of sunken ships come in almost daily, and it is their privilege to minister to these poor people and they hear their stories and complaints. Take for instance these three ships. March 1, ship torpedoed, name not known at present. March 2, S.S. "Carmelite," twenty-seven saved, two drowned. March 2, S.S. "Pennearn," thirteen saved, twenty-one drowned. These three all torpedoed in the same area and rescued men brought in. The hotel was crowded Saturday afternoon at three with survivors who were some of them being carried into the wounded room and were lying on the beds, a pitiful sight, being attended to by nurse and doctor Two negroes were being put into a motor to be taken to the hospital. The large billiard room was filled with half-clothed men being given suits by the representative of the Shipwrecked Mariners' Society and his daughter. Now that is the kind of thing always going on in this port, day by day, and naturally these people cannot but have their own opinions about it.

Now let me venture to give what are the chief causes of their anxiety. One anxiety which they have is this, that they consider that their port does not receive the same attention from the Government that other places do. I am not blaming so much the Admiralty, or perhaps the Board of Trade, but I am speaking generally, whoever is responsible. Before the war there was a captain of the port, an admiral, who is dead. He died a short time ago, and no successor has been appointed. The report is that no successor will be appointed and that Government House, with its important view of the harbour, is going to be let. The great railway that has its terminus there had a most able superintendent. He went off to active service, and died, and he has not been replaced. The great shipping company had its superintendent there and he has gone. They naturally feel under these circumstances that there is not much attention being given to them. Again, there was a wireless position—a "listening post," I think it is called—and that has just been dismantled.

Then, if I may refer to the admirable speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty, he mentioned three areas in which we are fighting the submarines—namely, the North Sea, the North Atlantic, and the English Channel. He did not mention the Irish Sea and St. George's Channel, yet this is the area where all these losses are happening. A Member who followed him remarked that in one single day in that area six ships had been sunk. That is in excess of the number I have been told of, but I dare say it is true, and one really wondered whether it was accidental or not that in his survey of the situation the First Lord did not refer to that important place.

As to another cause of the anxiety of those for whom I speak, perhaps I may give you a little anecdote to illustrate what I mean. The boys of a training ship had their shooting practice and a boy was shooting too much to the left. The instructor said to him, "If you miss the target, next time take care your shot is to the right, and not to the left again, because if you make the same mistake twice running, I shall think you are not taking pains." The anxiety of these people is something of this nature. They had a ship sunk an hour after the escort left, and three days after another ship was sunk in the same place. There is that ship which the noble and gallant Lord referred to, one of four ships sunk without escort. Then they say— Fresh sailors from the Beachleaf having come to the hospital to have their wounds dressed, make it clear that there is something suspicious about the escort leaving ships in a danger zone to be shortly afterwards attacked by submarines. … One would think it a moment of such serious consequence that not an hour would be lost in sending down most capable officials even as a precaution to diminish this death roll. Then I have another letter— There seems increasing distrust and suspicion as to influences at work here and the way the losses of ships in this immediate part is treated lightly. The ship torpedoed in the Channel which Mr. Maenamara was asked about was the one young Lewis Parry saw sunk close to his vessel. This took place Sunday week. We have had several since then. It seems one more form of courting disaster to treat precautions here lightly—as to Government House with a caretaker when dangers surround us. There is much that should be known as all feel, but find a deaf ear turned. It has begun to be realised all over Anglesey. Then, again, this came in to-day— It seems that several vessels that had put into the harbour the end of last week and had arrived with convoy, complained of being sent on without convoy to another port to unload their cargoes. It was at the very time the submarines were sinking the ships last Friday and Saturday. There is no real provision against unauthorised persons landing at Holyhead, and precautions generally seem inadequate.—said he landed from his yacht and passed quite unquestioned by any one into the hotel. The feeling is that the naval base is quite inert under the present authority. Now he writes about these four ships being turned round and sent back. I art only describing how it looks to a civilian. Four or five ships arrive in harbour under convoy and are told to leave to go to another port without convoy. These are the kind of things that are said here. I do not want to ask the noble Earl to tell me what he is going to do. It would be very improper of me to do so. What I would ask is that he should go and look into these things very carefully. It is complained that these things have been represented and that everybody turns a deaf ear to the repre- sentation. I would ask him mist humbly to go down to the place or send somebody down to talk to the people on the spot, to talk to the men who have been landed from these torpedoed boats, and hear what they have to say. It may be that these ships are to blame, as the First Lord of the Admiralty said, for having lit their lights when they should not have done so. That, of course, we do not know. There may be many contributory causes of that kind, but the men do complain—and people accept those complaints—rightly or wrongly that there is some want of control, something wrong in the way that that great port is managed. And I would only ask that this matter might be looked into.

If I may say one word in conclusion, I would say that these criticisms of mine may be just, but I can quite understand that they are possibly unjust, because I speak in ignorance. There are facts I know nothing about, and when a person who does not know all the facts criticises, he is so apt to do great injustice. Whatever I have said about those who sit in office chairs and administer these things, there is one class of men who are above my criticism and every one else's criticism. They are men about whose work I do know something, and we who know their work give them the most undgrudging admiration. They are those who man the small patrol boats and trawlers and do their best to guard the ships coming in and going Out of our harbour. Their devotion to duty, their courage, and their fortitude are equal to and unsurpassed by the devotion, courage, and fortitude of those brave men in the other three zones mentioned by the First Lord of the Admiralty.

THE ADDITIONAL PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE EARL OF LYTTON)

My Lords, there are a great many points in the two speeches to which we have just listened with which I am unable to deal to-night. Many are new to me and I have not the information at my disposal. I can assure both the noble Lords who have spoken that any matter which I am unable to deal with in my reply now I will certainly take steps to investigate, and, if necessary, will send them written information. It is, of course, quite true as the noble and gallant Lord has just said, that German submarines have been particularly active during the first two months of this year in the Irish Channel, and consequently our losses in those waters have been greater than they have been at any previous period of the war. It is inevitable that wherever enemy submarines may happen to congregate at any particular moment there must be losses of ships in those waters. At one moment it is in one part of the world, and at the next moment in another, according to the waters which the submarines choose for their hunting-ground, but no action that the Admiralty can take can completely prevent any loss of ships from taking place.

I really do not see that very much is to be gained by emphasising at particular moments losses in any particular part of the world and representing them as being due to the lethargy or inefficiency of the Admiralty; still less in encouraging the public to believe that ships are sunk through the operation of enemy agents resident in this country. It is a popular delusion that everything unfortunate which happens in the war is due to German spies in this country who have escaped the vigilance of the authorities. I believe, my Lords, that that is a profound delusion, and I think it is a misfortune to encourage anybody to believe that it is the case. The question of dealing with submarines is, of course, an extremely complicated and difficult matter. These questions have been raised in the House of Commons a great many times, and the Financial Secretary has always replied that this complicated matter is receiving the closest and most anxious attention of the Admiralty, who are attempting to provide within their means the most efficient protection. I think the noble and gallant Lord—if he will forgive me for saying so—is apt to treat the matter as if it were rather more simple than it really is, and perhaps not to give quite sufficient credit for the intelligence of the Admiralty authorities in dealing with it.

LORD BERESFORD

I know the difficulties.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

I will deal with the points he has raised in order in a moment, but before doing so I would like to make one answer of a general kind to the right rev. Prelate who has just spoken. I can assure him that, whatever losses there may be in the Irish Channel, they do not arise from the fact that the Naval authorities are paying insufficient attention to these waters, or to any port in particular. If that idea is abroad in the place of which he speaks, I should be most anxious to do all I can to dispel it. Far from our not paying attention to this part, it is a district which has occupied the closest attention of the Naval authorities for the obvious reason that, at this moment, it is a centre of submarine activity. If the right rev. Prelate says that because two ships are sunk in the same waters it is evidence that the Admiralty is not taking pains, which I rather gathered was the analogy of the anecdote he told us. I must express dissent from that view. It would be quite impossible, merely by sending down a capable official, to prevent a second ship being sunk in the seine district when submarines are operating there.

Although there has been much regret-table loss of life in the waters of the Irish Channel, it is necessary to point out that the losses of the Irish local traffic compare quite favourably with those of other parts of the world, and, really, it is a great exaggeration for the noble and gallant Lord to say that soon there will he no traffic left across the Irish Sea if sinkings go on at the present rate. I agree with the right rev. Prelate that it reflects the greatest possible credit upon the crews of these ships that they have not been deterred from following their trade by the dangers which they have to face, and it is entirely dace to their courage and devotion to duty that the Irish traffic has not been more seriously interrupted.

The noble and gallant Lord complained that we had too many routes across the Trish Sea. It may be true, as I think he stated, that there are something like thirty-one different points of departure for this traffic, but the noble Lord must not suppose that, because there are thirty-one or so points of departure, these ships are left free to follow what routes they please from one port to another. The routes which they have to follow are carefully prescribed for them and they are given the most detailed instructions as to the safest course which it is desirable for them to pursue. These routes, of course, are constantly being changed as the submarine situation requires, and the position is watched with the most anxious attention. The noble and gallant Lord suggested that, instead of the various points of departure, we should confine the traffic to three or four selected routes only, and that the ships proceeding along these routes should proceed under escort. The peculiarity of the trade between this country and Ireland, which consists largely of perishable goods, is such that if we were to adopt that course it would involve consequences which would be far more serious to the trade and, manufactures between the two countries than the present system.

After all, it is not only the object of German submarines to destroy life and ships; their object, also, is to interfere with trade. We could preserve lives and ships if trade was not carried on, and possibly, if we adopted the suggestion of the noble and gallant Lord, a certain amount of saving in life and shipping might result, but it would only be at the cost of the trade which is now being carried on between the two countries. There would be great congestion at the ports owing to the arrival of groups of vessels at one time and the delay which would result in the delivery of goods would really paralyse both trade and manufactures. It could be arranged, of course, so far as the Admiralty is concerned, but if we were to adopt that course there would be a very great outcry from the industries that would be affected. I think if we were driven to such a procedure as that, that the Germans really would have accomplished most of what they set out to do, and hope to do, with their submarines, whereas at the present time, in spite of the rather gloomy picture drawn by the noble and gallant Lord, I can assure Your Lordships that the results of their campaign have fallen very far short of their expectations. The noble and gallant Lord suggested that we should have at each port a Naval officer with powers to regulate truffle, close the port and send out ships as he thought fit. Tine noble Lord is, perhaps, unaware of the extent to which this exists at the present time. There is a senior Naval officer at each port who has very full powers indeed of holding up shipping and regulating traffic, so far as the port at which he resides is concerned.

LORD BERESFORD

I know that, but he is not independent.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

No; and it would be impossible, as I will explain, for these officers to be all independent. There must be some central controlling authority, otherwise this sort of thing might result—a Naval officer might, in his discretion, close a particular port and prevent a ship that was about to sail leaving the port, but he would have no power to prevent another ship, which had sailed from a distant port not under his control, arriving outside the port. In order that all the different ports of arrival and departure may be part of the same system there must be some general co-ordinating authority.

LORD BERESFORD

May I interrupt the noble Earl? That is the point I raised. If this independent Naval officer closed the port he would open the port to let the other ship in. That is where he would be independent. Now he has to refer to another authority.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

Yes; but it would be impossible for officers in the individual ports to have all the information which is available to the central authority, in co-operation with which they work, and which knowledge is absolutely essential to the formation of a right decision at any particular moment. I think the central supervision, which is provided at the present time and which is thy result of long experience, is really working quite satisfactorily. The Admiralty have from time to time made various experiments in dealing with the problem, and they feel that at the present moment, the system which is in vogue, on the whole, works well. The noble Lord said matters were worse since the Ministry of Shipping had been created because nobody knew whether it was the minister of Shipping or the Admiralty which controlled the shipping routes. I should like to take the opportunity of explaining this duty to the noble and gallant Lord. The duty of the Minister of Shipping, apart from the provision of ships, only arises when the vessel has arrived in port. The Minister of Shipping has authority over the cargoes of the vessels, and over the distribution and transport of the cargoes when they arrive. But he has nothing to do with the routes taken by ships nor with the protection to be provided for them when they are on the high seas. All that is entirely under the control of the Admiralty, and is in no way shared in or interfered with by the Ministry of Shipping.

LORD BERESFORD

The Ministry of Shipping directs the ship to the port.

THE EARL OF LYTTON

The Ministry of Shipping says to what port the ship shall go, and it is the business of the Admiralty to give instructions to the ship as to how it shad get there. The two functions are quite separate and distinct. The Ministry of Shipping is responsible for the distribution of cargo, and therefore it directs a ship to go to one port and not to another because from the one port and not from the other the cargo can be transferred. But the Ministry of Shipping has nothing whatever to do with the route to be taken by the ship or with the provision to be made for its safety upon the seas.

The noble Lord told me that he was going to raise a point in connection with the traffic manager of the London and South Western Railway who is acting as a transportation officer. He did not mention it in his speech. I am informed that that officer is attached to the Ministry of Shipping. He is not representing the Admiralty, and his duties deal only with the distribution of cargo and questions of transportation for which the Ministry is responsible. They selected this gentleman as the best individual that they could find for the post, and they are confident that he carries out his duties very satisfactorily.

Reference was made by the noble and gallant Lord to the present unsatisfactory position with regard to shipbuilding. He said that our output had lately been going back, and he asked that some public Inquiry should be held into the circumstances. I really do not think that that is a matter which could be at all elucidated by a public Inquiry. The circumstances and the causes for the falling off of the shipbuilding output in January have been made the subject of the closest investigation by the Government. All the causes are perfectly well known to the Government, but whether they should publish them or not is another Matter. That any authority could be set up to hold an Inquiry from which any information not now at the disposal of the Government would result I very much doubt. I think that the object the noble and gallant Lord really has at heart is that the general public should be made aware of the precise nature of the shipping position, and that above all the workpeople themselves should understand to what extent the whole nation's existence at this moment depends upon their activities. That is a point to which the Government has given the closest attention, and it is with the object of giving that situation in a true and detailed form that we are hoping before long to publish the kind of return for which the noble and gallant Lord has many times asked. I have in this House repeatedly given the noble and gallant Lord reasons why in our opinion it was inexpedient that this return should be made. We think, however, that the circumstances at this moment are such as to justify us in giving it. The situation in the shipbuilding trade was one of the factors which induced us to reconsider our decision, and another was the exaggerated figures put out by the German Government to which the noble and gallant. Lord referred. I may inform him that we are this moment in consultation with our Allies in regard to this subject. Obviously we cannot give any figures of world tonnage without the consent of our Allies. As soon as those negotiations have gone through we hope to be able to place the country in possession of the true position with regard to shipbuilding in order that it may be realised that our very existence as a nation depends at this moment, and will depend during the coming year, upon the extent to which we can produce ships from our shipbuilding yards. I am afraid that I cannot give in public a more detailed account of the arrangements made by the Admiralty for the protection of traffic in the Irish Sea, but if the noble and gallant Lord or the right rev. Prelate or any other noble Lord desires more definite information I shall be very pleased privately to give them any information that I can.

LORD BERESFORD

My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his speech. A large portion of it is most satisfactory, more particularly that with regard to publishing a proper Return of our losses. With reference to the output of shipbuilding, I think that if the noble Earl would ask the Government to publish what they know about it, it would have a good result. They have inquired into it, and I do not ask for another Inquiry but only that they should publish the real reason why the output has declined at the present very serious crisis in our life. The people would then know, and if it had anything to do with labour the Government would have behind them the enormous force of public opinion which would insist that the men must do the work. If that is done I shall be perfectly satisfied.

With regard to the transportation officer having nothing to do with the trade routes, I knew that. I know that the man that they have got at Dublin is an able man, but I would rather see a sailor there who knows all about the business than I would the traffic manager of a great railway who, I think, is not the most suitable man for this work. I am not finding fault with him, but I think that things would go better if you had men there to do this work who understood their jobs. One of the great reasons that we have spent such enormous sums of money and have had so many disappointments in this war is that we have put people to do things which they did not understand.