Lords Sitting of 16 July 1918

LONDONDERRY CORPORATION BILL.
Bill read 3a with the Amendments and passed, and returned to the Commons.
EXPIRING LAWS CONTINUANCE BILL.
  LABOURERS (IRELAND) BILL.
    MATERNITY AND CHILD WELFARE BILL.
    Brought from the Commons; read 1a, and to be printed.

MIDWIVES BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order).
Clause 12:
Repeal of section nine of the principal Act.
12. Section nine of the principal Act (which enables county councils to delegate their powers and duties to district councils) shall be repealed.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, there is a small Amendment on the Paper which I would ask the leave of your Lordships to move. It is to add at the end of Clause 12 the words "unless on the representation of the county council concerned the Local Government Board otherwise direct." I have put down this Amendment to meet an undertaking that I gave to the noble Earl, Lord Lichfield, in order to make assurance doubly sure that in cases where delegation is still permitted under this Bill there shall be no fear that that delegation shall be stereotyped.
Amendment moved—
Clause 12, page 4, line 36, at end insert ("unless on the representation of the county council concerned the Local Government Board otherwise direct").—(Viscount Peel.)
>THE EARL OF LICHFIELD: I am much obliged to the noble Viscount for having looked into the matter and for putting down these words, which will make ambiguity impossible in the future.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Viscount Peel.)
On Question, Bill passed and sent to the Commons.

FLAX COMPANIES (FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
EARL STANHOPE: My Lords, an increase in the production of flax throughout the Empire and particularly in the United Kingdom is a subject that I feel sure will appeal to your Lordships' House. Within the past twelve months a very remarkable increase has been made in the acreage under flax in England and Scotland, and assistance has also been given for the production of flax in British East Africa and in Canada. If your Lordships will agree to the passing of this Bill it is hoped still further to stimulate the production of flax in the United Kingdom, and particularly in Ireland.
Arrangements have been made for a very considerable extension of the acreage under flax in Ireland, and the necessary money will be advanced by banks, part of it being guaranteed by the linen companies, and part of it (with the consent of the Treasury) by the War Department. It was found that several of the trading companies concerned who wished to advance money for this purpose had not powers to do so under their memorandum and articles of association. The companies, of course, could have made individual application under the Companies Acts to have an alteration made in their articles and memorandum. It was felt to be simpler and perhaps quicker that the matter should be put right by Statute, following the precedent of munition powers, by which companies were allowed, despite what was contained in their memorandum, to engage in munition work in the early part of the war.
This Bill enables any company, association, or body of persons in the United Kingdom who desire to come to the assistance of the State in increasing the production of flax, subject to the consent of the Board of Trade, to take shares, become guarantors, or to lend money for that purpose. The interests of the shareholders are, of course, protected by its being necessary to pass a resolution at a general meeting of the company. The Bill imposes no obligation on anybody; it merely removes an obstacle in the path of those who desire to help the country by promoting the production of one of the vital commodities required for the war. In view

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of the ever-increasing demands of the Air Service for linen fabric, and of the large demands of the Admiralty and War Office, and in view also of the elimination of Russia and Belgium as sources of supply, I hope that your Lordships will give a not less favourable consideration to this Bill than it has received already in another place. The Bill is a very short one consisting of but one clause, and I trust, therefore, that your Lordships will be prepared to give it a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Earl Stanhope.)
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION (IRELAND) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Clinton.)
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord opposite—I understand that the Lord Privy Seal is not in his place, and that therefore we cannot expect a detailed examination of the Bill—to give us some information as to its general provisions. For even the most general outline we shall be grateful.
LORD CLINTON: My Lords, this is a Bill which I understand to be entirely of a legal and technical character. Its object is to remove in two instances difficulties that have arisen in the administration of the Summary Jurisdiction Code in Ireland. Does the noble Marquess want further particulars?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Well, if we could have a few more.
LORD CLINTON: A good deal of inconvenience is caused in County Dublin owing to the fact that cases arising in that part of the county which is outside the Dublin metropolitan district are not recognised by the county justices, but have to be treated before a Dublin police magistrate. This entails a good deal of inconvenience and expense to the police and public at large, and a memorial has been received from the county justices asking that the matter should be set right by legislation. This is clone by Clause 1. This measure has
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passed through the other House and there has been no discussion and no objection raised to it.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord.
EARL BEAUCHAMP: My Lords, I think your Lordships would wish to congratulate the noble Lord who has just sat down on having clearly read a brief, which he had not looked at before he rose to his feet to ask your Lordships to give a Second Reading to this Bill. This is not a proper way of treating your Lordships' House. It is a very clear want of respect. The Lord Privy Seal, who put down the Notice on the Paper, neither attended in his place to explain the Bill nor asked any other noble Lord to do it on his behalf. It is quite true that we are living in difficult times, but that is no reason why for the first time, I think, your Lordships should be treated with such scant respect as on this occasion. I hope your Lordships, if you do give a Second Reading to the Bill, will make it quite clear that you will not tolerate such treatment on any subsequent occasion, and that, if Bills are moved, they should be moved by the noble Lord who is in charge of them, or by some other noble Lord who has had an opportunity of getting up the question beforehand.
On Question, Bill read 2a.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (SILICOSIS) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
VISCOUNT SANDHURST: My Lords, this is, in effect, a development of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides compensation for workers contracting industrial diseases. It provides for compensation in the case of those killed or disabled by an industrial disease known as fibroid phthisis which arises from siliceous dust that is to be found, for example, in mining or quarrying of what is known as Bannister rock, a very hard rock, and also in the making of silica brick.
It was considered long ago whether this idea could not be incorporated in the Workmen's Compensation Act, but owing to the slow development of the disease and insufficient knowledge it was decided not to recommend that course. Now, owing to

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the advance of science, to deeper medical research, and to improved diagnosis, the change is recommended, and is considered necessary. It is intended by the Bill to empower the Secretary of State to make schemes for different industries, and by the schemes to establish in each industry a compensation fund from which all claims are to be paid. The burden will be distributed among the whole trade, and therefore no question of apportioning the liability among the different employers will arise.
The scheme has two aims—one precautionary, the other compensation. The process of the disease is extremely slow, and the Bill provides for the suspension from employment of those for whom this particular trade has become dangerous. In such cases, if the Committee to be set up find that the workman's capacity for work is impaired by the disease as the result of following the occupation, compensation will be given. For the purpose of this compensation joint committees will be set up of employers and workmen, and there will be an independent chairman. Among the provisions of the Bill is one for the appointment and remuneration of medical officers and advisory medical bodies who will have to do with this particular disease and with these workmen. The outlines of this scheme have already been worked out, and, while I cannot say that agreement is absolute, there is a very large measure of assent. The Bill is the result of continuous conference and lengthy negotiations by which many outstanding difficulties have been overcome. I hope I have said enough to show the useful and beneficent nature of this measure, and I ask your Lordships to give it a Second Reading.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a. (Viscount Sandhurst.)
LORD BUCKMASTER: My Lords, your Lordships will be anxious to give favourable consideration to this measure, which is obviously designed in the interests of workmen in a difficult and dangerous occupation. I rise only for the purpose of asking the noble Viscount whether he can give me a little information on one or two points which occur to me on cursorily glancing through the measure Is it assumed that this particular disease at the present moment is outside the scope of the existing Workmen's Compensation Act; and, if so, why? It seems that the disease
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obviously arises out of and in the course of occupation, and I do not for the moment understand why the Workmen's Compensation Act is not capable of dealing with it. I could have understood it better if this Bill had provided for a more extended and liberal scheme of compensation, but it appears by subsection (2) of Clause 1 that the scheme of compensation is that prescribed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Obviously there must be something at the back of it which has caused the advisers of the Government to think that this Bill is necessary. I should like to know what it is, because, if the workmen have, in fact, at the present moment rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act, I should not like to see those rights in any way weakened or impaired by the passage of another measure.
The second question that I wish to ask is, if the object of this Bill is to provide a fund out of which compensation is to be paid and to relegate to workmen the rights against that fund and against that fund alone, what provision is there in the Bill to secure workmen if the fund happens to be insufficient? There is a general fund which is to be compensated by subscriptions, and out of that fund the expenses are to be met and the compensation is to be paid. But suppose the fund is inadequate when any workmen takes proceedings to recover compensation, what is his remedy then?
The noble Viscount, I am sure, will understand that I am asking these questions with a genuine desire for information, and with particular anxiety that no existing right should in any way be weakened by a Bill passed on the hypothesis that the right is, in fact, unsound or untrustworthy.
VISCOUNT SANDHURST: In regard to the second question of my noble and learned friend, I believe the intention is that these workmen shall, by being taken in time, be prevented from becoming seriously ill from this particular disease. At present I understand that there are a large number of these workmen who are seriously ill, but after the improved medical inspection, and so on, we hope that that severe condition will be avoided. In reply to the noble and learned Lord's first question, I should like to inform myself a little better and I will make communication at the next stage of the Bill, as this particular disease is not

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confined to gannister quarries only but also exists in certain Cornish mines which are very difficult to work, and affects Sheffield grinders and certain pottery workers. Whether the actual conditions of the existing Workmen's Compensation Act would be sufficient I am unable to say, but I will in from myself and tell the noble and learned Lord at the next stage.
LORD STUART OF WORTLEY: My Lords, I think I can answer the question of my noble and learned friend below me, because I am somewhat interested in this particular kind of production which of late has become specially important. If you want to make munitions you must have steel, and if you want steel you must have furnaces, and those furnaces must be lined with a certain kind of brick, and those bricks must be made of this particular kind of clay called gannister. The noble and learned Lord may remember that when the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed it dealt solely—I think I am right in saying—with accidents, but there was a clause which said that it might he extended, and it was a very important extension, beyond accidents to disease by a certain process. The process provided in the Act was that it might be extended by Order in Council made on the advice of the Home Secretary. Here we have an industry in which it is said that a certain disease arises from the processes in which the workers are engaged—the mining processes and the brick-making processes. No doubt the Secretary of State could exercise his power of extending the Act to that industry by a mere Order in Council, by executive action; but it was felt, in view of the extraordinary importance of this production, that it would not be fair for any individual employer to bear alone the whole of the very serious financial liability which might be laid upon him; therefore it was necessary to set up—what this Bill really sets up—a compulsory insurance scheme for the whole trade. In my opinion it is a fair scheme; and not only is it a fair scheme, but it gives the workman a stronger fund against which to proceed. The noble and learned Lord asked, supposing the compensation fund became insolvent, what would be the workman's position? The answer is that, even supposing you make that extreme supposition, he would be in a better position than under any other Act which left his recourse against the assets of an individual employer. I
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think I have answered the questions of my noble and learned friend.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

SMALL HOLDING COLONIES (AMENDMENT) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Third Reading read.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 3a,—(Lard Clinton.)
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, before the Bill is read a third time I should like, very briefly, to say something which I had not the opportunity of saying on the Second Reading—namely, to support with all the emphasis in my power the plea of those who represent the County Councils Association that the embargo now laid by the Treasury on the operations of the county councils in respect of the provision of small holdings should be removed. It is a subject that has been raised before in this House, but I doubt whether the Treasury realise its importance. I know, of course, that the whole difficulty is financial; but has the Treasury considered whether the difficulty could not be met in any way by making it a condition that the money borrowed by a county council for the purchase of an estate should be invested in National War Bonds and the purchase price paid in that coin, if I may use the phrase? I throw that out as a suggestion.
Here you have this cruel dilemma. Everybody admits that at the end of the war a great responsibility will be put on the county councils to assist in meeting the demands for small holdings, not only from returned soldiers and sailors but from others; and all this time opportunities are going by when the county councils could buy suitable estates on the market instead of hereafter taking them by compulsion. It seems to me an absurd thing that you should want to do by friction and by compulsion hereafter, and, perhaps, at greater expense, what can be done now with universal good will. Therefore the refusal of the Treasury to remove the embargo must be protested against on every possible opportunity.
LORD CLINTON: My Lords, I, and everybody who is interested in the provision of small holdings, will sympathise

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very much with the noble Earl in the statement he has just made. It is in the last degree unfortunate that these funds are not available at the present moment. I understand that the whole system of loans out of the Public Loan Fund is under consideration now, and the case of one applicant, the county councils here, cannot be considered fully until the whole of the rest has been under the consideration of the Government; but I have no doubt that the remarks of the noble Earl will be noted, and I am sure that they will have sympathy.
On Question, Bill read 3a.
Clause 1:
Increase in area of land which may he acquired for purposes of a. 1 of 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 38.
1. Subject to the provisions of this section, subsection (3) of section one of the Small Holding Colonies Act, 1916 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Act"), which limits the area of the land which may be acquired by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries for the purposes of that section, shall have effect as if forty-five thousand acres were therein substituted for four thousand five hundred acres, twenty thousand acres for two thousand acres, and sixty thousand acres for six thousand acres, provided that for the purposes of the acquisition, equipment, and settlement of the area hereby authorised to be acquired by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Board may, with the consent of the county councils, employ the county councils as their agents, and vest in them all the powers hereby or by the principal Act conferred upon them, in addition to those vested in such councils by virtue of the Small Holdings Act, 1908, and paragraph (c) of section eleven of the principal Act, which limits the area of the land which may be acquired by the Board of Agriculture for Scotland for the purposes of the said section one, shall have effect as if twenty thousand acres were therein substituted for two thousand acres:
Provided that where land which is to be acquired for the purposes of the said section one could not, if this Act had not been passed, have been acquired for that purpose without making the total area of the land for the time being so acquired exceed the amount authorised to be so acquired, the land shall not be acquired otherwise than by taking the same on lease or by taking the same in feu:
Provided also that no portion of the additional land authorised by this Act to be acquired by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries shall be so acquired except after consultation with the chairman of the council of the county in which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, or with a committee of that council.
LORD CLINTON: The first Amendment standing in my name to Clause 1 is merely drafting.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, lines 15 and 16, leave out ("with the consent of the county councils, employ the county councils") and insert ("as respects any county with the consent of the council of that county employ that council").—(Lord Clinton.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
LORD CLINTON: The next Amendment is consequent on the foregoing one.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 19, leave out ("councils") and insert ("council").—(Lord Clinton.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE THE MARQUESS OF CREWE moved to omit the first proviso, from "Provided that where land" down to "taking the same in feu." The noble Marquess said: Your Lordships will, I am sure, remember what occurred at an earlier stage of the Bill with regard to this proviso. My noble friend Lord Galway, who is not able to be in his place to-day, moved the omission of certain words which at that time appeared in the Bill, with the result that the proviso read thus—
"Provided that where land which is to be acquired for the purposes of the said section one could not, if this Act had not been passed, be acquired for that purpose without making the total area of the land for the time being so acquired exceed the amount authorised and so acquired,—"
that is to say the amount which was authorised by the original Act, 6,000 acres—
"the land shall not be acquired otherwise than by taking the same on lease";
as my noble friend Lord Galway had moved that the subsequent words should be left out—those subsequent words being, "or by purchasing it on the terms that payment shall be made therefor by way of rent charge or other annual payment." Afterwards, Lord Saltoun moved to leave out the words "or by taking the same in feu," but that noble Lord was not successful in obtaining the omission of these words. The net result is, therefore, certainly not satisfactory.
It is true that my noble friend Lord Galway succeeded in his object of elimi nating the provision which only allowed payment to be made by way of rent charge, instead of by payment in cash; but he left the clause in this position, that the only method open to the Board of Agriculture of obtaining land at all was by

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lease. I think your Lordships will all feel that this is not a very satisfactory outcome of the whole discussion, and my noble friend Lord Galway asked me to state that he would prefer that my Amendment—namely, to omit the whole proviso—should be carried rather than that the clause should be left in the position in which his Amendment placed it.
The noble Lord in charge of the Bill proposes to restore the words struck out on the last occasion, and I wish to put it to him and to your Lordships whether in all the circumstances it would not be more reasonable to do what I propose—namely, to leave out the proviso altogether. What is the proviso required for? As the Bill would stand without it, it would be open to the Board of Agriculture to obtain land for the purpose of these colonies in any one of various ways; either by purchase, or on rentcharge terms, or on a lease, or by feuing in those parts of the kingdom where feuing is the practice. But what is important to remember is this, that they cannot buy the land outright and pay cash for it unless the money is forthcoming, and there is nothing in this Bill, if passed without the proviso, which will produce that money; it is, therefore, I think a somewhat unnecessary excess of caution on the part of the Treasury, directed against one of the Departments of their own Government and directed in some degree against the House of Commons, because I can quite imagine a case—undoubtedly a rare one—in which a particularly desirable area of land could not possibly be obtained except by paying for it, at any rate in part, in cash or in Government securities by the issue of Stock. Those cases might not be frequent, but it is possible that a serious misfortune might happen in the Department losing the chance of acquiring a peculiarly desirable site owing to the impossibility of the owner being content with a rent charge. In that case it would be for the Department to go to the Treasury and to obtain authorisation to add a certain sum to the Estimates of the year in respect of that particular purchase, but unless the money were voted by the House of Commons no such purchase could take place.
It does seem to me, I confess, rather a preposterous act on the part of the Treasury, which I will not qualify in the terms that I might if I were perfectly candid, to set up this barrier and make it
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impossible at any time for any amount to be paid down for the purchase of any of these colonies without the whole process of a fresh Act of Parliament being gone through. It seems to me an assumption on the part, of a particular Department, even though it is by way of guarding the national purse, which is I think quite unprecedented—I cannot recall a parallel—and one which your Lordships ought not to admit. It is not as though any kind of burden or obligation were being thrown upon the Department or upon anybody to expend money at a time when, as we all agree, it is undesirable that either particular Departments or public authorities should throw a burden upon the national credit by expending sums of money for any objects however desirable in themselves. But there is no question here of anything of the kind. All that the omission of the proviso would do is to leave the whole position absolutely open, no doubt leaving it in practice for the next year or two quite certain that money will not be forthcoming for purchase, and that if landlords are not prepared either to lease or to accept a rentcharge, no special arrangement is likely to be come to with them. But the time may come—circumstances may change—when it is desirable that at any rate some portion of the purchase money should be paid in cash, and we desire, therefore, to leave that possibility open.
I confess I feel so strongly on this point that I am bound to press my Amendment, and resist the restoration of the words which the noble Lord in charge of the Bill desires to replace. No suggestion has ever been made that payment for these purchases might be made after the fashion in which Irish landlords have received their payments—namely, in inconvertible security. Possibly some such suggestion, if the possibility of converting was withheld for a certain number of years, might produce a not unacceptable form of purchase in some cases, but no such suggestion has been made, and it is because I feel that the possibilities of obtaining desirable land may be seriously limited by this particular restriction that I feel bound to press my Amendment on the noble Lord and the Government.
Amendment moved—
Page 1, line 24, leave out from ("acres") to ("provided") in line 4, page 2.—(The Marquess of Crewe.)
LORD CLINTON: The noble Marquess has detailed to the House the happenings

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when this Amendment, or rather when the words connected with this Amendment, were moved out by your Lordships' House on the last occasion when we discussed the matter. My recollection is that the sense of the House was not taken upon Lord Galway's Amendment. He moved it, and through my own inadvertence, mistaking the method—no doubt the perfectly correct method—in which the Question was put, I did not challenge it, and the Amendment was passed before the error was discovered. I did object to the Amendment in speaking to it at the time. It seemed to me that these are words which ought to be allowed to remain in the Bill, because they show owners quite plainly the methods, and the only methods, which the Board of Agriculture could adopt in obtaining land for this particular class of small holdings. The noble Marquess is perfectly correct in saying that this is a proviso, taken as a whole, which affects the Treasury alone. It is made quite clear that the Treasury is not in a position, or does not propose, to advance any money in cash for this purpose. With reference to a conversation which passed in this House a few moments ago, when the noble Earl, Lord Selborne, brought up the question of purchasing for small holding purposes, I think it would be probably incorrect in this measure, which is for somewhat similar purposes, to admit the possibility or probability of actually purchasing land for cash, when that probability or possibility is not admitted for county councils.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: There is no Act of Parliament which forbids the advancement of money to county councils. It is the act of the Treasury in suspending these advances, and I take it that precisely the same thing will occur in this instance.
LORD CLINTON: There is, of course, no Act of Parliament, but the Treasury is unlikely or unable to advance cash. It is quite true that it would be exactly the same under this measure. The Treasury is of opinion that this ought to go into the Bill to make it clear that they are not prepared to adopt that measure—to make it clear to owners who are voluntarily giving up land for this purpose that they are not in a position to claim cash from the Treasury itself. It is of importance in that respect. It does away with demands which would constantly
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be made on the Treasury if they were empowered to purchase land in this way. I think the noble Marquess said there is no mention of convertible security. It is not mentioned in those very terms, but I think the rentcharge with the Government guarantee is obviously a convertible security, and probably convertible, for its face value at all events, as easily as land.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am afraid I did not express myself quite clearly. I meant to say that there is no provision in the Bill for payment in security which was not convertible, like the Irish Land Stock. I suppose that money might be borrowed privately on a Government rentcharge, although I do not know exactly at what rate of interest, but, it would be inconvertible security which was in my mind.
LORD CLINTON: My point was that this rentcharge world probably be saleable at its face value. The noble Marquess has told us also that in any case he is not prepared to support the Amendment for putting the words back into the proviso. The proviso as it stands, the noble Marquess will admit, is a very peculiar proviso for an Act of Parliament, and while I am very anxious indeed that the proviso should remain, at the request of the Treasury I shall have to ask your Lordships also to put back the words which were moved out at the last sitting of the House.
LORD STUART OF WORTLEY: I understand that the defence advanced by the noble Lord in charge of the Bill for this proviso is that be wants words in the Bill which shall negative any idea of the creation of ownership, and this contention he bases mainly on the ground of precedent. I do not think that the Act of 1908—the Small Holdings Act which passed in 1907, and was in charge of my noble friend Viscount Harcourt, at that time Minister for Agriculture—negatived entirely the idea of ownership to county councils. It is true that its clauses were so framed as to encourage tenancy rather than ownership, but the noble Lord's position is really not reconcilable with the attitude he takes up with regard to the next Amendment which we shall have to deal with, because he expressly proposes to replace the words "or upon grant of rentcharge," then the ownership will practically have passed, subject only to the payment of a rent-

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charge. The party who is liable to the payment of a rentcharge is the owner in fee who can pass on that ownership to a tenant or a small holder or any other person to whom, subject to his responsibility to the ratepayers, he thinks it best to pass it on. I do not know really what the origin or genesis of this proviso is. I can conceive it may have been imagined that it would place the Treasury in a better position for negotiation. I submit to your Lordships that it will have exactly the opposite effect. I remember that one of the best men of business I knew said that in all negotiations you should always allow the opposite party to think that he is not left with absolutely nothing. In any case here, where you want to bring in the landowner on a voluntary arrangement, you start by negativing all idea of paying cash. It is probably right from the point of view of our present financial position that you should not raise large capital sums where you can avoid it. Surely it is better to leave the negotiations as free as possible, because, as the noble Marquess says, you should be free to pay cash should there be a
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The "Contents" are 40, and the "Not-Contents" also 40. The Motion was to leave out part
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particularly valuable piece of land which, for the purposes of the new legislation, you want to acquire.
LORD CLINTON: With the leave of the House I should like to say that I think the noble Lord misunderstood my words entirely. I never raised any argument against ownership. Apart from that, the noble Lord's views really express mine. Under this scheme of rentcharge obviously you may obtain virtual ownership for tenants, but I made no arguments against the principle of ownership.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Does the noble Marquess move the Amendment down to the word "lease"?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Yes.
On Question, whether the words in the proviso down to the word "lease" shall stand part of the clause?—
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 40; Not-Contents, 40.

CONTENTS.

Finlay, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Knollys, V.

Faringdon, L.

Wigan, L. (E. Crawford.) (L. Privy Seal.)

Peel, V.

Harris, L.

St. Davids, V.

Hylton, L.

Kenyon, L.

Dartmouth, E.

Annesley, L.

Lee of Fareham, L.

Grey, E.

Armaghdale, L.

Muir Mackenzie, L.

Howe, E.

Ashbourne, L.

Oxenfoord, L. (E. Stair.)

Lichfield, E.

Cawley, L.

Pontypridd, L.

Selborne, E.

Clinton, L.

Ranksborough, L.

Stanhope, E.

Colchester, L.

Somerleyton, L. [Teller.]

Strafford, E.

Colebrooke, L.

Stanmore, L. [Teller.]

Cottesloe, L.

Sudeley, L.

Farquhar, V. (L. Steward.)

Digby, L.

Terrington, L.

Sandhurst, V. (L. Chamberlain.)

Elphinstone, L.

Wittenham, L.

Goschen, V.

Fairfax of Cameron, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Argyll, D.

Chaplin, V.

Hindlip, L.

Rutland, D.

Churchill, V.

Joicey, L.

Harcourt, V.

Kintore, L. (E. Kintore.)

Crewe, M. [Teller.]

Iveagh, V.

Lambourne, L.

Lincolnshire, M.

Montagu of Beaulieu, L.

Phillimore, L.

Ancaster, E.

Anslow, L.

Redesdale, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Ashton of Hyde, L.

Rotherham, L.

Eldon, E.

Avebury, L.

Sandys, L.

Mar and Kellie, E.

Beresford of Metemmeh, L.

Saye and Sele, L.

Powis, E.

Blyth, L.

Shute, L. (V. Barrington.)

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Brodriek, L. (V. Midleton.)

Southwark, L.

Yarborough, E.

Buckmaster, L.

Strachie, L.

Allendale, V.

Burnham, L.

Stuart of Wortley, L. [Teller.]

Bryce, V.

Farrer, L.

of the clause, and in these circumstances I submit to the House that the words do stand part.
LORD STUART OF WORTLEY LORD STUART OF WORTLEY moved, after "taking the same on lease," in the first proviso, to insert "or by purchasing it in consideration of the grant of a rent charge or other annual payment." The noble Lord said: I move the re-instatement of words substantially the same as those which were omitted on the Motion of my noble friend Lord Galway on a previous occasion. I think the House is familiar with the argument. The Bill itself negatives the payment of cash, and by retaining this proviso we have retained that prohibition, unfortunately as we think. It is clearly desirable—I speak as a landowner in a fiduciary capacity myself, one of the largest in the kingdom—that I should have all possible alternatives in negotiations, and all possible methods of compensation for the loss of my territory.
Amendment moved:
Page 2, line 2, after ("lease") insert ("or by purchasing it in consideration of the grant of a rnt charge or other annual payment").—(Lord Stuart of Wortley.)
LORD CLINTON: A similar Amendment is also down in my name, and I wish to support the noble Lord. I have already told your Lordships that the provision was left out through a misapprehension on the last stage in Committee, and I am glad to support the Amendment now.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Title:
An Act to authorise an increase in the Amount of Land which may be acquired for the purposes of the Small Holding Colonies Act, 1916.
LORD STRACHIE: My Lords, a doubt has arisen whether some alterations made by your Lordships in Committee, giving powers to county councils to act under this Bill, do not necessitate an Amendment of the title of the Bill, and whether the title should not have added the words "and otherwise amend that Act." The noble Lord, Lord Clinton, informs me that he has no objection and that the Government approve of this alteration. I therefore move the addition of those words.
Amendment moved
In the Title, after ("1916") insert ("and otherwise amend that Act").—(Lord Strachie.)
On Question. Amendment agreed to.
Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.

PARLIAMENT AND LOCAL ELECTIONS BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (The EARL OF CRAWFORD): My Lords, I regret that my noble friend the Leader of the House is so much indisposed as to be unable to move the Second Reading of this Bill himself. I therefore submit the Second Reading of the measure to your Lordships. The Bill is in a form which is, I think, now familiar to everybody. It consists of two clauses. The first prolongs the life of the present Parliament; the second postpones for a year specified local elections.
As regards the first clause of the Bill, the present Parliament met early in 1911, and was subject to the Septennial Act. That was amended in the summer, and Parliament then sat upon a quinquennial basis. When the life of this Parliament was about to reach its conclusion in 1916, an extension of the Parliament and Registration Act was passed. This was repeated in the latter part of 1916, and twice during the year 1917. This, therefore, is the fifth extension of the Parliament elected in 1911. The first extenion was for eight months, the second and the third for seven months respectively, and the fourth for eight months, and the extension proposed under the present Bill is for six months. As the present Parliament expires in a fortnight, a further extension of its life seems imperative.
The second part of the Bill deals with local elections. I understand that the general view of municipalities is that there should be a postponement, and for a variety of reasons. Municipal and local government elections involve an immense amount of work; they would divert energies from administrative into electioneering channels, and as there are no essential municipal or local government problems at issue—for instance, none of the normal questions about expenditure of the ratepayers' money upon public improvements—there is really nothing material upon which municipal elections could or should be fought. Meanwhile an immense amount of valuable administrative work is being carried out by these local bodies through war committees of every description, and, above all, a new obligation has recently been placed upon local authorities—namely, the management of local food con-

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trol work. I submit, therefore, to your Lordships that the case for the Bill is a good one, and I commend its Second Reading to the favourable consideration of the House.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Crawford.)
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I think that nothing marks in so extraordinary a degree the change which has come over Parliamentary affairs than the fact that a Bill of this magnitude can be moved by the noble Earl in so few words, and that your Lordships should show every sign of being likely to accept it after very brief debate. During certain periods when the noble Earl was serving his country elsewhere he was not present when very considerable exception was taken to the previous prolongations of Parliament. I believe that the calmness with which the present proposal has been received by many people is largely due to an expectation held out in another place that this would be the last extension that would be asked for. We cannot, of course, tie His Majesty's Government to that or to any other proposal in the present state of public business. But there is one point that I should like to make, and in it I believe that I shall have the sympathy of very many of your Lordships and of the public outside.
This prolongation—quite abnormal, and from many points of view to be regretted—is really given by Parliament solely in order to carry on, and if possible to complete, the business of the war, and I think that your Lordships will feel that it ought not to be made the machinery for bringing forward further and drastic changes of the Constitution, and for entertaining any more of those important proposals of change which have been showered upon us during the last two or three years, during the period after that at which the normal activities of Parliament should have come to an end. I am sure that the Government must realise that the most salutary provision in our Constitution is now passing from it. If the Government fail in any proposal, or in any measure, during the war, it is not to be desired that they should suffer for it in the ordinary way; at the same time, when no appeal is possible to the country, and when for an indefinite period the Government may expect power, they ought not to bring forward any of those great changes. I hope that before this debate
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closes we may have an assurance from the noble Earl that the idea of the truce has not altogether evaporated. The fact that for one reason or another every subject of dominant importance to domestic politics has been put forward in the last two or three years ought not to be made the reason for further subjects, involving important organic changes and enormous demands on the public purse for purposes which are not connected with the war, being introduced in the period of the extention of Parliament which is now asked for.
In view of the two debates which have taken place in your Lordships' House I would especially ask also that the Government shall give us an assurance that no new Ministries will be created. The number of Ministries created has become—I do not wish to use the word "scandal"—a great incubus, and will become a great incubus to Parliament. If further Ministries are created, that will also cause an amount of heart-burning and trouble, and of difficult work, discussion, and legislation in order to bring back within normal limits the great bureaucracy which has grown up during the war. I do not think that this country is in the least aware that the number of members of the Government has been practically doubled during the war, and that the number of persons employed in clerical work by the Government has gone up to nearly 100,000.
If the Government, on the plea of the war, ask for a further extension, they ought to abstain from pressing Parliament, which is really in a moribund condition, further to add to the Ministries by yielding to the pressure which is put upon them from all directions. These are two very simple matters upon which I desire an assurance. Considering that we are now at a period when Parliament is accustomed to wind up its business and adjourn, we ought to be assured that we are only to be kept sitting in October and November because of the abnormal circumstances of the times, and that the Government will not use those abnormal sittings for adding further to what many of us regard as the great burdens which they have already put upon us.
LORD ARMAGHDALE: My Lords, I do not desire to criticise or oppose the Second Reading of this Bill, but I think it is right that I should inform the House that it is

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my intention to move one or two small technical Amendments affecting Ireland in the Committee stage. It is not a matter which I can discuss on Second Reading, and I will therefore reserve what I have to say until the Bill is in Committee, which I presume will not be for a few days.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN: My Lords, I rise merely to support what fell from my noble friend just now when he made an appeal to the noble Lord opposite to state on behalf of the Government that no further Ministries would be created, at all events without full opportunities for discussion by Parliament. I do not know whether the House realises the effect of the answer given to me by the noble Lord the other day when I asked for information as to the present cost of the Ministry of Food. So far as I have been able to gather from a further examination of the figures—and I say this in order to draw the attention, if I can, both of Parliament and of the public to what is going on at present in one particular Ministry—what it comes to is this. I do not know in the least what return you expect to get—we were not favoured with any information upon that point—but at the present moment the outgoings for which they are responsible in the last six months, according to the information I received in reply to my Question, are at the rate of something not much short of £400,000,000 per annum. One item alone that was given me by the noble Lord was £185,000,000—that was for the purchase of food. I know perfectly well that we were told—it has been stated in Parliament, I believe in both Houses of Parliament—that it was the hope, and that that hope was to be taken as something more than the expression of a pious wish, that the cost of that administration would be very largely met by margins arising from the sale of commodities. That may or may not be.
There is another very remarkable feature in connection with this Department—namely, that they have in their employ, as far as I can make out, something like 12,000 officials at the present time. If money is being spent at the rate of something approaching £400,000,000 a year, and we have no information about the returns coming back from those margins in the shape of commodities, I do not think anybody can be surprised that my noble friend should have expressed the opinion that no more Ministries ought to
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be created at the present time, and the strong hope that he would receive some assurance to that effect from the noble Earl on behalf of the Government. I do not know whether the noble Earl is able to give any assurance of that kind at the present moment. If he is, I am quite sure that both Parliament and the public will be very glad to have it; but in any case, if he does not, he cannot be surprised if this question is raised again on a future occasion.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I would remind your Lordships that had it not been for the repeal of the Septennial Act this would have been the first extension of the Parliament elected in 1911. The fact that five extensions have been necessary is, therefore, attributable to causes which varied the Statute dating back for many, many generations.
I have been asked for three assurances. The first was that the idea of the truce has not been abandoned. I do not know whether Lord Midleton cares to have my views upon that question, but I will state them. So far as I am concerned I believe the truce continues. So long as the Coalition Government continues with Labour, Liberal and Conservative members in it, I should have thought that the truce was in itself essential and inevitable. Lord Midleton asked that I should give an assurance that no further demands on the public purse apart from war outlays would be made during the ensuing six months. I can give no such assurance, and I observe with some interest that my noble friend Lord Midleton voted against the Government twenty minutes ago in an attempt to increase a charge upon the public purse. Lord Midleton asked that no new Ministries should be appointed. I cannot give any assurance to that effect. I hope, however, that your Lordships will bear that claim in mind when a Motion is submitted to this House, I think to-morrow, that a new Ministry shall be established. I cannot possibly give any pledge on that matter, and I do not think that under present war conditions it is conceivable that any responsible Minister would say that during the six months it may not become necessary to formulate some further engine of the Government machine to deal with some further emergency which for the moment we cannot foresee.
I regret, therefore, that I cannot give either of the pledges which were asked of

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me. I should prefer to defer to another occasion, when probably a more suitable opportunity will occur for dealing with it, the point raised by the noble Viscount, Lord Chaplin, about the recoupment of public moneys in the Ministry of Food. I have no figures by me at the present moment, and I should not like to commit my memory on that subject.
On Question, Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

CORN PRODUCTION (AMENDMENT) BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order).
Clause 1:
Amendment of 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 46, s. 11 (3).
1. For subsection (3) of section eleven of the Corn Production Act, 1917, the following subsection shall be substituted:—
"(3) This Part of this Act shall not, except as hereinafter provided, come into operation until the termination of the present war, and the powers under the Defence of the Realm Regulations exerciseable by the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries with a view to maintaining the food supply of the country with respect to matters dealt with in this Part of this Act shall continue to operate until that date:
"Provided that—

"(a) before any person is deprived of the occupation of his land in connection with the food supply of the country, he shall be served with a notice of the intention of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to take such possession; and i any person is served with such notice as aforesaid, or with a notice requiring that any land in his occupation shall be cultivated according to the rules of good husbandry, or requiring any change in the mode of cultivating or in the use of land in his occupation, or otherwise dealing with the said land for the purposes of food production, the proviso to subsection (1) of section nine of this Act shall apply as if the notice had been served under the powers conferred by that section;

"(b) Where any notice is served order made, or possession of land taken under the said Regulations, the provisions of this Part of this Act relating to the determination and recovery of compensation shall apply as if the notice had been served, the order made, or possession taken under the powers conferred by section nine of this Act."

LORD CLINTON LORD CLINTON moved to add a new proviso at the end of proviso (a). The noble Lord said: This is nothing more than a drafting Amendment, and your Lordships will note that it is Clause 2 of the Bill placed in a position a little higher up.
Amendment moved—
Clause 1, page 2, line 4, at end insert:
"(b) Where any such notice is served on a tenant a copy of the notice shall at the same time be served on the landlord and the landlord shall have the same right as the tenant of requiring any question to be referred to arbitration; and."—(Lord Clinton.)
THE MARQUESS OF LINCOLNSHIRE: The noble Lord has told us that this is a drafting Amendment, but it is at the same time an excessively important one, and on it I should like to be permitted to ask a question of which I have given him private notice—namely, Can he assure the House that in his opinion and in the opinion of his advisers all risk and danger of the scarcity of cereals is happily at an end, and, if not, whether the scarcity of food can be met by the old peace time methods? If the noble Lord is able to give an affirmative answer to that question, as I hope he will be, it will not be necessary for me to say another word.
LORD CLINTON: I do not think that anybody, least of all the noble Marquess, can expect an affirmative answer to be given to the question whether all possibility of a scarcity is over. The scarcity of food remains, and, of course, must remain, as long as the war lasts. As long as the war is in existence there must be anxiety among all those who are in any way responsible for food production in this country. It is only, of course, by the very greatest efforts on the part of all concerned—individuals, the agricultural community, the food production authorities, and the Royal Navy—that something worse than scarcity has been averted; and it is impossible at the present time that we can afford in any degree to relax the efforts which we have made and which we are making now. It will remain our duty by every means in our power to increase production to the highest possible limit the land can attain.
Before the war we produced only one-fifth of the wheat we consumed, and, even with the whole of our present increased

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production and with all our reduced consumption, we are still no doubt very far indeed from being self-supporting. It is rather difficult to imagine this country in the position of ever being entirely self-supporting. As we are not self-supporting we naturally have to rely upon importation from overseas, an importation which is still surrounded by dangers of a certain kind which I need not specify to your Lordships. But presuming that these risks and dangers were entirely eliminated to-day, we should still be in the position that we should have to avoid as far as possible any further importation as the tonnage is urgently required for other matters, and it is compulsory upon us to increase production in every way possible.
The answer, I am afraid, to the first part of the question must be that the scarcity of food still remains. Then the noble Marquess asks whether the scarcity can be met by ordinary peace time measures. Clearly it cannot be met by any such measures. They are admirable, no doubt, for peace time. Our methods of cultivation and method of tenure have grown up with us and are probably in every way suited to their purpose in peace time, but they are too slow for a time of war and they cannot then be relied upon. Efforts are being made to speed them up, and they have met no doubt with a very great deal of success, a success which it is certain our ordinary methods could not by any possibility have produced. If we desire to continue our present production, as we must do, it is obvious that we have to continue methods which hitherto we have looked upon as extraordinary ones.
THE MARQUESS OF LINCOLNSHIRE: I am very much obliged to the noble Lord for his answer. It is not what I hoped, however, and I am bound to say that most people would consider it disquieting in the extreme. In the face of such an answer, how can the House venture to weaken the provisions of the Corn Production Act which was passed to increase the area of corn in this country and thereby to avoid the risk of great scarcity if not famine?
We have this Bill before us now, and we have the new Amendment of the Government before us also. I am afraid I must say that, in the opinion of a good many people, this Bill as amended is absolutely useless in the present food crisis; and the Government Amendment that has just, been moved makes it worse still. Your Lord-
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ships will remember that an Amendment was moved by Lord Desborough and backed up by Lord Parmoor. The noble and learned Lord is not in his place, and I thought Lord Desborough was not, but I see that he is; it is rather more difficult to say what I was going to say in his presence than it would have been to say it in his absence. However, those two noble Lords are recognised—I think rightly recognised—in this House as the twin acknowledged leaders of what I hope I may be forgiven for calling the Patriarchial Agricultural Party, just as Lord Selborne is the recognised leader of the more progressive Unionist or Conservative Party. Lord Desborough and Lard Parmoor are a formidable combination. They are men who are highly respected in the counties in which they live. They live at home; they themselves farm; they are large landed proprietors, and when they speak they do so from practical knowledge, and not, as some other people do, from theory or hearsay; and not only in this House but also in the counties where they live they are rightly listened to with respect and attention.
But I would respectfully ask my noble friend whether he is quite certain that, when he is advocating all these what he calls "safeguards," he knows the danger, and, I hope he will forgive me if I add, the possible mischief, of what he is doing? In war drastic measures are, of course, absolutely necessary; everybody submits to them; but if those drastic measures are to be carried out everyone should be treated alike. I will take one instance. We are at war; the guns are thundering on a fifty-mile front at the present moment; the fate of the Empire is trembling in the balance; every man in England has to go out and fight, and rightly so; you take a shop keeper, for instance, you ruin his business, you put him in the ranks and send him out to France, where possibly he may lose his life, and he leaves a wife and children to be looked after, as of course they will be properly looked after, by the country.
But when it comes to dealing with a man who is fighting exactly as big a fight—the man who is fighting the battle of the harvest at, home—how do you treat him? It is a very different state of things altogether. There is a shortage and a dangerous shortage. Some time ago we thought there was going to be a famine, and the Government quite rightly said, "You must increase the food production of the country." They

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sent to the different counties and said "You must produce so many acres more land under cereals." They appointed agricultural war committees with great powers. Many of us have served on those committees. The committees then went into the counties and said to the different people—take my own county; they took the greatest possible care, they got all the local knowledge, and they aaid to the farmers "We have to get 30,000 or 40,000 acres of grass land broken up. Plough up those ten acres of grass fields. You must do your share of the work and take the risks, and you must find the labour. You are fighting the battle of the harvest, so plough up those ten acres." Or else they say, "We have pledged ourselves, and it is the law of the land, that everybody who wants an allotment shall have it, so give up those fifty acres of land for allotments for people who want allotments."
What happens? The Bill as it was introduced by the noble Lord was a capital Bill, but as it now stands it allows the farmer or the owner to say, "You order me to plough up that field. I have got my safeguards. I demand and I can get not only notice given to myself as occupier or farmer, but I am going to have notice given to my landlord." The landlord may be fighting in Palestine and never get the notice at all. Also he can insist under this Bill upon arbitration. I am not going into that question now, but everybody knows what arbitration is, especially under this Bill. It means expert witnesses, and everybody knows what they are. It means lawyers, and we all know what lawyers are. It also means delay and dangerous delay, and I want to ask the House one question. What will the men who are waiting and determined to get these allotments—and there are thousands of them waiting at this moment, independently of the men out at the Front who when they return mean to get allotments out of the country which they intend to share—what will these men when they come back to their country say if they cannot get these allotments and if there are all these safeguards, difficulties, and arbitrations in the way and, worse still, if it becomes necessary to put the centres of population on bread rations, which God Almighty forbid!—what will they think of this procrastination and of all these agricultural safeguards?
I never speak for other people, but I believe I am perfectly justified in saying this, that every member of a war com-
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mittee—and some of these men have done splendid work—every one of them will tell you that the effect of this Amendment of my noble friend will be inevitable and fatal delay and will certainly prevent the crop being got in. It will probably mean the loss of a year, and the whole of Mr. Prothero's great scheme, which we have been told is a preventative against famine, will be paralysed. Besides that, if this new legislation is brought into operation you will lose for an absolute certainty all the best men on your agricultural war committees. Two or three determined men with a few good seamen in a submarine are quite enough to wreck a Dreadnought, and the action of Lord Desborough and of Lord Parmoor I regret to say may, and I almost say will, wreck Mr. Prothero's efforts to try and feed the country and put the food supply on a proper basis. I have seen it said in the papers—I hope it is not true—that on Thursday he is going to meet the landlords' demands and that he is going to climb down. I hope this is not true. I hope that when this Bill goes down to the House of Commons it will be restored to its original shape and sent back to this House as it was moved by the noble Lord opposite. If not, I fear that these agricultural safeguards will rouse a feeling all over the country that agriculturists are a favoured class. That will be a feeling which every man in this House would deplore, and which it may be very difficult to explain and perhaps impossible entirely to remove.
LORD DESBOROUGH: My Lords, I had no intention of trespassing upon your time, but as the noble Marquess has made a well considered and most polite attack upon myself I can hardly refrain from some attempt at explanation of the conduct which he thinks so very outrageous. What happened really is this, that neither I nor Lord Parmoor have attempted to introduce into this House any fresh legislation of any sort or kind. The legislation which was proposed was this—namely, that after we had agreed to four Parts of the Corn Production Act, when it came for the Government to carry out Part IV of the Act, they would not carry out their part of the bargain. I never suggested any legislation of any kind, but after full consideration of the Corn Production Act of last year the operation of Part IV was at the request of the Government, and to suit their convenience, postponed for one

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year. When the year was nearly over the Government came forward and brought in a very small Act to do away with their part of the bargain. Therefore I think it is rather unfair of the noble Marquess to say that I am, or Lord Parmoor is, introducing fresh legislation to bring upon the country all the terrible catastrophes which he prophesies. We all know that the Empire is trembling in the balance, and I understand from the noble Marquess that shopkeepers are threatened with ruin, but that is no reason why you should ruin by legislation a tenant farmer who cannot go to the Front, who perhaps may be over age, but who is doing his best to increase the food production of the country.
The noble Marquess who has just sat down objected to both Amendments. He objected to the Amendment of the Government which gave an appeal when land was to be ploughed up—an appeal which was in Part IV of the Corn Production Act. Since then Mr. Prothero has said that owing to the depletion of man-power in the agricultural world and the shortage of fertilisers they are going to issue instructions that no more land should be ploughed up and, with regard to the Orders which have been issued, I understand there should be some sort of right of appeal. Therefore that Amendment is practically going to be carried into force.
I do not wish to repeat the arguments I have used, but with regard to the other Amendment which was carried in your Lordships' House it merely reintroduced another portion of Part IV which was agreed to last year. There is no fresh legislation about it, and I think it is very necessary. You may do a great deal of harm to food production if, by ill-considered, compulsory taking of land, you ruin farmers. It may very likely happen, and it has happened. In all these demands for allotments or small holdings the whole case ought to be very carefully gone into and considered.
My Amendment does not in the least prevent land being taken, but it merely says that both the owner and the occupier of the land should have the right to be heard before an independent referee. There is nothing very drastic in that. If you take a farm and a man wants a small holding, what part of the farm attracts him? Naturally, he wants the very "eye" of
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the farm. He wants the best and not the worst of the farm. This has happened a number of times. If he gets people compulsorily to give him this bit of the farm, which may he well watered, surely the person who is farming land on a big scale—three or four or five hundred acres, and has buildings upon it and is paying the rates—miht be heard. If the case for taking the particular piece of land is a good one, the land will be obtained just the same. It is the same with allotments. Everybody wants to see allotments increased. They have increased and they will further increase. But surely if allotments are wanted, and the taking of land hinders the rest of the work on a farm, the appeal lies on that. The man does not appeal on whether the man should have an allotment or hot, but whether that particular piece of land is the best suited to be taken out of the farm, or whether some other piece should not be substituted, or whether it was really in the interests of agriculture to take the land at all.
The Government want to go on under the Defence of the Realm Act till the end of the war. Under that then is no appeal. That was the object of the repeal of Part IV of the Corn Production Act. The noble Marquess below me drew moving pictures of people who boldly ploughed, or refused to plough, ten acres of land. I can only says that people in South Bucks are not encouraged to plough up their land when they see the Government taking 600 acres of proved corn land. All the arguments which I have seen with regard to that are, I believe, absolutely wrong. You cannot expect people to plough up land after this. What is the good of ploughing up ten acres if the Government take 600 acres of good corn land? Grass land is problematical, but here you have 600 acres of land which has produced the best corn in the county of Bucks for years and years and years. One reason for taking this land, I understand, is that they were going to continue the canal, but the canal is given up. Therefore, that reason is gone. Another reason is that they wanted gravel. I read that the Under-Secretary of State for War said that they wanted gravel to hold up heavy lorries. The land is not gravel; it is deep loam. It will not hold heavy lorries. To destroy this land because it is gravel—when it is not gravel—and because it will hold up lorries—when it will not hold up lorries—is rather discouraging to the farmers in the neighboorhood.

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There is a little bit of gravel, and that is under our only isolation hospital which serves nineteen parishes. A lot of money has just been spent upon it. I think the hospital is going to be moved, and they are going to take out the gravel to make ferroconcrete. It is known that that gravel is absolutely unsuitable for this purpose. If you want gravel you must go miles. I do not think there is any nearer than Staines. All this applies to the question of the right of appeal. When farmers see the Government doing these things, and when the Government appeal to their patriotism to plough up ten acres of good, useful pasture land while hospitals and people are asking to be supplied with milk, it does strengthen my hand when I say that Part IV of the Corn Production Act should be restored and a right of appeal given, not to a lot of lawyers but to a competent surveyor appointed, in default of agreement, by the President of the Surveyors Institution.
VISCOUNT CHAPLIN: My Lords, if I may intervene for a moment it is to say a word in reply to the noble Marquess who rose at the same time as myself. He complained of the statement of the noble Lord who moved the Amendment, and said that his reply would cause the utmost anxiety amongst most people in the country. He went on to add that the Amendment which the noble Lord had moved would make things still worse. I rise to ask this question of my noble friend opposite who is in charge of the Bill—What is the difference between his Amendment and Clause 2, which is now in the Bill? They seem to me to be almost precisely the same. I was going to ask him—perhaps he will kindly tell us after I sit clown—what the difference is between the Amendment which is going to create anxiety in the minds of most people in the country and the Bill as it now stands.
I do not know why the noble Marquess should claim to speak on behalf of "most people in the country." It is a very wide term. I should doubt if, when he said that, he spoke on behalf even of most people in this house or of most people connected with agriculture outside this House, but that is neither here nor there. He went on to speak of the old patriarchal methods of conducting agriculture, of which he disapproved altogether. I can only say that it was under the old patriarchal methods that agriculture in this country reached the very summit of its prosperity, and to a
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degree which was never known in any other country in the world. What happened to it under the Progressive Party, of which the noble Marquess is such a keen and distinguished representative? We got into the terrible mess in which we found ourselves during this war; a mess, difficulty and trouble, due to the neglect of agriculture, and agricultural interests, by Parliament; and no one made this statement in more emphatic terms than the Present Prime Minister in the other House of Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton, spoke of the necessity of increasing the production in this country by every possible means. There is no one in this House who agrees with him more firmly than I do. He knows that I am as anxious for this as he is, but he has also experience enough in politics to know that it is permitted to politicians holding the same views sometimes to have a difference of opinion as to the methods by which their views can best be obtained. That is the only difference between the noble Lord opposite and myself.
If I have been mistaken in opposing certain parts of that policy, and I am ever shown to have been mistaken, no one will regret it more than I shall. But I do not think I shall be shown to be mistaken, and the best proof of it is that even on the part of those who are responsible for this policy, the President of the Board of Agriculture—to whom the noble Marquess referred just now—told me himself that what he was going to say in the House of Commons next Thursday will not disabuse the mind of the noble Marquess as to the injury which this Bill has inflicted, and is going to inflict, in connection with the war. I think he will be surprised with some of the instructions which have already been issued by that Department, and other instructions which are likely to follow in the future. I am sorry to have intruded again so soon on your Lordships' attention this afternoon, but I thought some of the observations of the noble Marquess could not pass altogether unnoticed.
I sincerely hope that the advice given by the noble Marquess will not be listened to for a single moment in another place. This is not a moment to create friction that can be reasonably avoided, between the two Houses of Parliament; and I am surprised that a man of his long experience in politics should have thought this a suitable occasion to try to promote friction

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between the two Houses. Those of us who have taken the line we have do so honestly believing it to be the best method of promoting the increased production which we all most urgently desire. I have worked in this cause for years; and fifteen years ago, although I could never get the least attention to my words, I did all I could to warn the country of what was coming and to prepare in time, before the moment came, the steps to be taken in connection with our food supply in time of war. Having given much thought and attention to this subject for a great number of years I am not prepared to take any instruction from the noble Marquess who spoke just now.
LORD CLINTON: I rise only for the purpose of pointing out that this interesting debate has hung on the question of moving a small number of words from one part of the Bill to another.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2:
Notices.
2. Where any notice is served on a tenant a notice shall at the same time be served on the land, who shall have the same rights under this Act as though the land were in his occupation.
LORD CLINTON LORD CLINTON moved to leave out Clause 2.
Amendment moved—
Leave out Clause 2.—(Lord Clinton.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 3:
Short title.
3. This Act shall be cited as the Corn Production (Amendment) Act, 1918.
LORD CLINTON LORD CLINTON moved to add at the end of Clause 3 the words, "and shall be construed as one with the Corn Production Act, 1917, and shall come into operation on the twenty-first day of August, 1918." The noble Lord said: The twenty-first of August is the day on which the Defence of the Realm Regulation powers, under the Corn Production Act, expire.
Amendment moved—
Clause 3, page 2, line 18, after "("1918") insert ("and shall be construed as one with the Corn Production Act, 1917, and shall come into operation on the twenty-first day of August, nineteen hundred and eighteen").—(Lord Clinton.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.

HERR VON KUHLMANN'S SPEECH.
LORD WIMBORNE LORD WIMBORNE rose to call attention to the speech of Herr von Kühlmann in the Reichstag on June 24 last; and to move a Resolution. The noble Lord said: My Lords, I put this Motion on the Paper three weeks ago, but it has been postponed mainly at the instigation of the noble Earl who leads the House.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: He asked that it should not be moved.
LORD WIMBORNE: I do not understand the noble Earl. I put the Motion down, and I postponed it at the instigation of the noble Earl who leads the House. We are all aware of the manifold and weighty duties which on the noble Earl the Leader of the House, and we are always very willing, as far as possible, to meet his convenience. In this ease I do not seem to have been very lucky, because, for reasons which we all deplore, the noble Earl is unable to be in his place on this occasion. The effect of the postponement has necessarily been to throw the subject that I wish to raise into a different perspective. Since then Baron von Kühlmann has fallen, and the battle has been resumed in France. On the other hand, a most important statement has been made by Count Hertling in the Reichstag on the 11th of this month, and it has had the effect of re-opening and emphasising what otherwise would have been considered to be a closed question. Therefore I think I shall be right in saying that, whether the present battle develops into the decisive event, or whether it dies clown leaving both parties in more or less relatively the same position, the pronouncements made by enemy statesmen have an independent significance, the consideration and analysis of which impose upon us a constant obligation. The subject, therefore, to which I desire to draw your Lordships' attention are the two speeches delivered in the Reichstag by Baron von Kühlmann on June 24 and by Count Hertling on July 11.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: Without notice?
LORD WIMBORNE: I gave notice.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: No notice has been given that the noble Lord intended to refer to the speech of Count Hertling.
LORD WIMBORNE: I think that is a small point. The speech of Count Herding really emphasises, and perhaps carries a little further, the speech of Baron von Kühlmann on June 24. As to the former speech, as it is now somewhat remote I will quote from the summary in The Times which appeared at the time of its publication and reads as follows—
"He said in spite of brilliant German successes no clear desire for peace was recognisable among Germany's enemies. He went on to say Germany's war aims are (1) the boundaries drawn for us by history; (2) oversea possessions corresponding to our greatness; (3) freedom for carrying our trade on the free seas to all continents."
Then there was the well-remembered part when he said that "a purely military decision of the war can hardly be expected; against Germany's resources the Entente should realise that their hope of victory is an illusion." Then he said—
"The Imperial Government had not shut the door to an honourable peace and would listen to plain and unambiguous proposals. He hoped that in due course their opponents would approach them with efforts in correspondence with the situation and satisfactory to German vital needs."
That is what von Kühlmann said; but to this Count Herding added in the other speech—
"Belgium is only a pawn for negotiation; we have no intention of keeping Belgium in any form whatsoever."
I think that it will be agreed that those speeches are none the less remarkable from the fact that the strain of them is not entirely unfamiliar in our ears. Since they have been delivered there has been much speculation as to what import could be attached to them. Are they definite bids for peace on the part of Germany, or do they constitute a trap? Do they represent apprehension, if not repentance, on the part of the enemy, or are they merely what is called a peace offensive? I do not intend to invite your attention to the former aspect, or to involve you in a discussion as to what our peace terms should be or should not be. Whether, therefore, these speeches constitute a genuine bid for peace or not, I feel pretty confident that alternatively at any rate they constitute what has been called a peace offensive, and it is to that aspect of the question that I would invite your Lordships' attention.
There is a good deal to make us take this view, because it is clear now that Germany has been nerving herself for a great effort involving doubtless immense sacrifices, and
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it is a noticeable fact that these military efforts are generally, if not always, preceded by peace talk. That is a coincidence which I think cannot be overlooked. On the assumption that these speeches are peace offensives, I would ask what is a peace offensive? A peace offensive has been defined in another place by the Foreign Secretary on more than one occasion. So late as June 20 he defined it as follows—
"A peace offensive is any effort, by speech or otherwise, under the disguise of asking for an honourable termination of the present unhappy war, to divide the Allies and to discourage the individual members of the Alliance."
I think that there will be general agreement with that definition as far as it goes. But does it go far enough? It seems to me to be incomplete; indeed, it appears to ignore the most essential part of the strategy of the peace offensive. The offensive is not mainly for its foreign effect, but for home consumption. It is not launched so much in the hope of dividing and discouraging the Allies as for stiffening and consolidating war-like sentiments in the Central Empires by throwing upon our shoulders the responsibility for the continuance of the war. For four years, my Lords, enemy diplomacy has failed to produce any external effect, and it is not in the vain hope of accomplishing that now but with the certainty of achieving the domestic result that these offensives are persevered in.
To prove this, let us examine for a moment the psychology of enemy public opinion. It is safe to say, I think, that there exists among them two attitudes towards war in general and to this war in particular. There are those who love war and profit, or hope to profit, by it, and there are those who bate war and suffer, and suffer grievously, from war. I think that these mental attitudes can and often do co-exist in the same individual, and, according to circumstances, alternate as the predominant frame of mind. Of the former attitude we have abundant and striking evidence in Prussian militarism. Of the latter attitude we naturally hear less, but even censorship cannot wholly hide the fact that there is periodic unrest and discontent in Germany, nor can it quite veil the significance of Parliamentary votes and Parliamentary discussion in Germany. I think that the Kühlmann incident fortifies that impression, for whatever else is

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discernible in von Kühlmann's speech, it is clear that there is a great body of sane, even perhaps pacific, feeling in Germany to which Kühlmann obviously appeals in his speech, and which even the German General Staff cannot afford to ignore.
What has happened—the noble Earl brought me to task for this—in regard to the Kühlmann incident? The General Staff having put up the Foreign Secretary, as doubtless they did—it is generally agreed that they did—to placate the moderates, a fortnight is allowed to elapse before he is disavowed. No answer to his speech being forthcoming in the meantime from the Allies, it can plausibly be asserted that such peace hopes as he voiced are vain and fruitless. That, in fact, is what Count Hertling said when he spoke on the occasion to which I have alluded. The effect of this is that moderate opinion is discouraged or reconciled to the inevitable. Ludendorff triumphs. The "peace offensive" has succeeded. For confirmation of this view let us look at Count Hertling's speech. He asks for—
"that unity on our internal front which is so tremendously significant to our brothers in the field."
Surely we have here a frank admission, not only of the existence of moderate as opposed to military opinion in Germany, but also of the necessity of bringing the latter into line with that military opinion. If this is true, as I think a little consideration shows that it is, it seems to me that we have displayed some lack of penetration and dexterity. The Foreign Secretary has contented himself with exposing the superficial and rather obvious character of the peace offensive fraud, but he has shown less skill in parrying the concealed but more real danger, and has never got in his riposte, or succeeded in turning the incident to our advantage.
In our handling, or perhaps rather lack of handling, of these enemy peace offensives we have consistently played into the hands of the military party in Germany. Consider what our attitude has been. The Foreign Secretary, speaking in another place on February 13, declared that at the present moment diplomacy was entirely out of court. It was with reluctance that on May 16 he admitted that the Government would not decline to listen to conversations of belligerents. There are people who go so far as to advocate the shutting up of the Foreign Office during the
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continuance of the war. I do not know that Mr. Balfour would go to those lengths, but our attitude has been—if the word is applicable to such a subtle dialectician—a little "stodgy." This is certainly the opinion of friendly and independent observers in neutral countries. Our diplomacy, they think, has failed to exhibit the imagination and insight which it should possess, and many opportunities for diplomatic triumphs have been lost.
But, it may be objected, Supposing this is true, what can we do? I certainly do not suggest that our Foreign Office should descend to the fraud and treachery of which they accuse German diplomatists. If that course were necessary I should not have brought forward this Motion. It is not necessary. To illustrate what I mean let me take a concrete example. I will take the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk, not because that example is peculiar, but because it is the simplest and gives the simplest illustration of what I mean. What happened at Brest-Litovsk at the start of those negotiations? Count Czernin spoke on that occasion for the two allied Governments, the Austro-Hungarian Government and the German Government. He said the Central Empires were prepared to negotiate a general peace on the basis of—
"no forcible acquisition of territory and without war indemnities, provided that within a suitable period, without exception and without any reserve, all the belligerent Powers bound themselves to such conditions. For "[he added]" it would not do for the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance, negotiating with Russia one-sidedly, to commit themselves to these conditions without a guarantee that Russia's Allies will recognise and will carry out these conditions honestly and without reserve also as regards the Quadruple Alliance."
I submit that that is a proposition which, without fraud or chicane on our part, we could at the time have accepted (subject perhaps to some minor adjustments) as constituting at its face value an admission of the main part of our case against Germany. For surely a Germany driven back within her pre-war frontiers without booty or prize of any kind—"all her glories, conquests, triumphs, spoils, shrunk to this little measure"—would have meant the defeat of militarism, and, I think, its permanent discomfiture.
But supposing we had consented to establish negotiations for a general peace on those terms, what would have happened? One of two things would have

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happened. Perhaps the world would have stumbled into peace. But I am bound to say another result was more likely. Assuming that they are dominant, the Pan-Germans and the Junkers would have taken alarm at this unexpected and undesired turn of events. They would have repudiated their Ministerial spokesman. That would have broken off the negotiations. And with what result? If the jackboot had triumphed then the lust of conquest, cynicism, and brutality of its wearers would have been exposed, not to us who know it, but to the great mass of the German people in unmistakable and unforgettable fashion. The peace offensive would not only have utterly failed, but would have failed with disastrous consequences to its authors. Germany would have been rent in two. That would have been an achievement which would have been worth many victories in the field.
But what did we do? We said nothing, we returned no answer to these proposals, and it was on our silence that the military party were able to ride off to perpetrate the infamy for which the Brest-Litovsk Treaty will always be remembered. I say, therefore, that there have been occasions for rejoinder which we could honourably and profitably have grasped.
The question arises whether the speeches of Herr von Kühlmann and Count Hertling offered such another opportunity. I certainly do not wish to dogmatise, but there are expressions in them which recall the situation at Brest-Litovsk on December 28, and I think that if I have at all made myself clear I may claim that they should not have been left totally unanswered. Three weeks have elapsed since the first was delivered, and yet no reply of any kind has been forthcoming from any responsible Foreign Minister, or, indeed, from any statesman with regard to them. At a critical moment of the enemy's fortunes, both military and domestic, we have allowed the poison of their peace offensives to exert its powerful anodyne on German nerves and consciences. The advantages of countering these effects seem so obvious that one is forced to inquire what objections there are to the course which I suggest. Is it that we are so afraid that the mere mention of the word "negotiations" will spell irresolution among our own people that they could never survive the disappointment, if nothing were to come of it, after their hopes had been raised?
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I sometimes think the Government is inclined to treat the country too much like children. Things are concealed which certainly would be no news to the enemy. The shipping losses, for instance, were concealed. Now they are published. Has their publication decreased or increased ship production? It has increased ship production. Is our attitude towards peace offensives governed by the same kind of old-fashioned precaution? Does that attitude of mind still linger in the Foreign Office? Or is it that our war objectives (which admittedly have undergone modification from time to time) are still somewhat indeterminate? Is there confusion in our minds between the end in view and the means? Who, for instance, who looks forward to a reign of peace in the world and brotherly love among mankind, can talk of the retention of conquered territory as a precautionary and defensive necessity? Is not that a contradiction of ideas? Is it not also a confusion to think of Balkanizing half Europe and a great part of Asia? The federation of the world and the Parliament of Man will not be reached as the result of the wholesale disintegration of existing units. It is through aggregation, not disintegration, that our ideals will develop and be realised. For instance, how could Mr. Balfour and M. Pichon logically talk of conferring independence on Bohemia? Surely federal autonomy for "dependent nations" (such as I suppose is intended for Ireland some day, and possibly for ourselves) provides a more permanent, progressive, and promising structure. And nothing stops you here. Germany has assented to that in principle—those are her own words—and she might be pinned down to the performance.
It would be no answer to my case to say that the Germans know our peace terms, and that they have often been authoritatively stated. I doubt whether one German in a million knows what our peace terms are. I wonder how many of your Lordships could write them down from memory? But, whether the German "man in the street" knows them or not, repetition is the quintessence of propaganda. Besides, that is not quite my point. What I assert is that, whether our terms are known or not, every war-weary German knows that on three separate occasions at least peace negotiations have been proposed by the Kaiser or his Ministers on terms which to him, a German, must seem accommodating to the verge of surrender, and that on each

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occasion those proposals have been received in the Allied Chancelleries with a stony and acid silence, and he thinks, therefore, that the Allies wish for nothing short of the total destruction of Germany and that there is nothing for it but for him to fight it out. That is what the average German thinks.
In confirmation of this, let me call your Lordships' attention to this very speech of Count Hertling, and this is what is believed in Germany. Count Hertling says—
"Mr. Wilson wants war until we are destroyed, and what Mr. Balfour has said must really drive a flush of anger to the cheeks of every German."
And, alluding to that, he says further—
"Behind these insults is a desire for our destruction. As long as a desire for our destruction exists, we must endure together with our faithful nation."
And so on, much in the same strain.
Now, as is known to your Lordships, there is a type of simple and somewhat impatient patriot whose perpetual and monotonous refrain consists of, "Stop talking, and get on with the war." Yes, certainly get on with the war, but get on with the objects of the war, too. However much we can prove in the field—as we all believe we shall prove—that militarism does not pay, we shall not have got appreciably nearer to that blessed sense of security which is embodied in the idea of the League of Nations as long as it is possible for the German authorities to assert, as they do assert, and for the German people to believe, as I fear they believe, that we, the Allies, are animated by the same material, commercial, industrial, and Imperialistic designs as they themselves profess. Beaten or unbeaten, Germany will continue a perpetual menace to us and to our children.
This is no pacifist Motion. The war must be won. But this is not an ordinary war. We are fighting not only to overcome Germany in the ordinary sense, but to convert her also. For this you need two weapons—force and argument. They do not conflict; you cannot neglect either. You must din your argument into German heads as much as you may have to plant your bayonets into German breasts. This is what General Smuts told us in a speech, which has not received sufficient attention, delivered at Glasgow on May 17—
"This war is much more than a military war, and we shall have to use our diplomacy and all the other forces at our disposal in order to bring it to a victorious end. Without private and in-
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formal comparison of nudes how are you going to know what your enemy is prepared to concede? The highest objects of peace will be secured not only by the gallantry of our Armies but by the weapons of our diploma y when the time is ripe for obtaining a satisfactory peace for the Allies."
Yes, but if diplomacy is to play its part its policy must not be obscure. It must be a simple concrete formula without reservations, implications, or complications, easily understanded of the people to whom it is addressed.
Reticence, vagueness, and contradiction are fatal. Let me illustrate this by taking a typical instance. The Prime Minister, addressing American troops the other day from a motor-car, said that the Germans could have peace to-morrow on President Wilson's terms. Your Lordships see from the quotation from Count Hertling's speech what that may be twisted to be. In so far as that declaration involves a modification of the "knock-out blow" policy it is to be welcomed, but I submit that, as a positive statement of our peace aims, it has all the defects so well known to this House of legislation by reference; to determine what the exact import of a clause is you have to hunt up antiquated, and sometimes partly obsolete, Statutes in order to find out where you are. If you are going to deal with a peace offensive, what is needed is a terse, concrete formula embodying the ideals which animate our policy. The Germans have said "no annexations," and even now they speak of "historic frontiers." Whether it is honest or dishonest, you must answer it, and keep on answering it. On every peace offensive you must hurl back your reply. It is not enough to resist stolidly; you must counter-attack. What I ask is that such a formula should be framed and used, and should be stuck to. I hope that we shall not have anything in the nature of a sliding scale here.
That is the case which I desire to submit to the consideration of the House. I have tried to put it in as few words as I could. If I must further compress it within the scope of a Resolution, it would run as follows—
"That in the reception accorded to enemy peace proposals more regard should be paid to the opportunities such occasions afford for defining our own terms and for discrediting militarism in the eyes of the people of the Central Empires themselves."
I beg to move.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, Lord Wimborne informed us that his Motion was postponed at the request of Lord Curzon. Lord Curzon told Lord Wimborne that the Foreign Office was averse from a discussion at the present juncture. Lord Curzon shared that view. He conveyed it to Lord Wimborne, and Lord Curzon's hope was, not that the Motion would be postponed, as Lord Wimborne indicated, but that it would be withdrawn from the Paper. I am not in a position to deal with the Motion which Lord Wimborne has just read to your Lordships. This Notice has been on the Paper for three weeks. Lord Wimborne has not thought it necessary to give notice of his Motion to either the Leader of the House or to the Department to which that Motion—
LORD WIMBORNE: I am sorry to interrupt the noble Earl. On the day on which I put the Motion down on the Paper I wrote to the Leader of the House and said that I was willing to tell him exactly what I proposed to say, and I have always been willing to meet him and to give him the whole thing verbatim. There is no question of concealment about it; he did not take the trouble to see me.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: Lord Curzon invited the noble Lord to withdraw his Motion, and he has tried on several occasions to see the noble Lord in this House.
LORD WIMBORNE: That is not true.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: And the Motion on the Paper as it stands to-day is not the Motion just submitted by Lord Wimborne. I submit that under those conditions it is impossible for me to do more now than to reply in the exact terms which Lord Curzon himself would have used had his health permitted him to be present this evening. I must say that I should have liked to advert upon certain attacks made by the noble Lord upon the Foreign Office and certain implications that he made.
Lord Curzon, however, says that he would have been precluded from embarking upon any discussion of the question at the present time, for reasons which he had already stated to Lord Wimborne. Those reasons were that, Herr von Kühlmann having fallen, his views did not now appear
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to be relevant to the present situation. So strongly wag this view taken in the other House that, when an hon. Member tried to raise a debate on a Motion for the adjournment, the House of Commons thought it so inopportune that not one Member rose to support that hon. Member in moving the adjournment. If it is sought to raise a discussion on these terms in general, it is submitted that the present moment, while a great offensive is in course of being carried out, is singularly ill-chosen for the purpose.
NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I might further submit that in any case such a discussion could most suitably be raised after due notice to the Foreign Office of the terms of the Motion, and, perhaps, with some knowledge that, in the opinion of the Public Department, public interests would not be prejudically affected by such a discussion. In the present case Lord Wimborne placed his Motion upon the paper without any intimation having been made to the Foreign Office or any such assurance having been received by them. In spite of Lord Curzon's intimation to him that at the present time a debate would not be in the public interests, and that Lord Curzon would not be in a position to reply, no intimation has been received of the particular points to which Lord Wimborne desired replies, and he has concluded with a Motion the terms of which have never been communicated to the Leader of the House.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: I did not quite catch the noble Earl's preface. Is he reading a letter which the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, asked him to read to the House?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I am speaking from a full note prepared for my guidance by the Leader of the House, and the terms are substantially those which would have been presented to the House had Lord Curzon himself been able to attend.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: I do not think that makes it quite clear. I have been in this House for over forty years. Do I understand that the noble Earl is speaking from the Foreign Office brief which would have been given to Lord Curzon in the event of his being able to be here?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I have riot been in this House for forty years, but it is quite twenty-five years since I first entered the House of Commons, and from my knowledge of Parliament as a whole I submit that the procedure which I am following is quite correct. I said—and it will appear in the OFFICIAL REPORT to-morrow—that Lord Curzon, being unable to attend to-day, had given me a full note of what he would have said had he been present. This note was not prepared by the Foreign Office, but is part. of the statement I am making on behalf of the Leader of the House and refers to the definite complaint that a Motion has been submitted to the House of which notice has been upon the Paper for three weeks without its terms being communicated either to the Foreign Office or to the Leader of the House, and that the terms of the Motion have only been divulged within the last five minutes. In these circumstances I regret I am not in a position to reply to the specific questions put by Lord Wimborne.
LORD WIMBORNE: My Lords, I must contradict the noble Earl on personal points. I myself spoke to the Leader of the House and put myself entirely at his disposal. I offered to put him in possession of everything I wished to say, and it is not my fault if he is not aware of what I wished to say. It is three weeks since I gave not ice of the terms of my Motion.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: Not the terms of the Motion.
LORD WIMBORNE: Notice of the fact that I intended to make the Motion. I put it down on Thursday fortnight, and it was withdrawn at the request of the noble Earl. I must tell your Lordships that I understand that the noble Earl came down to the House and saw Lord Colebrooke, who went up to the Table and took my Motion off the Paper. That was a most exceptional thing to do, but I make no complaint of it. I was most anxious that the Leader of the House should have nothing to complain of, and that he should be consulted as to the time when he would reply to my observations, but I must protest that it is totally untrue that there was anything clandestine or sprung-upon-the-House in this Motion. If the noble Earl did not know what I was going to say it is not my fault, because I put myself entirely at his disposal.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Does the noble Lord move?
LORD WIMBORNE: No, I ask leave to withdraw the Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

THE DUTCH CONVOY.
LORD BERESFORD LORD BERESFORD had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask His Majesty's Government for further particulars relative to the abandonment of the right of search at sea in connection with the Dutch convoy sailings to the East Indies.
Has the new arrangement been agreed to by the Allies of the British Government.
Do the Government still adhere to the words of the Foreign Office telegram of April 25, 1918.
Is the Declaration of London regarded as in any way binding with reference to the "Right of Convoy" for a Neutral Power.
Is the proposed convoy accompanied by armed vessels or vessel; and if so, can the orders given to the commanding officers be communicated to this House; and to move for Papers.
The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I want to draw your Lordships' attention to what I may describe as one of the most amazing documents ever presented to Parliament. It is contradictory, it is not clear, it is confused, and worse than all it really is a document which would affect our sea power in the future. I refer to a White Paper called "Correspondence respecting the Despatch of a Dutch Convoy to the East Indies." What that Paper conveys to the mind is that the British Government gave way to the Dutch Government after a threat of resistance by force on the part of the Dutch Government if we enforced our right to visit and search ships at sea. I think this Paper demands very careful examination. This right of search we have had for centuries, as the Foreign Secretary called attention to in the Paper, and this right is supported by International Law. I say that this Paper contains action unparalleled in all the traditions of our long sea history.
The Foreign Office appears to have given way to pressure, as it has-on many occasions,

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and its communications vary and sometimes are contradictory, provided we allow that the Minister of Blockade is under the control of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office really, with great respect, has been playing with war ever since the war began, under the plea of the tactful handling of difficulties. When they get to tactful handling they generally create a great many more difficulties which they have to make the best of. They always seem to decide against us and in favour of neutrals and of our enemies. There are many cases which have become public in which public pressure has forced the Foreign Office to act, but when public opinion is in front of the Government the Government are always too late. In the first two years of the war the Foreign Office allowed neutrals to carry immense volumes of trade to the enemy, and, although the people expostulated, an effective blockade was not put on. I was up in the North and saw four vessels laden with hematite ore which were detained by the senior medical officer against orders on the ground that they were going to Rotterdam where the cargo would be discharged into lighters and taken straight to Germany, but in the end he was ordered to send these vessels on. The same thing has occurred again and again, and those of us who are seamen and who know how to carry out work at sea have been horrified many times during the war at the action of the Foreign Office over and above that of the Admiralty.
I want to know what the Allies say about this right of convoy and the action of the Dutch Government in having broken International Law. Have the United States and Japan agreed to the abrogation of International Law? Have they ever been consulted? If the Dutch have nothing to conceal why should they put forward so arrogant a demand, accompanied by a threat, that these vessels should not be visited? They say that their vessels are to go free from the right of search which every other neutral is forced to comply with. There is no precedent for this case in any naval war which has ever been waged. What reply are the Government going to make to Denmark, Norway and Sweden should they make similar demands accompanied by similar threats? I do not see how they can do anything else but what they have done in the case of the Netherlands.
I see that in Sir Walter Townley's Despatch of May 4 it is stated that—
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"The naval attache was told that this information had been communicated to the Governments interested."
Why did not the Minister communicate this information, not leave it to the naval attaché? The whole thing seems to me to be confused and dangerous to this country. I see that the Minister of Blockade, in a Memorandiun of June 7, 1918, mentions that the waiving of our right might risk an international complication of the utmost gravity. I think that international complication is very likely to occur unless we know what these other neutral nations say with regard to what our Government is doing in connection with the Dutch nation. I should like it to be observed that M. van Swinderen never refers to the other nations at all in his Despatch, and we know, with regard to whether communications were made to the other Governments, what the naval attaché told Sir Walter Townley. But M. van Swinderen does say on page 10, with reference to the British Government's objection to the right of convoy—
"This point of International Law can he left out of account in the present case."
This is a most extraordinary way of breaking International Law, and I want to know what are the views of the Allies with regard to this very naive proposal.
With regard to the third Question, the White Paper contains contradictions and inconsistencies which appear to me to be quite inexplicable. The Foreign Office and the Blockade Ministry appear to be separate Departments, nominally working together. They send separate Despatches and the Blockade Department send secret correspondence. If your Lordships will allow me I will read the letter of April 25 of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which he says—
"You should let the Netherlands Government know that His Majesty's Government of course do not recognise the right of convoy,' and that they will exercise the belligerent rights of visit and search of merchant vessels should the Netherlands Government carry out their proposal."
Nothing could be more straight, or more strong, or more clear than that—that the Foreign Secretary was determined that we should maintain our rights at sea.
Then I turn to another letter of June 7, in which I find that the Secretary of State

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for Foreign Affairs says, in corroboration of the telegram I have already read—
"… the British Government thought it right to lose no time in warning the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs that they would he 'unable to recognise any claim for the immunity from visit and search of ships sailing under neutral convoy."
There again is a clear and definite statement based upon International Law. The Foreign Secretary also says—
"It was therefore with considerable surprise that I received on the 31st ultimo, by telegraph from Sir W. Townley, a translation of an official notice published in the Dutch press that morning by the Ministry of Marine at The Hague, announcing among other things that ' the commander of the convoy would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships.' "
Those words convey a distinct threat. The Foreign Secretary goes on to say—
"In the face of this announcement, so made, His Majesty's Government feel compelled to reiterate in the most formal manner that the right of visit and search which Great Britain, whether she was a neutral or a belligerent, has, in conformity with the rules of international Law, consistently upheld for centuries, is not one which she can abandon."
Then he adds—
"As the Netherlands Government is well aware, the claim that immunity from search is conferred on neutral merchant vessels by the fact of their sailing under the convoy of a man-of-war flying the national flag has never been conceded by this country. By the course, therefore, which they are now pursuing, they do in fact demand that Great Britain shall abdicate her belligerent right to stop contraband trade by the regulated exercise of naval force, and, in the middle of a gloat war, abandon the allied blockade. This is a demand to which Great Britain could not possibly accede."
I have read these telegrams which are clear, decided, firm, and quite understandable. But I turn to the same Paper, and, to my amazement, find that on the same date—June 7—the Minister of Blockade sends a Despatch, which he is empowered to do by the Foreign Secretary, in which, while agreeing entirely with the drastic remarks of the Foreign Office, conveyed on April 25, he gives way entirely to the Netherlands Government on account of their public announcement. What really happened is this. The Netherlands Government determined to send this convoy and they determined to send an armed escort. They, apparently, knew it was against International Law, and they published this in the newspapers. As they had published it in the newspapers our Government gave in to them, and, as I shall show directly, gave into them as an act of courtesy. If a man hits me on the point of the nose I
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certainly do not give in to him as an act of courtesy. So far as the Government go with regard to this convoy, we have had a very severe blow on the nose.
I wish to read to your Lordships another statement of the Minister of Blockade. He says—
"His Majesty's Government, whilst sincerely regretting that the Netherlands authorities should have adopted a course which appears to them to have been licking both in courtesy and in prudence—"
I do not know about "prudence," because the Netherlands Government carried their point by what they did—
"are anxious, nevertheless, to take into account the de facto situation in which the Netherlands Government have now placed themselves by their own public announcement."
Therefore, because the Netherlands Government made this announcement, accompanied by a threat, our Government are going to recognise it, and say—" Although we object altogether to what you have done, which is entirely against International Law, and although you have challenged a right which we have held for centuries, still, as you have placed yourselves in an unfortunate position, we are going to let you do what you suggest." I say that this is perfectly monstrous, and shows incredible weakness on our side.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs repudiated Articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration of Landon. Sir Walter Townley points out that the Netherlands Minister of Marine, speaking in the First Chamber of the States-General, said—
"As the honourable deputy is aware, this right of convoying was never really generally recognised before the Declaration of London."
Your Lordships threw out the Declaration of London when you threw out the Naval Prize Bill. It was an infamous Declaration as far as our sea-power went. The Foreign Office evidently recognises that it is dead. The Declaration of London, by those Articles 61 and 62 which I have mentioned, did allow the right of convoy. When we come to the Minister of Blockade he acts as if the Declaration of London was in force as International Law. As your Lordships remember, the House of Lords threw it out. If your Lordships had not thrown out that Naval Prize Bill, and we had gone to war with the Declaration of London in force, we could not possibly have won it.
Several NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
LORD BERESFORD: That is true, because we are an honourable nation. If we had passed that Declaration into law it would have handicapped our fleet to such an extent that I maintain we could not have won the war. We could not have treated it as a "scrap of paper," although it was perfectly apparent that it was deadly opposed to our interests and entirely in favour of the enemy. According to the reading of this Paper, although the Foreign Office repudiates the Declaration of London, the Ministry of Blockade does not. That Paper shows a confusion of thought. If this is the way in which we are going on with the war we shall lose it.
I want to ask some pertinent questions with regard to the differences of opinion which are so prejudicial to our interests. What really happened was this. When the Declaration of London passed the House of Commons the Government had the idea that it would pass the House of Lords—but it did not—and they began negotiations with Holland. By the mercy of Providence your Lordships threw the Bill out, and the Government were in this fix, that they had begun these negotiations with Holland although the Declaration of London had never passed into law in this country, and that is the position they are in now. On August 8, 1914, the Government of this country were negotiating under an Order in Council because they thought that the Declaration of London would pass into law, the House of Commons having passed it. I object altogether to this system of government. We are governed by Committees on the one hand and by Orders in Council on the other, and it is a dangerous state of affairs, more particularly when we are at war. These things should come before Parliament and be decided in the broad public light of day.
The Minister of Blockade is still, apparently, acting on this pernicious Declaration of London. He reiterates, as your Lordships will see in the Paper, that the right of visit and search should be maintained in the strongest manner, almost as strong as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and he says that this right cannot be abandoned. Then he writes a Despatch in which he absolutely abandons it. And under what? Evidently under the menace of an armed convoy. That is what I particularly object to, and I think the country will object. We want to keep Holland our friend, but this is not the way to show
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frienship. Surely the action of the Foreign Office and the Minister of Blockade on this occasion is most reprehensible and not according to British tradition. You will find on page 7 of the White Paper, in a communication from Sir W. Townley to Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, the following—
"It is obvious that the convoy commandant would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships."
That is a threat, and it is a threat that moved the Minister of Blockade to act as he has done. The Minister of Blockade says also that the matter is "wholly exceptional." On page 9 of the White Paper he says—
"Bat it for these motives and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are to waive their right of search in this particular case, as a act of courtesy, they must lay stress on the altogether exceptional nature of such a concession, which must not be treated as a precedent for similar concessions in future, nor held to commit His Majesty's Government in any way to the abandonment of their just claims on other occasions."
They have forfeited their just claims; and how on earth are we to know that these circumstances will not occur again? I think they are certain to occur again, and if made under the same threat our Foreign Office, or Minister of Blockade, will give way again.
I want to impress on your Lordships that this action will practically nullify the whole of the blockade. It is going against our traditional rights at sea which, as the Foreign Secretary himself has said, we have acted on for centuries. The broad fact remains that the British Government have surrendered our sea rights, after asserting them in the most determined manner, and by so doing have weakened our maritime power and created a precedent. Nobody can deny this, and it is done after the unmistakable threat of the Netherlands Government. The world, certainly, must think we have abrogated our sea right under the threat of armed resistance. They cannot think anything else if they read this White Paper. An armed escort with this convoy is a direct challenge to the British Government and their rights at sea. The Government say to the Netherlands Government, "We will not prevent your doing it, but we do not recognise your right." This is really what they have said; and this is the way in which we are sacrificing our sea power.

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I ask whether these merchant ships are Dutch or German, or whether they are partly owned by Germans. We know that before the war a large number of these ships, probably two-thirds of them, were in German hands, and I should like to know whether they are wholly Dutch or partly German, and if so how much is German. No innocent vessel would have the slightest thing to fear from being searched, but Holland evidently does not believe our word relative to innocent vessels being passed on, and in spite of our pledge they are sending an armed escort. This is not the way friends should act, and it will cause countless and innumerable difficulties not only during the war but after the war.
I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to another point, which I have also brought before the public, in the other House of Parliament. The Foreign Office is presided over by a Secretary of State. That is perfectly right. The War Office is presided over by a Secretary of State, and other Departments of the Government have a Secretary of State. The Government have just created an Air Ministry presided over by a Secretary of State. But the most important Department of all—the Admiralty—is not presided over by a Secretary of State, and in big affairs the First Lord often has to represent matters though a Secretary of State. I remember when I was at the Admiralty in 1885 there was the question of a stoker who performed a most heroic act in the stokehold. A steam pipe burst and he managed to turn off the throttle valve, saving the ship and the men. In war time he would have got, or have been recommended for, the Victoria Cross, but he was recommended by the Admiralty for the Albert medal, and the recommendation had to go through the Board of Trade. Some clerk there wrote to the Admiralty and said, "We do not consider that this act merits the Albert medal." The Admiralty wrote back and said, "We are the proper people to know whether it merits the medal or not." The Board of Trade objected, and the man never got anything. That position, however, was altered. Really Admiralty business that has to go before the Sovereign, much of it, has to go through a Secretary of State, because the First Lord is not a Secretary of State. I hope shortly to bring a Motion before your Lordships' House to the effect that the First Lord should be made a Secretary of State. He is now in a
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subordinate position, and that is not good or the Service or for the country.
The Foreign Office also have interfered with the Navy and Admiralty all through the war. The Navy brings in a ship to the three mile limit—it is really incredible, but that ship when brought in is under the control and orders of the Foreign Office and not of the Admiralty. For goodness sake make your policy in the Cabinet—that is your business; but it is not your business to interfere with the soldier or sailor as to how he shall carry it out. The reason we have lost an immense amount of time, many opportunities, and had so many catastrophes in this war, is that the politician, who should frame policy, will interfere with the executive, as they have done so many times. I desire to know, if the Government can tell me, who was responsible for these statements in this remarkable White Paper. We cannot succeed if we continue upon such methods.
With your Lordships' permission, I should like to summarise the case in this way. The Dutch Government make a proposal—it is really more than a proposal, it is a decision—that they are going to send an armed convoy without reference to other nations, to us, or to International Law or the traditional rights of the sea. They published this decision. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the strongest way possible, as we see in the White Paper, said that we should pay no attention to this decision, and that we were determined to maintain our right of visit and search. On the same day, June 7, the Blockade Minister is empowered by the Foreign Office to make what is called a confidential verbal Report, which is put in this Paper and which is diametrically and entirely opposed to the words used by the Foreign Secretary with respect to this breach of International Law. That sort of thing requires explanation. I do not suppose that anybody has yet been able to read that Paper, but if this sort of thing is to go on we shall hamper ourselves most materially in the war by raising difficulties which would not exist if we adhered to International Law. When we drive a great wedge like this into International Law and allow one Power to do something adverse to our interest, and adverse to the rules of the sea in war, we are opening the door in a perilous manner. Although I do not intend to divide the House on this occasion, I hone to bring forward the matter again, and to

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ask that these things shall cease, and that we shall not have this divergence of opinion without the clearest reason being given for it. I shall also ask your Lordships to consider the question whether the time has not arrived for making the First Lord of the Admiralty a Secretary of State.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD FINLAY): My Lords, my noble and gallant friend has used many hard terms with regard to the Foreign Office and the distinguished man who is at its head. I hope, if my noble and gallant friend will give me his attention, to be able to satisfy him that his epithets were wholly inapplicable.
LORD BERESFORD: They were not personal; they were directed to what he did.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not suppose for a moment that my noble and gallant friend would make any personal attack, but what I protest against in the most emphatic manner is attributing to the Foreign Office and to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs action which is the action of the Government as a whole, and attacking the Foreign Office and its head as if it were due to their default and their neglect of duty that things have occurred for which the Government as a whole is responsible. I hope to satisfy my noble and gallant friend that the apprehensions to which he has given such lively expression are altogether unfounded, and to convince him that he may rest in his bed in peace with no idea that International Law has been abrogated or will be abrogated.
I propose to make a statement to the House upon the whole question connected with the Dutch convoy. I regret that the hour is so late, but I hope that your Lordships will bear with me, because the time has come when the misconceptions which have been circulated in regard to this matter of the convoy must be dealt with. I do not think that those misconceptions have ever been more forcibly embodied than in the speech to which the House has just listened. I shall make a consecutive statement, but in the course of it your Lordships may find that I answer every one of the questions put by my noble and gallant friend in the order, I think, in which he put them.
The essential facts about this convoy are as follows. As appears from the White
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Paper which is before your Lordships, the Netherlands Minister of Marine on April 16 announced that the Government would send a convoy of Government passengers and goods to the Netherlands East Indies. On April 29 the Netherlands Minister informed the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the composition of the proposed convoy. The particulars are set out in the Note of the Netherlands Minister of that date—No. 3 in the White Paper—and the names of the vessels are given at the end of the communiqué of May 31, which also appears in the White Paper. The vessels were as follows. First, Her Majesty's ship "Hertog Hendrik" accompanied by a coal boat requisitioned for that purpose for the purpose of bunkering during the voyage. Second, a Netherlands merchant ship transformed into a man-of-war according to the rules of the 7th Convention, 1917, for the transport of military men to the Dutch East Indies, having for cargo military stores. Third, a Netherlands merchant ship requisitioned by the Netherlands Government, under convoy of the man-of-war mentioned under head one, for the transport of Government passengers with their families, and having for cargo exclusively goods of the Netherlands Government destined for the Government of the Dutch East Indies. It is, therefore, clear that the convoy, apart from the coal boat, consisted of one merchant vessel which was under the control of the Dutch Government, and was used for the transport of Government passengers and Government cargo only. The other two vessels were men-of-war which are not in practice subjected to visit and search.
On April 25 the Foreign Office had intimated through Sir Walter Townley, His Majesty's Minister at The Hague, that His Majesty's Government did not recognise the right of convoy, and that they would exercise the right of visit and search. This was communicated to the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 26, who, as H.M. Government were informed by telegram on May 13, made no demur, but no answer was received. On May 31 there was published at The Hague an official communiqué by the then Minister of Marine, in which it was stated as follows—
"The warships will therefore only carry naval personnel and war supplies, and the merchant ships only Government passengers with their families and Government goods. It is not intended to institute under protection of warships commercial intercourse which, without such pro-

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tection, would not be permitted by the belligerents according to their views of commercial liberty of neutrals. No mail will be carried. It is obvious that convoy commandant will not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships."
Thereupon Mr. Balfour sent a Note of June 7 to the Netherlands Minister again asserting the right of visit and search, and on the same day a verbal communication was made to the Netherlands Minister in London, which is set out in the White Paper, and which is so important that I propose, with your Lordships' permission, to read to the House the most essential part of it. Your Lordships will find the passage which I am now quoting on page 9 of the White Paper beginning at the third paragraph of that page—
"His Majesty's Government, whilst sincerely regretting that the Netherlands authorities should have adopted a course which appears to them to have been lacking both in courtesy and in prudence, are anxious, nevertheless, to take into account the de fac o situation in which the Netherlands Government have now placed themselves by their own public announcement. His Majesty's Government cannot consent to any abatement of the right which they claim to search vessels under neutral convoy. The repression of contraband and the enforcement of blockade lie, by international law, with the belligerent alone and not with the neutral; and this fundamental principle Great Britain is quite determined to uphold with all the force at her command. It is important that the Netherlands Government should be under no misapprehension on this point.
"If, however, the intention underlying the presentation of M. van Swinderen's note of the 29th April, and of communications in the same sense since made by M. Loudon to Sir W. Townley, was merely to suggest that a friendly arrangement might be arrived at between the two Governments under which such satisfaction would be given to legitimate belligerent requirements as would justify the British Government in dispensing on the present occasion with the formal exercise of their right of search, His Majesty's Government will not refuse to consider such suggestion. They desire, by adopting this conciliatory attitude, to give further practical evidence of their constant anxiety to maintain their relations with the Netherlands Government on the most amicable footing, and to show how far they are in fact willing to go out of their way in order to save the susceptibilities which the Dutch official announcement was calculated to arouse, and so to prevent the action of the Netherlands Government from definitely creating a situation gravely imperilling the friendly relations between the two countries.
"But if for these motives and in these circumstances His Majesty's Government are to waive their right of search in this particular case, as an act of courtesy, they must lay stress on the altogether exceptional nature of such a concession, which must not be treated as a precedent for similar concessions in future, nor held to commit His Majesty's Government in any way to the abandonment of their just claims on other occasions.
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"On this clear understanding His Majesty's Government are ready to state the conditions on which the convoy composed of the ships whose names have been notified might be allowed to pass without interference through the British patrols on the intended journey from Rotterdam or Amsterdam to the Dutch East Indies. These conditions will be found to conform substantially with the suggestions put forward by the Netherlands Government themselves, and should therefore meet with their ready acceptance."
The conditions follow, and this is really the most vital document in the White Paper—

"(a) A detailed list of all passengers sailing in the convoy, to be furnished to His Majesty's Government, none but Dutch Government officials and their families being allowed to proceed.

"(b) Full particulars of the cargo on board any merchant vessel sailing in the convoy to be supplied in the same way as is now done by the Netherlands Oversea Trust in respect of ships under their control.

"(c) The Netherlands Government to give a formal guarantee that no goods shipped in the convoy are either wholly or in part of enemy origin.

"(d) The slops sailing under the Dutch naval flag, including the converted liner, not to carry any civilian passengers, nor any goods or articles other than warlike stores destined for the colonial authorities or forces, of which complete lists should be furnished.

"(e) No mails, correspondence, private papers, printed matter, or patrols to be carried by any ship in the convoy (except official despatches of the Dutch Government).

"(f) The convoy not to sail until the above stipulated particulars and undertakings have been furnished and have been found satisfactory by the British authorities."

These conditions were accepted in their entirety by the Netherlands Government.
It will be observed that the second of these conditions was that full particulars of the goods should be supplied, as is now done by the Netherlands Overseas Trust in respect of ships under their control. It must never be forgotten that an effective search of vessels at sea is, under present conditions, impossible. For that purpose it is necessary that the vessel should be brought into port, and even there the process takes a long time. Put shortly the reasons why effective search at sea is impossible are the size of the vessels now used; the fact that the information contained in ships' papers must be supplemented by further information which is recorded in this country concerning consignors and consignees; and the danger of attack by Rib-marines while the vessels searched and those searching are stopped for the purpose.

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For these reasons the practice has been adopted with the Netherlands Overseas Trust of having the manifest and lists of passengers transmitted to London for examination before the vessel sails. This "advance booking," as it is called, is really the most effective way by far in which our naval control can be exercised, and it has, in practice, been found to be very effectual for the purpose of controlling shipments. With regard to the convoy now in question, His Majesty's Government is in a much better position with reference to the power of control than if we had chosen to rely solely on the exercise of the right of visit and search.
There is another consideration which His Majesty's Government were bound to take into account. They have no desire to criticise the motives which may have prompted the public statement in the communiqué of May 31, "It is obvious that convoy commandant will not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ships." It may have been prompted by a belief that such a statement would be grateful to public opinion in Holland, a country which is justly proud of the part which her Navy has played in history. His Majesty's Government have no reason to believe that any sinister design lay behind this statement. After such an announcement had been made it is obvious that to have stopped the convoy would have provoked a crisis of the most acute kind in the relations of this country with the Netherlands. We believe that that country and its Government are inspired by friendly sentiments towards Great Britain, and Great Britain has certainly no desire to quarrel with them. If the interests of Great Britain demanded it, we should not hesitate to put into practice the right of visit and search which we have steadily asserted for centuries. But the arrangement which was made gave us all, and more than all, we could have got by insisting on the exercise of these rights in all their rigour.
As regards the exercise of the right in future cases, if they should ever occur, this has been completely safeguarded. To have taken up an unbending attitude on this occasion might have led to consequences which would be deplored by every one. The decision taken was arrived at by the War Cabinet after the most careful consideration of all the circum-
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stances. The decision was that of the Government, and it would be a mistake to treat it as if the matter had been merely departmental.
My noble and gallant friend Lord Beresford, in his second Question, has asked whether the new arrangement had been agreed to by the Allies with the British Government. The correspondence was unofficially communicated to the Governments of the United States, of France, and of Italy, and His Majesty's Government understand that they welcomed the amicable arrangement which was arrived at. It must be remembered that the position was a little complicated by the fact that these Governments have in the past been opposed to the exercise of the right to visit and search vessels under convoy.
LORD BERESFORD: What does the noble and learned Lord mean by "in the past"? Does that mean since the war?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is within your Lordships' knowledge that the position of Great Britain with regard to the right to visit and search vessels under convoy is one which has been repeatedly stated by the British Government, but the Governments of other countries have held different views on the matter.
LORD BERESFORD: I only wanted to know whether it was during the war.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am speaking of the historical fact which is well known. The position taken up by this country, although we believe it to be absolutely right, has not been shared in the past by those who are now on the most friendly terms with us. That had to be taken into account in dealing with the situation.
The noble and gallant Lord's third Question relates to the telegram of April 25. His Majesty's Government adhere to the statement in their telegram of April 25 that they do not recognise "the right of convoy." Their waiver on this occasion of the belligerent right to visit and search has been prompted, not by any weakening on this subject, but by the special considerations to which I have adverted.

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The fourth Question relates to the Declaration of London. The Declaration of London is not regarded as in any way whatever binding with reference to the right of convoy for a neutral, nor, indeed, for any other purpose.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That Declaration was, as my noble and gallant friend has said, never ratified, and although it was partially recognised for the time by Orders in Council subject to certain limitations, I may remind the House that the Declaration of London Order in Council No. 2 of 1914, and all Orders amending it, were withdrawn by Order in Council of July 7, 1916. So that we are absolutely free from the trammels of the Declaration of London.
My noble and gallant friend's fifth Question was as to particulars of the vessels, and instructions to the officers in command. I have already given particulars of the vessels forming the convoy. His Majesty's Government had no information as to the orders given to the commanding officers beyond what is conveyed in the communiqué of May 31, which I have already quoted. I may add that, as the convoy was bound for the Dutch East Indies, no question as to enemy destination of any of the cargo could arise. The precautions taken on this occasion have enabled His Majesty's Government to satisfy themselves that there was nothing wrong with this convoy.
The noble and gallant Admiral has put five questions to me, which I have specifically answered. Perhaps he will allow me to submit one for his consideration. If we had refused the offer of a friendly settlement and insisted on carrying out visit and search of the solitary merchant vessel which was conveyed, what does he suppose we should have found? I am sure that he does not suppose that we should have found that the Netherlands Government had misled us. The conditions which we had enforced enabled us to satisfy ourselves that there was nothing wrong. There is really nothing whatever to suggest that goods or passengers have been carried on this merchantman on some nefarious errand, what, where, and how, nobody can divine. On the whole, I submit to your Lordships, better judgment that the. attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government in this matter has combined, with a due regard for
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the susceptibilities of a friendly neutral. complete security that neither cargo nor passengers open to any objection should be carried, and an unqualified assertion of the historic position of Great Britain on the subject of convoy.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack for answering my Questions categorically, but I think your Lordships must agree that the attitude adopted by the Netherlands Government with regard to this question was unfortunate. Why send men-of-war at all? That has not been cleared up by the noble and. learned Lord. It was published that these men-of-war would not tolerate any examination of the convoyed ship; they naturally would not tolerate any examination of themselves. I think that the misconceptions to which tie noble and learned Lord referred were justified. He has cleared up some of them, but I still deplore the way in which this thing was done. It was a way likely to make a difficulty and to break our friendship with Holland for the Dutch Government to publish a threat of what they were going to do. The Foreign Office were so astonished that they called attention to the want of prudence and courtesy. The thing might have been done in a different way; and the Netherlands Government are to blame for what they did. I am sure that everybody in this House wants to remain friendly with the Dutch, but this is not the way to make friendship; and I will that our Government have got out of a very grave difficulty somewhat cleverly.
My noble and learned friend spoke of the Declaration of London, and I was very glad that he made a definite pronouncement that this Declaration is dead, because it has sometime, been referred to as extant. I hope we shall never hear of the Declaration of London again. My noble and learned friend also referred to effective search at sea. Circumstances, of course, have altered now that we have great oceangoing liners, and search at sea is more difficult than it was, more particularly with under-water warfare. But the old right of search at sea was hardly ever observed. What happened was that if the weather was rough and a boat could not go from the man-of-war to undertake the search, the merchant ship was ordered to heave, to and they waited until the wind went down,

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and a prize crew was put on board to take her into port. It was rare to search and to condemn a ship at sea.
I want to point out once more that it was not our Government who provoked the crisis; it was the Netherlands Government. However, we have got out of the difficulty, and I am very much obliged to the noble and learned Lord for the explanations he has given in answer to my Questions. But I still say that the way this was done, and the Papers being so contradictory, gave rise to what are called misconceptions, which in my view are due to the perfectly contradictory and disquieting particulars contained in the White Paper that has been issued.

THE FOURTH OF AUGUST.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, in moving that the House do now adjourn, may I announce that to-morrow
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the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack will move—
"That this House do attend at St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, on Sunday, August 4, being the fourth anniversary of the Declaration of War, and invoke the Divine blessing on our just cause."
[From Minutes of July 11.]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 6) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and referred to the Examiners.

MILES DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
Minutes of evidence and proceedings before this House on the Second Reading, together with the documents deposited in the case returned from the Commons.
House adjourned at eight o'clock.