§ LORD LAMINGTON had the following Question on the Paper—
§ To ask His Majesty's Government whether any information can be given to the House as to the present position and future prospects of the South Persia Rifles, and whether His Majesty's Government can inform the House as to the present position of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.
§ The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to echo the congratulations made by the noble Lord, Lord Balfour of Burleigh, on the return to this House of the noble Earl, Lord Curzon. I do not wish to delay business when your Lordships are engaged on a lengthy consideration of the large Bill which is before us. But this question regarding the position of affairs in Persia has not been treated in this House since last February. Whilst I do not wish, therefore, to raise a general debate, there are two specific points of peculiar importance that I have put down on the Notice Paper.
§ Since the statement made by the noble Earl (Earl Curzon) last February, there had been a Despatch from Sir Charles Munro which has been published, but that does not really carry us much beyond the information that has been supplied by the noble Earl the Leader of the House. With regard to the first part of the Question standing in my name, the last information that we had was to the effect that Sir Percy Sykes had been right to Isfahan and had joined hands with the Russian forces there, but had then gone back to Shiraz and made that place his headquarters. The last event in connection with the forces under his command was that they had gone down to quell some disturbance at Kazerun and were down to the Persian Gulf, but were not strong enough and had to retire to Shiraz. That is the last information in respect of the operations conducted by Sir Percy Sykes of which I have heard. In February last the noble Earl (Earl Curzon) very justly paid great credit to the operations that had been conducted by Sir Percy Sykes, both from the military and political points of view, and it is only right that the public should learn something of the very arduous nature of the operations upon which he 821 has been engaged, and of the heavy responsibility that has been thrust upon him, and upon his subordinates who from time to time have to go out on missions far from headquarters and have thereby very special duties to discharge. It must be remembered that this small force, practically isolated, really forms the right Hank of the Allied battle front, which stretches from the confines of India up to the very north of Scotland, and therefore it is a matter of supreme importance to this country to have some knowledge of what is taking place in connection with that force. I trust that the noble Earl will be able to give good news of Sir Percy Sykes and of his command.
§ In regard to the second portion of the Question—the position of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907—I put this down on the Paper because, owing to the Russian débâcle, I for one have not the remotest idea how the position really stands at the present time in Persia. No doubt that Convention, badly conceived and ill-omened, has afforded, if not the justification, at least the pretext for the invasion of Persia by a German-Turkish force. It must necessarily be a very delicate topic to deal with, but it is a matter of supreme interest to the public, and I trust that the noble Earl will be able to give some indication of the position of the Anglo-Russian Convention at the present moment.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, I am glad to answer the Question of the noble Lord; and in view of the importance of the debate which we are all awaiting, will content myself with following his example in making a brief statement rather than a speech.
I think that there has been some misconception about the character and service of the South Persia Rifles, which are under the command of Sir Percy Sykes. For several years there has existed in the Southern portions of Persia a police or gendarmerie force, whose main duty it was to preserve order and to guard the principal trade routes. Up to and even after the beginning of the war this gendarmerie was commanded by Swedish officers. With their disappearance in 1915 the force itself was dissolved, and disorder at once again raised its head. The 822 Persian Government recognised the necessity of creating a new force to take the place of the disbanded gendarmerie, but at the time were unable themselves to undertake the task. They therefore formally accepted the offer of His Majesty's Government to place at their disposal a number of British officers for the purpose. A great many of the old gendarmerie were re-enlisted, the force was strengthened, its headquarters—as the noble Lord remarked—were established at Shiraz, and the effect was speedily visible in a return of local security and the revival of trade. But the force continued to be, what it was in its inception, what it will, I hope, always remain—namely, a Persian force. The most assiduous attempts have been made by pro-German elements, with whose devices we are now so familiar, to represent this force as a part of the British or Indian Army, and as engaged in a military occupation of the country. Of course, it is nothing of the sort. It is Persian in character, composition, and allegiance, and the first to suffer from its disappearance would be Persia herself.
This point has been continually placed before the Persian Government by the British Minister at Teheran, and, in spite of much interested misrepresentation, is generally recognised by Persian statesmen. An even surer guarantee of the sincerity of British intentions has been furnished by our willingness to discuss with a friendly Persian Cabinet the future of the South Persia Rifles when the war is over. We desire Persia to remain neutral during the war and to retain its complete independence after the war. There should be no difficulty in finding a solution of the question that will fulfil the triple criterion of satisfying Persian national sentiments, providing for the safety of the roads, and protecting the legitimate interests of trade. Without the existence of such a force the authority of the Persian Government would itself be imperilled. The sole aim of the British Government is to render it an effective unit in the military resources of the country. The matter, I can assure the noble Lord, is one to which, in consultation with our able British Minister. Sir C. Marling, His Majesty's Government have devoted and are devoting very earnest and sympathetic consideration.
The noble Lord, in the concluding sentences of his remarks, asked a further 823 question upon what he rightly described as an important but delicate matter—namely, the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907. This Convention was intended, not to impair the integrity or independence of Persia, but to put an end to the longstanding rivalry between the two great outside Powers in Persia; and whether it was a good or a bad Agreement, it certainly did not fail in its principal object. Nevertheless, there were many here again who lost no opportunity of representing to the Persian Government that what was in its essence a self-denying instrument was secretly inspired by a hostile purpose, and was aimed at the territorial integrity or political independence of the Persian Kingdom. There was no foundation for these beliefs at the time. I desire most categorically to repudiate and deny them now. Further, the great change in the situation produced by recent events in Russia has given to His Majesty's Government a welcome opportunity of testifying their sincerity in this respect. In the absence of a stable Government in Russia it has not so far been found possible to discuss the matter with that country. But we have informed the Persian Government that we regard the Agreement as being henceforward in suspense, and as soon as the conditions to which I have referred are satisfied we shall be ready to reconsider the whole question.
§ VISCOUNT BRYCEMy Lords, I was very glad to hear the emphatic disclaimer which has just fallen from the noble Earl. I do not wish to ask him any question which he would think it undesirable to answer, but if he feels it possible to tell us anything with regard to the state of things in North Persia, to which he did not refer, we should be glad to hear it. As I said, I will not ask him that question if he feels any delicacy in answering it.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONI am afraid, owing to the disorder prevalent in the Northern parts of Persia, that our information as to what is passing in those regions is very imperfect; and, even if I were to ask the noble Viscount to postpone his question, and put it on another occasion, I doubt very much whether the Foreign Office, all of whose telegrams I have seen, would be able to give him anything in the nature of a satisfactory reply.