THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, you will have observed in the Press a statement that the noble Earl who leads the House will be prepared to give us some information to-day upon the military situation. I trust that the rumour is correct, and that the noble Earl will favour us with a general statement on the military position.
§ THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON)My Lords, I rise at once, in response to the invitation of the noble Marquess who leads the Opposition, to make the statement of which notice has already been given in the Press. It was on Thursday, March 21, that your Lordships adjourned for the Easter recess. On that very morning the great German offensive was launched on the Western Front which has continued with slight intermission ever since, is still unexhausted, and has invested this stage of the war and this theatre of fighting with a gravity the extent of which no one will be disposed to under-estimate, constituting as it does the most serious peril with which the Allied cause has been confronted since the beginning of the war in August, 1914. Your Lordships will feel, in these circumstances, that I am only doing right in prefacing the re-opening of our proceedings 618 this afternoon by a statement of the military situation as it now exists.
Parliament is entitled to as full information on all that has passed or is in contemplation as can be given with due regard to the public interest and without conveying intelligence to the enemy. Your Lordships have all the greater right to this information inasmuch as it is about to be made the basis of an appeal to Parliament and to the nation for a measure of support and self-sacrifice in excess of anything that has been yet demanded, though not, I feel, in excess of what both Parliament and the nation, if treated with candour and if assured of the gravity of the case, will be prepared with good will and alacrity to concede. That appeal in the form of a Bill introduced to-day in another place will reach your Lordships in the course of a week from now; and when it comes here the members of the Government who sit on this bench will be prepared to make as full an explanation of the specific demands which it will contain as may be required. This afternoon I have the simpler task of acquainting your Lordships with the general course of events during the past three weeks which have rendered this appeal necessary, and which constitute the main justification of the steps that are now proposed.
For several months, in fact ever since the commencement of the present year, there has been evidence that the enemy was making preparations for a great offensive in the Western theatre. After the lamentable collapse of Russia and the disastrous peace that was forced upon that country by the enemy Powers, the Germans continued to move troops from the Eastern to the Western Front with as much rapidity as the capacity of their railways permitted. We had evidence that no fewer than thirty-five German divisions had been so transferred in the interval between January 1 and March 21, when the great attack began. Of course, it was not known at what precise point the enemy would attack; in fact, there were some high military authorities who doubted whether he would attack in France at all, and who argued that the concentration on the Western Front was merely a feint, designed to cover some sudden and desperate assault elsewhere. However, as time passed on the indications of an offensive on the French Front accumulated, and it appeared probable that the main theatre of attack would be either the British line between Cambrai and St. Quentin, or the French line in Champagne, 619 or possibly both. The French Commander, indeed, continued up till the end to expect an attack upon the second of these fronts, which was held by his own gallant forces. In the third week of March the evidences as to the scene of the offensive became Unmistakable, though obviously it could not be known whether the attack would be concentrated or diffused, whether it would be directed exclusively against the British, or the French, or impartially against both. Thus there was an inevitable element of uncertainty, both as to the exact spot to be selected and the tactics that would be employed. On the other hand, in the larger sense there was no element of surprise in the general strategy of the enemy or in his choice of a broad theatre of action. How broad it was is shown by the fact that for the first time in the war—and this, no doubt, contributed to the initial success— the attack was delivered on a front of as much as fifty miles. Even the date of the projected attack was fairly accurately foreshadowed, since it was expected to be launched in the first quarter of the Easter moon.
Your Lordships may like to know what was the general position of the rival forces at that moment. Along the entire Western Front there was an approximate equality between the combatant strength of the Allies and the Germans in respect of infantry; the enemy were slightly inferior in artillery, and considerably inferior in aircraft. The Germans, however, had so organised their forces as to produce a considerably larger number of divisions out of an equal or a smaller number of men. That, as your Lordships will understand, is a question of organisation, apart from numbers, though it had the consequence of enabling them to constitute a powerful reserve of more than 80 divisions, the greater part of which were concentrated in the rear of the right and centre of their line. Moreover, owing to the position of the Germans on interior lines, they were able to move their reserves from the centre of a great are to the circumference either of the British or of the French front more rapidly than the Allies could do because of the greater distances which the latter had to cover. This is an advantage which the enemy forces have almost consistently enjoyed by reason of the geographical factor alike in the larger and in the local aspects of the entire European campaign. The possibility to which I alluded just now of an attack on the French front in Champagne 620 necessitated the retention of a great part of the French reserves in rear of that front, thus rendering it impossible for the Allies, acting on exterior lines, to prevent the enemy from achieving temporary superiority at any one point in the line where he might choose to attack.
My Lords, I have made the above remarks about the approximate numerical equality of the opposing forces along the entire Front because there seems to have been a tendency in some quarters to suppose that, either from a reluctance to tap the available resources of man-power in this country or from a failure to appreciate military advice, the British Army in France had been allowed to decline numerically to a point that was fraught with peril. There is no foundation for such a suspicion; nor were any apprehensions of such a character either entertained or received. Our Commanders were equally satisfied with the numbers, the equipment, and the morale of their forces. Nor is it in any of those respects that fault has been found. Up to the very eve of the battle the Government continued to receive the most confident and gratifying assurances from the Allied military authorities on the spot.
There is another criticism, equally fallacious, which I must note in passing—namely, that the Western Front has been stinted or drained for the more distant campaigns in other parts of Europe or of Asia—campaigns which the Imperial responsibilities of Great Britain or her obligations to her Allies have compelled her to undertake. Such is not the case. Our military commitments in Salonika were made long before the present offensive was so much as dreamed of. They dated from the year 1915; and it will be within your Lordships' recollection that, instead of being blamed for undertaking them, the late Government were reproached both here and elsewhere for not having undertaken them earlier and in greater strength. I have never met anybody who recommended their complete or even their partial abandonment. So far from our forces at Salonika having been increased, it is a matter of common knowledge that they have been considerably reduced for the sake of the Western Front. Equally does everybody know that the Allied Armies there, though operating in a secondary theatre of war, are performing a military service of primary importance, desistence from which would have involved the abandonment of Greece to the Germans, 621 the disappearance of our staunch ally and friend M. Venizelos, the restoration of King Constantine, and, still more, the handing over to the enemy of the most formidable group of naval and submarine bases to be found in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Similarly as regards Palestine and Mesopotamia, I do not think that I need enter on this occasion into a defence of either of these campaigns. Those who attack them seem to forget that we are an Eastern as well as a Western Power, and that the pillars of our Dominions are planted at Delhi and Cairo no than in these islands. We were drawn into the Mesopotamian Campaign by the necessities of Imperial defence; and if the East has been kept quiet, I pray your Lordships to believe that it has been much more owing to what has happened on the Tigris than to any fighting on the Somme. Our advance upon Palestine, pursued with a success that still continues, was the alternative—and a very preferable alternative—to the passive defence of Egypt and the locking up of a large number of troops there. In these campaigns we have not only taken two of the capital cities of the Turkish Empire, but we have practically destroyed an entire Turkish Army. We have forced the Turk to withdraw the whole of his fighting forces from Europe, and we have even compelled the Germans to spare not only a German Field-Marshal and German units to assuage by their presence the discomfiture of their Turkish Allies, but even German regiments—an entire German battalion having been discovered only during the past few days in occupation of an important position to the east of the Jordan. I mention these two Eastern campaigns only in order to point out to your Lordships that neither of them has been allowed to affect the fighting strength of the forces in France or in Flanders. No British troops have been taken from France for any Eastern theatre of war. The only British divisions that have left France have been those which were despatched to the defence of Italy in the hour of her danger—a service which not even the strongest partisan of the Western Front would have grudged—and some of these it is known have been returned. There is no question here of Western as against Eastern strategy. The Western Front was well equipped to look after itself; and if it has in any respect failed to do so, the ex- 622 planation must be sought elsewhere. It will not he found in denouncing the secondary campaigns of our Armies, the full value of which will, perhaps, be even more visible at the Peace Conference of the future than it is now.
To return, however, from this digression, which I hope has not been altogether irrelevant, to the position in France at the opening of the attack on March 21 last. Though the rival forces were about equal in combatant strength the Germans possessed certain advantages, to some of which I have referred. I have alluded to the formidable reserves concentrated behind their lines and capable of being swiftly directed to this point or to that. I have spoken of the Allied reserves necessarily distributed over a much longer line and less mobile in character. My Lords, it is in my opinion much to be regretted that the measures arranged for at Versailles, which I had an opportunity of explaining in your Lordships' House only a few weeks ago, were not undertaken at an earlier period, and had not had time to assume a more mature and perfected shape before the need for their existence was conclusively proved But so much energy was devoted in Parliament and elsewhere to discussing whether it was desirable to have a unified Army of reserves at all, and so much controversy was expended on the points as to how it should be constituted, under whose orders it should be placed, and where it should go, that valuable time was consumed which might have been more profitably spent in organising the force itself. Had a greater measure of unity been secured at an earlier date, the opportunity of demonstrating its utility afforded by this great offensive might, perhaps, have been more effectively employed.
My Lords, the enemy enjoyed another advantage, which in the fluctuations of the war has sometimes been his and sometimes Ours. I refer to the advantage of the initiative. He could choose exactly where and when he was going to attack, while the Allies could never be positively certain at what point on a long front the spear head would be thrust in. The experiences of war at Verdun, on the Somme, and at Cambrai have shown that a great individual advantage lies with the offensive. The attacking Army, either acting by surprise, as at Cambrai, or advancing after a sustained 623 artillery preparation, reaches its objective after a few hours or it may be a few days, takes large numbers of prisoners and guns, and then, when the first victorious rush is spent, is held up or obliged to halt until it has consolidated its position and brought up its artillery and reserves. Such has been the experience of every offensive with scarcely an exception in the present war. The belligerent that can pursue the advantage thus gained, can convert a sudden and successful rush into a sustained advantage and proceed without undue delay from the first to the second phase of operations, is in a position of manifest superiority. It need hardly be added that the advantage of the offensive is greatly increased if it be executed upon a wide as against a confined or narrow front. But, my Lords, the crowning advantage enjoyed by the enemy in these battles, as in almost all the stages of the war, has been unity of command. He could dispose of the Armies of two nations—sometimes more. He could hold his front with an inferior force because he was always in a position to reinforce it. He could move his pieces backwards and forwards on a gigantic chess-board coextensive with the Continent. This advantage has never hitherto been ours. Where there are two Commanders, each has his own Army operating in its own carefully-defined sphere, and however close the contact and however amicable the arrangements between them, there is unity neither in direction nor in aim. There is dissipation of energy, dispersion of force, and very likely dislocation at the moment of danger. Each Commander is naturally and properly interested in his own area. He is convinced that the attack is going to be made upon his own line. Preoccupied with his own risk he cannot fairly balance the two risks, that of his own force and that of his Allies twenty or thirty miles away. He cannot concentrate upon repelling the greater of the two risks because he has no opportunity of measuring their relative magnitude. Only slowly and laboriously have the Allied Armies in France awakened to this great and overmastering necessity. Perhaps the British nation were not the speediest converts, but every one is converted now. The baptism of a great danger has consecrated the conversion, and a Government which a short time ago was almost called upon to apologise for attempting to create unity of command is now almost driven to apologise for not having created it sooner.
624 These were the conditions when the battle began on March 21. Although, as I have said, the probable date and locality of the offensive were accurately conjectured in advance, there were certain elements of surprise, because the attack was made in greater force on our extreme right flank than was expected, and included the valley of the Oise as far as La Fere. That portion of the line had been taken over by our troops from the French not long before, and therefore they were not so familiar with it as with other parts of the front. The enemy opened the attack with a numerical preponderance in the sector of the line selected by him of about two to one. Not for the first time in the history of the war the stars in their course appeared to fight not against Sisera but for him. The British were beaten by mud at Paschendale; but for the Germans in St. Quentin the ground was dry underfoot, while overhead heavy fog was lying along the valley of the Oise which hid their movements until they were 50 yards from our outposts, who were in many instances taken by surprise. But the fog had a worse result than this, for it prevented our artillery and machine guns from obtaining targets, a circumstance which placed them at a great disadvantage, since our system of defence depended largely upon the cross fire of our artillery and machine guns.
The defensive organisation of the British Front consisted in a series of zones. The first or forward zone was not intended to be held in case of a really heavy enemy attack. In that event a withdrawal was to be made to the battle zone or main line of resistance a short distance in the rear. Behind this zone, again, were a number of rear lines of defence. The weight of the enemy's attack was thrown mainly against our Fifth Army, north and south of St. Quentin. During the first day of the battle the enemy nowhere penetrated beyond our battle zone, except in the sector between St. Quentin and the Oise, where he drove in our right flank. This necessitated a retirement behind the Crozat Canal, and enabled the enemy to make a converging attack on our positions north and west of St. Quentin. The result of this attack, which took place on the second day of the battle, enabled the enemy to break through our line about Roisel, north-west of St. Quentin, and also north of the Crozat Canal. This necessitated the retirement of the whole of the Fifth Army.
625 In view of the dangerous situation which had arisen on the British front, the French at once, with characteristic and chivalrous loyalty, came to our assistance, and throughout the present battle they have afforded us the same unflinching support which they have rendered in the past on every occasion when the need has arisen. The two Armies have fought side by side in the strenuous fortnight that has elapsed since those anxious days, and British troops have on some occasions, in the confusion of the struggle, found themselves fighting under a French Commander. The rest of the battle consisted of a fighting retirement, in which our men behaved with a gallantry and steadiness beyond praise, contesting every yard of ground, making the enemy pay dearly for each successive advance, and exhibiting the characteristic qualities of the British soldier. In this connection special mention must be made of the stubborn resistance of the Third Army against greatly superior enemy numbers—a resistance which completely foiled all the enemy's attempts to penetrate their line, and definitely arrested his advance north of the Somme.
I am reluctant to mention the names of individuals because it is so difficult to select, but, my Lords, I think a word of special praise is due to General Sir Julian Byng, who, when forced to retire in order to establish a connection between the Third and Fifth Armies, conducted that operation with a skill, cool-headedness, and determination that equalled—it could not surpass—the valour and constancy of his men. The magnificent bravery of many of the Divisions of the Fifth Army also, who fought to the last in circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, was no less noteworthy.
In the meantime south of the Somme, as French reinforcements arrived, it had gradually become possible to organise resistance between that river and the Luce, and by this means the enemy's progress was definitely checked in that area. The portion of our Fifth Army which had become mingled with the French troops was gradually withdrawn as the latter came up. General Rawlinson was entrusted with the command of that part— the still fighting part—of the Fifth Army, which had been falling back slowly in good order between the river Somme and the Luce, fighting stubbornly against great odds. It was at this time and on this part of the battle front that a hastily-improvised force of 626 labourers, balloonists, machine-gun and other specialists, under Brigadier-General Carey, came to the rescue, and played a most distinguished part at a critical time, recalling the famous story of the cooks at the first battle of Ypres.
Throughout the battle the co-operation between our Air Service and the other arms was a factor of the greatest importance. The devotion of our airmen in dealing with the enemy's machiles, in attacking his columns marching along the roads, and in interfering with his preparations, was of invaluable assistance to our hard-pressed infantry. It greatly impeded the enemy's progress and inflicted serious losses upon his personnel. No fewer than 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition were fired from our aircraft at ground. targets, and in the first twelve clays of the battle 250 enemy aeroplanes were destroyed and 120 driven out of control.
My Lords, I have now given a general conspectus of the events that attended the retreat and break-up of the original Fifth Army. What actually happened at each stage of the struggle is still uncertain. In so large a theatre, and in the peculiar circumstances attending this protracted series of engagements, some little time must necessarily elapse before the various pieces of the mosaic can be fitted into their places. Moreover, the Commanders, from the Field Marshal downwards, have been so busily engaged with the anxieties of a crisis that has not yet abated that there has been little time for the detailed investigation of past events, themselves entangled in much obscurity and confusion. This inquiry has been ordered and. is being undertaken. In the meantime General Gough has been recalled to this country. It would be unfair to blame him until the whole facts have been cleared up. It would have been equally unfair to leave him in command while his conduct is under investigation.
We thus come, my Lords, to the end of the first series of operations, after which there was something of a lull while the enemy was organising his communications, relieving his exhausted divisions, and bringing up his artillery. This was presently succeeded by a series of new attacks, some of them pushed with great fury and attended with minor successes, although accompanied in each case by a reckless sacrifice of life which would be staggering were it not a part the settled policy of the enemy, who is believed to be willing 627 to lose a million men in the present offensive if only he can attain his object and bring the war, as he hopes, to an early and triumphant conclusion. His immediate object, as we all know, was to overwhelm the British right wing and to sever completely the British and French Armies. The larger object, which lay and still lies behind, was to capture Amiens, to sever the main lines of railway communication between the Channel and Paris, to cut off the Allied Armies from each other, and to roll back the British Army upon the coast ports. The results of the battle up to the present time have been that the enemy obtained a great initial success at the cost of very heavy sacrifice, but has so far failed in his main object. He has not driven a wedge between the British and French Armies; he has not broken our line between the Somme and Arras; he has not reached Amiens itself.
As to our losses, we have not the information at present to enable us to state with any accuracy how many prisoners we have lost or what casualties we have suffered. They do not, in any case, approach the figures that have been published by the enemy. But; my Lords, do not let us conceal from ourselves that the enemy is uncomfortably and dangerously near to Amiens; that he has captured, and holds, most valuable ground; that his effort is still unexhausted; that he continues on the whole to advance rather than to retreat; and that further and greater exertions on his part may certainly be awaited. I cannot affect to hide from your Lordships that the position is one which, although it contains many encouraging features, is still, and will continue for some time to be, one of grave anxiety. Further opportunities may occur as time goes on to keep your Lordships informed as to the progress of events. I hope I have neither extenuated nor exaggerated in my description of what has happened up to the present date.
In these circumstances your Lordships will want to know what action was taken by His Majesty's Government as soon as the thundercloud broke about our heads. Directly the emergency arose the Cabinet took immediate steps to replace our losses. Reinforcements were at once despatched from this country across the Channel at a maximum rate of over 30,000 in the day. In those proceedings you will be interested to learn that no single life has been lost. We were sorry that this step made it neces- 628 sary to cancel the usual leave given to men proceeding to the Front to enable them to say good-bye to their families and friends, and also to curtail the holidays of many thousands of soldiers who were at home upon leave. These sacrifices were received without a murmur by the troops, and I cannot too highly extol the spirit and patriotism with which they hurried to the aid of their comrades in such dire peril and to the support of their country in its hour of trial. The same necessity compelled us to send over to France young men of eighteen and a-half years of age, whom we have always reserved the right to place in the battle line in an hour of national emergency.
As regards the losses in guns and material, which have been considerable, though nothing resembling the figures published by the enemy, the Minister of Munitions informed us that he was more than able to replace at once all our losses. This has been done as rapidly as the capacity of the French ports allowed—with a balance in addition to constitute a powerful reserve. A further step was taken. Your Lordships will have read in the newspapers the appeals that were at once addressed by the Prime Minister on behalf of the War Cabinet to our Overseas Dominions and India, and the glowing and encouraging replies that were received from them. It has always seemed to me to be one of the most glorious experiences of this war that in the distant parts of the Empire, remote from the scene of conflict and exposed to no visible or imminent peril, the youth of the Anglo-Saxon race have rushed to arms, and the sedentary population have been willing to accept sacrifices with an ardour not inferior to that of the people who are almost within sound of the guns and whose homes and subsistence are directly threatened. This feeling has been confirmed and consecrated by the blood that has been shed on the battle-field, and the response that has come from very quarter of the Empire has testified anew that the true nature of the Amiens menace is realised as fully by them as by ourselves, and that no effort will be spa red to lend additional succour to the common cause.
We did not confine our appeal to our own fellow-subjects. We turned to our most powerful Ally, the great English-speaking Republic across the ocean, the anniversary of whose entry into the war we commemorated only two days ago, and whose absorption in the struggle has increased 629 with every month that has passed until, like ourselves, they realised that it would be better to perish as a nation than to allow this monstrous tyranny to pervade the earth. America has large numbers of troops in training across the Atlantic to take their place in the American Army that will one day turn the tide of battle in France. The arrival of these forces has taken longer than was contemplated, and if delayed much further they might have forfeited their chance of joining in the present phase of the struggle. In these circumstances we appealed to President Wilson to send his American soldiers at once across the ocean to be brigaded with the troops of the British and French Armies in France. He responded to this appeal with immediate and generous promptitude that warmed our hearts, and in point of numbers promised exceeded our most sanguine expectations. The House will not expect me to give the figures of the expected American arrivals, but the monthly supply of infantry and machine-gun reinforcements on whom we can now reckon in the ensuing months, and for whom it is possible to guarantee shipping, will alone constitute an Army of formidable strength.
Lastly, in conjunction with our Allies, we have taken a great forward step in the control of the Allied forces in the theatre of fighting. I was speaking just now about the advantage enjoyed by the enemy in respect of unity of command. That advantage we have not hitherto shared with hint. Co-ordination of action was the direct object of the Versailles agreement and of the Supreme Councils that have since been held to carry it into effect, but concentration of authority has never been secured for reasons which are too well known to call for recapitulation here. Time itself, and the Germans, have effected a conversion which argument could not secure. A few days after the battle the British and French Commanders themselves, on their own initiative, agreed to the supreme direction of strategy by a single head at the Western Front. A Generalissimo it was not proposed to appoint; a Generalissimo has not been appointed. There was no need to place any individual Commander in supreme charge to look after strategy, tactics, and administration. It would have been unnecessary and impossible to assign to any officer, however éminent, the administrative and tactical control of a foreign Army, the appointment or dismissal of its Com- 630 manders, and all the functions that appertain to the supreme command of an Army in the field. But the strategical control ought in such cases as these to be vested in single hands, or—shall I say?—in a single brain. We have suffered grievously from the want of this in the past. Invaluable time has thereby been lost. The enemy was in a position to strike while the two Armies and the Commanders were still acting independently, with a proportionate sacrifice of unity and strength.
If by common consent a single direction was required, such a direction could, in the circumstances of the case, while the struggle is taking place on French soil, while it is French territory that is being overrun, while it is the French capital and French ports that are in jeopardy, only be by a Frenchman, and, if a Frenchman, then he could only be General Foch. This appointment, in the conditions and with the limitations that I have described, has been received with acclamation not only by the British Commanders and by the American Generals, who have always been ahead of our military authorities in pressing for unity of control, but by public opinion in all the Allied countries, and it cannot but be helpful to the common cause.
Such, my Lords, is the situation as it now exists. It is grave in its present aspect. It is not less grave in its probable implications. The enemy realising that the balance of strength in the Western theatre is now more favourable to him than it is likely ever again to be in the future, and that this is therefore his best chance of obtaining a decision in the field, has embarked upon this great battle, or rather series of battles, with the object of achieving a decisive victory over the Allies. He is forced to this endeavour by a number of reasons—by the economic condition of Germany and still mare of Austria, by the exhaustion and war-weariness of his principal Allies, and by the knowledge that with ever' month that passes the trained armies of America will be pressing on to the field of action. He will therefore pursue the military advantage which he has gained with relentless purpose, with a complete disregard of human life, and with the single object of ending the war in the course of the present summer. Day by day, while we are sitting here, the sanguinary encounter goes on. Your Lordships must expect the first phase to be succeeded by a second, and the second by a third. This crisis itself may be prolonged not for weeks 631 but for months, and the months will before long take us into the fifth year of the war. Further than that it is unnecessary for me for the moment to look, though I need hardly acid that our forecasts have all along been made for a war that embraces at least the year 1919.
The Government would have ill discharged their duty if they had rested satisfied with the measures that I have already described. These are merely the executive or administrative steps that have been open to them to take under the powers that they enjoy. More than this they could not do without the authority of Parliament, and the approval of the country. Hence the proposals embodied in a Bill which is being explained in another place this afternoon, and which will reach your Lordships in a few days from now. I shall bespeak for those proposals, which it is not my intention and which it would not be becoming for me to dilate upon this afternoon, when they come here the earnest and sympathetic consideration of this House. I shall ask your Lordships to remember that we meet here in this week at a crisis as grave as any that has ever occurred in our history. I shall plead that this crisis may continue to be met as it has already been met, and I shall argue that it may be overcome, as I believe that it can be overcome, in this country by the patriotism of Parliament and the cheerful and unconquerable spirit of our people, and abroad by the armed strength of the Allies, throwing every man and every effort into the common cause, and by the moral and material support of the remainder of the civilised world. My Lords, freedom will not be allowed to perish out of the earth in this terrible encounter, and it is our glorious but perilous lot to be in the front line of those whose mission it will be to save it.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEMy Lords, I feel certain that the House will desire that something should be said of the nature of thanks to the noble Earl for the very full and lucid statement of the position which he has just made to us. We had, indeed, all hoped that the noble Earl would he able to describe as fully as he has the general situation abroad, although he has not, wisely as I venture to think, touched upon the course which it is intended to take at home, and we have certainly not been in that respect disappointed. I feel also that we ought to be grateful to the noble Earl for having in no way attempted to 632 underrate the gravity of the situation in which we now are. The noble Earl's speech was in no sense alarmist, but he did not attempt to minimise the gravity, not merely of the military situation as it is in France at this moment, but the probably long continuance of the situation, becoming as we hope ameliorated as the weeks pass on, but which is bound to remain critical for a considerable time yet to come.
There are only one or two points in the noble Earl's speech upon which I wish to make a few observations. The noble I Earl desired to dispose of what he conceived to be a myth accepted by some that the Western Front had been denuded of part of its strength for the benefit of campaigns which are being conducted in other parts of the world. I confess I did not know that this belief was held by anybody who pretended to any degree of information. What has existed, I believe, in the different Allied countries is a school of thought which has from time to time desired to treat the Western Front rather as one which ought to be held without attempt at further advance there in any circumstances, while believing that there are different parts of the world in which advances might be made to the great advantage of the war as a whole. There have been, as we know, marked differences of opinion in the different countries on this subject, and it is fortunate, I think, that the noble Earl has been able to explain, as he has categorically to us this afternoon, that in fact no divisions have been moved away from the Western Front to any other part of the world, at any rate during the time which it is necessary to consider at this moment. Very few people, I suppose, would have desired to abandon our Eastern campaigns altogether. What the noble Earl said on this subject of the effect on the Eastern world of our enterprises there appears to me to be absolutely true. But there were, no doubt, some who were inclined to deplore what they considered an excessive enterprise in other theatres of war, fearing that our main strength might thereby he somewhat sacrificed.
One other point on which the noble Earl spoke was that of the mobile reserve, which had been, as he thought, called into being at somewhat too late a date, and the earlier existence of which might, as he appeared to believe, at any rate in some degree, have saved the situation in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin. I confess I do not precisely follow the reasoning of 633 the noble Earl in that respect. I should have supposed that the utility of a mobile reserve depended entirely upon one thing—namely, upon the means of transport, the strategical railways which have been made in order to transport it from time to time to points at which it was particularly required; and, assuming it to be the case that the Germans possess an advantage over us in that respect in Belgium, it must be due, I take it, to the fact that, either on a larger scale or on more useful lines, they have done more in that encouragement of mobility in the rear of the positions than, for one reason or another, we have been able to do. I confess I cannot see that the mere existence of a mobile reserve, without measures such as I have described, could operate greatly in helping a critical situation such as that which has occurred.
I am sure the whole House heard with interest the clear explanation which the noble Earl gave of the concentration of the supreme direction of strategy in the hands of General Foch. As everybody knows, there is no officer in the French Army more admired and more trusted by the British troops than General Foch, and for these reasons I am quite certain that the concentration of strategical direction in his hands will be not merely accepted but cordially agreed to, as the noble Earl has stated.
At the same time, it is hardly possible, I think, by any unity of direction of that kind to obtain the precise degree of advantage, which the German. Army have all along possessed on the Western Front, of being composed practically, not merely of men under one command, but of men of one nation. You cannot get over the fact that the 40,000,000 of population of France and the 40,000,000 of population of Great Britain cannot, by any unity of command, produce an Army so absolutely homogeneous as that formed out of the 60,000,000 to 70,000,000 Germans. And when the noble Earl said that the diversity of command must lead to a certain dissipation of forces and to a difficulty of balancing the risks which the different Armies might have to encounter, it can hardly be the fact that that particular difficulty of balancing the risks which each Army may have to take can altogether disappear under a single command—even the command of so distinguished a soldier as General Foch, who, however, possesses for this purpose the peculiar advantage of having, from a 634 very early date in the war, worked in immediate contact and close concert with the British Army itself.
The noble Earl enthralled the House in describing in the clear and measured terms which he did the episode of which we are all naturally most desirous to hear—namely, the fortunes of the Fifth Army in the neighbourhood of St. Quentin. How far the misfortune which occurred there—because that, I take it, is not by any means too strong a term to use—was due to division of command we may hear later. I entirely agree with the noble Earl that when an inquiry is pending into the whole subject it would be not only futile but altogether improper at this moment to discuss the question of responsibility. We shall all, I hope, trust that it may be proved that the misfortunes that occurred were rather due to circumstances which even valour could not conquer than to the defect of any of the commanders, either principal or subordinate. But there is no advantage in attempting to discuss that question now.
What I think we may discuss, and with satisfaction, is the staunchness which has been shown by the whole country in a period of tension and trial which has certainly not been equalled since the two months from early in September to the middle of November in 1914. The spirit of the people has been altogether admirable. I have heard, from some of those who have seen them, of the manly enthusiasm, even more visible and more audible than ever, shown by the thousands of drafts travelling from different parts of the United Kingdom to take their place at the Front. I believe that the spirit of the civilian population has been equally good. As the noble Earl so truly said, we have all been profoundly heartened and encouraged by the attitude of the American people at this moment of danger; not least, I think, by the great speech which President Wilson delivered at Baltimore last week. I believe that, when the final record of this war comes to be written, the successive speeches made by President Wilson throughout its course will prove to be the most notable milestones in the whole of its history It is no depreciation of any of the statesmen here or in European countries to say that the speeches which President Wilson has made have been altogether unrivalled. The oratory of war all through history, from the days of Demosthenes to those of Lord Chatham, has produced numberless instances of powerful eloquence and of 635 heart-stirring appeals to patriotism, but I do not know where in history to find any parallel to such utterances as those which President Wilson has addressed to the whole world—so flawless in their logic, so final in their judgment, and so completely elevated above the ordinary conceptions even of those who love their country and who desire to see their country victorious. The determination which President Wilson expressed in that speech has been heartening to all the Allies here; and I am very glad that the noble Earl did not forget to express the particular thanks of the Government and of the country to the fine act of selfdenial—because it is an act of the most genuine self-denial—in postponing the formation of the great American force into armies, and corps, and divisions, and allowing by no means inconsiderable numbers of troops to be brigaded with the British and French Armies. It is a fine action of the nature of the famous conduct of General Outram at the time of the Indian Mutiny, and it is one which, I am sure, will not be forgotten by England and the English people.
I will not attempt to anticipate in any way the discussion which will take place—as I assume before very long, because the measure is being hurried with all possible speed, as I understand, through another place—on the Bill of which, I believe, the Prime Minister has given an outline there to-day; but I can assure the noble Earl that, reserving, of course, the freedom of everybody in this House to say what he thinks on any particular detail of the measure, I feel certain there will be no noble Lord here who will not wish to give those proposals his most candid, and, indeed, most sympathetic consideration, knowing what the need of the country is.
THE EARL OF DUNDONALDMy Lords, I do not propose to inflict myself upon your Lordships for more than two or three minutes. I listened to the speech of the noble Earl the Leader of the House with the greatest interest, especially to what he said with regard to our responsibilities in the East. But, having regard to those responsibilities, were we right in using up the best men, the men who came forward voluntarily at the commencement of the war, and behind whom there were practically no reserves? We must remember that this country has not passed its population through the ranks as the Central Empires have done. Behind our forces there is nothing. I 636 read the report of a speech by no less a person than the Chief of the Staff in which he said, "If you want to kill the Boche, go where the Bache are." Did he realise that not only did we kill the Boche but that the Boche killed us? I have read an account of the enormous and almost irreplaceable losses sustained by our Artillery. Unless one has spoken with officers who have served in the Artillery during bombardments by the Germans one can hardly realise what our men go through. In one battery in two months three men went mad—two remained with the battery under restraint, and the third rushed away into the German lines. My son-in-law, who was commanding this battery, told me those facts. The commitments that we might have in the East all pointed to holding the Western Front, and not to making partial attacks with insufficient forces to thrust through on a front of insufficient breadth. But that is a thing of the past.
With regard to the position on March 21, we are told by the noble Earl that the Germans had a superiority in one or two respects, one being an important one—namely, that they were working on interior lines and could concentrate a larger force than we could, and more rapidly. Did not this imply—the possibility of the concentration of this larger force at any particular point—that we also should not have been content with an equilibrium, but should have had much larger reserves? I did not hear from the noble Earl—perhaps it seemed such a small detail that it was omitted from the information that he had—anything with regard to our wire entanglements. I have heard that the German wire entanglements are far superior to ours, much more difficult to get through, and would hold up men for a longer time. We have had, my Lords, during this war various Commissions of Inquiry into military happenings in different parts of the world. I say this, that the result of every one of those Inquiries has been to prove two important facts—one, that the men are incomparable; the other, that the Staff system was faulty and sometimes the leaders were faulty.
What does this arise from? My own opinion is that a great deal arises from faultiness in our military system. We entrust the great duty of the selection of the Higher Command and such matters which in Germany are in the hands of one 637 of their greatest military leaders—we en-trust these things to the supreme control of a civilian, namely, the Secretary of State for War. I am sure that he exercises his powers to the best of his ability, but is it possible for a system such as this to compete with the German system? The German military system is divided into three main portions. The first and most important is the Military Cabinet, which is presided over by one of their greatest Generals. Entrusted to this Cabinet are the duties which we entrust to the Secretary of State for War. The noble Earl shakes his head, but where am I wrong? Well, my Lords, you reap what you sow, and for fourteen years our military system has boon controlled by a civilian, assisted by an Army Council, who look to him for everything. This civilian sometimes makes a good appointment and sometimes makes a very bad one; but if he makes a bad one and appoints an inferior General to a command, that inferior General in his turn selects officers for advancement. A good man will select good men, but an incompetent as a rule selects incompetents, and those that the bad man selects will in future come forward in their turn for preferment. My opinion is that unless we, a free democracy, agree to give up some of our freedom and adopt the sensible portion of the German system, and give over to a professional that which a professional should supervise, we shall never make war with success.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (THE EARL OF DERBY)My Lords, I must disabuse the mind of the noble Earl of one thing. He seems to think that I make military appointments of my own accord. I do nothing whatever of the kind. There is a Selection Board, there is the advice of the General Officers Commanding in the various fields, and there is the Army Council; and not a single appointment have I ever made, or would I ever make, without consulting and getting the recommendation of those bodies. It is their recommendation, and they do what I think is the right thing to do. They put forward the names of those men who they think are fitted for command, and they eradicate the names of those who they think are of no use for command.
§ THE EARL OF DERBYThe system surely is the same. You have military advisers who put forward recommendations to the civilian head of the War Office, which is a recognised institution in this country. It is, after all, purely nominal consent on his part, and in the case of the Higher Command it is brought before the War Cabinet.
THE EARL OF DUNDONALDI am perhaps out of order in speaking again, but I ask your Lordships' consideration. When Lord Haldane was in office he specially reserved to himself the selection of officers for commands which Lieutenant-Generals could hold.