Lords Sitting of 20 November 1917

Preamble
Earl GREY—Sat first in Parliament in succession to his father.

FOODSTUFFS—COMPULSORY RATIONING.
LORD LAMINGTON LORD LAMINGTON had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask His Majesty's Government whether they can make a Return showing the consumption of foodstuffs for the first six months of 1917, as compared with the similar periods in 1915 and 1916; also, if the present consumption is in excess of supplies, whether they will not forthwith introduce a system of compulsory rationing; and to move for Papers.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this Question has been on the Paper for some time owing to the noble Lord the Food Controller being too busy to attend this House; he has been occupied in going about the country exhorting to economy of food. Since I put it down a certain change has taken place in the situation. To judge from the noble Lord's speeches and those of Sir Arthur Yapp, there is no doubt that compulsory rationing is bound to come. In ordinary circumstances I am a strenuous advocate of a voluntary system, but war changes circumstances, and a war-time Government has to take control of various departments of life. The first part of my Question asks what has been done by the voluntary rationing system first laid down by Lord Devonport. In reply to a Question of mine about April, as to whether that scheme had been effective, Lord Devonport said he thought that owing to voluntary rationing there had been a reduction of food consumption of about 60 per cent. in certain articles. I should be glad if the Food Controller could say whether there has been a sensible reduction of food consumption since that time. I am confident that many thousands of households have loyally and patriotically adhered to that system. Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles has been our own habit of lavish hospitality. People, among the upper classes at least, when entertaining guests are afraid to be thought mean. Then there is the very numerous class who are nowadays receiving wages far in excess of what they have been
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accustomed to. I do not believe that they sin wantonly, but they have not realised the importance of consuming less, and from all sides one hears of reckless expenditure on foodstuffs among that class.
But besides the system of voluntary rationing there have been numerous other Orders promulgated, sometimes rather contradictory and perplexing. For the last few months these Orders have been issued in abundance. Even in May the noble and learned Lord, Lord Buckmaster, referring to the perplexity created by these multitudinous Regulations and Orders, said that in April alone there had been ten restrictive Orders issued. How many more have been issued since that time I have no idea. There has been a vast number, and I am sure that up till last week the average householder did not know what was expected of him. Had some simple direct Order only been addressed to every householder exhorting him individually to a strict adherence to voluntary rationing, I believe that there would have been far more food economy than has been attained by all these restrictive Regulations.
In the main there have, been three chief lines upon which the Government's policy has proceeded. First of all, from time to time they have raised wages and given bonuses; then they have fixed maximum prices; and, finally, they have artificially fixed the price of bread. Now, the raising of wages to enable the working classes to buy food is a policy which creates a vicious circle. Every time wages have been raised I understand there has been a greater consumption of food. The Government have tried to meet the difficulty by fixing maximum prices. We know what a perplexing situation has been created by, first of all, fixing maximum prices for potatoes, and then giving a minimum price to the grower, so that at the present time the Government are simply overwhelmed by the amount of potatoes that have been raised, and they do not know how to deal with the matter. In yesterday's Times there was a long letter from Mr. Mackenzie, the Director of the Cambridge University Farm, in which he shows the impasse that had been created by fixing the price of meat.
The farmers that I have spoken to, in Scotland at all events, are simply immersed in difficulties in trying to ascertain where they really stand. In many instances crops have been partially wasted owing to these incessant Government Orders, and

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generally speaking a new sphere of speculation has been entered upon in consequence of the Orders, so that the producer really does not know where he stands from day to day. The fixing of maximum prices not only tends to restrict production, but also it tends to restrict importation. That was very clearly brought out by Mr. Prothero recently in an address in which he said that in the Great Napoleonic War we were brought within an ace of starvation in one year, and the thing that helped to pull us through was the fact that the French themselves were so affected by the high prices of corn that they sent their corn into this country. That is an illustration of how high prices really tend to produce a supply. And the fixing of a maximum price therefore tends to discourage the supply, whether from the producers in this country or from abroad.
As for the artificial fixing of the price of bread, I believe that is less harmful than anything else. I think that it costs the country £40,000,000 or £50,000,000 a year, but the country knows where it stands, and if the Government believe that the people are not able to afford bread at the present time it is far better frankly to acknowledge it, and to take action of that kind than to try to interfere with the ordinary prices produced by the law of supply and demand. Mr. Prothero himself, in the House of Commons, said that "Once the Government interfered with the ordinary regulation of prices by supply and demand, they landed themselves into a sea of difficulties." That is absolutely true. They land not only themselves but the whole community in a state of absolute perplexity. Consequently in my opinion the action of the Government in these three respects has not been to do what an ordinary man would have thought was his first duty namely, to see that there was less consumption of food, and that the supply of food had been as far as possible properly conserved in the country. I maintain that the action of the Government has tended to encourage consumption and not to reduce it.
I think that Lord Rhondda took credit to himself the other day for having brought down the high prices of food. That may be very beneficial from the political point of view, but it has not effected reduction of consumption, which ought to be the most important object of his Department. I was furnished the other day with a copy of the Financial News, which had a very
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interesting and logical article reviewing the whole, action of His Majesty's Government in respect of the food supplies of the country. It seems to me that the Government have been more concerned with the idea that there is a class of people who engage in profiteering than with anything else. It is very unfortunate that Ministers have not been at greater pains to explain to the public that high prices have not been caused by profiteers.
I addressed a private letter to the noble Lord asking for an answer on the point whether profiteering can be said to have been in any degree the cause of the raising of prices. We have seen it stated in the Press that prosecutions have from time to time taken place, and no doubt there are people willing to make undue profit in these days; but I am not at all sure that there has been a wholesale operation of such a practice. I should think profiteering was a very difficult operation, and also a dangerous one seeing that the Government have such large powers for punishing it. I dare say the noble Lord will be able to indicate clearly whether there has been any serious amount of profiteering in the country. This point has been in the minds of the Government a great deal. Lord Milner, in dealing with this question not long ago, said—
"The cost of food has been a very important factor in causing unrest; but I am convinced that the belief that it has been due to trade manipulation has done far more harm than the high prices themselves."
The noble Viscount indicates that as a belief on the part of the masses. At meetings of the trade unions it has been constantly stated that high prices were solely due to certain people making improper profits. If I am correct in my assumption, I think it is a great pity that His Majesty's Government have not been at greater pains to disabuse the minds of the people as to what amount of profiteering has really taken place.
Another subject, rather germane to this, has been referred to from time to time namely, private hoarding. Everybody must admit that, when once a declaration has been made that certain articles of food are scarce, private hoarding is a selfish and unfair practice. But up to the time when a voluntary system of rationing was advocated, I think that a person who had what I call some regard for thrift was carrying out a very excellent

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practice. When times of scarcity come, those who squander in times of plenty rebuke those who have then some forethought and practise economy. It is like the story of the foolish virgins. If the Government had exhorted the people to put by in times of plenty the country would have been in a better position than that in which it is to-day. But the Government have been the last people to do that. They themselves had an opportunity to hoard on a large scale when there were bumper crops across the Atlantic, when shipping was plentiful, and when freights were low. If His Majesty's Government had then imported large quantities of breadstuffs our position would have been very different. I call it criminal neglect on their part not to have taken such steps. The commander in charge of a town who did not see to its provisioning until he was besieged and could not get in the necessary food would rightly be condemned. In the early days of the war there is no doubt that the Government thought we should win with a minimum effort, and it is that belief which has placed as in the position in which we stand to-day.
If the action of the Government up to the present time has not been successful in reducing the normal consumption of food to any great extent, what are they going to do in the future? Will they not have to institute compulsory rationing? In April of this year the noble Viscount, Lord Devon port, who was then in charge of the Food Department, said—
"I think the time has arrived now to acquaint the local authorities with what their responsibilities will be in connection with food distribution and rationing, if we have to come to it. The instructions will be issued to the local authorities shortly. They will knew exactly what part they are going to play in this national organisation if and when it is required. It will be for the people to decide in the next six or eight weeks before any machinery is ready to came into action."
I would ask the noble Lord, Lord Rhondda, whether those instructions were ever issued to the local authorities, and what was their nature? I maintain that it is better to institute a system of voluntary rationing when there may be a moderate amount of food in the country rather than to wait until the days of greater scarcity. At one time in the summer, I believe there was only a twelve weeks' supply of wheat in the country. We do not want to go so near again to the margin of safety. Unless the Food Controller can see hiss way clearly
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to provision the country on a voluntary basis, I think it is high time to enforce a system of compulsory rationing. In one of his speeches he said that it must necessarily take several weeks, as it was such a complicated business; and that nobody wished to propose it unless it were coming inevitably. One knows the difficulties—how to meet individual requirements, how to secure distribution in different localities, and so on. But after all, other countries have managed to put such a system into force. Germany is always held up as an example of the disadvantage of compulsory rationing, owing to the amount of forgery and evasion that has taken place there. But I believe that other countries, like Switzerland and Holland, have such a system in force; therefore it must be practicable.
Some who speak with very high authority contend that any compulsory rationing system, to be of use, must necessarily entail a considerable reduction in the amount of food that a person ordinarily eats, which is quite true; and they go on to argue from this that the people in this country will not submit to any large reduction of their food. I do not hold this opinion. If there is one feature in this war which has been made clear it is the extraordinary submissiveness and readiness of the people of this country to obey any Older that is issued or listen to any appeal that is made by the Government. I suppose that from the palace to the cottage there is hardly a home in these islands that has not made the greatest sacrifice and that has not been Stricken; yet the personal circumstances of the public generally have been left almost untouched by this war, in comparison with what other countries in Europe—not only enemy countries, but countries which are anxious to remain neutral—have had to suffer.
From the very outset of this gigantic struggle I have always believed that it would be impossible for this country to emerge from the war without undergoing privation and suffering, and if only His Majesty's Government would explain to the public that a restricted food supply is necessary and is not the outcome of private greed or manipulation but is due to the cruel tyranny of war, and that there will be as far as possible an equal distribution of the necessaries of life among high and low, I am confident that the people would respond to what is inevitable as readily

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and as resolutely as their kinsmen have gone to the trenches. Therefore unless the Government feel sure that they can continue to feed the people on a voluntary basis, the sooner they adopt compulsory rationing the better.
THE FOOD CONTROLLER (LORD RHONDDA): My Lords, the noble Lord has dealt with a member of matters not directly arising out of his Question on the Notice Paper, and he has generally criticised the action of the Government or of the Ministry of Food, and stated that their action in fixing maximum prices and in regard to the varied restrictions that they have ordered from time to time has done more harm and created more difficulties than it has removed. He also, in the latter part of his speech, criticised the action of the Government early in the war. Your Lordships will not expect me to express any opinion either in defence of the action taken then or in opposition to it, because it happened in the time of the Government, before the last, and it is enough for me to bear the burden of responsibility for my own actions. The noble Lord said that he gathered from speeches which I had made in the country generally that I considered rationing was bound to come. I do not think I went so far as that. Indeed, I am sure I did not. What I said was that if the appeal now being made by Sir Arthur Yapp was not adequately responded to, then I was afraid that compulsory rationing would have to be brought in.
The noble Lord also complained of the issue of the great number of Orders from time to time, and the perplexity which he says those Orders have created. Noble Lords must realise the immensity of the task undertaken by the Ministry of Food. When the Government were called upon to undertake the regulation of the food supplies of 45,000,000 people, and had to set up an organisation in the course of a few months, it was inevitable that great difficulties would be encountered. We are travelling along an entirely new path. The restrictions are, of course, artificial; and it is very difficult to know when any Order is issued what the effect will be and what unseen difficulties will arise; but I maintain that in the main the action of the Department—both under my predecessor, Lord Devonport, and under myself—has been very beneficial. We have unquestionably checked the soaring of prices during the last five months. The average
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price of essential foods has been checked, and in some cases reduced.
I do not know whether it is necessary for me to refer in detail to the noble Lord's criticism on the effect of the Potato Order of the Government, but perhaps I had better do so. In order to encourage the production of potatoes, as early as last February a pledge was given by the Government of a minimum price to the farmer. Partly as a result of the encouragement then given, and also of the fact that the weather was suitable for potato growing, a very large surplus was produced. Naturally the public looked, in view of the very large production, to a reduction in price; and there was also the danger that, having this large source of food, it might be wasted unless the price was brought within the range of the poorest consumer. An Order has now been issued, as the noble Lord knows, which I hope will at any rate get over the difficulty and reduce the cost to the Treasury to a minimum.
The noble Lord referred to a letter which appeared in The Times a day or two ago from a Mr. Mackenzie, who I think is a Director of Agriculture at Cambridge, and who said that an impasse had been created by fixing the price of meat. I can assure the noble Lord that this is not so. As the noble Lord knows, from early in the war until prices were fixed last summer the price of meat was going up by leaps and bounds, until the retail price of meat had doubled the, figure at which it stood before the war. The increase in price has not only been checked, but the average retail price of meat, beef and mutton, has been reduced by from 15 to 20 per cent. The future must necessarily be one of anxiety. The civilian population before the war depended very largely upon the importation of meat. A very much smaller quantity is imported at the present time, and we have been obliged to rely more and more upon our own supply. Therefore I say that while the future is not free from anxiety, there is nothing in the nature of an impasse. On the contrary, I believe that meat will be produced on a very large scale next year; and your Lordships can accept my assurance that the importation of store cattle from Ireland has very largely increased during the last few weeks, and is a considerable percentage larger than it was at this time last year. And the number of store cattle changing hands in the English markets has also very largely increased.

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The noble Lord, while he criticised the action of the Government, said the political siutation might have been cased by it—I am speaking of the political situation as apart from Party politics altogether Well, one purpose of the Ministry of Food is to remove political unrest, as political unrest, if continued among the masses of the people for any length of time must certainly result in war-weariness. The noble Lord asked me what effect profiteering had had in raising the prices of foodstuffs. In the past it has no doubt contributed towards the increase which has occurred in prices, but it is difficult to say in what precise degree. I am repeating what I have said before when I say that the action I have taken in fixing prices and eliminating purely speculative transactions has had the effect of stopping profiteering in the main. The rise in price of essential articles over which my Department has been able to exercise control has been checked, and in some cases price have been substantially reduced. The principal factor in the rise in price is the expansion of currency arising from inflation of credit and the issue of large amounts of paper money. I do not know that I am going too far in saying that the real controller of prices is not the Food Controller but the Treasury.
The noble Lord has placed on your Lordships' Paper a Question in regard to the consumption of foodstuffs for the first six months of 1917, and he has asked me whether the present consumption is in excess of the supply. Then he goes on to inquire whether we propose forthwith to introduce a system of compulsory rationing. I do not think it would be desirable to give the Return in the form suggested by the noble Lord. In the first place, I doubt whether such a Return would not be open to misinterpretation owing to (1) the variations in home supplies—e.g., in meat and dairy produce (both seasonal and as between different years); and (2) the difficulty of comparing the consumption by the Armed Forces at home in the present and earlier years. In the second place, there are objections to publishing detailed figures as to consumption of essential foodstuffs. I question very much whether it is in the public interest that precise figures should be given, and probably your Lordships will agree. In Germany, in the Prussian Landtag, discussions of this kind are always held in secret session and the reports are very strictly censored. At the
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same time, I am most anxious to give all the information I can without going too much into definite figures. The figures for 1915 have not been worked out, but if your Lordships express any wish to have them they could be worked out on the same basis as those for 1916.
The approximate estimates of the consumption in the first part of 1917, as compared with that in the first part of 1916, have been made and warrant the following conclusions. The consumption of cereals used for human food in the first half of 1917 shows a slight increase, perhaps 4 per cent. This is more than covered by the diluents added to wheat flour. The consumption of potatoes decreased by about 13 per cent. The consumption of meat, including bacon, shows a decrease of about 12 per cent., but the consumption of home-fed meat has increased. There was some increase in the consumption of fish, owing to increased imports of salted fish, for the most part purchased by the Restriction of Enemy Supplies Department. The consumption of dairy produce, including margarine and lard, was practically the same as in 1916. The consumption of imported fruit shows a decrease, owing to the restriction of imports.
The position generally of stocks in this country is not one to cause alarm. It is the future that causes anxiety. I may say that the general position of stocks in this country is better to-day than it was this time last year. But noble Lords must remember that we have now to help France and Italy, where the harvests have been exceedingly bad, from our own stores. I say frankly that if it were a question merely of supplying this country with food, I do not think compulsory rationing would be necessary. Although we are getting over the submarine menace—Ministers are very fond, too fond, of giving publicity to the statement that we have already got over it—the fact remains that it is an increasing difficulty, and until we ourselves and our Allies are launching more boats than are being sunk by the Germans, naturally the position must get worse. I say again that although the position to-day is not one to create alarm, in view of the fact that the tonnages difficulty is likely to increase one has a certain amount, not of very grave anxiety, but of anxiety for the future.
With regard to compulsory rationing, I repeat again that I still hope it may be avoided. It depends entirely upon how

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the public respond during the next few weeks to the appeals that have been made on behalf of the Ministry of Food in favour of voluntary rationing. If that campaign does not succeed, then compulsory rationing will be necessary. I think your Lordships will agree with me that, in view of the possibility—I will not say probability; I do not like to use that word yet—of compulsory rationing being necessary in the course of the next few months, and the fact that it will take some weeks, if not months, to get the machinery ready for the purpose, it is desirable that we should have our machinery ready when the time comes should it be necessary to put it into operation. That is the view I take. I have submitted a Memorandum to the War Cabinet, and the matter is now before them.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, the whole question connected with food goes back to the old point—tonnage; and with what the noble Lord said, with regard to anxiety for the future I agree. It is about the spring of the year, before the next harvest, that the real pinch will come. It does not matter one bit if every submarine was accounted for to-morrow. You cannot get the tonnage on the ocean in time to make up the deficit, not merely for this country alone but in order to supply those other countries which we shall have to supply to a very large extent in the near future. What I should like the noble Lord to tell your Lordships is this. I think I am right in saying that you grow only one-fifth of your necessities in this country.
LORD RHONDDA: Wheat.
LORD BERESFORD: Meat yon do, and certainly wheat. With all your efforts, which have been very extensive and energetic and patriotic, will yon be able to grow two-fifths in this country? I doubt if you will. Certainly you have to get three-fifths of this main food of the country over the water. You cannot produce the tonnage. We are a long way behind our own suggested tonnage as far as standardised ships are concerned. I will not mention numbers—perhaps it is not wise to do so—but I should think we have got only one-quarter of the tonnage we thought we should have in the water at this moment. Of course, everybody's mind is centred in the war—How soon will the war be over? The war cannot be over, in my humble
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opinion, until the Americans come in in force, say two to three million men strong. They cannot get here for some considerable time. Therefore, every ton that you can save is a ton saved to bring the Americans over to end the war. I should like to ask the noble Lord and the noble Duke (the Duke of Marlborough) whether they are both satisfied that they can get the tonnage to make sure that the food necessary for this country—I am not now speaking of our Allies—will reach us in the spring of the year. In my opinion that is the dangerous time, and with all respect I think it would be wiser on the part of the noble Lord to carry out the views of my noble friend and not bring compulsory rationing on too late. He should bring it on even before there is a necessity for it, because it will be very difficult to keep the people quiet if they do not get food. Imagine the case of a munition worker, who has been working loyally all these years, coming home to his wife and children and being asked how they are to get food. A very serious position would be created, and I think we ought to guard against anything of that kind. While I am sure the noble Lord is doing everything that is right I would suggest that compulsory rationing, which I am certain will have to come, should be brought about before the time which he suggests.
I should like to ask whether we are utilising the services of prisoners of war in this country to the extent we could in tilling the land. Every person engaged in tilling the land will reduce the tonnage necessary to bring food to this country. I do not know whether this is under the noble Lord's jurisdiction; if not, perhaps the noble Duke (the Duke of Marlborough) would toll us. Then again I ask, Are better arrangements being made for distribution? It is a most difficult task. There are any number of people in this country at the moment whom it would pay well to grow roots and vegetables if they could get them to the market; and I hope that some arrangement will be made in the future, by the use of canals and by buying the thousands of lorries we shall have at our disposal after the war, to improve the system of distribution in the villages and counties. The real difficulty at this moment is that of distribution. There is any amount of vegetables and other things in the country decaying and deteriorating because of lack of distribution. I should like, however, to have an answer as to tonnage, because that really is the crucial

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point of the whole question. I should like to know whether the noble Lord is satisfied that he can get tonnage for the three-fifths which I say is necessary next spring.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I have no desire to discuss at any length the very clear statement of my noble friend opposite, or, indeed, to do more than thank him for having stated so explicitly the circumstances as he, on behalf of the Government, now apprehends them, and for stating quite categorically the developments which may make it necessary to bring in a system of compulsory rationing. I think there is some little misapprehension, shared by the noble Lord who has just spoken, on the question of compulsory rationing. It seems to me to be assumed by some that the main objection to its introduction is that people will not like it, that it will make them uncomfortable, and that it is desirable not to do anything which might dishearten the public by inflicting upon them this system until it is proved to be absolutely necessary. I take it that this is only a small part of the Government's difficulty. One difficulty—and it must be a very serious one—is the establishment of the necessary machinery which will prevent a system of rationing from being really an unfair distribution of food, pressing more hardly than anything now does on the very poor and operating quite differently in different parts of the country. The establishment of the system would, unless I am greatly mistaken, demand a great amount of time and labour on the part of persons in very large numbers, acting on behalf of the Government and of local authorities, who would have to give up a good deal of most useful national work which they are doing at present in order to carry out this tiresome but necessary business. I do not wonder that on these grounds the Government desire to postpone bringing into operation such a system until it is proved to be absolutely necessary. I have no desire to discuss how far the operations of such a system are likely to be successful or otherwise. The data at the disposal even of the Government are not very clear or numerous, because it is chiefly in the countries of our enemies that the system has been in full force. I desire merely to express the view that the reluctance of the Government to start the system is not to be ascribed only to the fact that it is a system which by a great number of persons will be found inconvenient.
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The only other point I wish to mention has reference to an observation from the noble Lord who introduced the debate as to what the Government at the beginning of the war might have done, but, as he thinks, neglected to do. From what he said one would have supposed that at that time, in the autumn of 1915, there was an unlimited amount of corn in the world, an unlimited amount of tonnage to bring it here, and that the seas were absolutely clear. My noble friend has forgotten his history. He does not appear to remember, for one thing, that the German cruisers were not cleared off the seas until the winter of that year, and that so far as some of the trade routes were concerned, particularly those from the Far East and India, commerce was absolutely held up for a time by the enemy. Further, the shortage of tonnage had then already begun to be felt most seriously. Every ton of shipping that could be swept in—and it was swept in from the beginning, a fact which my noble friend appears to forget—was employed for the transport of men, munitions, and stores of all kinds, including a very large quantity of corn. I do not think, if the facts were known, that any charge of the kind which my noble friend brought so lightly against the Government of that day could be sustained; and I might appeal to the noble Earl (Lord Crawford), who was in the next Government and well cognisant of all that was being done on behalf of the Board of Agriculture and the Board of Trade, to confirm that during the time of the Coalition Government there was no neglect to utilise all the tonnage for the purpose for which the nation required it, specially for the bringing of food. My noble and gallant friend never spoke a truer word than when he stated that this was little more than a question of tonnage. The whole future of our supplies, and to, a great extent of the war, depends upon the adequacy of the tonnage which can be produced to bring, in the first place, food supplies not only to this country but also to France and to Italy, where, as everybody knows, there has been an alarming shortage of food; secondly, to bring the necessary munitions and Army supplies for the different Forces that are now in the field; and, in the third place, to bring, as we hope, the great Forces which will come from the United States, and which, let it not be forgotten, will have to be supplied every day from the United States. That will necessarily demand an

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enormous amount of tonnage. But I do not feel sure that it is necessary to draw the precise moral that my noble and gallant friend did from these facts—that the wise thing to do would be, in consequence of this, to put a rationing system into force at once. I, for one, am quite content to leave that decision to His Majesty's Government, who know all the facts far better than we do. Therefore we must, in my opinion, leave the matter as it is left by the very clear statement which the noble Lord opposite (Lord Rhondda) has been good enough to give us.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, I believe I have a right of reply. Dealing first with the remarks made by the noble Marquess regarding my accusation that the Government at the early stages of the war had been neglectful in not securing that supplies of wheat were brought into this country, I would say that surely there was more shipping available in the first eighteen months of the war than was the case later, and I cannot understand why it was not more possible to bring wheat into this country at that period in large quantities and store it here than it is to do so to-day. I cannot admit the strength of the argument of the noble Marquess; nor do I consider that what he said is any justification for the lack of foresight on the part of the Government in the early stages of the war.
In respect of the introduction of a system of compulsory rationing, the noble Marquess stated that the Government were reluctant to resort to it, not only owing to the effect that it might have on the temper of the people, but also because of the great question of personnel involved. I understand that the necessity of compulsory rationing entered into the scheme of Lord Devonport, and that it would really have been carried out then by the local authorities. The noble Lord did not answer my question whether, when Lord Devonport, on April 28 this year, stated that the scheme for compulsory rationing was ready and that it was going to be promulgated, it really ever was issued to the local authorities?
LORD RHONDDA: No.
LORD LAMINGTON: That answers my question. I will ask in that case whether the present Ministry of Food have their scheme ready, and whether it is the same
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or practically the same as that of Lord Devonport; also, whether Parliament will have an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon the scheme before it is promulgated and enforced. I think it is highly desirable that such a complicated system, which possibly may be rather oppressive and interfere with the habits of the people, should come before Parliament so that an opinion may be expressed upon it before it is carried out. I am obliged to the noble Lord the Food Controller for the ample reply that he gave to my Question.
LORD RHONDDA: My Lords, I feel that I should be lacking in courtesy if I did not make a brief reply to the questions and suggestions which have been raised by noble Lords. In regard to the question as to whether the compulsory scheme of rationing was promulgated by my predecessor to local authorities, I think he announced on April 28 that he was considering a plan, but it was never promulgated or put into operation in any form. I have a scheme, but I am not prepared at this stage to give it any degree of publicity. The suggestion that your Lordships should have an opportunity of considering it before it is put into force is one that I will carefully consider.
The noble and gallant Admiral, Lord Beresford, asked me some questions about production, and how far interned aliens were being employed. Those are matters altogether outside my province, and I think the noble Lord himself understands that. The Board of Agriculture look after production; I simply look after distribution. With reference to distribution, that has always been and will continue to be a difficult matter, and, I may say, an increasingly difficult one as the railway service is utilised more and more for other purposes. This is a difficulty that we are constantly considering. Even with a general sufficiency of food in the country, the difficulty of distribution will no doubt create scarcity and trouble in localities. But when I am asked whether there will be sufficient tonnage to bring home to this country the necessary supplies, I reply that I am myself very sanguine indeed about that. Notwithstanding the increasing scarcity of tonnage, I think that there will be quite sufficient to bring the necessary supplies of food to this country. I am not in the least degree fearing that there will be famine or anything approaching a famine. There will be a scarcity in certain articles, possibly, and it may be that there will be a scarcity

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generally which the country may have to put up with, but there is really little more than that to be feared. It will be a matter of inconvenience, it may be of grave inconvenience, but we shall not lose the war from the action of submarines.
Another question that I have been asked is whether we will be able to produce two-fifths of the wheat required by this country instead of one-fifth. I may tell the noble Lord that the position is this. In normal times we produce one-fifth of the wheat requirements of this country, speaking broadly; and, generally, we produce one-third of the total food requirements, and have to import two-thirds. As to what extent the action taken by the Board of Agriculture to increase supplies will change this, that is something which I cannot myself deal with, and perhaps the noble Lord will put the question to the representative of the Board of Agriculture.
I am much obliged to the noble Marquess, Lord Crewe, for his statement, which, if I may say so, is a common sense one—that he at any rate is prepared to place confidence in the Government, and to allow the Government and the Ministry of Food to say at what time compulsory rationing should be adopted, if it should be necessary to resort to it. I am constantly considering this. Personally, I consider that it is desirable that a scheme should be ready to be put into operation, and the noble Lord may rely upon it that if I am at the Ministry of Food I will see that it is put into force in good time, if it should ever be necessary.
VISCOUNT DEVONPORT: My Lords, I would not like any ambiguity to exist in your Lordships' mind as to the correctness of the statement that I made in April last, that I had prepared a scheme in the carrying out of which the local authorities would be utilised. At the time that I made that statement the scheme was complete in every detail; it was worked out to the point of the letter that was to be sent to every local authority explaining to them the responsibilities that would fall upon them, and calling upon them to exercise such responsibilities. The letters were drawn up after consultation with the Irish Department, the Scottish Office, and the Local Government Board, over which my noble friend Lord Rhondda presided at that time. At the end of the month of April and early in May the position
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materially improved owing to the largely increased importations of bread-stuffs, and therefore the matter of issuing these instructions to the local authorities at that particular moment was considered again. The Cabinet came to a decision—a decision that I myself practically asked them to come to—that we should stay our hands somewhat longer. That we did, and, as your Lordships are aware, in the month of June I resigned my office. I only want to remove any doubt that my statement in this House that the scheme was ready to go out was not the fact. It was the fact. The scheme was complete in every detail, and it was held back for the reason that I have stated.

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS.
LORD CHARNWOOD LORD CHARNWOOD had the following Motion on the Paper—
To move to resolve—(1) That the extension in any way of the indulgence now shown to conscientious objectors would be unjustifiable unless accompanied by measures for the permanent forfeiture on their part of the protection they receive from the State. (2) That no person who has applied for exemption (conditional or total) from military service on the ground of conscientious objection ought thereafter to be permitted to teach in any school or college supported or assisted by public funds.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I heard to-day from His Majesty's Government that it would be convenient to them that I should postpone this Motion, and of course I am very glad to do so. I understand that Wednesday in next week will in all probability be convenient to the Government; that being so, I shall put my Motion down for that day.

THE SCARCITY OF BUTTER.
LORD STRACHIE LORD STRACHIE rose to call attention to the scarcity of butter, and to move for Papers. The noble Lord said: It is undoubtedly a fact that there is a great scarcity of butter, and I want to elicit from the Government the reason—whether it is owing to the action of the Food Controller, or owing to other causes over which the country has no control. I noticed some ten or twelve days ago a rather curious announcement, made, I

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suppose, at the instance of the Food Controller. The announcement was—
"The Ministry of Food announces that in view of the recent high prices of Danish butter, and in order to get an approximately flat price throughout the country equivalent to the price of Irish butter, the Food Controller has now decided to fix the first-hand price of Danish and Dutch butter at 229 s. per cwt. export."
I think it requires some further explanation why the Government should think it was necessary to reduce the price of foreign and English butter to the price of Irish butter. Undoubtedly it is a fact that in Ireland they are able to produce butter at a cheaper rate than it is worth while to produce it at in this country, from the fact that in Iceland they have not that great market for milk that we have in this country and in Scotland. Up to the present moment, I believe, there is no maximum price fixed for milk in Ireland, and I suppose it is the old principle of supply and demand, and that the milk in Ireland is probably still sold at such a price that it still pays factories to buy milk and turn it into butter, though it does not pay in this country. The announcement goes on to say—
" These prices come into force for Dutch and blended butter on November 6, and for Danish butter on November 13, and the general effect will be to bring imported and home-produced butter to approximately the same level of prices."
Now this is a statement which I venture to think should not have been made, because it entirely misleads the public. The public will naturally think from this statement that after the dates mentioned—November 6 and November 13—the effect will not only be to reduce the price of English butter, but also of all imported butter, Danish and Dutch, to the price of from 2s. 3d. to 2s. 6d. per lb. At the present moment the price fixed for Irish butter in this country is 224 s. per cwt., that is, 2s. per lb., and for British factory butter and farm butter a little over 2s. per lb. I should like to know, as regards that, whether the Board of Agriculture was consulted in fixing these prices. Perhaps later on the noble Duke who represents the Board of Agriculture here (the Duke of Marlborough) may come into the House, and we shall be able to ask him. This is a very important matter, and we ought to know whether the English and the Scottish Boards of Agriculture approved the fixing of this price.
Now what has been the effect of this Order in Holland? Exactly the effect that
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any one would expect. In The Times the other day I read this announcement—
"THE HAGUE, November 9.—The export of Dutch butter to England has been stopped. The reason given is that the maximum price fixed by the British Food Controller for Dutch butter—namely, 299 s. per cwt.—leaves no profit for Dutch producers, as the production price of Dutch butter is fixed at 5¼ florins per kilogramme."
This, roughly speaking, in English money is 4s. a lb. That is exactly what you would expect the Dutch producer to say—that he certainly cannot send butter into this country at 2s. a lb. when it costs him 4s. a lb. to produce. And in practice that is what would be the cost of butter in this country if you take the price of milk as it was fixed last October.
Perhaps I might tell the noble Duke who has just entered the House that I was asking whether in the fixing of butter prices by the Food Controller the Board of Agriculture had been consulted, and whether they had approved of English factory and farmers' butter being reduced to 2s. a lb., a price at which the noble Duke knows it is perfectly impossible to make it.
Then I would ask whether the cost of production in this country has been considered by the Food Controller? The general public were no doubt very pleased to think they were going to get butter at 2s. 3d. or 2s. 5d. per lb. But, as a matter of fact, the noble Duke and the Lord Privy Seal will know perfectly well that the effect of such prices will be that the Dutch will not send us any butter on account of the high cost of production, and that the English farmer will take exactly the same line. It is ridiculous to fix such prices for butter when very much larger sums can be obtained by the farmers for their milk. Three imperial gallons of milk are taken as the average quantity required for a lb. of butter. Taking the October price of milk, which was 1's. 5d. an imperial gallon, a lb. of butter would have cost 4s. 3d. to produce. Taking the November price for milk of 1s. 7½d., a lb. of butter would cost 4s. 10½ d. After November the price of milk has been fixed at 1s. 9d. per imperial gallon; therefore if the farmer were to get a fair price for his milk he would receive 5s. 3d. for what would be necessary to produce a lb. of butter. There are, of course, some by products, such as skim milk and buttermilk, but the amount of those commodities is infinitesimal. Even in these days one could not take off more than 3d. for those by-products. Consequently the net price

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to the fanner for the three gallons of milk used in making a lb. of butter would be 5s. If the object of the Food Controller is to increase the supply of butter and to make it cheaper for the public, I venture to think that this is not the right way to go about it.
I cannot help thinking that the real object of the noble Lord—and I would ask him whether this is not so—is not only to prevent the production of butter in this country but also its importation from abroad. The Food Controller may say that butter is not a very valuable food and that it; will not matter if none is made here in the future. If that is so, I can understand the position; at the same time the public ought not to be told that they can buy butter from 2s. 3d. to 2s. 5d. per lb. It may be that it is very desirable that the whole of the milk supply in this country should be conserved for consumption as such and not turned into butter at all. That may be a right principle. But there are great difficulties in the way of small holders, for instance, distributing their milk owing to restricted railway facilities, difficulty of conveyance to the station, and so on. The only way such people can get rid of their milk is by turning it into butter. I am sure that the Food Controller is anxious to obtain such a wholesome food as skim milk, and to see that its production should not be reduced.
I venture to think, in connection with butter, that it would have been very much better if the noble Lord had allowed the law of supply and demand to have play, because I cannot see that it is going to do much harm if butter is dear. The poorer classes are fortunately able to purchase margarine, which is now manufactured in very large quantities in the country, and which is very good indeed. In fact, speaking as an agriculturist, I am afraid that the people will find margarine is so much like anything but the very best butter that after the war that commodity will come down to the price of margarine, except in a small number of cases where the public taste has been educated to best butter. Therefore I cannot see why the Food Controller should not leave butter alone and let it find its own price in competition with margarine. Perhaps my noble friend will tell me why he could not have done what he did in the case of cheese. He raised the price of cheese so that its manufacture should not be stopped. The noble Lord is, of course, aware that had this step not been taken no more cheese would have been made. I can assure my
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noble friend that, if his Order is carried out in its entirety, butter-making will cease to a large extent in this country, and the public will not get cheap butter because they will get no butter at all.
LORD RHONDDA: My Lords, I must apologise to the noble Lord for my absence during the early part of his speech, but from what I have been able to gather from my noble friends beside me, I think the answer that I shall give will cover the points raised by him. In respect of the shortage of butter, the main reason is the restriction of the supplies from Denmark and Holland, from which countries comes in normal times the bulk of our imported supplies. The reduced supply is due to the shortage of fodder, and in particular of imported feeding-stuffs. Lord Strachie has said that it would have been very much better to have left butter to the free play of the law of supply and demand. I would say now, as I have already said several times in the House, that whereas I am a firm believer in economic laws and in allowing them to have free play in normal circumstances, it is inevitable that the Government must interfere in times such as these; otherwise in the case of an article of prime necessity even a small shortage below the requirements would send the price up by leaps and bounds to a stage altogether beyond the reach of the poorer classes. That, in fact, had already happened before the Government stepped in and began to regulate supplies artificially, and before any maximum prices for butter were fixed at all. The price had, I think, nearly doubled under the free play of the law of supply and demand to which my noble friend referred.
The policy of fixing the price of butter has had to be governed by different considerations in the case of home-made and of imported butter. This is an important matter, and I shall probably travel beyond the scope of the noble Lord's Question, but I think the House will like to hear the general position. In regard to butter produced within the British Isles the most important consideration is the relation of butter production to that of milk and cheese. The increased cost of production due to the war has been taken into consideration also, but the encouragement of the production of milk has had to be put first. According to the Royal Society's Report on the Food Supply of the United Kingdom, it is calculated that it take

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2½ gallons of milk to make 1 lb. of butter, but only one gallon of milk to make 1 lb. of cheese; and it is obvious that in any general consideration of the food supply the production of milk, which cannot be imported fresh, must be put first, and next the production of cheese, which is relatively more important than the production of butter. It is for this reason, therefore, that the maximum prices fixed for butter are less remunerative to the producer than those fixed for milk, while they allow for a reasonable increase, over the pre-war price.
With regard to imported butter, the best bargain possible has been made in the interests of the consumer in whatever quarter butter supplies are available, but at the same time when butter has been purchased from European neutrals it has been necessary to make price concessions so as not to divert supplies of butter to enemy countries. Purchases of butter have been arranged with the Dominions, and, in particular, the whole of next year's production of butter, amounting to 30,000 tons, has been bought from Australia; negotiations are also in progress for securing the New Zealand output, which is estimated at 15,000 tons, and 8,370 tons have been bought from the Argentine.
It is, however, impossible to buy at similar prices from Denmark and Holland, because of the competition of Germany and the high prices which she is willing to pay. While the price of these butters was left uncontrolled, there was a temptation to sell the various butters whose price was controlled as Danish in order to obtain the very high price which then ruled for this article. It has therefore been necessary to fix a maximum wholesale price for Danish butter on a parity with the prices fixed for Irish and British-made butter—namely, 229 s. per cwt.—and this has been done by a system of pooling. After December 1 an arrangement will come into force for pooling all the butters imparted direct by the Ministry of Food at various prices above and below the maximum, and striking an average price; this will be done by the Import Committee.
The policy of pooling imports from all these different sources, together with the supply from Ireland, will also result in the fixing of an average retail price based upon the total cost of the whole supply. It is estimated that this price will be, in the next few months, about on a level with the retail
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price for British-made butter—probably 2s. 6d. per lb. In view, however, of the considerable imports which have been arranged for and the possibility of using substitutes for butter, it is desirable that the British farmer should put the production of milk foremost, and, next after that, the production of cheese. The noble Lord does not entirely agree with me, but this is the considered opinion of the Ministry of Food, and I have acted under the guidance of experts.
With regard to the shortage generally, the noble Lord expressed the view that if butter was not obtainable the deficiency might be made up with margarine. The difficulty of getting butter from Denmark, however, applies also to margarine. Before the war, we got a good deal of our supplies from Holland. Before the war, the consumption of margarine in this country was, as compared with butter, about one to three; that is to say, of the total consumption of margarine and butter one-third was margarine, and two-thirds butter. The difficulty of getting butter and margarine from the old sources of supply has largely increased, and before very long those supplies may practically cease altogether, and therefore we must look to other sources. The production of margarine in this country has largely increased in the last couple of years. I have not the figures for 1914, and I do not remember ever having seen them, but in December next the potential production in this country will be two and a-half times what it was in 1915, and by next June, I hope, it will have increased to nearly four times what it was in 1915. The relative consumption of margarine and butter has entirely changed, and from now on the consumption of margarine will largely exceed that of butter. Although there is a shortage now of margarine and butter, I hope that, by next summer the production of margarine and butter will be equal to that of butter and margarine prior to the war.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Can the noble Lord tell us how much is the shortage, now, as compared with the production before the war? He gave us the figures of the import of butter which he is going to buy from, I think, Australia, New Zealand and the Argentine. Can he give us the import of butter from Ireland into this country at the present time?
LORD RHONDDA: I am sorry that I cannot answer either of those questions. I cannot, charge my memory with the figures, but if the noble Marquess will give notice, I shall be pleased to supply the information.
LORD STRACHIE: May I ask the noble Duke—or perhaps the Food Controller will be able to answer the question which I put to the noble Duke—whether the figures fixed for butter meet with the approval and consent of the Board of Agriculture? And also whether—he was talking of pooling it is the intention still to keep the price of Colonial butter about 2s. per lb., and then make up the loss as it is made up in the case of the sale of bread at 9d.
LORD RHONDDA: I do not think it would be desirable to state the figure that we have paid to the Dominions. The full price we are told will be about 2s. 6d, a lb. and there will be no charge on the Treasury. With regard to the other question, I would rather not commit myself definitely, but as a matter of fact we are working on very cordial terms with the Board of Agriculture. I have to take the whole responsibility for the fixing of prices, but we generally do it in consultation and in agreement with the Board of Agriculture.

AIR FORCE BILL.
Brought from the Commons.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (THE EARL OF CRAWFORD): My Lords, in moving the First Reading of the Air Force Bill, I wish to say that, if possible, it is desirable that the Second Reading should be taken to-morrow, and that the Bill should receive the Royal Assent at the end of this week. It is entirely for your Lordships to settle, but I wish to give the earliest notice that it would be of the greatest convenience to have the Act in operation at the earliest possible moment.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 1a.—(The Earl of Crawford.)
On Question, Bill read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a to-morrow.

NAVAL AND MILITARY WAR PENSIONS, &c. (LOCAL COMMITTEES) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed, and to be read 2a on Thursday.
PARLIAMENT AND LOCAL ELECTIONS (No. 2) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed, and to be read 2a to-morrow.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, before the House adjourns, I desire to ask the noble Earl the Lord Privy Seal whether he can state what is the precise urgency, beyond that of a general desire to bring the Air Force Bill into operation, which makes it necessary to take the Second Reading to-morrow. I think the noble Earl must see that it would hardly be possible, assuming noble Lords desire to debate the subject, that there could be anything like a general or adequate discussion if the Bill is taken to-morrow. I speak without prejudice because I have not followed the subject closely. I do not desire to raise any objections to the principle of the Bill, and I am not competent to discuss all its details, but it is very possible that some noble Lords may wish to do so. If the Second Reading is put down for to-morrow and the Committee stage on the following day—indeed, all the remaining stages on the following day, which is what the noble Earl asks—it is quite clear that your Lordships' House cannot give the subject any review which would be of much value. Perhaps, therefore, the noble Earl will tell us what the special urgency is, over and above that which would naturally appeal to His Majesty's Government, having decided on the step—the desire to bring it into force soon. I think that your Lordships will generally agree that this is a somewhat extreme instance of the rather cavalier treatment to which we are not altogether unused.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I have been treated cavalierly by the noble Marquess himself in his day; therefore, I will not respond to that observation. I will tell him quite frankly what is the urgency of the Bill. It is briefly this. It has passed through the. House of Commons, and, with the Bill in prospect, the Royal Flying Corps and the Naval Flying Unit cease to exist as such; the Air Board,

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which is now familiar to your Lordships, with its huge Department, ceases to exist as such; the whole of this gigantic Service, therefore, is in a state of flux, pending the passage of the Air Force, Bill, which re-establishes de novo a great unified Air Force. Clearly, it is most desirable that this state of indecision, which I should imagine must be paralysing to the ordinary Departmental work of the Air Board and which must also present some difficulty to the soldiers and sailors concerned, should be terminated at the earliest possible moment. That is the case on which I suggest, in quite a tentative way, that your Lordships should pass the Bill this week. As to the suggestion that we are taking the House by surprise, I assure the noble Marquess that this question has been the central topic of political, as opposed to military, discussion about the Air Service for at least eighteen months. Everybody who has had to concern himself with the Air Service generally is thoroughly familiar with the objects and machinery outlined in the clauses of the Bill, with two or three technical exceptions, on which certain Peers will probably require to make observations. I would remind the noble Marquess that in a sense no division on the whole subject took place in the House of Commons. Divisions were called three times, I believe, and Tellers were named three times, but on not one of those three occasions did anybody go through the "No" Lobby. I take it, therefore, that
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the Bill is practically an agreed measure. It entirely depends on your Lordships when the Bill is taken. I have merely stated the view, which is impressed upon me, that it is desirable to get it dealt with at the earliest possible moment.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: And the noble Earl will place it on the Paper for to-morrow?
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: I will certainly put it on the Paper for to-morrow and, if it is desired, it can be postponed, but I would rather take the Second Reading to-morrow and postpone the Committee stage until next week than take the Second Reading on Thursday and postpone the remaining stages still further. I should like those sailors and soldiers and administrators connected with the Air Force to know at least—what I am personally confident of—that your Lordships will give a Second Reading to the Bill, and so endorse its principles.
SEVERAL NOBLE LORDS: Hear, hear.
THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: In that case I will put it down for to-morrow, and by that time perhaps the noble Marquess will have had more leisure to see the Bill and decide whether it can go forward.
House adjourned at six minutes past six o'clock.