HL Deb 13 December 1917 vol 27 cc151-62

LORD BERESFORD had the following Notice on the Paper—

To call attention to the various statements made lately by His Majesty's Ministers and authoritative persons, and to ask whether such statements represent the view of the War Cabinet as a whole; and to move a Resolution.

The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I should like to call attention to various statements that have been made lately by Ministers and authoritative persons which are not always consonant with each other, some of which are exaggerated, and many of which convey wrong inferences, which I think is a very serious state of affairs now that we have arrived at the crucial moment of the war, when language should be perfectly plain and clear and absolutely in accordance with facts. I may describe what has occurred as a sort of oratorical camouflage; that is, the language either conceals the object altogether, or it makes it represent in many cases what it does not represent. I think Ministers should be most careful not to be too optimistic—certainly not to be pessimistic; but they should be careful that what they state; is absolutely clear to the public.

I am rather afraid that at the present moment more particularly, when you want all the historical grit of our race, which is faced with great dangers both within and without, there is a sort of wave of timidity and anxiety going through the country, which has certainly not been lessened by a letter that was written by my noble friend Lord Lansdowne. This is a moment when we want the whole nation together—absolute unity of purpose, absolute, unity of determination. And what for? War aims. There is a great deal of talk about war aims, but you can put the matter in one word. Our war aim is "victory," and if we do not succeed then it is the end of the British Empire. Either this country or Germany has to go down.

I would refer notably to some remarks made by the Prime Minister. I hope that my noble friend opposite will not think that I wish in any way to undermine the Prime Minister; I would support him with all my efforts. What I am afraid is that in many of the remarks he is making he is undermining himself. First of all, he said that the people "wanted cheering up," or some words like those. The people do not want cheering up at all. The best people in the world, if you tell them the truth, no matter how bad it is, will always set their teeth and try to pull through. Many of the statements which have been made by the Prime Minister have been entirely refuted by subsequent events. It is a pity that this should be so, and I do not think it helps him towards winning the war, or gives him that unanimous support in the country which he desires. The other day Mr. Lloyd George spoke of the "impenetrable barrier" in France, and deplored the casualties. In my opinion, that was a mistake. You cannot fight without losses. It does not cheer the, troops at the Front to be told that they are up against an "impenetrable barrier." But that was refuted shortly afterwards, because, with magnificent heroism and wonderful organisation, they smashed the great Hindenburg Line.

I wish that somebody in the War Cabinet would invent some effective though painless muzzle for the Prime Minister whenever he speaks of sea affairs. He generally puts the Navy in a secondary position, but when he does speak about it he makes statements which are. I will not say contrary to facts, but which are made in a way that conveys a wrong impression. At the Queen's Hall the other day he said that we were going to build four times the amount of shipping this year that we built last year. I am afraid we shall do nothing like that. Certainly we shall not if we judge by what has been done in connection with standardised ships. We ought to have had a great many more than seven standardised ships by now, and one of these seven has already been sunk. The Prime Minister ought to have told the public that we built only 500,000 tons of shipping last year as against our ordinary output of over 2,000,000 tons.

Mr. Lloyd George then said that we had sunk double the number of submarines in the last ten months compared with the number we had sunk in the preceding twelve months. He would, of course, know more about that than I should. I dare say it is true. At the same time, it is well known how difficult it is to say whether a submarine has really been sunk and destroyed. Yet even if the Prime Minister's figures were true, the enemy submarines put down in the ten months more than double the tonnage that was sunk in the previous twelve months. I do not believe that we can build ships at a rate anything like equal to our wastage; at any rate for some considerable time to come. If that is the case, the public should be told the truth. We are going to have a very hard time in this country between next February and the following autumn. At present we have not the tonnage. The winning of the war entirely depends upon our having sufficient tonnage. Two-fifths of our food is water-borne; and, in addition, the Americans will have to be brought over in effective force before we can consider that the end of the war is at all in sight.

The Prime Minister has also said that he had no fear of the submarine menace in the future. That was after one ship of over 1,600 tons was logged in the Weekly Return as having been lost. Immediately after that the losses went up. In the week following that in which one ship was logged as having been lost, the losses given in the Weekly Returns were 11; in the next week, 13; in the week after that, 16; and last week they were 14. All these ships were over 1,600 tons. That statement of the Prime Minister was, again, far too optimistic, far too encouraging and cheering, and, as in previous instances, was immediately refuted by subsequent events.

I have many times brought before your Lordships the misleading nature of our Weekly Return. In the week when we lost one vessel there were lost considerably over the average of Allied and neutral vessels—the vessels which are really feeding us, and which are never put into the Return at all. Therefore our Return is misleading. People were cheered up by seeing that only one ship had been sunk, but they did not know that the actual losses for that particular week were considerably over the average. No mention was made in the Weekly Return of the convoy of twelve ships attacked a short time ago. Those were Swedish and Danish ships, and nine of the twelve were sunk. I trust that my noble friend will use his influence to get a proper Return put before the public as to what ships are available for feeding this country, and showing how imperative it is that we should economise by every means in our power if we wish to get through the months between next February and next autumn. The Prime Minister then took the best month and the worst month of losses— April and September. In April the British, Allied, and neutral losses were 763,000 tons for the four weeks. In September the losses were 329,000 tons for the four weeks. The rate of progress is satisfactory. I acknowledge that matters are improving in this direction; but such a statement as that made by Mr. Lloyd George gives the country too rosy and too cheery a view of the real situation.

I also have to complain of the fact that the Government speak in one House of Parliament with one voice and in the other House with another voice. I do not see my noble friend Lord Lytton in his place, but he distinctly told me that, in the case of the "Apapa," the naval escort was not withheld when the ship was near the critical zone. Yet Dr. Macnamara said in the other House that the "Apapa" parted company on Admiralty instructions. Those two statements are entirely different. The facts are that the ship was convoyed as far as a certain point—I know the point, but it would be very unwise to say it. The "Apapa" was then ordered to go on alone, and within three-quarters of an hour she was sunk. That is very unsatisfactory, and the loss of that ship ought not to have occurred. I know the enormous difficulties of the Admiralty in the matter of providing escorts. We went to war about 500 destroyers short, notwithstanding warnings that had been given for years. But I maintain that if ships cannot get an escort in the danger zone they should remain in harbour until an escort can be provided. It has been necessary for some ships, owing to engine defects and other causes, to go with cargoes of food into harbours where there are no wharfs, no lighters, and no derricks with which to get the food out of them. But the food could remain on board, as most of it is stored in ice chambers. I wish my noble friend Lord Lytton were here to explain this matter of different statements being made, by two members of the Government. For on another occasion when I brought forward the question of pensions for the men in the Navy, I must say that although he answered me in most admirable and polished language, he at the same time inferred that I was mischievous and somewhat troubled with mendacity. The case of the "Apapa" is one of many such cases, the brutality of which cannot be too frequently brought before the country. The enemy actually get the men and the women into the boats, and getting them into the boats could only have been for the purpose of making a better target for murdering them with machine guns. I think those things ought to be brought forward as often as possible. What astonishes me is that men like my noble friend Lord Lansdowne, and others with most brilliant and distinguished careers, representing what I may call the best stamp of British gentlemen, can think for one moment, of suggesting that we are ever going to negotiate with these people. There cannot be any negotiations with people of this sort. There must be nothing but orders at the point of the bayonet and with the assistance of machine guns when the Allies choose to indicate their terms.

Then on December 5 Mr. Thorne, in the House of Commons, asked whether there was any truth in the statement that fast ships and slow ships were convoyed at the same time, and Sir Chiozza Money, on behalf of the Admiralty, said it was absolutely untrue. Why say that? I do not mean that Sir Chiozza Money told an untruth, but he certainly made a mistake, because I know of a ship of 13½ knots being convoyed with a large number of other ships that could only go 7 to 9 knots, and they were escorted by two armed trawlers that could only go 7 knots: and this 13½ knot boat, being a big ship, was singled out by an enemy submarine and torpedoed. The speed of a convoy is the speed of the slowest ship; the other ships have to conform to that speed, and most of the escorts have to be slow because we have not got proper vessels to escort convoys. In the case of the nine ships which were sunk, they happened to have the best convoy possible for submarines namely, two of our most modern, most speedy, and best armed destroyers—but it happened that two cruisers came up and sunk the destroyers and nine of the twelve vessels. This shows the enormous difficulty with which the Admiralty have to contend. They ought, if possible, to have not only destroyers with convoys to defend the, convoys against submarines, but also cruisers to defend the convoys against cruisers if they appear. That being so, it is all the more, necessary that Ministers should be very careful not to make mis-statements unintentionally, and not to make any statement that may be misunderstood.

Then Sir Chiozza Money spoke of the standardised ships and told us we had seven. We are a long way behind our estimate. We have had difficulty with steel, labour, etc., and I think the Government can have been hardly well advised to put down the national yards, certainly with the present yards not full. It will not tide over our dangerous time, which I maintain is from February to the autumn. You cannot get ships in time, and the Americans cannot get ships in time. In my opinion we shall never get 6,000,000 tons next year, and we shall not get them in time to avert the dangerous period which I have tried to describe. Sir Chiozza Money said that we were within measurable distance of making up our losses. He meant for the month, but he ought to tell us how close we are to making up our losses. I venture to say that he has made a mistake, and that we, are not within measurable distance of making up our losses for that month, or anything near it. Therefore the public ought not to be confused by this statement, which, if by the force of circumstances it is proved to be wrong, will have a very serious effect upon the minds of our working classes.

The whole point of winning the war is tonnage, and I should like the Returns to be more accurate, or at any rate to include information which the public ought to have. I should like Ministers to throw away what I may describe as delusions and distractions in their speeches, and to tell the country the truth now before it is too late. There is no time for pessimism or for optimism, but certainly there is necessity for telling the truth at the present moment, as matters are far more serious than the public are being led to believe. I hope that my noble friend Earl Curzon will not think that I have said anything in any way to weaken the Government. I want to strengthen the Government, and I say that many of the speeches that have been made lately are more likely to undermine the Government than anything else. They have been controverted and have led people to believe that things are much better than they are, instead of inducing people to see how serious is the state of things now and how serious it is going to become, and how necessary it is for every man and woman to exercise every possible economy.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON

My Lords, I believe that your Lordships' House is commonly regarded as an embodiment of all that is most law-abiding and respectable in our Constitution. In my view, as regards our procedure and the advantage often taken of it here, we are about the most lawless body in the world, and I am not certain that the most lawless member of your Lordships' House is not the noble Lord who has just addressed us, though I should have thought that from very long and distinguished experience in the best disciplined Service in the world he would have acquired a very different character from that which he constantly presents to us.

Let me ask your Lordships to contemplate what the noble Lord has done in the present case. A few days ago I saw for the first time in the limbo of Notices of Motions and Questions for which no date had been fixed this astonishing Notice To call attention to the various statements made lately by His Majesty's Ministers and authoritative persons, and to ask whether such statements represent the view of the War Cabinet as a whole; and to move a Resolution. When I read those words I confess that I had not the remotest idea what they meant or to what they referred. I concluded that it was some little amiable jest on the part of the noble Lord. He proposed to call attention to various statements of Ministers. There was no indication what those statements were. There was no hint of who His Majesty's Ministers were. The Resolution also referred to statements of "authoritative persons." I had no idea who those authoritative persons were. The noble Lord then proposed, at some unnamed date, to ask your Lordships, or the Government, whether such statements, unnamed, represented the view of the War Cabinet as a whole, and, finally, to move a Resolution of the nature and wording of which not the smallest hint was given.

As long as it rested in that limbo, I did not pay much attention to the Notice. But judge of my amazement when I took up the Paper this morning and found that the noble Lord had mobilised his reserves and was bringing into the front rank this extraordinary Motion. At least I expected that in the course of the morning I should receive some, indication as to who were the Ministers and authoritative persons whose speeches were in question, and as to what it was I was to be called upon to defend. I hoped, but hoped in vain, that I might have some clue as to the nature of this portentous Resolution, to which your Lordships are now being asked to give your assent. I come down to your Lordships' House and I sit here in a state of tense expectation for the best part of two hours, and then finally, after listening to the noble Lord, I ascertain that what he is really after is a covert but most courteously delivered attack upon the Prime Minister, or rather a denunciation of words used by the Prime Minister, and a general repetition of views with which we are already familiar upon tonnage, shipping, and all that kind of thing.

Next as to His Majesty's Ministers. It turns out that His Majesty's Ministers are (1) the Prime Minister, (2) Lord Lytton, (3) Sir Chiozza Money. Who the. "authoritative persons" are, I have not the slightest idea. The only one alluded to in the speech of the noble Lord was Lord Lansdowne and if he wants to know whether Lord Lansdowne's recent utterances were considered by the War Cabinet before they were delivered or whether they met with any general approval on our part, I can at once answer that question by saying, No! Then as regards the Resolution. The Resolution has disappeared, and as to what the noble Lord asks your Lordships to do this afternoon we are still in absolute doubt. I said that this House, though supposed to be the embodiment of all that is law-abiding, is the most lawless Assembly in the world. Is it conceivable that in any other Assembly it would be possible to submit a Resolution and to make a speech of the character which the noble Lord has made? Why, in the House of Commons over the way the thing would be utterly impossible; and the noble Lord, who was a model of propriety when there, comes here and, taking advantage of the irregularity of your Lordships' procedure, really conducts himself in a manner that is almost impossible to meet.

What am I to do? What am I to say? Am I called upon to defend the speeches of Lord Lytton and of Sir Leo Chiozza Money? If the noble Lord desired to attack those speeches, why did he not either give me notice or give notice to the noble Earl (Lord Lytton) who was concerned? Lord Lytton is at the present moment ill in bed, but I have no doubt, had he known that his remarks were going to be challenged, he would have taken steps to request the noble Lord to postpone his attack to a later date. As regards the Prime Minister, am I called upon here to defend every utterance that has fallen from the Prime Minister? The noble Lord seems to think that the speeches that are made by Cabinet Ministers are discussed at the War Cabinet in advance, and that we have a certain collective responsibility for them when they are delivered. I can assure my noble friend that we have other and much more important things to do. He suggested that a muzzle should be put on the Prime Minister in respect of speeches about naval affairs and shipping. I think that this suggestion had better be submitted by the noble Lord to the Prime Minister himself, and I can well imagine the reception which it will meet with at his hands.

Now what the noble Lord seems to complain of is that speeches are sometimes delivered in an optimistic and sometimes in a pessimistic vein, and that it is possible on occasions to point to a certain contrast or contradiction between the two. I dare say that is the case. The fact is that optimism and pessimism are largely a temperamental matter. Some of us look at things through rosy spectacles, some through spectacles habitually clouded. This is so well recognised that now and then you have epithets indicating an optimistic temperament attached to some persons, and the reverse to others. I have heard of persons in my own experience known, for instance, as "Cheerful Charlie" on the one hand, or as "Dismal Jimmy," or whatever may be the name, on the other. It represents the point of view from which you look at things. The Prime Minister is constitutionally an optimist, and I submit that, at a time of national crisis and emergency, on the whole it is better to have in your Prime Minister a man who looks through bright-coloured than a man who looks through dark-coloured spectacles at the affairs of the great crisis through which we are passing.

Let me make another point. The incidents of the war themselves vary so much from day to day that it is possible, with strict regard to truth, to be making an optimistic speech one day, and before the close of the week to have to make the reverse. Look at what happened at Cambrai during the last ten days. There occurred that great and splendid forward thrust of our troops, taking the enemy by surprise and resulting in the capture of several miles of country. So that anybody speaking on that day would naturally have made a speech full of pride and encouragement. Personally I regret any excuse of that sort for very often premature congratulations. Nothing distressed me more than when I heard that the joy-bells were ringing after the Cambrai victory was announced, because I felt that the joy-bells might be turned into bells of sorrow and suffering before a fortnight had passed; and so it has happened. Suddenly there is a kaleidoscopic change in the scene, a great forward movement of the enemy is made, our line is pierced, grave events take place, and undoubtedly anybody making a speech ten days after the first event would have to pitch it in a very different key.

My Lords, these are the ups and downs of warfare, and the speeches of Ministers to some extent, and inevitably, reflect these ups and downs. The only way to avoid that, it seems to me, is that Ministers should never speak at all, or that they should never speak about the progress of the war. If we took that attitude, if we sat mum, who would be the first person to challenge us I Who would be the first noble Lord who would say, "What are you people there for except to get up and tell us what is going on?" That is what we are there for, my Lords, and we do our best to meet the situation when it arises. I do not claim for a moment that there is always complete consistency in all our observations, and I know not how to attain it, unless we appoint somebody like the noble Lord to sit in a censor's box and look over our speeches when we make them and see that they all dovetail in, and that we satisfy the severe standards of consistency, exactitude, and moderation invariably illustrated by himself. In the absence of the noble Lord to assist us, I am afraid that we shall sometimes continue to err; and all that I can do will be to pass on to my colleagues the fact that we have incurred the censure of the noble Lord and ask them to be very careful that they say nothing in future to expose them to the same rebuke again.

LORD BERESFORD

My Lords, in his more or less humorous speech my noble friend has criticised what I had to say. I still maintain that my remarks were perfectly justified and correct. The public have not got the real facts of the case placed before them as they should have them up to date, and, though I agree with the noble Earl that perhaps I ought to have told him or Lord Lytton before I brought the matter forward, still I thought it was so important in the present crisis that I ventured to raise the question. I was very glad to hear my noble friend deprecate the ringing of the joy-bells. I thought it was a great mistake, and I see from some remarks that Mr. Bonar Law made yesterday that he thought the enthusiasm evinced in the House of Commons when he made his statement as to the glorious battle of Cambrai was overdone. If he thought the enthusiasm was overdone, surely he could have stopped those bells being rung. My noble friend (Lord Curzon) shakes his head. Anyway, I agree with him that it was a pity the bells were rung.

Moved, That the House do adjourn, except for Judicial business, until Monday next.—(Earl Curzon of Kedleston.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at half past six o'clock.