Lords Sitting of 31 May 1916

CLAYTON ANILINE COMPANY (RAILWAYS)
(Petition for Bill).
Examiner's Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee To-morrow.

RIVER GLEN BILL. [H.L.]
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE AND GATES-HEAD GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Committee to meet To-morrow.

SOUTH METROPOLITAN GAS BILL.
Read 3a, with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.

RETURNS, REPORTS, &c.
Post Office Servants—Second Report of the Committee appointed to examine the issues arising out of the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Post Office Servants, 1912–1913: Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.
Public Record Office—Additional Rule for the disposal of documents which are not considered of sufficient public value to justify their preservation in the Public Record Office: Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 6) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and referred to the Examiners (No. 55.)
CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.
The DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE appointed to take the Chair in Committee of the Whole House this day; and to take the Chair in the Committee on Private Bills and in the Standing Orders Committee To-morrow.
BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Moved, That Standing Order No. XXXIX be considered in order to its being suspended for the remainder of the week (The Lord President (M. Crewe)); agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
LORD BERESFORD LORD BERESFORD rose to call attention to the speech of the Lord Privy Seal delivered on May 5 in reference to the establishment of a War Committee; and to ask His Majesty's Government to explain the difference between the methods of controlling and directing military operations under the War Committee and those which were in force previous to its establishment.
The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Curzon made an interesting speech on May 5, in which he stated that there had been set up a War Committee of six, and that upon no single occasion had the decisions of that Committee been overruled by the rest of the Cabinet. That was a very satisfactory statement. But I think the public have a right to know the difference between the methods of controlling and directing military operations under the War Committee and those which were in force previous to its establishment. There is no necessity for secrecy on this point. Many people think that too much secrecy has been observed over a great number of different matters with regard to the war. There is no question that the French get considerably more information than we do. They are given a semi-official statement nearly every day. We have been promised fuller information, but we never get it. To return to the point of my Question, I should like to be told the date when this War Committee of six was formed, and who the individuals are who constitute it.
Since hostilities commenced this is the third authority that we have had for the control of the war. First we had the Radical Government. We cannot say that they were a great success, because they conducted the war in such a manner that at last they had to come to the Unionists to form a Coalition. Then there was the Coalition. As I have previously said in your Lordships' House, I do not think a Coalition Government can be a great success, because coalition is a matter of compromise. Now we have a War Committee of six, which would appear to me a common sense arrangement and much more likely to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion than either of the previous two. But it seems curious that there is no naval representative on the War Committee. I would suggest that there should be placed upon it some young

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Admiral who has distinguished himself and who has been in the war and knows what he is talking about. After all, the whole success or failure of the war will depend upon the British Fleet, both for ourselves and for our Allies; and I think that many blunders would not have been committed had we had a known young Admiral in an authoritative position earlier in the war. I may say that the French and the Russians have an Admiral on their war bodies, but in the case of neither of those countries is that so imperative as here, because, as I have said, the whole question of the success or failure of the war depends on the British Fleet.
I would ask whether it is possible under this new system to have a recurrence of what I consider the crazy campaigns of the past, carried out from political considerations without any reference to military necessities—that is to say, without having first ascertained that we had the forces necessary to make the policy a success. I refer to Antwerp, the Dardanelles, Salonika, and to a certain extent to Mesopotamia. The public want to be assured that under the new principle, which, as I have said, I consider an excellent one, the mismanagement of the past will not recur. Then I would like to ask, Are the Six responsible for the military as well as for the political conduct of the war? We have seen failures produced by the latter which I hope we shall not see again. I should like to know what are the relations now between the fighting Services and the statesmen. I would further ask, Was this Committee aware of the state of Ireland before the rebellion, and, if not, why not? I may be told that this has nothing to do with the war. It has a great deal to do with it. If we had not had considerable luck and the German ship containing ammunition had reached the country with Casement, telegrams would have gone all over Ireland announcing that 100,000 Germans had landed. That would have meant 300,000 troops and the whole of Ireland aflame. So it had a great deal to do with the war.
Personally I have advocated a Committee of five ever since the war began, so that I can testify to my great satisfaction at the adoption of this new principle which Lord Curzon enunciated the other day. I should like to ask, Did the Committee of six bring about compulsion? Lord Curzon said that compulsion could not come until the military authorities demanded it. I think
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that was a very grave statement. The military and naval authorities have nothing whatever to do with finding men. Their business is, the Cabinet having declared a policy, to state to the Cabinet what they consider necessary in order to make that policy a success. What do the military authorities know about trade unions, or about opinions in Ireland? I think Lord Curzon made a mistake there. The business of the military authorities is merely to put down the number of men they want, and not in any way to say how they are to be provided, whether by compulsion or under the voluntary system.
Again, I should like to ask whether it was this Committee of six or the Foreign Office which despatched Mr. Hurst and Admiral Slade to Paris to discuss contraband. The Foreign Office have controlled the blockade up to the present, many people think most deplorably. This sending of Mr. Hurst and Admiral Slade to Paris is causing the greatest anxiety throughout the country, as these are the two gentlemen who were principally concerned in drawing up the Declaration of London, which would have curtailed the power of our Fleet. It was a Declaration which, as has often been said, was based entirely on the idea that we were always to remain neutral. It certainly would have benefited us under those conditions, but it would have handicapped us proportionately in war. I maintain that had an effective blockade been established at first, the war would have been over now; and we could have made an effective blockade according to International Law. The neutrals would not have said anything at first, because they had not then embarked upon their present enormous enterprises and contracts with Germany and Austria. I quite acknowledge Lord Robert Cecil's argument. It was very difficult after the neutrals had embarked on these enterprises for the British Government suddenly to cut them off; but if an effective blockade had been put on at first, I am satisfied that the war would now have been over. This is proved by the present position in Germany. After public opinion had forced the Government to make cotton contraband and to make the blockade more effective, we then heard that Germany was feeling the pinch. If she feels the pinch now, how much more would she have felt it had we put on an effective blockade at first.
The question of food is getting more and more serious, and requires the greatest

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consideration and foresight. Is this Committee of six considering that? Further, is the War Committee considering the question of tonnage, which is perhaps the most important of all questions at the present moment? I think we have a right to criticise the Government upon those matters on account of the number of gallant men who have lost their lives and on account of the immense amount of money that is being squandered. Had we continued the conduct of the war on the same lines as obtained before the appointment of this Committee of six, I am certain we should have lost it. Every responsible person in the country wishes to support the Government. But, as I say, we have a right of criticism, and apparently this Chamber is the only place in which the Government can be criticised. The Press cannot criticise them, neither can the House of Commons. If any man went to a public meeting and criticised the Government, the Press would be debarred from reporting what he said. We desire that the Government should show some symptom of knowing how to control the war, and therefore there is every reason why we should be informed what the difference is between the methods of directing military operations under the present War Committee and those which were in force previous to its establishment.
All criticism must be fair to be of any use, and, of course, everything is not black. We must look at the admirable achievements of our naval and military forces. There is nothing in history like those achievements; they have been simply marvellous. But much of that splendid work is being wasted by bad management and want of quick decision and prompt action on the part of the Government. What we want to stop, to quote a phrase I heard the other day, is Birrellism abroad. Had the authorities exercised their powers parallel with the efforts of the fighting forces, the war would have been over. It is a notable fact connected with this war that whenever there has been a pronounced failure by those in authority they have invariably been rewarded by honours and decorations. I hope that will cease. It is because our forces, which have done such marvellous work, are so severely handicapped by bad management that criticism is necessary, and I hope my noble friend will not think that I have been unfair in what I have said and will be able to answer the questions which I have submitted to him.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, my noble friend Lord Curzon is not able to be in his place yet this afternoon, because he has to preside at an important meeting of his Air Board, at which witnesses attend, so that it was impossible for him to alter the time. In any case he would have desired that I should reply to this Question, although his name appears in it, for the simple reason that he has only been apprised of all these matters since the Coalition Government was formed, whereas they have fallen under my notice since the beginning of the war.
My noble and gallant friend asks what difference now exists, since the formation of the War Committee, in the control over military matters from that which obtained before it was formed. Perhaps I may briefly describe what the course of Government control of warlike operations has been. At first the responsibility of the Cabinet as a whole for the control of military and naval operations was more direct than it is now. The Cabinet undertook more direct responsibility than it does now, although, of course, its final responsibility still remains unimpaired. But in some respects the situation was not so dissimilar as might appear, because there were certain members holding particular offices—who for a long time had served on the Committee of Imperial Defence, and were thoroughly cognisant of the method of working with the naval and military officers on the respective staffs—who undertook a special charge in connection with military operations. Their charge was more informal than that of the War Committee is now, but it was in essential respects not less real. Then after a time, when the Expedition to the Dardanelles was undertaken, a special Cabinet Committee was appointed to exercise a general supervision over those joint operations. In time it was seen that it was convenient that such a body should extend the sphere of its work over a wider field, and, indeed, generally over warlike operations, and it therefore became what at that time was called the War Committee. The defect of both those bodies was that they were somewhat too large; they were not quite definite in their constitution as is the present War Committee. As my noble friend will well understand, the tendency of a body of that kind is to increase rather than to diminish in size. Therefore it gave

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place to the existing War Committee. Unluckily, I do not carry in my memory the precise date when the present War Committee came into being, but I can easily ascertain that for my noble and gallant friend.
This War Committee, as the noble and gallant Lord correctly stated, is strictly limited in number, but other Ministers whose Departments are specially concerned with the subject under discussion attend for the purpose of that particular discussion. Those additions are made purely ad hoc and for the purpose of the, particular subject. Therefore the general answer to my noble and gallant friend is that there is no real, or at any rate no intentional, difference between the control exercised by the Government or a part of the Government over military operations compared with that in the early stages of the war. That is to say, there is no time at which any Expedition or any large strategic movement has been sanctioned from here without full consultation with the naval and military advisers of the Crown, or one or the other according to the necessities of the case. There is no instance in which that military or naval advice has been overridden by the Civil head of the Department. Perhaps I might remind the House once more, as I did on the last occasion when a kindred subject was under discussion, that naval and military experts are exceedingly apt to hold different opinions among themselves. Therefore when expert advice is spoken of it is important to realise precisely what expert advice is meant, and naturally every critic is disposed to attach more importance to the particular military advice with which he happens to agree.
LORD BERESFORD: That is perfectly true if naval and military experts are asked individually, but if they are put together as a War Council without a Minority Report it is a totally different thing.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My noble and gallant friend has experience of the Board of Admiralty. But I am bound to say from my experience, which now extends over a considerable number of years on the Committee of Imperial Defence and on the various War Councils and War Committees since, that I have often known—and it surely is bound to occur—Admirals of great distinction or military officers of great distinction to take diametrically opposite views of the advantages or disadvantage
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of a particular course. All, then, that the unhappy civilians can do, as representing the taxpayers and the people of the country, is to form the best opinions they can, which may be right or may be wrong, on the materials set before them, just as in countless cases a Judge in Court has to form an opinion on a subject of which he is not specially cognisant, or as the members of any Board or Committee have to form an opinion on subjects of which they are not experts. One thing that I think the experience of this war has brought specially home to all of us is that there is and can be no more difficult problem than to decide what is the precise amount of discretion which ought to be left to a commander in the field or at sea, to the" man on the, spot" as he is called. We all know that the Aulic Council, which was supposed to direct actual operations in the field from a room a hundred miles away, has become a byword for futility. Yet, on the other hand, those who are finally responsible are bound in some cases to discount the natural confidence of a brave man in the success of an operation of which he has charge, and also to take into consideration the natural dislike which any such man must feel to declining the responsibility of undertaking a difficult task.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I venture to think, therefore—and I am glad to note that my noble and gallant friend, who has had so much experience, agrees—that there is no more difficult problem set before those responsible for a war than to decide the precise amount of discretion which ought to be left to those in the field. I do not hesitate to say that as the months have passed the particular machine of superintendence of the war runs on smoother and on more rapid wheels than it did at first. That, if one comes to think of it, is by no means surprising; and I have no doubt that all the belligerents, including even the Germans, whose organisation is so universally praised—and it is natural, of course, that those who intended war should be more prompt and efficient at first than those who did not intend it—would say that they have learned during these months a vast deal regarding the efficient conduct of such a gigantic war as this.
Now I will endeavour to deal with one or two matters which my noble and gallant

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friend mentioned, though I am afraid I am not able to give replies to all the conundrums which he put to me. I did not quite understand what he meant by saying that there was no naval representative on the War Committee. It is quite true, of course, that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is a regular member of it, is a civilian, and, as we all know, a most capable civilian, but he is invariably accompanied by the First Sea Lord, and often by other members of the Board of Admiralty for particular purposes, who, indeed, are the chosen directors of our naval affairs. Of course, it is open to my noble and gallant friend to suggest that some change ought to be made by the addition of, I think he used the phrase," a young Admiral." I suppose he means some one who has seen recent service. But that is, as he will see, an entirely separate question. So far as representation of the Admiralty on the War Committee is concerned, that is always and fully provided for. My noble and gallant friend asked whether certain different questions came before the War Committee. He will not expect me, I think, to divulge any of the recent subjects of discussion before that Committee. That, I am sure, is the last thing he would desire.
LORD BERESFORD: Hear, hear.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: But I can tell him in general terms that all matters so far as they directly affect the war and are urgent invariably come before the War Committee. So far as my knowledge goes, the programme for each particular meeting is drawn with the most meticulous care that no question of immediate urgency should be overlooked, and the Committee meets very often on several consecutive days in order to lose no time in considering questions which can be regarded as in any way urgent. That observation covers such questions as those regarding blockade and other matters about which my noble and gallant friend inquired. Perhaps he will forgive me if I do not enter at all on the subject of Ireland at this moment. I have no quarrel with my noble and gallant friend for alluding to it in this connection, but he, I am sure, will not expect me to develop it. So far as concerns the phrase to which he took exception—that of whether the military authorities had demanded compulsion and compulsion was agreed to at the request of the military authorities—I do not disagree with the construction
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which my noble and gallant friend placed on that phrase. It was, of course, not for the military authorities to demand or to suggest the purely Parliamentary remedy which had to be applied to the lack of the necessary number of recruits. The function of the military authorities is, and has been all through, to say how many men they would desire to have and were able to train, arm, and equip for the purpose of particular operations which are undertaken by agreement between ourselves and our Allies, and their functions do not go beyond that. When my noble and gallant friend says that it is for the Cabinet to decide the policy and for the military authorities then to say how many men will be required to carry it out, I should venture to point out that the two operations ought so far as possible to be concurrent, because it is useless for the Cabinet to come to a decision (if my noble and gallant friend likes, on political grounds) that a certain operation would be desirable, and then to be told that the men or the particular naval force required were not forthcoming. The two consultations ought to take place together, and the one naturally has to hinge on the other.
I think I have answered as many of my noble and gallant friend's question as I can. When he said just before he sat down that the Government enjoyed absolute immunity from criticism in every quarter, including, I suppose, another place and also the whole of the Press, and that it was only in this House that any critical accent was ever heard, I feel that I must refer my noble and gallant friend to the files of the daily newspapers, or some of them, in which he will note that our shortcomings are dwelt upon to an extent which we perhaps are wrong in thinking excessive, but which at any rate cannot be described by any one as scanty. I am afraid I cannot answer definitely any more of the questions which my noble and gallant friend put to me, but I hope he will consider that my reply is not altogether barren of information.
LORD BERESFORD: Could we have the names of the members of the War Committee?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I think the names have been already announced. The Prime Minister presides over the Committee, and the other regular members are the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the

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Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Minister of Munitions.
LORD LEITH OF FYVIE: My Lords, I should like to ask a question, not exactly on the lines of that placed on the Paper by my noble and gallant friend, but distinctly connected with it. Are the Committees, like the one which deals with contraband, appointed by the War Committee direct or are they appointed by the War Office and the. Admiralty? The point is that the Admiralty representation on the Contraband Committee is in a decided minority, with the result that they have no power in that Committee of carrying their arguments to an executive decision. Again, what connection have the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade with the appointment of representatives on and assistants to these Committees? It is understood by some representatives of the Press and also by the man in the street that the, old system of Party Government is still carried on in the appointment of these Committees, especially the Contraband Committee, the work of which, if it were carried out by the executive officers of the Navy, would probably be, done in a much more distinct way than it is at present. Then it has been pointed out in the public Press that, after the Navy have had the trouble and danger of bringing ships into harbour, many of these ships are allowed to go, notwithstanding that the naval officers responsible for seizing them know that they carried contraband.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I am afraid I cannot enter into any detail in replying to my noble friend opposite. So far as the Contraband Committee and some of the other Committees which deal with kindred subjects are concerned, those have always been appointed with the full concurrence of the Departments and the heads of the Departments who are represented on them. There ought to be no colour for the statement that the Board of Admiralty takes any exception to its representation either on the Contraband Committee, or on the War Trade Advisory Committee, or on any other body in which it is interested. My noble friend started again what was rather a familiar hare—namely, that of the supposed chagrin of certain officers in the Navy at finding that ships which had been brought into British
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ports, sometimes with great difficulty and at considerable risk to themselves and their crews, had afterwards been released. That subject has been discussed before, and my impression is that the officers of the Navy have now been more fully informed than they may have been at an earlier stage of the necessity for the release of certain ships after they have been brought in. It is not possible, as I am sure my noble friend will realise, to put every ship that is brought in into the Prize Court; and that being so, after having either parted with certain parts of her cargo which may be prize-courted, or after having gone on her way with the sure guarantee that certain goods will be brought back—a great many of the cases come under that head—a ship may then be allowed to complete her voyage to a neutral port. I am sure my noble friend will forgive me if I do not attempt to develop without notice the questions which he has raised. I can assure him once more that, so far as the composition of the Committees is concerned, the fighting Departments have the fullest voice in the selection of those who are to represent them.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I am sure we owe a debt of gratitude to my noble and gallant friend behind me for having again raised this question, in which I think we have a hereditary interest. If I recollect aright, the first demand that was seriously put forward for a War Committee came from these Benches last September or October. We had the great advantage then of a speech from the Lord Privy Seal, who not only promised us that a War Committee was under consideration by the Prime Minister, but added that the Prime Minister had it under his consideration to carry out a reform on which we were all much set—namely, a reduction in the numbers of the Cabinet. I am bound to say he never led us to suppose that the result of that consideration by the Prime Minister would be a somewhat cynical disregard of our views, because the Cabinet has been increased constantly ever since.
In regard to the conduct of the war, we really do not gather from the noble Marquess's speech that any considerable change has taken place as compared with the practice which obtained in the earlier period of the war. I think that is a very serious admission, if admission it be, because we had grave reasons to doubt the previous system, and we should have liked

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very much to hear from the noble Marquess that the steps now taken were such that a recurrence of the unfortunate decisions which we all lament would be avoided under the system of the new War Committee. I somewhat fear that in this respect the Government have fallen under the precedent which was good for peace but does not obtain at all in time of war. If my noble friend Lord Selborne were in his place, he would bear me out that the Defence Committee which was originally established in 1902 was formed for two purposes—first, to bring together all the pundits, if I may so express it, the most prominent men in the Government, who were to meet to give decisions which would be difficult for individual Ministers representing the War Office or the Admiralty to get, on matters which it would be inconvenient to bring in detail before the whole Cabinet; and in addition to establish a general review of the needs, the dangers, and the possible military operations by land or sea of the whole of the Empire. That Committee did an enormous amount of valuable work. But the circumstances for which you want the Committee which we are now discussing must surely require it to be built up on very different lines. You do not want academic consideration, the greater part of which must be carried on outside the actual council chamber. You do not want very occasional meetings, for which even the busiest members of the Cabinet could find time. What you want is a small Committee sitting almost de die in diem, powerful enough to take decisions and able to afford the time to carry out, and see that they are carried out in other Departments, those decisions, so far as they do not immediately affect the War Office or the Admiralty. I venture to maintain two things—first, that this War Committee, so far as the names which were given to us a few moments ago are concerned, does not carry out that view; and, secondly, that there must be references to the Cabinet which make it highly desirable that the Cabinet should consist of about a dozen members, or half its present size, rather than this enormous and inflated body, which can hardly be taken into confidence without grave danger of confidential papers going astray. Consider who have been put on the War Committee, You must have the Prime Minister, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the Secretary of State for War. The Foreign Minister, I understand, is a member.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: No, he is not.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: We see his name very frequently.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: He often attends, but he is not a member.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: The Chancellor of the Exchequer is probably one of the hardest-worked members of the Government. I know that for months together he could not find time to preside over a very important Committee for which every hour was of value. And at a moment when he was most engaged on questions involving hundreds of millions of loans to our Allies and the meeting of our own expenditure, we suddenly saw that he was placed on the War Committee. Obviously the Chancellor of the Exchequer has to be consulted on all such questions which involve finance, but how is it possible for him from day to day to exercise a controlling influence and to find time for the thought necessary for the effective discharge of such very difficult duties? I might say the same of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, from another standpoint. Although I would not go the whole distance of my noble friend in suggesting, as I think he does, that all those who sit on the War Committee should be without portfolio except the Ministers immediately employed in the war, I confess that I think the advantage of such offices as there are which do not involve heavy official work would be very great, and that so far as possible those offices should be utilised for the immediate conduct of the war at this critical time. The Lord Privy Seal said that the Cabinet had so far never overridden the War Committee; but there are occasions when questions must come before the Cabinet. Supposing, for instance, that a fresh Expedition were going to be undertaken, would not that come before the Cabinet? If a fresh Expedition to some other part of the globe were to be undertaken, would that be decided by the War Committee or would it come before the Cabinet?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: As the noble Viscount challenges me, I will, if he will permit me, interrupt him by replying to the two specific points which he has raised and on which he requires information. In the first place—and it is desirable that there

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should be no misunderstanding on these points—the work of the War Committee, for its members, takes precedence of all other work, of all Departmental or even Cabinet work. Therefore I think that the strictures which the noble Viscount has raised regarding its composition are not entirely justified. He instanced the case of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who at certain times has undoubtedly heavy pressure of work, but, as the noble Viscount knows very well, the Chancellorship of the Exchequer is not departmentally at all a heavy office—indeed, it is one of the lightest—and it is only in connection with certain periodical matters that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is fully occupied. Then as regards the equally important point which the noble Viscount raised and which had been alluded to by my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal in his speech—namely, the extent to which the Cabinet as a whole interfere with the decisions of the War Committee—I can repeat quite conscientiously what was said by my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal, that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the decisions of the War Committee are not considered by the Cabinet at all. They are treated as final, as a rule. They are, of course, subject to the consideration of the Cabinet, because the Cabinet is informed of the conclusions that are reached. But whatever the reason may be, as a matter of fact those particular matters are in practice never re-discussed by the Cabinet as a whole. It is important to make that entirely clear, because if it were not so the objects of promptitude and the advantages of discussion by a smaller body, with which we all agree, would not be fully achieved. We believe that as a matter of fact they are achieved, that both rapidity and efficiency are brought about so far as possible, and that therefore the present system is as good a one as could be devised for the carrying on of the war. The noble Viscount apparently asked me to promise that the War Committee would never make a mistake or never advise anything imprudent or anything which turns out badly—because half of the criticisms that are made on the conduct of the war are not that a particular plan was a bad one, but that it did not succeed. If the noble Viscount asks me for such a pledge I am afraid I cannot give it to him.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: I believe I am expressing the opinion of most of us when I say that we should infinitely prefer to
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hear that these questions—the ninety-nine out of a hundred questions connected with the war—were settled by men who were not overburdened with the work of their Departments. As regards the relations between the Cabinet and the War Committee, some interesting questions present themselves on what fell from the noble Marquess. For instance, it is quite impossible to put on the War Committee all the numerous Ministers who are concerned in the war. Besides those who have been mentioned, there are the Foreign Minister, the President of the Board of Trade, the Air Minister, the President of the Board of Agriculture, and so forth. They are men of ingenious minds and of great concentration. Surely questions must occur to them which ought to be brought before the War Committee. Is there any machinery by which that is done? Have they to communicate with the Prime Minister or with the secretary of the War Committee, or must they take the War Minister aside and say" We want you to consider this." We wish to know that the best is being done. We know that the country looks to the Cabinet. They have confidence, not merely because five or six members, two of whom are amongst the busiest of Ministers, are on the War Committee, but because those on whom they depend and in whom they have confidence are sitting in the Cabinet. I cannot see, from the noble Marquess's statement, any machinery by which those members of the Cabinet who specially have knowledge of military matters, who have had military experience themselves in administration, have any power to make their thoughts and wishes known on the War Committee. That seems to me to be a flaw of the greatest magnitude, and it is a flaw directly connected with this system of putting very busy men on the Committee. If you had two or three men on the Committee whose time was given up to the war, their colleagues could go to them and say," I want to direct your attention to this which has come up in my Office, and beg you to bring it before the War Committee." To expect the War Minister or the First Lord of the Admiralty to do that, or to expect the Prime Minister (who has been away on the public service repeatedly in the course of the last few months) to act as a sort of post office, would be absurd. I do not think that the machinery, so far as it has been sketched by the noble Marquess this afternoon, is such as to inspire confidence.

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The noble Marquess's one chance of commanding our confidence in this new arrangement would have been to make out clearly the difference between the old and the new methods. I am not going to follow even the distant allusions made by my noble and gallant friend to what occurred in the Dardanelles. We have had to choose on that subject between two courses—one, to allow the matter until the end of the war to go in silence; the other, to insist on probing to the bottom one of the most unfortunate transactions in the whole of the military conduct of affairs in this country. We elected to take the former course. For that reason I do not wish to draw illustrations from the past. But I am sure that noble Lords, whether they belonged to the Government before or whether they joined it after those transactions were past praying for, if I may use the expression, will agree that a great change was needed, and it is because we have not in the noble Marquess's speech any evidence of that change that I do not think that this discussion has been as satisfactory as we might have hoped.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I cannot help thinking that my noble friend opposite is rather hard to please in this matter. He and his friends have been clamouring for a long time past for a small body to deal with the conduct of the war. They have got a small body. My noble friend suggests that the change is no considerable change. I venture to think it is a considerable change. My noble friend behind me (Lord Crewe) gave a very full account of the different modifications of the Cabinet machinery which had taken place. When the small Committee was set up there was in existence another Committee known as the Dardanelles Committee, to which from time to time more than one member of the Cabinet had been added; and that Committee—I speak from memory—when the change took place consisted of twelve members. To my mind there is all the difference in the world between a body of twelve and a body of six.
What are the conditions which my noble friend lays down as indispensable in order to bring about the efficient consideration of business by this small body? He says it is not to be engaged in academic discussions; it is to be a small Committee sitting de die in diem, powerful to take decisions and powerful to see that they are carried out. That is exactly what we have got
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now—a small Committee, I will not say sitting de die in diem, but sitting constantly, able to take decisions, and able to see that they are carried out. Then my noble friend expresses dissatisfaction or misgivings as to the relations between this small Committee and the plenum of the Cabinet. To my mind they are the only relations which can reasonably be set up. What happens is this. The decisions of the War Committee are from time to time reported to the whole body of the Cabinet. The Cabinet has an opportunity of considering them, and it certainly has an opportunity, if it so desires, of raising questions with regard to them in the Cabinet. My noble friend has said—of course, the expression was not intended to be mathematically accurate—that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the decisions of the War Committee have been accepted. Upon my word, I cannot at this moment recall the hundredth case in which we differed from them, but that may be a lapse of memory on my part. If a reference of that kind was not made to the full Cabinet, I really doubt whether any self-respecting member of the Ministry would very much care to remain in the Cabinet at all. It seems to me that for a member of the Cabinet to be completely ignored in regard to all matters concerning the conduct of the war would be to place that Minister in an almost intolerable position.
My noble friend took exception to the manner in which the members of the War Committee are selected, and he rather concentrated his criticism on the selection of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. All decisions concerning the conduct of military operations on a large scale mean the expenditure of vast sums of money, and it seems to me not at all unreasonable that the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be in a position at the very outset, if he desires to do so, to say something as to the financial aspects of these great military and naval proposals. You cannot wage war without thinking of something besides the men whom you are employing. You have to think of the munitions; you also have to think of the money, and the presence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer is very valuable for that purpose.
Then my noble friend has noticed that from time to time the small Committee becomes increased by the presence of other members of the Cabinet. Is that unreasonable? Is it unreasonable, for example, that the

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Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be called in when you are considering the question of military operations which may involve the interests of other Powers? Or take again the Air Minister. Is it, unreasonable that he should be invited from time to time? Or the President of the Board of Trade? These occasional reinforcements of the War Committee seem to me entirely reasonable and defensible. My noble friend says," What machinery have you to provide for these additions?" What does my noble friend mean by" machinery"? Does he want to have stereotyped rules, under which it shall be laid down that such and such a Minister shall be only called in after certain procedure has been followed? I venture to say it is infinitely better that the proceedings should be elastic, and that the Prime Minister and the other members of the War Committee should be in a position to call in from time to time any colleagues whose counsel they may desire. I maintain that upon the whole we have given effect to what I believe was the desire of most of your Lordships and of a large section of the public outside. We have set up a very small and a very efficient body to watch over the conduct of our military operations.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, I am quite sure that my noble friend who sits beside me (Lord Midleton) was fully justified in his remarks, because they drew from the noble Marquess the speech which we have just heard. I speak in the recollection of your Lordships, but I think that the impression conveyed by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House was that there, really was not very much difference in the management of the war under present conditions as compared with what it was in what we think were the old bad days.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Perhaps I may correct the noble Marquess, if he will allow me.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Most willingly.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My observation was that there was no difference in the precise conduct of the war in the sense in which we were invited by my noble and gallant friend on the Back Bench to admit that there was a difference—
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namely, that before the constitution of the War Committee there had been regular interference with the naval and military authorities by the Civil Ministers, whereas now the conduct of the war was left to the experts. The absence of difference that I desired to point out was in this—and I am sorry if I gave either the noble Marquess or anybody else in the House the impression that there was no difference in the plan or methods of superintending the carrying on of the war—that neither then nor now had there been any ignoring or overriding of the military and naval authorities by the Civil members of the Government.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: It is always useful to have debate, because one gets at the truth or at as much of the truth as it is possible to give in Parliament. No doubt your Lordships have heard with the greatest interest, from my noble friend Lord Lansdowne and now from Lord Crewe, that there is a great change in the method in which the war is managed so far as the Cabinet and the Committee of the Cabinet are concerned. That was the principal point which it was important to elicit. We wanted to know whether there was a great difference. The reason why we wanted to know that was that the country was very dissatisfied with the conduct of the war formerly. That is the plain English of it, and everybody knows that this is true. The question was whether there had been a change in the method by which we might hope that the war would be better conducted. Now we hear from the members of the Government who have spoken that this is so, and it is a very important statement which I hope will be quoted throughout the country and which ought to some extent to restore confidence.
My noble friend criticised Lord Midleton for having said a word or two about the machinery under which this change has been carried out. The change is of great importance in so far as we have a small Committee instead of the whole plenum of the Cabinet to decide these things. But my noble friend Lord Midleton called attention to the fact that all the members of the Committee were very hard worked Ministers in their Departments. The noble Marquess (Lord Crewe) told us that notwithstanding their being hard worked they put the questions and matters of the war before everything else, and that therefore the deliberations and decisions of the War

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Committee do not suffer. That must be very difficult, all the same. It must be difficult to find time to do the Departmental work and all the work of the War Committee. Although it is quite true, as the noble Marquess said, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is during a great part of the year not a very hard worked Minister, yet everybody knows that during one particular portion of the year—namely, the last quarter which precedes the close of the financial year—he is an exceedingly hard worked Minister. But the war does not stop during the last quarter of the financial year, and it is a criticism well worth consideration whether during that period of the year the Chancellor of the Exchequer can be a very valuable member of the War Committee.
I cannot help wondering who it is who thinks out the larger policy of the war. Let us look at the Ministers who form the War Committee. Is it the Prime Minister who thinks out the great problems which the Government of this country have to decide in respect of the war? Does he think of new ideas and new departures? Does he originate suggestions of high political importance? I rather doubt it, because he goes away to Rome, to Dublin, and elsewhere, and it does not seem to matter very much. Then who does? Is it the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or is it the Chancellor of the Exchequer? There remain the two great Departmental Ministers, the two Ministers of the fighting Services. No doubt they or their advisers do; and I hope that is the truth whence the suggestions come. But even so, that is not a very satisfactory arrangement; because the military advisers must look after the military part of the war and the naval advisers must look after the naval part. Who co-ordinates, who correlates, them? Who acts as the great driving force of the policy of this war? That is what we should like to know regarding the machinery. I do not say that I expect to receive a reply. All these questions are rather difficult for Ministers to reply to. But I think I am doing my duty in stating that these are the kind of preoccupations which are felt in the country. We desire that the best machinery for driving this war forward should he employed, and we are anxious to see that all the best intellects and Departments of the Government co-operate toward this consummation. That is the anxiety of the country; and if
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anything which has been said in this debate reassures the country, so much the better. If, on the other hand, any suggestions we have made are fruitful in the consideration of the Government, again so much the better. In any case we are grateful to my noble and gallant friend for having raised the discussion.
THE EARL OF DERBY: My Lords, I wish I could follow the noble Marquess in the remarks he has just made. I, like the noble and gallant Lord who brought forward this proposal, am very strongly in favour of a small body of men to administer the war. But as I understand my noble friend who has just sat down, it is not to be the Secretary of State for War; it is not to be the First Lord of the Admiralty; it is not to be the Chancellor of the Exchequer—
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I beg the noble Earl's pardon. I said nothing of the kind. Of course, the Secretary of State for War; and of course the First Lord of the Admiralty. What I suggested was that they by themselves were not sufficient, and that there might be something to be said for not relying upon hard worked Departmental Ministers to co-operate.
THE EARL OF DERBY: I do not want in any way to misrepresent what my noble friend said. But it has been argued that the men who were to be on this Committee were not to be hard worked officials. I cannot conceive any more hard worked officials than the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Secretary of State for War. Personally I think that they must be on this Committee.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: Hear, hear.
THE EARL OF DERBY: And what they ought to go to the Committee with is the plan of campaign upon which they have agreed and which has been put forward to them by their military or their naval advisers, as the cast may be. Surely that is what is done at the present moment. The First Lord of the Admiralty goes with the views of the Board of Admiralty and the Secretary of State, for War with the views of his Chief of Staff. My noble friend asks, How are you to co-ordinate those, two views? Surely when you have the First Lord of the Admiralty and the

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Secretary of State for War on the Committee, accompanied as they may be, and as I think I am right in saying they are, by the chiefs of their respective Staffs, this is the best way of getting a discussion before impartial men who are best able to decide how far they can go into each other's schemes or how far they can be modified to make a regular policy. Personally I agree with my noble friend when he says that it is an excellent thing that this debate was instituted, because it has brought out much more clearly than any of us recognised before that the present system of the War Committee is very different from the old system, and that there is now a small Committee of six Ministers of State who, though their views have to be laid before the Cabinet, do not have their views overruled when they have decided on a matter on the advice of their naval and military advisers.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, I feel that it is presumptuous on my part to address your Lordships on such a highly important and interesting question, not sitting on either Front Bench and having throughout the war maintained a detached attitude as regards the conduct of the Government; but possibly my opinion may be of some little value. I must say my noble friends are rather hypercritical. I cannot see the practical character of their suggestions. I have agreed with them all along in that I thought what was wanted for the conduct of the war was a small body of men as free from Departmental labours as possible. But when you come to work that idea out, you tumble up against this difficulty. All the members of the Cabinet must be very overworked men just now, and I cannot conceive a body formed to a considerable extent of members not in the Cabinet being able to take those prompt decisions which are necessary, and which we understand from the noble Marquess the present Committee is able to take. That is the difficulty, and if you work it out carefully you find that you must come back to the idea of a small Cabinet within the Cabinet. I do not see how you can get away from it.
Exception is taken more than all, I think I may say, to the inclusion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Obviously you do not object to the inclusion of the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty, and obviously you cannot object to the Prime Minister being included. Those are obviously three men
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who ought to be there. I quite agree with my noble friend Lord Derby that if the thing is worked properly the strategical schemes, perhaps even the tactical schemes, ought to come from the advisers of the Secretary of State for War and the advisers of the First Lord of the Admiralty. And as regards diplomacy, the Committee call in the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Surely that is not a bad combination. Now the principal objection, as I say, is to the inclusion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. But the Committee would never be able to come to the same prompt decisions without the presence on the Committee of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. My noble friends know even better than I do how many political questions depend upon the answer of the Treasury, and if this small Committee had to refer back to the Treasury the question whether a particular expenditure would be sanctioned, it would obviously take longer than if the Chancellor of the Exchequer, being on the Committee, was able to say offhand," Yes, I will consent to that." Having in my humble way been watching the proceedings of the Government with great care during the whole of this time, I can honestly say that I have never been able to attach myself to the extremest critics of the Government, and I am grateful to the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, for the statement he has made to-night, which in my opinion ought greatly to reassure the whole country.
VISCOUNT MILNER: My Lords, I quite agree that the interesting statement of the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, was calculated to give great satisfaction in many respects to those who have been most severe critics of the conduct of the war. Everything that he said in his almost vehement assertion of a great contrast between the manner in which the supreme direction of the war is conducted now and the manner in which it was formerly conducted was, I think, the fullest justification of the criticisms which have been directed against that conduct in the past. I cannot imagine a more complete vindication of the action of those who have constantly urged that the conduct of the war by so large a body and by a body in many respects so ill qualified as the Cabinet was bound to lead to unfortunate results.
With regard to the present system, I think it has been from some points of view

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rather unjustly criticised. So far I agree entirely with the last speaker (Lord Harris). I do not think this is a discussion in which we are divided into parties, those on this side of the House wishing to find fault with those on the other, or noble Lords opposite wishing to put the best face upon everything. I think this is a distinctly practical discussion, in which we all have one object in view—the object of making the important machinery which we have now got as perfect as possible. I agree with my noble friend Lord Derby that the body must be a small Cabinet within the Cabinet. There is no way out of that. But why should we create for ourselves those unnecessary difficulties which arise from being too much tied to the old Cabinet traditions? The old system—and for ordinary purposes of peace it is a good system—is that the heads of the most important Departments of the Government, all of them very busy men in their respective Departments, meet together from time to time to discuss general questions affecting the government of the country and to compare, notes about their various Departments. I have never been in a Cabinet myself, but I have a fairish notion of the sort of work that goes cm there. Under the tremendous pressure of a war like this and with the enormous new questions and difficulties which beset us, are we not able to shake ourselves free a bit from this old system of a number of Departmental chiefs meeting together and necessarily forming a Cabinet?
Undoubtedly the people who compose the War Committee are for the time being by far the most powerful, important, and influential Ministers. That is clear. Therefore they are members of the Cabinet. They are, if you like, the inner Cabinet. But why should they or any of them be responsible for the main work of enormous Departments? We are told that the Secretary of State for War must be on the War Committee; we are told that the First Lord of the Admiralty must be on it. If this means that men of first-rate knowledge of military and naval subjects must be on the Committee, very good. But why does it also involve the same men who are on the War Committee being actually the responsible and working heads of the great naval and military Departments? As for the Chancellor of the Exchequer being on the Committee, I am absolutely unconvinced by all the arguments which have been advanced of the necessity for that. It has been said that the Chancellor of the
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Exchequer is not a very hard worked Minister. That may or may not be. I once had the privilege of being private secretary to a Chancellor of the Exchequer for a certain number of years, and I cannot say that I thought the work I then experienced was at all light or that the work which my chief was doing was at all light. And that was in time of peace. At present surely if the Chancellor of the Exchequer is not a very busy man in dealing with the purely financial problems which he has to face, then he ought to be. There is something seriously wrong if he has much time to spare at present for the very important work of the War Committee.
I think that the small number of men—I am not saying who the men ought to be; that is a matter of personal qualification far more than of office—the small number of men who are selected from the Cabinet to form this War Committee have the most arduous task which it is possible to conceive, and it seems to me perfectly irrational—I cannot use too strong an expression—not to relieve them for the time being from all Departmental duties whatsoever. It may not be necessary, if they are the nominal heads of Government Offices, absolutely to detach them from those Offices altogether; but every man who is on the War Committee, if he is to be an efficient member of it, would require to have a double in his own Department. I cannot conceive what the difficulty is in arriving at such an arrangement as this, that the members of the War Committee should either consist of Ministers who have no important Departmental work, or, if they consist of Ministers who have great Departments dependent upon them, those Ministers should be relieved of all, or very nearly all, Departmental work while the war lasts, and while they have, as members of the War Committee, duties infinitely more arduous, more trying, and more important than any ordinary Departmental chief in time of peace, however important he may be.
THE MARQUESS OF LINCOLNSHIRE: My Lords, I do not want to detain the House on the subject now before us, but there is one thing I should like to bring before your Lordships' notice which I think ought to be said. I wonder whether my noble and gallant friend opposite has the smallest conception of how a good many people dislike and resent the tone and temper of some of the speeches he has

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made in your Lordships' House. I listened this afternoon to his speech, in which he said that he wanted the Government to have control of the war; he complained of the wastage and want of management; he said honours and decorations followed failures. He talked about the mismanagement of the war" which he hoped would not occur again"; he wanted to know whether the Government knew the state of Ireland; and he then talked about his Committee of five, which we remember he advocated in his maiden speech when he spoke of His Majesty's Government—the Government which is really a Committee of Safety—as a collection of twenty-one or twenty-two amateurs who had usurped the executive of the war. He ended his speech this afternoon by saying that he was perfectly entitled to criticise His Majesty's Government on account of the gallant men who had fallen in the war.
I do not suppose anybody inside this House, or outside it, would object to criticism of the Government of the day. In fact, if they did object to it, how could they stop it? But I would remind the noble and gallant Lord of the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Cromer about three weeks ago in speaking on the Vote of Censure on the Government on account of their Irish policy, which was brought forward by Lord Loreburn. Lord Cromer said that nobody could object to criticism if it were just and reasonable, and he added that if we wanted to be victorious in the war it would be necessary to support His Majesty's Government in a crisis like the present. I believe everybody will agree with that. I think people would go almost further and say that criticism, when the enemy is at our gates, ought not only to be just and reasonable, temperate and accurate, but ought not to contain one single word in it in any way to depreciate or—I do not know exactly what the word should be; perhaps I may use a French word—dénigrer the Government or embarrass or make more difficult our diplomatic relations with neutral or friendly countries. And, above all, that it ought not to contain one single word which would in any way give away military secrets or endanger the lives or limbs of our soldiers and sailors who are fighting abroad.
We have heard a great deal of criticism this afternoon. From time to time we have heard perfectly reasonable and just criticism from the Front Bench opposite. But
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can it be honestly and truthfully said that the criticism brought forward in some parts of this House by irresponsible persons does come up to this standard? I have not the quotations with me, but everybody remembers instances, to which I need not refer. We all recollect some speeches which have been made. Some of them have been criticised by Lord Derby in language much stronger than that usually used by members on the Front Benches. How is it that men who stand so high, and deservedly so, in the estimation of the country should follow the line of policy which they have thought fit to adopt? They tell us that they are actuated—of course, they are—by the highest possible motives. Obviously they are not actuated by any sort of attempt at personal gain or personal advancement or advantage, and we know that they are aware of the danger that there would be in the advertisement of any discord at all. I ask myself—and I am sure many people put the same question—Why is it that these men who stand so high in the opinion of their fellow-men should be induced to follow this line of policy? I fancy that the real reason must be the one which was given by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack, in one of those speeches which held the attention of the House, when he said that the mind of every man in the country was sore; he could not possibly know what was being done, and it was not unnatural that he should complain. And that was well backed up by a sentence in the great Unionist weekly, The Spectator, where it was written—
"This sort of criticism is quite intelligible it is well-intentioned; but the results are deplorable, and white trying to injure the enemy it in fact frequently helps and sustains them."
I should very much like to bring before the noble and gallant Lord the speeches and the actions of those great leaders of democratic thought, the statesmen who have come from the Dominions across the seas. If we glance over the speeches of Laurier and Borden, of Smuts and Botha (men whose patriotism was some time ago so cruelly and wrongly questioned), or, above all, those of the great Labour leaders, the great statesmen from Australia, Hughes and Fisher—these seem to me to teach us a great object-lesson. It was not so long ago that my right hon. friend Andrew Fisher was addressing a number of men who in happier times would have been called by noble Lords opposite" infernal Home Rulers and Radicals"; and he drew

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vehement cheers from these men when he said," We from the Dominions are with you heart and soul, and will fight with you to the last gasp. We do not care two straws what the Government of the country is, so long as it is determined to fight to a finish and to act up to the statements of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister. We are with you heart and soul, and for you and for the King and for the country we will spend our last shilling and send you our last man." That breathes the spirit of national unity, a unity which we all desire and without which we cannot win.
LORD BERESFORD: My Lords, I do not know whether it is worth my while to answer the amusing attack of the noble Marquess opposite. I think that the Government are very well able to take care of themselves without his assistance. He has charged me with being inaccurate and vindictive, and he has brought a number of other charges not usually associated with a gentleman. But I leave all those charges in the hands of the House and my fellow-countrymen. I do not attempt to answer them.

THE TREATMENT OF BRITISH PRISONERS.
LORD BERESFORD LORD BERESFORD rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether the number of British prisoners in Germany can be given, differentiating between naval, military, and civilian; whether it is not a fact that the food given them up to now has been inferior in quality and short in quantity; whether it is not a fact that if it had not been for the exertions of Mrs. Picton Warlow and Mrs. Grant-Duff's Committees, and of oilier similar Committees, the prisoners at Ruhleben and other camps would have starved; whether His Majesty's Government will make further representations as to the quality and quantity of the food supplied; whether the number of British prisoners who have died in Germany can be stated, giving their names; whether His Majesty's Government can state the number of British prisoners in Bulgaria and Turkey, and what their condition is as regards food and comfort.
The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I do not apologise to my noble friend Lord Newton for bringing the question of prisoners forward again so soon, because we know we have his hearty sympathy and that he will do anything he can for the relief of these men. I should like to
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amplify my Question in a few words. I understand that the prisoners are not allowed by the Government to make any statement that can be made public afterwards, and we are not allowed to see their depositions. I think that is a great mistake. I hold that the public should be accurately informed as to anything that has occurred to these prisoners, because as far as my information goes—and I have taken a great interest in them ever since the war began—they have been treated in very many instances most brutally. Vindictiveness is shown against the English prisoners particularly, more so than in the case of the Irish, Scottish, and Welsh, by these Germans. I remember that when first we brought this subject forward—it was a long time ago—in a debate in another place I complained of the authorities for not taking enough interest in the matter. That debate was initiated by Sir F. Banbury, and during the first three speeches there was not a single Cabinet Minister on the Front Bench. That was hardly sympathetic; in fact, it was very much the reverse. A day had been given by the Government, and they ought to have been there to answer the questions. It was mentioned at the time that this was not the line of conduct which the Government ought to take with regard to these prisoners.
There is another point about which I wish to question my noble friend. The Germans, I understand, have been withholding correspondence. I am not sure what the German authorities allow in regard to the number of cards or letters during the week, but they are now withholding correspondence. Food is also being held up in many cases. Some of the parcels do not arrive at all, and when they do they have been broken into. Germany is no doubt getting very much pressed for food owing to the blockade, and I am afraid that when Germany begins to be crushed the fury of the people will be inconceivable and it will be vented against our unfortunate prisoners, whose fate may be appalling. In my Question on the Paper I mention the names of two ladies. I did not mean, however, to be invidious. I only mention them because they are the two who started the Bread Committee which has been sending bread to the prisoners. But it would be wrong not to call attention also to the splendid work done by regimental committees and by the prisoners' friends.
I do not know whether your Lordships

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have seen a letter in the Morning Post to-day from a Dutchman who has recently returned from Germany. What he says is what the prisoners who have come back also tell me in many cases. He says—
"There is no doubt that the British prisoners of war are going to be in a very bad way. Undeniably, Germany is suffering from want of food of all kinds, and when the Germans face actual famine the prisoners' parcels will no longer be given to them—certainly not to the English prisoners."
Then he makes a comment on the deplorable mistake quite unintentionally made by Mr. Tennant in another place, and proceeds—
"All over Germany now his words are quoted. ' See what the English War Minister has said: the English swine have more than have the brave sons of the Fatherland in cursed England! But he will not say again that the swine who are with us get bettor food. Soon there will be none for them to get.'"
Whatever Mr. Tennant has said, it is being used in the German Press against our prisoners and in favour of the German prisoners.
I would like to ask my noble friend about the treatment which the British prisoners have had in the German hospitals. I know one case of a man who had his leg badly shattered, and whose diet while in hospital consisted daily of one ounce of food. His breakfast was coffee, without sugar or milk; his dinner, very poor soup containing decayed cabbage and sometimes carrots, with black bread; his supper, poor soup again with black bread; and he had tea on Wednesdays and Saturdays. In this hospital there were no medicines provided at all. I will tell my noble friend the man's name, and where he is at the moment. The patients had to make their own beds, and if they were too helpless their comrades came to their aid. There were French orderlies who looked after these wounded prisoners. Many of the parcels sent from home never reached these men. During the whole of the time that the man to whom I have referred was in hospital, which was a year, he had only two baths, and no soap and no hair-brush. There are many other cases which I can give my noble friend. I would also ask him whether he can give us the numbers of British prisoners in Turkey and Bulgaria. This matter is arousing the greatest interest throughout the whole of the country, and also intense irritation; and it is due to the relatives and friends, to those who have husbands, fathers, and sons in the prisons in Germany that we should make every effort for their relief as soon as we can.
THE EARL OF MAYO: My Lords, before Lord Newton answers the Question of the noble and gallant Lord, I should like to corroborate what Lord Beresford has said. I interviewed some of the returned prisoners of the Dublin Fusiliers, and your Lordships would be astonished at the beastliness of the food which those prisoners were given. It is quite true, as Mr. Tennant said, that were it not for the parcels they received they would have starved. Now comes a very serious question. Within the last month we have been getting letters from the men saying that they have not received their parcels. I am speaking of the organisation in regard to the Dublin Fusiliers. These prisoners have been receiving their parcels most regularly up to now, almost from the beginning of the war. But we have received letters that they are not now getting their parcels, and we have not received the usual number of cards, the cards which are printed and handed out to the prisoners in Germany for them to fill up saying they have received their parcels. That is a serious state of affairs, and I would ask the noble Lord whether he cannot communicate with the Foreign Office and get the Foreign Office to ask the American Minister in Berlin and also the Swedish Minister to endeavour to find out the reason why almost suddenly the delivery of the parcels has been stopped. We begin to think, as my noble friend Lord Beresford has said, that the Germans are taking the parcels. Things must be pretty bad in Germany, because men who have returned have told me that the guards had asked them to sell them their German rations when they had been able to do without them in consequence of the parcels. I hope representations will be made to the American Minister and the staff there, who I do not think have had that recognition in the Press here which they ought to have had. They have helped a great deal in finding out the state of the prisoners. I hope that the noble Lord will represent this matter to the Foreign Office and try to find out why the parcels are not given to the prisoners. There may be a reason; the men may be out in the fields working, and unable to get the parcels. But I have my doubts. I think the Germans are collaring the food.
LORD MAC DONNELL: My Lords, I should like to mention a few facts to your Lordships in regard to this matter because I happen to be intimately connected with

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one of the large associations who supply Irish prisoners of war in Germany with food. I refer to the Irish Women's Association, the prominent members of which are the Marchioness of Sligo and the Marchioness of Ormonde, and many other Irish ladies who combined at the beginning of the war for the purpose of supplying food to prisoners of Irish regiments with the exception of those whom my noble friend Lord Mayo has mentioned, the Dublin Fusiliers and another Dublin regiment, At the present time this Irish Women's Association supply every fortnight a parcel to 2,700 prisoners, and it is astonishing to us how punctually the parcels are delivered and how rarely any complaint reaches us. We get cards from each of the prisoners, and these arrive with punctuality. We have had no such cases of complaint as the noble and gallant Lord (Lord Beresford) mentioned to the House. It may be that other associations have not-worked in the same way as our association has done. At all events, we have no complaint whatever to make in this matter. Where prisoners die, the parcels are returned to us. This is of great use, because we are able to examine the parcels and find what particular substance bears the journey well. So far as the experience is concerned of the Irish Women's Association, which is working here in London and whose work has been recognised by their Majesties the King and Queen by the grant to the association of a suite of rooms in Kensington Palace where they carry on their work, they have nothing to complain of against the German authorities.
THE EARL OF MAYO: May I say that it has only just happened that these letters of complaint and not the postcards of acknowledgment are coming in.
LORD MAC DONNELL: Up to the present time we have had practically no complaints of the parcels not being delivered.
VISCOUNT PEEL: My Lords, I can give one piece of testimony on this matter. The point raised by my noble friend is a very important one as regards all the large associations which are sending from day to day considerable consignments of food and comforts and various forms of clothing to Germany. I have some experience of this work, because I am honorary treasurer of the largest of these associations, and I have taken a considerable amount of trouble at
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various times, with my colleagues, to find out whether the parcels did or did not reach the camps. Our consignments are very large—I am talking of our direct consignments, not of the goods and materials which we supply through the regimental funds—and it is extremely difficult to say whether or not all these consignments reach the German camps. For this reason I took a certain number of cases at random, and was able, through the good offices of the American Ambassador here, to get inquiries made through the American Ambassador in Berlin as to whether these consignments—they were six in number—had or had not reached the camps. I found that in every case they had reached the, camps. I confess that this considerably helped us, because it seemed very strong testimony that the large consignments did reach the camps and were delivered by the Germans. I should not like to say the same about individual consignments. The experience we have had shows that it is desirable that this food and these comforts should be sent in large consignments, not of course officially but under the œgis of some large association, rather than as individual consignments, a great many of which have undoubtedly been pilfered. It is much more difficult for the authorities in Germany to exercise supervision over small consignments, but as regards the large ones we have ample testimony that most of them arrive. I am much concerned, however, by the, statements which have been recently made, and I hope my noble friend in his answer will be able to assure us that the same system as has obtained hitherto is being continued.
LORD DEVONPORT: My Lords, I should like to say a few words on this important question, which so far as I am able to judge is becoming very serious and grave. The public are beginning to realise now in what tremendous jeopardy British civilian and military prisoners in Germany are likely to be. On the question of parcels, I would agree with Lord MacDonnell up to a point. It is quite true—I am speaking only as regards the Ruhleben camp, where the civilians are interned—that up till recently the parcels have arrived there almost with great regularity. But now I confirm what Lord Mayo has said, that recently these parcels have not been arriving. What is an ominous feature is the fact that the postcards have not been arriving; no letter has arrived from the

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Ruhleben camp for the last six weeks. This is the first time within my experience that such a thing has happened, and it happened concurrently with what was said the other day by Lord Robert Cecil in another place, when he referred to the fact that the prisoners were absolutely dependent upon these parcels, which is true, and said he had grave misgivings as to what would be the position in the future. I say the time has arrived when the Government will have to apply themselves most seriously to this problem; otherwise we shall have a great outbreak of national indignation in this country that may carry us very far indeed.
The food that the Germans have been giving to the prisoners—I am speaking only from my knowledge of the civilian prisoners at Ruhleben—has been scandalously defective in quantity and quality from the very commencement. Therefore I was more than amazed when I read about three weeks ago the statement made by Mr. Tennant in another place as to the liberality of the rations that the Germans were according to prisoners. He said that the authorities' scale of rations in Germany was carried out very generously. I think we are entitled to ask upon what authority that statement was made. The noble Lord referred to the fact that this was being circulated broadcast in Germany as good evidence of the liberality of the German rations. Within a fortnight or three weeks of making that statement Mr. Tennant recanted it. And on what grounds! That he had had the opportunity of interviewing prisoners who had returned from this camp—that is to say, he had taken the opportunity of securing first-hand information; and instead of what he had said three weeks before being the fact, it was the very reverse. The true state of affairs was this, that the rations were such that, were it not for the parcels, the men would starve.
I do not want to say that the Government are to blame. I do not want to make any offensive criticism. But this is too important a matter to allow to pass without a protest. I want to know why first-hand information has not been taken advantage of for the year or move that it has been available. I myself have taken a close interest in the fortunes, or misfortunes, of the prisoners at Ruhleben for reasons that I need not explain here. I have interviewed on every occasion that has presented itself—and they have not been few—returned prisoners from Ruhleben. It is certainly
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more than a year ago since I came into contact with some of those who had been released. Since then the flow of releases, though not great, has been continuous. Surely the Government ought to have access to accurate information and ought not to be making statements such as that made by Mr. Tennant, which he himself withdrew three weeks afterwards because it was founded upon inaccurate information. My point is that if there is a proper bureau here at home returned prisoners ought to be consistently and steadily examined as to the sort of treatment they have received; otherwise the public will not be accurately informed as to what is going on.
Contrast the treatment of British civilian prisoners in Germany with the treatment which the German civilian prisoners receive here. A gentleman with whom I have had communication returned recently from the camp at Ruhleben, and whilst there he held a very important position, so far as a prisoner can, in the administration of the camp. He has now had the privilege of visiting the Alexandra Palace civilian camp, where the Germans are interned, in order to draw a comparison between the dietary that he suffered under and what was prevalent there. At Ruhleben this was the daily dietary. For breakfast each prisoner received a bowl of coffee, or what is called coffee—I think it is synthetic coffee; it consists of roasted beans and acorns and anything but coffee, but it bears the name of coffee—a bowl of coffee in which there is no sugar or milk. That is the breakfast. A loaf is served out, and that is a ration for two days. For some time past it has been very indigestible, very coarse, and most unpalatable, and all prisoners who can afford it have their bread sent from Berne to the camp under the excellent arrangement that has been made for that. For dinner the prisoner gets a bowl of so-called soup, in the same bowl that he used for his coffee; it is a sort of fixture. I am assured by those who have been fed upon this soup that in appearance and in consistency it is very much like that adhesive substance that bill-stickers use to fasten bills to hoardings. There is no meat in it, or if a piece of meat is encountered it is more of a surprise than an expectation. There are no potatoes served, no vegetables of any kind; and that is the main meal of the day, the dinner. For tea the same bowl serves again, and into it the prisoner can have poured a liquid called either tea or

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cocoa. And that is the bill of fare! As a returned prisoner put it to me the other day," I had no opportunity of exercising my teeth at German expense from the time I became a prisoner in Ruhleben." The gentleman to whom I have referred told me what he found at the Alexandra Palace. There was a dining-room, a table cloth, and all accessories to a meal—plates, knives, dishes, condiments, first-class joints, and an abundance of vegetables. Contrast that with the terrible dietary that exists at Ruhleben.
I have on several occasions had an opportunity of visiting the officers' internment camp in North Wales, not very far from where I spend my leisure time when I have the opportunity. What did I find there? It is occupied entirely by German officers, among them von Tirpitz, the son of the notorious Admiral. They have splendid surroundings and ample exercise ground, and hockey, football, and games of that description were being played by the Germans without let or hindrance. What about the treatment? They are as well treated as any man would wish to be in any first-class hotel in England. The farmers come every day with milk, cream, poultry, and eggs, and solicit custom and get it; there is no rationing and no limit. Some of those who escaped were found to have in their possession £200 in money; and they enjoy the splendid treatment I have described. I have read about the treatment of British officers in Germany, and it is very bad.
On the one hand yon have this country behaving as it should behave, and on the other you have a country behaving as it should not behave. The question is, What is to be done? I am convinced that the conditions are becoming dangerous to the lives of British prisoners abroad. I am convinced that there is a movement now in Germany which, unless it is arrested by some action on the part of this Government, will condemn hundreds of our fellows there to sufferings that I hardly like to contemplate. Now what is to be done? Some people talk about retaliation. None of us here will listen to that; at least I hope not. But any amelioration that has come to our prisoners has come through the agency of the neutrals, notably the United States of America, through their Embassy in Berlin. I suggest that it is the duty of the Government to bring to the attention of the United States Government what may possibly happen in the future. I take these words
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from a statement made by Lord Robert Cecil when speaking of the treatment of prisoners. He said—
"The matter is one which I think ought to be regarded with grave anxiety as to what may possibly happen in the future; it is one of the matters which ought to be very carefully considered by all the Departments concerned."
I do not know what he means by" all the Departments concerned." It is the main consideration of the Government, and I suggest that it is their duty, and it is incumbent on them in my judgment, to take immediate action through every available channel against the possibility of British prisoners in Germany being reduced to starvation. We must not, we cannot, we dare not, leave this thing to chance. If we do, it is not only what will happen to British prisoners abroad, but I know there will be an outbreak here which will be a poor look-out for certain prisoners in this country. The Government may do what they can to try and control it, but if the people here once get the idea that British prisoners in Germany are being slowly starved to death no power except that of armed force will keep them quiescent.
I therefore beg the Government to consider the matter seriously. I recommend them to address themselves to the United States, and tell them what they fear is about to happen. I will never believe that America will hold aloof and regard it as no concern of theirs if and when helpless prisoners were being slowly and cruelly starved. It is absolutely unthinkable, and I am perfectly sure that one firm word from the United States to Germany to the extent of indicating that it must not happen would settle the thing and it would not happen. I would like to say, in conclusion, that I am convinced that we have in Lord Newton a sympathiser in this matter. I remember with gratitude that he was the first in your Lordships' House to raise the question before he sat on the Ministerial Bench. I was not here last Thursday when he spoke on the subject, but I read his speech with the greatest gratification and thank him for it.
LORD SOUTHWARK: My Lords, I do not propose to go over any of the ground that has been covered by other noble Lords, but a suggestion has been made to me with regard to invalid civilian prisoners, about whom nothing has been said this afternoon. The suggestion is that there might be an independent examination for invalid civilian

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prisoners such as is done with regard to military prisoners by Swiss doctors, and that these men should then either be allowed to go to Switzerland in the same way as military prisoners or be repatriated. I could confirm a great deal of what has been said by noble Lords this afternoon, as for some little time I have taken an interest in these Ruhleben prisoners. I will not, however, detain the House. But I would ask my noble friend to consider the point I have raised.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, so far as Kentish prisoners are concerned we are quite satisfied that they are getting their parcels. We receive replies methodically and regularly. It cannot be pretended for a moment that the prisoners could live on what is supplied to them by the Germans. That is disproved by the evidence of a doctor who had returned from one prison. What he told us was that some of the men there must die anyhow from the ill-treatment they received last winter, and that some were only going to be kept alive by means of the food sent to them. I am not defending in the least the. German allowance of food; but I am bound in justice, to say that, so far, we have had no reason to suspect that the food sent out to these men from home is not arriving. It is a curious thing that not one noble Lord who has spoken to-night has referred to the interesting White Paper which was circulated a week ago. With reference to what my noble friend here said about our not being grateful enough to the Americans, there is hardly a page in that White Paper upon which there is not a letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs asking that his thanks may be conveyed to this or that official of the American Embassy in Germany for the great care and attention he had given in the direction of making inquiries into every prison in Germany.
THE EARL OF MAYO: The public do not know that.
LORD HARRIS: I suppose the newspapers have been so crowded that they have not been able to refer to it. Noble Lords who read the White Paper will be relieved to find that his Excellency himself, as well as the subordinate officials, bears witness over and over again to the fact that the men do not complain. They say that the food has a great sameness, but they do not complain that there is not sufficient;
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and in many cases there are opportunities for games. There is also a report from the American Ambassador about an officers' camp in which I have an unfortunate relative interned. The Ambassador refers to the comforts that are supplied there, and his statement, I am happy to say, is borne out by private letters from my relative.
THE EARL OF ALBEMARLE: As your Lordships perhaps know. I am particularly interested in this subject. I listened with attention to what Lord Devonport said, but I should not like it to go forth to the Germans who read the reports of our debates that it has been stated in this House that officer prisoners up to the present moment have been badly treated in Germany. I endorse what Lord Devonport said with regard to the future, and I support his suggestion that the American Embassy in Berlin should be asked to take steps to look into the matter. Before my noble friend Lord Newton replies I should like to express the hope that His Majesty's Government will not overlook those British prisoners in Germany who are not in internment camps but who are spread about on forced labour. Those are the men whom we are very likely to lose sight of, though I think they are in the greatest jeopardy at this moment.
THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD NEWTON): My Lords, perhaps it would be convenient if I dealt first of all with the specific questions which were addressed to me by my noble and gallant friend opposite—namely, those relating to the numbers of prisoners in respective countries. In Germany there are, so far as we are aware, 25,621 British military prisoners, 1,089 naval prisoners, and 4,000 civilians, these last being, as the House knows, almost entirely concentrated at Ruhleben. Of the military prisoners 1,318 have died; and 7 naval prisoners and 45 civilians have died. In Bulgaria there are about 449 British prisoners, all of whom are military. In Turkey there are 8,857 military prisoners, 103 naval prisoners, and 60 interned civilians, which is not inclusive of Maltese, Cypriots, and Indians. With regard to these two latter countries, Bulgaria and Turkey, there has been, as my noble friend probably knows, considerable difficulty in obtaining accurate information, because the American representatives have found great difficulty in visiting the camps; and as regards Turkey, the American representatives

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have not yet been able to visit any of the prisoners' camps in Asia Minor. From Bulgaria, as the House is well aware, the first reports were extremely unfavourable and unsatisfactory, but I am happy to be able to state, from information which has reached us recently, that the condition of the prisoners there has greatly improved. The majority of these men are now interned at Philippopolis, and the last reports we have of them state that they are well and kindly treated. I should like to lay emphasis on this fact that, as regards Bulgaria, we and the prisoners owe a very great deal to the exertions of Mr. Einstein, the American Minister there; but I must guard myself against giving the impression that everything is totally satisfactory in Bulgaria, because there are certain districts in which smaller parties of men are employed, and it has not yet been possible to obtain accurate information with regard to them.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: "Employed" the noble Lord said. Does he mean employed or imprisoned?
LORD NEWTON: Employed on working parties.
THE EARL OF MAYO: Are they getting any parcels in Bulgaria yet?
LORD NEWTON: Yes, the parcels are arriving regularly at Philippopolis. With regard to Turkey, as I explained just now the American representatives have not been able to visit the camps, but from private information which has reached this country it appears that, although in the first instance the reports were extremely unfavourable, an improvement has taken place, and that even in so remote a place in Asia Minor as Bozanti, a place with which I happen to be acquainted, parcels and postcards are arriving regularly; and many of the men are employed, and are receiving in pay sums ranging from 1s. 6d. to 3s. 6d. daily. This information is obtained from what is known as the Government Committee, and in view of what has fallen from previous speakers it may be as well if I explain briefly what this Committee is. It is a Committee which was set up by the Home Office and the Foreign Office for the purpose of obtaining evidence from prisoners returning to this country, and therefore it fulfils exactly the purpose of the body which was asked for by the noble Lord behind me (Lord Devonport), who expressed a strong
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opinion that there should be a body of persons in this country who should be in a position to receive the evidence of returned prisoners. This Committee has been in existence for, I think, something like nine months. It has worked in conjunction with the Foreign Office and the Home Office, and has rendered most valuable assistance in every way. I believe that this Committee has examined practically every man whose evidence is of any value. It has been all taken down, and, as noble Lords will recollect, a good deal of that evidence appeared in the Wittenberg Report. That Report was, in fact, the Report of this Committee, the chairman of which is Mr. Justice Younger.
I will pass from the Government Committee and Bulgaria and Turkey to what is more important—namely, Germany. The noble and gallant Lord opposite asks in his Question whether it is not the case that the food is inferior and short, and he suggests that were it not for the exertions of Mrs. Grant-Duff and of another lady there would be practically no food at all. I was glad to hear this erroneous impression corrected, because although I should be the last to disparage the services of these two ladies the parcels which they send into Germany amount to only about one-quarter of the total number of parcels which enter Germany at the present moment. The remaining three-quarters of these parcels, whether they consist of food or otherwise, are sent by regimental organisations and by private individuals; and in this capacity what is known as the Prisoners of War Help Committee has been of great assistance.
The House may, perhaps, be surprised to learn that no fewer than 100,000 parcels containing food go into Germany every week. A simple calculation in arithmetic will show that this works out at an average per prisoner of rather over three parcels per week; and considering the enormous number of camps in Germany—there are, if I am not mistaken, considerably over 100 camps in which British prisoners alone are confined—it is a surprising thing that more parcels do not go astray. We have had this afternoon a conflict of opinion upon the subject of parcels, and noble Lords on both sides of the House have given their experience. My own impression is that upon the whole it is really surprising, as I have said, that so few parcels go astray. It must also be borne in mind that parcels are frequently

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lost and go astray because they are badly made up and are not in a condition to deliver when they arrive. But what I would like to impress on the House is this, that whenever we receive intelligence that parcels sent to these men are not arriving, we at once complain to the American Embassy and request them to investigate the circumstances. In every case this is done, and I have no hesitation in saying that the officials of the American Embassy, from the Ambassador downwards, do their very best to render our prisoners every possible assistance. I would also like to point out in this connection that Mr. Gerrard, the American Ambassador in Berlin, although in virtue of his position he is not bound to do any such thing, has frequently visited the camps himself; and that is an instance of devotion to his work which we ought to be the last to forget. Now my noble and gallant friend suggests that were it not for the parcels which are sent from this country our prisoners would literally starve. I do not know whether he is prepared to adhere to that.
LORD BERESFORD: Yes.
THE EARL OF MAYO: That is what Mr. Tennant said.
LORD NEWTON: Then I must say it is an exaggeration. If the noble and gallant Lord were correct in his assumption that the prisoners in Germany would literally starve to death if these parcels did not arrive, let me point out to him that hundreds of thousands of prisoners would be dead already. My noble friend must be aware that Russian prisoners in Germany receive no parcels at all. There are over 1,000,000, if I am not mistaken, of Russian prisoners in Germany at the moment; and if it were literally impossible to exist on the food supplied by the German Government these men would have died like flies. I am the last person who would desire to give the Germans credit when it is not due; but it would be infinitely more accurate to say, not that our prisoners would die if they did not receive the parcels, but that it is impossible for them to keep in good health if they have to subsist upon the food which is supplied by the German Government.
But I think the noble and gallant Lord and some other speakers in the debate are rather prone to ignore the fact that
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Germany is a blockaded country at the present moment; and I think the noble and gallant Lord would be the first to denounce the Government if he thought that the blockade was not being maintained with sufficient severity. The plain truth is that there is a general scarcity of food throughout Germany, and if our prisoners unfortunately do not get as much as they ought to have it has to be admitted that in all probability the vast majority of the German population is also in a state of comparative hunger. You might argue that, however hard up a Government may be, it ought at all events to feed its prisoners properly. If Germany cultivated chivalry, that might be the view taken by the German Government. But the German Government does not pride itself so much upon being a chivalrous Government as on being a practical Government, and that being so there is not very much to be expected from them in the way of generosity so far as food is concerned. But personally I have never been able to see what advantage there is in making out that the case of our prisoners in Germany is worse than it really is. It seems to me to be little short of an act of cruelty to the relations of these unfortunate men in this country to lead them to suppose that our men are not only in a state of misery but in a state of literal starvation as well.
Now what are the broad facts with regard to prisoners in Germany. In the earlier stages of the war these men were treated with gross and almost incredible cruelty. I say "incredible" because it is almost inconceivable that a highly civilised nation could have tolerated the hideous cruelties which were perpetrated upon many unfortunate British prisoners; and what is so remark-able about it is that these acts of cruelty were not the acts of a class, or the acts of a sex even, but they were the result of an incomprehensible feeling of fanatical cruelty directed against British prisoners. I admit all this. It would be absurd to deny that there was distinct and evident discrimination against British prisoners. But I am referring to a long anterior period. Nobody who has paid any attention to this question can fail to realise that there has been an immense improvement; that improvement dates from about a year ago, and I think it would be unjustifiable upon our part to contend that at the present moment there was discrimination against British prisoners. I wish that noble Lords who bring forward

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these questions would adopt the advice of my noble friend Lord Harris and study the publications on the subject. We produced a large White Paper only a week or two ago, and I should like to know how many noble Lords there are in the House at the present moment who have read that book. I know that Lord Harris has, but I question very much—
LORD BERESFORD: I have read every line of it, and I do not believe it.
LORD NEWTON: Then I am disappointed that the noble and gallant Lord was not more correct in his facts.
LORD BERESFORD: Prisoners tell me differently. I do not believe the statements in the White Paper.
LORD NEWTON: The noble and gallant Lord positively staggers me. What are you to believe?
LORD BERESFORD: I believe what the prisoners who have come back tell me.
LORD NEWTON: What is the good of having a Report at all?
LORD BERESFORD: I cannot argue that.
LORD NEWTON: Does the noble and gallant Lord suggest that the Reports which are written by the American representatives are documents to which no credence is to be attached? Those Reports are written in a perfectly impartial spirit, and I venture to suggest that it is extremely unfortunate that the noble and gallant Lord should throw doubt upon them.
LORD BERESFORD: I do not say for one moment that the Ambassador and those who worked with him put forward what they did not think was true. I should be the last to say that. But I believe what the prisoners tell me, and it is not in accordance with the Reports. That is all I say.
LORD NEWTON: I think that if the noble and gallant Lord will carefully study the reports of the prisoners themselves he will find that there is not such a great difference in the facts as he supposes. I think that anybody who has taken the trouble to study the Reports must realise the great difficulties which surround this
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question. The Germans have an enormous number of prisoners to deal with, and I doubt whether that fact has been sufficiently realised. I suppose that at the present moment there are 2,000,000 prisoners in Germany; and the English prisoners alone, as I stated earlier, are distributed over more than 100 camps. It is therefore not surprising that you should find considerable variation in the conditions at those camps. We all know that the conditions of a camp depend largely upon the character of the commandant, and I think it will be evident to anybody who studies the subject that there are all varieties of camps in Germany. There are bad camps—Wittenberg is an example—and there are others, perhaps, almost equally as bad. There are indifferent camps. There are also—I do not know why we should not admit it—good camps, camps in which it is perfectly evident that our prisoners have no complaint whatever to make against their guardians; and it is not altogether beyond the bounds of possibility that these well-conducted camps might in some instances compare with our own. It is a somewhat peculiar circumstance worth noting in connection with these varying conditions that the camps where the prisoners are best treated are usually camps which are commanded by men who have had some association with this country, and in which the guards are men who have actually fought against our men in the field; whereas when you get a camp which is commanded or managed by a man of pure unviolated German blood, then the conditions are apt to be much less satisfactory.
But what I would insist upon is that whenever complaints come to our notice we invariably take action, and I do not think I have heard any method suggested by any speaker in the course of the afternoon by which any abuses could be effectively remedied. Everybody, as I understand, repudiates retaliation; and in connection with this I believe it is a mistake to imagine, as is imagined in some quarters, that retaliation has produced amelioration of the prisoners' lot. What retaliation has done is this. In certain instances it has restored the conditions to their original level. One Government has heard that its prisoners have been ill treated; it has threatened retaliation, and the men's original condition has been restored; but whether this has

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effected any real improvement I have considerable doubt.
I have already detained the House longer than I intended, but I do not want to conclude without some reference to what the noble Lord behind me (Lord Devonport) said with regard to Ruhleben. He complained that he had not received any communications from Ruhleben within the last six weeks. I confess that I do not clearly understand that, because no complaints with regard to this particular point have reached us. But with a great deal of what he said I am in entire concurrence. Speaking for myself personally and looking at the question generally I confess that the people who appeal to me most and whose case seems to me to be the most pitiful are the civilians who are interned not only at Ruhleben but also in this country, and I think the first thing we ought to set ourselves to do is to secure the liberation of as many of these men as possible. The noble Lord behind me suggested that we should appeal to the Americans for assistance. We are doing that every day. It is to the Americans to whom we appeal.
LORD DEVONPORT: I was assuming that the forebodings of Lord Robert Cecil were likely to prove true. That is quite a different question. You are in communication with the American Embassy at Berlin only in regard to incidentals that crop up from time to time. But Lord Robert Cecil rather gave the indication—and communications from other directions point the same way—that these parcels are going to be interfered with, and that it is impossible for the men to live without them. If the Government believe that, then it is time to make representations to the United States and see what can be done.
LORD NEWTON: The noble Lord may take it for granted that we are fully aware of the danger to which he has alluded, and it is imperative upon us to do all we can to avert so horrible a calamity. But it seems to me, looking at the matter from a plain practical point of view, that we ought to get away as many of these people as we can. That was the burden of what I said the other day in this House, and I remain of the same opinion. I think we ought to do all we can, in the first place, to get as many of these civilians as possible away from Ruhleben; and if I could contribute in any way towards that result and restore these unfortunate men to freedom
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I should consider that for once in a way I had rendered a service not only in the cause of humanity but in the cause of common sense.
LORD SOUTHWARK: The noble Lord has said nothing about the invalid civilian prisoners at Ruhleben. I do not know whether he can hold out any hope.
LORD NEWTON: The arrangement to which the noble Lord referred applies at the present moment only to military prisoners. The noble Lord asked whether it could be made to apply to civilians. That is a question which has not yet been considered. It will be a matter of very great complexity, and at the present moment I do not feel in a position to express any definite opinion on the subject.

HOUSE OF LORDS REFRESHMENT ROOMS.
Order of the Day read for the consideration of the First Report of the Select Committee, which was as follows—
That the Committee have met and have considered the Report of the subcommittee of last session and have approved of their recommendation, viz.: that a qualified chartered accountant should be appointed to audit the accounts of the caterer, Mr. Casbon, for one year terminating on the 1st of July, 1916; and the Committee recommend that the sum of £126 should be paid to such accountant out of the Fee Fund of the House of Lords for his services up to the 1st January, 1916.
Moved, That the Report of the Select Committee be considered.—(Lord Muir-Mackenzie.)
LORD DEVONPORT: Is this payment to the auditor a new payment or an annual payment?
LORD MUIR-MACKENZIE: It is a payment on account of work that has been actually done by an auditor appointed by the Committee to see how the accounts of the caterer have been carried out under recent arrangements that have been made on your Lordships' authority by that Committee.
LORD DEVONPORT: Then the payment has already been made?
LORD MUIR-MACKENZIE: Yes, it has been made so far; and at the next meeting of the Committee it will probably be proposed to pay the same auditor for the work done up to the date when the Committee meets.
LORD DEVONPORT: I assume from that statement that this is the case of an auditor being called in to render a particular and special service, and that this is not to be an annual audit. If it were, I was going to suggest that the remuneration is inordinately large for the amount of auditing that would have to be done. I am not very familiar with what goes on in your Lordships' dining room, but I would venture to say that very few dinners take place there. There may be some few teas, and possibly the lunches of a legal Lord or two. To pay £126 for an audit of this kind is an extravagance which we might pass on this one and only occasion; but if it were proposed to repeat it I should oppose it vigorously and even divide against it. I should have thought an auditor would have been well remunerated for such work as would be required in this case if he received 25 guineas.
On Question, Report considered and agreed to.

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order) Bill reported without amendment: Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Bill read 3a, and passed.
CONSOLIDATED FUND (No. 3) BILL.
  NAVAL DISCIPLINE (DELEGATION OF POWERS) BILL.
  Read 2a (according to Order): Committees negatived: Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Bills read 3a, and passed.

COURTS (EMERGENCY POWERS) (AMENDMENT) (No. 2.) BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD BUCKMASTER): My Lord, I think I ought
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to say a few words in introducing this Bill to your Lordships' notice. It, in fact, represents certain clauses in the Bill introduced in your Lordships' House some time in April. These clauses were then omitted in deference to the request of one or two noble Lords who said they required further time for the consideration of the matter, and as it was impossible to proceed with the Committee stage before the recess the clauses, as I have said, were dropped out of that Bill. They have now been introduced in a new Bill which has been passed through another place and has now come up to your Lordships' House.
The real question and the only point of consequence relates to the rights of a mortgagee in possession of real property. Under the original Act a mortgagee who was in possession of real estate before the passing of the Act was not hindered by the restrictions which appertained to a mortgagee's power of sale. It was considered that the grave liability which the mortgagee was under was sufficient to justify him to sell if he could get the right without having the necessity of applying to the Court. The whole of the position with regard to a mortgagee in possession of stocks and shares was affected. As your Lordships know, there are large blocks of stocks and shares held by banks from time to time on behalf of their customers; at the present moment the opportunity for the sale of these large blocks of shares is almost destroyed, and in certain cases if they were put on the market suddenly the man whose security was so dealt with might be ruined. No doubt in many cases the banks have met the matter with their own good sense, and have not attempted to realise them; but people connected with the Stock Exchange are very apprehensive about allowing the power which is now vested in the banks to be exercised without application to the Court. The consequence is that there is introduced into this Bill an omission of personal property from property the possession of which entitles a mortgagee to sell if he is in possession. That is the sub-stance of the Bill.
There is one other clause to which I ought to refer. At the present moment it is very undesirable that any building operation should be undertaken on a large scale. It uses up labour which can be better employed for other purposes, and it is wise that it should be discouraged in

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every way. But there are persons who had begun to construct buildings and then discontinued their construction, and rights of light may thereby be acquired against them which will permanently prevent them from building further. Consequently a clause has been introduced into this Bill enabling a person who has arrested his building under circumstances connected with the war to apply to the Court, and, if he proves the fact to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court may in terms provide that the period during which he ceased to build shall be omitted from the time during which the prescribed period runs enabling another
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to acquire rights of light against him. Those are the main points of the Bill.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Lord Chancellor.)
On Question, Bill read 2a.
Committee negatived.
Then (Standing Order No. XXXIX having been suspended), Bill read 3a, and passed.
House adjourned at half-past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.