Lords Sitting of 25 May 1916

LECKY'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read: Counsel called in: Witnesses examined: Moved that the Bill be now read 2a; agreed to: Bill read 2aaccordingly.

LORD BURGH.
The House being informed that his Lordship was attending with his writ of summons, the Lord Chancellor explained to the House his Lordship's descent: Then his Lordship was called in and took the Oath and then took his place on the Baron's Bench.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with:
Local Government Provisional Orders (No. 2).
The same was ordered to lie on the Table.

RHODES ESTATE.
Petition of the Earl of Rosebery, the Earl Grey, the Viscount Milner, and Sir Leander Starr Jameson, on behalf of themselves and other the trustees of the will of the Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes, deceased, praying for leave to introduce a Bill to revoke a codicil to the will of the late Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes, and for other purposes; together with a copy of the proposed Bill annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.

RETURNS, REPORTS, &c.
India (Military)—Papers relating to Major-General C. V. F. Townshend's appreciation of the position after the battle of Kut-el-Amara:
Board of Agriculture and Fisheries—Annual Report of the Chief Veterinary Officer for the year 1915:
Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.
Public Accounts and Charges Act, 1891—Treasury Minute, dated 5th January 1916, directing that fees, &c., payable to the Registry of Friendly Societies shall be applied as Appropriations in Aid of the Vote for that Department:
National Insurance Act, 1911 (Part II) Account—Account showing the nature and amount of the Securities held by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt at 31st March, 1916 as Investments for Moneys, forming part of the Unemployment Fund paid over to them by the Board of Trade under section 92 (3) of the National Insurance Act, 1911:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

BRITISH NORTH AMERICA BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Tuesday next (The Lord Islington). (No. 43.)
NORTH BRITISH RAILWAY BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read 1a, and referred to the Examiners.
JOURNAL COMMITTEE.
Report from, that the One hundred and forty-seventh Volume of the Journals (5th and 6th George V, 1914–1916), with an Index, was ready for delivery; read, and ordered to lie on the Table; and the said Volume ordered to be delivered in the same manner as the preceding Volumes of the Journal have been delivered.
REGISTRATION OF FIRMS BILL. [H.L.]
The evidence taken before the Select Committee from time to time to be printed, but no copies to be delivered except to Members of the Committee, and such other persons as the Committee shall think fit, until further order. (No. 44.)
CONSOLIDATION BILLS.
Leave given to the Joint Committee to report from time to time. The evidence taken before the Joint Committee from time to time to be printed, but no copies to be delivered except to Members of the Committee and to such other persons as the Committee shall think fit, until further order. (No. 45.)
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (BUXTON SCHEME CONFIRMATION) BILL. [H.L.]
  IRVINE'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
  Read 3a(according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

SMALL HOLDING COLONIES BILL. [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the Day for Second Reading read.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, I wish first to express to your Lordships my regret that this Bill was so late in being circulated. I assure yon that the delay was as great an annoyance to myself as it could have been to your Lordships, and I know that it has caused inconvenience, but I hope you will accept my apology. This Bill is based on the Report of a Committee which was presided over by Sir Harry Verney, to whom Mr. Henry Hobhouse succeeded when Sir Harry Verney took upon himself military service. When I accepted the office which I now have the honour to occupy just a year ago I found this Committee almost completed, and in appointing it I really did no more than complete the work begun by my predecessor. I want to take this opportunity of expressing my great appreciation of the way in which Sir Harry Verney and Mr. Henry Hobhouse and their colleagues conducted their labours, and I cannot but think that their Report, upon which, as I have said, this Bill is founded, is a real contribution to the study of the question of small holdings, which interests so many of your Lordships and others of the public.
I wish to make certain preliminary points quite clear before I proceed to describe the Bill and its object. In the first place let me say, although I admit that it is not expressed in the terms of the Bill, that the object of this Bill is to help a certain number of discharged and disabled soldiers and sailors. It does not profess to be a large contribution to the very serious problem of demobilisation, though we hope that the experience gained in these colonies—if Parliament is good enough to give, us the powers—may be of real assistance in dealing with the problem of demobilisation. Nor does the Bill profess in any way to hold out an offer to every discharged soldier and sailor of a right of accommodation by the State upon the land. It is a limited
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experimental Bill, but its object is in making this experiment to benefit a certain though a small number of the men who have fought for us by sea and by land, and if possible we hope that disabled seamen and soldiers will be included in that number. There are degrees of disablement which would obviously incapacitate a man for any kind of work upon the land, but there are other degrees of disablement which would not necessarily so incapacitate him. Your Lordships know that Parliament has put on the Statutory Pensions Committee presided over by Mr. Cyril Jackson the duty of looking after these disabled soldiers and sailors, and, so far as they are concerned, if Parliament gives the Board of Agriculture the powers for which we ask we shall endeavour to act as the agents of that Committee in accommodating a certain number of disabled men in these colonies.
I have said, and I wish to lay special stress on the fact, that this is an experiment. What the nature of the experiment is I will describe presently. But let me clear away one controversy which divides Parties in respect of small holdings. The Party to which I belong has always believed in ownership as the basis of small holdings. The other great Party in the State has, on the whole, pinned its faith to the system of tenancies. The Committee to whose Report I have referred deal with this question, but I am authorised by them to say that in dealing with it they were not intending to lay down opinions on the general question of the merits of ownership or of tenancy, but they did mean to point out, owing to the special character of the pioneer colonies which they were proposing, that tenancy must be the basis. There is no wavering, my Lords, in my personal allegiance to the principle of ownership. I have not changed my opinion in any degree that Mr. Jesse Collings was perfectly right in making ownership the basis of his policy of small holdings; but I am, notwithstanding, prepared to advocate the arguments of the Committee in respect of the three pioneer colonies which I ask your Lordships to authorise—and for this reason. In finding men suitable to occupy this land among discharged sailors and soldiers there must necessarily be a period of trial; very little will be known about many of these men beforehand, and their suitability for this purpose must be tested. Again, some of them at any rate will not have had previous

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experience on the land and will have to be trained; and the whole operation, as I have already stated, is of an experimental character. It seems to me obvious for these reasons that during the experimental period, at all events, the State must keep the control of the land in its own hands. If the experiment is a success, I sincerely hope that the day will come when the holders will become the owners of their holdings; but at the present moment I am convinced that they must be admitted, if at all, on the basis of tenancy.
Your Lordships will ask me what has been the experience so far of small holdings initiated or encouraged, either directly or indirectly, by the action of the State. First of all, there was the Bill passed by the Unionist Government of which Lord Salisbury was the head. That measure owed its inspiration very largely to Mr. Jesse Collings. Then there was the Bill passed by the late Government in the year 1908. In both cases the action of the State was indirect—that is to say, the executive action was taken by the county councils and not directly by the Board of Agriculture. In round figures, the result of those Acts has been to place 15,000 small-holders on 200,000 acres, at a cost of £6,000,000. And, in passing, let me say that the estimate of Sir Harry Verney's Committee as to the cost of the scheme which I am going to commend to your Lordships is based on the experience of the working of those Acts. But do not suppose that these 15,000 small holdings are all exactly of the same character. On the contrary, some of them are new holdings altogether, which have had to be equipped with houses and buildings appropriate to their size. Others are additions to existing holdings, which have been allowed on the principle that it was very wise to turn an uneconomic into an economic small holding by increasing its size. Lastly there has been the provision of what I should describe as accommodation land, where there has been no existing holding and no provision of house or building, but where a tradesman, or a blacksmith, or a publican, or a labourer living in a cottage and having other occupation has been provided with a small plot of ground on which he could turn out a horse or a cow, or which he could cultivate. Therefore your Lordships will notice that it would be most misleading to divide £6,000,000 by 15,000 small holdings and say that an average small holding costs a
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certain sum. If you want to arrive at the cost of a fully equipped new small holding you would have to take into calculation only those which have been provided of that class, and divide their total cost by their total number, excluding from the calculation the provision of accommodation land or the increase of previously uneconomic small holdings.
I may be asked what has been the financial effect of this large operation—because I may use that term in respect of the money involved, though not, perhaps, strictly in respect of the number of men actually put upon the land. The financial aspect of the case is distinctly satisfactory. I can say that the losses to the county councils have been absolutely negligible. Out of all the counties—and every county has had a scheme of one kind or another, more or less—of England and Wales, in only six counties has there been any loss on a scheme, and, of those six, four of the losses are of a trivial character, and the other two have been due to causes which were not within the control of the county council or of the small-holder. For instance, in my own county of Hampshire there was a waterspout on the shores of Porchester Creek which absolutely swept all the cultivated land within the area visited by the waterspout into the sea; and in Norfolk there were most devastating floods owing to breaches in the barriers of the rivers which laid many thousands of acres under water and kept them in that condition for many weeks. With those two exceptions, where there were calamities of nature which visited farms as well as small holdings, the only losses on schemes have been in the case of four counties, and those were of an unimportant character.
But all the schemes of small holdings instituted by county councils have been of an individual character—that is to say, whenever an individual person wanted land the county council endeavoured to provide it for that man in the area of the county in which he wished to have it, and each individual holder has been left to his individual resources. There has been no attempt on the part of county councils to establish anything in the nature of a colony, nor to select a particularly suitable area of land and try to form a colony of holders on that land. In fact, there has been no attempt to bring the holder to the land, but always an effort to bring the land to the individual holder. So much for the

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action of the county councils. But there have been attempts by various persons at one time or another to introduce the colony system of small holdings. It would take up too much of your Lordships' time were I to try and give you a full account of them. I can only say that some of them have been successful and some have been unsuccessful.
I will now describe to your Lordships what the plan of the Committee is which the Government have adopted in the case of these three experimental and pioneer colonies. It is proposed to take an area of land, in the case of a fruit or market garden colony, of not more than 1,000 acres; in the case of a dairy and pig and poultry colony, of not more than 2,500 acres; and to settle on each of those areas, roughly speaking, 100 small-holders. The holdings would be grouped round a central farm, which at the commencement of the colony would be at its maximum, and when the colony was in full swing and complete in its number of selected settlers would be at its minimum, but which would never pass out of existence. The central farm would be managed by a director, and in connection with its buildings would be offices and depôts for the purposes which I am going to describe. The whole object of the colony system is that co-operation—free co-operation, not enforced co-operation—should prevail from the commencement. As it would be beyond the means of a smallholder to purchase many instruments for which he has only occasional use but which are necessary to him on occasion, such instruments would be kept at the central depôt and let out to him on strictly economic terms when he required them. In the same way, in connection with a small fruit holding, the small-holders will have only occasional use for a horse; therefore the horses would be kept at the central depôt and let out. Generally speaking, the central depôt would be responsible for all the transport of the colony. The central depôt would also be the agency to buy at wholesale prices the requirements of the settlers for the purpose of their agriculture, and it would also be the agency which would dispose of, in the best market available, the produce of the colonists. Your Lordships will see that the central depôt would be the agency for the hire to colonists of instruments which they require, the agency for transport, and also the agency for
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purchase and sale, but all done on a strictly commercial basis and with no element of philanthropy whatever.
In addition the central farm would be always an example to the colonists of what might be done under this particular system of agriculture, and it would afford the opportunity for small experiments necessary for the particular purposes of the colony. The director and those working under him on the farm would be the experts to whom the small-holders might always look for advice and assistance; and, in the beginning, on this farm would be trained those ex-sailors and ex-soldiers who had been selected as holders, yet lacked that agricultural experience which is necessary to success. They would be placed in the houses that they would eventually occupy, and, according to the discretion of the director, they would be furnished with the land adjoining their houses necessary for their holding. They would begin with a small portion of land according to their experience and their capital and work up to a larger amount, with a fixed maximum, which would be taken as required from the farm; so that, as I endeavoured to describe to your Lordships at the beginning of my statement, the farm would start at its maximum size and dwindle to its minimum as the holdings were gradually taken up and reached each its maximum.
It is not proposed that the houses of the colonists should be scattered at random; on the contrary, we hope to benefit by the study and the experience which has been acquired in recent years in the matter of town planning. We hope to give the colony the advantage of the experience gained, and, so far as is possible with a strict view to business and not to philanthropy, we propose from the beginning to encourage the amenities of a settlement of this kind. It must have its school, of course. It must have places of worship, if they are not already near enough at hand; and we should hope it would have its parish hall. In the case of a fruit colony, there would be a jam factory in connection with the central depôt; and in connection with a dairy colony, there would be a creamery. We should also keep in view one of the strong recommendations of the Committee so far as possible to combine with the agricultural work of the colony some form of rural industry. If the colony is near a woodland area, that, of course, would be comparatively a simple

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matter. But that is not the only form in which we hope that additional rural industry may be introduced into such a colony. I have already stated that the conception of the colony is that of co-operation from the commencement, though not of enforced co-operation. We believe that the advantages offered will be so obvious that the small-holder will not hesitate to take advantage of them; but if he thought he could do better by buying for himself and selling for himself, he would be perfectly free to do so. Then we hope in time to graft on this co-operative system a System of credit, so as to give the small-holders the advantages of credit which are only afforded in this country by the ordinary joint stock banks or local banks, but which in almost every country on the Continent are afforded in some form or another by specially devised credit banks or credit societies.
If I have succeeded in giving your Lordships a general picture of the scheme, let me say at once that the rents to be charged to these colonists are to be strictly economic. The rents charged are to cover all the costs of the enterprise, except the cost of the training of men who require training. That is the scheme. I quite admit that it will require extreme care in detail and in administration to give effect to the intention; but obviously the experiment will be a failure unless it is an economic success. Therefore personally I express my very clear sense of the necessity of seeing that the rents charged do cover all the costs of the operation. Opinions, of course, will differ as to whether or not there is any chance of success for an experiment of this kind. I have no doubt that experienced men in agriculture can be found who will shake their heads and say that the experiment is bound to fail; but I can certainly cite others, commanding the highest authority in agriculture, who believe that with good management this experiment ought to succeed, who believe that small holdings have hitherto been tried under the most unfavourable conditions, and that this for the first time will be trying them under the most favourable conditions. They have been tried under most unfavourable conditions in the past because each holder has been isolated; he has had no general guidance, no assistance in his marketing or in his purchasing, no expert to whom to go for advice in an emergency, and he
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has in my opinion too often only imitated the big farmer by his side. I do not believe, except in rare instances, in the success of a small-holder who conducts his business simply as a microcosm of a big farm near at hand. I believe that small holdings may be and ought to be a great success in this country in the proper localities and under suitable conditions. The general system of the farming of the small-holder ought to be of a distinctive nature, and not a mere imitation of the capitalist who lives near by.
Were your Lordships to ask me the conditions which I think essential to the success of this experiment I would name them thus. I would say that a great deal will depend on the right selection of the men. From all the demobilised Armies and Fleets there ought to be a large selection of men. Your Lordships may ask me how many men out of these demobilised Fleets and Armies do I think would wish to settle on the land. That is a question which I admit I cannot answer. My friends offer me suggestions and opinions which vary from the view that almost every man in the Army will want to settle upon the land to the opinion that all soldiers will have had enough of digging and of the soil to last them for the rest of their lives, and that therefore there is no good expecting to find recruits for the land out of the Army. There is no material by which any of us can form an opinion. Will a great number of men refuse to return to the indoor occupation which they left or to the office stool which they had previously occupied, or will they hanker after the sociability of the town and refuse to do anything more in the nature of trench digging? No one can say. I am taking what steps I can, through the kindness of Sir Douglas Haig, to find out what the general temper of the men is in this matter and whether they have thought of it at all, but I have not yet had any figures or information from him which I can quote. But here comes in the wisdom of the caution of this small experiment. It is inconceivable to my mind that we shall not be able to find three hundred really suitable men out of all the demobilised Armies and Fleets for settlement in these colonies. And when I say "suitable," I mean by character and temperament and the industry of habit that is essential to a successful small-holder. But, of course, we will always give the preference, other things being equal, to the man who has had

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previous agricultural experience, to the man who has a little capital of his own, and to the man whose wife, in his absence, has been helping us on the land in this time of emergency, The task of selection will be a difficult one, but therein comes the necessity for what I call the period of sifting and of training.
The next condition of success is in the right selection of the land. The greatest stress must be laid upon that. Certainly I am not prepared to take upon myself the responsibility of putting a settlement down upon any land as to which I have no definite and clear advice from the highest authorities that it is suitable for the purpose. I should like to take this opportunity of alluding to the munificent offer which a member of your Lordships' House and my immediate predecessor in the office I hold—Lord Lucas—has made in this connection. I do not know yet whether we shall be able to avail ourselves of his offer, because, of course, the land which Lord Lucas has been good enough to offer us must be judged on exactly the same basis as all other land; it must be subjected to the same opinion, and can only be utilised if it is clearly exactly what we require for the purpose. Whether or not we are able to put a colony on this estate, I cannot sufficiently express my gratitude to Lord Lucas for the, example and lead he has given in putting his property at our disposal for this purpose. As soon as he heard of the Report of this Committee—he was then in Egypt—he communicated with me and made the offer, in the first place, of his house and garden for the permanent use of disabled seamen and soldiers, if it could be utilised for that purpose. That aspect of his offer does not come within the purview of my responsibility. That concerns Mr. Cyril Jackson and the Statutory Pensions Committee. But he went beyond that and said that out of the whole of his property we might select any area that we thought suitable for one of these colonies, and that he was prepared to sell that area or to lease it on a long lease at the valuation of anybody appointed by the Government. I hope your Lordships will recognise the generosity and patriotism of that offer. I may say that his example has already been followed. I have had similar offers from other gentlemen, and it is for those reasons that I look forward with much hope to being able to find the exactly suitable sites that we require for this purpose.
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Then the next element of success will be the right selection of the directors of these colonies. Given the right land and the right settlers, everything will still depend on getting the right men to direct the colonies and to manage them. Lastly it is necessary that care should be exercised to see that every detail is worked out with systematic regard for economy, and that no money is wasted owing to carelessness or a desire for what may be described as show. I should mention, in connection with the estimates which your Lordships will find in the Report of the Committee—and this is another reason why great care must be shown in working out the details of these colonies—that the prices of the houses there given were based on the prices at the time. Undoubtedly if we were to build now those houses would cost more. The Government decided to adopt the Report of the Committee to the extent of forming these three pioneer colonies at a moment when the Board of Agriculture had already been depleted by the departure of every officer who could possibly be spared to the war, when the, war work of the Office was becoming heavier and heavier, and I was living in daily anxiety as to whether my officers would not break down under the strain; and here was a new piece of work of great importance and requiring special skill, special knowledge, and special discretion in dealing with it successfully. I was indeed fortunate in those circumstances. I had a generous offer from Captain Bathurst, a member of the House of Commons, that he was willing, as his war work, to come and help me in this matter; and I am quite sure that the general superintendence and organisation of this scheme could not be in better hands. I have also had the advantage of having the advice of another distinguished Member of Parliament, Mr. Prothero, which he has given to us whenever we required it.
Having given your Lordships this perfunctory, though I am afraid rather tedious, account of the intention of the Bill and of this scheme, I think you would wish me to go shortly through the clauses and explain their intention. Clause 1, subsection (1), gives power to the Board of Agriculture to acquire land by agreement. There is no compulsory clause in this Bill, although I should have thought, myself perfectly justified in asking for compulsory powers for this purpose had those powers been necessary; but as I knew that I should have all the land I required, and more, put at

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my disposal by agreement without compulsion, there was no necessity for the incorporation of a compulsory clause. As I have said, there is power to acquire land by agreement. The Bill is limited in its duration to the period of the war and a year after, therefore showing its intention of being connected with discharged sailors and soldiers. There is a maximum limit of 6,000 acres which may be taken, again showing the strictly experimental character of the proposal. And, of course, there is the usual provision for the consent of the Treasury. I may say that it is my great hope not to have to buy any land at all. I hope to get the land on long lease; and in the case of Crown properties, some of which are certainly quite suitable for the purpose, that can be easily arranged, because I happen to fill the office not only of President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries but I am also one of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests. I have also received private offers—of which I have given your Lordships already an example in Lord Lucas's case—of land to be let on long periods; and, of course, your Lordships see the great importance, in the state of our finances, that the Treasury should not be asked to find a large sum of money for purchase if an annual Tent will settle the matter. Subsection (2) of Clause 1 is the usual provision in the circumstances of a Bill like this. This incorporation of the Lands Clauses Acts is customary in these cases, as they include various useful provisions.
I come to Clause 2, and I would briefly explain the object of that clause to be, with the consent of the Treasury, to carry out the recommendations of the Committee for the establishment of small co-operative credit societies. Do not think, my Lords, that I imagine that we can start a credit system immediately with a number of small-holders who are to a large extent untried and who do not know each other. The credit system must be a growth of mutual knowledge and of previous co-operation, but it is necessary to make provision for it in this Bill.
Clause 3 deals with another matter altogether. It has nothing whatever to do with the institution of these three pioneer colonies, and that is why the Title of the Bill is of a composite character. Your Lordships will see that the description of the Bill is—
"An Act to provide for the acquisition and management of land by the State for experimental
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small holding colonies, and to extend the powers of acquisition and management of land by certain Government Departments under the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act, 1909."
The explanation of that is this. One of the problems which was confronting the Board of Agriculture before the war, and which will be of the most urgent character after the war, is the question of afforestation. By the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act, 1909, the Board of Agriculture has power to purchase land for the purpose of forestry demonstration areas, but it has no power to hire the land by agreement or to get an option on the land to purchase it. This clause merely gives the Board of Agriculture power to take land by agreement on lease, or to acquire an option of purchasing the land or of taking the land on lease, in addition to its existing power of buying the land. Clause 4 contains the necessary powers of management, which I do not think require any detailed explanation. Clause 5 has to do with the financial management. Clause 6 deals with the power of landowners to grant long leases. Clause 7 is the interpretation clause.
Clause 8, which I dare say appears rather mysterious, is susceptible of an innocent explanation. The proceedings of the Board under the Bill would involve some work for which a solicitor would be required, and Clause 8 is intended to enable this work to be done by the present legal adviser of the Board, who has been appointed to act also as solicitor to the Woods and Forests Department and can utilise the solicitor's staff of that Department for the work. Being a barrister and not a solicitor he could not act formally as solicitor unless these sections are applied to the post. So that this is a perfectly innocent proposal connected with the machinery of the office of the Board of Agriculture which happens to be necessary under the peculiar circumstances of the ease. Clause 9 applies the Bill to Scotland, and provides that the maximum number of acres to be used for this purpose in Scotland shall be 2,000, as distinct from the 6,000 that are permitted for England and Wales. I hope I have succeeded in giving a fairly clear idea of the special, though strictly limited, objects of this Bill, of the nature of the scheme which is proposed, and of the provisions by which it is hoped to give effect to that scheme. I beg to move that the Bill be read a second time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Earl of Selborne.)
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I have listened with deep attention to the interesting speech of the noble Earl in explaining his Bill. It was the more interesting because it contained a great many details and certain modifications which did not appear in the body of the Bill itself. We have, however, had very short notice of the Bill. We received it only two days ago, and there are some noble Lords anxious to take part in the discussion of the Bill who are not able to be present to-day. Further than that, what the noble Earl has just said seems to me to require some time for consideration and thought. Therefore I would ask him to recognise that this is perhaps not the best moment to proceed to discuss the Bill, and to consent to the debate being adjourned to some more convenient day.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I am quite aware that my noble friend and others of your Lordships have been placed at an inconvenience by the late delivery of the copies of this Bill, and as I wish to consult the convenience of your Lordships' House in general I am quite prepared, as you have been good enough to listen to my exposition of the Bill, to consent to the adjournment of the debate. I suggest, if that date will be convenient, that the resumed discussion should be taken on Thursday next.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Hear, hear.
On Question, the further debate adjourned until Thursday next.

EXCHANGE OF INTERNED CIVILIANS.
LORD BERESFORD LORD BERESFORD had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask His Majesty's Government how many interned British and German civilians have been exchanged since the beginning of the war; whether any alteration or extension of the present system of exchange, is contemplated; whether a statement can be made with regard to the agreement concluded with the German Government for the transfer to Switzerland of British and German wounded and invalid combatant prisoners of war; whether the number can be given; and whether the agreement will allow of repatriation.
The noble and gallant Lord said: Before my noble friend answers this Question, I should like to call attention to the fact that there is growing anxiety and distress in the minds of the relatives of those who are prisoners in Germany at the brutality of treatment to which they are being subjected. I now have the honour to ask the Question standing in my name.
THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD NEWTON): My Lords, the number of British subjects who have been repatriated since December, 1914, is 628, and the number of Germans who have been repatriated is 1,160. As I informed the House the other day there are, roughly speaking, about 27,000 German civilians interned in this country, and that number tends to remain unchanged, because although a certain number are being continually repatriated the numbers are again filled up by fresh arrests either in this country or of men who have been taken off ships at sea. As against the 27,000 Germans in this country there are 4,000 British civilians in Germany, who are all interned at the well-known Ruhleben Camp. In view of these figures, I am reluctantly compelled to admit that the number of repatriations seems to me upon the whole to be thoroughly and distinctly unsatisfactory.
I do not know whether the House agrees with me, but it certainly appears to me that the lot of the interned British civilians in Germany is an especially hard one. In fact, I am disposed to state—at all events it is my opinion—that the case of these men is really harder than the case of the military; because, after all, when a man enlists in an Army and takes part in war imprisonment is part of the fortune of war. But these civilians in many cases have not committed any action at all. They were living peaceably in one of the two countries concerned; they were taken up, and many of them have been in these camps for something like two years. Therefore it seems to me most desirable, if only in the interests of humanity, that every effort should be made upon our part in this country to liberate these 4,000 unfortunate men now at Ruhleben. The condition of these men is so unfortunate that I am given to understand, on the best authority, that many of them are in process of losing their reason; and it may not have escaped

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notice that of the nine civilians who were repatriated from Ruhleben a few days ago three were described as insane.
It may be rejoined that if the case of the British civilians interned at Ruhleben is hard, the case of the Germans interned in this country is equally hard. I am not disposed altogether to dispute that assertion. But the cases are not altogether upon a par, because—I state this most emphatically—the lot of the German civilians interned in this country is appreciably better than the lot of the British civilians interned at Ruhleben. I have it on the first-hand authority of men who have come back from Ruhleben and who have visited some of our civilian internment camps, that the interned German civilians here are treated in a more humane and more kindly manner, that they are better fed and better clothed, and that they enjoy privileges which are not enjoyed by the unfortunate British prisoners at Ruhleben.
My noble and gallant friend asks me in his Question whether any extension or alteration of the present system is contemplated. My reply is that an extension is contemplated, and has already been proposed. We proposed to the German Government a short time ago that the age, which is now placed at 55, should be lowered to 50, and that in the case of men who were unfit for active service in the field the age limit should be reduced to 45. We made this proposal some weeks ago, but have not yet elicited a reply although several efforts have been made to obtain it. But I would like to point out that even supposing this proposal is accepted there will be, in effect, no considerable change in the rate of the rapidity of exchange, for this reason. Everybody must have realised by this time that the ultimate decision in regard to the exchange of prisoners, whether civilian or military, rests with the naval and military authorities, and whatever agreement may be come to with respect to the age, experience shows that the naval and military authorities, not only on one side but on both sides, will discover all sorts of reasons why these men should not go back to their own country. The naval and the military authorities are prone to regard every interned civilian as possessing some potential naval or military capacity; and if he is physically unfit, they frequently discover other reasons which in their opinion are excellent and adequate for keeping that man under restraint. Therefore if we do
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succeed in lowering the age limit, as we have proposed, I am afraid that the rate of exchange will not be very largely accelerated. To show the length to which the restrictions are pushed by the naval and military authorities upon both sides, I need only point to the fact that at this moment there are confined here and in Germany not only men of 50, but men of 60 and men of 70; and there is at this moment, if I am not mistaken, a retired military man interned in Germany who is actually 80 years of age.
While there are obviously distinct advantages in a policy of general internment, there are at the same time obvious disadvantages: One obvious disadvantage from the point of view of the Government is that these interned aliens cost a great deal of money, and they also require a great-amount of guarding. On the other hand, take the case of the interned civilian himself. It is highly probable that when you intern him you ruin him commercially; it is quite possible that you may ruin his health, too. But what is, perhaps, even more important is that by adopting this process you turn men who were originally friendly into most determined enemies. You take a man who has lived for a long time in one of these two countries, either in England or in Germany, a man who in all probability was extremely friendly to the Government under which he lived, and you convert him into a man who becomes animated with the bitterest spirit of hostility against the Government which has imprisoned him. We shall be confronted with this problem unless the rate of exchange is accelerated, that at the end of the war there will be thousands of men in this country who will be liberated, and who, in consequence of the change I have described, will form a most undesirable element in the population. I think any thoughtful person who has given consideration to this matter must have realised that this is an extremely grave problem. It is certainly open to argument whether the present principles upon which both countries act ought not to be modified or changed to a considerable extent.
The noble and gallant Lord also asks me whether any alteration is contemplated with regard to the system of exchange. I am glad to have this opportunity of stating that there is one—I do not know whether it would be correct to describe it as an alteration—but one principle upon which

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we are all agreed at the present moment. When I say "all," I am alluding to the four Departments more immediately concerned with prisoners—namely, the Foreign Office, the Home Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office. All these Departments have come to the conclusion that the principle of what is known as individual exchange is thoroughly unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory for various reasons. In the first place it involves, as experience has shown, very long preliminary negotiations which lead in most cases to very inadequate results. In the second place it creates, and must inevitably create, the strongest feeling of dissatisfaction and discontent on the part of the unfortunate people who are, unable to command any influence upon their behalf; because it is undoubtedly the case that many of these proposals for individual exchange are the result of political or of social influence, or, if they are not really the result of that, the general belief is that they are caused by the exercise of influence of that kind.
Then it is also evident that a process of individual exchange takes the form of a bargain, and each Government is perpetually trying to get the better over the other, with the result that it develops into little better than a kind of blackmail. I will give the House an instance in point. Everybody knows the case of Lord De Ramsey. Lord De Ramsey suffers from an unfortunate physical infirmity which naturally prevents him from being of the slightest military value. Yet in spite of this the German Government detained him for something like a year upon the pretext that he had at one time in the course of his life been a soldier. Of course, the obvious reason why they detained him was in order to get somebody back from this country whom they considered of particular value to them. But the strongest condemnation of this system of individual exchange is to be found in the fact that scarcely any individual exchanges have been effected under it at all; and it is also a melancholy and painful fact—it has been brought to my notice frequently—that there have been many cases in which elaborate efforts have been made to procure the liberation of British officers and civilians by means of individual exchange, and these unfortunate men are now no nearer liberation than they were months or even a year ago. That alone is sufficient to condemn the whole system of individual exchange.
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In my opinion, and I believe it is the opinion of everybody who has had anything to do with this question, there is only one fair basis of exchange, and that is that the question should be decided solely by the man's age and physical condition. That is a principle which I think I may say will be adopted in future, and it will not be departed from unless it can be shown conclusively that the exchange of a particular individual will be one of definite public advantage.
With regard to the latter portion of my noble and gallant friend's Question, he is probably aware that the arrangement with regard to the transfer of British and German incapacitated soldiers to Switzerland has been agreed to. The Swiss Commission have already arrived in this country. They are in process of visiting the various camps, and have already, I believe, examined a certain number of men. It is hoped that by the end of the month sufficient progress will have been made to permit of the actual transfer of some of these men on both sides. I am unable at this stage to give the noble and gallant Lord any figures, because, of course, the figures depend upon the result of the examination. We have heard in a somewhat vague and indefinite manner from Switzerland—not from Germany—that the number of British prisoners expected there amounts to something like 1,200, but whether there is any foundation for this assumption I am not in a position to say. All I can say is that every effort will be made to carry out the arrangement as quickly as possible, and it is to be hoped, in the interests of all concerned, that a large number of these unfortunate men in both countries will find their way to Switzerland.

PRIZE MONEY.
LORD BERESFORD LORD BERESFORD had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask His Majesty's Government the total amount of prize money in their hands up to date; how much of it is in the hands of the Prize Court; how much is in the hands of any other officials; if so, what officials; why it has not been paid into the Exchequer; how many enemy ships have been detained in British and Dominion ports since the beginning of the war; whether His Majesty's Government have applied to the Prize Court for their confiscation and condemnation; by virtue of what

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authority have His Majesty's Government taken possession of some or all of these vessels and employed them in carrying freight; whether it is intended at the end of the war to return them to the enemy; if so, will the enemy also be paid the freight these ships have earned while employed by the British Government.
The noble and gallant Lord said: My Lords, I apologise for intruding on the House twice on one afternoon, but the matter which I wish to bring before your Lordships is very important. It is impossible to overrate what we owe to the British Navy during this war. Without the Fleet we could not have continued the war, and we and our Allies could not have had any hope of success in the war. Therefore anything connected with what the officers and men of the Fleet may consider as justice to themselves should be carefully considered; and I know it will have a very sympathetic hearing in this House. I do not intend to discuss prize bounty, because that has been settled more or less under the new Order in Council of February 29 last and is being paid to officers and men. But I should like to touch on the question of prize money. I believe that up to date there must be considerably over £4,000,000 of prize money which should be paid to the Fleet. That sum entirely escapes the control of Parliament, as it is under the control of the Paymaster-General and is not paid into the Exchequer. I should like to ask my noble friend by what authority that is being carried out. The Government have never given any sound reason why this has been done. They have abolished the old scheme, but have established no new scheme and are not going to do so until the end of the war.
The present position is very unsatisfactory for the officers and men of the Fleet. They are a poor Service; the officers particularly can barely live on their pay. Seeing the extraordinarily arduous work they have been carrying out in the North Sea and elsewhere, I think some effort should be made to let them know the nature of the new scheme to be proposed by the Government. The Government may have a very good scheme. It may be better to have the new plan instead of the old one, but I think we should know what it is. Certainly the interest in the Fleet on this question is very keen. I quite agree with the new idea of the, distribution of prize
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money, having regard to the new necessities of the case. In the old days it was the smart frigates which made all the prize money; they captured the vessels, particularly the merchant vessels, which returned most of the prize. It would be very unfair in these days if we gave the whole of the large sums of money taken in that way to the cruisers, and forgot the patrols and the destroyers and the small cruisers who have been doing superhuman work in the North Sea ever since the war began. Nobody will appreciate the fairness of that more than the officers and men of the Fleet themselves.
I would like to ask my noble friend who represents the Admiralty a further question. The Order in Council of August 28, 1914, did away entirely with the authority of the Prize Court and delegated the authority to the Prize Claims Committee at the Foreign Office. Why and by what authority was that done? Another question. Queen Victoria's Proclamation of 1900 was in force from August 4 to August 28, 1914. A number of vessels were taken and a good deal of prize money paid in during that period, and I should like to know why that has not been paid. The succeeding Order in Council nullified the payment of those moneys until such a time as the Government should fix after the war. It is only fair that the money gained between August 4 and August 28 should be paid to the officers and men, because there is no authority by which they should not be paid. I make out that there is a sum of £2,819,060 received from the sale of condemned vessels, out of which, according to the White Paper, there were "Proceeds to claimants, £637,047." I should like to know who these claimants were, and why, if money could be paid to claimants, it could not be paid to the Fleet.
The Government refuse to give the prize money to the officers and men of the Fleet at present, but they are going to pay, or have paid, a large sum to a certain Baron Schroeder, a German, because he either mortgaged or owned the cargo of a ship that was taken. That is not very satisfactory to the men of the Fleet, who certainly will ask why certain sums should be paid to this German while they have not received what is their due. Again, the Government Prize Claims Committee decide compensation to be given for claims not recognised by the Prize Law. That appears to me very confusing, and I should

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like an explanation. Dr. Macnamara, who is always very sympathetic with regard to this matter, said in the other House that the prize money is to be paid after the war on a new system of pooling. Well, the war has lasted nearly two years now, and the Government are unable to produce a system of distribution. There are apparently two sets of Regulations, one relating to armed ships and another to merchant ships. Perhaps that could be explained to us. In addition to the £4,000,000 in the hands of the Paymaster-General, there are about 93 ships retained in our ports. I want to know why they were not brought to the Prize Court for condemnation and confiscation. I believe that if those ships were adjudicated upon by the Prize Court a further £5,000,000 would be added to the money which will eventually fall to the Fleet. Why are these ships not placed in the hands of the Marshal of the Prize Court? That is the law. Why has it not been carried out as before? The Government are running the ships as if they were Government property. They requisitioned them without their being condemned by a Prize Court, and are now using them for freight. I want to know whether these ships are going to be returned to the enemy after the war, and what is going to be done with regard to the freight they have earned.
The attitude of the Government has not been explained. I know they are just as sympathetic as myself to the officers and men of the Fleet, but they should relieve the anxiety that exists as to these matters. The position is not clear in the Orders in Council and White Papers. In one it would appear that the Government are going back to the Proclamation of Queen Victoria of 1900. Is that so? Anyway, since the cancellation of the Proclamation of 1900 the allocation of the money is determined by the sole will and caprice of the Government, as is evinced by the Baron Schroeder instance. I have asked my noble friend a number of questions. It may be that he is not prepared to deal with all of them now. If there are any which he cannot answer at the moment, I shall be pleased to put them down again, perhaps after the Whitsuntide recess, so that a full reply may be given.
THE CIVIL LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE): My Lords, I am obliged to my noble and gallant friend
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for his last observation, for, as he knows, this question is a complicated one. The Question on the Paper does not err on the side of brevity, and it has been supplemented by a number of other inquiries. I have done my best to prepare answers to the questions on the Paper, but I hope my noble and gallant friend will not expect me, without notice, to deal with the other complicated and technical matters to which he has referred.
The Question as it appears on the Paper relates, I presume, to what are technically known as droits of the Crown, and does not deal with droits of Admiralty. As many of your Lordships are aware, the broad distinction is that enemy vessels detained as prizes by port authorities are known as droits of Admiralty, and, as such, are claimed by the Exchequer. On the other hand, vessels captured at sea are known as droits of the Crown, and according to ancient practice the prize money was awarded to the, captors. My noble friend has referred to the distribution of prize money and the change which we contemplate making. Instead of, as in the past, making the award of the prize money to the actual captors, the money is to be pooled and distributed among the whole of the Fleet at the close of hostilities. I think that when the circumstances of modern naval warfare are borne in mind this will be considered the fairest course that could be proposed. There are a number of points even in connection with the Question on the Paper which I am not able fully to answer at this moment as they have to be still further considered, and to that extent I hope that your Lordships will not regard my answer as final. But I should like generally to assure my noble and gallant friend and your Lordships that the policy of the Board of Admiralty is to treat the Naval Prize Fund in the manner which will produce the most favourable result to the Navy as a whole. We fully recognise the work which the Fleet has done, and we quite see that their ancient rights should be fully maintained.
I will now answer the various heads of the Question seriatim. The total amount of prize money held by the Paymaster-General under the Supreme Court Prize Deposit Account was on May 10 of this year £4,420,372. In addition to this sum there would be the moneys in the custody of Indian and Colonial Courts and the proceeds of certain vessels condemned in

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such Courts. A part of these funds is in the charge of the Overseas Prize Disposal Committee, for whom a special account is kept by the Paymaster-General. As various claims have to be met out of the fund the money has not been paid into the Exchequer, but in the meantime the Government have had full use of the money, and the best use that can be made by the Government of the money is made. The number of enemy ships detained in the United Kingdom ports, Oversea British ports, and Egyptian ports, or seized on entering these ports, is rather more than 200. I believe that in all cases these vessels have been or are being dealt with by the various Prize Courts concerned. Under the Prize Courts Rules and by the provisions of The Hague Convention the Government have power to requisition ships which are ill the charge of the Prize Courts, and I believe that every one of them which could be economically and usefully employed has been so employed. Many questions relating to the status of these ships are engaging the consideration of the Government, and I am unable at present to deal fully with this subject; but I do not think that the noble Lord need fear that any money will be paid to the enemy on account of any freight which may have been earned by these vessels while employed by the British Government.
My noble and gallant friend raised a point as to why this money should not be distributed to the Fleet. There are certain technical and practical difficulties in the way of immediate distribution. It would be difficult to ascertain the sum which would be available for distribution, as that would entail the establishment of a Central Fund into which receipts from the Prize Courts throughout the Empire would have to be collected. Another difficulty is that of the realisation of the value of the many vessels which, instead of being handed over to the Prize Court, have been requisitioned by the Crown. For instance, some people claim that the value of a ship is the value on the day on which the ship was seized. From the point of view of the Navy, I should rather have as its value the value at which it might stand now, which, as my noble friend knows, is probably greater than it was when the ship was seized. Therefore from that point of view I think it would be wiser that the value of the ships should not be determined at the present moment. In the final adjustment
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all the various interests and claims to which the proceeds are subject will receive attention. There is also the question of the number of individuals who may be eventually employed by the Navy.
On the whole the Government think it would be advisable that before any distribution is made we should await the conclusion of hostilities, when we shall be able to ascertain fully what is due to the Navy and the number among whom it would have to be distributed. The change of method which has been suggested, and which I think generally has met with approval, will need legislation to give it effect. A Bill will accordingly be introduced into Parliament, and these matters will no doubt then be raised. In the meantime, as I have said, it is from many points of view advisable not to make this distribution until the conclusion of hostilities. As to the case of a man who is killed, and who, had he lived, would have been entitled to a share of the money to be distributed, I understand that there is no difficulty in providing for its payment to his representative or dependant.
LORD BERESFORD: Can my noble friend tell the House what becomes of the interest on this vast sum of money? Will it eventually go to the officers and seamen?
THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE: I believe that has not yet been settled. Personally I hold a very strong view upon the matter. If money to which the Navy are entitled earns interest in the meantime, that interest ought to follow the capital. That is my opinion for what it is worth.

SOLDIERS' DEPENDANTS.
LORD HARRIS LORD HARRIS rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether it is the case that Army Order I of 1916 has deprived certain soldiers of the privilege of claiming from Government an allowance—in addition to their own contributions—for their dependants; and, if so, whether this is not in contravention of the intentions of Parliament.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, a case which attracted my attention at a Tribunal meeting recently has caused me to put this Question. A Territorial soldier stated that whilst he was contributing something to his mother as a dependant she was getting nothing at all from the Government, I

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therefore wrote to the Territorial Association concerned, and received this reply—
"It is regretted that no claim for Government allowance in respect of this man can now be admitted, as under the provisions of Army Order I of 1916 the claim had to be made on or before December 10 last. The soldier completed Army Form O. 1796, making his mother a voluntary allotment of 6d. a day, but no claim for Government allowance was made."
That answer led me to suppose that the reason why the mother was getting nothing from the Government was, in the first place, that the soldier had omitted to make a claim, which might have been due to his own ignorance; but, in the second place, that the Government had passed an Order which absolutely prevented him, unless he claimed before December 10, from getting the Government contribution although he was contributing himself.
It was obviously the intention of Parliament that the dependants of soldiers should be assisted reasonably by a contribution from the Government, the amount depending upon the soldier's own contribution and the extent to which he had been assisting the dependant before he joined the Army. In the face of that which I fancy was unquestionably the intention of Parliament, the War Office pass an Order which, as far as I can see, deprives the man of what was given him as a right. It seems to me questionable whether a Government Department is entitled to do that. Therefore I have taken the liberty of putting this Question. I dare say my noble friend will be able to give a satisfactory reply and explain the circumstances, but I thought it as well that we should have the explanation publicly. This cannot be an isolated case. In all probability there are many others like it, and it would be as well if the men in the Army thoroughly understood why they are deprived of this advantage. The man in question could not understand it. I questioned him closely as to why his mother was only getting 3s. 6d., and all he could say was that he could not get any answer to his requests that she should get a Government contribution as well as his own.
LORD SANDHURST: My Lords, if my noble friend has a case in which he thinks that hardship has occurred and he will forward it to me, I will make investigation into it and communicate with him. The War Office do not consider that they have acted in contravention of any intention of
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Parliament. This new Army Order I of 1916 is a modification with relaxation of a former Army Order of 1915. The reason that the War Office had to set a limit for these applications was that there was such an enormous number of fraudulent claims. Where the claim was very belated it was almost impossible to trace what was a proper application and what was a fraudulent one, and very reluctantly the War Office had to institute a large number of legal prosecutions, with the result that they succeeded in getting a great number of convictions for fraud. I can assure my noble friend that the Rules are not harshly interpreted. That is naturally the very last thing that the authorities at the War Office would wish. I may add—and this would apply to the case he has in mind—that many claims are admitted for consideration if it is shown that through ignorance, or genuine misunderstanding, or for some other good reason the claim has not been received within the proper time. When a man enlists or joins from the Reserve he is required to sign one of the following sections of a form—

"(a) I do not wish to make any allotment from my pay or to make a claim to separation allowance.

(b) I wish to make an allotment from my pay as stated below, but I make no claim to separation allowance.

(c) Declaration by a recruit who wishes to claim separation allowance for a dependant."

And a leaflet is handed to soldiers emphasising those alternatives. But even supposing the soldier, after signing (a) or (b), changes his mind, he can make a claim on a form which is obtainable from the Commanding Officer provided that if he changes his mind he does so within one month. I again assure the noble Lord that there is no intention of being harsh with regard to these cases, and, as I have said, if he will be good enough to forward particulars of any case to me I will make it my duty to investigate it.
LORD HARRIS: Am I to understand that any sufferers are not entirely barred by Army Order I of 1916?
LORD SANDHURST: If a good reason can be shown why they did not make their application, further investigation will ensue.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed.

ROYAL COMMISSION.
The following six Bills received the Royal Assent—

Military Service.

Colonial Bank.

Swansea Harbour.

City of Dublin Steam Packet Company.

Cardiff Railway.

Alexander's Restitution.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
LORD FARQUHAR: My Lords, I beg to move that the House do adjourn, except for Judicial business, until Tuesday, May 30.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past Six o'clock, till To-morrow half-past Ten o'clock.