Lords Sitting of 27 June 1916

CORE'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read: Counsel called in: Witnesses examined: Moved that the Bill be now read 2a agreed to: Bill read 2a accordingly.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following petition for a Bill have not been complied with:
Shropshire, Worcestershire and Staffordshire Electric Power.
The same was ordered to lie on the Table.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Report from, That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the petition for a Bill by the
Conway and Colwyn Bay Joint Water Supply Board
ought to be dispensed with and leave given to introduce the Bill.

CONWAY AND COLWYN BAY JOINT WATER SUPPLY BOARD BILL, [H.L.]
Presented (pursuant to leave given this day) and read 1a.

SHROPSHIRE, WORCESTERSHIRE AND STAFFORDSHIRE ELECTRIC POWER,
(Petition for Bill).
Examiner's Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee on Tuesday next.

RETURNS, REPORTS, &c.
Miscellaneous, No. 20 (1916)—Note from the United States Government regarding the examination of parcels and letter mails (in continuation of "Miscellaneous, No. 9 (1916)" [Cd. 8223]):
Education (Scotland)—Report of the Committee of Council on Education in Scotland, 1915–1916:
Rebellion in Ireland—Report of the Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland:
Factories and Workshops—Annual Report of the Chief Inspector of Factories and Workshops for the year 1915:
Ireland Development Grant Act, 1903—Report of the Lord Lieutenant of all his proceedings under the Act for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 1916:
Settlement and Employment of Sailors and Soldiers on the Land—Part II of the. Final Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to consider the Settlement and Employment on the Land in England and Wales of Discharged Sailors and Soldiers:
Presented (by command) and ordered to lie on the Table.
Destructive Insects and Pests Acts, 1877 and 1907—Orders, numbered D.I.P. 362 and D.I.P. 363, dated 15th June, 1916, declaring areas described in the Schedules thereto to be infected areas for the purposes of the; American Gooseberry Mildew (Infected Areas) Order of 1915:
Electric Lighting Acts, 1882 to 1909 (Proceedings)—Report by the Board of Trade respecting the applications to, and proceedings of the Board under the Electric Lighting Acts, 1882 to 1909, during the past year:
Irish Universities Act, 1908—Statute VIII of the National University of Ireland:
Intermediate Education (Ireland)—
Rule determining the maximum number of Superintendents to be appointed, 1916;
Rule appointing places of examination, 1916:
India (Civil Service)—Provisional Rule, dated 17th June, 1916, made by the Secretary of State for India in Council, under the Government of India Act, 1915:
Finance—Finance Accounts of Great Britain and Ireland for the Financial Year ended 31st March, 1916:
Civil List Pensions—List of all Pensions granted during the year ended 31st March, 1916, and payable under the provisions of Section 9 (1) of the Civil List Act, 1910:
National Insurance Acts—Regulations, dated 23rd June, 1916, of the Welsh Insurance Commissioners as to Insurance Committees:
Shops Act, 1912—Orders made by the under-mentioned Local Authorities and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, affecting certain classes of shops within their respective areas—
Councils of Urban Districts of Ilford, Acton, Edmonton, Barry, and Ashington (Five Orders);
Council of Borough of Clitheroe:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL (MONEY) BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read 1a and referred to the Examiners.
VAN DIEMEN'S LAND COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: The said Amendments considered, and agreed to.

LORD SELBORNE AND THE CABINET.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE THE EARL OF SELBORNE, rising from the corner seat below the gangway on the Ministerial side, asked leave to make a personal explanation concerning his resignation from the Government. The noble Earl said: It is the rule of your Lordships' House that a personal statement may be made just before the commencement of public business. I believe the rule also enjoins that it is not in one's power, in making a personal statement, to inaugurate a debate. Indeed, I venture to think that the moment has not yet come when, in the interests of the public service, a debate can take place on those grave matters on which I am going only just to touch.
Your Lordships will remember that when the war broke out the Home Rule controversy had reached this stage: The main principle in respect of which the Unionist Party had contended for thirty years had been decided against them, but the Ulster question had not been decided. When the war broke out the whole Unionist Party agreed to accept the accomplished fact and to abandon any attempt during the war to renew any phase of the struggle about
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Home Rule. That also was the position when the Coalition Government was formed about a year ago. The government of Ireland was being conducted by Mr. Birrell on principles of which we had never pretended to approve; and although, naturally, we did not desire to interfere then more than we could possibly help with the government of Ireland, that would not have absolved us, I quite admit, from interference if we had known that the position had changed, and that the condition of affairs in Ireland was worse than it was when we joined the Government. But we did not know that. Mr. Birrell never informed us that the condition of affairs in Ireland had grown worse, nor did private information reach us from other sources. Therefore we knew nothing about the drilling and manœuvring, and all those matters which were known to other people, and consequently the rebellion took us by surprise.
After the rebellion had been put down the Prime Minister paid a visit to Ireland. He returned impressed with the desire of all parties in Ireland for a settlement of the outstanding problems between Unionists and Nationalists. The Prime Minister appointed Mr. Lloyd George to see all the Irish Parties concerned and to ascertain whether there was any settlement which they would all accept. Mr. Lloyd George was necessarily entrusted with much freedom of action, but I wish to make it quite clear that he was not a plenipotentiary. His function was to make inquiries, to gather opinions and suggestions from other people, then to form the best judgment he could on the position, and, when he had formed it, to report to the Cabinet, with whom the decision rested. And this, I am informed, is the attitude he has throughout adopted.
I understood that the basis of the inquiry was an amendment of the Government of Ireland Act by which Ulster, or a part of Ulster, would be excluded from its operation, and that the Bill of Exclusion would be passed during the war. But I believed that neither the principal nor the amending Act would come into operation until the restoration of peace. This was not a vague impression. I had, and have, sure and definite grounds for believing that when Mr. Lloyd George was appointed this was the basis contemplated. In this belief I concurred in his appointment. It was during the Whitsuntide recess that I learnt for the first time that the basis of the

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inquiry had been changed, and that it had become a contemplated part of the proposed settlement that the Government of Ireland Act should, with certain modifications, be brought into operation during the war. I immediately—that is, the same day—informed the Prime Minister that I could take no responsibility for such a policy and placed my resignation in his hands. I also took care that the principal parties to these negotiations were informed of the existence of dissent.
In conclusion, let me state briefly why I dissent. Since the Government of Ireland Act was placed upon the Statute Book I have not contemplated its repeal. I have laboured, and should have continued to labour, for the exclusion of Ulster, or of a part of Ulster, from its operation; but, dangerous as I have thought the policy of Home Rule and unworkable as I have believed the actual Act to be, I have been quite clear in my mind that the welfare of the whole United Kingdom, and, indeed, of the whole British Empire, demanded that it should be given a fair trial. I should, therefore, have been perfectly ready to arrange for the exclusion of Ulster, or of part of Ulster, now, and to give every guarantee that the Government of Ireland Act should come into operation immediately after the termination of the war. But I am not prepared to advise His Majesty that it, or rather some travesty of it, can wisely or safely be brought into operation during the war. I say some "travesty" of it, because I do not suppose anybody contemplates the possibility of holding elections in Ireland now. Ireland is in a gravely disturbed condition, and in my judgment, to inaugurate a constitutional change of such magnitude during the war would be more perilous than any other course open to us. I say this while acknowledging in the fullest way the loyal and patriotic attitude of Mr. Redmond all through nearly two years' stress of war. I know well the great difficulties of the case, that there is much to be said on the other side, and that others with an equally honest endeavour to form a wise judgment take a different view; but in matters of such gravity each man must form his own judgment and act upon it.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): I rise, my Lords, simply to express on behalf of His Majesty's Government, and I feel certain that on this occasion at any
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rate I am also expressing the feeling of the whole House, our great regret that my noble friend has thought it necessary to relinquish his office. On the personal ground I need only say that the noble Earl and I—and I think the same is true of my two noble friends behind me—have been on terms of personal friendship for forty years or so, and therefore I can truly say that the close of our formal association in this manner is a serious grief both to them and to me.
So far as the public aspect of my noble friend's resignation is concerned, I will simply say this, that since the formation of the Coalition Government he has filled the important office which he has held with high credit and distinction. As the House very well knows, the functions of the President of the Board of Agriculture have been peculiarly difficult during the last few months or a year, partly from the peculiar relation in which his work has stood to the paramount need of supplying as many men as possible for service in the Army; and during all that time my noble friend has carried out the duties of his office with a devotion and an absorption in his work which are altogether beyond praise.
Perhaps I may be excused if I do not at all attempt to enter this afternoon into the actual circumstances surrounding my noble friend's resignation. As he has pointed out, it would not, indeed, be in order for me to do so. There is no question before the House, and to attempt to discuss now the various aspects of the intensely difficult and complicated question to which he has merely alluded would be wrong for me and clearly could have no advantage in the public interest. It is quite certain that within a short space of time a general discussion will be held both here and elsewhere on the whole question, and until that time arrives—and it cannot be long deferred—I must ask your Lordships to excuse me from saying a word more on that side of the subject.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: My Lords, the noble Marquess has not addressed himself to any controversial part of this topic, and I recognise that it is the rule on these occasions not to raise a debate upon a statement such as has just been made to the House by my noble friend who sits below the gangway opposite. But I cannot honestly say that the mystery which surrounds this question has been at all cleared up by that statement. The noble

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Marquess promises a discussion on an early day. I hope that it will be a very early day, for I think the country is entitled to know what has been going on and under whose authority it has been going on. That, however, is a matter into which I will not enter now. A rumour has reached us that there is to be a statement in another place shortly. I should like to ask the noble Marquess whether he will be able to make a statement to-morrow.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I cannot answer that question definitely.

CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES.
The Duke of Devonshire appointed to take the Chair in Committees of the Whole House this day.

ELECTRIC LIGHTING PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) PROVISIONAL ORDER (No. 1) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bills reported without amendment, and to be read 3a To-morrow.

LECKY'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order), and Bill to be read 3aTo-morrow.

DESPATCHES FROM THE FRONT.
LORD HENEAGE LORD HENEAGE had the following Notice on the Paper—
To call attention to the omission of any Despatch from the G.O.C. in France in command of the British Expeditionary Force dealing with the operations on the British Front between the 8th of October, 1915, at which date Viscount French's last Despatch finishes, and the 19th of November, 1915, when Sir Douglas Haig's first Despatch commences; and to ask His Majesty's Government whether any official Despatch dealing with that period of the war exists, and, if so, why it has not been published; and, if not, what steps the War Office propose to take to remedy the injustice done to the troops engaged with great credit to themselves and which sustained heavy losses at the attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt on the 13th of October and in many other engagements during the period referred to, by the omission of all mention of
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their gallant conduct in the operations in which they took part and for which they have been honourably mentioned by their divisional and other commanders at the Front in the usual Orders of the Day or other official communications.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I need not detain the House for more than a few minutes, but I wish to emphasise the facts connected with the Question standing in my name on the Paper. The question arises, why has there been no record from the Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force dealing with the operations on the British Front for the period of over six weeks mentioned in my Notice. The last Despatch from the noble and gallant Field-Marshal, Viscount French, brought us down to October 8; the first Despatch received from Sir Douglas Haig commenced on November 19, and there is an entire blank as regards any narrative of the war from official sources between those two dates. No one will deny that a great deal went on at the Front during that period, and a number of new Divisions of Territorial battalions were then engaged for almost the first time. They lost heavily, and there is not the slightest doubt that they behaved with the greatest credit to themselves. Why, I ask, has all mention of their gallant conduct been omitted from the official records?
I do not wish to take your Lordships through the whole of the six weeks in question. I will confine my remarks to the first week, which will be quite enough to show that by the omission of any official record a great injustice has been done to these troops. On October 13, five days after the conclusion of the period covered in Lord French's Despatch, there was a very important engagement in the attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt. The Division which was foremost in that attack, the 41st Division, had not very long left these shores, and it consisted entirely of Territorial battalions from the Midland counties. I am not able to tell your Lordships the casualties in all these battalions, because I have no proof with regard to them all and do not wish to state anything for which I cannot be absolutely and entirely responsible. But I can give you, from the case of one battalion, an example of the number of casualties sustained. Of the two Lincolnshire battalions engaged in this attack I know a great deal, and naturally I am very interested in them, having been

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the first chairman of the Territorial Association in Lincolnshire under which they were formed. But I am more particularly interested in the 5th battalion, because it has its headquarters at Grimsby and was enlisted to a large extent in North Lincolnshire. I know the officers personally and have been in camp with the battalion. This battalion—and I do not refer to it in order to take more credit for this battalion than for any other, because they all deserve the highest credit—this battalion went into action with twenty-three officers, of whom twenty-two were either killed or wounded, only one officer coming out untouched; and of the whole battalion, only 120 men came out without being wounded. That shows that this was a pretty heavy engagement; and if all the other battalions engaged lost in the same proportion, the engagement was obviously one which ought not to have been entirely overlooked. I know that there is a bitter feeling both at home and at the Front owing to there never having been an official record of their services, though the whole Division have received the greatest praise from their divisional and other commanders for the way in which they behaved.
Let me say that there were two brigades of this Midland Division. They included, besides the two Lincolnshire battalions, two Leicesters, four Sherwood Foresters, and four Staffordshire Territorial battalions; they were all highly commended, as well as the Midland Artillery Brigade. I will read a semi-official communication which we received at the Lincolnshire Territorial Association from the Major-General commanding the 46th Division—
"I shall be obliged if you will inform the president and members of your Association that in a recent attack on the enemy's position the North Midland Division behaved with distinguished gallantry, worthy of the best traditions of the British Army. I trust that their example may arouse enthusiasm in their various counties, and that the result of their gallant efforts may be to bring every able-bodied man into the ranks. I am proud to command a Division composed of officers and other ranks who, for love of King and Country, have sacrificed private interests, and whose example should be widely followed by other men imbued with patriotic sentiments.
(Signed) E. STUART-WORTLEY."
I think, after what I have said about the casualties and what I have read to your Lordships from the officer commanding the Division, there can be no question that this was a considerable engagement and one which ought to have been recorded.
Although I do not think it is necessary that a large number of troops should be present at an engagement under some General of high rank in order to make the engagement an important one, I wish to point out that the 10th Division, besides others, was also engaged in this attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt. Therefore I should think that an Army Corps commander must have been present; at any rate, there must have been reports from the divisional commanders. What I want to know is, what has become of these reports? We are told that there was some confusion on account of the change in command about this time, but it does seem to plain business men extraordinary that for eight months it should never have been discovered that there was this omission in the narrative of the war. Were the reports of the divisional Generals and of the Army Corps commander in the hands of Lord French's staff when they returned to England; are they in the hands of the staff of Sir Douglas Haig in France, or are they pigeon-holed in the recesses of some sub-department in the War Office? It is extraordinary that no single person connected with the Staff either abroad or at the War Office should have discovered this omission. I wish to ask whether there are any such Despatches, and, if there are not, what the authorities are going to do to remedy the great injustice under which these gallant troops have been suffering.
THE DUKE OF RUTLAND: My Lords, I cordially support the attitude which has been taken by my noble friend Lord Heneage on this subject, because I have an intimate knowledge of what the North Midland Division went through on October 13 and 14 last. I do not wish to emphasise the gallantry of any individual battalion, because all the battalions behaved well in the series of battles during those two days. But I should like to say, on behalf of one or two battalions which were primarily engaged in the taking of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, that although they had their personal gallantry mentioned in the Gazette and many officers and men received their just rewards, still there has been something lacking in the absence up to date of any official Despatch relating to the matters which occurred at the Front between October 8 and November 19.
I do not pretend to know what has become of anything that may have been

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written with respect to that period, but I feel that the regiments which were employed over that period of time have some ground, I will not say for complaining, because regiments do not complain, but for hoping that before long the missing Despatch may be published, so that the public may know exactly what did occur and what these troops did on that occasion. One battalion with which I am intimately concerned, which was employed primarily with one of the Lincolnshire battalions in taking the Hohenzollern Redoubt, lost between fourteen and sixteen officers killed and wounded and a proportionate number of men; but I can say on the highest authority that they held on, and, notwithstanding the terrific losses in officers, did most admirably, and I received the highest private congratulations on the conduct of this battalion.
In replying to a question on this subject in the other House Mr. Tennant—who has done extraordinarily well in the management of the tremendous work which has fallen on his shoulders as representative of the War Office in the other House, and who has invariably answered for the Department not only with courtesy and promptitude but often with a great amount of wit—fell rather short of what he has hitherto succeeded in doing in that respect, for he said that during the period in question no events of outstanding importance occurred which seemed at the time that Lord French laid down the command to call for a Despatch additional to that of October 15 which had already been published. This can hardly be so, because some of the hardest fighting took place during this period. These events were certainly of outstanding importance and had a considerable effect upon the general determination of that fight.
Mr. Tennant also said that great difficulties occurred during the transition in the chief command in preparing any such Despatch, but I hope that we may very shortly have the missing document laid before us, because in justice to those gallant regiments which fought so well—not only this Division but the other brigades and Divisions which were engaged in conjunction with the North Midland Division—we should know what the opinion of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief was of their behaviour on that occasion.
LORD SANDHURST: My Lords, I fear that I am not competent to follow the noble Lord and the noble Duke in the speeches which they have delivered, beyond saying that I cordially share the appreciation which they have expressed of the gallant conduct of these troops. I am afraid that I am not in a position to give more of an answer than that which has already been criticised by the noble Duke and a portion of which he read. The reply that I have to give is this, that during the period in question no events of outstanding importance occurred which seemed at the time that Lord French laid down his command to call for a Despatch additional to that of October 15 which has already been published. The change in the chief command and the subsequent assumption of new and onerous duties by Lord French caused an unavoidable delay; but a Despatch covering the period between the beginning of October and the beginning of November is now being compiled. I may add that I will convey to Lord French what has been said by the noble Lord and the noble Duke, and I have no doubt that he will lay the Despatch with as little delay as possible.

ARMY ORDER OF MAY 25.
LORD PARMOOR LORD PARMOOR had the following Notice on the Paper—
To call attention to the administration of the Army Order of 25th May, and to ask whether its provisions have been applied in all cases.
LORD SANDHURST: Before the noble and learned Lord asks this Question, I would respectfully make an appeal to him. He is aware that the Prime Minister was to have made a statement in another place on the subject which forms the point of my noble friend's Question. The press of business, however, has been such that it has been impossible for the Prime Minister to make his statement to-day. It would be more convenient, therefore, if the noble and learned Lord would be so good as to postpone his Question for a day or two.
LORD PARMOOR: I should certainly comply with a request made in the terms which the noble Lord has used. My desire is to promote a just settlement of a very difficult matter, and I do not think it would promote an object of that kind to bring on my Question at the present time, after what

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the noble Lord has said. I will therefore postpone it until Thursday, which I understand will be a convenient day.
LORD SANDHURST: I am much obliged to my noble friend. Thursday will suit very well.

STATE WOOL PURRCHASES.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN rose to ask for definite information as to the day and the terms on which the Government will pay for the wool crop, the sale or disposal of which is at present prohibited; and also the date on which the wool will be removed from the premises of the owners.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, it was on June 8 that the Army Council issued an Order which forbade from that moment all further dealings in wool, whether public or privates. The Order contained nothing except that. The result, of course, was utter disorganisation in the wool trade. It may be said that that could not be helped. But it was very unfortunate. This Order was issued by the Army Council, who I have no reason to believe possess any particular knowledge of wool and the wool trade, on the morning on which more than one public sale by auction was taking place. That in itself introduced complete disorganisation into the wool trade, and this has prevailed ever since. All that the public knew at that time was that it was impossible to deal in wool.
About two or three days afterwards the Secretary to the War Office issued a notice in the Press stating that arrangements were under consideration for the purchase of the whole wool crop of 1916. It was then that it was made certain that the War Office meant to purchase the whole of the wool crop. But with regard to the arrangements, it was merely stated that they were under consideration. The action taken had stopped the whole of the trade, but the arrangements under which the trade was to continue were merely "under consideration." Had any scheme then been settled, or has any scheme been settled since? When the Army Council issued their Order, had they realised what an enormous dislocation of trade they were creating? It is not as if this could have been a matter that came upon the Army Council by surprise. They must have known months before that they proposed to take this wool. I conclude that it is required for
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the clothing of the Army. Whatever the purpose, there was no reason why the authorities should not have considered the matter months before and have produced their scheme at the time they stopped the trade. I do not wish to find fault in any captious way, but I must say that this action does seem to show an utter want of business capacity and forethought, and I am afraid it is another instance of the practice, with which we are not wholly unfamiliar, of the Government launching schemes before the details had been thought out.
With regard to the arrangements, we have no further public information. I have seen in the newspapers a rumour that the Board of Agriculture have been introduced into this matter for the first time, apparently as negotiators and dealers between the producers of wool and the market generally. We have been told—it is merely a rumour, and it may not be correct—that at the present moment negotiations are going on with the farmers, based to a large extent on the prices of the year 1913. I hope that is not true; because, whatever may be the right thing to do, clearly to take the average of the prices of the year 1913 cannot be just. Consider what was done the other day by the Treasury in the case of American securities. Your Lordships know that the Treasury commandeered the American securities belonging to all investors in this country. I do not say that this was not right and necessary; but they issued at the same time a declaration that they would give the price of the day. At all events they did not propose to go back to the prices of two years before.
I should like to know the day on which the Government will pay for this wool, because, remember, they are shutting it up and preventing dealings in it. On what day and on what terms will they pay for the wool crop? Also, on what date will the wool be removed from the premises of the owners? I have no doubt that the War Office know very little about the wool trade. They probably do not know that if wool is kept on the premises of the farmers it is not merely a great inconvenience to them, but the wool becomes lighter the longer it is kept, and if it is kept for any length of time the probability is that a considerable proportion of it will be spoilt. It is for that reason I ask that we may be informed of the date on which the wool will be removed from the premises of the owners and under what conditions.
LORD SANDHURST: My Lords, I am not in a position to follow the noble Earl into all the details which he has raised, but I may say that there is a scheme approaching completion, and if at an early date the noble Earl desires to raise the matter again I shall be happy to give him the best explanation I can. But at present the arrangements are necessarily incomplete. In reply to the Question on the Paper, I may say that the wool of the 1916 clip will be acquired by the Government at fixed prices based upon the prices ruling in the months immediately preceding the outbreak of war, with an addition of 30 per cent. in view of the increased expenses of farmers. Delivery of the bulk of the clip will be taken as soon as the necessary organisation for collection and purchase has been set up. Payment will be made to the extent of 75 per cent. of the estimated value on delivery, and the balance after final inspection: but it is impossible to fix any one day upon which payment will be made for the whole wool clip. In regard to the pre-war price, I may say that under the Defence of the Realm Regulations market prices as the criteria in connection with the output of factories applied to leather, boots, flax, jute, and so on, are definitely excluded, and that the same principle is applied now to the purchase of the wool clip.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: The noble Lord has not given any reason to excuse the War Office for having stopped this trade absolutely on the day on which they issued their notice.
LORD SANDHURST: I am not in a position to answer that question.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, in the district where I live it is a very important matter to farmers to know what the terms are to be and when they are likely to be carried out. I wish the noble Lord could answer these two questions. First, does he mean the percentage to be additional to the price which a particular farmer got for his wool in 1913, or does he mean the percentage to be additional to the then average market price? There are many farmers who pride themselves on the character of their wool and the way in which it is brought to market, and who have obtained prices considerably in advance of the market price as regards the particular staple of wool in which they are
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interested. I wish to know whether those farmers will be fined—for that is what it comes to—for having in old days endeavoured to produce the best quality of wool. That is a very important matter to farmers in the district in which I live.
The second question I should like to ask is this. Why is the figure of 30 per cent. adopted? I have made calculations in my own district and I find that in order to meet the extra expense incurred through the increase in wages and the increased price of feeding stuffs, the farmer would want an additional 50 per cent. As a matter of fact, the prices are, and were a year ago—I take the 1914 prices in the market—as nearly as possible, at any rate in my district, 50 per cent. above what they were in the pre-war time; and the natural addition as regards the price of wool did not more than meet the increased cost of production owing to advanced wages and the additional cost of feeding stuffs. I assume that this action has been taken by the Army Council because the wool is wanted for war purposes. But if this artificially low price is placed on wool while producers of woollen manufactures are able to get increased prices, their prices not being regulated, it will be placing an undue hardship on farmers. Farmers in this country have held their own in the past under very bad conditions. They do not desire to make anything like an undue profit out of the necessities of the war, but it is a serious matter to them if the prices of their produce are reduced to such an extent that they are in a worse position than before the war broke out. I do not know whether the noble Lord can give any further information on the two points I have raised.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, I associate myself with the two questions which Lord Parmoor has asked, though I do not suppose, from the tenor of Lord Sandhurst's answer just now, that we are likely to get any replies to them. I suppose the noble Lord's statement that a scheme is approaching completion and will shortly be issued is the Government's answer to the question put by Lord Camperdown. I come from a sheep farming district, and last Wednesday we had a very large market at Gisburne, a market which belongs to me, where about £6,000 worth of stock changed hands. Lord Camperdown has not at all exaggerated matters when he says that the

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course taken by the Government and the extreme uncertainties and mysteries which seem to surround it have created a good deal of apprehension. The cause of most apprehension in my part of the country are the conditions of delivery. Up in the fells the farms are very remote and a long way from stations; the farmers are small men; the war has taken away their workers, and they do not feel at all confident as to how they are to pack the wool. They have long distances to cover and very few horses. The other night when I was up there a deputation came to see me about the matter, and I drafted a letter which, owing to recent events, I did not send on to Lord Selborne, who has always been very kind about our farming affairs in that part of the country. Some very responsible people, whom I am glad to represent in this matter, point out that unless you have in remote districts a depôt of some sort which will undertake at a reasonable commission all the questions of sorting into qualities, packing, and delivering, the farmers will consider themselves very hardly treated by the way in which this matter is being dealt with. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Camper-down. I cannot see why the Government's scheme should be incomplete. The authorities must have long known that they would want a great deal of wool. As the noble Earl has said, wool loses as time goes on. The farmers have no places in which to keep it, and the Government will really get themselves into great difficulties unless they decide exactly what they are going to do and let the farmers know the arrangement as soon as possible.
LORD HENEAGE: In Lincolnshire there is a great deal of alarm over this subject. It is not so much a question of the Government having commandeered the wool as the amount of uncertainty that hangs about the matter. It is shown most clearly by the way in which this action has been taken that nobody acquainted with wool has had anything to do with this Order. Otherwise it would have been recognised that the Order was issued at the most inconvenient time and in the most inconvenient way. Farmers had been looking forward to selling their wool and having it taken up in order that they might have more money at their bankers for carrying on their labour up to the harvest; but at the present moment there is no arrangement in sight to which they can look forward. They want some
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assurance that there are business men dealing with this question. I hope that if the noble Lord is unable to give a better answer than that with which he has been entrusted this afternoon the question will be raised again, because the present state of things has disorganised the whole of the financial arrangements of a large number of farmers throughout the country.
THE DUKE OF BUCCLEUCH: I do not think the noble Lords who have spoken at all exaggerated the seriousness of this question. I must say that I think the course taken has been high-handed and outrageous. Farmers, of course, are willing to do all that is possible to help the Government, but they feel that Government Departments should adopt business-like arrangements, and there can be no excuse for this Order being issued on the day of the first wool sales. There are many other serious questions in connection with this. My noble friend Lord Ribblesdale alluded to the question of packing. Perhaps the War Office are not aware that there are a large number of sheep farmers who do not do the packing themselves. The wool is sent immediately to dealers. These farmers have no premises in which to store the wool. What is to happen to them? It may not matter to the War Office how much wool is spoilt, but it is a serious thing for the farmers.
I should like to know what the authorities are going to do about foreign wool. Are they going, when it comes into this country, to commandeer foreign wool at the price at which it stood two years ago? A great deal of the material for making clothing for the Army will be made out of oversea wool, either from foreign countries or from our Colonies. Why should the farmers of this country be treated differently from any one else? The only fair and reasonable course is for the War Office to pay the market price. I have taken the trouble to have this worked out in the case of two farms, and to compare the price which the War Office are offering and the current price at the time. In the case of one farm with a rental of £230 the loss to the farmer will be £60; in the case of the other farm, the rental of which is over £800, the loss—namely, the difference between what the War Office offer and what the farmer would have been able to get in the market—is over £300.

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There is another question. Are farmers who have lately purchased sheep to be recouped for their outlay? In the valuation of sheep the prospects in regard to wool and the price of wool enter into the calculation; and if the farmer is to be deprived of part of his wool profits through the fixing of an arbitrary price, surely the War Office ought to refund to him a portion of the purchase price of the sheep. I am not a lawyer and do not know whether the War Office have power to do what they propose; but, whether they have or not, I submit that they ought to reconsider the matter and fix a fair price in consultation with the trade. It is grossly unjust that one particular class of the community should be made to suffer in this way.
LORD SANDHURST: As noble Lords will understand, I am not in a position to-night to answer the various criticisms which have been made, but I can assure the noble Duke who has just sat down and noble Lords that I will make it my business to convey what has been said as clearly as I can to the War Office; and if one of the noble Lords would be so good as to put another Question down I shall come prepared with the fullest answers I can get.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Might I ask the noble Lord whether, when making representation to the War Office, he will impress on them the necessity, in fixing the price of this wool, of employing men who know about the trade and about the value of the wool, because from what we have seen up to the present there is not the slightest reason to suppose that this matter has been dealt with by anybody who knows anything about it. The War Office commandeered the wool, but when it came to fixing the price they brought in the Board of Agriculture, which had nothing to do with the matter, which never issued the original Order, and which is not a professional buyer or seller of wool. All one wants is justice. I shall therefore be much obliged to the noble Lord if he will represent in the strongest way to the War Office that this question of price should not be gone into except by a body which is acquainted with the trade and knows the rights and wrongs of the question.
LORD SANDHURST: I will take care to make the representation which the noble Earl has mentioned.

ARABIA, THE SUDAN AND SYRIA.
THE EARL OF CROMER THE EARL OF CROMER rose to ask—

1. Whether His Majesty's Government can give any further information as to the events which have recently taken place in the Arabian Peninsula.

2. Whether it is proposed to publish any Papers as regards the recent operations undertaken against the Sultan of Darfur.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I should like to offer a few words of explanation with regard to the two Questions which stand in my name. The accounts which have appeared in the newspapers about events in Arabia, which have all the appearance of being authentic, are extremely important. They are also, I think, very satisfactory; and I may add that they are all the more welcome because they are rather unexpected. They are important, because anything which affects the political status of the Holy Places touches very nearly the interests of the whole Moslem population; and amongst the Moslem population I need hardly remind your Lordships that there are a great many million British subjects. They are satisfactory, because although we have no detailed information on the subject I hope and believe that the action taken by the Sherif of Mecca and those associated with him is an indication that they place the most implicit confidence in the declaration which was very wisely made by His Majesty's Government a year or so ago that they had no sort of intention of interfering with the independence of the people of the Hejaz. Not only are they satisfactory, but they are, as I have said, somewhat unexpected; because although the whole of Arabia has been more or less in a state of chronic revolt for many years past, if anybody acquainted with its affairs had been asked whether there was likely to be a revolt, he would have replied in the negative. It did certainly appear that the success unfortunately gained by the Turks at Kut-el-Amara was likely to nip in the bud any idea of revolution in Arabia. However, that has not been the case; and it is another object-lesson to be added to the hundreds that have gone before showing how utterly impossible it is for any European to foretell what is going to happen in the East. All we know is that we may invariably expect the unexpected.
Since I put on the Paper the Question relating to the Arabian Peninsula. I have seen

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in the newspapers that there have been revolts of the Arabs against the Turks at Kerbela. Kerbela is near Baghdad, and it contains the shrine of Hussein, son of the celebrated Khalif Ali; and the city is regarded with almost as great a degree of sanctity by the Shiahs as the rest of the Mahomedans and the Shiahs regard Medina and Mecca. I cannot complain if I get no information on this subject, as I did not mention it in my Question, but if the noble Marquess can give any information it would be very welcome to those interested in the affairs of the East.
My other Question is in connection with the affairs of the Sudan. We have had, unfortunately, during this war to deplore a good many failures and disappointments both in the field of diplomacy and in the field of military operations. It is therefore especially pleasing to be able to dwell on a success. In the Sudan a very remarkable success has been achieved, not merely the military success to which I have alluded in the Question but a success in the realm of the civil administration. Consider what the position of the Sudan was at the beginning of the war. It is an enormous country, as large as France and Germany put together, perhaps larger; the difficulties of communication are very great, the climate is extremely trying, and the population, as we know from the experience of the last few years, is very often turbulent. The whole of this country under all these conditions has been governed by a mere handful of civil and military employees, many of them young men who have only recently left the Universities or the military colleges. They have been aided by an altogether insignificant force of British soldiers; but in spite of all this, there has not been in the Egyptian Sudan proper the smallest disturbance of public tranquility since the war began. That, I think, is a very remarkable achievement, and I do not know that it has been as fully recognised in this country as it ought to have been. I am not by any means complaining that it should not have been noticed by the Press, because as far as my own experience is concerned it is always a sure indication in countries like Egypt and the Sudan that matters are going well when the Press never alludes to the officials concerned either by way of praise or blame. At the same time I think a little timely encouragement from His Majesty's Government would be welcome.
The state of affairs in the Sudan is one of the greatest indirect compliments that has ever been paid to the wisdom and beneficence of English administration. Moreover, it affords the most ample justification for the lines on which our general Imperial policy is conducted. I may say it also shows the very great wisdom which Lord Salisbury displayed when some few years ago he laid down the general lines on which the Sudan was to be governed. The arrangement then made was full of anomalies and might have been riddled with criticism by political theorists, but it was singularly calculated to meet the requirements of the case, and it has in fact proved a great success. The utmost credit for all this is due to Sir Reginald Wingate and to the officers under his command, and I think it is impossible to speak too highly of the services they have rendered. Let me in fairness also add that I think a great deal of credit is due to the Public Offices in London—not for what they have done but for what they have very wisely abstained from doing. I shudder to think what might have happened if any attempt had been made by Departmental officers to govern the Sudan from this country. It is very probable that we should have created under those circumstances as much confusion in Sudan affairs as appears, from what we have heard this afternoon, to have been created in the wool trade.
Recently Sir Reginald Wingate and his officers established another claim to our gratitude. The Sultan of Darfur, Sultan Ali Dinar, has always been a most unsatisfactory and uncomfortable individual. For a great many years he was kept pretty well in order, mainly through the influence exerted on him by Slatin Pasha. Slatin Pasha, being an Austrian, was obliged to leave the British service directly the war broke out, but that ought not to obscure the fact that during a great many years he gave most loyal and efficient service to the British Government. Whether it was his withdrawal or other reasons, I do not know; but the fact remains that recently the Sultan of Darfur adopted an extremely hostile attitude. Sir Reginald Wingate very wisely and courageously did not hesitate for a moment what to do. He undertook military operations against the Sultan. I see in his place my noble and gallant friend Lord Grenfell, who can speak with greater authority than I can on the difficulties of campaigning in the Sudan. They are

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unquestionably very great. The climate is very trying, and the difficulties of transport and supply are enormous. In this particular instance the railhead reached only to El Obeid in Kordofan, and Sir Reginald Wingate's force had to advance 300 to 400 miles to El Fasher, the capital of Dar-fur. All this was accomplished with success, and I must say that I think a more brilliant little military achievement has rarely been accomplished in these Eastern countries. I hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Government will see their way to publish Despatches in order to enable us to judge of the details better than we can with any information we have now in our possession.
LORD GRENFELL: My Lords, I am glad that the noble Earl has asked these two Questions, and as regards the latter I am very pleased to bear testimony to the extraordinary ability with which the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, conducted these operations. I do not think anybody knows the present Sirdar better than do Lord Cromer and myself. He served under me for a period of eight or ten years, and we both served under the œgis of the noble Earl (Lord Cromer). The difficulties of this expedition were very great indeed. I know something of these expeditions when I have commanded in the Sudan. On this occasion, as Lord Cromer has mentioned, the great difficulty was the long distance between the base at the railhead, which was about 350 miles away from the place of the operations. There was little water and nearly all the well-holes had to be re-dug; there were no roads, and at one part they had to pass through a dense forest. The sand was so deep that only camels could be used for transport. There is an idea that a camel will travel a great while without water. That is the greatest possible mistake; he requires a great deal more water than one would expect, and the difficulties of transport are therefore enlarged. To reach El Fasher the expedition had to pass through a part of the Sudan which is inhabited by Arabs whose loyalty was rather doubtful, and I think the diplomatic qualities of Sir Reginald Wingate were greatly displayed by his being able to get through this difficult and dangerous region without any hostilities whatever. There were no Europeans except the English officers who commanded in the Egyptian Army, and perhaps I might be allowed to pay a tribute to Colonel Kelly, who commanded
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under Sir Reginald Wingate. I do not wish to allude further to the question which Lord Cromer has raised, but I am very glad to have had the opportunity of saying what I have; and I am sure your Lordships will agree with Lord Cromer and myself as to the great success achieved and the wonderful foresight exercised by the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, in this very brilliant campaign.
VISCOUNT BRYCE: My Lords, I hope I may be permitted to add two or three supplementary questions to those which my noble friend Lord Cromer has addressed to His Majesty's Government with regard to the state of things in Arabia. In the first place, I should like to inquire whether any information can be given us with regard to the state of the Hejaz railway and the number of troops which the Turks at present dispose of in Palestine and Syria. As your Lordships are aware, the only means which the Turkish Government have, since they have been cut off from the sea, of communicating at all with Medina and Mecca and that part of Arabia is by the Hejaz railway; and no doubt one of the chief objects with which Abdul Hamid spent such an enormous amount of money on the construction of this railway was to have a means of communication with those parts apart from the sea. The railway was made largely by German engineers, and although it is only a single line railway it is very well laid, and it has the advantage of having very few bridges for the simple reason that there are no rivers. There are viaducts here and there, but except in one or two spots there is nothing above a brook; therefore in that respect the railway is easy to maintain. I should like to know whether there is any truth in the statement in to-day's newspapers that the forces of the Sherif of Mecca have torn up part of the railway line to the north of Medina, and therefore made it impossible for the Turks to get to Medina and relieve that city by means of the railroad.
Another point on which I would like to have information is the state of things in Syria. We hear very little about Syria, which seems to have been completely bottled up by the Turks; but what little we do hear goes to show that the country is suffering terribly from famine and disease, and from the cruelty exercised by the Turks upon any of the Arab population whom

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they suspect of disaffection. As your Lordships know, there has long been a smouldering disloyalty towards the Sultan among the Arab population, and although it is strongest in the wandering tribes it extends to some extent into Syria, and I believe it has given occasion to unparalleled severities by the Turks in that part of the country. Lebanon, which is the most prosperous as well as the most beautiful of the Turkish regions because it enjoys an almost complete autonomy and is therefore better governed than any other of the Turkish dominions, is said to be in a state of misery; and the last vestiges of the beautiful forests which grace its slopes are being destroyed to provide fuel because no coal is available for the service of the railway.
Then I should like to ask whether we can be told anything about another question which is of great importance but about which it may not perhaps be thought desirable to give any news at this moment—I refer to the attitude of the Arab tribes in Irak and along the upper portion of the Persian Gulf and near Basra. If we could have such information it would also be of considerable interest. It would be important to know whether the action taken at Mecca has had a sympathetic, effect on those Arab tribes and is inducing them to take up a more friendly attitude towards us than we have reason to believe has been the case during the recent Mesopotamian campaign. I need hardly say that my questions are put only in the hope that His Majesty's Government may feel it consistent with the public service to give us such information as they possess.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, I fear that so far as the part of the noble Earl's Question which relates to Arabia is concerned, I cannot add very much to the information which has appeared in the Press and which your Lordships no doubt have read. We have not seen that information altogether with surprise. As my noble friend very truly stated, it has been OUT point of view all through that the Holy Places both in Arabia and in Mesopotamia must be secured under Moslem control, and as soon as it appeared that the Turkish Government, under foreign influence and under something like German control, was ceasing to represent the Moslem world in the truest sense, it became obvious that a rising such as has lately occurred was by no means impossible.
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The Turkish Government has been for some time past losing its real validity as the representative of Islam, and, that being so, nobody has the right to feel surprised at what has occurred among those who regard themselves as the true representatives of the Moslem faith. It is equally true that we can none of us refuse our sympathy with those who endeavour thus to throw off an alien yoke. And there is a further reason—I do not think it has been mentioned by any noble Lord—why we are sympathetically disposed towards the Arabian efforts to free themselves from Turkish domination. The pilgrimages have been of late greatly and of necessity interfered with. As noble Lords know, thousands upon thousands of His Majesty's subjects go from India and from further East on pilgrimage to the Holy Places, and its seems, I hope, likely that what has taken place in Arabia will render it far more easy to encourage the renewal of the Hadj, which had been interfered with to a great extent by the necessary blockade of the Turkish ports on the Arabian coast.
As regards the point raised by my noble friend below the gangway (Viscount Bryce) concerning the Hejaz railway, we have no reason to suppose that the report which is mentioned of a cutting of a portion of the railway is untrue, but we have no further information regarding it than what has appeared in the public newspapers.
As to Syria, we have, I am afraid, confirmation of the deplorable state of things in that country. Great severity has been exercised by the Turks under Djemil Pasha against a number of Syrian notables who became suspect to the Turkish Government. At least twenty persons of importance were condemned to death, and a number of others were imprisoned or exiled. But apart from that, there is the terrible condition of things which was indicated by my noble friend. The Turks appear to have formed a regular cordon round the Lebanon district and to be practically starving the population inside that cordon, depriving them of the necessaries of life. Representations, I believe, have been or are being made by the United States Government to the Turkish Government, pointing out what a departure from the ordinary proceedings of civilised Governments is involved in action of this kind, and it is difficult to see what other step it is possible to take for

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the relief of these unhappy people. Bearing in mind the fate of Armenia, it is impossible not to feel the gravest disquiet at the possible fate which may threaten the inhabitants of Syria. We, of course, and also the French, although greatly interested in the lot of the Syrian Christians, are also concerned for the fate of the Syrian Moslems, and the whole future of Syria is one which naturally causes us the deepest concern, and we can only hope that the successes which may be obtained in the different parts of the world in the military field may assist in settling this question.
As regards Kerbela, we have no very special information beyond that which has been mentioned by the noble Earl opposite. It appears to be the case that the Turks attacked Kerbela, actually firing shells at one of the famous shrines, and it may be assumed from this that a considerable part at any rate of the Arab population of that part of Mesopotamia are in hostility to Turkish rule—by no means an uncommon thing, as the noble Earl knows, as between some of the Shiah population and the Turks. But as regards the wider question which my noble friend puts with reference to the general attitude of the Arab tribes in Mesopotamia in their relation to our Expeditionary Force, I am afraid I am not in a position to give him any particular or special information.
I pass to the much more satisfactory subject of Darfur and the success which has been obtained there. The noble Earl, Lord Cromer, has told us in broad outline of the recent history of that Sultanate. Sultan Ali Dinar, a quite uneducated and fanatical type of Moslem, maintained for a considerable period rather distant but at any rate correct relations with the Government of the Sudan, but in 1915 he began to show signs of resenting our rule. He refused to pay the very small amount of tribute which he had been in the habit of paying to the Sudanese Government, and he started intrigues with the tribe of the Senussi and with other Moslem elements in Africa which he thought might prove to be hostile to us in Egypt and in the Sudan. Consequently, early this year Sir Reginald Wingate concentrated a small force—he had not, indeed, a very large force at his disposal—to protect the border of Kordofan, which it seemed might not improbably be attacked from Darfur. It is well to note that the French Government, whose colony of Wadai is on the
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western side of Darfur, were naturally deeply interested and became somewhat concerned at the unrest shown by the Sultan of Darfur, and also at the possible consequence upon their colony of energetic action on our part. It was clearly important that we should not in any way disturb or imperil their frontier. But the real necessity of inflicting a lesson upon the Sultan of Darfur became more and more evident, and it is quite clear now that by far the best course was taken in the interests of the French as well as of ourselves. Sir Reginald Wingate accordingly determined that an advance should be made on El Fasher, and friendly communications with the French authorities resulted in an agreement that they should render on their side any help that they could. All offers of help were naturally welcome, because—as the noble Earl and the noble and gallant Field-Marshal with so much personal experience of that part of the world have described—the expedition to be taken to El Fasher was one of no ordinary difficulty. The capital of Darfur lies just about 400 miles from the railhead at El Obeid.
In the meantime the Sultan had become more and more truculent. He addressed some very violent letters to the Governor of Kordofan and the Inspector at Nahud, which is on the border. The second of these, couched in the most lurid terms and with a sort of grim humour, was addressed to the "Governor of Hell" in Kordofan and the "Inspector of Flames" at Nahud—a letter, in fact, full of the Jehad idea and calling down and announcing his determination to inflict upon all the infidels those combined punishments in this world and the next which the Moslem is in the fortunate position of being able to distribute. It was quite evident that this fanatical Arab had been misled by that propaganda completely misrepresenting the true thought and belief of Islam which has been spread all over the Mahomedan world through German agency, and of which we have had evidence not merely in Africa but also freely in Asia.
On March 16 the advance of the British force began in circumstances which, as the noble and gallant Field-Marshal has explained, were made harder through the scarcity of water. It might perhaps be asked, "Why advance at a time when water is so difficult to get; why not have waited until the rains, when movement becomes easy?" The answer to that not

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unnatural question is that when movement is easy for you it is easy also for your enemies; and on a line of communication of that length it is worth the risk and the discomfort to avoid the chance of that line being cut at a time when raiding parties can move freely about; the country. In the dry season they, too, are tied to short travel, and I have no doubt therefore that the General, in acting as he did, showed the truest possible sense of the needs of the situation. It was also likely that if further delay for a more favourable travelling season were incurred some of the Turkish and German emissaries, whose presence with the Senussi tribe we have already had occasion to recognise, might have found their way to Darfur and added to the difficulty of the General's task. At the same time the French made a demonstration in force on their side—that was, I think, towards the end of April; and co-operation between the forces was arranged. The advance from a place about halfway from the Kordofan border took place about the 15th, and the capital, El Fasher, was occupied on the 23rd, after some sharp fighting. Heavy loss was inflicted on the force of Ali Dinar, and he himself fled with a small following. That is, briefly, the history of what occurred. I hope that when Sir Reginald Wingate's complete report of the operations is received we shall be able to lay it before Parliament at the first possible opportunity.
Before sitting down, I desire to add the warmest possible tribute, on behalf of the Government, to what has been already said of the services rendered by Sir Reginald Win-gate and the Sudan officials, both for the very sound judgment which was shown throughout and for the careful weighing of risks without refusal to take a certain amount of hazard, which undoubtedly existed in making this move forward at the time when it was undertaken. The plan was most carefully drawn, and the execution was rapid and prompt. This is indeed just what we should have expected from Sir Reginald Wingate, who is one of the most brilliant representatives of that type of soldier-administrator of which the history of our government in India and also in Africa has given so many examples. He was admirably supported by his headquarters staff; and I should like also to add a word of commendation to those who were referred to by Lord Cromer—namely, the young officials, many of them of quite short service, who have carried on the Sudan administration
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with such success under the Sirdar. It is also right to remember the name of Colonel Kelly (who was mentioned by my noble and gallant friend), who made the actual march to El Fasher, and who evidently carried out the military part of the expedition with the utmost care and with the success which we are all so happy to recognise

LOSS OF AN AEROPLANE.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU: My Lords, I rise to ask His Majesty's Government whether they can give any information to the House as to the start, flight, and landing of a certain F.E.2D. aeroplane which left Farnborough on 31st May and has not yet joined the squadrons at the Front; and whether any wireless message has been received in reference to it. In my opinion this incident is a serious one, and I should not have referred to it at all had I thought that anything I was going to say, or the mere reference to it, would be of any assistance to the enemy. Such an incident as this, though I am sorry I cannot say it is without precedent, is comparatively rare; but it is so serious that I think the House is entitled to have the answer which no doubt will be given by the noble Earl who presides over the Air Board. I trust we shall hear from His Majesty's Government that steps will be taken as far as possible to ensure that such an incident will not occur again.
On the morning of June 1 the aeroplane to which I have referred and which was fitted with a 250 horse-power engine (No. 7) left the Farnborough Aerodrome to fly to France. What I say can be of no possible use to the enemy, because they have the plane and the engine. It flew across the Channel, past our lines and over the German lines, and descended unhurt—pilot, observer and machine—in the German Aerodrome at Lille. There is a possibility of a mistake in approaching St. Omer and Lille from the air. Pilots very often are guided by two canals which are to a certain extent similar. But in this case there was no question of mistaking the two canals, because I am sorry to tell your Lordships that the pilot who flew this machine over had never flown in France before and had no knowledge whatever of the geography of the Front. That makes it a very serious incident. The pilot's name is Lieutenant Littlewood, originally of the North Lincolnshire Regiment, Special Reserve, and the observer

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was Lieutenant Grant. I may mention that Lieutenant Littlewood was gazetted to the Royal Flying Corps as a flying officer only on June 8, some days after he was in the hands of the enemy.
It would, perhaps, be well if I read to the House from a letter which was written to me by one who happened to be down at Farnborough at this time. The officer when penning the letter did not, of course, know that it would be quoted, but I have his permission to read it. It commences—
"The War Office sent down and asked for two F.E. pilots, the machines being F.E.'s in which the engines were placed, to fly them oversea—"
I may say that the F.E. is by no means an easy machine to fly—
"Owing to an error in the delivery of the message, it was understood that the pilots were to fly ordinary F.E.'s—"
This one in question was a special type of F.E.—
"with the result that in one ease an inexperienced pilot was sent. I was at Farnborough and saw the pilot "[the pilot who lost the machine]," who complained that he was not an experienced F.E. pilot, also that he had never been oversea and was not sure of the way. The authorities there, who heard all this, took no notice of his complaint, and told him to take the machine. Later a report came through that an F.E. had crossed the lines at Armentieres and had disappeared in the direction of Lille. That evening a German wireless communiqué stated that an F.E. had landed intact south-west of Lille, the pilot having lost his way—"
The somewhat sarcastic German wireless message was to this effect. While informing us that the officers and machine had landed unhurt at the German Aerodrome at Lille, they thanked us for the engine and plane, which, they said, would be "most useful" to them. But to continue the letter which I was reading—
"Thus it will be seen that within three hours of its being turned out of the factory our newest and latest machine was handed over intact to the Huns. I should think if you wrote and told—about this he would have somebody's blood, as it is the second time our beauties at the War Office have lost a brand-new machine in the same way. When the V.E.2E. had just come out, the fourth or fifth machine we sent over to France was also sent over by a chap who had only just got his wings and did not know the way, and he landed right on the Lille Aerodrome and handed the machine over to the Huns. To say it is nobody's fault is rot."
I must add that I agree with the general conclusion to which the writer comes, and I would ask His Majesty's Government whether they will give serious consideration
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to this most unfortunate incident. From a certain neutral source I have this information as given by the Germans with regard to the landing: "Reason of landing unknown, but pilot stated he did not know where he was and was not aware he had crossed the lines."
There are three questions to which I hope the noble Earl will be able to reply, as I think we are entitled to an answer on them—(1) Who was responsible for sending this inexperienced pilot with one of outmost valuable and latest machines? (2) Is it a fact that other pilots inexperienced in the geography of the Western Front have been sent on previous occasions? (3) Will the Government take steps to ensure that such serious mistakes will not occur in the future? I think I have said enough to justify my asking these questions, and I have carefully omitted details which I have thought might be of use to the enemy.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (KARL CURZOX OF KEDLESTON): My Lords, to the question on the Paper I am quite ready to reply to the best of my ability, but with regard to the other questions which the noble Lord has just addressed to me across the floor of the House he must not mind if I cannot answer them as he would wish. As to the incident referred to, the noble Lord is obviously fully acquainted with all the details; indeed, it is clear that from the means of information at his disposal he knows more about it than I do, and I can only tell him so much as I have been able to find out from the knowledge available to us.
It is true that the aeroplane to which reference has been made left England on June 1. The German Wireless of the day after stated that a British biplane had landed near Lille, no date being mentioned. We now know that it was the missing machine to which the noble Lord has referred in his Question, and that the pilot and his passenger, from whom communications have been received, are prisoners in the hands of the Germans. The pilot after crossing the Channel appears to have lost his way and to have descended in the German lines. Such accidents, as the noble Lord knows perfectly well, have happened before and will happen again. They are not confined to one side rather than to the other; they have happened to German pilots just in the same way as they have happened to our own pilots.

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I am not clear whether the noble Lord meant in this case to suggest any particular inference or to base upon what happened any particular charge. He made something of the fact that the pilot was probably an inexperienced man and had not flown across the Channel before. That, I believe, is true, but I doubt whether it would be wise to lay down a law that no machine should be taken across the Channel, even by a competent flyer, unless he had had experience of the particular route to be taken. No doubt in ordinary cases we should be only too glad to send with the machine a pilot who had done the same job before. But the noble Lord will realise, with the operations going on at the Front, that a pilot who has those qualifications might be much more valuable at the Front than employed in this country to take machines over to France. This is one of the risks of aerial warfare that have to be run. In the present case it resulted in the loss of the machine, and an accident, although fortunately not dangerous, to the pilot himself. I cannot give an undertaking that such incidents will never happen again.
LORD MONTAGU OF BEAULIEU: I thank the noble Earl for his answer. I may mention, however, that there were two other pilots available on that particular morning—at any rate, that is my information from a very reliable source—and I should like to know why this particular man was chosen to fly over to France with the best machine we had of a special type. This is a very grave incident indeed, and one of which serious notice should be taken.

SMALL HOLDING COLONIES BILL. [H.L.]
LORD STRACHIE: May I ask the noble Marquess whether it is still the intention of the Government to take the Report stage of the Small Holding Colonies' Bill on Thursday next?
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Yes, unless any noble Lord desires to raise objection. We have placed it on the Paper for that day.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Four o'clock.