§ THE LORD ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY rose to ask His Majesty's Government for an explanation as to the retrospective bearing of the statement made in both Houses of Parliament on June 29 respecting the treatment of conscientious objectors to military service.
§ The most rev. Primate said: My Lords, when a week ago [July 4] there was some little discussion upon the subject of the arrangement made for dealing with the problem of the conscientious objector, reference was made to—indeed, the whole discussion rested upon—the statement made by the Prime Minister in the other House on June 29 and repeated in this House on the same evening; but the discussion did not elucidate the points of difficulty which arose in the minds of many of your Lordships as to the exact meaning of the Prime Minister's statement. Indeed the two noble Lords who spoke on behalf of His Majesty's Government on that occasion seemed to me to be in the same doubt as to the exact meaning of the phraseology. The simple point that I am anxious to get made perfectly clear is whether or not the arrangement foreshadowed by the Prime Minister is retrospective or not. The words are capable of being construed either way. I do not know whether the document has yet been issued in a formal shape; if so, I have not seen it, and I have been obliged to rely on the statement as it appears in the Parliamentary records of both Houses. But I shall be glad if His Majesty's Government can give us a perfectly clear statement, apart from the question of technical rules, as to whether or not the promise given by the Prime Minister with regard to the treatment of these men relates not only to those who now come under its provisions, but to those who have already been dealt with and placed in a position which is felt to be possibly an unfair one, and from which every one of your Lordships would desire, if it be an unfair one, they should be extricated.
§ I am anxious to say again that in asking this Question I am not in the slightest 723 degree implying censure or criticism of the action of the Tribunals, still less of the action of the higher authorities who have had to revise in some eases what the Tribunals have done. I believe the Tribunals to have discharged a difficult task with conspicuous fairness, and I am not in the least suggesting that they desire to act otherwise than with perfectly reasonable consideration towards men whom it is almost impossible to know how to handle because of the inconsistency and the apparent incompatibility with the elements of citizenship of the professions they are putting forward. In a document which has been sent to me, and no doubt also to many of your Lordships, it is stated to be a grievance now that this statement does not solve the problem, because a large number of these men cannot conscientiously undertake work of national importance as an alternative to military service. Well, a man who will not undertake work of national importance as an alternative to military service is putting himself outside the pale of citizenship; he is simply placing himself in a position for which no defence can reasonably be brought forward by men who are looking upon public duties as part of the responsibility of citizens in a civilised country. A man who is claiming the protection of the Police and makes other claims, but declines to take alternative work because it is an alternative to military service, is deliberately putting himself into a position in which consideration for him is rendered impossible, or, at any rate, most difficult.
§ But none the less we desire to know what is the position of men who are now in detention or are imprisoned, and who would not have been so had this Order been issued some months before. That question does seem to me to call for an answer; and I venture to hope we may have it, freed from technicalities, which are extraordinarily difficult to follow, with reference to Rules and Regulations. I am sure your Lordships will acquit me of the slightest desire to shield these men from the consequences of an action which, as I have said before, seems to place them outside the category of ordinary citizenship. But a conscientious objector is something a little different from that in some cases; and it is for the reasons I have given that I should like to have an answer to the Question I have put upon the Paper.
724§ THE EARL OF DERBYMy Lords, I think your Lordships and the country generally will be obliged to the most rev. Primate for the pronouncement he has made with regard to those who are now attempting to carry their conscientious objection to the extreme length that they cannot even undertake national service in lieu of military service. I hope to be able to answer the most rev. Primate's Question in a manner that will be satisfactory to him. Every conscientious objector who has been sentenced to imprisonment—whenever sentenced, that is—has been sent (or the order has gone for him to be sent) to a civil prison, and his case has been or will be immediately submitted to the Central Appeal Tribunal. There are, however, conscientious objectors at the present moment undergoing detention. They fall into two categories—those who while under detention are obeying the military commands given to them, and those who refuse to obey the military commands. I will deal with the second first. Those who have refused to obey the commands are being brought to trial by Court-Martial, and if convicted they will come under the new scheme and be transferred to civil custody and their case will be dealt with by the Central Appeal Tribunal. As to those who, though conscientious objectors, are whilst undergoing detention obeying the military orders, we feel that they ought not to be in a worse position than those who are disobeying orders. The intention, therefore, is to inquire into all their cases also, just in the same way as in the other class. I hope this answer will be satisfactory to the most rev. Primate.