NATIONAL SERVICE.

HL Deb 18 April 1916 vol 21 cc769-85

VISCOUNT MILNER rose to move to resolve—

That in the opinion of this House it is necessary, in order to secure the objects for which the country is fighting, that an Act should be passed without further delay rendering all men of military age liable to be called upon for military service during the continuance of the war.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, the Motion which I rise to propose is one of an uncommonly grave character. I can assure you it was not without great search- ings of heart, and after long reluctance that I decided to put it on the Paper of your Lordships' House. I realise that there are serious inconveniences about the public discussion of such a Motion, and if it were not for my conviction of its paramount importance I should have hesitated to initiate this debate. Whether I was right to wrong, the responsibility is entirely my own. In view of the atmosphere of suspicion which prevails, in view of the constant talk in newspapers about cabals and plots, and all the rest of it, I feel bound to say that I am here not as the spokesman of any party or any group. I did not consult anybody before putting this Motion on the Paper. I have no idea what amount of support I may obtain. I do, indeed, hope—I hope very sincerely—that the cause I plead will meet with a large amount of sympathy in your Lordships' House, as I believe it represents the views of a very great body of opinion, indeed I believe the views of the majority of the people of this country at the present time.

I only wish that this cause had a better exponent. I am painfully conscious that I am in many ways not at all the best-fitted man to be the advocate of this great cause. I have never, to my regret, been a soldier, and I am too old to become one. Not that I should hesitate to perform any duties for which I was fit which might be allotted to mile if the Government thought well at a crisis like this to commandeer the whole nation, to apply the principle of National Service not only for military but for all purposes. As long as such a measure was general, as long as it was equitable, of course I should, as a good citizen, submit to any duties, however disagreeable, which were imposed upon me. If I suffer from the disadvantage of not having been a soldier, on the other hand I also suffer from the disadvantage of having for many years before the war been an advocate of National Service. You may say, Why is that a disadvantage? Because it exposes me to the suspicion—unjust, but not unnatural—of wishing to make capital out of our present embarrassments in favour of the policy for which I have always pleaded. For these reasons, conscious of these disadvantages, I have waited long and anxiously—perhaps too long—for someone else better fitted to bring the proposition which I am advocating before your Lordships' House. But it is now the eleventh hour. If it is desirable, as I believe it is, that the passionate conviction of so many thousands of our fellow-countrymen should find an expression in this place, if there is no one else prepared to start the ball rolling, then, with all my disadvantages, it is my duty to go on and to do what little I can.

A great deal has happened since I put this Motion on the Paper of your Lordships' House. In drafting the Motion I wished to assert the principle of National Service in its broadest form. The words of the Motion were intended to cover not only the unattested married men, but the men who have become eighteen years of age since August 15 last, or who may attain that age during the continuance of the war; also the time-expired men; and also the removal of many of the existing exceptions and exemptions. Since my Motion was put on the Paper it has been reported—I do not know with what accuracy, but the report certainly has the appearance of truth—that the Government have decided to bring within the area of compulsion the men attaining the age of eighteen since August 15, also time-expired men, and further to make considerable changes with regard to excepted occupations. Well, if they are conceding so much, what I wish to implore them to do is to go the whole length and now at last to place this whole business of recruiting upon the only firm, unassailable, and entirely satisfactory basis, as far as military service is concerned—equality of obligation for all men of military age. By military age I suppose we mean, for present purposes, the ages between eighteen and forty-one, though, as far as I am concerned, if it was thought necessary to extend the age to forty-five I think a good cause could be made out for it. But that is a minor matter. Anyway, whatever the limits of age, there should be one rule for all men who come within them.

This is spoken of very often as equality of sacrifice. I am afraid that equality of sacrifice is an unattainable ideal. You may have equality of treatment, but in view of the great variety of human circumstance it is not possible that, however equal the treatment of the individual by the State, there should not be an infinite variety in the degree of sacrifice. But that is no reason why you should not have equality of obligation, equality of duty—why the State should not have the same claim upon every man. It ought to have. There ought to be no exemption except on public grounds. The country has the same right to the services of all its citizens, and Heaven knows it has need of them all. If a man of military age is not physically fit for military service—and the test of fitness ought to be very strict; I think we have been much too lax in that regard in some of our recruiting—I say that if he is not fit for military service, or if he is more needed for some other work conducive to the successful conduct of the war, taking the broadest conception of what constitutes the conduct of the war—these are valid reasons for not making him a soldier. But I can conceive no other valid reason whatsoever. Here at least you have a principle simply honourable, indisputably just. It furnishes the clue, and I believe the only possible clue, out of the maze of difficulties with which this problem of recruiting is at the present time encumbered. As long as you stop short of that, I am sure that with every extension of the principle of compulsion you will only get into fresh difficulties.

Let me take only one instance—the question of the time-expired men. It is a very strong measure to compel time-expired men to go on serving, but it is a measure which the extreme necessity of the State, being in the midst of a life-and-death struggle, does justify. But, my Lords, if the time-expired men are to be subjected to compulsion, is it possible for us to contemplate their being kept on after years of service to the State, while other men who have rendered no service at all are not called upon to take their share of the burden? I am convinced that, whereas the time-expired men would be willing to continue their service as part of the general obligation, there would be discontent and the deepest feeling of injury and injustice on their part, who deserve so well of their country, if the principle of compulsion were to be applied to them while it was not applied to others. I might say the same about the extension of the age of military service. I do not know whether it is contemplated, but if it were contemplated to take all men up to forty-five years of age I think it would be justified at a time of such extreme necessity. But surely if you were to compel only single men up to forty-five years of age to serve, the argument for compelling all men of younger age to serve would be almost unanswerable. As I say, these extensions of the principle of compulsion, as long as you have not got an equal rule for everybody, only land you in fresh anomalies and difficulties, and will compel you to go on altering and altering from time to time, when we have really now arrived at a stage when it is of extreme importance that we should have a final settlement, of this question for the whole course of the war. I feel bitterly the gibe of the enemy newspaper which points out that this is the third or fourth different system of recruiting that we have had during the war. Since this is such a great struggle and so much time has been lost and so many energies absorbed, for goodness sake let us get this question settled now once for all. There is enough else to occupy the thoughts of all those who are responsible for the country's welfare in the great struggle in which she is engaged.

For fully a year past the necessity of National Service has, I believe, been evident to everybody who looks at the war objectively—I mean free from prejudices and pre-conceptions, free from all considerations other than those connected absolutely with the war itself. That year has been spent in trying to evade the principle of universal obligation—to evade it as if it were an evil thing, whereas I believe it is a noble and an elevating thing—to evade the principle and to escape grasping the nettle. It has been spent in delays—in half measures, in successive spurts of what is known as "anxious consideration," in the study of innumerable sets of figures, the object of which seems to me to be to determine what is the minimum amount of national effort by which we can decently persuade ourselves that we may hope to get through. It appears to me useless to try to calculate how many men we want. Surely it is evident that in a struggle of this magnitude we want every single man we can get. Calculations are indeed necessary, and most necessary, but only for one purpose—to calculate how soon we can get the men and what degree of force we may hope to be able to employ at a given time. For the purpose of limiting our requirements calculations are futile and even mischievous. There can be no limit to our requirements. This is a case in which we can never have done all we ought to have done until we have done all we can. It is an absolutely wrong frame of mind to be in, to sit down and try to calculate what we must do to win the war. We must do everything, and then pray to God that we may win.

When the Coalition Government Was formed there were a great many of us who hoped that this truth had been grasped, that we were about to fight with our whole manhood, and that it was precisely in order promptly and easily to carry a measure of National Service that a Ministry of men of all Parties—except the Irish Party, whom we should all have liked to see included—had come into existence. For by that time—last May—the great impulse given to voluntary recruiting by the personality of Lord Kitchener, and by the great outburst of patriotic enthusiasm at the beginning of the war, had clearly spent its force. The results achieved were a wonderful tribute to the patriotism of the people, and I am sure that there is no other country in the world where voluntary recruiting would have produced anything like the same results. But for all that, by the time of which I am speaking the returns were petering out; yet the hopes that the new Government would deal promptly and decisively with the situation were doomed to disappointment. For three months our rulers kept on burying their heads in the sand and trying to convince themselves and the nation that the voluntary system, which by that time had degenerated into a mixture of cajolery and threats, was still adequate to the situation.

The only thing done at that time was to create a National Register, and when that Register was created it was said with loud and repeated protests that it was never, never going to be used for anything so wicked as the supply of men for the Army. Then there arose a Press campaign for National Service, attributed to Lord North-cliffe, and a large section of the public and even some of our leading men seemed for the time being to have forgotten that there was a war in their eagerness to belabour an unpopular individual who happened to be in the right. Profiting by this diversion, Ministers continued to fight shy of dealing with the recruiting problem; but by the beginning of the autumn it had become evident that the Olympian calm with which they appeared, by external appearances, to have regarded the situation really covered considerable anxiety, and probably very acute differences of opinion.

Now all this time, while nothing was being done, the war was going extraordinarily badly for the Allies. The Russians had been driven back a long way; Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers; the Dardanelles Campaign was becoming more and inure hopeless; the storm cloud of Austro-German invasion was rolling up over the head of Serbia; and, my Lords, every new development of the war, every fresh incident and fresh feature was emphasising the supreme importance of numbers, and especially of British numbers. We were short of men everywhere, short of them on the Western front, short at Suvla Bay, short on the Tigris. I do not mean to say that there were not other causes to account for our want of success—mistakes of policy, mistakes of strategy, and so forth. But at any rate there was always this one permanent and ubiquitous cause of weakness, the want of men. I am not saving that by way of criticism. Having regard to the tiny Army with which we began the war, having regard to the enormous demands upon our military power which the war has made, demands far greater than any of us, the most farseeing, the most experienced, had the slightest inkling of before the war began—that applies equally to men of all Parties—say having regard to these things, it is not surprising that for a long, time at any rate the want of men should have remained perhaps our heaviest handicap. What is open to criticism is the slowness with which we learnt the lesson, the fact that we still pin our faith to these anxious computations about the precise numbers with which we may just hope to scrape through, instead of devoting all our efforts to getting as quickly as possible the very last man we can, whom we are able to arm and train.

I apologise for the digression. Let me return to the position of affairs in the middle of October last. About the middle of that month it had become evident that some decision of the recruiting question was an absolute, inevitable necessity. Then came the unfortunate illness of the Prime Minister, which caused some further delay. Finally, as a last effort to save the voluntary system, of which it still preserved the semblance though not the substance, we had the half-way house of the Derby Scheme. That was an immense advance on anything that we had had before, because it introduced for the first time into the haphazard system of recruiting that order and method, and some degree of that fairness as between man and man, which are among the greatest merits of the system of National Service. It was of great advantage to have men put into age classes, which might be successively called up as required, and to have proper machinery provided for dealing with exemptions. But as a means of avoiding compulsion the Derby Scheme was a pure waste of time. It merely meant that compulsion had to be resorted to in January instead of in November. In January, after eight months of havering, it was at last resorted to, but then only for single men; and it was carefully explained to us and insisted on over and over again in the House of Commons that it was not being resorted to because of its fairness or for the sake of the principle of equal obligation, but for a purely accidental reason—namely, to fulfil a pledge which had been given by the Prime Minister to facilitate the working of the Derby Scheme. When that was done by that half-hearted proceeding, a great opportunity was missed.

The case with which the National Service Act was passed—a great lesson for us, by the way, at the present time—the ease with which that Act was passed, after all the threatenings, is conclusive proof to my mind of a readiness on the part of the nation to accept anything which the Government declare to be essential for the successful prosecution of the war. We might then, in January, perfectly well have got down to bed-rock, swept away all the remaining anomalies and injustices, and avoided all the subsequent waste of time and energy. Instead we got a measure which nobody could possibly believe would be a final settlement. It was perfectly certain that as soon as the attested married men were called up the old complaints of injustice would revive. It was also evident that to apply compulsion to men who were eighteen before August 15 last and refuse to extend it to the men who became eighteen from that time forward during the war, however long the war might last, was a plan that could not possibly stand. That absurdity we are now given to believe—I hope rightly given to believe—is going by the board.

My whole plea is that as we are once more compelled to deal with this matter we should new at long last make a clean job of it. The Government in its obstinate resistance to the principle of equal obligation is being driven from trench to trench. If they now cling as the last position of voluntarism to the immunity of the unattested married men, it is perfectly certain that they will have sooner or later to abandon that also. Why go on yielding bit by bit and dealing piecemeal with a matter which cries so loudly, so incessantly, for a comprehensive and final settlement? The voluntary system, whatever its merits—I do not want to discuss them; I do not want to indulge in any abstract controversy—has clearly broken down, at any rate for the period of the war. Then let us at least get the full advantages of the system of National Service. You lose much of the value of that system as long as you embrace it piecemeal, reluctantly and halfheartedly. The moral effect of complete and whole-hearted acceptance of the principle of National Service as a proof to our Allies and our enemies alike that this country was determined to throw its whole weight into the scale would be immense. It would be immense, too, among ourselves.

To justify this wretched piecemeal method we shall be told that the additional number of men whom we should get by the adoption of an all-round system of compulsion would not be very great. It has been said that it is not worth while to worry about the unattested married men, because from this source—although there are more than a million of them—you would not, after all the deductions are made, get more than an additional 200,000 or 300,000 men, and we can do without an additional 200,000 or 300,000 men. Precisely the same argument was used in January about the men attaining the age of eighteen after August 15—it was not worth while to bother about them; we could do without them. Now we find we cannot do without them, and we shall find just the same presently about the unattested n tarried men. This discredited argument is brought up again in the next similar case. Even if the calculation were correct—and if had more time I think I could show that it is a very dubious calculation—that there were only 200,000 or 300,000 extra men to be got from this source, how can you possibly tell that you may not want these additional 200,000 or 300,000 in men? If nine months hence or a year hence, at the final push, an additional 200,000 or 300,000 men would make the difference, and we had not got them, how should we feel then? Besides, is no weight to be attached to the argument of fairness? Is it of no consequence that, while compulsion is partial, all compelled men go with a sense of grievance? Is the spirit in which men go when they are called to the Colours of no importance to us?

Then it is said, We must not think only of fighting men, but of other elements of national strength in war time. I fully agree. Of course, we must. It is said that a balance must be kept up between the numbers of men required for fighting strength and for other competing claims also for war purposes. Men, munitions, money—that is the formula. It is suggested that in extending the area of compulsion for military purposes we shall be drawing men, not only from munitions, but from other work necessary for the successful prosecution of the war, from other necessary industries such as agriculture, and thus weakening our economic strength. My Lords, is not the exact opposite the truth? Is it not the fact that nothing disorganises industry like a haphazard scheme of recruiting? You are not obliged to take men because you have a right to take them. Indeed, you are the less likely to be driven to take the men you ought not to take, the larger the reservoir upon which you are able to draw.

These arguments against general compulsion are so weak that I am convinced that they cannot be the real motives of those who employ them. The real motive, I believe of resistance to the introduction of National Service is simply fear. I do not mean fear for themselves on the part of those who resist it. I make no such odious imputation against those who diner from me. What they are afraid of is public disturbance. They think that if a general measure of compulsion were resorted to there would be active resistance, disturbance, above all, strikes. They are afraid of the temper of the working classes. I am convinced that they are entirely wrong in their estimate of the character of their fellow-countrymen. I believe that the manual labourers of this country are, as a body, just as patriotic, just as anxious to see this war through at all costs, as any other section of the population. Of course, there are a great many weak-kneed and wrong-headed men among them and a few downright traitors, just as there are in every other class, but, speaking generally, what cause have we to doubt that the bulk of the manual workers are just as keen as we are for the triumph of our righteous national cause? Has the lesson of the Merthyr Tydvil by-election already been forgotten? You say, "Look at these sporadic strikes. Do they not indicate that a great proportion of the working class are concerned with their personal interests and are indifferent to the national need?" Where these things happen I believe it is simply because the men do not realise the extent of the need. And no wonder that they do not realise it, having regard to the misleading character of almost everything that they hear, and especially that they read, about the war. We are now paying the price for the constant glozing over of our reverses, the constant exaggeration of the defeats of the enemy and the weak points in his position, the constant tendency to encourage people to trust to anything but their own efforts, to rely upon the Russian steamroller, or the starvation of Germany, or the fabulous losses of the Germans, against which some of us, despite all the nonsense about encouraging the enemy and discouraging our own people, have never ceased to protest. I do not believe you can ever discourage this nation by telling it the truth. Let it only once realise the colossal task which it yet has before it, and there will be such an uprising of the national spirit as will sweep away resistance to all measures, however stringent, and bring about cheerful acceptance of all sacrifices, however severe, which are clearly seen to be necessary for the full output of the national strength.

My Lords, can we really doubt that the time has come when we must put the very last ounce of effort into the struggle? Who can doubt it who looks, on the one hand, at the objects which we have proclaimed as indispensable of attainment, and, on the other hand, at the progress—can it be progress?—which we have hitherto made towards the accomplishment of any one of them? I will not repeat the already often-repeated words of the Prime Minister on the subject of what we are fighting for. Some of his phrases I have always thought were rather indefinite, and I do not want to pin myself to them. But some things, at least, are clear. How about Bulgaria? How about Serbia? You have got to get the bone out of the dog's mouth, or at any rate to make him drop it. And how about future safeguards for the independence of the smaller nations of Europe and for their protection against wanton assaults? These things are the least with which we can be satisfied. If we are to accomplish even that, can we doubt that, despite all the heroism and all the immense sacrifices of our Allies, this country will have hereafter to bear a yet greater and an ever-increasing share in the common burden? After all, why should we complain of that? We have so far felt the pinch very much less than any other of the warring nations. We alone have still immense reserves of strength. But the time has come when we really must mobilise all those reserves if we are to be able to use them in time to prevent some of our friends from succumbing to too great a strain.

I am told that in pressing these matters we are imperilling the unity of the nation. There is nothing I would not do, no price I would not pay, to preserve the unity of the nation—except the price of defeat. If there is any section of the people who are not prepared to accept, who are determined to resist, sacrifices which are necessary for the safety of the whole, then I can only say that the community will have to deal with them, and to carry even that burden, if need be, in addition to the burden of external war. After all, we had a mutiny at the Nore in the very midst of the great struggle at the end of the eighteenth century, and we yet came out victorious in that war. But, my Lords, for my own part, I am perfectly confident that these are bogeys, that we need not fear on the part of any section of the population of this country worthy of consideration formidable resistance to any measures which the Government, speaking with the authority of their military advisers, declare to be essential to the prosecution of the war. I know that it may require some courage to face these threats which, nevertheless, I believe to be idle. But it is no use making great protestations of what we are going to do, it is no use making eloquent appeals to the national spirit, if the leaders making those appeals do not show spirit themselves in tackling internal as well as external difficulties. I believe that, boldly faced, those internal difficulties, at any rate, will disappear. I believe that it is only necessary to go before the people of this country with a full and frank statement of the position in which they find themselves, and the task they have to perform, and You will find a ready and a universal response to any demands that You feel bound to make upon them.

Moved to resolve, That in the opinion of this House it is necessary, in order to secure the objects for which the country is fighting, that an Act should be passed without further delay rendering all men of military age liable to be called upon for military service during the continuance of the war.—(Viscount Milner.)

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The MARQUESS OF CREWE)

My Lords, the whole House has listened with the most obvious attention to the statement of the noble Viscount opposite, and we on this Bench would have been very glad had it been possible for us to enter into a detailed discussion of what he has said. But it would only be possible for us to do that after making a statement of the intentions of His Majesty's Government for dealing with this question of how to supply a sufficient number of men for service in the Forces during this prolonged war. We had hoped that it might have been possible to do so to-day in both Houses, but it is not within our power to do so to-day. It was, of course, entirely within the right of the noble Viscount to set out his views on the subject of Universal Service in the manner in which he has, and I have no doubt he will agree that it is also within our right to abstain from a frill discussion of the subject until we are in a position to make the statement of which I have spoken. I can assure the noble Viscount that no disrespect towards him is intended by our desiring not to continue the discussion to-day. Indeed, quite the contrary. When, as I hope we soon shall be, we are in a position to proceed, we shall have had the advantage of full consideration of what the noble Viscount has said this afternoon.

I regret myself that there should be any delay in dealing with this matter, and I observe from comments I have heard in ether quarters that we are accused of some dilatoriness in dealing with this matter. I noticed a day or two ago on a contents bill of a popular newspaper of large circulation these words, "Downing-street—Still Thinking." That was, of course, a grave charge to bring against any body, and I have no doubt that the conductors of some of those popular newspapers and not a few of their readers cannot be accused of excessive devotion to that dangerous practice. But the noble Viscount, with all the traditions of Balliol behind him, is not likely, I think, to complain of our desiring to give close and careful consideration to this or to any other subject. From what he has said he is fully aware of the great complexity which surrounds the whole subject of the supply of a large Army from this country. He fully recognises the diversity and number of the conflicting claims equally necessary for the successful prosecution of the war which are made on the manhood of the nation. It is evidently quite true that, if we lived in a more simple civilisation, if we live had the fortune to live in such a state as one of the Zulu monarchies of other days, that of Cetewayo, or of Lobengula, where all the men of military age could be called upon to fight and the simple and primitive industries could be carried on by the older men and the women, the conduct of the war would be an infinitely easier matter for us. But as the noble Viscount has shown in his speech, be recognises that this is very much the contrary of being the fact. He knows also, I am sure, that these considerations are not less recognised by the War Office and by the General Staff than they are by the civilian members of His Majesty's Government, and they, too—the General Staff also—are not above thinking hard on this question of the supply of men and of how many men it is possible to spare. They are quite as well aware as we are of the great number of men who have to be regarded as indispensable for other purposes, and who in their way are doing national service not less than those who join the Colours. I can say, therefore, that His Majesty's Government are not ashamed that we feel obliged to regard these questions from every possible angle.

The noble Viscount has spoken of those who take a different view on the question of Universal Service from that which he himself holds. He would admit, I feel sure, that their views are held with precisely the same earnestness and depth of conviction with which he holds his own, and he will be aware that this fact does not add to the ease and rapidity with which a solution can be arrived at. I therefore beg your Lordships, on behalf of the Government not to attempt to continue this debate until we are in a position to make the statement of which I have spoken. I desire, therefore, to move that the debate be adjourned until to-morrow. I cannot say with certainty that we shall be able tomorrow to make the statement of which I have spoken, but l trust that we may; and for that reason I do not desire to put the debate off any longer than can be possibly helped.

Moved, That the further debate be adjourned until to-morrow.—(The Marquess of Crewe.)

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

My Lords, when the rumour reached us in the course of this morning that the Government were not prepared to make the statement in either House of Parliament which had been confidently expected—which, so far as the House of Commons was concerned, had been definitely promised—it came upon us, I must say, with great surprise. My noble friend Lord Milner took every step to consult the convenience of His Majesty's Government when he put this Motion upon the Paper. He asked them what day would be convenient for them, and they fixed, in consultation with him, upon this evening, and we understood that the country was to be in possession of the views of His Majesty's Government on this very critical question.

The noble Marquess asks us to postpone the discussion. Such a request, made by the Government at a moment like this, it is, of course, impossible to refuse; but I wish the noble Marquess had spoken with greater confidence as to when the debate is likely to be resumed. He said "Tomorrow, if the Government are ready." When will the Government be ready? Are the Government ever ready? We desire, so far as we possibly can in this great crisis, to support the unity of the nation and to back up the Government in every way we can. If they will only show a definite policy I am sure they will find that all sections of the country will support them. As it is, however, I am bound to say that the Government are losing the confidence of the country. I am not exaggerating when I say that. I earnestly beg them to treat the country differently. I do not say that I agree with every word my noble friend said just now, but I am quite certain he was right in saying that if the Government will only take a strong line they will have the whole country behind them. There is nothing that the country will not give them in men and in money that they choose to ask for, and if a sufficiency is not supplied the responsibility must rest upon the Government, and upon the Government alone.

Just think of the delays. I sometimes think that the Constitution of this country and the training of British statesmen are the worst in the world for the conduct of a great war, because, after all, the whole of our Constitution is framed in order to produce delay. All our system of Parlia- mentary procedure, all the infinite consideration in committees and sub-committees, makes really for delay. Speaking as a Conservative, I am not sorry for the results in time of peace; but in time of war decisions have to be taken immediately. The Government seem to think that a delay of days, of weeks, or of months, does not very much matter. I earnestly beg that they will bethink themselves in time. I understand from the Press that there is disagreement in the Government; the Press seems to be very fully informed as to what passes in the Cabinet. I hope that this disagreement may be healed and that a definite policy will be produced. But that is not going to be sufficient. Unless the Government approach the conduct of the war in a totally different spirit sooner or later they must come to grief. They must, if I may venture to say so, and I urge it upon them with all the earnestness in my power, be prepared to make up their minds and to make up their minds rapidly; and those Ministers who cannot make up their minds had better stand aside. I earnestly hope that the Government will not think that I have been guilty of any impertinence in saying this much. The gravity of the situation is so deep, the feelings of the country are so strong, that if we agree to the adjournment to-night, as I hope we shall do, I trust we shall be rewarded by a full statement of a firm, strong policy on the part of His Majesty's Government not later than to-morrow.

LORD BERESFORD

Supposing the Government cannot give a reply to-morrow, do they intend to put off this important question until after Easter?

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

I am afraid I cannot give a definite reply to my noble and gallant friend. I hope—but I do not speak with complete confidence—that we may be able to make the statement to-morrow; if not to-morrow, then I should hope on Thursday. Assuming that we are not in a position to make the statement by Thursday, we should then, I presume, adjourn—probably until Monday. That is the best forecast that I can make.

THE EARL OF DERBY

Shall we not know until we come down to the House to-morrow as to the resumption of the debate?

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE

I will try and inform the noble Earl as soon as I can.

VISCOUNT MILNER

A suggestion was made to me, on behalf of the Government, that I should put of this Motion until to-morrow. The reason why I did not do that was that I felt bound to noble Lords who had inquired of me very urgently, some of them being at a distance and coming up for the purpose, whether I meant to go on with it to-day and to take a Division. I answered both questions in the affirmative. One, I could be quite certain of—that I meant to go on with the Motion. The other necessarily depended to some extent on the course of the debate, though I must say I should like to have the vote of this House registered in favour of the principle I am advocating. I should consider it of great importance. I could not put off the Motion for that reason. But I hope that for the same reason—namely, the convenience of noble Lords, some of whom, being busy elsewhere, have come up at some trouble to themselves—every effort will be made to let us get on with the discussion as soon as possible. I understand from the noble Marquess that this may be clone to-morrow. I very much hope that it may be possible.

On Question, the further debate adjourned till To-morrow.