Lords Sitting of 23 June 1915

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
Shops Act, 1912—Order made by the Council of the County of Glamorgan and confirmed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department affecting certain classes of shops within the Parishes of Llangynwyd Lower, Newcastle, and Ynysawdre:
Universities of Oxford and Cambridge Act, 1877—Statute made by the Governing Body of Merton College, Oxford, on 6th March 1915, and sealed on the 11th of that month, further amending Statute IV, 6 (a), of the existing Statutes of the College:
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act) and ordered to lie on the Table.

INDICTMENTS BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to amend the Law relating to Indictments in Criminal Cases and matters incidental or similar thereto—Was presented by the Lord Chancellor; read la; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Wednesday next. (No. 98.)

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Report from, That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the Petition for the

London Electric Railway Companies Facilities Bill

ought to be dispensed with.
Read, and agreed to.

ELECTRIC LIGHTING PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. I) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bill reported without amendment, and to be read 3a on Wednesday next.
TRAMWAYS PROVISIONAL ORDERS BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): The Amendments proposed by the Committee made: The Report of Amendments to be received To-morrow.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 2) BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): The Amendment proposed by the Committee made: The Report of Amendment to be received To-morrow.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 3) BILL.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 4) BILL.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISIONAL ORDERS (No. 7) BILL.
CONWAY FISHERIES PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
SEA FISHERIES (CARDIGAN BAY) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
SEA FISHERIES (POOLE) PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
House in Committee (according to Order): Bills reported without amendment, and to be read 3a on Wednesday next.

MASSY'S DIVORCE BILL. [H.L.]
Amendments reported (according to Order), and Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.
CUSTOMS (EXPORTATION RESTRICTION) BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read la; to be printed; and to be read 2a To-morrow (The Duke of Devonshire). (No. 96.)

FOOD SUPPLIES.
LORD CHARNWOOD LORD CHARNWOOD had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask the President of the Board of Agriculture whether, in view of the great rise in the price of meat which must take place as the war continues, and in view of the difficult position in which butchers are placed in this matter, he will consider the advisability of prompt legislation prohibiting the slaughter of veal and lamb.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the answer to my Question has already appeared in the newspapers this morning, but I believe the noble Earl the President of the Board of Agriculture will have something to say on the subject. I do not know whether he will be able to extend his answer beyond the terms of my Question, but in any case perhaps he will allow me

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to congratulate him on the step which he has taken in the appointment of a strong Committee to inquire into the whole question of maintaining the food production of the country.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, with all respect to the noble Lord I sincerely trust that my noble friend the President of the Board of Agriculture will hesitate before he extends the Order in Council to lambs. The noble Lord who has raised this question appears to assume that the food for cattle and for sheep is assured. I congratulate him on his good fortune if that is so in his neighbourhood. I am sorry to say that in my neighbourhood it is very far from assured. Six weeks of east wind are neither good for man nor beast, and if we have a few weeks more east wind, with nothing growing, I do not know where the keep is to come from for the amount of stock now on the land. An extension of the Order in Council to lambs and the prohibition of their slaughter, which of course must affect the demand from people other than butchers, would entail an incubus on sheep farmers of two kinds. In the first place they have to find the keep, and there is the question of the rotation of crops which they have laid down with some foresight and for the purpose of producing lamb for the market. If that is ended, on to what are they to put their lambs? That is a question of which I am sure the noble Earl with his practical experience has not lost sight. In the second place, at this time of the year sheep farmers have probably sold the last of their stacks of corn and there is nothing coming in except from the sale of their flocks. There are many things which are variable as regards agriculture, but there is one thing absolutely sure—the labour bill. That has to be paid every week, and there is nothing so certain to a farmer as having a flock from which he can draw in order to procure the cash with which to pay his labour bill. I therefore sincerely hope that the noble Earl will hesitate a very long while before he extends the Order in Council to sheep.
LORD CHARNWOOD: I think the noble Earl must have misheard me. I did not intend to urge that time Order should be extended.
LORD IIARRIS: It is in the noble Lord's Question.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF SELBORNE): My Lords, as the noble Lord behind me has said, this question has already been dealt with in another place, and therefore I need not detain your Lordships by going into the matter at the same length as the Parliamentary Secretary did in the House of Commons. But I should like to say that the Board of Agriculture has been the recipient of an extraordinary amount of conflicting advice on the subject. Half my correspondents have warned me to leave the farmers alone and not try to meddle with a business which they understand, and the other half have said that unless most drastic steps were taken to prevent the extermination of cattle and sheep in this country we should be in a parlous state in a few months. The reason for that conflict of ideas is not only that one man thinks to-day he may make an exceptionally good price out of the cattle he has whether they are very young calves or old cows, and another man is anxious to get stores with which he may be able to make a good price in a few months' time or next year; but, of course, there is great diversity of practice in agriculture all over the country. In one place a dairyman avoids rearing calves if he possibly can, and indeed in the great town dairies in such places as Liverpool the slaughter of calves almost at birth or within three days of birth is the permanent, I venture to think disastrous, habit. Then I have been told that we are in the middle of a drought, and that does very materially affect any decision which has to be taken at this time in respect of checking the slaughter of cattle or sheep. Again, the price of meat is very high, and it has been pointed out that when the meat of the people is so dear it is not the time on any account to reduce the supply.
I do not think that any of those considerations really exhaust the matter. They all have to be taken into account. But to my mind the most important consideration of all is this—What is going to be the supply of live stock in this country this time next year? I think the chief consideration of the Government during the crisis of this war must be to prevent any undue depletion of the live stock of the country, especially of course of the breeding stock. It was not easy to obtain accurate information as to the extent to which animals were being sent to the butcher which in normal times would not

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have been sent to the butcher and which really ought not to be so sent. Some correspondents gave most alarming accounts of the way in which dairy cows were being slaughtered because their price as beef at the moment was greater than their value as dairy cows. We have taken such steps as we could to ascertain the movement throughout the country. The result is that, taking 52 public slaughterhouses in England and Wales—very fairly representative of the whole country—and comparing the period from August to April last with the corresponding period in 1913–14, we find that there has been an increase in the number of slaughtered cattle of all sorts of 26·1 per cent., and an increase in the slaughter of calves in the same period of 13·4 per cent. A very small proportion of these cattle, as far as I can make out, were really fat cattle that ought to have gone to the butcher. There is no evidence in my possession that there has been any marked increase in this period in the number of fat cattle that were fit to go, and ought to have gone, to the butcher. Therefore I am afraid that this increase has been almost entirely of dairy cows, of breeding stock and store, that really were not ripe to be turned into beef.
From some centres, notably from Glasgow—which, of course, is not under the jurisdiction of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries—the figures as to the slaughter of cows that were in-calf were really very serious; and I consulted on the subject the representatives of the Boards of Agriculture of Scotland and Ireland and also the Agricultural Advisory Committee over which Sir Ailwyn Fellowes presides, and which is, I think, thoroughly representative of the farming community of England and Wales. We laid these figures before them and asked them also to remember the fact that the figures must be taken into account in connection with the stock of the country as it was last July. Last June and July, when the Returns for the year 1914 came in, it was found that, as compared with the average of the previous five years, there were no fewer than 220,000 more mulch cows and heifers in the country, and 106,000 more cattle of other sorts; but, on the other hand, there was a great diminution in the number of breeding ewes and other sheep. The breeding ewes were down by 613,000, and other sheep by 1,410,000; and pigs were up by 222,000. After taking all these facts
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into consideration and taking counsel from the authorities I have named, I came to the conclusion—and the representatives of the Boards of Agriculture of Scotland and Ireland agreed with that conclusion—that no case had vet been made out for what I may call drastic measures, but that a case had been made out for checking the practice of the slaughter of cows that were far gone in-calf; and a cow in that condition is not really fit for human food, let alone the extravagant waste of slaughtering such an animal a few weeks before she calves.
Then, again, we thought that the slaughter of young calves should be checked, because the contribution which they make to the meat supply of the people in their very immature state is small, and, if kept, of course in a very few months they would be a far larger contribution for that purpose than they are shortly after birth. The question of "if kept" has to be faced, because it is a matter of common knowledge that a great many farmers are not in a position themselves to rear calves. It is not part of their agricultural practice. It is quite legitimate that they should carry on agriculture without that being a part of their practice. But the demand for stores of all sorts—and I include in that, term for this purpose very young calves—is so great in certain parts of the country, notwithstanding even this drought, that I cannot help believing that if farmers are forbidden to kill their very young calves a way will shortly be found for exchanging those calves between the man who does not want to keep them and the man who is anxious to secure them. Therefore the Order which will be issued to-morrow is framed as follows—
"An animal which is visibly or obviously in-calf or in-pig shall not be slaughtered, or be caused or permitted by its owner to be slaughtered."
The veterinary authorities assure me that these words will cover the case. At six months certainly and often at five months there can really be no doubt in the mind of a man accustomed to deal with cattle, be he farmer, middleman, or butcher, whether or not a cow is in-calf or a sow is in-pig. Therefore this Order, so far as cows and sows are concerned, will only forbid the slaughter of animals in the last period of pregnancy. The Order will go on to provide that—
"A calf under the age of twelve weeks shall not be slaughtered, or be caused or permitted by

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the owner thereof to be slaughtered; but this provision shall not apply to a male calf of any of the following dairy breeds, that is to say, Channel Islands, Ayrshire, and Kerry breeds."
Therefore I think your Lordships will agree that this Order is a very cautious and moderate one, and there is no reference in it at all to sheep.
The evidence was quite overwhelming that there was no case whatever for dealing with sheep. The number of sheep slaughtered between the period from August, 1914, to April, 1915, as compared with the same period in 1913–14, instead of showing an increase—as in the case of cattle, calves, and pigs—shows an actual diminution of 3·9 per cent., so that there is no case for dealing with sheep. But I want it to be distinctly understood that in this matter I regard it as the principal function of the Board over which I have the honour to preside to consider this question from the point of view of the food supply of the country next year, as we all know now that this war is unfortunately going to be a long one; and if this Order which is going to be issued does not prove a sufficient warning to farmers in this respect, and if they continue to send to market cows and sows that ought to be kept for breeding in the present crisis just so as to avoid the definition contained in this Order, I hold myself perfectly free to issue another Order of a more drastic character. For that reason a Bill has been introduced into the House of Commons—it will come up to your Lordships' House to-morrow, and I hope you will consent to pass it through all its stages in the one day—giving continued and even increased powers to the Board of Agriculture in this matter. The emergency Act that was passed last August expires next August, and therefore has in any case to be renewed. But that Act only enabled the Board of Agriculture to prohibit the slaughter of breeding stock. I do not say they will be necessary, but I think in these times of war the Board of Agriculture ought to have wider powers than that. Therefore the Bill which will come up to your Lordships' House, if approved by the House of Commons, will give power to deal with all stock, whether breeding stock technically or not. I can give an assurance that those powers will be used with a great sense of responsibility, and with a constant consideration of that great balance of argument of which I have tried to give some indication this
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afternoon. If I think it necessary for the purpose of maintaining sufficient stock in this country at possibly critical times next year, I shall not hesitate to use the powers if Parliament confides them to me.
LORD ST. AUDRIES: My Lords, I am sure we all agree with the noble Earl as to the vital necessity of keeping up our breeding stock, and of prohibiting absolutely the slaughter of cows which are obviously in-calf. That, of course, is right. But I do not think that in many parts of the country the extra sale of cows has been of cows in-calf. I know a good many markets, and I have seen a number of cows sent to market which were not particularly good breeders and not particularly good stock, and the farmer has realised a profit on them a year or two before he otherwise would; but in the West of England I do not think that there has been any considerable sale of breeding stock.
As to the Order in Council which is to be issued, I can only express my gratitude that sheep are left out. The inclusion of sheep would have been a great hardship on the farmer. As my noble friend Lord Harris said, this drought is a serious thing. We are short of grass now; we shall be short of hay; and it would not be fair to the farmer to compel him to have a greater amount of stock than his farm would carry merely to keep a larger supply of live stock in the country. In connection with the Bill which has been introduced in another place, I should like to impress upon the noble Earl that if this policy is to be a success he will have to work on broad principles of decentralisation—that is to say, the policy must not be a universal one for the whole country worked by a clerk in the Board of Agriculture, but wide powers must be given to the local authorities mentioned in the Bill, because the conditions—conditions of breeding, of climate, and of agriculture—vary in different parts of England. For instance, the word "immature" is a very wide word, and I am glad it is, for there are a number of breeds of sheep whose offspring mature for lamb and lamb only. In the same way I maintain that cross-bred calves mature at a very early age, because they mature for the one purpose that they are fit for—veal. You might keep them until they were three years old but they would never grow into beef. Therefore I hope that in

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administering the Act two things will be kept in mind—first, the need for decentralisation; and, secondly, the necessity for giving the word "immature" a very wide definition.
There is one other point to which I should like to call attention. I do not know whether it will require an amendment in the Bill to remedy it, or whether it can be done by an Order in Council. But take the case of an area in which the sale of stock is prohibited. In that area a farmer may be giving up his farm and may wish to sell the whole of his live stock. Obviously if sale was prohibited the farmer would be at a disadvantage, because he would be unable to realise on his cattle. No doubt such a case could be met by the local authority having power to give the farmer leave to sell. Perhaps the noble Earl will bear that point in mind in proceeding further with the Bill.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I understood the noble Earl to say that this Bill would come up from the House of Commons to-morrow, and that he trusted it would be passed through all its stages in this House on the one day.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I hope so.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Well, it seems to me that this is an undesirable extension of the practice of introducing Bills in this House which we have not seen in print and passing them through all their stages forthwith. Lord St. Audries made one or two remarks which implied that he wanted to see the details of the Bill. I do not know that there can be any pressing necessity for passing the Bill to-morrow. At all events, I hope the noble Earl will present the Bill to the House in the ordinary way in mint.
LORD STRACHIE: Unless there is great urgency—and that does not appear to be the case, because the Bill is going through the House of Commons in a leisurely way—I hope the noble Earl will not ask the House to pass the Bill through all its stages on the one day. The Bill is one which requires to be very carefully considered, not as regards its principle, but as regards some of its details. I shall certainly oppose its being rushed through to-morrow unless there is very good reason for it.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: The House, of course, will decide the matter. But there are real reasons for proceeding expeditiously with the Bill. We want to get the Order out to-morrow, but the Order goes beyond the present powers of the Board of Agriculture. As I explained to your Lordships, the present Act only confers powers to deal with breeding stock. I am advised that male calves cannot be brought under that head. If the Order is delayed while the Bill is under discussion it is obvious that a great many cows could be hurried into market in the intervening days.
LORD HARRIS: But the Board of Agriculture has the powers now as regards cows?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Yes; but we want to deal with the whole matter in the one Order.
LORD ST. AUDRIES: Does the noble Earl think that if he fails to get his Order to-morrow some Herod will arrive who will dispose of all the cows in the country?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I am, of course, in the hands of the House.
THE EARL OF DESART: Will these Orders and will the Bill apply to Ireland?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Not the Orders, because they have to be made by the Irish Department of Agriculture.
THE EARL OF DESART: Will similar Orders be made for Ireland?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: That is the business of the Irish Department of Agriculture. But the Bill will apply to Ireland.

CANADA AND SHELLS.
LORD DEVONPORT: My Lords, I rise to ask whether His Majesty's Government have received from time to time since the commencement of hostilities direct offers of large quantities of munitions from Canadian individual firms and also a combination of firms; whether direct negotiations with reference to these offers had been declined, and, if so, on what grounds; whether there is any agreement by which the Imperial Government is prevented from dealing direct with British firms or manufacturers in any of the Dominions of the Crown.

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When the Munitions Bill was under discussion in this House about ten days ago I took the opportunity of asking whether under its provisions the new Minister of Munitions would be able to release himself from certain conditions which had hitherto prevented His Majesty's Government from dealing with direct offers from Canada. I quoted a case to which I will refer again in a moment. The noble Earl who then replied on behalf of the Government was good enough to say that he would inquire into the matter and communicate further with me with regard to the point I had raised. The point was this. I definitely said that it was within my knowledge that a group of manufacturers in Canada had attempted, through their representatives in this country, to establish business relations direct with His Majesty's Government, but that the agreement between the Government and Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York, stood in the way. Lord Curzon, in the communication he subsequently sent to me, stated that the Morgan agreement had application to the United States only and even in that area did not constitute a monopoly, but that it had no application whatever to Canada. That compels me to present cases to show that Canadian firms which have attempted to open direct business relations with the Government here have been referred to Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York; and I shall incidentally show at the same time that direct offers from other Canadian firms of great eminence, where those firms have not been told that they must pass their business through New York, have not been entertained at all by the Government.
First of all I will take the case to which I referred the other day. I do not wish it to be assumed by any one that I am giving hearsay information. Everything that I state here to-day I shall be able to verify and prove. In order that this particular case may be easily identified I will state that a solicitor of great eminence in this city whom many of us know quite well, Sir Frank Crisp, has had communications with the Government with regard to this offer and the rejection of the offer; and by my mentioning that name the noble Earl, Lord Curzon, will be easily able to follow the correspondence that has taken place between this group and the War Office. In fact, I know that there has been correspondence between Sir Frank
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Crisp and the Prime Minister and also between Sir Frank Crisp and the new Minister of Munitions. This group three months ago approached the War Office with an offer to supply 2,000,000 shells, guaranteeing within 60 or 90 days from the signing of the contract to be in a position to deliver at the rate of 30,000 shells weekly. This firm was told to place its business through Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York, or, alternatively, through the Shells Committee in Canada. This particular group would do neither. They absolutely declined to transact business through Messrs. J. P. Morgan, very properly claiming that as Canadians they were British subjects and ought to have free access to the Home Government.
Writing to the Prime Minister, under date May 17 last, Sir Frank Crisp said—
"Dear Mr. ASQUITH.—Every morning when I pick up The Times and read of the 'need for shells,' and so on, I marvel at the fact that people should be ready to supply 2,000,000 shells and the Government will not take them, through what in such a serious matter seems to us on this side of the table a mere question of punctilio—that is, whether the order is to go through an American firm or should be taken direct."
The result of that refusal is quite obvious. Had the offer been accepted we might be receiving every week from that quarter alone 30,000 of the high explosive shells which are said to be so badly needed. I think I have stated enough to establish the fact that this particular Canadian group was referred to Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York. Therefore I am sorry to have to traverse the statement of the noble Earl that the Morgan agreement did not apply to Canada at all.
In another case a group of manufacturers in Toronto, represented by Mr. Pringle—I mention that name for the purpose of identification, because all this correspondence is to be found in the War Office—made offers in April to supply 3 in. high explosive shells at the rate of 10,000 per day, delivery to begin two months after the order. Mr. Pringle tells me that this was the sort of reception he got. He was told at the War Office, first, that at the moment they did not require any shells, and, secondly, that, if and when they did, the business could only be transacted through Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York, or, alternatively, through the Shells Committee in Canada. April, of course, represented a period when a good many people in

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high authority held the belief—the erroneous belief—that there was no shortage of munitions. We all have in mind the Prime Minister's statement at Newcastle. What is apposite at this moment is to refer to the fact that the Prime Minister, in explanation, mentioned that he did not make the statement in any haphazard way and that the information he received came from the very highest quarter. That establishes the fact, for what it is worth, that at that particular time it was assumed that we had plenty of shells.
I am quite alive to the fact that it may be said—I am not suggesting that the noble Earl will say it—that the capacity, status, and standing of this particular Toronto group were inquired into and were not found satisfactory. Therefore I mention this fact, that at all events the status of the group has been found satisfactory in some quarters, because orders for 100,000 18-pound shells have been placed with them by the Shells Committee in Canada, and those orders are now being executed. I mention that to prevent the possibility of its being surmised or suggested that the status of this particular group was not as it should be. Here again I make the same point as I made in connection with the first case which I cited. Had the Government taken advantage of this direct offer we would now be receiving 70,000 shells per week from this particular quarter. In May the representative of this group—a well-known man in Canada—made a further attempt to open up business relations with the Government, but he made it quite clear in his offer that if it had to go through Messrs. J. P. Morgan no business would result, as he would not treat on those terms. He was invited by the War Office to submit his offer in writing, and also to put in writing his rooted objection to having any transaction through Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York. He did so, and received the following most extraordinary reply from the War Office—
"I beg to thank you for your letter of the 22nd, addressed to the Secretary, offering yourselves as alternative agents to Messrs. J. P. Morgan for the purchase of shells in the United States of America. The Director of Artillery does not wish to take advantage of your offer."
That answer was a non sequitur; it was entirely irrelevant. This was a Canadian group endeavouring to enter into direct relations with the Government and absolutely making shells for the Government
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through the Shells Committee in Canada. Their first offer was not entertained; they repeated their offer, and were told to put it in writing so that there should be no mistake about it; they were also told to put in writing their objection to trading with Messrs. Morgan; this they did, and they received the curious answer which I have read.
I come to another and far more important case which is entirely divested of any reference to Messrs. J. P. Morgan, of New York; it is a purely- Canadian case. The company to which I refer is the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, of Montreal; and if the noble Earl will glance at this document which I hand to him he will see the character of the eight great concerns which this company possesses, the productive capacity of which is enormous. There is no noble Lord who has been to Canada who has not heard of this company. It is one of the most brilliant institutions that the Dominion possesses, and it claims—I think with great justice—that it is the largest industrial concern in the Dominion. There are eight separate plants in different parts of the country, some of them quite near to where the raw material is, fully equipped with machinery capable of producing any quantity of shells. Mr. Butler, the vice-president of this great concern, a man as well known as the president of the Canadian Pacific, has related to me his experiences of attempts to get business direct from the War Office here at home. He visited the War Office for the first time in January, and was told that he was a little too late as all the Government commitments were made. He was rather curious to know what "a little too late" meant. He inquired whether it applied to the present only or for the duration of the war, and he was informed that the commitments were made for a very long time ahead, practically for the duration of the war. That is a statement which I should very much hesitate to make unless I had ample confirmation of it, and the confirmation is here. He wrote a letter on the 15th of this month to the War Office, from which I will quote two paragraphs—
"About the 10th of last January I was told in your War Department that I was on the ground a little late to secure orders for material that we were and are prepared to furnish, and that the Department had made all its commitments. I was particular to inquire whether this applied to the duration of the war, and the answer was, Yes."

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He was asked to leave a list of the things he could produce so that if by chance there might be any requirement for any of them he could be communicated with. Indeed, I think he was promised to be placed on the War Oilier list, whatever that may be. But no communication has reached him. No request for quotations has been made to this gigantic concern, who were willing and anxious to give us the service of all their splendid productive plant. It seems to me an astounding thing that a concern with such a capacity should be so disregarded.
Finding there was no possible chance of doing business here, Mr. Butler made his way to Petrograd. There he saw the Russian Government, and almost instantly secured an order from them for 5,000,000 shells for their field guns, half of shrapnel, I believe, and half of the high-explosive kind, and they are now being delivered. Mr. Butler has returned and recently visited the new Ministry of Munitions and made another offer to supply 2,000,000 3 in. shells at the rate of 400,000 monthly, delivery to take place within 90 days of the signing of the contract. I have very great hopes that different methods will be adopted by the new Department towards these direct offers; and it is with the object of eliciting front the Government some idea of what their policy is to be in relation to such direct offers that I have brought the matter before your Lordships to-day.
There is one other case that I desire to mention, that of another great concern, the Canadian General Electric Company of Toronto, which is second only to the concern to which I have just referred. Mr. Frederick Nicholls, the president of this company, has cabled to me as follows—
"The Canadian General Electric Company communicated with the War Office on November 7 last offering to invest necessary capital in special machinery for manufacturing shells should we receive a firm offer for 1,000,000 shells, but a letter from the War Office declined to consider our proposal and stated that as there was not likely to be any immediate demand it would probably not be desirable for me to undertake a journey to London at present. If the offer had been accepted we could have long before this been shipping from 15,000 to 20,000 shells daily, but all the orders we have received was one from the Canadian Shell Committee for 15,000 and another for 25,000, all of which have been shipped. At this late date production is much delayed until the delivery of special machinery. Many millions of dollars of orders have gone to the United States, but a company like ours, with ample capital and reserves, was not authorized
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to use its capital and energy in producing munitions at a time of such vital importance to the British Empire. At the time the War Office declined to consider our proposal we could easily have secured delivery of necessary special machinery which it is now almost impossible to obtain. The Bank of Montreal can advise you of the standing of this company, which has assets of four minion pounds sterling."
Everybody who knows Canada intimately knows perfectly well that this is a firm of great repute and standing. And here again I make the same point, that they have been entrusted with small orders from the Shells Committee, which at all events shows their Competency. It is an undoubted fact that Canada has great facilities for turning out large quantities of munitions; and seeing What Canada has done for us in the way of sending such splendid replays of troops to fight our battles on the Continent of Europe, I submit that she should receive consideration in this matter. I do not suggest that she should be given a preference, but if there was a question of giving a preference undoubtedly Canada should be favourably considered. We are pouring great quantities of orders into the United States, while Canadians are not having the consideration to which they are entitled. I dare say many noble Lords noticed a statement which appeared a few days ago in The Times from Colonel Bertram, the chairman of the Canadian Shells Committee, to the effect that Canada could manufacture ten times more than the quantity of war munitions which are being made in that country at the present moment, and he blamed the British authorities for lack of orders.
Sir Robert Borden, the Premier, has been obliged, I suppose by the force of public opinion, to make a statement in explanation of why it is that Canada is being so scantily patronised by the British Government in regard to the output of munitions. In reply to persistent complaints in regard to this matter Sir Robert Borden issued a statement to the Press—this was on June 15—pointing out that by an arrangement made at the beginning of the war Great Britain undertook to purchase all field-guns and ammunition. Sir Robert Borden added—
"Under the above arrangement the British Government has undertaken full responsibility for ordering all field-guns and ammunition. That Government has been made thoroughly acquainted with the resources of Canada in that regard, and is entirely responsible for the amount of the supply ordered."

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So that this fact emerges, that Canada is capable of producing ten times—I should think twenty times, but it has been asserted in official quarters that she is capable of turning out ten times—the amount of munitions that she has been entrusted with, and it would be interesting to hear what explanation is to be given for our kith and kin in Canada who are part and parcel of the British Empire not receiving full consideration in this matter. Orders are pouring into the United States. I submit, and I hope I shall find response in all quarters of your Lordships' House, that Canada at all events ought to be filled up with orders to her full capacity.
I referred at the commencement of my remarks to the Morgan agreement. As the noble Earl told me, that agreement is not an absolute monopoly in the United States—that is to say, there are exceptions. The British Government has reserved to itself the right of transacting business direct with certain American firms. It would be hard to justify making an exception in America and not making a corresponding exception in Canada. I can assure the noble Earl that I have not the faintest desire to attack the Morgan agreement. I know enough of affairs to realise that some agreement of the kind was absolutely necessary in the conduct of these huge operations in the United States of America. Finance and all sorts of arrangements have to be considered and adjusted. But if the noble Earl, in the goodness of his heart, would give us a little information about this Morgan agreement it would be of great interest. At all events I invite him, since he has told me that it does not constitute a monopoly, to explain its limitation. As regards American manufacturers, there are many who have absolutely declined to put their business through the Morgan agency. I have had in the last few clays a rather heavy correspondence with the United States on this point, and knowing human nature as we do we have to take it as we find it; arid if we want to get these munitions and if there are capable and competent people in the United States who say they will not transact their business through Messrs. J.P. Morgan, the Government ought to consider what elasticity should be given to that agreement so that they can avail themselves of all offers that are worth consideration.
My object in putting this Question on the Paper has simply been to give the
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Government an opportunity of making clear what their policy is, and I hope they will tell us that the Minister of Munitions and his Department are determined not to be hampered with restrictive arrangements that are hurtful to the common object we have in view, which is to get an adequate and complete supply of munitions of war. We cannot afford to reject offers from competent and capable firms. We want all the help we can get. Mr. Lloyd George, in an eloquent passage in the speech he made at Manchester, acquainted us in the most graphic way with the consequences of lack of supplies. He pointed out that the temporary failure of Russia had arisen from lack of munitions. He admitted that we were suffering from the same defect, of course in a lesser degree, and that had we had all that was necessary we should have driven the enemy out of Belgium and France, have penetrated Germany, and have brought the end of this terrible war in sight. In view of those circumstances I think I am not guilty of any unpatriotic action in raising this question at this moment, in order that the Government may convey to us their determination in relation to tearing aside any impediments or handicaps that stand in the way of their getting copious supplies of ammunition from all quarters.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL (EARL CURZON OE KEDLESTON): My Lords, I will endeavour to the best of my ability to answer several, at any rate, of the questions which the noble Lord has addressed to me. Nobody who knows him can possibly suspect him of any unpatriotic action either at this or any other time, and I am not for one moment complaining that the many questions which he has rained upon me he was not entirely at liberty to ask and probably justified in the public interest in asking. I will only say, speaking for myself, that I cannot help rather regretting that he did not give me some intimation in advance of the scope of the speech that he was going to make or of the principal subjects that he intended to raise. The Munitions Department has only been in existence for a few days, and my own connection with that Department is somewhat ill-defined. The bulk of the noble Lord's observations related to the conduct of the War Office at a time many months before the Munitions Department came into existence; and had he desired, as no doubt he did, that I should give your

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Lordships a full reply to many of the specific cases he has mentioned, I think the noble Lord might at any rate have told me what some of those eases were beforehand, so as to enable me to get the information from the War Office in advance and to give a more full reply than I am now able to do. Subject to those limitations, I will do my best to answer such points as I am cognisant of or familiar with. We have in your Lordships' House a very peculiar practice. A noble Lord puts a Question on the Paper, very likely of a brief and innocent description, which presupposes, not a speech, still less a debate, but a request for information which the Minister is asked to give, and which in nine cases out of ten he is only too happy to give. And the noble Lord will forgive me for saying that his Question as it appeared upon the Paper would have been susceptible of reply in a few sentences. Indeed that reply was furnished to me by the Department, and I will give it to the noble Lord in order that he may realise how much of my information is directly apposite to the Question on the Paper, and how much he will have succeeded in extracting from me by subsequent cross-examination.
To the Question on the Paper the official reply, which is very brief, is as follows:—"Offers have been received from time to time since the commencement of hostilities from Canadian firms, and they have been referred to the Canadian Government. Direct negotiations have not taken place with individual firms. There is no agreement by which the Imperial Government is prevented from dealing with firms or manufacturers in any of the Dominions of the Crown, but it has been arranged in Canada that the Canadian Government shall deal with the matter on behalf of the British Government." That is a direct answer to the Question on the Paper. But the noble Lord wants very much more than that, and to the best of my ability I will give it to him. He gave us in succession statements about four firms or companies who had made applications to the War Office in England with reference to the supply of munitions for the war, in each of which cases he led us to think that the reply that bad been received was chill, unsatisfactory, and, in the public interest, inexpedient. The first case was that of a firm, or of a group, as he described it, whose name he did not even give, but of
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whom he told me the spokesman or representative in the negotiations which had taken place was an eminent man, Sir Frank Crisp. I am not able to deal with the particular case.
LORD DEVONPORT: He was the solicitor to the parties interested.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am unable to deal with that specific case because, owing to the omission of the noble Lord to supply me with any information in advance, this is the first I have heard of it. The second case was the Toronto case, of which the spokesman was a Mr. Pringle. This is the first I have heard of that case. The third case was that of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, represented by Mr. Butler, who in their inability to secure a contract here went to Russia where they succeeded in obtaining a contract for a large number of shells, which the noble Lord said—and I am delighted to hear it—have now been delivered. That is the best news for the Russian Government that I have heard for some time. The last case cited by the noble Lord was that of the Canadian General Electric Company, who have received certain orders from the Government for shells but desire more. With that case, again, I am not familiar. But I should like to make this observation about the whole of those cases—premising that I am only too glad to look into any of them and give the noble Lord any information that he desires—that it is not the case that any firm went to the War Office in London desirous of obtaining a contract for the supply of munitions in Canada and was told that such negotiation was impossible because of the agreement with Messrs. J. P. Morgan in America. It is obvious, on the face of it, that no agreement with Messrs. Morgan in the United States can have anything to do with Canada; and on the one occasion on which a representative of one of these firms seems to have derived the impression that he was debarred in Canada by something which had been already agreed upon in America, that impression was at once removed. If, as in this case, any manufacturer has been led to believe that an agreement made during the war in America prevents him getting a contract in Canada, he can take it from me that there is not an atom of foundation for it.
LORD DEVONPORT: I was asked to state as a fact that such information had been conveyed by the War Office to these Canadian representatives.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: On one occasion I heard that a Canadian representative had carried away that impression, and it was at a subsequent interview conveyed to him that a mistake had been made, either by him or by the gentleman who had been talking to him, and the matter was cleared up. The noble Lord may say, "So far so good; but what about your Canadian policy?" and this really is the matter to which he directed the greater part of his speech. After all that he said about the patriotism of Canada, the part she has played in this great war, our desire to give every possible opening to her industries, it is not to be believed for a moment that with sources of supply placed at its disposal the Government would stint them, still less that it would stint them in the case of a Dominion which has rendered such splendid and patriotic service. But what is the reason for our policy with regard to the supply of munitions from Canada?
I think, however, that before I pass to that I ought to endeavour to answer the question put by the noble Lord about Messrs. Morgan. He asked me whether I could tell him something about the Morgan contract. I will endeavour to do so. When the war broke out and the War Office began to buy munitions from America they commenced by placing their orders with companies and firms—the very system which the noble Lord now desires us to introduce into Canada. The result was that very high prices had to be paid, the deliveries were almost invariably late, and the system had to be abandoned as unbusinesslike and bad. It was in consequence of this that the agreement with Messrs. J. P. Morgan was concluded. It was done, if I may sum it up in a sentence, in order to get the advantage of competition amongst the various firms concerned. Messrs. Morgan were, as I told the noble Lord in a letter the other day, not given a complete monopoly—that is to say, the Secretary of State is at liberty to deal with other persons or firms if he informs Messrs. Morgan of the facts; but, broadly speaking, all orders except those which had been concluded with firms in the earlier period to which I referred, now pass through Messrs. Morgan. The com-
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mission they are paid is 2 per cent. [†] and all expenses; and the experience of the Government has been that, in consequence of this arrangement as regards American supplies, not only do we get the things at a much cheaper price than before but we also have much earlier deliveries. That will answer the question with regard to Messrs. Morgan.
Now perhaps I may revert to the subject of Canada, from which I diverged for a moment. In Canada the system adopted by the War Office has been this. They have made their orders from an early date through the Canadian Government, treating the Canadian Government, in fact, as their agents for the supply of munitions of war. Any requirements from the War Office here are communicated by letter or telegram to the Canadian Government, or, rather, to the Minister of Militia there. This officer constituted quite early in the day the Shells Committee to which the noble Lord referred. That is a body presided over by a gentleman whose name he mentioned, a General Bertram, and upon it are representatives of the various manufacturing interests in the Dominion, and the function of the Committee is to advise the Minister as to the contracts which, on behalf of the Imperial Government, he shall conclude. All applications are made to him. They go before the Committee, who examine and adjudicate between the claims or the capacities of the different parties; then the contract is concluded over there, and finally the Canadian Government assume the responsibility of inspecting the munitions for us when they have been produced. I think your Lordships will see at once the obvious advantages of such a method as that. In the first place, the statements and claims of the various business applicants can be tested on the spot by those who know and deal with all the firms concerned. In the second place, in Canada they have naturally a very much wider knowledge as to the resources of the country in respect of raw material, labour, and so on, than anybody could possibly have in the Offices in London. In the third place, firms can be brought into competition with each other, the price lowered, and a chance given to all. This may be a good or a bad system. The Government have hitherto acted upon the belief that in the circumstances it is the best system; and whether the noble

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Lord agrees with that, or whether he prefers the system of dealing with independent agents coming to London, he will I think realise that as long as the old system exists you cannot go behind the back of the Dominion Government in Canada and make separate arrangements with gentlemen, however reputable, coming to this country. I think that in one respect the noble Lord was a little mistaken. He spoke in one part of his speech as if some one in Canada enjoyed a monopoly comparable with that of Messrs. Morgan in America.
LORD DEVONPORT: I did not suggest that.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I beg the noble Lord's pardon if I misunderstood him. The Shells Committee is a business body which places its orders in the manner it thinks best. Let us take the rival case pat before us by the noble Lord. He seems to think that a much better plan would be, when the chairman, agent, or representative of a firm conies over here and tells the War Office what he can do, that the War Office should at once jump at the chance and make an arrangement with him. But it is obvious that in such a case it is quite out of our power to accept the statements made by the gentleman, of whatever character or position he may be. We must satisfy ourselves as to the capacity of his firm for production and as to the speed with which he will deliver the articles we may order from him, and we cannot be sure that we may not get a better article elsewhere. The noble Lord seemed to speak as if the firm in question, by being refused here, would exhaust its chance of participating in the war contracts. That is far from being the case. There is nothing to prevent its tendering in Canada and having its tender accepted. Indeed, I think he admitted in two cases to which he referred that the firms in question bad already received and were turning out considerable orders for munitions for the British Government.
Let me state another point. The system which the noble Lord, I understand, advocates has been tried in Canada in respect of the purchase of other articles required for the war—articles, I mean, other than munitions; articles such as forage, food, saddlery, and the like. In the first months of the war those articles were purchased partly from agents in Canada
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and partly from gentlemen coming to this country. The result was found to be so unfortunate, so lacking in system or regularity, that it had to be replaced by an arrangement by which the War Office purchased those articles through the Canadian Pacific Railway, which has a great purchasing organisation most useful for the purpose. On the question of policy it is, of course, open to the noble Lord, or, indeed, to any one, to argue that the War Office ought to have taken earlier in the war a wider view as to the necessities with regard to munitions and to shells. Probably most of us hold that view. That, however, relates to a matter connected with the Government before the Government was reconstituted. I am not bound to stand here as the champion of the War Office. I stand here, I suppose, as the representative of the Munitions Department; and I am not concerned, indeed I have not the knowledge or the authority to enable me, to defend the policy of the War Office in its wider aspect. What I have been concerned to expound to the House is the method it adopted, which is still in operation.
But I would like to point out one or two things to the noble Lord when he assumes that the offer of a firm to produce so many shells within a given space of time practically means that addition to the fighting strength of our forces. That is far from being the case. It is not a question of the shell alone. The shell by itself is useless. The shell is ineffective for its purpose unless it has a cartridge behind it, unless it has a fuse at its point, unless it has a propellant to discharge it into the air. With the exception of the propellant, Canada does not make these. Canada does not make the fuses or the cartridge cases; and as a matter of fact when orders are given to Canada she has to go to America for these component parts of shells. The delay thus caused has these effects. In the first place I am informed it causes delay in the delivery of shells; and, in the second place, it causes great interference in America with the contracts which we have already entered into with manufacturers in that part of the world.
The noble Lord, as I have remarked, assumes throughout that the drawing up of a contract, the promise to deliver so many shells at a given moment, is equivalent to their possession by us when that moment arrives. Alas! if he had seen

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the information I have seen relating to firms, not Canadian or American only, but firms in all parts of this country, if he had seen the figures I have seen as to promises and delivery he would have entertained no such sanguine opinion. And I am bound to tell him as regards Canada, to which he specially directed his remarks, that the delivery of shells from Canada under such orders as have been placed there has been unsatisfactory, and does not encourage orders being given on an extended scale to individual firms. If orders were placed wholesale in Canada without the check of the Shells Committee and the Canadian Government we might find ourselves, if the war came to an early termination—which many of us think unlikely—with enormous stocks of shells on hand which we had not received in time to use.
My observations have not, perhaps, satisfied the noble Lord, but they are the best I can offer in the rather peculiar circumstances in which I have been placed. The Government, of course, admit that the case as regards munitions everywhere, including Canada, is one of enormous magnitude, but it is also one of great difficulty and complexity; and your Lordships will have seen in the newspapers with some satisfaction that Mr. Lloyd George has prevailed upon a well-known ex-Member of Parliament, Mr. D. A. Thomas, to go out to America and Canada with a view to seeing whether any changes or improvements in organisation can be effected. When Mr. Thomas comes back and reports to the Government, I hope I shall be able to make a statement to your Lordships more complete than that which I have offered this afternoon.
LORD JOICEY: My Lords, I have listened to the speech of the noble Earl with great interest, and I sympathise with him in having to reply to a speech with so many details and so many hard facts proved up to the hilt without the necessary information with which to do it. I confess that he has made an admirable reply from his point of view. But there is one fact with which, I think, he has not sufficiently dealt. He said that the Canadian Government practically acted as agents for the supply of shells; but we have Sir Robert Borden making a statement that the shells were entirely ordered by the British Government, and that the British Government alone were responsible for them. I come to the conclusion, therefore,
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that the British Government have not ordered sufficient shells from Canada, and that had Canada been given an opportunity of making more shells she could have supplied a very much larger quantity than she has done. I think we all agree, if there is any claim at all as between America and Canada, that Canada, being part of the British Empire and having sent so many splendid troops to our assistance in this terrible fight, certainly ought to have the preference.
I think that my noble friend has done great service in bring this question forward. Throughout the whole of the country there is great anxiety on this matter of munitions. It is felt that we are and have been at a great disadvantage for want of shells, that we have lost thousands of lives that might have been saved had we been in the same position as the enemy in regard to the supply of shells. Surely after ten months the War Office—I do not know who is responsible in the War Office, probably the Contract Department—surely they cannot say that they have justified their action when we are left with such a short supply. I think that any ordinary business concern would have gone into this question sooner. Even if we had a few million shells left over and above what we required, what is the expense of that in comparison with the value of the lives which are at stake? Who can say that the system which has been adopted by the War Office has been a success? It must have been well known to the people who had to order the shells that for some time there was a deficiency. I judge a system by the results, and- I submit that there has been failure. When the German Government want timber, or shells, or iron, or steel, they get six of the very best experts in that country to advise them and deal with the question of purchase. Had the War Office done that at the early part of this war we should not be in the position we are in to-day. It is not necessary for me to say what that position is. We all feel it too keenly. Who it is that is responsible I cannot tell, but that the War Office has failed in its duty so far as shells—aye, and rifles—are concerned, I have not the slightest doubt. I trust that Mr. Lloyd George, with that energy, skill, and ability which he possesses, will remove this reproach, and that in the future conduct of the war, at all events, we shall not want for an ample supply of shells.
LORD LEITH OF FYVIE: My Lords, the question which has come up is, I think, somewhat mystifying, because it is not understood why a banker should be employed by a Government to do work which is not in his line. No one in business, of course, would think of employing a banker to buy shells or to do anything out of his line. This whole question is a financial operation. The Morgan contract unquestionably would not have been entered into unless it was in connection with exchange. Everything that is bought has to be paid for; as every one knows the question of exchange comes in, and in the last sixty days it has gone down to the lowest point it has been at for sixty years. That, in my opinion, is the crux of the contract with Messrs. Morgan. I am intimately connected with America and the contracting parties in the United States in metals and shells, and I am convinced that the Government would not have had to pay two per cent., which is a double commission, had it not been for the financial operation in which Messrs. Morgan were employed for the purpose of controlling exchange. They are undoubtedly the best firm that could have been employed for the purpose; unquestionably so in the time of Mr. J. P. Morgan. Every one knew the United States Government controlled the exchange and the rate of interest a good deal through Mr. Morgan's intense concentrated knowledge of how to handle it, and there is no one else to-day who can handle it except the German financiers in New York. This contract with Morgan's is not a contract for supplies only, but both for buying and paying for them. The Canadian Government is almost in the same position. They had to have, and did have, arrangements with Morgan's for large exchange operations. That, again, was a question that had to be controlled; the buyer and paymaster had to be in one hand; therefore a large commission was paid, and contracts in consideration from Canada would have necessarily passed through Morgan's hands with the question of how they were to be paid. There was the question whether they were to be paid direct from London, or through New York. If they were paid through New York, the exchange balances that were arranged for in Canada were drawn on. It is well understood in business why Messrs. Morgan were employed. Unfortunately it has got turned round in the shape of refusing contracts for Canada. It is probably through
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the curt replies which the Government give to those to whom they do not want to give a direct answer that some of this misunderstanding has arisen. It is the experience of all who have been brought into contact with Government Departments that their replies are curt and not couched in business language. I mention this because it is as clear as anything why the contract with Messrs. Morgan was made. But it is unfortunate, because I do not think the Government know how to buy raw material—pig iron, and so on; they have to employ others, probably inferior men, to do this work for them, whereas those at the head of businesses, the most practical and successful men, would be the ones to deal with it. I mention this because it has been made rather a mystery of.
LORD GRIMTHORPE: My Lords, it seems to me that the noble Earl has not got the matter clear with regard to Canada. As he pointed out, it is not his special duty or business to defend the War Office. Nevertheless he said all that could be said in favour of it in view of the very damaging and serious remarks which fell from the noble Lord behind him (Lord Devonport). But I venture to say that the noble Earl made rather a serious aspersion upon Canada. He said, I think, that the deliveries from Canada were more unsatisfactory than those coming from any other part.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I did not put it as high as that.
LORD GRIMTHORPE: May I ask whether the deliveries are defective in respect of orders given by the War Office to Canada, because from the speech of Lord Devonport it seems that very few orders have been given by the War Office to Canada. Small orders have been given through the Shells Committee, and that Committee presumably made inquiries and thought they were dealing with responsible people who would deliver the orders they contracted to deliver. Therefore it looks as if the Canadian manufacturers were condemned in advance by the War Office. The noble Lord said that in one case the War Office were approached in January, and the offer which was then made was rejected promptly on the ground that shells were not wanted. I do not understand from the speech of the noble Earl that the War Office have ever complained of shortage of deliveries or of deliveries not up to time. I do not think their

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refusal to give orders was based on that ground. I think what the noble Earl has said will have a very wide effect and may do serious damage to Canadian industries. The Canadian manufacturers are now coming into the market and offering to deliver shells, not only in London, but in Paris and Petrograd, and if it goes forth on the authority of my noble friend that their deliveries are not to be relied upon, business with Canada will, I am afraid, be very seriously interfered with. It is so serious a charge against Canada that it ought to be thoroughly investigated, because if Canadian manufacturers have not delivered shells up to contract they ought to have been informed of the fact by the War Office. I did not gather from the noble Earl whether the orders the deliveries of which were unsatisfactory were given through the Government or the Shells Committee. Is the Canadian Government responsible? Has the War Office appointed the Canadian Government to act as its agent, as it has done in the case of Messrs. Morgan, of New York? The matter seems to be in some confusion, and it is essential that it should be cleared up. Again, the noble Earl said that in view of these unsatisfactory deliveries the War Office would naturally hesitate to give orders. But the War Office might do in regard to the Canadian manufacturers exactly what the French and Russian Governments have done—what I believe our own Government has done in many cases—namely, exact guarantees, which means that a deposit is put up by the manufacturer which is forfeited if the deliveries are not up to date. I agree with Lord Devonport—everybody would agree—that the need for shells was so great that those offers put forward by responsible people in Canada with every probability that they would be carried out, ought to have been accepted by the War Office.

THE POST OFFICE AND ENLISTMENT.
THE EARL OF MAYO: My Lords, I have been requested by a noble Lord who cannot put the Question to ask His Majesty's Government how many male clerks are at present employed in the Postal Service in London between the ages of 18 and 40; how many are (a) married, (b) single; how many could be spared by the Post Office Department for work outside their ordinary duties; and whether it is possible to replace any of them, and if so, how many, by female clerks, pensioners, or boys under the age of 18.
VISCOUNT ALLENDALE: My Lords, from the way in which the Question is worded it is not clear whether the noble Earl refers to clerks in the narrow sense of the word or whether he includes telegraphists, sorters, and counter clerks. The figures furnished to me by the Department have been given on the assumption that the former is intended. The number of clerks employed by the Post Office in London is, roughly speaking, about 4,000. As to what proportion of these are (a) of military age, and (b) married, I am afraid such information could not be obtained without a large amount of detailed labour, which there certainly has not been time to devote since the Question appeared on the Paper. The exact figures are not available as to the number of London Post Office clerks on military service, but it is believed they number about 1,000. The work of the clerical staff is already carried on under some difficulty, and no considerable body of men can be spared for work outside their ordinary duties. A large staff of female clerks has been engaged; pensioners have been recalled where they can be usefully employed; and boy clerks have been used so far as the Civil Service Commission is able to supply them. Permission to enlist has not been withheld except in cases where the men possessed special telegraphic qualifications, or where there was a special reason why they could not be released.

TERRITORIAL OFFICERS' OUTFIT ALLOWANCE.
EARL BATHURST EARL BATHURST rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether £30 can be added to the peace outfit allowance of £20 for Territorial officers who were serving on 4th August, 1914, so as to place them on an equality with Territorial officers joining after mobilisation who receive an outfit grant of £50.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in asking this Question I need say very little. But I should like to allude to one fact which appears in the Question—namely, that the allowance of an ordinary Territorial officer on joining was only £20. That was not a very generous amount, considering that he had to buy both his service kit and all his camp equipment, and generally either a dress kit or a full

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dress uniform. There is no complaint about that. The complaint is that when mobilisation took place any new officer who joined got the full allowance of £50, with which he could buy clothes suitable for winter wear, while the former Territorial officer, after perhaps being in camp two or three months, would have found his uniform the worse for wear, and it would be necessary to procure thicker clothing and that almost indispensable article the" British warm" in order to get through the winter. Further than that, there is the case of those officers who had formerly been in the Territorials but who had retired a month or two, possibly a year, before the war. Those officers returned to their unit, or went to some other unit, and on rejoining they received the full outfit allowance of £50, though they had probably retained their old kit. I have brought this matter before your Lordships' notice as I am president of my County Association and take a great interest in the officers of the Territorials, and I hope that His Majesty's Government may be able to give this extra grant to those officers who were serving their country at the time mobilisation took place.
THE PAYMASTERGENERAL (LORD NEWTON): My Lords, the Question as it appears upon the Paper seems calculated to create a somewhat erroneous impression, because it is not the case that the outfit of the officers in question was limited to a sum of £20. It is true that it was limited to that amount up till August, 1913, but the £20 was then raised to £40, subject to certain conditions. Officers commissioned after August 4, 1914, no matter to which branch they belong, are given £50, including £7 10 s. for camp kit; and I would point out to my noble friend that this £7 10 s. was allotted to the officers on behalf of whom he is making the complaint. The £50 in question is not given to any officer who was serving before August 4, 1914, whether Regular, Special Reserve, or Territorial Force officer, and there is no particular reason why this concession should be made to one branch of the Forces alone. As a question of abstract justice I admit that my noble friend appears to have a good case, but I do not think he has made sufficient allowance for the circumstances of the case. It must be perfectly obvious to him, as to every one else, that in war time everything is more scarce and more expensive. For
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instance, if my noble friend wished to purchase a horse he would have to pay a great deal more for it at the present moment than before the war began. We have been assured on the highest authority that no country was more unprepared than ours was when war broke out. For one thing, we were largely deficient in officers. These officers had to be procured by some means or other, and it is obvious that special inducements had to be offered, because otherwise in many cases they would not have been able to afford the necessary expenses. I admit that on the face of it there does seem to be some slight injustice, but it is practically impossible that his suggestion should be adopted. The question was carefully considered at the time, I am informed, and it was found impossible to make this grant retrospective. I hope that my noble friend will not consider that I have returned an unsympathetic reply; and I feel sure that on reflection he will see that it is impossible to make a concession to one branch of His Majesty's Forces which is not available in the case of others.
EARL BATHURST: Did I understand my noble friend to say that officers who had originally been in the service did not receive the full grant of £50 on rejoining? If so, I think he is mistaken. I was told that cases had actually happened of officers who had only retired a month or two before mobilisation and who got the full amount of £50 on rejoining. I can speak for myself; it was specially mentioned that I was to have £50 for my kit, although I had a certain amount of my old kit in my possession.
LORD NEWTON: I will make further inquiry if my noble friend desires me to do so.

THE WAR—PEERS' ROLL OF HONOUR.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I have a Question on the Paper to ask the Lord President of the Council whether he will indicate what method he proposes to insure that the Return asked for by Lord St. Davids shall be accurately made, but I have been asked by the noble Marquess to postpone it. I beg to give notice that I will renew the Question this day week.

FOOD SUPPLIES—DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE.
LORD HARRIS LORD HARRIS rose to ask His Majesty's Government for the terms of reference to the Departmental Committee recently appointed by the President of the Board of Agriculture.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I ask this Question as the result of an announcement which appeared in the Press last week that the Minister for Agriculture had appointed a Committee for the purpose of advising him whether legislation was advisable for the purpose of maintaining, and, if possible, improving, the output of the country. It struck me as rather ominous that the noble Earl should so soon after his entry into office—upon which I sincerely congratulate him and ourselves—be contemplating legislation for the purpose of altering the system of agriculture in this country, for I do not see what other construction can be put upon it. From the debate that has taken place previously this evening I know that the noble Earl has up till August full power as regards the slaughter of beasts, and therefore power of interference, to some extent, with the sale of beasts. The Government have full power over cereals; they have just as much right to commandeer wheat in this country as the Government of India had to commandeer it there. Therefore I can only construe this announcement as being a hint to the agricultural industry that, for some reason or other and in some direction or other, the Government contemplate legislation which is likely to interfere with the system of agriculture here.
The noble Earl, if he grants my request for the terms of reference to the Departmental Committee, may also be able to give us some idea of the direction in which he thinks alterations in our system advisable. I must say that I deprecate very much anything heroic; and I was glad this evening to hear from the noble Earl, certainly as regards the particular question we were then discussing, that he did not consider there was any need for drastic action. The noble Earl must be able from his Statistical Department to procure all the information that can be usefully got with regard to future supplies, both as regards beef and as regards wheat. Those are the two most important materials that we want; and it seems to me that if he pledged himself to anything in the speech
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he made he pledged himself to maintaining our flocks and herds at their present capacity, and, if possible, at an increased capacity, so that we may be more independent of the rest of the world this time next year. I do not think I am misconstruing what the noble Earl said. Well, if that is his policy, then it obviously must mean that he does not contemplate interfering with the system of agriculture, as distinct, of course I mean, from pastural occupation. I should hope that that is so.
At the same time this announcement came very significantly after some articles in The Times that were very interesting and good reading. But I do not think I am misconstruing them in saying that if there was one practical suggestion in them that would be seized hold of more readily than another it was an advocacy of such an alteration in our system as would result in a very large increase of the laud under wheat. In fact, a suggestion was made that the acreage under wheat in this country might be increased by two million acres. If there is any connection between those articles and the policy of the noble Earl I would ask him—and from his practical experience he will acknowledge that these are points of importance—to consider this, that the agriculturists of this country have been seriously weakened in these last ten months in their ability to carry on their business. We are short of men, of horses, and of tackle; and I doubt very much whether we are capable of keeping the land in the same heart as we were before the outbreak of war. My impression, borne out by practical agriculturists, is that the land is going back; and if that is so there is most certainly very little chance of being able to increase a crop which requires more labour than land under grass does. There are people who hold the view that it is possible, by the application of certain manures, largely to increase the growth per acre of this or that crop. I think, as a rule, if you consult a practical agriculturist on these points he will tell you that you can no more stuff the land with rich manure than you can stuff your stomach with rich food without making it sick. But it does not matter in the least. These fads are aired as regularly as possible annually; and I hope that the Department of Agriculture is practical enough not to seize hungrily at every possible suggestion to increase the output of the soil.
I should like to tell a little story in connection with this which I think is applicable. About the year 1889 the Government of India, in its benevolent way, thought it its duty to teach the farmers of India how to farm. India, of course, has a system of agriculture infinitely older than ours, but nevertheless the English Government there thought itself capable of teaching the Indian farmers how to farm. So they sent for a very eminent agriculturist, Professor Voelcker, to advise them, and he travelled up and down the country and examined all the systems of agriculture there. It so happened that I was in Bombay when he was leaving, and he came to see me before presenting his report, a very voluminous one. He said, "You will find a lot of interesting matter there, but the gist of it is in the last paragraph." There were two lines in the last paragraph, and they ran—
"I have nothing to teach the Indian farmer. He knows his business thoroughly well. If you can supply him with more firewood he will produce more manure."
That was a very practical reply to the query of the Government of India as to whether they could teach the Indian farmer to farm better.
At the beginning of the war Viscount Milner made a speech in which he advocated the trying down of a larger quantity of land under wheat. Unfortunately I was unable to stay in the House until the conclusion of his speech, but I saw him afterwards and I said, "There was one factor you did not mention which is a somewhat important one as regards agriculture. We are all anxious, with wheat at its present price, to grow more wheat, but we are entirely dependant on whether the season is suitable." I am afraid the amateurs overlook the fact that the farmer is always competing against the climate, and that his system of farming is based on the experience of many centuries of the climate of this country. He takes the average climate and introduces his rotation of crops to suit that climate. I venture to suggest to my noble friend opposite that even in a year like this heroic legislation for the purpose of maintaining, and possibly increasing, the crops of this country is scarcely possible. I say that because I do not think the fanner has the means, either in men, horses, or implements, to increase very considerably the output of wheat. I believe the farmers in this country are now producing as much
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as is possible from the land under their present system of agriculture. I cannot see, after the noble Earl's speech earlier this evening, what can remain in the way of legislation to be done, because he has committed himself to maintaining—if possible, increasing—the flocks and herds of the country, which cannot be compatible with a large increase of the acreage under wheat.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I will make two preliminary observations in reply to the remarks that have fallen from my noble friend. I read with great interest the articles to which he alluded, but I can assure him that there is no connection, direct or indirect, between those articles in The Times and the policy which has culminated in the appointment of this Committee. The second of my preliminary observations is that I do not think it is true historically, as might be inferred from the noble Lord's remarks, that there is any necessary relation between the amount of grass in a country and the number of flocks and herds that are kept. I believe that in Denmark, which is a country where a very large proportion of the land is under plough, the proportion of flocks and herds to the total acreage is even greater than it is in this country.
LORD HARRIS: There are very few sheep in Denmark.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I do not say that the conditions of England are at all the same as those of Denmark, or that the systems which apply to Denmark apply to England, but I quote Denmark as a protest against the assumption, which might arise from the noble Lord's language, that there is an essential relation between the number of flocks and herds kept and the amount of the land in the country that is under grass. The noble Lord asked for the reference to this Committee. I think he already knows it, but I will gladly read it out to him. The Departmental Committee has been appointed—
"to consider and report what steps should be taken, by Legislation or otherwise, for the sole purpose of maintaining, and, if possible, increasing, the present production of food in England and Wales on the assumption that the war may be prolonged beyond the autumn of 1916."
That is the reference; neither more nor less. It is perfectly plain to your Lordships that the problem which this Com

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mittee is asked to consider is a war problem; it relates exclusively to the conditions that may be prevailing in this country next year, if the war lasts as long. We must all recognise that this war is going to be a long one. In a war you have to take great risks, but there is one risk which I do not think should ever be taken, and that is a possibility of a shortage of food for the people. There has been no shortage at present and I do not say that there will be a shortage, but, if there were a shortage in a critical period of the war, and, as President of the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, I had not taken all steps open to me to prevent that shortage, then I should be the first of those who would be justly hanged.
The question I have put to this Committee is whether there is or is not any means of preventing a diminution in the amount of food produced in this country during the war; and whether, if that diminution should or should not be threatened, there are any means of increasing that production during the war. The noble Lord will recognise that the words are "production of food," which includes all kinds of food, not only cereals, to which he alluded, but flocks and herds. That question does not involve agricultural considerations alone. The problem is a very complicated one. The agricultural side, of course, is one of the greatest importance, but there is a political side, an economic side, and a financial side. What I endeavoured to do was to form a Committee competent to consider the question from all points of view, and to weigh the evidence presented to it by the most competent practical farmers in the country and by economists and scientists and politicians.
The allusion to legislation is quite easily explained. If the Government can take no step either to prevent a diminution of or to increase food production the Committee will say so, and I shall have done what was in my power in the matter. But if the Committee should be of opinion, and the Government should share that opinion, that there are steps which can be taken either in the one direction or the other, it is quite clear that we must be ready to take those steps when the new farming year begins, after the next harvest; and if those steps should involve legislation it is equally obvious that that legislation must be passed during the present session
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of Parliament. I wish the noble Lord to understand hat I have no preconceived plan, no patent theory, which I desire to air. But I do wish this question, which might under certain circumstances be of absolutely vital importance to the country, to be considered in all its bearings by the strongest Committee which I can get together. I think the noble Lord himself justified my action. He spoke of his doubts whether under present circumstances the farmers of England and Wales would be able to continue to produce food at the same rate at which they had been accustomed on the average to produce it; and he gave as his reasons for those latent doubts the difficulties in connection with labour and with tackle. All those questions are, as I am sure the noble Lord will understand, very present to my mind; and it has occurred to me that the Government might be able to help the farmer in dealing with such questions.
LORD HARRIS: By legislation?
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: Certainly, if necessary. If the powers of the Defence of the Realm Acts are not sufficient, other powers might be given. It was only quite recently that, without any legislation, I received the greatest assistance from the Secretary of State for War. I first of all represented to him how valuable the co-operation of the Army might be in getting in the harvest which is now becoming due, and without any hesitation he has put at the disposal of the farmer, under what I think are generally admitted to be fair terms, a large portion of the Army, both for the hay harvest and then for the corn harvest. But he has done more than that. I went to him and pointed out what a serious thing it was for the farmers that not only was agricultural labour being taken for the Army in an ever increasing quantity, but that that labour often included some of the most skilled hands on the farm, men absolutely essential for the working of the farm—such men as foremen, stockmen, head carters, and shepherds. Directly I pointed that out to Lord Kitchener he told me that he would meet me in every possible way, and would issue instructions to his recruiting officers that those specially skilled types of agricultural labourer were no longer to be taken from the farms and included among the recruits for the Army. Of course, he pointed out to me that if such men are determined to leave the

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farm and go into the Army there is no power of preventing them, but that so far as he was concerned he would see that the recruiting officers took no steps specially to induce such men to join.
I do not know why the noble Lord is so afraid of legislation in this matter. If I can help the fanner without legislation there will be no need for legislation; but it does not seem to be quite inconceivable that the farmers may desire help which under the present laws I should not be able to give them. Should the Committee report that legislation is required for such a purpose, that the present powers are not sufficient, I am not afraid that Parliament will refuse to give those powers if I can make good the case. I want particularly to impress on the noble Lord that this Committee is not appointed to advance any preconceived theory, and that it is a purely war emergency to deal with those future months which may be most critical in the history of this country. I cannot conceive how it would be possible for the Government to exonerate itself, should a period of crisis come, if steps had not been taken which might have been taken to meet that crisis simply because the subject had not been considered in time.

AIR RAID CLAIMS.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN had the following Question on the Paper—
To ask what amount of compensation, and on what principles, and in what proportion to the total loss, the Government has paid to persons whose property has been proved to Lord Parmoor's Committee to have been destroyed or damaged by air raids or by bombardment by the enemy; (2) whether the same principles of compensation will be followed in similar cases which may occur before the issue of the promised Government scheme which will, it has been stated, include an insurance against such occurrences; (3) when the Government scheme is likely to be presented to Parliament.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, the subject which is raised in my Question is a very important one—namely, the extent of the moral liability of the Government in cases of air raids or bombardment by the enemy. At the present time Parliament is, I think, entirely in the
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dark. Bombardment and air raids have occurred, and so far as I am aware what has been done has been this. A Committee, which was called the East Coast Raid Committee and had as its chairman my noble friend Lord Parmoor, was appointed to inquire into this matter and to report. That Committee sat, I believe, very regularly, and it has reported to the Treasury. But further than that, so far as I am aware, Parliament knows nothing. We do not know what the Committee has advised or what the Government has done in any case, and therefore, seeing that these raids are not necessarily at an end, we have not any idea as to what may happen to any one whose property is damaged or destroyed. That is our position at the present time. The Government have given notice of a measure which is to deal with this question, but there may be raids before that measure has been laid before or passed by Parliament.
In the first place, I want to know what the principles are on which the Government intends to deal with cases which have occurred. In the second place, supposing that further cases occur before the Government has passed a Bill on the subject, what are the principles on which they are prepared to act? Are they the same principles on which they have acted up to the present time, and on what principles have they acted up to the present time? The Government proposal, so far as I have seen it stated in the newspapers, is to comprise a system of insurance, I think that proposal a very good one, even if it were for no other reason than this, that at any rate that insurance would be paid. Up to the present there are a great many people who have done their best to insure their property against damage, but none of the best insurance offices would accept the liability, and it does not at all follow in the case of those persons who have accepted it, if there should be any extensive damage done, that they would be able to meet the liability incurred. And it is quite possible, indeed probable, that there are many persons who believe they have insured themselves against damage who will find, if damage is done, that their remedy is not available.
But there really is more in it than that. It comes to this—and the question ought to be answered—What is the liability of the Government in cases of such damage?

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If a riot takes place in a town and someone's house is destroyed, or his windows broken, or something of that sort; he has, so I understand, an absolute right of claim against the local authority. But what is the liability of the Government in this matter? Moral liability I contend there is, because the Government has the Navy and the Army and so on, and is supposed to protect the persons living in the country against damage. It seems very hard that because the damage is done in some particular place, say in some seaboard town, the persons who have incurred the loss should alone be liable for that loss. So far as moral liability goes there is no doubt to my mind that the Government is liable. But what in practice would occur is quite a different thing, and that is exactly what I should like to know. We ought to know how far the Government has gone, how far it is prepared to go, and how far it proposes to cover this matter by insurance. I also ask when we may expect this legislation. It seems to me that the delay ought to be as short as it possibly can, because we may have a raid any day before this legislation is passed, and then in what position shall we be? The whole subject is one on which Parliament ought to have definite information, and that is my object for putting to the Government the Question which stands in my name.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD BUCKMASTER): My Lords, nothing that I shall say will, I hope, suggest that the Government fails to recognise in full the great importance of the question that has been raised by the noble Earl. It is unnecessary for me to emphasise that, or to repeat the expressions of sympathy that have already been made to the people who have been the unhappy victims of these air and coast raids. I think every one feels that the hazard of these attacks is the hazard of us all, but the risks are realised only by a few, and I am sure that all would be reluctant that on those few should fall the fill burden and brunt of the losses.
I am in a position to answer more or less categorically the Questions that have been put down by the noble Earl on the Paper; but there are one or two supplementary questions which he introduced into his speech upon which I may not be able to give him quite the same exact information. After all, the real point is this—What has
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been done to compensate people who have suffered in the past, and what will be done to compensate people who may suffer in the future? With regard to the people who have suffered in the past, the answer is this. There has been a Committee sitting, presided over by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Parmoor—who I am sure will be only too willing to supplement from his own wide knowledge any information that I give to the House—which has ascertained the loss suffered by people whose claims have been brought under its consideration, and up to the present time the amount awarded has been £90,038—a very considerable sum. The principle upon which that sum has been fixed may be stated in general terms to be what is known as an insurance principle—that is to say, a man is indemnified against the actual loss he has suffered, but he is not compensated for consequential damage or prospective loss which he might suffer. I will illustrate that by one or two concrete instances. If a man's shop is burned down he would be paid the value of his shop, but not the loss of profit he would incur through his shop being taken away. The same thing if a man's stock is destroyed; he would be paid the value of the stock but not the prospective profit he would make if his stock were left alive. Those are the principles, and I trust the House will think that they are fair, sound, and businesslike principles. The next question is, What is going to be done in the future?
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Can the noble and learned Lord tell us what proportion the sum he mentioned bears to the total amount of loss incurred?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It may be that my noble and learned friend Lord Parmoor can give that information. Certainly I cannot. I think it may be accepted that this £90,038 represents the loss, calculated upon the principle that I have stated, in all the claims that have been brought before the Committee over which Lord Parmoor presides. So if you accept, as I trust the House will, the principle upon which the award is based as a sound and businesslike one, this sum is a fair and adequate one.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: And it represents what we may call total loss?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I should prefer to call it actual loss.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Apart from loss of prospective profits or anything of that sort?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes; it is actual loss that has been suffered, of course carefully sifted, tested, and examined, as the noble Earl will admit it should be, by the Committee over which the noble and learned Lord presided.
As to what will happen in the future, it is a little more difficult for me to give precise information, and for this reason. The noble Earl asked me to say whether there was a liability which the Government accepted in respect of future losses. I think it must be obvious that if a measure is going to be introduced for the purpose of dealing with those losses, it would be highly, undesirable to state in plain terms beforehand that the Government accepted any legal liability. I am not prepared to say that a legal liability does exist, but it certainly would not be wise to begin discussing your Bill upon the footing that there was a legal liability Which could be enforced by some means—I must say I do not know by what means—against the Government. For the rest, the Government is at the present moment anxiously considering this matter. I am told that they are pressing on the question as fast as they can, and that as soon as it is possible to arrive at a sensible definite solution of the whole difficulty, of which they are quite conscious, further information will be placed before the House. For the moment I cannot give any further information, because it is obvious it is not wise to discuss a scheme before it is born. The matter is receiving careful consideration; and I am sure that the noble Earl will realise that there are interests besides those of the persons whose property has been damaged that have to be considered in connection with a matter like this. The noble Earl referred to insurance companies. It is quite plain that the Government may be compelled to embark upon an enterprise which may bring them into conflict with trading concerns. I am not sure; I am not saying that is so; and therefore it is undesirable that I should say more than I have done—namely, that the Government are fully, aware of the importance of the matter, and are anxiously pressing on the scheme which will overcome the manifest grievances which exist.
LORD SOUTHWARK: My Lords, we are much indebted to the noble Earl for the very practical form in which he put his Questions, and also for the observations that accompanied them. I rise as the President of the London Chamber of Commerce to say that this question in the City of London is of a very grave and urgent character. The Government is well aware of the seriousness of the matter, and how much pressed the City is with regard to this question that something definite may be known, and known promptly. The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has given us some information with regard to the results of the Committee presided over by my noble and learned friend Lord Parmoor, who no doubt, will tell us something more about that presently. But what we want to know in the City of London and in the country generally is whether the policy that has been laid down and followed with reference to Lord Parmoor's Committee is going to be the policy in the future.
The noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack says that a Government measure is being prepared, and that he cannot disclose the contents of it before the Bill is introduced. But I should like to point out the urgency of the matter with regard to the City of London. The banks holding bills against goods, or making advances against goods, are asked to hold policies to cover the goods against all risks. Noble Lords will understand that the banks in some cases are asking for the insurance receipts before they make the advances, and in cases where they have made advances they are calling the money in because the goods are not insured. In the case of large warehouses there are hundreds of thousands, even millions, of money concerned. The insurance companies are not taking these risks at all. Therefore I urge upon the Government that this matter is serious. What we want is that the Government should state at the earliest possible moment what their policy is going to be. Whether it is Mincing Lane, Mark Lane, or the wharfingers, they all want to know what their liabilities are, and so far as I am aware they have had no guidance from the Government. I have always felt that this is a national liability and not a personal one; and the observation of the Lord Chancellor with regard to the sum of £90,000 assessed by Lord Parmoor's Committee proves to me more and more how

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desirable from a business point of view it would be, on the ground of economy, for the State to take over the whole liability.
Whatever the effects of an attack by aircraft or bombardment may be—and I hope they will be limited to the extent they have been in the past—but whether they are large or small, I consider the liability should be upon the shoulders of the State. I agree with what the noble Earl said. We have our Army and our Navy; we pay taxes for the protection of our lives and property; therefore I consider that this question ought to be treated in the same way as if an ironclad is sent to the bottom—it should be considered a war risk and paid for by the State. Everybody would be sorry to find a great business concern ruined because of an aircraft raid or a bombardment. We ought to share all the losses alike, whether we live on the coast or inland. The Lord Chancellor was good enough to say that he had sympathy with the victims. But it is action we want, as I recollect saying to his predecessor. There was a big demand for a public meeting to be called in the City of London, but the meeting was deferred as we are anxious to know what the Government's policy will be. For in no way do the citizens of London wish to show that there is anything like a difference of opinion between them and the Government at a time like this. But this is an urgent question, and I beg the Lord Chancellor to acquaint his colleagues of that fact and to let us know at the earliest possible moment what policy the Government proposes to adopt.
LORD PARMOOR: My Lords, I think I might usefully supplement the information that has been given to the House as regards the work of the East Coast Raid Committee, in order that the principles upon which we have acted and the result of those principles may be clearly understood. As the Lord Chancellor stated, there can be no doubt, so far as what is called legal liability is concerned, that there is no liability in that sense upon the Government as regards damage by these various Zeppelin or other raids on the East Coast; and I apprehend that it was because there was no legal liability in the matter and no insurance scheme that the Committee of which I had the honour to be selected chairman was appointed to deal with this very complex question. We have made a series of Interim Reports. We
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have dealt with more than 7,000 claims, ranging from a few shillings in individual cases up to £14,000—I think that was the largest of the individual claims that came before us. I cannot say exactly what the total claims were that were made, because in some cases claims were never put in in a money form. But in substance, whereas we recommended £90,000, the claims brought before us for which money compensation was asked were about £150,000 in the aggregate.
It was our duty to recommend the figures of damage to the Government. Of course, this is a matter for the Government and not for our Committee, but I believe that payments are being made by the Government in relation to the figures which we have advised and recommended. We always had in mind—the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack has referred to it—the question of a possible insurance scheme. There is this difference. Under the recommendations which we made there really is an insurance scheme to which the whole country contributes, whereas you might have an insurance scheme in the ordinary sense to which parties might if they desired pay a premium, and then I presume only those who paid the premium would be compensated as regards any future damage. I may say that the cases of every raid that has taken place up to June 17 has been referred to us. The noble Lord opposite (Lord Southwark) and the noble Earl (Lord Camperdown) may be pleased to hear this, that apart from any general insurance scheme the principles which the East Coast Raid Committee have adopted would give the same compensation if damage is in fact suffered as, according to our views, any person injured would get if he contributed to a Government insurance scheme. The only difference, therefore, is that in the one case I presume you get the funds from the National Exchequer—or, as the noble Lord opposite put it, all people contribute towards the loss—whereas if you had an insurance scheme I presume that only those insured would have compensation, and the money would in the main be provided, or ought to be provided, by the premiums. One of the matters which the Committee have considered very carefully is the working out of an insurance Scheme, and the experience we have got is at the disposal of the Government or the Government's advisers should they wish to ask for it.

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It is important that the exact basis on which we have awarded compensation should be fully appreciated. Therefore I propose to read the actual principle which we have adopted in dealing with these questions of compensation in respect of property. We have already had to deal with questions of damage to persons. Perhaps that is more difficult still, but that is not involved in the Question which the noble Earl has asked, and therefore I will limit myself to the question of damage to property.
LORD SOUTHWARK: You have dealt with persons?
LORD PARMOOR: Yes; in every single case so far, as referred to us. We made a Final Report on June 3, and we have made interim Reports. We have sat de die in diem, though not the whole day. We have appointed skilled assessors to give advice with regard to the amount of compensation, and where the Committee have had any doubt as to the information given by the advisers they have gone themselves to the spot in order to view the premises. This is the principle on which we have acted, and I think it is very important that people should know it, not only in reference to the past, but that others who are now making claims—and there are claims coining in every day—should be perfectly cognisant of the principle on which we shall act with regard to claims sent in. I will therefore read the passage from our Report which we sent in on June 3, and in which we laid down our principle—
"In assessing the figure of damage to buildings the Committee have had regard only to damage directly caused by the bombardment and have not included claims for consequential damage. … To have included them would have placed the owner of uninsured premises or buildings in a better position than an owner who had taken the precaution to insure, either wholly or partially, under the usual terms of a war risk policy. The Committee thought that any such result would be highly undesirable, and in fixing the figure of damage gave full weight to this consideration. The same basis of assessment has been applied in fixing the figure of damage for furniture or trade plant or stock. In the case of furniture or plant capable of repair the Committee have taken the cost of repair as the measure of damage, and where stock has been destroyed or injured they have based the figure of damage on the cost to the trader and not on the profit which the trader might have expected to obtain from a sale of such stock by him in the ordinary course of his business."
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Your Lordships will appreciate that that is in accordance with the statement made by the noble and learned Lord on the Woolsack—namely, what he called an insurance principle. So that if an insurance scheme should be introduced, an injured person under that insurance scheme would be entitled to receive, and would receive, exactly the same measure of compensation as is now awarded ender the principles laid down by the East Coast Raid Committee. I do not think it is necessary to go into any further detail, but I thought it desirable that your Lordships should know what the principle adopted was; and that principle will be applied at any rate to any damage up to June 17. I am not aware of the intention of the Government, but it seems to be that until their insurance scheme is perfected all damage in the meantime should be referred to this Committee, which will deal with all claims in the same way and on the same basis.
LORD SOUTHWARK: Can the noble and learned Lord state what has been done with regard to injury to persons? As he is no doubt aware, accident insurance companies will not be liable; and it would be interesting to the country to know whether any policy has been adopted with regard to loss of life or injury to persons.
LORD PARMOOR: I have not before me the actual terms of our proposal with regard to injury of persons in the same way as I have with regard to injury to property. But I may put it shortly in this way. Where the case is such, owing to the position of the person injured, that he would be the same class of person as would claim compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act we were guided by the principles of that Act. I do not mean to say that in every case we gave the exact sum because we had to consider the special conditions in each case, but the guiding line was that if he were a workman injured, or a workman killed, he would receive the same measure of compensation as he or his dependants would have received had he been injured or killed in the course of his occupation. We thought that that was fair and just in cases of that sort. We bad a large number of other cases which were very difficult to deal with—people who could not have had the benefit of the Compensation Act because they would never have come within the definition of work—

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men at all. In the majority of those cases we thought it sufficient, as regards the claims made, to pay any outgoings incurred as regards doctors' bills or other matters of that kind. We did not, in other words, think that a person altogether above a workman as regards his position in life could fairly claim compensation other than to be reimbursed any expenses he had incurred. Between those extremes there were a large number of cases which were very difficult to deal with, but we endeavoured in each case, as I say, to put the person injured as nearly as possible as money compensation could do it back in his old position, subject always, of course, to what is obvious in these cases, that you
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cannot restore health and vigour, unfortunately, to any man, and no money compensation can compensate in that way. I hope I have sufficiently indicated what the principles are. I am bound to say that in dealing with persons there was far greater difficulty than as regards property, and far greater difficulty in laying down any general principle that could be followed in all cases.
House adjourned during pleasure.
House resumed by the Lord COLEBROOKE.
House adjourned at half-past Eight o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.