§ THE DUKE OF RUTLANDMy Lords, in rising to call attention to the instructions issued to the Lords Lieutenant of certain counties with reference to invasion and to ask His Majesty's Government for further information on the subject, I can assure the noble Marquess the Leader of the House and his colleagues that I have not the slightest wish to cavil at any of the provisions which they may have laid down, but I cannot help thinking that the time has come when these instructions should be somewhat consolidated and more force given to them in order to make them effective. Furthermore, I do not think that these instructions have yet gone thoroughly round to all the Lords Lieutenant, who may be called upon to act in a sudden emergency and under possibly somewhat critical conditions. Therefore I feel that I need make no apology to your Lordships for bringing the subject forward to-day.
One might fairly divide this subject under two heads—first, the question as far as it affects those counties which have already received the instructions, limited though they may be, from the Home Office on the subject of raids and invasions; and, in the second place, the question how those instructions affect counties which march with and touch the coast counties and the Lords Lieutenant of which have received no specific instructions on the point. If I may take first those counties the Lords Lieutenant of which have received certain notifications from the Home Office and the War Office with respect to county defence in case of raid or invasion, I would point out that those instructions, though excellent in themselves so far as they go, do not, as far as I can make out, give Lords Lieutenant any very great power to act except in certain circumstances. In fact, it appears to me that the position of a Lord Lieutenant who may be called upon to act is a somewhat difficult one. Lords Lieutenant, as far as I know, only proceed in carrying out their duties under some ancient Act of Parliament, and 288 no actual power is given to them to put into operation the instructions they receive from the Government.
In the first place, may I call your Lordships' attention to paragraph 2 in the instructions headed "E," which Lords I Lieutenant hare received. It runs—
The Government are of opinion that considerations of secrecy should not preclude full consideration by local emergency committees of the purposes for which they are to be organised.It must be obvious, I think, to every one that that is rather a Gilbertian statement, because if the local emergency committees are not to know for what purposes they are organised they cannot be of much use. But that is a minor matter relatively, because no doubt they would act to the best of their ability. As a matter of fact, the whole of the orders and instructions which have been sent down to what I may call the scheduled counties require, in my opinion, to be consolidated, and more effective power should be given to those in authority in the counties. The Lords Lieutenant and the authorities in the scheduled counties are told that they must destroy a certain amount of grain in certain circumstances; that they must remove stock, and may deal with the civilian population, and, if necessary, pull down buildings, and so on. All that is quite right. But it is a little doubtful under what power they would proceed in those matters. It is also a little doubtful who would issue the necessary orders. At the present moment, I, for one, have not the slightest idea under what definite and final authority the county committees would act if they were forced to put the instructions into operation. If you write upon the subject to the governing bodies in this country, what happens? You may write to the Home Office; you are then very likely referred to the War Office; the War Office refers you to the Army Council; the Army Council ends up by referring you to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the Committee of Imperial Defence probably hands you back again to the Home Office. That has been done in certain cases.What I want to call the attention of the Government to is the absolute necessity, if we are to have proper organisation for home defence, that there should be a central authority capable of dealing once and for all with the matter. Power should be delegated by them to the military authority 289 in each district, who in turn should appoint in each county—I do not care whether it is a coast county or whether or not it has received these orders—an officer who is able to get hold of the peculiarities, physical and otherwise, of the county, and who should be on the spot to answer all military questions with respect to the defence of the county and to issue instructions thereon. We should know then whom to go to for information. At present there exists a happy-go-lucky state of affairs, and the matter is one which, in my opinion, requires immediate attention. It is not as if we were going to be given six months notice of a raid, so that we might make the necessary preparations. These things come a good deal quicker than that, as we have, unfortunately, reason to know; and preparation now would be a most valuable thing to make. As a matter of fact, it would cost nothing to be prepared; whereas it may cost a great deal if we are not prepared. Furthermore, it may cost a great deal not only in money, but in lives. Although it may seem a small thing that steps of an adequate nature have not been taken to repel a raid or invasion, still I think we have had a lesson lately which rather does away with any idea of that sort. In fact, it is the duty of the Government now to go a little further and to render assistance to the authorities in the counties with respect to this very grave question.
I turn next to those counties which have not yet received any orders from the Home Office, but which actually impinge on and march with the coast counties which naturally would be the first to be affected in this matter—counties such as the one which I have the honour to represent at this moment, which touches a coast county of the first importance. In respect of this I would like to say that at the request of my Territorial Associations and other bodies I wrote to the authorities and inquired whether I should organise a proper system of defence, especially with regard to the movement of the civil population, stock, and so on, and I received instructions not to do so. I have no doubt that other noble Lords who are Lords Lieutenant could give similar; instances. What is the result of this? Only the other day the police authorities brought to me an urgent request to state, for the information of the emergency committees of Lincolnshire, what exactly my county could do with respect to receiving 290 and housing and feeding several hundreds of persons who might be moved off from Lincolnshire into Leicestershire, what camps we could form for them, what provision could be made for the movement of cattle, and so on, and what forwarding methods we could employ. As we have received no instructions in Leicestershire to act and have no power to act, naturally the answer I had to send was that we regretted extremely that we could send them no information on the subject. Surely that is not a wise way of being prepared for a possible serious emergency? I sincerely hope that the Government will see their way to issue simultaneous orders to practically all the counties throughout the kingdom, so that they may be in a position to deal with the civil population, with stock, and with the food supplies, and, if necessary, with the military side of the question. It should not be left to individual coast counties to be placed under these orders, because they are very much hampered by not being able to deal with the counties next to them, the authorities of which may have had no instructions on the subject.
I trust that the Government will see their way to put into execution as soon as possible some scheme whereby there may be a central authority to at any rate inaugurate' matters connected with home defence, and that they may also see their way to appoint a military control in each county to whom the authorities may make instant request for information and advice. Those military authorities would naturally be under the Northern Command in the case I am thinking of. This should not be a difficult matter to arrange, considering the number of men who are now under arms. There are a great number of officers perfectly competent to undertake this duty. At this moment I frankly say that if a sudden necessity arose in the county of Lincolnshire and civilians had to be sent away from the coast, which is not very far from one part of Leicestershire, it would be a very difficult thing for my county to know exactly how to deal financially with that case. Except under certain and very rare circumstances, the nonscheduled counties have no financial power to deal with this matter at all. Furthermore, the present state of things is adding to the grave danger of not being prepared—the greatest danger we could possibly have in this country. It is a stock danger. We 291 have never been fully prepared, and we are continuing that system now. Surely it is time that we should change it. The question of invasion is not one which I wish to harp upon. I do not for a moment believe that any great danger exists. But certain things will occur; they have happened, and they will happen again. Lives will be lost, and it is to minimise future loss of life that I am so anxious that His Majesty's Government should gravely consider the question of home defence.
I have not touched on the delicate and difficult question of aliens. That was fully dealt with in your Lordships' House last night. At the same time I should like to call attention to a notice issued within the last two days by the Home Office to chief constables throughout the country with regard to innocuous aliens. That notice, in my opinion, requires some explanation. It is to the effect that chief constables are to send to the Home Office the names of all aliens under supervision in their respective counties who they may think are innocent or unoffending people. The question at once arises, If those persons are unoffending and innocuous and harmless now, does it follow that they are going to pursue that blameless life in the immediate future if they are let out? And supposing that any of the aliens whose names are sent up by chief constables as being in their opinion at the moment not likely to be in any way a danger to the State should at any time develop dangerous tendencies, is the unfortunate chief constable concerned to be held responsible or is the Home Office going to take the blame as having issued this circular? Chief constables are placed in an extremely difficult position, especially as at this moment I do not quite know how they are being enabled to exercise full control over the districts to which they are appointed. I should like a little more information from the Government with respect to the question of whether or not the Home Office really has any power of interfering with the decisions of the police bodies in various counties as regards the detention of aliens, or whether this is merely a suggestion that they have sent down.
I should also like to know whether the military authority is in any way under the control of the Home Office with respect to aliens of any sort or kind in the respective 292 districts in which they are in command. One hears so many accounts of dangerous aliens, Germans and Austrians, who have been moved out of their districts at the direct wish and order of the police authorities, but who are, at the instance of some authority in London, replaced again in the positions which they originally held inside what we should call the danger area. I understand that the noble Marquess who leads the House says that it is the military authority who gives those orders. Does the military authority act under the suggestion of the Home Office in those circumstances? I cannot believe that any military authority would deliberately interfere with the arrangements made by the local police for the defence and protection of the county, and I should like a little information on that point. Various circumstances, especially on the East Coast, have arisen which in my opinion render it highly advisable that some distinct notification should be made as to what definite powers the local police authorities have with respect to the detention, and so on, of aliens. It is useless to blink the fact that a great many pieces of useful information with respect to the troops and the Navy leak out from time to time and get across the water, and it is with the object of minimising this as far as possible, even at the expense sometimes of hardship to some of these aliens, that I strongly urge the Government to take stringent steps to deal with what is perhaps one of the gravest dangers this country has to face at the present moment.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE)My Lords, I have no doubt that the House will not be sorry that the noble Duke has raised this question, which is one of interest to the whole country—of especial interest, no doubt, to some districts, but of universal interest to no small extent. It was decided, with regard to this question of the steps that ought to be taken by the civil population in the event of a hostile landing on our shores, that the best method to work would be through the Lords Lieutenant of counties, who historically have a position in the county over which they preside which marks them out as the best people for the purpose. Accordingly some instructions were issued so long ago as the middle of October to the various Lords Lieutenant. Those instructions were sent 293 through the medium of the Home Office, but it would be wrong to regard them as in any sense Departmental. As our organisation of business in this country exists it is obviously necessary, in cases of emergency, for some particular Department to undertake a duty of this kind; but there is nothing in the ordinary functions of the Home Office which specially marks them out for this duty, which is closely bound up with military considerations, and which, therefore, has to be dealt with at a great emergency such as that in which we are living with the best machinery which it is possible to produce at short notice. Those instructions were found to be capable of some modification, and I think they were further modified towards the end of that month, and further, again, in the form of a confidential paper to which the noble Duke opposite has alluded, which was issued in the course of November.
It then became an important question for consideration by the Government what degree of publicity it was advisable in the general interest to give to instructions of this kind. Nobody wanted to give an impression to the public, who are not in a position to follow closely all the multiplied questions involved, that a landing by a hostile force on these shores was imminent. On the other hand, it was equally undesirable to encourage a condition of local apathy and indifference, in which people would shut their eyes to the possibility of something of the kind occurring. It is important to remember, and I think it will easily be remembered by those who have followed the frequent discussions which we have had in this House on the subject of invasion—the discussions which were so often initiated by the noble and gallant Field-Marshal whose presence on the Cross Benches we so greatly miss in this House (Lord Roberts)—that even those who were most sceptical about the probable landing on these shores, either in time of peace or in time of war, of four or five hostile army corps, never denied for a moment that a raiding force which might be of considerable dimensions might conceivably, either in time of profound peace or, as we are now, in a condition of war, be landed on these shores, create a large amount of local disturbance, and do a large amount of local damage, more especially if the troops composing that force belonged to a country which was prepared to ignore and neglect what we have believed to be the 294 proper conventions of the conduct of war and principles of humanity and enlightenment.
As this balance existed between possible panic and possible indifference, we have thought that the question ought to be regarded as one of a reasonable insurance to be taken against risks rather than the kind of precautions which might be taken by a town which was imminently expecting to be besieged; and it was also desirable that plenty of time should be given for taking the particular local precautions suitable to each place which might possibly become the subject of such an attack. It is important to bear in mind that if an attack of this sort occurs, the prime object of the forces that defend the country must be to crush the hostile force. That is the primary consideration. The interests and the fears of the civil population, of course, have to be borne in mind; but with regard to them, the important factor is that their presence and their possible demoralisation should in no way hamper the military forces of the Crown, whose business it is to defeat or destroy the hostile landing force. I do not propose—and the noble Duke opposite only touched on the very fringe of the subject—to enter into the question of how an attack of this kind would be met by the military forces of the Crown, but I can assure the House that this subject has been the object of the closest attention of the War Office ever since war was declared. But as regards the effect on the civilian population, the plan that has been adopted has been to appoint, under the direction of the Lord Lieutenant, local emergency committees to work out details in the different localities. I do not think that the noble Duke quite laid sufficient stress on the profound differences which exist between different localities in this regard. He desired that we should issue a series of detailed instructions of universal application, holding, as I gathered he did, that the purely general instructions which had been issued were not sufficiently precise to give proper guidance to those responsible in the different districts.
§ THE DUKE OF RUTLANDI hardly meant that. What I meant was that a universal communication should be made to the different counties so as to bring them all into line and enable general preparations to be made, which I believe would save money and time in future.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI think I see the noble Duke's point. As a matter of fact, it has not been thought desirable, after full consideration, to issue general instructions for the formation of these committees to every county in the United Kingdom. I am not in a position to state which particular counties have been included and which have been omitted. It is not considered desirable that we should do so, nor is it considered desirable that I should enter into any detail on the particular instructions given to different localities. But I should like to bear testimony to the remarkable amount of public-spirited work that has been done by people, from the Lords Lieutenant downwards, in the different localities in this regard. No time or trouble has been spared by many people in giving their best energies to the consideration of these difficult questions; and difficult they are owing to the fact which I have just described—that in different parts of England the needs vary and the possibilities of action also vary. And I should also be quite wrong if I did not pay a tribute to the care which Mr. Arthur Balfour has taken, he having been one of the people who have devoted special care to this in concert with the central authority here, and his services, as I need not tell the House, have been of the greatest possible value in regard to it. On the whole, we have thought that it was wiser to trust to this public spirit and to the play of local energy in a quiet way rather than to a great amount of public discussion and of ventilation of views in local newspapers.
The plan adopted was gradually to communicate the desired arrangements to local residents—people of different kinds carrying weight in the particular places in which they lived—then gradually to make the proposed arrangements more public, and finally to issue, as has been done in certain cases, local proclamations by the Lord Lieutenant and the local authorities. I am very far from saying that local experience may not lead to a number of further modifications in the arrangements that have been made. On that point I would ask the noble Duke opposite to believe that he must not suppose that no other arrangements will be made, and that the particular objects which he has in view—for instance, with regard to his own county—may not in due time be brought about. I am quite certain that the authorities will be grateful 296 to the noble Duke for any advice he can give, particularly on the point he mentioned with regard to the movement of population in certain events from coast counties to contiguous counties which up to now have not been included in those in which regular committees have been formed or to which regular instructions have been issued.
The noble Duke made, towards the end of his speech, a similar request to that which was made by a noble Lord on the other side of the House in the course of yesterday's debate on the subject of alien enemies, for the institution of a new central authority to be solely responsible for this particular work. It cannot be denied, I think—we have to make the best of it—that from one point of view this is a subject which comes within the purview of the Defence Committee; from another and purely military point of view it falls within the province of the War Office; and also from a different point of view, more especially with regard to the precise arrangements which have to be made on a small scale in different localities, the county police authorities are those through whom it is necessary to work. That may seem unbusinesslike, but I cannot help feeling that we have to make the best of that situation and endeavour to work through those different authorities in combination as best we can; and so long as the general result is coherent and rational, so long as there is no undue passing forwards, backwards, or otherwise of papers, and, speaking generally, so long as the system works with tolerable general smoothness and success, I think that in time of emergency it is as much as we can venture to expect can be brought about. As I ventured to say yesterday in the other connection, I am by no means sure that the constitution of an entirely fresh ad hoc authority for a matter of this kind would have the results which some noble Lords seem to hope in the way of bringing about smooth working, absence of friction, and general felicity all round. The different Departments that are involved have their different experiences, they have the habit of intercommunication, and so long as matters proceed without serious difficulty or friction, it may be wiser—I will not put it higher than that—to work through them rather than to attempt to invent an entirely new authority.
Quite at the end of his speech the noble Duke travelled away from his Question altogether on to a subject which we were 297 discussing yesterday. I hope he will not think me discourteous if I do not attempt to repeat now what I ventured to say yesterday afternoon on that subject. But this much I can say, and I am glad to have the opportunity of saying it, that if anybody supposes that a chief constable is likely to be held responsible in the damaging sense in which the noble Duke used the phrase—I mean that he would be severely blamed if an error was made with regard to the release from custody of a particular alien supposed to be innocuous but who afterwards proved to be of a dangerous character—I can assure him that would not be the case. The responsibility, as I said before, rests with the military authorities. They use to the utmost the local knowledge of individuals, which, as everybody knows, bearing in mind what the operations of the detective branch of our various police forces are, is of a kind which is possessed by the police forces to an extent to which it is not possessed by anybody else. That knowledge is used by the military or the naval authorities, as the case may be, for the purpose sometimes perhaps of clearing a man's character but in a number of other cases for pronouncing him to be a suspicious character who ought not to be at large, or, if at large, should be kept under close observation. But it would be altogether a mistake to suppose that any further responsibility than that rests upon the police authorities in the particular counties, and I should like to say quite distinctly and categorically that the Home Office do not interfere in any way in dealing with individual cases in the counties of that kind.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONMy Lords, this question of home defence and the possible action of Lords Lieutenant and the committees beneath them at a time of emergency may be invested with such tremendous significance that I should like with your Lordships' permission, to carry the matter a little further than it has been left by the speech of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. I think, if I may say so, we ought to express our gratitude to my noble friend the Duke of Rutland for having brought this subject before the House and for the able and temperate manner in which he stated his ease. I should like to admit straight away that I think this matter of home defence has been carried a good many stages further than the point at which it stood when we last met to discuss the subject 298 at the end of the month of November. At that time there was no general idea as to what the duty or functions of civilians would be in the case of invasion—either those civilians who wanted to take up arms and fight, or those who for various reasons were incapacitated from fighting. At that time there was no force recognised as existing under the rules of war which the former could join, and there was very grave general doubt as to what it would be possible for the latter to do.
Your Lordships will remember that in the debate which we had in this House all sorts of questions were put as to whether a civilian ought to use arms, and, if so, under what conditions; were people to sit at home and wait fur the enemy to come; were they to destroy their carriages and vehicles, or were they to hand over their horses to the police or the military authorities; and, if they meant to fight, where were they to procure arias and what ought they to do. During the six weeks that have intervened a great change has been made for the better. The Lords Lieutenant have received, and have been acting upon, the instructions which have been so abundantly referred to to-day. Emergency committees have been formed in the whole, I think, of the scheduled counties. May I say, in passing, that I do not quite understand on what principle the schedule has been constituted. I happen to be residing at present in what is a maritime county, the county of Hampshire, but that is not included in the schedule, though I should think that it was eminently suitable to be there, while an inland county like Hertfordshire is included. What may be the explanation of what appears to me at first sight to be an anomaly I do not know. Further, in the interval, the rights of the civil population to take up arms in their own defence in the event of invasion have been admitted and an organised force has been created for the purpose. But I think a good deal more remains to be done.
I will first take the case of the Lords Lieutenant, their action, and the action of the committees which they have constituted. I spent this morning in reading the instructions, so far as they have been made public, of all the Lords Lieutenant of the eastern counties from Northumberland in the North down to Kent in the South. These notices or proclamations, whichever may be the right word to apply, 299 vary a good deal both in the degree of preciseness of the instructions they give and in their general character. The great majority of them give general instructions as to the joining of local volunteer corps by those who wish to fight, and as to the attitude that ought to be adopted by peaceful civilians who wish to remain at home. All of them, I think, refer to the constitution of these emergency committees, and they also say, with some indefiniteness, that in an emergency you should go to the local police, who, acting under the military authorities, will tell you what you ought to do. That, broadly speaking, applies to the whole of the notices which I have read. Others go further and give the names of the emergency committees and the addresses of their chairmen. That has certainly been done in one case or at the most two cases. Others again—and this is a very small class—give the most detailed instructions as to the use of particular roads, the removal or destruction of live-stock, the use of cellars or trenches in the event of bombardment or of attacks from the sky, the treatment of public buildings, and the uses of motors and vehicles of transport in general. By far the most detailed of these proclamations is the one which has emanated from a right hon. gentleman who sits in the House of Commons, Sir Courtenay Warner, who is Lord Lieutenant of the, from this point of view, most important county of Suffolk. All these instructions seem to be very good in their way, but I must say that the great variety that they present lends in my view much force to the contention of my noble friend behind me that some co-ordination is required, some codification, if I may use the word, of the law which is being applied on the matter. I understood the noble Marquess to argue against publicity. The only ground on which I think publicity could have been successfully contested was that if it had been resorted to at an earlier stage it might have tended to produce alarm and possibly panic—
THE MARQUESS OF CREWEI stated that the principle upon which the authorities had gone was that of gradually bringing about publicity. It was not thought desirable in the first instance to publish everything which could quite well be published since, for the reason which the noble Earl has mentioned; but it would not be accurate to say that I argued against publicity as a principle.
§ EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTONNo doubt the process adopted by the Government in that respect was entirely wise. But whatever might have been the chance of creating a panic three months or two months ago, nobody can pretend that the issue of any instructions of this kind would create the faintest new apprehension in the minds of anybody, and the question is whether the moment has not now arrived when something like publicity has become both wise and necessary. The noble Duke read out a passage from the instructions which he had received, and he read it out almost as if it was a matter of knowledge to the House, but those of us who are not Lords Lieutenant—by far the larger number—have not seen the document and know nothing about it. And yet that document affects not only Lords Lieutenant but also the whole of the civil population.
Really when we talk about publication may we not refer, if we want a precedent, to the almost parallel case that occurred in the history of this country a hundred years ago? At that time the whole country was watching for the descent of Napoleon Bonaparte, just as at the present moment we are anticipating a possible attempt on the part of the German Emperor. The whole of the forces of the country, particularly of the maritime counties, were organised to meet that attempt. We remember well the picture of Mr. Pitt organising the forces of Kent at Walmer Castle against the foe. In the year 1801, long before matters had become as serious as they did in 1803, 1804, and 1805, the Duke of York, who was then Commander-in-Chief, issued an order to the Generals under his command throughout the country dealing with every aspect of what might happen in the case of invasion—houses, roads, animals, the civil population, the fighters, and so on. That is a historic document. Nobody brought against it the objection at the time that it was likely to produce panic. If that was done one hundred years ago I can see no particular reason why it should not he done again now.
And is there not a further reason for greater publicity? When an attempt is made, when Scarborough or Hartlepool is bombarded, what is the good then of going to somebody to ask what are the instructions? The poor people at Scarborough who went out into the streets at eight o'clock on the morning of December 16 had no time to go to the 301 police and ask for the address of the chairman of the emergency committee. While they were in the streets the bombs were falling upon them. Therefore I submit that the case for publication—not publication inconsistent with the public interest, but the broad publication of the general lines on which people are to proceed—is not merely justifiable, but, in the circumstances, has become almost necessary.
The noble Duke behind me talked about the happy-go-lucky system that at present exists at any rate in the counties with which he is acquainted. He seemed to think that seine greater concentration of military authority was required, and that there should be some central body to which the Lord Lieutenant himself could turn, and I understood him to say that while Lords Lieutenant have instructions they have not any powers. If that be true, as I believe it is, may I not say, if you have your local man, if he is the man to be appealed to in these circumstances, if he is to discharge these responsible duties, give him the power. That is what was done a hundred years ago. The whole business was then in the hands of the Lords Lieutenant. Pitt was a Lord Lieutenant as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports and had the power then, and I submit that from the analogy of a century past you may derive some useful guidance.
One other point. It was not touched on by the noble Duke behind me, but it is immensely important and directly germane to the subject which we are now discussing. I said at the beginning that when we were dealing with this matter six weeks ago nobody had any clear idea, if they wanted to fight, how they were to fight or where they were to go to. Now, as I understand, the Government are going to rely upon the Association of Volunteer Training Corps organised by the great energy and admirable patriotism of my noble friend Lord Desborough and other noble Lords sitting on both sides of the House. But this raises a most important issue. I understand from what I read in the newspapers that this association and these corps are to be an outlet for the energies of those who are beyond the military age, those who, perhaps, have been rejected when they tried to join the Regular Army, and I imagine also, though I am not quite clear on this point, the great industrial army of men of military age and of good physique who are necessarily deflected front the Army by the 302 necessity of digging coal, or running railways, or making guns and ammunition and uniforms and boots. I suppose that is the class of person who will belong to these volunteer training corps. Of course, they will not be allowed to include anybody who ought to join the Regular Army; they will not be allowed to be a refuge for shirkers.
The point that I understand has been reached is this. The Government have given recognition to these corps in so far as they have authorised them to wear a particular armlet and to provide themselves with a particular uniform, but all other accoutrements, equipment, arms, and ammunition are to be provided by themselves or by wealthy people subscribing on their behalf. This is a point about which I should like some assurance from the Front Bench opposite. This force, even if it contains, as I have seen in the papers, a million of men, will be useless when the emergency conies unless it is in touch with the military authorities, unless it is under military control, unless it acts in co-operation with the regular military forces of the country. Not only that, but it might constitute a great danger because it might fail to be recognised as a combatant force by the enemy, who might make its existence an excuse for acts which we have seen elsewhere. I hope, therefore, that it will be made perfectly clear that this force, which may play so valuable a part in our home defence, will only be allowed to exist, from the military point of view, under the control and in the conditions which I have ventured to, indicate.
There remains the question of the noncombatant civilian, the man who does not want to fight, or, for one reason or another, is incapacitated from fighting and who, under the general instructions issued by the Lords Lieutenant, is told he ought to sit at home. Now, should a raid occur do we imagine that those people are all going to sit at home? They have not had much encouragement from the example of Belgium to sit at home. The poor wretches who sat at home in Belgium, for some fanciful reason of a shot here or an accident there, were taken out of their cottages and cellars, set up in rows, and shot down. Those lessons have eaten into the hearts and minds of our people, and however excellent it may be for the Lords Lieutenant 303 to issue instructions to all the good people to sit at home, what will be the case when a raid is announced by telegram one morning? What happened at Scarborough? A lot of people flocked to the railway station to get away. So that if a considerable force lands you will have a stampede of people rushing away into the interior. All I would ask is whether the Government, in the arrangements they are making, will contemplate the possibility of this occurrence and perhaps make some provision or issue some orders for the transport of these fugitives, if they are found to be in great numbers, by rail or by road, and very likely the determination of some localities, free from the range of the operations of the military, to which they can go. The point is a minor one, but perhaps not altogether unworthy of consideration.
§ THE EARL OF DURHAMMy Lords, I had not meant to intervene in this debate, but the noble Marquess has so skirmished round the question put to him by the noble Duke that we have derived very little information from his speech. I much prefer what the noble Earl opposite said—namely, that we should have no secrecy in this matter. I may say that I am Lord Lieutenant of one of the counties which have had active experience of what a raid means—I refer to the bombardment of Hartlepool. There was no indication given by the Germans that they intended to bombard Hartlepool; it was a sudden operation which occurred about eight o'clock in the morning, and they killed about 110 people there besides doing immense damage to property. Under the instructions submitted to the noble Duke opposite—I do not know how or by whom—the Lords Lieutenant were told not to inform the country, not to tell the emergency committees what to do, and not to call out a special constable until an invasion had taken place. That is an absurdity. How were we to know at the Hartlepools that this bombardment was not a preface to a raid or invasion? The noble Marquess referred to instructions as emanating from the Home Office. I know it was stated in one paper that they came from the Foreign Office. Evidently they came from all Departments, and consequently we do not know which to obey.
I received a document called "E," confidential. A week afterwards I was 304 asked to destroy that and replace it by another document "E." The noble Marquess talks as if the Government had I made up their mind that different modifications were necessary in different counties. But it took the Government two months to find that out; yet it did not take us two days. The first emergency committee that I called together were, I venture to say, business men and sensible men. I told them that it was my duty to put those instructions before them, but I said, "I hope you do not intend to pay any attention to them." That was the most applauded part of my speech. I said to them, "Use your common sense in your particular district. Instruct your special constables beforehand what their duties are, and tell them that if timid men or frightened women come and ask what they are to do in a case of bombardment—what they are to do with their sheep, and carriages, and so on—they must tell them at once. It is no use telling them at the last moment when there is a bombardment." That was only common sense. I certainly cannot see the object of this secrecy. In my opinion there should be no secrecy at all in this matter. Other noble Lords have issued instructions very different from mine. Mine were rather pompous proclamations, but they did not give away the Government's case. Lord Nunburnholme's proclamation comprised the greater part of Form "E," which was marked "Confidential."
§ LORD NUNBURNHOLMEThe latest communication from the Home Office said that we could go as far as saying what I did say.
§ THE EARL OF DURHAMI think that was after the bombardment?
§ LORD NUNBURNHOLMEYes.
§ THE EARL OF DURHAMA noble friend of mine opposite, Lord Harris, also issued instructions. I liked them very much indeed, except on one matter which rather hurt my feelings. I do not know whether my noble friend's knowledge of geography was as weak as it professed to be, but he talked about the "great loss of life on the Yorkshire coast"—he was reported to have done so, at any rate. I happened to be in London on the occasion of the bombardment and I went to my club to find out 305 what had occurred. I found a group of officers there, amongst whom was a General officer who is on Government service now. He said, "My knowledge of geography is not very great, but I think I am correct in saying that the Hartlepools are south of the Humber." That was a General officer.
I venture to say—and I do not think any one will contradict me—that a young man who has joined the Army since the commencement of the war and who happens to be on the staff, say, in the Northern Command—in the County of Durham—can give instructions to me, the Lord Lieutenant, to the chief constable, and to all time emergency committees and the 1,300,000 inhabitants as to what we are to do. I have no power or status to remonstrate with that young officer's orders. The only authority we have we are told is historical authority. That is no use now. We want a little more practical authority. The Government, who quite rightly always try to get as much as possible out of a Lord Lieutenant, ask us to do a certain thing, but I submit that we should have more power and authority. Why, I cannot even go about my own county without being held up by a special constable whom I have myself appointed. It is a necessity that the inhabitants of this country should know what they have to face. I can assure you that in the County of Durham the inhabitants behaved with the greatest courage and coolness at the time of the bombardment. They were not frightened; and they are not at all frightened when I tell them that there may possibly be yet another raid.
LORD HARRISMy Lords, I apologise to my noble friend opposite for not having referred to the County of Durham, but for the sake of brevity I referred to the loss of life "on the Yorkshire coast." I have not had the unhappy experience of my noble friend, and perhaps it will be some comfort to your Lordships to know that in one county we have not very much to complain of as regards the measures taken by the Government or the liberty we have been given to make such arrangements as we could. I do not, quite understand what was suggested by the noble Duke, that Lords Lieutenant should have given to them some legal power which they have not got now. I confess I have not found any difficulty whatever as regards that. Every 306 suggestion I have made has been accepted with the greatest good will, the greatest self-denial, and the utmost patriotism. I have to deal with at least three General Officers Commanding and two Admirals, and I have not found the slightest difficulty. The emergency committees and the nearest military authority and the executive officer, who is almost invariably the police superintendent, are all How in the closest touch; and I should hope, if the crisis arose, that the necessary action would ensue very promptly. As a matter of fact, the emergency committees when the crisis arrives are not executive. Their functions at present are to prepare, and they have been preparing I think on the whole very sensibly for what is to take place if an unheralded landing is attempted. I wish the noble Marquess, when he extended his thanks to Lords Lieutenant and to these committees, had carried his thanks down a little lower—I am sure he would have done so if he had thought of it—to those who may be affected by the operations that are to take place if an attempt is made at landing.
LORD HARRISI am glad of the opportunity of bearing witness to the admirable tone which has animated the whole population who may be affected by these operations. They affect their domestic life, and they affect their property very materially. They have accepted all the instructions issued by the emergency committees with the utmost readiness and the utmost patriotism. I do not mean to say that they are not desirous of arguing as to whether or not this or that operation is feasible and whether it is the best. But, on the whole, they have accepted generally all the instructions which the emergency committees have issued as regards the removal or destruction of stock, the removal or destruction of transport, horses, or goods in the most admirable spirit; and I am glad to have the opportunity of bearing witness to that attitude which I think is highly creditable to our nation.
I entirely agree that the secrecy which has been imposed, the confidential character of the communications that have been made to the Lords Lieutenant, was excessive. That is a matter of opinion, I quite admit; but I do not think that the 307 British character is one that is liable to fright. I think that if we had taken the general public into our confidence earlier they would have been better prepared. I think they are prepared to some extent now. It has got generally known what are the operations to be carried out. In fact, in a good many cases the local orders are out. If the strict directions of the Home Office had been carried out it would have been quite impossible to convey to these emergency committees any instructions except by word of mouth. A Lord Lieutenant would have had to call his emergency committees together at some central place and to tell them by word of mouth what to do. Your Lordships know from experience that it is absolutely ridiculous to suppose that these gentlemen would have carried away in their heads the precise instructions which the Lord Lieutenant, who had had the opportunity of reading them all from a paper, had got in his mind; and it was only after argument, and with help from Mr. Balfour, that consent was given to our conveying these instructions to the emergency committees. That sanction having been obtained the rest was simple. The emergency committees, with a great deal of sympathy, I think, have taken their neighbours into their confidence without any sanction from the Lords Lieutenant or the Home Office, and the result is that in every area practically the whole of the population now know what is to take place in the event of a state of emergency being declared.
Although I may be hopeful in thinking that everything would work smoothly when that state of emergency was declared, I think I am justified in saying that our state of preparation now is infinitely superior to what it was in the beginning of October; and although great hardships may ensue and although there may be great loss which will not be covered by any remuneration from the Government, still I am sure that this effect will be secured—namely, that, to use an expression of my own in the brief announcement I made to the county, "Our coast will be rendered as inhospitable as possible to the enemy should he be successful in landing." My noble blend the Duke of Rutland said he wished that permission had been given for certain instructions to be published broadcast. Well, he has been very unfortunate if he has not received—perhaps he has not—an official communication which is the 308 result of the combined efforts of the Home Office and the War Office. After much cogitation these Offices have authorised the Lords Lieutenant to circulate, amongst other things, this salutary admonition to householders—that should a shell come in at the front door it would be safer for them to go out at the back. That is one of the warnings which result as the combined efforts of the Home Office and the War Office—and, a noble Lord informs me, the Admiralty.
I had a previous experience of an attempt to warn the public. I prepared a voluminous manifesto, far more voluminous than that which caught the eye of my noble friend opposite. I was somewhat pleased with it; I thought it rather a successful effort; and I sent it, as instructed, to the Home Office for the consideration of the Minister. When I got it back I felt somewhat as I used to do when I was at Eton and got back my copy of verses with a good many five-barred gates in blue pencil indicating false quantities and other errors I had introduced. Most of my manifesto was objected to. In particular I had expressed the pious hope that "under God's Providence a landing would never take place"; and it was suggested to me that it would be, perhaps, better not to introduce an expression of that kind as it might be providential that a landing should take place as occurred in 1588. Those are my experiences of having tried to warn the public with which I am more immediately concerned. They have not been successful. I honestly and humbly think that His Majesty's Government might have been a little more liberal in the permission they gave to the Lords Lieutenant as to the advice they might offer to their counties. The result has been these very jejune paragraphs which have been referred to to-day, and which differ materially according to the construction which the Lords Lieutenant put cm the authority they had received as regards publication. So much as regards the civil population in connection with an attempt at an unheralded landing.
One other subject has been referred to, more especially by the noble Earl who leads the Opposition to-night, and that is as regards volunteer movements. As to that I support the noble Earl most cordially in hoping that His Majesty's Government 309 will give us some advice. They have given us no advice as to what the civil population is to do in the event of a landing; they have left that to the unfortunate Lords Lieutenant to indicate if they choose. 'Personally I have indicated nothing as yet, but when I have been asked to I have pointed out that the orders mean the devastation of the countryside and as an obvious corollary to that it seemed that the civil population had to move. When I have been asked where they are to go, there I have been done, unless it is a general indication of "going to the West"—not in the mournful way in which the expression has been used lately on the Continent. No doubt there may be some difficulty for the Government to say where the civil population are to go. But as regards Volunteers, they are bound to take this matter into consideration and deal with it in a more precise way than they have done hitherto.
I do not say one word as to what has been done by my noble friend Lord Desborough and his Committee. They have acted in a most patriotic way. But I think that, having trusted the Lords Lieutenant as regards the preparations to be made against a landing in so far as the civil population is concerned, it has been rather a slur that the Lords Lieutenant have been passed over as regards the volunteer corps being formed in their counties and a preference given to a body of gentlemen assembled in London. I think we could have been of more use to the Government than the Committee. I do not see how the Committee is to know precisely the gentlemen who are raising this corps; whether they are reliable, what opportunities they have for obtaining officers for the corps, and what chances they have in the particular neighbourhoods where they are trying to raise it of getting that support which is obviously necessary if the Government are not going to assist with anything in the shape of arms, uniform, or money. I think the Lords Lieutenant, if they had been trusted in the first place, could probably have taken the matter in hand and dealt with it more precisely and in a way that would have produced a force more regular than this one. At present this body is liable to get a great deal out of hand, I should think. I suggest very humbly to the Government that the movement has now assumed such volume that it is absolutely essential that they should deal with it, 310 not as one huge force, which it is at present, under very little control I should think, but break it down to smaller units; and in all probability they will find that the county is the best unit. That, is only a suggestion which I venture to make. But I think it is obvious front what we see in the papers that the Government will have to deal with this body in a more precise and resolute way.
§ THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE)My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for more than a few moments because there is other business to which the House has to proceed, but some things that have been said in this debate call fur comment, so far as I am concerned of a friendly kind. I think the noble Lord who has just spoken has shown us exactly how the business which he undertook ought to be performed. He has dealt with it in a concrete fashion, not sparing himself the labour of going into details; and he has somewhat generously disregarded the letter of the instructions while observing the spirit. That is what must be done in a case of this kind.
I was cognizant of the original genesis of this kind of instruction. I say "original" because this matter was considered long ago in peace time in the days when I was at the War Office, and we were then anxious not to discuss it in public because in times of peace it might have had an alarming effect. As times change circumstances change. The obligation of secrecy, which I think was a very real One then, has become much less real now; and I agree with the noble Lord and the noble Earl who spoke before him that the British public are very sensible; they get accustomed to these situations very rapidly. As we know, there was no flurry or disturbance after the recent raid; people took things in a most sane fashion; and I believe they are ready to take these instructions in a proper fashion, and more detail could be given than has been the case. The reason why it was done as it was in the first instance was that the thing had been handled from the point of view of a central authority, which cannot deal with the localities in the differential manner which is required and therefore can only lay down general principles. Well, the principles have been too general; and the personages entrusted in the matter have 311 been requested to consider the instructions given as of a confidential character. That was almost inevitable in the early stages. But I think the speeches to which we have listened to-night show how these things work out when the spirit and not the letter of the instructions is looked at.
I desire to say, speaking for myself, that I agree with the mode in which the noble Lord (Lord Harris) has discharged the duties which devolve upon him in the county of Kent. I think that this debate has been an instructive one, and it has been valuable that the noble Duke who raised it should have done so; and I think your Lordships see some of the reasons why the counties have been treated on different footings, the interior counties from the coast counties, and, I would say, some of the Southern counties from some of the Eastern counties. These things have been done for military reasons, reasons which will change as time goes on. Meantime things have been said in the course of this debate which I can only say to your Lordships will have our consideration. I hope that any formal manifesto or other instruction which indicates any change of method or plan will be communicated without so much secrecy, and that we shall attain our end, which is to prepare the minds of the people for that which they have to do, without creating any sort of scare.
§ THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIREMy Lords, I did not want to revert to the subject raised by the noble Duke, but in spite of what the Lord Chancellor has said we who live in the interior counties are placed in a position of great difficulty. We are quite sensible of the fact that the problem which confronts maritime counties is entirely different, but no one will deny that there are problems that have to be faced by us in the inland counties. My noble friend, in the course of his speech, told us that an application had come to his county from the neighbouring county of Lincolnshire, and I understand that he was left without any instructions of any sort, kind, or description. The same position as a matter of fact daily happens in my own county. I am continually asked, "What are we to do?" The question has become one of such an acute character, and so many requests are made by men residing up and down the county, 312 especially as they know that within a short distance from where they are living active steps are being taken, that we should have some instructions. It is only natural that questions should be asked by people as to whether they were to do anything. If we were only told to-day by a responsible member of the Government that there is nothing for us to do, and that different sorts of problems may arise in different counties, we should know where we are. I submit that we want something further and something clearer and more definite than we have got at the present moment.
Personally I do not know whether I have placed myself in the wrong, but the matter got so acute that I had no other option but to summon a meeting of county councillors and leading men throughout the county, and I am glad to say that a representative from the General Officer Commanding at York attended that meeting. I had to apologise to those present for not having received any definite instructions, and to explain that I was acting entirely on my own account in summoning the meeting. That seemed somewhat to surprise the representative of the General Officer Commanding at York, and on the following morning he sent me a copy of these confidential instructions. Whether I have received them in an official capacity or not I do not know. At any rate I have received them, and have been allowed to show them to other people. Whether we were entitled to do so I do not know, but we have formed a committee to deal with these problems. It is obvious that there may be a big influx of population from the coastal counties, and we have a very large industrial population of own own. As your Lordships are aware, a great number of men have joined the Army and our population consists of a large number of women and children who ought to have some guidance and to be told what to do. We have taken the matter upon our own shoulders and are proposing to act. But it would be a matter of great relief to us—and I believe there are many others situated in a similar position—if some clear and definite instructions could be received from those in authority, instead of waiting to see what may turn up. I do hope that as a result of this debate something more clear and distinct will be issued, not only for those who reside in coastal counties, but for those who have to face these problems in the inland counties.