HL Deb 16 December 1915 vol 20 cc670-93
LORD STRACHIE

had the following Notice on the Paper—

To ask the Lord President of the Council whether it is the case that the Foreign Office have entered into an Agreement with Denmark whereby that country can import food or other goods and re-export them to neutral or belligerent countries.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, it is some time since I put this Question upon the Notice Paper. Since then a good deal has happened in another place. There has been attempt after attempt there to get some explanation of the policy and the attitude of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Agreement which has been entered into with certain traders in Denmark by the Foreign Office, and therefore, of course, by Majesty's Government. The House of Commons have not the power to discuss this question when they think fit, but only at Question time. It has therefore been very easy for the Government up to now practically to say: "We will tell you nothing about it"; though I notice that yesterday one concession was made. The Prime Minister stated that he world at some time— it was not stated when—lay upon the Table of the House a statement with regard to the Agreement. That I venture to think is hardly satisfactory. If this is not to be treated entirely its a secret document it is much better that the whole Agreement should be seen, and that the country should know exactly what the position is as regards this question of imports into and re-exports from Denmark to other countries.

It is rather curious to find that an Agreement has been made by His Majesty's Government, not with the Kingdom of Denmark, but with two trading companies —the Merchants' Guild of Copenhagen and the Industrial Association of Denmark. I do not suppose that many of your Lordships know the constitution of this particular Guild or this Industrial Association. As far as we know they may be largely composed of enemies of this country. Lately your Lordships were discussing a Bill dealing with the difficult question of trading with the enemy. I venture to ask the noble Marquess Lord Lansdowne, who I understand will reply this afternoon in the place of the Lord President of the Council, to whom my Question on the Paper is addressed, why this Agreement was made with certain traders in Denmark and not with the country of Denmark itself. I would also like to ask him whether it is a usual thing for a Government to enter into secret Agreements with traders of a foreign country during such a state of things as the present, when a great many difficulties may be raised. It has been said—and in my Question on the Paper I ask specifically as to this—that under this Agreement these goods can be re-exported from Denmark into Germany. The House will see that this is very important indeed, because if there is anything in the Agreement which allows this it is certainly stultifying our object—if this is the object of the Government—to prevent as far as possible any food or other goods going into Germany which may be useful to the enemy in the prosecution of the war. Is it a fact that Danish traders can under the Agreement export to Germany in limited quantities certain articles such as china, ink, earthenware, cheese, and machinery? It is also asserted that they are able to re-export into Germany from Denmark in unlimited quantities beer, leather, matches, malt, coffee, tea, and clothing. It is a very important matter that we should know exactly the true state of things, because, naturally, a great deal of unrest has been raised in the country from the statements which have been made and which remain as far as I am aware uncontradicted. To me, as an old Member of another place, it seems rather a curious thing that during the whole of the continual attacks in the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has never himself dealt with the matter but has left it entirely to the Under-Secretary; and the Under Secretary, it has been noticed, has constantly said that he does not know the position and will have to make inquiry. That appears to be an unsatisfactory state of things. But we are fortunate to-day in having the noble Marquess here. As a member of the Cabinet he will be able to say from his own knowledge whether this question was considered by the Cabinet and the Government before the Foreign Office entered into this Agreement about which there is so much controversy.

One cannot help wondering whether there has been a change of policy. Is the policy of the Foreign Secretary and of the present Government different from the policy which was announced by the Prime Minister in March last? Mr. Asquith then said that henceforth our policy was to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. He declared— There is no form of economic pressure to which we do not consider ourselves entitled to resort. The British Government hold themselves free to detain … ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination or ownership.

He added—and this seems to me very important—that we were not going to be hampered by "juridical niceties." After such statements it is very curious that at the present moment we have this secret Agreement which apparently enables Denmark to import an enormous amount of articles and to re-export them to Germany. Even if there is no power under this Agreement to re-export to Germany, it is obvious from what has been going on in the past that Denmark is importing much larger quantities of articles, such as those I have mentioned, than ever before. She cannot be doing it for her own population; therefore the inference is that she must be supplying goods to the enemy.

It is very remarkable, not only with regard to Denmark but as regards other countries, the enormous amount of stuff that neutrals are importing in comparison with the figures before the war. Take Holland, as an example. In 1914 we exported to Holland only 399 tons of linseed oil, while in a similar period of this year we exported 29,511 tons. Then Holland exported to Germany in the first nine months of 1914 4,803 tons, and in a similar period of this year she exported to Germany 79,000 tons, of linseed oil. Those figures seem very remarkable; and it looks as if the statement of the Prime Minister—that we were going to put such pressure on Germany that she could not obtain goods at all, that no juridical niceties were going to be observed, and that we were going to see, come what may, that Germany was not going to receive goods to enable her to carry on the war—has certainly not been carried out. We have a right to ask why it is that up to now that declaration of the Prime Minister has apparently not been carried out.

What at the present moment in practice is really happening is this. Our Fleet is stopping neutral ships carrying contraband. But when those contraband goods have been stopped they are taken into the Prize Court. It is proved before the Prize Court that these goods are going to a neutral country in excessive amount, but the ships and the goods are released by the Court because no legal proof can be shown to the Court that the goods are intended directly for Germany. That again seems in direct contradiction to the statement made by the Prime Minister that we were not going to be hampered by juridical niceties and that the object of the Government was, come what may, to prevent Germany getting goods in any way. It is perfectly obvious that the consignor is not going to be so foolish as to say that he is consigning the goods for any other purpose except legitimate trade in Holland, or Denmark, or wherever it may be. Therefore under present conditions the Court says, "You can give us no actual proof where the goods are going," although there is great suspicion. Therefore they are released and go on quite unhampered.

I am informed that under present conditions the Government allow trading with neutrals. The consignor of goods may be a German or a suspect neutral, the negotiating agent may be actually on the black list and the consignee a neutral, yet that is not sufficient to allow the goods to be confiscated. Is not that really splitting hairs? Is it not playing into the hands of the Germans and enabling them to get goods through in neutral bottoms and through neutral sources? It seems to me that we are simply playing with this matter. What, then, is the use of our great Fleet and our boasted command of the sea when goods are allowed to go into enemy countries? And coming on top of all this we have a secret Agreement—made not even with a foreign Government but with foreign traders—which His Majesty's Government, for some reason or another, decline to allow either House or the country to see. If this Agreement is in the interests of the country, what possible objection can there be to laying it before Parliament. I am much too new a member of this House to move that this secret Agreement should be laid upon the Table, but I venture to make the suggestion. Perhaps later on it may be thought fit to do so. I feel certain that the people of the country would think your Lordships were doing a great service if you were to insist that this Agreement should be laid before Parliament so that they may be made aware of its provisions and an end put to the existing unrest, because undoubtedly the country in this as in other matters are beginning to lose confidence in His Majesty's Government.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

had on the Paper a Notice on the same subject.— namely: To call attention to a statement widely circulated in the Press that certain Danes have negotiated a Treaty or arrangement of some kind with Great Britain whereby articles exported from Great Britain can be re-exported from Denmark to other countries; and to move for Papers.

The noble Earl said: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission I should like to recall to your memory what was stated by the Prime Minister during a debate in the House of Commons in March of this year. The Prime Minister not only spoke very plainly on that occasion of what our intentions were, but he made use of these words— I propose now to read the statement which has been prepared by His Majesty's Government, which declares in plain and unmistakable terms the view which we take, not only of our rights but of our duties. Therefore the Prime Minister entered upon a very much larger field than the mere question of the assertion of any definite rights. He went on to say— Germany has declared that the English Channel, the North and West coasts of France and the waters round the British Isles are a 'war area,' and has officially notified that all enemy ships found in that area will be destroyed and that neutral vessels may be exposed to danger. Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non-combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, including food for the civipopulation, from reacting or leaving the British Isles or Northern France. Since the Prime Minister made that declaration this policy has been deliberately adopted and carried out by the Germans. It has not been particularly successful, but there was the intention; and so far as they were able to do it they have carried out that policy. Then the Prime Minister went on to say— Her opponents" [that is, the opponents of Germany]" are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. And he added— If, as a consequence, neutrals suffer inconvenience and loss of trade we regret it, but we beg them to remember— I beg your Lordships also to remember— that this phase of the war was not initiated by us. If I may say so, that was a very plain and distinct statement. It was a pledge, and it was the charter also of our policy of sea power. It is not unreasonable, therefore, that great interest should be aroused in the country, and, if I may say so, great suspicion amounting to great indignation that anything should be done to tamper with the full effective force of our sea power. And that is all the more felt because this Agreement with Denmark has been, for reasons which have never been explained, sedulously kept secret.

I—I think in company with many other gentlemen of influence—have seen this draft Agreement. It is a draft Agreement —now, I understand, an Agreement—with the Merchants' Guild of Copenhagen and the Danish Chamber of Manufacturers on the one part, and on behalf of the Foreign Office on the other. I understand that the Danish Government has not formally signed it, but that it has given the Agreement what it calls "unofficial approval." I am loth to trouble your Lordships with more details than I can help, but I should like with your permission to state what goods, so far as I can judge from the draft Agreement—a copy of which I have in my possession—the Government allow to be re-exported to Norway and Sweden. They allow the re-export to Norway and Sweden of a long list of goods, including coffee, cocoa, steel, iron, other plates or sheets, machines, tools and instruments, ovens, tea, tobacco, feathers, glass, paper, salt and soda, draperies, wool and cotton, linen, cloth, linoleum, carpets, mahogany, sanitary goods, grass seed, cakes, biscuits, macaroni, and a large number of other articles; and they do this under a rule that makes the importer pledge himself to apply for permission to the Merchants' Guild and the Danish Chamber of Manufacturers and obtain from them the requisite guarantee. But in the Agreement which I have seen that guarantee had not been drafted Supposing a guarantee has been inserted I would ask your Lordships, as men of the world, and men of business, how is it going to be enforced? These agents in Norway and Sweden, to whom these goods are to be re-exported from Denmark, may be, and I have not much doubt they probably are, largely Germans, or traders with German interests, or traders in debt to Germany working on German capital. Having dealt with the goods which may be re-exported to Norway and to Sweden, I should now like to say a few words upon the articles which may be re-exported from Denmark direct to Germany. These articles are divided into two classes.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

I do not wish to interrupt the noble Earl. But, as a matter of order, can this Agreement be discussed unless it is to be laid on the Table? Would the noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne) tell us? I believe that as a matter of Parliamentary practice an Agreement of this kind, unless the Government are going to laid on the Table, cannot be discussed. Will it be laid on the Table?

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

We do not intend to lay it. The course which the noble Earl is taking may be extremely inconvenient, but it is for him to decide whether he wishes to pursue it.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

It may be inconvenient, but I think I may state what I know. It is within the competence of the noble Marquess to follow me and say that my information in regard to these matters is incorrect. I can assure the noble Marquess that I speak on this point only from a strong sense of public duty. I have not the slightest desire to take advantage of the Government, but I think the country ought to know how far these goods can be re-exported into Germany.

Now to proceed after what seems to me to have been perfectly unnecessary interruption. The following articles may be re-exported to Germany, I understand in limited quantities taking it from the point of view of money: spirits, £7,500 per quarter; china, £5,000 per quarter; earthenware, £7,500 per quarter; toys, £2,500 per quarter; printing inks, £5,000 to £10,000 per quarter; rennet—which I should have thought was a matter connected with food—rennet (for cheese), £7,500 per quarter; and machinery, £50,000 per quarter. I now come to the articles which I understand can be re-exported Germany in unlimited quantities. They include beer, matches, leather goods prepared with imported tanning materials, malt, coffee, chocolate, tea, fresh and dried fruit, women's and children's clothing, clocks, and watches. There is a certain irony about all this. It is worthy of note that while the British workman is being docked of his beer the Foreign Office thoughtfully provides beer in unlimited quantities for the German workman, and that while the poor English woman has to pay more for her tea the "pundits" of the Foreign Office, to quote a phrase of the noble Marquess opposite—

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

It was not my phrase.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

In any case I think it is a very good one. While the poor English woman has to pay more for her tea, the "pundits" of the Foreign Office thoughtfully provide that their German friends shall be supplied with unlimited quantities of tea and coffee. Again I am told that malt is to go to Germany. We know that malt constitutes a most excellent and valuable feeding stuff for cattle and is very much needed by Germany now that her imports from Russia are closed. I would also call attention to this fact, that a German demand for malt must raise the price both of grain and of shipping freights to this country. Coffee, chocolate, and tea are all commodities every one of them suitable and fitted for Germany's fighting forces.

Now I come to another point. I should like to bring to your Lordships' notice a few of the names of these Danish gentlemen who constitute the trading bodies with whom our Foreign Office are doing business. The first name on the list is Abrahamson; then we have names like these: Buelow, Gammeltoft, Gluckstadt, Karl Meyer, Hesserschmidt, and Schmidt. I confess that these names do not seem to me to bear any close relation to Danish names, to the descendants of the Vikings or the sons of the Sea Kings; and one cannot help having a sort of suspicion that behind all this business there is a trail and odour of finance which is not very creditable and not at all pleasant.

Having stated what I know about the terms of this Agreement, I should like to refer to one other point in connection with it. The noble Marquess (Lord Lansdowne), in the course of a debate which I raised with regard to the Declaration of London, made use of this language. He said— There are other people to be thought of, and when the noble Earl and his friends airily treat these questions as if there were no such people as neutrals, I venture to think they make a very great mistake. And my noble friend Lord Bryce on the same occasion made use of these words— The noble Earl seemed to me rather to ignore the fact that in all the operations we are conducting at sea neutrals as well as belligerents are involved. I beg with all humility to say that I have never kept out of my mind reasonable regard for neutrals. I agree entirely with the sentiments expressed by the noble Marquess and by Lord Bryce, but I should like to bring before your Lordships what it seems to me from a layman's point of view constitutes a very serious international objection to an Agreement of this kind.

Let me deal first with the provision for re-export into Germany. Speaking as a layman, it has always seemed to me that whatever substance lay at the back of the Order in Council of March, 1915, resides in the fact that this Order created not a technical blockade but a blockade modified to meet the existing changes in economic and commercial conditions. I believe it is indisputably true that one of the invariable principles of blockade has been that the blockading Power shall not in any form grant exemption or preference from the operation of the blockade. This is not a technical point but lies in the sense of the nations that preferences are essentially impossible. Consequently it has always been a defence in a Prize Court that the blockade was ineffective or was suffered to be knowingly violated. The written Agreement, therefore, of the Foreign Office to permit direct shipments into Germany through Denmark is preferential treatment which would abrogate any existing blockade under International Law.

My second objection to this Agreement from the point of view of neutrals is this. Apart from the considerations respecting blockade which I have ventured to touch upon, certain foodstuffs like tea, cocoa, and like products are permitted to be imported into Denmark and thence to be re-exported into Germany. These foodstuffs are conditional contraband, and, on account of what has been done by the German Government and of the orders of the German Government, have been treated virtually as absolutely contraband. An Agreement now executed in favour of Denmark deliberately permitting the introduction of contraband articles into Germany does seem to me to constitute further preferential treatment. I do not understand how Great Britain could in any Prize Court assuming to administer principles of International Law seize American tea, cocoa, or products consigned to Germany herself if the provisions of this Danish Agreement be properly pleaded.

The last objection from the point of view of neutrals is this. The third Article of the Danish Agreement permits exports from Denmark into Norway and Sweden. It is to be assumed that our Government still limits shipments from the United States into Norway and Sweden. If that is so and I presume it is—we have presented an Agreement between Great Britain and Danish concerns in effect regulating without any consultation with Norway, Sweden, or the United States trade between these three neutral countries. In other words, Great Britain and Denmark are assuming to control the trade between the United States and Sweden by an Agreement to which neither the United States nor Sweden is a party. I pass over the workableness of the Agreement, and its aspects from the British point of view. I only say that I cannot imagine any logical argument which does not see in this Agreement preferential treatment for Denmark over the United States. In questions of contraband and blockade since the inception of International Law—I think I am correct in saying in the presence of many distinguished lawyers—preferential treatment is abhorrent.

I move for Papers, and I do so for the following reasons. In the first place, this Agreement constitutes a complete departure from the pledge of the Prime Minister in March. The country is entitled to be placed in full possession of a commercial Agreement with private individuals involving a complete change of policy. My second reason is that the Cabinet is the Committee elected by Parliament for executive purposes. Consequently—and this is my third reason—holding this matter to be of grave importance, it is eminently disquieting to know, from the very evasive answer which the Prime Minister gave in the House of Commons, that this Agreement was not drawn up with the consideration of the Cabinet. My fourth reason is this. The Government are proposing by postponing the General Election to disfranchise for the time being the constituencies. This being so, surely the public have a special, an emphatic claim to look to Parliament for enforcing every safeguard and control that is necessary for the proper conduct of the war.

The noble Marquess may perhaps ask me, What has this Agreement to do with the conduct of the war? I reply that it affects it vitally and directly. Our troops are splendid, but our political and military strategy have not been so successful. The one formidable force which Germany feels and dreads is the silent pressure of the Navy. To weaken that in the smallest degree is, in my opinion, treachery to the country. If the noble Marquess says that this Agreement does not weaken the pressure of the Navy, let him lay these Papers on the Table of the House. Let him have the courage of conviction and dare to face publicity. Nothing less will prove or satisfy the public that the insuperable objections of Lord Robert Cecil are other than that the whole transaction cannot stand the light of day. I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name.

Moved, That there be laid before the House Papers relating to a reported Treaty or Arrangement with Great Britain whereby articles exported from Great Britain can be re-exported from Denmark to other countries.—(The Earl of Portsmouth.)

LORD DEVONPORT

My Lords, it is, I think, a matter of common knowledge that during the earlier period of the war our naval operations were restricted to a large extent by the control exercised upon them from headquarters. And when I say "headquarters" I do not mean naval but political headquarters. I need not recite the incidents that occurred. We are all familiar with them, and I do not think the statement will be challenged. That state of affairs endured for at least seven months, and it was only when the submarine policy of the Germans came into existence that the Government seemed really to awake to the fact that we were engaged in war. Then it was that the Prime Minister made the statement which has been quoted by both the previous speakers, and that statement was the forerunner to the promulgation of the Order in Council. The Order in Council, in most definite, clear, and unmistakable terms endorsed—if I may use such a term with regard to an Order in Council—the declaration made by the Prime Minister, and it gave to the country hope and encouragement that at last the policy of weakness was to come to an end.

This is what the Order in Council said. After reciting the incidents that had occurred on the part of Germany to justify the Order in Council being promulgated—it is clearly described as a retaliation against the actions of Germany—the Order says— His Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. I recite that from the Order in Council, because though in effect the Prime Minister used the same words his words have not statutory effect, but the Order in Council has. The declarations of the Prime Minister were translated into statutory form. As I have said, the effect of the promulgation of the Order in Council was that we were able to feel that at last we were to have the full advantage of the might and influence of the British Fleet, upon which we had always been taught to believe, and did believe, that we could rely. I think the people of this country have an accurate instinct as to what this great weapon means. They have never hesitated to support it, and were any parliamentarian to attempt to vote against the upkeep of the Navy he would receive but short consideration from his constituency. The public in this country believes that the power of England on the sea is irresistible, and that, whatever may be our misfortunes by land, sooner or later the Fleet will get us out of our difficulties. Any one who has studied the history of the Napoleonic times sees over and over again that it was the Fleet that broke Napoleon's power; although his career was terminated on the field of Waterloo it was the Fleet that tore him away from his Allies and finally brought him to his ruin. When the Order in Council was promulgated the country was encouraged in the way I have described, but it has not taken long for this apparently firm action on the part of the Government to prove somewhat delusive. Why is that? Because since the promulgation of this Order the Government have, by a series of indulgences to neutrals, prevented the enemy from feeling the full consequences of our blockade.

The noble Earl (Lord Portsmouth) has recited many of the articles that through the agency of this Agreement are to be enabled to pass into Germany—articles which, if they came along on the sea, would under the Order in Council be stopped by our Fleet. If therefore you allow them to get in, as it were, by some back door I think I am justified in saying that by a series of indulgences to neutrals the Government is sparing the enemy from the full consequences of our blockade. I have with me some figures of the commodities that are being imported in large quantities by the Netherlands Government, by Sweden, and by Denmark; but I will not trouble the House by giving them, as I think the figures quoted by Lord Portsmouth and Lord Strachie are sufficient in themselves to prove that enormously increased quantities of various commodities are going into those countries. The only inference, the only deduction, to be drawn from the figures is that commodities are finding their way through those countries to the enemy.

Now a word or two about the Agreement itself. The Government, for some incomprehensible reason, declare it to be so vitally secret that they dare not reveal it. The noble Marquess said just now that he will not reveal it; he refuses to lay it on the Table of the House. This particular group of manufacturers in Denmark consists, I believe, by Statute of practically every trading concern in the country. There appeared in the Globe—on Monday, I think it was—a letter of an official character front the President of the Guild. He wrote because the competency had been called into questior of this Guild to speak for the trading community of Denmark, and he pointed out that not only did he represent through the Danish Chamber of Manufacturers and the Merchants' Guild all the industrial concerns in Denmark, but that by an ancient Statute every trading concern—there were a very few exceptions—was ipso facto a member of this organisation. So we arrive at this point, that the information contained in this sacred and secret document is in the possession of all the industrial concerns in Denmark; yet it is denied to us. But if I may say so, the Government do not preserve their own secret. It is a matter of common knowledge that a certain group of Members of Parliament were called together and shown this document at the hands of a member of the Government. That has been said in the House of Commons; it has never been denied, and I have every reason to believe it is true.

Now as to whether the Cabinet were consulted in connection with this document. That has been challenged, and it has not been denied. Rumours fly about in all directions, and this is the price and penalty you have to pay for concealing this document from the House of Commons and from this House. If it is an innocuous document, why not let us know its contents? But it is not really concealed. Copies of it are as plentiful as can be. The noble Earl has a copy of it, and I am bound to say that I have been favoured with a copy. Everybody I meet who is taking a passing interest in the matter seems to have in his pocket a copy of the document. These copies have been quoted from by many speakers and the validity of the copy, or the accuracy of the information conveyed from the copy, so far as I have been able to glean up to the present moment, has never been impugned. The noble Earl made it sufficiently clear, I think, that the Agreement gives the power to these neutrals to transmit goods to the enemy, and therefore I will not trouble your Lordships, as I had intended, by reading the paragraphs in the Agreement that make that abundantly clear.

There is another point that has been touched upon in another place and again here to-night—namely, as to the responsibility of the Foreign Office for this document. It would, of course, be an extraordinarily serious thing were the Foreign Office permitted to usurp the functions of Government and enter into arrangements of this kind with possibly far-reaching consequences. And in this connection—I do so in no hostile sense—I quote appositely, I think, certain words used by Sir Edward Grey that were published in a Report made by the German Ambassador who was here in this country when war broke out. On his return to Berlin Prince Lichnowsky gave an account of his last interview with our Foreign Secretary. Sir Edward Grey, I believe, sent for him and gave, or was reported to have given, reasons why we found it incumbent on ourselves to enter the war. But the words that have a bearing on this situation, assuming that the Foreign Office is and has been usurping the functions of Government, are these. He is said to have told Prince Lichnowsky that he was "remote from every idea to crush Germany." Those words have been credited to Sir Edward Grey. If they represent his views then and now, that might be some key to the negotiation of an Agreement of this kind, because it is certain that as long as arrangements of this kind are permitted we shall never succeed in crushing Germany in the way we hope to do by bringing to bear the weight of our Fleet against her by blockade.

I wish to put two questions. One has been referred to by the noble Earl. First I should like to ask, What is the consideration for this Agreement? Governments, like individuals, do not make great concessions of this kind unless they are going to receive some consideration. Here, again, rumour is busy. Rumour says that the consideration is this, that we are seeking certain things from Germany that we find it difficult to get along without, and that this is to be the consideration. I should doubt it, but that is what rumour says; and it is well that the noble Marquess should be made aware of the rumour and that he should, if possible, have the opportunity of giving his views as to its accuracy. If that were true it would, of course, be a shocking condition of affairs. It would be simply this—that in return for services rendered, instead of maintaining the Order in Council and preventing commodities of any kind entering into or leaving Germany, we should be aiding and abetting to the contrary. That is an unthinkable situation. But if you will give us the Agreement you will not be subject to suspicion; we shall have the facts in front of us. I am only pointing out the evils and the price you are paying for your concealment.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (THE EARL OF SELBORNE)

The noble Lord tells us that he has read the document itself. He must know that is not in it.

LORD DEVONPORT

What is not in it?

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

The consideration from Germany.

LORD DEVONPORT

I did not suppose it was. It would be a very funny document if it contained the consideration. I think that is a very poor point to make. Of course, the consideration would not be stated in the document. I never suggested it was.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

Then your observation about laying the document on the Table is not to the point.

LORD DEVONPORT

If the noble Earl will persuade his colleagues to produce the document there will be no room for any controversy. I hope that even now at the eleventh hour we may persuade them to do so. The second question I want to ask is as to whether this Agreement constituted a preference to Denmark. The noble Earl opposite has dealt with this point. The lot of a neutral is not a happy one, especially when one of the belligerents happens to be the greatest naval Power. His trade is hampered and interfered with, but to that, of course, he has to submit. But the law of nations lays down clearly and unmistakably that in the treatment of neutrals there shall be uniformity and no preference, and if any such preference could be shown it would have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, it might bring you into conflict with one or another of the neutrals. It might bring you into conflict with the United States, if it could be proved—and have heard from Americans over here that the point is already engaging their attention—that you were giving one of the neutrals a preference. In the first place they would treat with contempt your Order in Council; they would defy you, and, what is more, they would be justified in defying you because you would be acting contrary to the law of nations.

I claim that we are entitled to be made aware of the terms of this Agreement. I believe that there are other Agreements subsisting with other neutrals. Some are in course of arrangement or consideration. If that is so, it is incumbent on the Government to let us know the situation, not only in relation to Denmark itself, but also in regard to any Agreements that may have come into existence that we know nothing about. I am perfectly certain that we are discharging a public duty of the highest importance when we enter our protest against any policy of secrecy in matters of this kind. I am sorry if I have said anything to offend the susceptibilities of any member of the Government. If I have I cannot help it, because I feel that it is only right and proper that this matter should be made public.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, the questions which have been put by the two noble Lords opposite are intended, and they do not dissemble the fact, to compel His Majesty's Government to produce and make public the Agreement which has lately been entered into between this country and two great Danish trading associations. The question of making public this Agreement has, as the noble Lords opposite are well aware, been more than once raised, And upon each occasion it has been stated clearly and explicitly that we did not think it desirable in the public interest that the Agreement should be published. To that conclusion we adhere, and much as I regret to disappoint the two noble Lords I am bound to tell them that we are not prepared to meet their wishes in this respect. Nor are we prepared by making admissions or contradictions in regard to particular provisions which may or may not be within the compass of the Agreement virtually to give away its contents to the two noble Lords. I am asked why we are so secretive, considering the fact that the contents of this Agreement, or what purport to be the contents of this Agreement, have been frequently quoted in public discussions. Indeed, an attempt has been made to quote them in this House to-night.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I beg the noble Marquess's pardon. I did not make au attempt—I did quote them.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

lf the noble Earl wants to have it that way, by all means.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I Prefer it that way.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

What I say to the noble Earl is that I am not prepared to admit that the fragmentary citations which he gave afford at all a sufficient or complete account of the contents of the Agreement. Nor do we intend by these citations to have our hands forced into the production of an authoritative account of the Agreement itself. Let me assure the House that when we refuse this information it is not from any desire to shield ourselves. Suggestions have been made in the course of this debate which, apparently, go to show that we have sacrificed the interests of this country, and that because we know we have done so we are unwilling to confess to what we have done. I can only tell your Lordships, and I am sure you will not doubt my sincerity, that in my belief this Agreement is a good Agreement for this country, and that it will help us, and not interfere with us, in carrying this war to a successful conclusion.

But we have a great deal more than our own reputations to think of in this matter. Let me mention very briefly one or two other considerations which seem to me to be entitled to weight when we come to discuss whether this Agreement should be published or not. It is an Agreement between this country, and some great trading corporations in Denmark which I think we were told a moment ago represent the whole of the commercial interests of that country. There are several different interests to be taken into account. We have to think of the effect upon the enemy of the publication of the whole of this arrangement. We have to think of the effect that will be produced upon the country with which we have made it. We have to consider the effect upon other neutral countries; and last, but not least, we have to think of the effect upon our own interests.

As regards the enemy, I suggest to your Lordships that as the primary object of this Agreement is to prevent goods from passing to the enemy through neutral channels, it is, on the face of it, not desirable that we should proclaim upon the house-tops what steps we are taking for that purpose. In regard to Denmark, it has to be borne in mind that she is—you have only to look at the map to realise the fact—in a position which exposes her very much to pressure from Germany. It seems to me that we should be likely to increase the prospect of that pressure if we were to reveal the whole of the details of the arrangement which we have entered into with the Danish traders. At any rate, I do not think we ought to make this arrangement known unless we have reason to believe that it would be agreeable to the Danish Government that we should do so. Then there is the case of the other neutrals. This is not the only Agreement into which we have entered. There is the Agreement with the Netherlands Oversea Trust, there is a Swiss Agreement and there are other minor Agreements with groups of traders in different countries. None of these have been published, and if we were to publish this Agreement it would be impossible for us to refuse a demand that the whole of the Agreements should be made public. In addition to that, we have to consider this point. It is part of our policy to enter into Agreements of this kind. Would it make it easier or more difficult for us to make advantageous Agreements with other neutrals if the whole of the terms of the existing Agreements were already public property? I do not believe it would make it easier. I think the noble Lord, Lord Devonport, suggested a moment ago that it would be a very desirable thing if the public in this country were placed in a position which would enable it to control negotiations of this kind. I venture to differ wholly from that.

LORD DEVONPORT

I must contradict that. I said nothing of the kind. I was speaking only about the Agreements being made public. I never suggested that the public should control negotiations.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

I thought the noble Lord referred to the desirability of the public having some knowledge of negotiations of this kind, presumably in order that the public might influence their course.

LORD DEVONPORT

Yes; knowledge when the deed is done. That is not controlling negotiations. That is quite a different matter.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

If I misheard the noble Lord, I regret it. I pass to another complaint that was made by, I think, all three speakers who have addressed us. It was suggested that this Agreement involved something like discrimination in favour of Denmark as against other neutral Powers; and Lord Devon-port told the House, quite correctly, that it is part of the acknowledged law of blockade that the blockade should be effectual and of general operation. I do not admit that this Agreement or any of the Agreements into which we have entered can be properly described as involving discrimination in favour of the countries concerned. The object of these Agreements—and this cannot be too distinctly known—is to provide that our blockade policy should be as efficient as possible and should work as smoothly as possible in regard to all those whom it affects. If it comes to the charge of discrimination, I am certainly prepared to say that we are ready to enter into corresponding Agreements with other neutrals if they so desire it. Of course in these matters there must be a certain amount of elasticity, and whatever Agreements are entered into must have some regard to the conditions of the country with which you are dealing, its geographical situation and its commercial status.

Let me point out to the noble Lord on the Back Bench (Lord Devonport) where his theory that there must be uniformity would lead him. I understand him to contend that. we ought not to make an Agreement with one neutral unless we made Agreements with all the neutrals, and that all the Agreements must be run in exactly the same mould. That seems to me to be an absolutely absurd position for us to take up; and I, for one, put altogether on one side the complaint that there is anything that could be properly called discrimination in the Agreements into which we have entered.

Although I am unable to say anything as to the contents of this Danish Agreement, I should like to say a few words on the general question of policy involved in arrangements of this kind. Your Lordships have been told this evening that because we have entered into these arrangements with Denmark and with other neutral Powers we have therefore undone to that extent whatever good was achieved by the Order in Council of March 11 of this year; and noble Lords have brought up in support of that charge the memorable announcement of the Prime Minister that it was the intention of this country as a measure of retaliation for the conduct of our enemies to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. Let me in the first place say that nothing in this Agreement touches in any way our belligerent rights of search and capture. That, I think, is an important point. The noble Earl (Lord Portsmouth) quoted, and evidently was pleased with his quotation, the passage in the Prime Minister's speech in which my right hon. friend went on to point out that these severe measures which we were about to adopt must inevitably occasion inconvenience to neutral traders. That, of course, is obvious. You cannot take measures of this kind without inconvenience to neutrals. But the Prime Minister was very far from adding to his announcement words to the effect that in the pursuit of our object we should not shrink from subjecting neutral countries, however friendly and however blameless, to any amount of suffering and inconvenience.

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

I did not say that.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

No; I am saying that the noble Earl argued as if our pledge committed us to pursuing the objects of our blockade—

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

indicated dissent.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

That really was the argument of the noble Earl, although he shakes his head. What we have said throughout was that it was our desire to minimise the amount of inconvenience occasioned to neutral Powers, and that subject to the efficient conduct of our blockade operations we should endeavour to mitigate their effect so far as neutral traders were concerned. I should like to put it to the noble Earl, Is that really an unreasonable policy for this country to pursue? We put in the first place the maintenance of an efficient blockade, and, subject to that, we put the minimisation of inconvenience to neutrals. I suggest to the noble Earl that this is a policy which is demanded from us by considerations of common fairness and justice, and not only by those considerations but by considerations of our own self-interest. I cannot conceive anything more unfortunate for this country than at a moment when we have the whole of the forces of our enemies arrayed against us we should also be confronted by the resentment and ill-will of the whole of the neutral Powers.

Assuming that that is our policy—the two-fold policy of carrying out our blockade and avoiding needless inconvenience to neutrals—it seems to me that the policy which we have adopted in regard to these Agreements is by far the most hopeful mode of giving effect to our own principles. What are the bases of that policy? In the first place, we have endeavoured to arrive, in consultation with the neutrals concerned, at an understanding as to the amount of the different commodities required by those neutrals for their own normal and legitimate consumption. We have endeavoured to arrive at an understanding that when that amount is exceeded it should be admitted that there arises at once a presumption that the excess goods imported are for enemy destination. In the next place, as machinery for carrying out this policy, we have endeavoured to provide for the establishment in the neutral country concerned of a competent body ready to assume responsibility for recording the amount of the goods passing into the country, for receiving those goods, and for seeing to their proper distribution. These arrangements may, it is true, not be perfectly watertight. I do not think that you will devise any arrangements which will not leave some opportunities for the defeat of your precautions. But I believe that arrangements on these lines are the best arrangements possible in view of the extreme difficulty of the case with which we have to deal.

I would like your Lordships to consider what would be likely to happen if no such arrangements as these were to be made with the neutral countries concerned. I go so far as to say that in the case of a country situated as Denmark is, in close propinquity to the country of our enemies, unless you have some arrangement of that kind you will find that you are helpless to prevent great quantities of supplies from passing through neutral channels into the hands of your enemies. The temptation to carry on business of this kind is enormous. There are vast profits to be made. There is corruption on every side. The noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite (Lord Strachie) spoke of what we expected from our Fleet in the way of preventing supplies passing to our enemies. My Lords, your Fleet may be never so powerful but it will not be able to prevent goods passing through what I may call the back doors through which our enemies obtain most of the things they require. Unless you can obtain a working arrangement with the neutral country itself, an arrangement which that country will respect and which it will endeavour to carry out to the best of its powers, I believe you will be helpless to prevent the passage of almost unlimited quantities of supplies to Your enemies. And let it be remembered that unless you set up some responsible body of this kind in the neutral country to conduct the business for you the mere fixation of a limit representing the normal consumption of certain classes of commodities by the neutral Power will not help you in the least.

Look what happens. You hold up ships carrying cargo which you suspect is going to the enemy. You may find that you have let through an amount of a particular commodity representing the full limit to which the neutral country is entitled for its own consumption. But if, as time goes on, you find more cargoes coming in and the papers of the ships which carry them are in order and there is no proof of enemy destination, you are absolutely helpless, and you have really to acquiesce and see all these supplies passing through, in spite of your precautions. These difficulties, I will not say disappear entirely, but are very much diminished if you have, as we have in the case of the Danish Agreement and in the case of the Netherlands Agreement, a competent body which is able to issue the necessary certificates, to keep proper records, to see to the distribution of the commodities, and, when the limit has been reached, to place on record the fact that it has been reached, and that the time has come when anything in excess of that limit may be regarded by common consent as being destined for the enemy. The procedure is I will not say simple, but it is simpler than any other; and it has this great advantage, that it obviates those delays and uncertainties which are beyond all else galling and irksome to the neutral traders.

There is one other point about which I wish to say a word. Various observations have been made as to the paternity of this Agreement. It has been suggested that the Cabinet had nothing to say to it, that it was the offspring of the misdirected ingenuity of a single Foreign Office official; and it was pointed out that when the matter came up for discussion in the House of Commons it was Lord Robert Cecil, and not Sir Edward Grey, who dealt with it. My Lords, all these ingenious theories rest upon a very unsubstantial foundation. The policy of this Agreement is the policy of His Majesty's Government, and it has been within their cognisance and under their consideration for many months past. It is true that the application of the policy and the details of the arrangements under which the policy is carried out must necessarily be dealt with by the Departments concerned. The business of the Government could "not be carried on if all matters of this kind were dealt with by the Head of the Department himself. But let me say, and I say it emphatically, that the policy is not the policy of any one Department; it is the policy of His Majesty's Government as a whole, and we assume the fullest responsibility for it.

The noble Lord who spoke first (Lord Strachie) referred to the announcement made by the Prime Minister last night to the effect that a statement dealing with our policy in regard to these questions was being prepared and would be shortly laid. I understood him to say that this would not be satisfactory. Perhaps he had better wait until he sees it. But I think he will be disappointed if he expects to find in it an authorised version of the Danish Agreement. I can hold out no hope of that. And for the reasons which I have tried to give to the House, I must resist the Motion for Papers with which the noble Earl who spoke second concluded his speech.

LORD SYDENHAM

My Lords, this question is a very grave and difficult one. It is a national question; it could almost be called an international question, as every one of the Allies is interested in it. I think there are a number of noble Lords who would like to speak on this subject, especially after hearing the weighty speech of the noble Marquess. I therefore move that the debate be adjourned until Tuesday next, if that day would be convenient to His Majesty's Government.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

As there is a great deal of business before the House in the early days of next week, I venture to suggest that it would be better that we take the adjourned debate on Monday.

Moved, That the debate be adjourned until Monday next, December 20.—(Lord Sydenham.)

On Question, the further debate adjourned to Monday next.