Lords Sitting of 20 April 1915

INDIA (IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS).
His MAJESTY'S Answer to the Address of the 16th of March last, delivered by the Lord Chamberlain (L. Sandhurst), and read as follows, viz.:—
"I have received your Address against the Draft Proclamation creating an Executive Council for the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, which was laid before your House on the 2nd of February last.
"In accordance with your prayer I will direct that no further proceedings shall be taken on the Draft Proclamation, without prejudice to the making of a new draft."
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with:
Blyth Harbour.
Also the Certificate that the Standing Orders have not been complied with in respect of the Petition for additional Provision in the following Bill:
London County Council (General Powers).
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.
WARWICK GAS BILL, [H.L.]
ORMSKTRK GAS AND ELECTRICITY BILL. [H.L.]
SALOP COUNTY COUNCIL BILL, [H.L.]
FALMOUTH DOCKS BILL, [H.L.]
BRIGHTON AND HOVE GAS BILL, [H.L.]
Reported, with Amendments.

SHEFFIELD CORPORATION (TRAMWAYS) BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from, the Select Committee, with Amendments.

ROTHERHAM CORPORATION BILL, [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
HALIFAX CORPORATION BILL, [H.L.]
ABERDARE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL (TRAMWAYS, &c.) BILL, [H.L.]
EASTERN VALLEYS (MONMOUTHSHIRE) JOINT SEWERAGE BOARD BILL, [H.L.]
PLYMOUTH CORPORATION BILL, [H.L.]
ASHINGTON URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL, [H.L.]
STALYBRIDGE, HYDE, MOSSLEY AND DUKINFIELD TRAMWAYS AND ELECTRICITY BOARD BILL, [H.L.]
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord Newton and the Lord Blyth be proposed to the House as Members of the Select Committee on the said Bills in the place of the Marquess of Bath and the Earl Cathcart and that the Lord Newton be Chairman of the said Committee; read, and agreed to.

SPENNYMOOR AND TUDHOE GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
ASCOT DISTRICT GAS AND ELECTRICITY BILL.
DONCASTER CORPORATION BILL.
GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY BILL.
LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAIL-WAY BILL.
METROPOLITAN DISTRICT RAILWAY BILL.
STREATLEY AND GORING BRIDGE BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read la, and referred to the Examiners.

YORKSHIRE ELECTRIC POWER BILL. [H.L.]
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord Weardale be proposed to the House as a Member of the Select Committee on the said Bill in the place of the Earl of Essex; read, and agreed to.
BEAMISH'S DIVORCE BILL, [H.L.]
  DENNY'S DIVORCE BILL, [H.L.]
  Message from the Commons for copies of the Minutes of Evidence taken before this House, together with the proceedings and the documents deposited in the cases: Ordered to be communicated with a request that they may be returned.
HOUSE OF LORDS REFRESHMENT ROOMS.
Message to the Commons for leave for the Right Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Amelius Lockwood, C.V.O. (a Member), to attend to be examined as a witness before the Select Committee.

OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL MARINES.
LORD LATYMER LORD LATYMER had on the Paper a Notice to move for a Return of the number and rank of—

(1) Naval officers attached to the Land Expeditionary Force.

(2) Efficient officers of the Royal Marines at present unemployed.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the two parts of the Motion standing in my name are very closely connected, as any one who knows the history of the Royal Marines will be aware; but as I have reason for thinking that my Motion in its present double form is not likely to be accepted by the Government, I wish to withdraw the first part relating to naval officers attached to the Land Expeditionary Force and merely to ask for a Return of the number and rank of efficient officers of the Royal Marines at present unemployed. Hints are constantly being thrown out that in these difficult times any questions relating to military or naval affairs, and I suppose to Royal Marine affairs, are out of place. I cannot, however, agree with that doctrine in the present instance. I am not asking for the names of Marine officers who are unemployed, but merely for their number and rank. Not only is it in my opinion harmless, but I am bound to say I think it is decidedly to the public benefit, that this question should be answered; and I cannot see that I am in any way embarrassing the Admiralty in asking for information which it cannot possibly take five minutes to find out..
It is common knowledge to us all that at the present time as many efficient officers are required as can possibly be obtained. Therefore it does seem on the face of it an extraordinary thing that a body of highly trained and physically fit men who are available to serve their country and who are of high rank in their own particular line of service should be apparently left without any work to do at all, unless it be an inferior place in a wireless telegraph station or recruiting office, or some inferior post of that kind. As far as my information goes—and it is fairly authentic—there are about thirty of these men who, as I am told, are "efficient." That, I suppose, means that they have gone through all the necessary military training and experience and are also physically able to perform service if they were required.
In one respect it does not signify very much whether this Motion is received or
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not, because if the Government will not give any information on the subject one must draw one's own conclusion. It is impossible to imagine that these men are kept in the background because of any inefficiency on their part. Therefore there must be other reasons for the Admiralty not recommending them for military service. I will not venture to enter into what those reasons may be, but I am quite sure they will be present to the minds of all noble Lords who are conversant with the history of the Marines and the relation between the Admiralty and the Marines for the last hundred years. To put this Motion is really for the public benefit. I say so because officers are most certainly required at the present time. Why should the public have been put to the expense of having these men highly trained for many years past if at the end of all that expense they are to be left on the shelf with nothing to do? I acknowledge at once that if my Motion as amended is accepted the next step will be to ask why these officers have been left in this position of idleness. On the other hand, if the Admiralty do not wish to give any answer to this question noble Lords will no doubt take for granted that they do not wish to give the reasons. I beg to move.
Moved, That there be laid before the House a Return of the number and rank of efficient officers of the Royal Marines at present unemployed.—(Lord Latymer.)
THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (LORD EMMOTT): My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for not pressing for the information which he desired to obtain under heading No. (1) of the Motion which stands on the Paper, but I am sorry that I cannot meet him even on the question of the Return which he asks for under the heading of "Efficient officers of the Royal Marines at present unemployed." The noble Lord has expressed the opinion that it would be for the public benefit that this information should be given, but I am bound to tell him and the House that in the opinion of the Admiralty such details cannot be given at the present time with any public advantage. As the Motion stands on the Paper, I do not know exactly how it could be given effect to. For I do not know precisely what "efficient" means. But even if I could agree with the noble Lord that "efficient" means properly trained men and men who are physically fit, even if we could agree on some definition still

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I fear the Return could not be granted. The noble Lord has spoken of the history of the Royal Marines during the last hundred years. So far as this is an old complaint, I think it can well stand over until after the war. So far, however, as the complaint which the noble Lord makes refers specially to this war, to give the numbers as lie now asks us to do without the names would, I think, be of no use; and to give the names for public use and in a form which would possibly lead to public discussion of a most undesirable kind would be very unwise. This much and this mach only I can say to the noble Lord. If he has any cases of individual hardship which he thinks require reconsideration, I promise on behalf of my right lion friend the First Lord of the Admiralty that they shall be inquired into. Otherwise I must beg of him to leave this matter at ally rate until the war is over, for during the war the Admiralty cannot see its way to grant this Return.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, I have no knowledge of the facts of this ease, but what I understand the noble Lord alleges is that there are efficient officers of the Royal Marines who are at the present moment unemployed. By "efficient" he means officers who are physically efficient, because if they were not otherwise efficient they would not still be in the Royal Marines. He may be completely in error. There may be no such officers. But if there are it seems to me a most astonishing fact, when we remember that in the Army not only is every officer who in a similar sense may be called efficient employed, but every officer is utilised who has retired within the last twenty years and has had the patriotism to come forward. Moreover, in important commands— those of battalions and brigades—officers are employed who have never been in the Army itself and who can only be described as zealous amateurs. Therefore I throw out as a suggestion that if there are Marine officers who are at present unemployed or not doing service in positions corresponding to their rank, the Admiralty might apply to the War Office and the War Office might be very glad to employ them.
LORD LATYMER: I intended to include in the term "efficient" not only those Marine officers at present actively connected with the Royal Marines but also those who are on the Reserve or retired.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

SECONDARY THEATRES OF THE WAR.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I rise to ask the Lord Privy Seal whether he can give the House any information as to the recent fighting or present position of affairs—

(1) At the head of the Persian Gulf.

(2) In East Africa.

(3) In the Nyassaland Protectorate.

(4) In the Cameroons.

I have put down this Question in order to enable His Majesty's Government to give what I think your Lordships will all agree is very much needed information upon what is passing in the secondary theatres of war. In this country our attention is almost entirely and naturally concentrated upon what is happening on the battlefields of Flanders and France, and about them we hear a good deal, if not as much as we might desire. But the Forces of the Crown are engaged at the present moment in no fewer than seven other areas of war, and about those secondary scenes of action I would submit two propositions to your Lordships. The first is that the men who are there engaged in fighting, and, very likely, in laying down their lives, are engaged in a public service not less important, not less patriotic, and not less serviceable to the Empire as a whole, than that which is being performed by our troops on the other side of the Channel. The second proposition is that the parents, relatives, and friends of the soldiers to whom I refer are just as much entitled as any of us who have friends across the Channel to hear something of what is happening to those who are dear to them, and to be informed about the general progress of events.
I allude more specifically to parents and relatives, because since I put a Question on a subject similar to this in the month of January last I have received weekly, literally almost daily, letters of inquiry from persons in the British Isles in that position. I have received no fewer than three since I entered the House five minutes ago. All of these correspondents complain bitterly of the degree of secrecy— as they think, the needless secrecy—which has been observed about these operations. They ask for some news about the progress of events, and—although this is a minor point, to which I shall come presently, it is not without importance—

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about the fate and fortunes of their own relatives and friends. I need hardly say that none of these people plead for publicity with any idea of selfish or vainglorious advertisement of their relations and friends. That is the last thing that enters into their minds. What they do ask is that in their private and domestic interests, and even more in the public interest, the veil of impenetrable darkness which has been allowed to close down round these secondary theatres of war should be raised. For my part I am at a loss to understand why this should not be done.
In France, where I spent last week at the Front, I found an absolutely universal sentiment from the Commander-in-Chief at the top down to the humblest private—and I had an opportunity of talking to a good many—that a wholly unnecessary degree of mystery and secrecy is being observed. You have only to look at the newspapers in this country—and here I would say that the expressions in the newspapers that ordinarily support noble Lords opposite are much stronger than they are in the newspapers which represent the views of noble Lords on this side of the House—to see that a sentiment is growing up of annoyance and irritation, I think I might almost use the word exasperatinn, which must seriously react upon the strength of the position of the Government—which every one of us desires to maintain to the uttermost—and which must further react upon the confidence and the feelings of the population at large. No one asks, or ever has asked since the beginning of the war, that anything should be said by Ministers in public about plans or preparations in advance. What we do ask is that some record should be given, prompt and candid, about performance when it has taken place. Such a record can do nobody any harm; and it would, from all that I have heard, do our own Forces and our own people untold good.
And if these considerations apply to the main theatre of war in Europe, I submit that they apply with much greater force to these subsidiary and distant areas of operations. For this reason, that although military pleas may be and often are alleged with regard to the war on the Continent, it is difficult to conceive that the kind of information which could be given here at
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this great distance could be of any service to our enemies in the parts of the world to which I refer. Yet, my Lords, about what is going on in these four scenes of action—with the exception of the Persian Gulf, about which the noble Marquess has been rather less chary of information during the last few days—we know literally nothing. In the month of January last I did elicit something in reply to a Question which I put to the noble Marquess; and a little later the Secretary of State for the Colonies made a speech to some gathering in London in which, in picturesque and dramatic language, he described his table as almost groaning under the weight of telegrams pouring in to him night and day from all parts of the world and recording the brilliant achievements of our arms. But unfortunately those telegrams never seem to get beyond the precincts of the Colonial Office.
What I am here to ask the Government to-day is this, Is there any reason why the public, to whom you are appealing so constantly for support—a support which I believe they are only too ready to give—should not be allowed to some extent to share the knowledge which Ministers obviously possess? I believe for my own part that the best method of bringing home to our people the magnitude of the effort in which they are engaged—still, as I believe, largely unrealised in many parts of the country—and the tremendous extent, which I cannot exaggerate, of the sacrifices which they will still be called upon to bear, is to give them information. We have been told on the highest authority in the past few weeks that the great needs of the Army—and it is obvious—are munitions and men. I do not, of course, say anything so extravagant as that information would be a substitute for either; but you may be sure of this, that you will inspirit your men, and you will enable them to use the munitions which you provide for them with much greater advantage if they feel that some knowledge of their endurance and achievements is possessed by their fellow-countrymen at home.
I need refer but very briefly to the particular areas mentioned in my Question. I will deal first with the Continent of Africa. The first region that I have named is East Africa. It is, I believe, common knowledge that at the outbreak of war in that part

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of the world the German Forces were, in point of equipment, numbers, and efficiency, organised for war in a manner totally exceeding anything we could put in the field against them. The war took us by surprise, but it did not take them by surprise. Our Forces were inadequate in numbers and deficient in arms and equipment; and, as the noble Marquess told us towards the end of last year, there were at the opening of the campaign incidents—notably at a Fort named Tanga—which reflected very little credit upon our arms, and which lent great spirit and encouragement to the enemy.
I said just now that among the letters that I have received were complaints, not only of the withholding of information on a large scale but of information with regard to individuals; and your Lordships will readily concede that nothing can be more distressing to personal sentiment than to lose your son, your brother, or other relative, and for months to be told nothing whatever about it. I have in my hand a letter which reached me since I came into the House to-day from a gentleman unknown to me, and it contains these words with reference to the engagement at Tanga, which took place as far ago as November 4 last—
"I am the brother of an officer who was killed at Tanga, in German East Africa. We have received no official information abut him, except that he was killed in action on that date."
And a little later on—
"I know the wife of another officer who was killed the same afternoon, and she has received no official information at all."
Since those incidents in November we have heard from time to time, from letters that have appeared in the newspapers and from friends of our own, that fighting has been going on in German East Africa over a very wide area. Numerous engagements have taken place. But whether at the present moment our Forces there are on the defensive or on the offensive, none of us has the slightest idea. Whether the German Colony is still in possession of the Germans; whether they are in occupation of our territory; whether we have turned the tables on them or not, if do not believe any man in this House knows. Indeed, from information which I have received—the whole of which I am not going to lay before your Lordships—I have reason to think that the position is one which, from the point of view of
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the armament and equipment of our Forces in that country, is far from being free from considerable anxiety.
The same remarks apply to the smaller but not unimportant area, a little further south, of the Nyassaland Protectorate. There I believe the position was complicated at an early date in the war by a native rising. I had some information to that effect. There has, I believe, been fierce fighting in that country. What is the present position of affairs? Whether we have got the better of the enemy, I have no knowledge. This, again, is a point about which we shall be grateful for such information as the noble Marquess can give us.
I pass to the Cameroons. The noble Marquess told us, in January last, that in that part of Africa British and French troops were acting in co-operation, and he mentioned the name of the British commander who is in control of our Forces. Since then, so far as I know, there has been not a word, not a piece of information. The Cameroons are very difficult country. It is a mountainous area rising to a great height in the interior above the sea. The hills are clothed with jungle, affording opportunity for offensive positions of great strength, which can only be taken with considerable sacrifice of life. We know that a number of columns started from different parts of the coast to make their way into the interior, and I have seen a letter which indicated that the Germans in the Cameroons are pursuing there the same barbarous and detestable methods of warfare with which we are too painfully familiar in Europe. What has happened to those columns since they left the coast and vanished into the interior I know not. Here again I ask for information.
The last area to which I refer is the head of the Persian Gulf; and here, as I remarked just now, we may be grateful to the noble Marquess for having given us rather more information than we have received about the other secondary theatres of war. During the last week he has published in the newspapers two long and important telegrams showing that there have been engagements on a very large scale in that part of the world, in which our Indian Forces appear to have comported themselves with great gallantry and to have achieved substantial results, although ap-

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parently with a loss of not fewer than 700 casualties. My Lords, so far so good. But I confess, from a fairly intimate knowledge of these regions, that I am not altogether reassured by the nature of the information which we have been given. It is clear from these accounts that the power of the Turks to assume the offensive in that region is very considerable, and is as yet unimpaired. They appear to have at their disposition very large numbers of forces plentifully supplied with the most modern implements of war. Further—and this is a point which I put before the noble Marquess rather with a view of drawing his attention to its extreme importance than of eliciting information—they appear to have succeeded in impressing into their service the greater part of the Arab tribes in the lower parts of Mesopotamia. I confess that that is to me a phenomenon of considerable significance, and one that causes me great surprise. We have always maintained, and I had thought were still maintaining, very friendly relations with the Arab tribes in that part of the world, and the spectacle of the Arabs in their thousands fighting side by side with the Turks against us is one that calls for the closest investigation. There are methods of dealing with the situation that I, perhaps, should be unwise to refer to in public, which are doubtless known to the noble Marquess, and which perhaps he will allow me to have a few words with him about in private on some future occasion.
Further, I wonder whether your Lordships realise that in that part of the world Persian neutrality has been shamelessly violated, that one of the scenes of active warfare is in Persian territory, on the Upper Karun, and that the pipe line conveying the oil down to the estuary, under the scheme which was started by His Majesty's present advisers, was cut at an early stage of the operations, and of course since then has been of no use whatsoever. I think that the facts which I have placed before your Lordships give reason for asking for sonic rather more detailed information from the noble Marquess. I believe he has—in fact, I think he told us so—very wisely taken the step of considerably reinforcing the Indian troops at the head of the Gulf, but I should like to have some kind of assurance, if it be possible to give it, that our Forces there will not be confined
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to merely defensive operations in the heat of the Mesopotamian summer, which I can assure your Lordships is a very arduous and painful experience, but that their position, if it has not already, will be rendered sufficiently strong to enable them to make their strength effectively felt and, if the need arise, make an advance.
Reverting to the remarks with which I began, I would only add this. I hardly think that it ought to be left to a private Member of Parliament, whether of this or of the other House, to elicit information upon points of such general interest and importance as these by question and answer in either House of Parliament. In my opinion the information ought to conic spontaneously without pressure from His Majesty's Government. There is some evidence during the last few days that a corner of the curtain is being raised on the operations that are taking place in Europe. Doubtless the arguments which have been used have had effect with His Majesty's Government. And with reference to these other parts of the world I would similarly plead for more information, more confidence, less mystery, and less reserve. I beg to put the Question standing in my name.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE Eon INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, the noble Earl prefaced his Question by some observations of a general character on the information supplied to the public with regard to these various scenes of military operations, and he concluded his speech by some further references to the same subject. I will endeavour to reply to the general questions raised by the noble Earl, and I will also say something on the subject of the Persian Gulf, which falls within the Department with which I am connected. The other topics mentioned by the noble Earl come under the control of the War Office, which now undertakes the military operations in all parts of Africa except, of course, those in which the Cape Government is engaged. Therefore my noble friend Lord Lucas, who represents the War Office here, will make some remarks upon them in reply to the noble Earl.
This general question of information is one which I know has excited not a little

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public interest, and the noble Earl has more than once called attention to it. On a former occasion I think he mentioned the hardship which was inflicted upon the relatives of soldiers, particularly of soldiers who lost their lives, in not receiving more official information on the subject; but so far as these particular theatres of war are concerned they are, I take it, in this respect in precisely the same position as the relatives of those who are engaged at the Front in Europe. When an officer unhappily loses his life care is taken that the fact should not be published in any casualty list until the relatives have been informed. They receive a telegram; they also, I believe, receive an expression of sympathy from His Majesty and one from the Secretary of State for War. But so far as I know that is all they ever hear officially, and that, I believe, has been the practice in all campaigns in all parts of the world. The further information which is so precious to those who are bereaved is obtained from the brother officers or the men who have served in the same unit as the fallen officer, or from the evidence of any eye-witness who happened to be present; but so far as the respective Offices are concerned it has never, I think, been thought to be within their responsibility to supply to the relatives of those who have unhappily fallen the details which, of course, they are most anxious to hear. So far as the India Office is concerned and the particular instances of individuals such as the noble Earl calls attention to, and who, I suppose, appeal to him owing to his former high official connection with that country, I can only say that in no case do we know any more at the India Office than we have communicated to the relatives of the officers.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I think the complaint which is made is this—it is not made in the letters to which I have been referring to-day, but my impression is that have heard it made—that the relative of an officer who has fallen is acquainted with the fact in the manner which the noble Marquess describes; that thereupon he or she communicates with the Department of the Government concerned, and asks whether any further information can be given to him or to her; and that at that point information is withheld which would be of so much value to the bereaved relative.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I quite follow the noble Earl's point, but so far as I am aware the information is only withheld because it is not possessed. I can assure the noble Earl that if in our Military Department at the India Office we received any details about the circumstances under which an officer was killed we should certainly communicate them to those relatives who were within reach. The officers in that Department receive a number of visits, very often of a most painful character, from the bereaved relations of officers, and I am certain that those relatives are received with the utmost sympathy, and that every scrap of information which we possess is most cheerfully given to them—even, I have no doubt, in some cases information the character of winch they would be asked not to repeat because it was of the kind which in ordinary circumstances we should not publish. I cannot believe there is a single case in which information of that kind which we have possessed has been withheld from a relation.
On the general question of information, which as I have often admitted seems to me as a civilian meagre in all the various scenes of military operations, there are no doubt a number of people who would say that it was an error not to have allowed newspaper correspondents, even under a certain censorship, to carry on their business as has been the case in past wars. But that has not been the view of the military authorities anywhere, and so far as I know there is no newspaper correspondent even accompanying the Forces in the Persian Gulf; and such newspaper reports of the operations in Europe as have been published have been published under the closest possible restrictions. The noble Earl stated that from knowledge acquired during a recent visit to the Front in Flanders he is under the impression that the military authorities generally—I hope I am not misrepresenting the noble Earl—agreed with him in believing that, while it is obvious that all hints of possible future operations must be carefully withheld, yet there was no reason why prompt and candid— I think those were the epithets which he used— accounts should not be given of past operations. All I can say, from what I know of the opinion of the military authorities, is that they have taken the strongest exception to either prompt or candid accounts being

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given of military operations that have taken place. The general rule, as I understand, that has obtained during this campaign has been that no detailed accounts of any military operation ought to be given until the Despatch of the Commander-in-Chief on the subject—the Despatch covering the particular operation—has been received and published in the London Gazette, and that after that sonic further latitude may exist for the publication of the names of particular military units engaged and in some cases of the services of individual officers and men.
EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: The views that were impressed upon me universally, without a single exception, by officers in the highest command were not identical with those which have been put before us by the noble Marquess. I do not discuss the point as to whether the official account should precede what I may call the journalistic account. In all probability a General officer would be entitled to that, and would lay great stress upon it; but putting that point aside, I found that it was universally held from the highest to the lowest that more publicity and speedier publicity would be better for the Army out there and for the people at home.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I have no means of knowing from what sources the noble Earl derived his information, but from such sources as I have been able to derive information—and the subject is one which has been much discussed by competent persons of all degrees of official importance in the official hierarchy—I have not acquired the impression which the noble Earl has stated. In fact, I cannot help repeating once more that every objection which has been taken to the publication of accounts of military matters has been a purely military objection and has not been advanced, so far as I know, by any civilian in any position in this country. I think it is important to place that on record. And I think that if the noble Earl compares the accounts of events published by our Allies he will find that a very similar rule obtains. I am inclined to believe, at any rate from the study of such French newspapers as I have come across, that the information given to the public in France is somewhat less than that which we receive. I am given to understand that the same holds
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good of Russia. We are not bound to follow the German example in any sense, except in so far as it is wise to learn from an enemy; but I take it there is no doubt that the greatest care is taken in the German Press—those who study it tell me so—to refrain from publishing anything which can throw a light which might possibly be useful, not merely on the coming events of the campaign but upon those which are passed.
I pass to the specific question of the Persian Gulf, with which I told the noble Earl that I would deal. He was good enough to say that I had shown a somewhat more liberal spirit in the supply of information than had been the case with regard to the other secondary operations of the war. I will not attempt to dispute the compliment, because I can tell the noble Earl that in every case in which I have received a telegram describing a military operation which could be of the faintest interest to the public I have given the whole substance of that telegram to the Press at once, and any information that has been withheld has been of a purely personal character which, as the noble Earl knows as well as anybody, sometimes is found in telegrams and communications between different Departments. So far as the military operations in Mesopotamia have been concerned, the noble Earl and the public generally are quite fully informed. There seems to have been some misapprehension in the public mind as to these operations and the purpose for which we ever went to Mesopotamia. If I remember right, the noble Earl was good enough to express his approval of the course which we took in the earlier stages of these operations by limiting our occupation in the first place to Basra and afterwards to Kurna, at the junction of the two rivers, without attempting to advance further in the direction of Baghdad. That, I think, the noble Earl considered at the time the wisest course to take, and everything that has occurred since has, I think, confirmed the correctness of that view. But we have never been under any kind of illusion as to the possibility that the Turks might bring a force of considerable magnitude to attack our positions there. If the House will consider what it is that Turkey has undertaken to do and will consider the force which is at the disposition of the Turkish Government, it will be obvious that such is necessarily the

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case. Turkey sent a considerable force to the Caucasus, and sustained a rebuff there. She sent a considerable force to Syria for the purpose of attacking Egypt, and sustained also a considerable rebuff there, although the fighting was not on the same scale or of so desperate a character as I believe it was in the Caucasus. Turkey has also a considerable force in Turkey in Europe and the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople, but even if all allowance is made for the magnitude of those forces it will be seen that from the whole Turkish Army, which is as the House knows a large one numbering several hundred thousands of men, a considerable balance is left for possible operations in Baghdad and its neighbourhood. Therefore we were never under any kind of delusion on that point. We always expected that sooner or later an attack in considerable or even in great force would be made upon our troops in Mesopotamia, and it was for that reason that we took the opportunity of strengthening them so far as we could both by sparing some men from the really small force now left in India and also some from the force which was left in Egypt, which was none too large in itself for the defence of the Canal and of that country.
Nobody, I am sure, will realise better than the noble Earl, knowing as he does the limitations of the Indian Army and in particular its limitations in the matter of expansion, that it is no light matter for India to send so fine and so considerable a force as it has to Europe; also to send a force for the defence of Egypt; to send a smaller force—a force, speaking generally, of a somewhat less experienced character—to act as a garrison in East Africa; and, in addition, to send this large Army Corps, as it now is, to the Persian Gulf. Therefore when the noble Earl speaks of the possibility of further movements there, which I hope later on it will be possible to make, he will also bear in mind the necessary numerical limitations to which we are subject by the fact that the Indian Forces are being employed in so many parts of the world at this moment. I can heartily bear out what the noble Earl has said about the success of the operations which have recently taken place. They do great credit, I venture to think, both to the commanding officer and to the officers and men of the forces generally. The enemy they had to encounter proved to be well trained, thoroughly understanding the
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art of entrenchment and maintaining themselves with great determination when they were attacked. In several cases they had to be turned out of the trenches at the bayonet's point, not having given way to gun fire and rifle attack; and the whole character of the action, I repeat, reflects great credit on those who were engaged in it.
I have another telegram which I received last night which has not yet been published, of which I can give the substance to the House. The noble Earl will have remarked that these operations are very largely of an amphibious character. A considerable part of the country in which they have been carried on is flooded, and there are, I understand, a number of water channels passing in various directions upon which armed craft of a small kind can be moved, and it is possible, therefore, to institute something in the nature of a naval blockade on a small scale in conjunction with the military operations which one feels must thereby be made specially interesting to conduct. The blockade, Sir John Nixon, the General who is now commanding there, tells me could do nothing on the 16th instant owing to heavy weather, but then they proceeded. A place called Ghubbashiyah was found to be deserted, and the blockade fired some rounds at groups of men and baggage. On the morning of the 18th the blockade—that is to say, these gunboats and armed rafts—observed our Cavalry at Nakhailah, which place had been obviously lately abandoned by the enemy; it is reported to have been very strongly entrenched. It has been found impossible to follow up the enemy by water beyond Ghubbashiyah. And then Sir John Nixon states the orders issued for reconnoitring from the water channels. The General Officer Commanding at Shaiba reports that from personal observation he now estimates the enemy's casualties on the 14th at not less than 2,500. He finds the enemy's trenches so well concealed as to be invisible at from forty yards. Reconnaissance was carried out by water on the 18th from Kurna towards east; there is nothing fresh reported from there or from Ahwaz.
That brings me to the point to which the noble Earl also alluded—the operations which have taken place in the neighbourhood of the Karun River, and in connection with the defence of the oil fields and the

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pipe line. I am very glad that the noble Earl drew attention to a most important point in connection with those operations—that they represent, in fact, an attack by Turkey on Persia; they represent an invasion of Persian territory by a Turkish force. That is a point to which it is desirable that attention should be called. We, of course, have a most direct interest in the oil fields and in the immunity of the pipe line; but the fact remains that it is the neutrality of Persia which is being violated by this attack. The force which is there is, I hope, sufficient not merely completely to repel but to defeat and if necessary to pursue any attack which the Turks can make against Ahwaz and the neighbourhood.
In conclusion, I ought to advert to one point which the noble Earl mentioned—namely, the fact that a considerable number of Arabs have joined with the Turks in these attacks. At the battle of Shaiba, where there were certainly not less than 10,000 Turkish troops engaged, probably not far from something approaching the same number of Arabs took part in the operations; and that, as the noble Earl mentioned, has been a considerable disappointment to many. It was perhaps somewhat too hastily assumed at first that all Arabs would, when Turkey joined the Germans, take the opportunity of breaking the Turkish yoke, and would, therefore, be glad to ally themselves to those who were fighting against Turkey. Of sonic Arabs, particularly of many of the desert tribes, that is no doubt true. It is at any rate partially true in the Yemen, and it is presumably true of the plateau of Nejd, and in many other parts of Arabia proper. How far it applies to the more sedentary Arabs of the cultivator sort who, I take it, supply the Arab forces which are now operating with Turkey, it is not easy to say. It is reasonable to suppose that a considerable number of them have proved willing to join Turkey now because they have had it dinned into their ears that Islam is being attacked. Some of them may even believe the amazing stories that are told about the conversion to Islam of eminent Germans, including the Emperor himself. On the other hand one would think that there must be a considerable number of Arabs, particularly those in the immediate neighbourhood of the Holy places in Mesopotamia, who cannot thus be affected, and who are
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rather keeping their eyes upon Persia than upon Turkey. But the reports that I have received from time to time seem to have pointed at intervals to the existence of considerable dissatisfaction and dissention among the Arabs and between them and the Turks, and I think it may be hoped that as the campaign proceeds and the Turks receive, as I hope they will, some more lessons of the same kind that they have received at Shaiba, there will be less temptation to the Arabs to co-operate with them, and they will perhaps fall away. So far as they are engaged in cultivation, I think it is reasonable to expect that they will desire to return to their lands rather than continue fighting. That is all I have to say about the Persian Gulf. I can assure the noble Earl that we shall continue, as we receive it, to make such news of the operations public as can properly be communicated to the Press.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, before Lord Lucas answers the further interrogations of my noble friend Lord Curzon I should like to ask the noble Marquess who leads the House two specific questions connected with what he has said about the rule which the censorship is instructed to observe, because I take it that the censorship is only acting on rules laid down by the War Office and the Admiralty—that is, by His Majesty's Government. Why has the censorship frequently refused to allow our newspapers to publish extracts from foreign newspapers? There was a notorious case brought forward by the Morning Post in a leading article two days ago. An Italian paper had made certain statements about the operations in the Dardanelles. Those statements, we are now told, were not true. That, however, has nothing to do with it. Those Italian newspapers are at the disposal of the Germans, and there could be no question of concealing news from them. Why should not our papers be allowed to copy extracts from foreign papers even if they are not true? There is no guarantee of authenticity by any such extraction, and it might be said perfectly well that it is published without any guarantee of authenticity. But surely, my Lords, it must be unwholesome to keep the nation in this sort of artificial glasshouse. That is my first question—Under what principle and for what reason is this code of vigilance imposed upon the censorship?

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My second question is, Why are no German newspapers allowed to come into this country? English papers are freely allowed into Germany. You can buy, I believe, The Times, the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail, and many other papers all over Germany. Not only are no German newspapers allowed to be sold in this country, but I understand you are not allowed to bring them even privately into this country. I want to know on what principle has that rule been made. I sincerely trust that there is an exception in the case of the War Office and the Admiralty. I hope that they are allowed to study the German newspapers, and I do not see why we should not be allowed to do so.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, as regards the noble Earl's last question I am certainly not aware that the facts are as he has stated them. We had a debate before the adjournment, the noble Earl will remember, on the subject of the Press Bureau, at which time I made some inquiries as to the manner in which the censorship was conducted. I was then told that no restriction whatever was placed upon the importation into this country of any foreign newspaper, except so far as it might possibly be made the means of carrying on a cipher correspondence between the two countries. As the noble Earl knows, it is not difficult to make a rough and ready cipher out of a newspaper. I was informed that not only were imported newspapers allowed to be received by British subjects without restriction, except for examination for the purpose which I have mentioned, but that they were also allowed to be received by such people of German birth as are not interned in this country and who, for one reason or another, are allowed to be at large. I will certainly, if the noble Earl desires it, inquire what the facts are, but I have no reason to suppose that any alteration has been made since I received that information when we discussed the whole subject at some length in reply to a Question from my noble friend Lord Bryce.
As regards the other question—as to whether it is reasonable to suppress information which an English newspaper desires to copy from a foreign newspaper, whether such information is accurate or not— I have no information. I have not
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heard the point raised before. I can conceive that the reason for taking the course may be this, that no little criticism has been uttered on the censorship for allowing reports, some connected with naval events and some with military events, which reports they knew to be untrue, to go on receiving circulation in the Press. It may be under the fear of criticism of that kind that the censorship have taken action in suppressing accounts from foreign newspapers which they knew to be untrue. I can conceive no other particular reason for doing it; but if the noble Earl desires I will see that the attention of the authorities is called to this point also. I confess I know very little about the censorship or the manner in which it is worked, but I will make inquiry if the noble Earl desires.
THE EARL OF SELBORNE: I shall be very much obliged if the noble Marquess will do so, and if he will also inquire why it is not possible to buy a German newspaper from a Smith's bookstall.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (LORD LUCAS): My Lords, I can give your Lordships the following information on the operations in East Africa, the Nyassaland Protectorate, and the Cameroons. First of all, I will take East Africa. After the unsuccessful attack on Tanga on November 3, 1914, and the simultaneous operation against the German post of Longido, in the district of Kilimandjaro Mountain, it was found necessary temporarily to adopt a defensive attitude along the northern frontier of German East Africa. On November 17 the German outpost of Longido was occupied by the British troops, and is now held by us. Longido is a small post, I might say, about twenty miles into German East Africa and roughly half way between the coast and Lake Victoria Nyanza. Early in December it was found necessary to institute operations against the German forces which had penetrated into our territory along the sea coast north of Tanga and had there established themselves. With the aid of the naval forces on the East Africa Station these operations were successfully carried out, and by the end of the month we had driven the enemy out of British territory and occupied the post of Jassin, about twenty miles within German territory. On January 12 this year a strong German force, with guns and machine

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guns, secretly concentrated against Jassin, and although every effort was made to relieve it I regret to say that the post, after expending all its ammunition, was compelled to surrender. I am glad, however, to report that in these operations the Indian and African troops fought with great gallantry. On January 8 an expedition was sent from Mombasa to occupy the German island of Mafia, situated off the coast of German East Africa. This was successfully accomplished with slight loss. The island has now been placed under British rule. On January 9 a small British force attacked and occupied the German port of Shirati, on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria Nyanza. During December and January steps had been taken to arm the British steamers on Lake Victoria Nyanza, with the result that on March 6 the steamer "Winifred" drove ashore and totally disabled the "Muanza," the only German armed steamer on the lake. I should like to add that the "Muanza" was much more heavily armed than the "Winifred." On March 1 a blockade of the East African coast was declared, and ample steps have been taken to make the blockade thoroughly effective. On March 12 a German raiding party of about 300 men was attacked near Karunga, in the Lake Victoria Nyanza district, by a force of mounted Infantry and King's African Rifles and driven, with considerable loss, over the German border. Latterly, owing to the rainy season, no operations of any magnitude have been undertaken, although there have been several encounters with hostile patrols.
With regard to the operations in the Nyassaland Protectorate, no fighting has taken place between our forces and those of the enemy since the engagements fought at and near Karonga on September 8 and 9 in which the enemy was severely defeated, and reports of which I think your Lordships will remember were published at the time. That has been the only fighting with Germans that has taken place there; but, as the noble Earl who asked the Question said, there was a native rising which was not a very serious affair. It commenced on January 23 and was quickly suppressed. There were a certain number of lives lost, and on the 1st and 2nd of February fairly frill details were published in the Press. On February 3 the ringleader was killed, and that was the end of the rebellion.
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Then as to the Cameroons. In the Northern Cameroon combined British and French forces, operating respectively from Northern Nigeria and the Chad Military Territory, are dealing with German strongholds in the Mandara Hills and on the Benue River. Along the remainder of the Nigeria— Cameroon frontier there are numerous minor encounters, but none of them of any importance. The Allied Expeditionary Force, under General Dobell, which your Lordships are aware effected a landing at Duala, is operating along the two main lines of railway—namely, the Northern Railway, which runs from Bonaberi to Nkongsamba, and the Midland Railway, which runs from Duala, to Eseka. Very considerable losses have been inflicted on the enemy at comparatively small cost in life to the Allied forces, and the operations of the Allied Expeditionary Force are going steadily forward and can be described as extremely successful. From the Ubangi-Shari; Middle Congo, and Gabun territories of French Equatorial Africa, French columns have penetrated into the Cameroon. And besides this a blockade of the coast has been established.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My Lords, my noble friend behind me (Lord Curzon) alluded briefly to the defection of the Arab tribes on the Persian Gulf, and the noble Marquess made some further remarks on the subject which I am sure were listened to with great interest by noble Lords. I do not intend to dwell upon the subject at any length, but I think I may go so far as to say that there is at this moment a good deal of tension in the Mahomedan world and a certain amount of suspicion as to our intentions. Those suspicions are easily accounted for. I do not think that they are so much due to the extraordinary falsehoods propagated by the Germans as to the very natural question when, as is not improbable, the Ottoman Empire crumbles to pieces, What is going to happen to the Caliphate? That is a question that I will not discuss now, but I cannot help thinking that His Majesty's Government might do a great deal to dispel any suspicions there may be as regards our intentions if, in consultation with the best Moslem authorities on the subject, both in India and elsewhere, they would issue a sort of manifesto to explain their views. I am aware that a Proclamation was issued stating that we intended to preserve the sanctity of the Holy Places. But I think

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something rather more than that is required—something done in communication with the Moslem authorities themselves. Perhaps the noble Marquess will consider the question.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, perhaps I might explain, as the noble Earl has introduced this highly interesting subject, that we are taking the views so far as we can of those who are entitled to speak on behalf of the various sections of Moslem opinion. But I am sure the noble Earl will feel that we are right—I think the noble Earl opposite (Lord Curzon) will also agree— in maintaining the attitude that the future of the Caliphate must be a matter for the Moslem world itself. It is not for us, I will not say to attempt to impose a Caliph on the Moslem world, but even to bring about by forcible means a situation which would in practice compel the choice to fall on a particular individual. It is due to the Moslem Faith, which is held by so many of His Majesty's subjects, that for the future of this great office, which, of course, is now exciting the deepest interest in the whole Mahomedan world, there should be a free hand, so far as is possible, for those who hold the Faith to unite upon the selection of a successor to the Prophet.
THE EARL OF CROMER: My previous remarks were to a certain extent inspired by the fact that the rumour got abroad that the present Sultan of Egypt, Prince Hussein, was going to run for the Caliphate. I believe that to be entirely untrue; but Orientals are very suspicious, and I know that the idea did get abroad and did a great deal of harm. I need hardly say how entirely I agree with the noble Marquess
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that the Moslems should decide this question for themselves; but I think we might go so far as to give them some sort of assurance that we recognise that the Caliph should be not only a Moslem but a Moslem of such a position as to be independent of any European pressure of any kind or sort. I think that something of that kind might be considered. Any action taken should be the result of consultation, not only with English authorities who understand the question, but with Moslems themselves. Let me give your Lordships an illustration of what I mean. When Lord Wolseley was in the Sudan he sent me down a Proclamation which it was proposed to issue and which was in brief, terse, Napoleonic sentences, eminently, as he thought, calculated to impress Moslem opinion, and he asked me to have it translated into Arabic. I did so, and then gave the translation to a Moslem friend of mine who was possessed of great political insight. He said that the Arabic was perfect, but at the same time he did not think that a single inhabitant of the Sudan would have the least idea of what Lord Wolseley meant. I then asked him to put in his own language the substance of the document. He did so, and produced a document of remarkable eloquence which read more like a chapter of Isaiah than anything else. I do not, of course, suggest that His Majesty's Government should endeavour to emulate Hebrew prophets, but they might, perhaps, issue a manifesto prepared with Moslem help, and calculated to soothe Moslem opinion. I think in that way it might do good.
House adjourned at Six o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter-past Four o'clock.