Lords Sitting of 15 May 1912

WAKEFIELD GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
RAMSBOTTOM URBAN DISTRICT RAILLESS TRACTION BILL.
Reported, with Amendments.
WOKING DISTRICT GAS BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
RHYMNEY VALLEY SEWERAGE BOARD BILL. [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
TEES CONSERVANCY BILL. [H.L.]
The King's consent signified, and Bill reported, with Amendments.
BARRY RAILWAY BILL.
Read 2a, and committed.
ASHBORNE URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL (GAS) BILL.
Read 2a, and committed: The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
TAVISTOCK URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL.
Read 2a, and committed.
BIRKBECK SHARE AND DEBENTURE TRUST BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
YORK UNITED GAS BILL. [H.L.]
  WANDSWORTH, WIMBLEDON AND EPSOM DISTRICT GAS BILL. [H.L.]
  Moved, That Standing Order No. 143 be suspended, and that the Bills be now read 3a; agreed to: Bills read 3aaccordingly, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
DUBLIN AND SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY BILL.
Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
SIDMOUTH URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL. [H.L.]
Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments: The said Amendments considered, and agreed to.
METROPOLITAN POLICE PROVISIONAL ORDER BILL.
Re-committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Tuesday the 11th of June next.
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to amend the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, the Vagrancy Act, 1898, and the Immoral Traffic (Scotland) Act, 1902—Was presented by the Lord Charnwood; read 1a, and to be printed. (No. 54.)
GLASGOW AND SOUTH WESTERN RAIL WAY ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL. [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY (GRIMSBY FISH DOCK) BILL. [H.L.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): I have to ask your Lordships' permission to do rather an exceptional thing to-morrow in the case of a Bill which is before your Lordships' House awaiting Second Reading. It is not desired to read it a second time until the Standing Orders Committee of the House of Commons have given a decision which they are expected to give very shortly, but their decision has not been arrived at in time for me to move the Second Reading of the Bill now. The Bill to which I refer is the Great Central Railway Bill, and the particular subject concerns a dock at Grimsby. It is a late Bill, and I do not wish to move that it be read a second time until it is known whether the Standing Orders Committee in another place will dispense with their Standing Orders to allow the Bill to proceed. The decision of that Committee will not be known until later this afternoon, and if their decision is in favour of the Bill proceeding, it is important that it should be read a second time before we adjourn for the Whitsuntide recess, so that the time for depositing petitions might commence to run at once and the

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Bill go to a Committee immediately on the resumption of the House after Whitsuntide. I therefore propose to ask leave to move the Second Reading of the Bill to-morrow morning when the House is sitting for Judicial business.

FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY.
THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH rose to call attention to a speech delivered by the Secretary of State for War at Barn-staple on April 20, and to ask His Majesty's Government how they are able to reconcile the principles of foreign and military policy then enunciated with recent events and the statement made to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in calling attention to the speech which the noble Viscount delivered at Barnstaple, I must remind your Lordships of what was said by Sir Edward Grey in November last in the House of Commons. I shall therefore be obliged to read from the speech of the Foreign Minister an extract which generally summarises the foreign policy which Sir Edward Grey, after full and careful deliberation, considers is the one which should be accepted by this country. Speaking in the House of Commons on November 27 last, Sir Edward Grey made use of these words—
"There is one foreign policy different from the one which I have been endeavouring to sketch to the House, and it seems to me to be advocated in some quarters of the country. It seems to me to be simply disastrous. It is that we should give it to be understood that in no circumstances, however aggressively, provocatively, or wantonly, a friend of ours was attacked, we should give our friend no assistance whatever. That would be an attempt in revert to what was once called a policy of 'splendid isolation.' It would deprive us of the possibility of having a friend in Europe, and it would result m the other nations of Europe, either by choice or by necessity, being brought into the orbit of a single diplomacy from which we should be excluded. The ideal of splendid isolation contemplated a balance of power in Europe to which we were not to be a party, and from which we were to be able to stand aside in the happy position of having no obligations and being able to take advantage of any difficulties which arose in Europe from friction between opposing Powers. That policy is not a possible one now. Any single Power that attempted to adopt that policy in Europe to-day would be felt as a public nuisance, and if we were that single Power, one result would be that m the course of a few years we should be building warships, not against a two-Power standard, but probably against the united navies of Europe. As a matter of fact that policy, which would be disastrous, is not a policy. It is the negation of policy."
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Those words are very clear and distinct, and I believe that the vast majority of the people of this country supported Sir Edward Grey in that clear and moderate statement of our policy abroad.
I must ask your Lordships to consider the effect of the language of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War. Speaking at Barnstaple on April 20—I am quoting from the Western Morning News report, which I believe to be on the whole the most reliable report I could get—the noble Viscount made use of these words—
"All military organisation, all naval organisation in this country depends on foreign policy."
I am sure We entirely agree with the noble Viscount on that point. He proceeded—
"It is on our foreign policy that the shape of our Army and Navy depends…If foreign policy changes, you will Have to have a new system, but I hope foreign policy is not likely to change. I do not think it is likely to change, as I believe our best policy is to be as free as possible of Continental alliances, to manage our own affairs in our own great Dominions, to have our great Fleet commanding the sea, to have our great Oversea Army which we can send anywhere—the Continent or anywhere else necessary—and to retain our independence, relying for home defence on the voluntary efforts of our citizens."
I do not know what the noble Viscount meant by our independence unless it implied an independence of all understandings with foreign Powers. It does seem to me to be impossible to reconcile the principles of policy stated by Sir Edward Grey and those views expressed by the noble Viscount opposite.
I should also like to ask the noble Viscount what he means when he talks of our great Oversea Army. He went on to say—
"We have 320,000 men engaged for oversea service—77,000 in India…"
But, my Lords, we could not send the men in India anywhere. Those men in time of crisis, or presumably so, would have to remain in India. Then the noble Viscount went on to say—
"We have an Expeditionary Army with its line of communications which is about three times as large as the Expeditionary Army for oversea service of any other Power in the world."
I cannot understand what the noble Viscount had in his mind when he spoke of our having an enormous Oversea Army. He went on to speak of Germany. He said—
"Germany has somewhere under 3,000 men who are engaged for voluntary service oversea. They have 3,000 men in Africa; that is the whole Oversea Army of Germany."

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But surely the German Army and the French Army, provided they had the ships, would go and take their part wherever the theatre of war was in Europe. It seems to me ridiculous to talk about the German Oversea Army as limited to 3,000 men. Why, I believe that at the present moment, though it is difficult to get at the exact figures, it is a modest computation to say that the Italians have at least 100,000 men in a purely Expeditionary Force in North Africa.
I come back to the point of an Oversea Army. When the noble Viscount talks about a great Oversea Army, let us see what the great armies of the Continent are, which for all practical purposes, if they could land on these shores, could be used as much against us in England as if we were part of the Continent. At the present moment, putting it at a very modest computation, the Germans can put at least 900,000 men into the field at once, and it is a very modest computation also to say that the French could put at least 700,000 men into the field at once. I should like, now that I am touching on this question of Germany and France, to call your Lordships' attention to this fact, which is a very significant, and, I confess, a very serious one. The population of Germany is 65,000,000, with a yearly increase of 900,000. The population of France is 40,000,000, and their population is practically stationary. The French have to take at the present moment for military and naval purposes, of those attaining the age of twenty, 77 per cent.; the Germans have only to take 47 per cent. Germany, by adding, as she has decided to do, 29,000 men to her peace establishment, will in five years' time add at least another 100,000 men, well trained, to her army. On the other hand, the French Military Budget for 1912 provides, owing to decreasing birth rate, for a decrease of 10,000 men as compared with 1911. All these facts give great weight to what I have no doubt was in the mind of Sir John French when he spoke at the Royal Academy and stated that the maintenance of these great Continental armies must depend very largely upon the maintenance of population. That brings me back to this point. I have great respect and regard for the German people, but this is not a time when, if we wish to maintain our good feeling with and fulfil our obligations to France, we ought, knowing how
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pressed in regard to population the French are, to show any inclination that we are not prepared to take our part in a reasonable assertion of the balance of power in Europe.
There is another part of the speech of the noble Viscount which seems to me to indicate a contradiction or confusion of thought, unless it is a further emphasis of the policy of splendid isolation. Speaking on the subject of home defence the noble Viscount said—
"We do not need to make home defence our first concern, as we are girt round with the sea, and so long as we have a Navy that commands the sea we can rely on the exertions of the citizens, properly organised, to do the rest. Our first line of home defence is the Navy, the second our professional Army, and the third the Territorial Force, which owes its existence to the sense of duty of our citizens. If we tried to combine the thing, if we brought in compulsion, we should do just what the Chancellor of the Exchequer does—he stops all voluntary gifts to himself."
With your Lordships' permission I would like to deal with these sentences as they stand. The noble Viscount says, first of all, that we can rely on the exertions of the citizens properly organised. If that means anything it means the Territorial Army. It is not necessary to make general statements against the Territorial Army. Every one realises, no one more than myself, the enormous difficulties that have confronted and must confront the Territorial Army. Among other things, I think people are beginning to realise that the Territorial system is one which in a nation like ours, a great commercial nation, introduces, not technically a system of compulsion, but involves and brings with it a great sense of hardship. The best of those who join the Territorial Army—I think the larger portion of them—are more or less engaged in trade. One of the reasons which I am convinced in my own mind is beginning to have a considerable effect in recruiting for the Territorial Army is this, that the men are beginning to realise that not only are they performing a duty which ought to be shared by all alike, but that in case of mobilisation they are placing themselves in a very serious business difficulty. What I mean is this. Supposing that the system of the Territorial Army had obtained during the time of the South African war. Men engaged in business in London and elsewhere would have had to leave their places and would have been taken away from them for an indefinite time, and they

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realise the fact that, however well disposed employers may be, it is impossible for them to keep the places open for an indefinite period.
But, my Lords, do not let us go into the question now merely as to the difficulties of the Territorial Army. Let us look at the facts as they have been disclosed to us by official statements. We know, according to the last Return—that of October 1, 1911—that we had a shortage in officers of 1,774; in non-commissioned officers and men, of 47,351—the difference between strength and establishment. We know that the engagements of over 80,000 non-commissioned officers and men expire between October 1, 1911, and September, 1912. We know also that if these men remain on it is not possible for them to form a Reserve. We know, further, that after four years of existence the Territorial Force Reserve numbers only 166 officers, and 490 of other ranks. Again, we know that Sir John French, in his official Report, was not able to say a single word as regards the efficiency of the Territorial Army. He spoke a great deal of their patriotism, but said nothing about their efficiency. We know also that quite recently he told the East Anglian Brigade that the Territorial Artillery could not possibly be fit to meet Regular troops without more training. We know that there were absent from camp, with leave, 1,450 officers and 25,317 non-commissioned officers and men, and that there were absent, without leave, 41 officers and 6,703 non-commissioned officers and men; so that out of a total strength of 264,000, about one-eighth, or 33,500 officers and men, did not attend camp at all.
Then as regards the question of discipline. No punishment has been awarded for absence without leave; in fact, the Under Secretary of State for War, in reply to a Question in the other House on May 7 as to what punishment had been awarded to the officers and men of the Special Reserve who had absented themselves without leave, and who I find from the Army Annual Report number 41 officers and 1,455 men, said that the War Office had no information as to whether any, and, if so, what punishment had been awarded to these men for what, after all, as regards the Special Reserve, which is a higher branch of the Army, is a very serious offence. Then as regards physique.
We know that 12.76 per cent. of the Territorials are under nineteen years of age. As regards the physique of the recruits of the Special Reserve, Colonel Seely would not give any information. I am informed—I hope it is not general—that in some cases men have been engaged whose height was only 5 feet 1½ inches, and their chest measurement 29½ inches, and it is really absurd to suppose that these men can possibly carry the field service equipment, which, as your Lordships know, amounts to close upon 60 lbs.
Then the noble Viscount said that our second line of defence against invasion is our professional Army. If our professional Army is to be our second line of home defence, what becomes of the Expeditionary Force? You cannot count it two ways. I think it was the noble Marquess who leads this House who, in some former discussion on this subject, implied that if we could not send the whole of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force abroad we should have to send fewer. Judging human nature by what it is, do you suppose that if we were confronted by a serious Continental Power the people of this country would allow our shores to run the risk of being invaded by 70,000 men, if they could get across and avoid our Fleet, and permit the invaders to be confronted only by Territorials whose numbers and discipline and training are admitted by official figures to be absolutely incomplete and inefficient?
Then I come to another sentence in the noble Viscount's speech—
"If we tried to combine the thing, if we brought in compulsion, we should do just what the Chancellor of the Exchequer does—he stops all voluntary gifts to himself."
It is always difficult—in fact, it is impossible—when you enter into the region of prophecy, to know exactly what will take place. It is impossible to predict exactly what would be the effect, if we had in any shape or kind a compulsory system, upon recruiting for outside service; but it seems to me that the balance of fact, judging from the past, is in favour of our being able to work in conjunction a voluntary and a compulsory system. I do not for one moment say that the system of the Militia ballot, which was a matter of chance and unequal, was a good one, but I should like to give your Lordships certain figures which were drawn up by the Adjutant-General's Office in November,

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1813—that is to say, figures which showed the working of Lord Castlereagh's Local Militia Act. Those figures are rather significant. That Act, if I remember rightly, was passed in June, 1808, and the following returns were drawn up by the Adjutant-General's Office of that time. In 1809–10 we got, for the Napoleonic wars by ordinary recruiting, 20,815; during that year we got 23,885 volunteers under the Local Militia Act. In 1811 the numbers were—by ordinary recruiting, 11,472; volunteers, 11,453. In 1812 the numbers were 14,432 and 9,927 respectively; and in 1813, 11,285 and 8,834 respectively. Therefore during the years of the Napoleonic wars 43 per cent. of the recruits were volunteers under the Militia Act. It is not my object to-day to discuss compulsory service, but at the same time, if the noble Viscount wishes to controvert the arguments as to compulsory service, I do not think he can say with any certainty at all that compulsory service would interfere with voluntary recruiting for the Regular Army. There is only one other matter which I wish to put to the noble Viscount. I do think that the country ought to have some assurance that the principles of foreign policy enunciated by Sir Edward Grey now hold the field. Certainly the speech delivered by the noble Viscount reads in a different direction. At any rate, so it seems to me, and I am sure it would have that effect upon a provincial audience. It seems to echo a sort of return to the old provincial policy which we had hoped was dead and buried—the policy of splendid isolation.
One word more, my Lords. I am very anxious that I should not be misunderstood with regard to a certain sentence in the noble Viscount's speech. I am at one—at least I hope I may say I am—with the noble Viscount in a dislike and a distrust of what are technically called Continental alliances, offensive as well as defensive. But unless Sir Edward Grey's speech meant nothing and was mere empty verbiage, it is not a reasonable policy for this country to ignore the balance of power in Europe; nor does it seem to me an honourable policy, still less an effective policy, to make no adequate military provision for acting up to any understanding we may have with our friends on the Continent, whose interests under certain contingencies, which it is unnecessary to discuss here this evening, deserve and demand mutual
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help and support. Without wishing for one moment—I should deprecate it very strongly—to use any language which could be provocative to or distrustful of any foreign Power, I do hope the noble Viscount when he rises to speak this evening will be able to assure us that we shall do nothing which in any way could weaken the sense of our good understanding with our friends. I go further than that. I hope that the noble Viscount may realise, perhaps more fully even than he did in his speech at Barnstaple, that it is our duty as well as our interest to provide suitable military provision to carry out our obligations abroad.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, the Notice on the Paper in the name of the noble Earl was to call attention to a speech delivered by me at Barnstaple and to ask the Government how they were able to reconcile the principles of foreign and military policy then enunciated with recent events and the statement made to the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The exordium and the peroration of the noble Earl's speech dealt with that topic, but in between there was interposed a large body of matter which does not appear strictly relevant to the Notice, and therefore I do not propose to go into the general question of the principles which lie at the foundation of the Territorial Force. I would rather refer the noble Earl to those speeches which he made when he was the eloquent and enthusiastic apostle of this Force during the conduct of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill through this House. He spoke to-day of Territorial numbers. Territorial recruiting is always a difficult question. But if I am too optimistic, the noble Earl ought not to be quite so gloomy. After all, on April 1 last year the Territorial Force was within eleven of the highest point it ever reached during the boom period. Recruiting has been very good during this year; and as to the exodus, men have remained and others have taken the places of those who have left. As to the future we cannot tell; we must await that. But as to the present, I do not think that any one has any title to be full of gloom. Then the noble Earl spoke of the lesson to be drawn as to the possibility of combining compulsory service with voluntary recruiting from what took place at the beginnings

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of the last century. The period of the Napoleonic wars was very different from a period of peace. Therefore I do not think much of the case which can be founded upon that.
I come to what was the real point of the Notice and speech of the noble Earl. It may be clue to some obtuseness on my part, but I cannot for the life of me find anything that is in the slightest degree inconsistent between my humble utterances at Barnstaple and the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons last November. We said, as far as I can see, precisely the same thing. I certainly meant to say the same thing, although I did not say it so well as my right hon. friend did. We both of us spoke in the same sense. It is quite true that the policy of splendid isolation is over. I never said that it was not. I was speaking of the difficulties which alliances impose. I never uttered a single syllable about those friendships, those ententes, which are much more the order of the day than they used to be. What I was speaking of is apparent from the excellent report with which the noble Earl provided himself, and I have in my hand a verbatim report of my speech taken from another local newspaper. What I said was this—
"No one Empire has ever been so great as our Empire, and it extends all over the globe, in distant places to which our soldiers have to go. The result is that we must have a great Navy to command the seas, and an oversea professional Expeditionary Army which can go out and reinforce the garrisons which defend the distant possessions of the Crown. No other country has such an Empire; no other nation such an obligation."
In that sentence I defined what I meant by an Oversea Army. I did not mean an Army that travelled for a short distance over an arm of the sea, or that crossed a frontier such as that of France or Germany, or that made a short transit like that of Italy. I was speaking of an Oversea Army which is required to defend our distant possessions in India and in other parts of the Dominions of the Crown, which may have to go there for prolonged periods and serve for many years, and the men of which have therefore to be recruited professionally for long service in a fashion which enables you to get them only upon a professional and voluntary basis.
The noble Earl referred to the German Army, but if he will give his attention to
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the story of the German Army he will find that Germany did not send its compulsorily raised soldiers to China, its last long distance expedition; the men who were sent were raised voluntarily. Germany does not send compulsorily raised soldiers to Africa; she gets them voluntarily. Germany has some 2,850 professionally recruited soldiers for service oversea, as against 320,000 which we get, and get without very great difficulty, under our voluntary system. That is why I said I did not wish to gamble with our present system, because our present system is essential to us so long as our distant Dominions are not in a position to provide for their own defence. Therefore I said that our first concern was a great voluntarily raised Army and a Navy commanding the seas. Then I went on to point out what I meant by alliances. I said I could conceive a change of foreign policy, one in which we entered into actual alliances with other Powers possessing great Navies, which might relieve us from the necessity which we are under at present of keeping an enormous Navy for ourselves. I did not advocate that policy. On the contrary, I said I hoped we might never come to it; but I said that if we did the price exacted by these Powers under alliances might be the provision of a large Army for service on the Continent which could only be got by compulsory service.
I pointed out that our military system depended on foreign policy and changes in foreign policy. f should have thought that was a truism, and I ask the noble Earl, Wherein in the enunciation of that truism is there anything inconsistent with what was said by ray right hon. friend in the House of Commons? I certainly said no word in the slightest degree referring to our friendship with France, a friendship on which we rightly set great store. I spoke of a policy of alliances in a sense defined, which is a very different policy from our policy of to-day. Our policy to-day is not a policy of splendid isolation; it is a policy of certain friendships which my right hon. friend explained in the other House. I was not quite sure from the conclusion of the noble Earl's speech whether, although he said he did not like alliances, his mind was not tending a little in the direction of alliances and the kind of Army we might have to raise if the alliances included in their terms the provision of such an Army.
THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: I share with the noble Viscount distrust and dislike of Continental alliances in the technical sense. My first point was that it was possible to read into the speech of the noble Viscount a weakening of the position taken up by Sir Edward Grey, and the other part of my speech was to show that where you have an alliance or understanding your military policy and military position must be sufficient to be able to maintain your diplomacy.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I hope I have shown that any suggestion such as the noble Earl feared is not to be read into any utterance of mine. As to the noble Earl's second point, there again he puzzles me. You cannot provide a great Continental Army contemporaneously with the pursuit of the policy which is our present policy, and which is conditioned by our obligations with regard to the distant Dominions of the Crown. If that ever changes, then would arise the possibility to which the noble Earl has referred. The reason why I carefully guarded myself from pointing in that direction in the speech to which he has referred was the reason which I have given to-day. I think I have now made it clear that there was no deep-lying or sinister intention in the speech I made at Barnstaple, and I confess, having read that speech over again—a thing I very rarely do with my own speeches—I am very much puzzled to understand how such an idea could have got into the noble Earl's head.
LORD LOVAT: My Lords, the debate this afternoon has been particularly interesting in that we have had an opportunity, which is rare in this House, of hearing the two noble Lords who were responsible for the introduction of the Territorial Army scheme—one pointing out the weakness of the scheme, and the other defending the scheme. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War has rather talked round the point which I feel sure many of your Lordships would like to get at—namely, whether the Expeditionary Force is actually there and able to sail. The noble Viscount said there was no contemplation of any policy of a great Army on a Continental basis. I do not suppose that any of us imagined for a moment that there was. But is it possible that this Expeditionary Force, of which we hear so much, can be sent out
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of the country? Through the policy which His Majesty's Government have adopted in regard to the land defences of the country they always find themselves on the horns of the same dilemma. They talk very largely about the Expeditionary Force, and for the purposes of this Force all the officers are counted in. But when it comes to a question of home defence these unfortunate officers are counted over again. I should like to ask, in the first place, whether we have the organisation to send out the Expeditionary Force; and, secondly, whether we can afford to let it go. The noble Viscount ought to tell us at some time or another whether the policy of His Majesty's Government is the policy laid down by Sir Edward Grey, or the policy which I read into the noble Viscount's speech—that we cannot compete on the Continent with the great Continental armies.
Every day that passes we see less and less hope of the Expeditionary Force being able to set sail. The noble Duke behind me pointed out the other day the lamentable state of things in regard to officers in the Special Reserve. If I read The Times report of the noble Duke's speech correctly, he stated that there would be practically no subalterns at all in the Special Reserve at the moment that the Expeditionary Force is to sail. I understand that for this integral part of our home defence officers are to be improvised after the Expeditionary Force has left these shores. I notice that the noble Viscount dissents from that. But, according to him, 'we shall be 1,100 officers short in the 74 battalions, and we are to make up for 600 of them by getting boys from Sandhurst. Youths with only six months' training at Sandhurst or Woolwich are to be pitchforked among a number of men they have never seen, and perhaps at the moment before action. You are to make up 600 officers of cadets. What are the remainder going to consist of? The noble Viscount spoke of two or three hundred "patriotic gentlemen" who are to come forward. God help those men! They will indeed be patriots to join an army which is going to be organised in this manner. In the noble Viscount's own words, there will be 1,100 subalterns short at the moment of mobilisation. Therefore I ask the question again, Can this Expeditionary Force sail, or can it not? And is there any intention that it

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should ever sail? All sorts of attempts have been tried to get out of this. We were told by the noble Marquess the Leader of the House some two years ago that Continental operations were outside the scope of the Government's ideas—
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Has the noble Lord the reference to what I said?
LORD LOVAT: No, I have not; but I will give it to the noble Marquess afterwards. Then we had the statement that only four out of the six Divisions would sail. And afterwards we were told that only three were going to sail, the authority for that statement being Lord Lucas. Then we had a statement in the other House of Parliament by the Under-Secretary, who produced plans by which the six Divisions could get under sail within fifteen days. If they are going to fight on the Continent and fight with success they must be on the spot somewhere between the fourteenth and the fifteenth day. The great battle would take place between the eleventh and the twenty-fifth day, and unless we had our Expeditionary Force there in time for the great action we might as well not send it at all. Our bagatelle of troops would be nothing to a defeated army on the Continent, but it might make all the difference if our Expeditionary Force arrived in time. I trust that some noble Lord on the Front Bench opposite will give us further enlightenment on this point, and let us know what the policy of His Majesty's Government is and whether they can send this Expeditionary Force oversea if circumstances arise which make it desirable that we should send it for the support of our ally.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I think the question put by the noble Lord who has just sat down is a fair one, but your Lordships are in some difficulty over the Notice on the Paper. The noble Earl, Lord Portsmouth, put down a most innocent looking interrogatory, and on that he has founded a speech which in reality goes into the whole question of the external relations of this country, and, in addition, raises in a very definite form the desirability of our adopting compulsion for military service. I am under a difficulty which I think a good many of your Lordships are under in that we had not the advantage of reading the speech
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which the noble Viscount delivered at Barnstaple. I have tried hard to get a copy, but have not been able to discover what this epoch-making speech actually alleged. But to a great extent we are relieved from that difficulty, by the speech to-day of the noble Viscount, who has practically ranged himself in line with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I can only say that we on this side of the House congratulate ourselves that the noble Viscount has taken that attitude. If there was anything in the Barnstaple speech which appeared to differ from the attitude of the Foreign Secretary, we are obliged to Lord Portsmouth for having succeeded in obtaining so reassuring a statement as we have had this afternoon from the noble Viscount. The only thing I think we are entitled to say, after that statement, is that that announcement of policy, that clear abandonment of the isolation of this country, the adoption of the policy of alliances, does involve a corresponding obligation and liability on the Secretary of State for War.
What I think your Lordships in these discussions sometimes find so difficult is to disentangle the interchange of criticism and recrimination as to the past as against the present, and as to our alleged strength and our real strength. What seems to me to be the really important issue is this. Is the policy of His Majesty's Government such as involves a heavier charge and liability on the country than was the case seven years ago? And still more, Have circumstances altered in relation to our possible antagonists in such a way as make the professions of the Government more difficult to carry out than they were some years back? I for one do not shrink from these comparisons of strength as against a few years ago, because I believe that the state of our Forces as we handed them over in the then circumstances of the time was absolutely defensible, indeed in some respects a good deal more defensible than would be the case under similar circumstances at the present moment. But I think we ought to keep clearly in our mind that the obligations and dangers of 1912 are very different from the obligations and dangers of 1905. There has been a great change in the comparative power of Fleets, of our own Fleet as compared with foreign Fleets. We know that the two-to-one standard was then adopted, and we know now that

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His Majesty's Government have not found it possible to work up to so high a standard. There has been also a great change in policy. Upon this matter the noble Marquess asked for the reference to his speech which was alluded to by Lord Lovat. I have a perfect recollection of that speech, in which the noble Marquess told us that we did not expect so to organise our military forces as to enable us to employ them on the Continent of Europe. The change which was made last year was, I venture to say, an epoch making change, and especially so coming from the Benches opposite. There is also, I am afraid I must say, too, in this relation a considerable decrease in our offensive power in certain particulars, especially in the case of Artillery and of officers. What I really ask for, in supporting what has just fallen from Lord Lovat, is that we should get on all these subjects rather more chastened information than we have had in the past.
I do not wish to accuse the noble Viscount of any desire to do otherwise than give the House absolutely reliable information, and I am not going either to follow out the question of whether we can defend ourselves at present without compulsion, which was raised by the noble Earl, or even the question of whether six Divisions could be sent abroad at the present moment, but I am going to lay down two things which I hope your Lordships will take note of, and which I think the country ought to study. The first is that the policy of the Government has changed completely in the last three years with regard to the number of troops they would send abroad in the contingency of there being a European foe by whom we might apprehend invasion. This point was put over and over again to the Government in a debate about three years ago, and in the end we had a direct statement from the noble Marquess the Leader of the House. We pressed the Government on this point. We said, "You can make up six Divisions somehow, no doubt. If you do, you will, in our opinion, leave behind forces quite unfit to use against a European army. Will you, in these circumstances, send six Divisions abroad?" The noble Marquess, after the fullest deliberation and after the question had been put by four different speakers on this side, stated that if there was anything like a danger of invasion, if there was anything to apprehend, unless
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the sky, so to speak, was clear in that respect, the Government did not propose to send more than four Divisions abroad.
In certain circumstances last year the Government, as we all know, found it necessary to contemplate sending abroad the whole of the six Divisions which were said to constitute our Expeditionary Force. That involves a complete change in the situation in regard to home defence, because the whole of the Government's scheme rests upon their having six months in which to prepare forces for home defence. That six months would be taken away, and my noble friend Lord Lovat was anxious to pursue the question and to know whether or not, in the circumstances, the six Divisions could go. I have my own opinion about that, and I believe that, one way or another, they would go. I believe that the organisation for sending them is in a far better state. I am not quite so sure about the stores, and the noble Viscount has not been so reassuring on that point. I should like to know a little more as regards the reserves of stores for that occasion, of course assuming that a sufficiency is left behind for home defence.
A dangerous feature in all the assumptions of the noble Viscount is that regiments at home will have to be wrecked in order that the six Divisions may be sent abroad in complete form. The noble Viscount stands first on one leg and then on the other, and expects us to believe that in each case he is resting his whole frame on both. I have here the remarks which he made on March 6 last and the remarks which he made two nights ago, in reply each time to the noble Duke. The noble Duke's point is this. He says, "You may be able to send the six Divisions, but you are going to take practically every subaltern out of the Special Reserve. You give Regular officers to the Special Reserve and you say the Special Reserve will not be efficient without those officers, yet you are going to take the whole lot away on mobilisation." On March 6 I asked the noble Viscount what number of officers who would go abroad would have to be taken from the Officers Training Corps, the noble Duke having said that 600 of them would be officers of the Special Reserve. The noble Viscount replied—I am quoting from Hansard—
"You would not, at any rate to any large extent, take officers from the Officers Training Corps of

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the Special Reserve for that purpose. What you would do would be to draw upon the Regular officers belonging to the other establishments at home. There are 780 of them with the Special Reserve battalions. You would make your Expeditionary Force as perfect in officers as possible."
That is a definite statement that from the 780 Regular officers with the Special Reserve battalions will be drawn the officers necessary to bring the six Divisions up to strength on mobilisation. Two nights ago the noble Duke made a very damaging case as to the condition of these regiments if officers were to be taken away in this manner, and the noble Viscount then used these words—
"All the Regular officers belonging to the Special Reserve establishment in peace will remain with them on mobilisation."
That is an absolute divergence of statement. I do not for a moment suggest that the noble Viscount deliberately intends to mislead the House. But when the attack is that the six Divisions cannot go, he tells us that he can draw on the Special Reserve and take away their Regular officers for that purpose; and when the attack is that the Special Reserve will be perfectly useless because it will have no subalterns of experience in it, he says that the whole of them will be left for home defence. A man cannot be in both places at the same time. I am not going to ask your Lordships to go more deeply into this question to-night, but I have deprecated on previous occasions and I deprecate now the system under which the noble Viscount, who is trying to make bricks without straw, endeavours to prove to us that all the bricks will be forthcoming at the time of mobilisation. We are not in the least averse to helping the noble Viscount in his difficulty if he has any. We do not in the slightest degree complain of the firm language which has been used in certain foreign difficulties recently, but we do complain that the Government will not tell the country what sacrifices may be necessary in order to make that firm language effective.
There is, the noble Viscount must know, one serious grievance amongst officers in this country. I have long been of opinion that it is impossible to fill the ranks of officers unless you pay a living wage. Army subalterns are worse paid, in my opinion, than any other body of men in this country, except, perhaps, those who go into the Church. While other trades and pursuits have been more highly
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remunerated, I do not think there has been any improvement in the position of the subaltern officer in the Army for a great number of years. For a long time the argument used to be—I remember hearing Lord Randolph Churchill make use of it in a speech in the House of Commons—that it was absurd to talk of adding to the pay of officers in the Army. The great mistake, said Lord Randolph, was to pay them anything at all; they were quite willing to join for the honour of serving the Queen, and it was absolutely unnecessary, he said, to consider the question of pounds, shillings, and pence. That is not the case now, and, considering the lavish expenditure into which this Government has been plunged, I do say that before we desert the idea of voluntary service and before we say that Regular officers cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers we ought to consider whether the inducements offered to them ought not to be improved.
I add the pious hope that, with these strong pronouncements of policy, we may be allowed some insight into the difficulties and, what is really more important for the remedying of them, some admission that there are difficulties now that the policy of the Government includes sending six Divisions abroad immediately without the six months' delay for training, and now that the Government themselves must realise that there are difficulties, not anticipated by the noble Viscount five years ago, in filling up the ranks, not merely to the numbers which now ought to be there in case of invasion, but to the numbers which then, under much more favourable circumstances, he said were the minimum on which he could contemplate the efficient defence of the country.
THE EARL OF ERROLL: My Lords, I should like to say a word in support of what has fallen from the noble Viscount as to the necessity of paying officers better. In every other walk of life when men are wanted higher wages are offered and the men are generally obtained, but during the last 100 years I believe the pay of officers has been almost stationary while that of the men has been very much increased. It seems to me that the British officer at the present moment is the worst paid in the world. You give him the wages of an artisan or of one of your

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Lordships' butlers, and you expect for that to get an educated gentleman to Rive his services to the country. I should like to read to your Lordships a comparison with what is paid to officers in America and in Australia, and you will see how very much worse off are the officers in this country. I gave these figures to your Lordships four years ago, but since that time I believe nothing has been done.
A second-lieutenant in the British Army gets the princely wage of£95 a year; in Australia, apparently, there are no second-lieutenants; but in America a second-lieutenant receives£280 a year. A lieutenant in the British Army gets£118 a year; in Australia he gets£200, rising by£25 a year to£300; and in the American Army he gets£300. A captain in the British Army receives£211; in the Australian Army a captain receives from£325 to£400; and in the American Army£360. Majors receive in this country£247 a year; in Australia they get from£425 to£500, and in America£500. Lieutenant-colonels receive here£328 a year; in Australia they get from£500 to£600, and in America£600. These figures show that the Colonies recognise the justice of giving a fair day's pay for a fair day's work, and that they treat their officers much more generously than we do. I cannot help thinking that there are plenty of young men in this country ready to come forward and officer the Army, young men who are absolutely suitable from their pursuits and their traditions to do so, but at the present moment I do not think the conditions offered are adequate to induce them to come forward in sufficient numbers. At present the rates of wages which you offer are too low, the prospects are hazy, and the plums are too few.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, as the noble Viscount opposite stated, we are all placed at some disadvantage owing to the fact that the quite simple Question put down by the noble Earl opposite was as to the possible discrepancy between the terms of the speech delivered by my noble friend in Devonshire and another speech delivered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary in another place. That apparently harmless Question has grown into a discussion ranging over the whole field of foreign policy and Imperial
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defence, and both sides are placed at a certain disadvantage by that, as when the noble Viscount opposite wanted to call attention to some former words of mine he was not able to give me the reference, and equally I am not in any position to contradict him, not having the reference at hand myself.
My noble friend, Lord Haldane, performed a service in the course of his speech in pointing out that these discussions are apt to be conducted with a certain laxity of language and without a perfectly clear understanding of what particular terms mean as we use them. He instanced the term "Oversea Forces." It is quite true that the term "Oversea Army" is used alike at different times for a force which has to take a long spell of service in tropical countries, and for the entirely different services which a British Army might conceivably be called upon to fulfil—namely, that of serving on some part of the Continent of Europe. The battle of Assaye was fought overseas and so was the battle of Waterloo, but they were engagements of a totally different class, fought by the same General but with entirely different armies and under totally different conditions. It is important, I think, to keep this distinction clear in one's mind, because it has a real bearing upon the difficult and vexed question of compulsory service, which I quite agree this is not the moment to discuss in all its bearings, although it has, of course, a close reference to the subject under discussion.
My noble friend behind me also pointed out that there are two extreme policies, both of which were repudiated in his speech and also in the speech of my right hon. friend Sir Edward Grey. On the one hand, there is the policy, which some people regard as an ideal policy for this country, of complete isolation, of remaining absolutely uninterested in what happens on the Continent of Europe, and of resolving that in no circumstances will you take part in any complication unless you are yourselves directly attacked. That is a policy which, as Sir Edward Grey pointed out and as my noble friend has also pointed out, it is riot possible for this country to pursue in existing circumstances, if indeed it ever was a possible policy for this country to maintain as an abstract proposition. Certainly it has never been maintained as a historical

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fact. The alternative policy, of course, is the policy—also repudiated by the noble Earl opposite—of close alliance with great Continental Powers involving the performance of serious obligations on our part, perhaps in matters in which we have no real interest whatever.
I was not quite certain what the noble Earl intended when he spoke of offensive and defensive alliances as being the kind of alliances which he thought we ought not to undertake. I was not quite certain whether he desired to hint that we might conceivably undertake a policy of defensive alliances as distinct from the universal obligation attached to offensive and defensive alliances, but I am sure the noble Earl will be aware that what is called a defensive alliance may, as a matter of fact, throw almost as heavy an obligation upon any Power as an alliance for all purposes; and for this reason, that where an attack is made by one Power on another, which is the really responsible party in the collision between the two Powers is a matter which in fact can only be decided by the ultimate verdict of history. It is a matter upon which it is hardly possible to give a sound opinion at the time. If the noble Earl would consider all the various wars that have taken place in which European Powers were concerned in the whole of the latter part of the nineteenth century, he would find on examination that in the case of almost all those collisions each side would have said that it was not the attacking but the attacked party. Consequently such a distinction as I could not help thinking the noble Earl meant to draw is one which in fact it is exceedingly difficult to make.
The noble Lord opposite, Lord Lovat, alluded specially to the Expeditionary Force, and to some phrases of mine which I used, I think, about two years ago. As I stated earlier, I have not the precise reference to what I said, but I have no reason to think that I hold now a view in any way different from that which I held then; nor, which is infinitely more important, have I any reason to suppose that the policy of His Majesty's Government has in any way been modified since that time. If I remember aright, on that occasion an attempt was made to pin us to a statement that at a moment's notice, in all circumstances, whatever might be the condition of affairs on the Continent
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of Europe and whatever might be the threats which had been levelled against us, we should be prepared to send out six Divisions to some part of the world—it is not important where—but that we should be prepared at once to send them out of the country. At that time I stated, and I am quite prepared to state again, that the circumstances of Europe might be such that it would not be possible to send at short notice more than four Divisions out of the country.
I am prepared to go further than that. I can conceive other circumstances in which it might not be possible to send more than two Divisions. I can conceive other circumstances in which it would not be possible to send a single man out of the country, and I have not the least doubt that there is not one of the great military Powers on the Continent of Europe which would not be able to make a similar declaration as to what might happen in special circumstances on the Continent of Europe. The fact is, my Lords, we have two forces which both exist primarily, of course, for purposes of defence, but are both capable of offence—the first being the Fleet, and the second being that portion of our Army winch it is possible to send abroad. Without knowing what the precise circumstances are, what Powers are hostile to you in Europe at the time and what are friendly, what are their relations among themselves, and what is the position on the Continent of Europe in regard to alliances inter se—without knowing all these things it seems to me altogether impossible to lay down as a general proposition that you are prepared either to send abroad 50,000, 100,000, or 150,000 men, or, in the course of time, the whole male population of this island which is capable of bearing arms.
LORD LOVAT: That is our point. We say you are not sufficiently strong at home to be able to make use of the Expeditionary Force in all circumstances.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: I in no way dispute the conclusion which the noble Lord chooses to draw from the observations which I have made. It appears to me that it would apply equally well, as I have said, to every country in Europe. If it were at the time being engaged in a contest of a particular kind, it might not be able to send either part if its Fleet or a particular

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part of its Army to a particular part of the world. You could, easily devise a case, I suppose, with regard to any of the great military Powers of Europe which have possessions abroad, in which it would be exceedingly difficult for them to send any troops abroad. It would not, I should think, be taken as a confession of weakness on the part of the German Army or of the French Army were they to admit freely that if they were engaged in a great European war on their frontiers they would not respectively desire to send, or even in a sense be capable of sending, 100,000 men in one case to South Africa and in the other case to Indo-China. It would be an entirely irrelevant question to put to those who control those armies to ask them if they could conceive any special circumstances in which they would not be able to move their men about the chess board in the manner in which they might move them supposing no complications existed. That being so, I am quite certain that my noble friend will not feel himself in any way pinned into a corner by the fact that he is obliged to admit that the precise number of men that can be sent away from this island at any particular moment must depend on the special circumstances of the case and primarily upon the issues of foreign policy.
Some part of the speeches made has dealt with specially military questions of the character of those touched upon in the Questions of the noble Duke which are next on the Paper. I have no desire to attempt to play any of my noble friend's cards by dealing with those questions, which excite great interest, such, for instance, as that which was dealt with by the noble Earl who spoke last and was also touched upon by the noble Viscount opposite—namely, the exceedingly important question of the pay of the British officer. Nor would there be any advantage in my attempting to deal with those other questions as to the supply of subalterns for the Expeditionary Force or for the Home Defence Force, which were touched upon by the noble Earl who initiated this debate and also by Lord Lovat. With some of those matters I have no doubt my noble friend the Secretary of State will be able to deal in his reply to the noble Duke's Questions. I have endeavoured to confine these observations simply to questions of policy, and to show, so far as I could, that the discrepancy alleged by the noble Earl
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between the observations of my noble friend and of the Foreign Secretary does not in reality exist, because although this country does not take up a position of complete isolation from all possible interests on the Continent of Europe, yet it is equally removed from the policy of the opposite pole—that of entangling or embarrassing alliances.
The noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, used the word "alliances." That could only have been a slip, because he is, of course, aware that no such alliance with any Great Power on the Continent of Europe exists. We have no engagements of any kind, as has often been stated, involving military obligations on our part. That has already been clearly stated by my right hon. friend, and in view of the character of this discussion and of the rather easy manner in which the possibility of moving large bodies of troops on to the Continent of Europe has been mentioned, it is desirable, I think, that that statement should be categorically made again. We have no entangling military alliance. But, as noble Lords opposite know very well, we have friendly understandings of an intimate character, and of the possible bearings of those understandings upon conceivable foreign complications noble Lords who keep their eye on the world at large are as competent to judge as we are, because the whole business is entirely above board. We have no secret engagements or obligations, and noble Lords opposite are entitled to figure for themselves, and are quite capable of doing so, the conceivable circumstances in which those understandings might lead—which Heaven forbid should be the case—to our interfering in some complications abroad. But I think that my noble friend made the matter, as far as he is concerned, quite clear, and I have done nothing more than to repeat what he said.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, it appears to me—I do not know whether I am mistaken or not—that the noble Marquess has just dealt a mortal blow to the military policy of his colleague beside him. The keynote of that military policy, so far as I have understood it, is that this country, owing to the admirable arrangements which the noble Viscount had made, was in a position to send abroad 150,000 men whenever they were required in any conceivable contingency; and the Under-Secretary of State for War went so far

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as to assert in the House of Commons the other day that he had only to address an envelope and the thing was done. Now we gather that in certain circumstances that are not altogether improbable the Government are not prepared to despatch a single man of the Expeditionary Force. I do not desire to offer any further comment upon that. I am not going to say anything on the general political situation, because I venture to think that without notice and on an impromptu occasion like this it is a very imprudent thing to discuss international relations. But I hope that at least the nation will realise what the military position of this country actually is. I do not know how this declaration will be taken abroad. I do not know how it will be taken in this country. But, at all events, I do feel convinced that anybody who studies the declaration which has just been made will come to the conclusion that the veil of optimism with which the noble Viscount has so successfully clothed his scheme up to the present moment is in rapid process of disappearing.

THE ARMY.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention—

1. To the deficiency of 600 Regular Infantry officers, excluding Staff, on the mobilisation of the Regular Infantry of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force, and to ask what would be the deficiency, including Staff.

2. To the statement of the Secretary of State for War (House of Lords, Official Report), 6th March, 1912—

(a) "What you would do would be to draw upon the Regular o officers belonging to other establishments at home."

(b) "In the Peninsular War we had to make up a deficiency of officers on mobilisation, and we promoted a large number of non-commissioned officers in those days."

3. To ask the Secretary of State for War whether, on the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force, Regular officers attached to the Infantry of the Territorial Army will be re-posted to their Regular battalions in order to complete the number of Regular officers required.

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4. Whether it is the intention to promote from the non-commissioned rank to fill vacancies in the commissioned ranks before the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force, or subsequently during the progress of the campaign; and to move for Papers.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, on mobilisation the Expeditionary Force will be short of 600 Regular Infantry officers, not including those required for Staff duties. To meet this deficiency the noble Viscount told us on March 6 that he has "1,571 Regular Infantry officers available—namely, 780 Regular Infantry officers now doing duty in the Special Reserve and 791 belonging to the infantry of the Regular Reserve of Officers." I wish to test those figures. The first point is to discover the total shortage of Infantry officers in the Expeditionary Force when the requisite number are withdrawn for Staff duties. The requisite number is given in detail in "War Establishments, Part I, Expeditionary Force, 1912." "War Establishments" is a War Office manual published by authority. I find in that book that there are required for Brigade and Divisional Staff 48 officers; for transport, signalling, and machine gun, 3 officers per battalion—234 officers; a total of 282. I do not propose to give the details, which would mean the reading of a page and a-half from this manual, but if the noble Viscount challenges these figures I have the detail here and shall ask to be allowed to read it in the course of my reply. Then comes aviation. This is not yet allowed for in "War Establishments." For aviation work 182 officers from all branches of the Army are required by Memorandum on Naval and, Military Aviation [Cd. 6,067]. Say that the Infantry contribute 50. That makes a total of 332. If, therefore, for Staff work 332 more Infantry officers are required, then the total deficit of Regular officers for the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force is 932. If we say, in round numbers, 900 Regular Infantry officers, we shall be well under the mark. Because this estimate does not include every Staff appointment, and it does not make any allowance for unfitness for active service. How is this deficiency of 900 Regular Infantry officers to be met on mobilisation?
The noble Viscount told us, on March 6 last, that he had 780 Regular officers

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serving with the Infantry of the Special Reserve, and that he was going to draw upon them in the first place to make good the deficiencies in Regular officers with the Line. But the noble Viscount forgot., when he gave the figure of 780, that he had already withdrawn all Regular officers from the Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve except the adjutants and quartermasters, and was left with 632 Regular officers in the Special Reserve Infantry. Now, out of this number field officers, quartermasters and adjutants are not available as company officers. There are available, by the Army List, in the 74 Third Battalions of the Special Reserve 358 Regular company officers, which is not quite the same as 780, being less than half. The noble Viscount wants 900; he has got 358, and is left with a shortage of 542. He then falls back upon the Reserve of Regular Officers. He told us, on March 6 last, that in the Reserve of Officers—
"There were at present 791 Infantry officers after allowing 40 per cent. for officers who for various reasons may not be forthcoming. That figure by itself would wipe out his (the Duke of Bedford's) 575,"
that being the deficit excluding Staff.
But what is the real state of the case here? There are available in the Regular Reserve of Officers, by the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for War on March 13, 129 Infantry captains and 38 Infantry subalterns who are resident in the United Kingdom, who do not belong to any other branch of our military forces, and who have left the Army less than three years—a total of 167 to meet a deficit of 542, leaving a shortage of 375. It is impossible for the sate of efficiency to allow more than three years of complete rustiness to accumulate upon an officer who is to command a company in action within three weeks of rejoining!Again, there is the point of age. It is useless to call back elderly captains to command Infantry companies on active service after they have "got slow." To sum up the noble Viscount's figures. He has told us that he had in the Special Reserve 780 Regular officers and in the Infantry of the Reserve of Officers, after allowing for all wastage, 791—a total of 1,571 Regular officers available to make good deficiencies in the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force. But when we come to go into detail by reference to the Army List we
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find that, instead of 1,571 officers being available, we have 525—that is, one-third of the number given by the noble Viscount. The deficit in the Expeditionary Force is 900; the number available for wiping out the deficit is not 1,571, it is 525, leaving a shortage of 375.
The question I ask is, How does the noble Viscount, having exhausted all available Regular officers in the Special Infantry Reserve and in the Regular Reserve of Officers, propose to make good this shortage of 375 Regular Infantry officers previous to embarkation? To bring back a lot of rusty and elderly captains from the Reserve and put them in command of companies over the heads of senior subalterns fully qualified for the promotion which is due to them will not add to the efficiency of battalions. There are 129 captains to come back from the Reserve, so that it seems that on mobilisation companies to the numerical equivalent of sixteen battalions—that is four Infantry Brigades—will be commanded by Reserve captains. That is not desirable, although perhaps the best that can be done in the circumstances. But what is very much worse as far as efficiency goes as well as still more unfair to the Line subalterns is to bring in several hundred non-Regular officers from the Special Reserve. Bringing in non-Regular officers over the heads of Line officers previous to embarkation ought at all costs to be avoided; anyhow, the less of it the better. The effect of posting some hundreds of non-Regular captains and subalterns from the Special Reserve and Supplementary List of the Special Reserve to Line battalions on mobilisation is this. In the case of the captains, captains who have served fewer months consecutively than Line subalterns have years, and who have passed for their promotion under much easier terms, will step in and deprive the latter of the promotion due to them, for which they are qualified and to which the officers who go over their heads have no sort or kind of claim.
In the case of lieutenants, first lieutenants from the Special Reserve will supersede second lieutenants in the Line. The Special Reserve first lieutenants on being posted to the Line on mobilisation, however much junior they may be, rank s to all Regular second lieutenants however

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much service they may have had. A first lieutenant from the Supplementary List of the Special Reserve who happens at his own convenience to have completed four separate fortnights of service, two months in all, will go over the head of a junior Line subaltern with nearly four years of consecutive service to his credit, and who has passed for the rank of first lieutenant in the Army. Now, as a former company officer in the Army I say at once that there is nothing I should have resented more keenly than a man who has avoided all the drudgery and hard work of military life in time of peace coming into my battalion over my head. An individual of one's own age, or very likely younger, and very probably a known failure to get into the Army, is to supersede you the moment it is a question of active service. This supersession of Regular officers by non-Regular officers on mobilisation destroys the Army as a professional career. The noble Viscount told us on March 6 last, "You would make your Expeditionary Force as perfect in officers as possible," and he proceeds to supersede the fit by the less fit, and that on the eve of active service.
The noble Viscount, in dealing with the Army Estimates on March 14 of last year, said—
"There is no difficulty at all in mobilising as far as officers of the Expeditionary Force are concerned. But, of course, you would deplete to a very considerable extent the depôts and home establishments."
I demur to the statement that there is no difficulty at all in mobilising as far as officers of the Expeditionary Force are concerned, but I entirely agree that the home establishments and the depôts must he depleted. But what does the noble Viscount mean exactly by the home establishments? On the departure of the Expeditionary Force we are left with four Regular battalions for the whole of Great Britain and Ireland and the Channel Islands. I presume that the noble Viscount does not propose to deplete these four borne battalions of their officers. But it would be satisfactory to have an assurance from him that he does not intend, to do so. Then as to the depôts. The noble Viscount cannot deplete the depôts because he has done that already. All Regular officers belonging to the depôts leave the depots of mobilisation with the Third Battalions of the Special Reserve, and we have already
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dealt with them. There is nothing left at the depôin the way of Regular officers on mobilisation, and you cannot deplete nothing. But there is still a body of Regular Infantry officers left in the country—namely, the adjutants of the Territorial battalions. There are 207 Regular infantry officers serving as adjutants of Territorial battalions. It is these officers, and not non-Regular officers, who should join the Expeditionary Force. Home Line battalions mobilising under great pressure for instant active service abroad are no place for non-Regular officers. With the best intentions in the world they will be more in the way than anything else, because they lack all knowledge and experience, in dealing with Regular non-commissioned officers and soldiers.
A battalion at home has been called by the noble Viscount a feeding battalion in the sense that it has to send drafts to its linked battalion abroad. If the feeding battalion is called upon to take the field within two or three months of having despatched all its drafts, then it is in the condition described by Lord Wolseley as that of a "squeezed lemon." When Lord Card well established the linked battalion system he most certainly never contemplated squeezed-lemon battalions being used within a fortnight of mobilisation for a great European campaign. He meant them for home defence. But His Majesty's Government, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, are credited with having contemplated the possibility of using them last summer on the Continent of Europe. It is that which makes it especially interesting to consider in detail the composition of the battalions with which the Government were prepared to embark on a European campaign. In round numbers there will be available for each home battalion, after the departure of drafts abroad, 300 young soldiers with the Colours; consequently on mobilisation 600 Reservists will be required. First, as to the serving soldiers; most of these are boys of twenty years of age with little more than one year's training. They cannot be the equals of what are often referred to as Continental conscripts, who are men of not less than twenty-two years of age and none of whom will have done less than two years' training. Again, on the Continent the whole manhood of the nation is in the Army. You cannot say that Line recruits in this country

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represent the manhood of the nation. It is idle to suppose that the boys serving with the Colours in the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force will not be outclassed in every respect by the Continental soldiers whom they will have to meet.
Next we come to the Reserve. Now, we organise our Reserve on a different plan from that of Continental Powers. They train their Reserve officers and men annually with the units with which they did their Colour service and with which they will serve again on mobilisation. We do not. We do not train our Reserve, either officers or men, annually, and we post officers and men to units in time of war with which they have never served in time of peace. Our plan ensures our Reservists becoming more and more rusty with the lapse of each year spent in civilian life without any military training. Our Reserve is of varying quality—from excellent to the reverse. The men in Section "A" who have done seven years' Colour service and have not been more than a year in the Reserve are probably the best trained Infantry soldiers in the world, but their numbers are limited. Some Reservists, and you must take the best, are required by Mobilisation Regulations, 1912, for Mounted Infantry duties in place of the Divisional Cavalry, which is lacking from the Expeditionary Force. But few of the serving boy soldiers would have been through a Mounted Infantry course, or would be strong enough to ride. They could not control one cob, let alone holding two or three others all unbroken to Mounted Infantry work. A boy cannot do a man's work in the Army any more than in any other field of labour. In the present Army Reserve many men have been passed prematurely to the Reserve after two or three years' Colour service. The exact number is known only to the Adjutant-General in the War Office. But what is known to every one outside the War Office is this, that men who have had two years' training with the Colours and spent many more, in the Reserve without any training at all are of no immediate value as first-class soldiers. Thus in the Regular Reserve you pass by degrees from excellence in Section "A" to uselessness amongst the re-enlisted Reservists in the last years of their service in Section "D."
The evidence given by many General Officers before the South African War
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Commission shows that Sections "A" and "B" of the Reserve proved most satisfactory on service, provided always they had had time to regain military habits, discipline, and proficiency. Field-Marshal Lord Methuen states that he found the Reserve efficient with the exception of the men in Section "D," who could not march and many of whom he had to leave behind. We rely, by the way, on Section "D" men for the Expeditionary Force. Lord Methuen adds that—
"The difficulty with the Reserve is that when you bring them, as I did, up the Orange River and launch them against the enemy at once, they have hardly got to know their officers and non commissioned officers. Therefore I should say that to give a battalion a full chance the Reservists ought to be with the battalion a few weeks in the field before they are used."
Now the first-class Army Reserve was called up on October 7, and the Battle of Magersfontein was fought on December 11—nine weeks after mobilisation. There had been mobilisation at home, the voyage out, the disembarkation, the march up the Orange River, but, even after that, the Reserve was not yet at its best. Now what chance is there of the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force having nine weeks previous to going into action on the Continent of Europe? The answer is none, absolutely none. The men will not have time to get used to their new boots much less their new rifles. The problem is how to attain the maximum of efficiency in a couple of weeks with a battalion composed of a collection of 300 young serving soldiers undoubtedly inferior to Continental soldiers, and 600 Reservists some of whom may be superior and others again inferior to the troops to whom they will be opposed. The degree of efficiency to which a battalion can attain under these circumstances within two or three weeks must depend entirely on the ability and experience of its officers and non-commissioned officers. Hence the necessity of employing none but Regular officers who know how to handle and deal with Regular soldiers.
The noble Viscount must summon the 207 Regular officers from the Territorial Army. We remember that in the early days of the Territorial Army the type of man to make an ideal Territorial adjutant was said to be a young solicitor. Could not the noble Viscount cause lists to be

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prepared of young solicitors who would be ready to act as adjutants on the mobilisation of the Territorial Force, and thus set free Regular officers urgently required for more important duties abroad? No one has ever yet been able to explain the use of the Territorial Army. We have had many debates in your Lordships' House on this subject, all of which have intensified the obscurity. But this is clear—if the Territorial Army is to endanger the initial success of the Regular Army in a Continental campaign by depriving it of Regular officers, then so surely the Territorial Army as an institution becomes at once a standing danger to the Empire. If the noble Viscount reports to the Army 207 adjutants from Territorial battalions, then there is still a deficit of 168 Regular officers to be made good from the Special Reserve and by promotion from the ranks. If the noble Viscount leaves the Regular officers with the Special Reserve battalions as he told us last Thursday, then it will be 168 plus 358—that is, 526. The noble Viscount can make good that shortage by taking every Special Reserve subaltern from the Third Battalions—there are at present 500 available—and making good the further shortage by promotions from the ranks. But I have included the 207 adjutants from the Territorial Army. If the noble Viscount does not repost these Regular officers to their Line battalions, then he must make good the 207 by promotion from the ranks. As regards the Special Reserve officers I would venture to make this suggestion to the noble Viscount. Send none but subalterns to the Line previous to embarkation, and make all Special Reserve subalterns, whether they be first lieutenants or not, join at the bottom of the list of Regular officers as recruit officers. Let them join as they do now on passing for the Army. Why should the fact of not passing for the Array allow them on account of mobilisation to join senior to Line subalterns? You will thus avoid interfering with promotion in the Line, anyhow previous to the commencement of the campaign, whatever may happen afterwards.
Then as to promotion front the ranks. On March 6 last the noble Viscount told us that—
"In the Peninsular War we had to make up a deficiency of officers on mobilisation, and we promoted a large, number of non-commisioned officers in those days."
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Does the noble Viscount propose to promote from the non-commissioned ranks before the embarkation of the Expeditionary Force or during the progress of the campaign? I cannot find instances of noncommissioned officers promoted from the ranks previous to the commencement of the Peninsular War. Perhaps the noble Viscount would kindly inform me where the records can be found. During the campaign several non-commissioned officers were promoted for distinguished service in the field and were generally appointed adjutants in other regiments. The Under-Secretary of State for War stated, on March 12, that lists of non-commissioned officers qualified for commissioned rank had already beer prepared. It is impossible to tell if an officer, a non-commissioned officer, or a man will show distinguished ability on service. In the Peninsular War they tried non-commissioned officers in the field first and promoted them afterwards. The obvious disadvantage of promoting front the ranks on the eve of embarkation is that experienced noncommissioned officers are invaluable on mobilisation, and although the commissioned ranks may be strengthened the non-commissioned ranks must be weakened by being deprived of their best and most experienced members. It may be that promotion from the ranks on an extended scale at the moment of mobilisation may impair, and not add to, the total efficiency of battalions.
If the noble Viscount resorts to promotion from the ranks he must give those promoted a living wage. The pay of a second lieutenant is 5s. 3d. a day; that of a sergeant-major, 5s. But when a cadet joins from Sandhurst he is not as a rule a married man with a wife and six or eight children, which is generally the case with sergeant-majors and senior non-commissioned officers. The noncommissioned officer has his uniform, boots, and other articles of clothing provided, also his rations. Then he has free quarters for his wife and children, and when the battalion moves they travel at the public expense. The moment he is promoted to commissioned rank he loses all these allowances. I presume that this question of pay has been considered, and I hope the noble Viscount will give us some information upon the point. In conclusion, I hope that the noble Viscount will do as he told us he was going

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to do, namely, make the Expeditionary Force as perfect as possible in officers. But that entails depriving the Territorial Infantry of the Regular officers, and not superseding Regular officers by Special Reserve officers. I have avoided any reference to the wastage of war, as my remarks apply solely to the officers of the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force previous to embarkation.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: My Lords, I confess that experience has now taught me to tremble when the noble Duke gives notice of a Question, because it branches out into a vast variety of topics. Much of what he said dealt with matters to which this Motion does not refer. For instance, the quality of the British Reservist as compared with the Continental Reservist. It is quite true that he is not trained during his Reserve period to the extent that some Continental soldiers are trained; but, on the other hand, the British Reservist has served seven years with the Colours and is a much better trained man initially than his Continental contemporary, and that is the reason why we lay less stress on training than is laid upon it on the Continent, where the Reserve period commences after two years' training. There were other topics to which the noble Duke referred, to even touch upon which I should be taking up a great deal of your Lordships' time. I will only refer to one. He said that aviation will require an increase in the establishment of officers. That is quite true. We shall have to recruit more officers to meet the demands which aviation is making, and we are proceeding to do so. Recruiting for that establishment will be added to the recruiting for the other establishments, and as aviation grows so we must get as many officers as we can for this work. It will be satisfactory to noble Lords opposite to know that the officers of the Flying Corps are on the whole well paid. We have seen to that. As regards non-commissioned officers who may be promoted, there, again, I can inform the noble Duke that we have anticipated what he said, and his observations have therefore not fallen upon deaf ears.
Then the noble Duke went into a string of further figures, of which again I had no notice. If there belonged to your Lordships' House a noble Lord with the gifts of one of those marvellous youths to be seen in the music-halls in the capitals of this
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country and the Continent, who can perform astounding feats in impromptu calculation and carry in their heads strings of figures, he might be in a position to cope with the noble Duke; but I am wholly deficient in those gifts, and therefore I can only deal with the figures of which he has given me some notice, except where by chance I happen to carry some others in my head, which I fear is but rarely. The noble Duke spoke first of the deficiency of 600 Regular Infantry officers, excluding Staff, on the mobilisation of the Regular Infantry of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force. He asked what would be the deficiency, including, Staff. My answer to that is that the actual shortage in the Infantry battalions of the Expeditionary Force on March 1 last, after deducting the officers required for Staff and extra-regimental appointments, was 666. The number varies from day to day, and can no more be considered constant than the number of subalterns to be taken from each Special Reserve battalion. This number must depend on the requirements of the Regular units and on the strength in officers of the Special Reserve battalions. The authorities do not propose necessarily to take four officers from each Special Reserve battalion. If a particular Special Reserve battalion is considerably below-its establishment of subalterns, its strength may be left undisturbed.
On Monday last I told the noble Duke that in all periods of history and in every country mobilisation must be a ragged business. The immense leap front peace to war establishment, in the case of officers in particular, is always trying, even in the most perfectly regulated armies. If the noble Duke found himself in Berlin he would probably hear complaints, almost as loud and long as his own, of the system which they have there, although it is a better system, owing to their circumstances, than we have here. The actual method of filling the deficiencies in the Expeditionary Force must be determined at the time and in the circumstances of the moment, having regard to what the number may be when the need arises. Then the noble Duke called attention to what I said on March 6. I then said that what we should do would be to draw upon the Regular officers belonging to other establishments at home. The noble Viscount opposite has also called attention to that sentence. But meantime—on Monday last

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—I explained what I meant. I said that we should draw on the Regular establishments at home, but that that was not to be taken as meaning that we should mop up all the officers, or the greater part of them. We have no intention of taking away the Regular officers with the Special Reserve units. We have no intention of depriving the Territorial Force of its Regular officers, of its adjutants and so on. I do not think the noble Duke displayed any love for the Territorial Force in the suggestion which he made to me on that point. But I can assure noble Lords that as regards the Territorial Force our virtue is proof, as it is in the case of the Special Reserve, so far as regards Regular officers. In the course of the development of mobilisation schemes it has been found that it is not desirable that we should draw Regular officers from any establishments at home except the Staff College and other establishments which would naturally be closed on mobilisation. As I explained on Monday, we do not propose to draw away the Regular officers with the Special Reserve battalions or the Regular officers with the Territorial Force.
Then I explained that it is our intention to promote a number of non-commissioned officers on mobilisation, and we have made provision for proper remuneration for them. It is intended to give commissions to a number of non-commissioned officers to fill vacancies in the Expeditionary Force prior to its embarkation, and this source of supply may subsequently be drawn upon also to meet the wastage of war. While non-commissioned officers are very valuable, this is not an aspect in which the Army is deficient. We have always been able to maintain great elasticity in the supply of non-commissioned officers, and the Reserve is sufficiently large to enable us to make up the slight depletion which the promotion of these non-commissioned officers would occasion. I have now answered all the points as to which the noble Duke interrogated me in his Questions. I am wholly unable to cope with the torrent of figures which he poured out in his speech and to which no reference is made in his Notice on the Paper; and. I can only say again that if he wants information about these figures, many of which go into great detail, the best plan would be for him to come and see us at the War Office and we will supply him with all the in-
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formation he desires. I can assure him he will always be welcome.
LORD LOVAT: The noble Viscount has definitely stated that no Territorial officers will be used.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: Regular officers.
LORD LOVAT: Will no adjutants be taken?
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I can conceive it possible that we might take a particular adjutant because he was suitable, but we would always replace him by a Regular officer.
LORD LOVAT: In the Artillery?
VISCOUNT HALDANE: You cannot have in the case of mobilisation a scheme so defined that you can say whether or not you will take a particular officer or an officer in a particular arm. We should avoid doing anything which would injure the efficiency of the Territorial Force.
LORD LOVAT: We wish to find out where these officers are coming from.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: The noble Lord ought to know that it is contrary to the practice of every country but our own to give even as much information as I have given regarding mobilisation. The noble Lord's experience must show him that it is not in the public interest to probe far into mobilisation details.
LORD LOVAT: I decline to accept the reference to other Continental Powers. The noble Viscount said that there was equal anxiety in Berlin. Germany has a reserve of officers under the rank of major numbering 28,000; and France, I believe, has a reserve of officers of about 17,000. Therefore we have in this country every right to be anxious and to desire to pin the noble Viscount down to every single thing we can get cut of him. Moreover, a good many of our officers appear in two places. They appear in the Army List both as officers of the Territorial Force and in the Reserve of Officers. I should like to ask whether any of these can be taken away to serve with the Expeditionary Force on mobilisation.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: Do you mean Regular officers?
LORD LOVAT: I mean officers who have been Regular officers and who are now serving in the Territorial Force.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I should say certainly if the interests of the country required it. In those circumstances it would be right to take them. They are not Regular officers in the sense in which I have spoken. They are officers who have been Regular officers and who have become Territorial officers, but who are still under obligation.
LORD LOVAT: I do not dispute the noble Viscount's wisdom in saying that he might take these officers away, but I wish to press home this fact, that the Territorial Army is to be depleted at the time of the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force of its most efficient men. Thus the training of the Territorial Force will be deprived of its backbone. The noble Viscount said that he did not tie himself to take any particular number of officers from any of the Special Reserve regiments. All the Special Reserve regiments are short, I think, with only three or four exceptions. The inference, therefore, is that they will be entirely denuded of subalterns.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: Most of these officers who have served long enough to get a pension and are now in the Territorial Force are senior officers and of captain's standing, at all events, and there is no deficiency in officers of that sort. The General Reserve of Officers contains officers liable to serve in that rank in abundance. The difficulty is in junior subalterns, and to supply these we have called into existence the Officers Training Corps, which, as I explained the other day, now consists of 25,000, and some 18,000 have passed through it having obtained either the "A" or "B" certificate. We believe that the Corps will give us a large supply. As regards the rest, the promotion of non-commissioned officers, which the noble Lord opposite seemed to think a bad system—
LORD LOVAT: No. What I said was that it is a bad system at the moment of mobilisation; in fact, at the moment of mobilisation it is an infamous system.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: it is, at any rate, resorted to in France, and it is only not resorted to in Germany because of that large reserve of officers to which I referred last Monday. On mobilisation
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we have to do the best we can. It is only by making use of such means as the Universities and public schools afford that we can deal with the subject, and it is not made any better by probing too minutely into details.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: I regret that the noble Viscount will not harden his heart and take the 500 or 600 Regular Infantry officers whom he proposes to leave at home with the Territorial Force. They would be valuable for the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force. The noble Viscount has not told me where I can find the record of commissions granted before the sailing of the Army for the Peninsular War.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I will make inquiries among those who are learned in these things, and if I can get any light on the subject I will communicate with the noble Duke. As to the question of the desirability of taking away Regular officers from the Territorial Force, the noble Duke must fight that out with the noble Lord (Lord Lovat) who sits below him.

THE CONGESTED DISTRICTS BOARD OF SCOTLAND.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I wish to ask when the Report of the Congested Districts Board of Scotland for the year to March 31, 1912, and the Report of the Crofters Commission for the year 1911 will be laid upon the Table.
LORD WILLINGDON: In answer to the noble Earl's Question I have to say that the Reports to which he refers are in a forward state of preparation and will be laid on the Table as soon as practicable, but I am not in a position to name the exact date. In view of the fact that the Crofters Commission came to an end on March 31, 1912, the Report of the Commission will cover the period down to that date—that is to say, a period of fifteen months instead of twelve months.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Last year the Report of the Congested Districts Board of Scotland Was received in the Scottish Office, according to the date upon it, on April 22, but it was not laid on the Table of your Lordships' House until

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August 22, when this House was on the point of adjourning. I think any one who read the Report could understand that it was not a Report of which any Department would be very proud. I ask this Question to-day in the hope that the Scottish Office will not repeat the bad precedent of last year, but will present the Report in the month of June at the latest.
LORD WILLINGDON: The Scottish Office are fully aware of the position taken up by the noble Earl, and I can assure him that they will do everything to provide time for the criticism and discussion of this Report.

SMALL LANDHOLDERS (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1911.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I beg to make the Motion which stands in my name.
Moved, That there be laid before the House a Return (a) of the names, official designation, salary, and conditions of employment of all officers and clerks who have been appointed by the Land Court or by the Board of Agriculture for Scotland under the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act, 1911; and (b) specifying those of the above officials who before the passing of the Act of 1911 were employed by the Crofters Commission or by the Congested Districts Board, and giving their former official position and terms and conditions of employment.—(The Earl of Camperdown.)
LORD WILLINGDON: I shall be happy to endeavour to meet the desire of the noble Earl for information on the subjects which he mentions, but in view of the fact that a number of appointments have yet to be settled I would suggest that it would be more convenient that the matter should stand over until the complete list is ready. If the noble Earl will raise the question again when the House resumes its sittings I shall be happy to give him every information.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Does the noble Lord mean that between now and the next few weeks there is going to be a large number of further appointments made?
LORD WILLINGDON: All I mean to say is that the appointments are not fully made at the present moment. I will give the noble Earl the best information I can when the Horse resumes after the Whitsuntide recess.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: A considerable number of appointments have been made, and I think it is desirable that we should know the names of those appointed, their official designation, their salaries, their term of office, whether they have served before, and so on. We were informed by the late Secretary for Scotland that the greatest care would be taken to pick out the most impartial and best men of every sort and kind, and I merely wish to know who have been appointed up to the present time. I suggest that no harm can be done by the giving of a Return of all those appointments which have been made up to the present time. If there are others made subsequently, I can renew the Motion later with regard to those particular appointments.
LORD WILLINGDON: If the noble Earl will be satisfied with having a Return of the number of appointments that have been made up to the present time, I will agree to the Motion.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: That is all I could expect.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

HIS MAJESTY THE LATE KING OF DENMARK.
THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: Your Lordships are aware that the House as a rule does not sit on Ascension Day, which is to-morrow, but there is a special reason for our meeting in order to propose, which I shall have the honour of doing, the presentation of an Address to His Majesty the King and one also to Queen Alexandra conveying the condolence of this House with their Majesties upon the lamentable death of the King of Denmark. I understand that it would meet the convenience of the House if we assembled at three o'clock to-morrow afternoon.
House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.