HL Deb 13 May 1912 vol 11 cc981-94

*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention to—

  1. 1. The statement of the Secretary of State for War on 8th March, 1910: "Those who take commissions in the Special Reserve of Officers will remain on an average about ten years. If you bring in 1,000 a year you would thus get 10,000, and when you have once got a considerable establishment the wastage in that establishment will not be so serious."
  2. 2. The answer of the Under-Secretary of State for War on 20th February, 1912, who, when asked the number of officers from the Officers Training Corps who have joined the Special Reserve up to 1st February, 1912, replied that "during the last two years 217 subalterns on joining declared their intention of presenting themselves for commissions, and some have already passed into the Regular Army. Up to the 1st February 241 members of the Officers Training Corps have been appointed to commissions in the Special Reserve."

To ask if it is not the fact that— 1.—(a) The number of Special Reserve subalterns serving in the 74 Third Battalions by the Army List of last March was 510. (b) That the number required by Appendix V of Army Order of 23rd December, 1907, to pass to the Depôts and to the Line battalions on mobilisation is 370. (c) That 510 less 370 leaves 140 Special Reserve subalterns available on mobilisation for battalion duties with the 74 battalions—in round numbers, two subalterns per battalion.

2. That in the case of the Fourth Battalions—

  1. (a) The number of Special Reserve subalterns by the Army List of March last was 168.
  2. (b) That the number required by Appendix VI of Army Order of 23rd December, 1907, to pass to the Line battalion on mobilisation is four from each battalion, a total of 108, leaving 60 subalterns available for battalion duties with 27 battalions—in round numbers, two subalterns per battalion.

3. That the number of Special Reserve Infantry subalterns on the Supplementary List is shown in the Army List for April to be 34.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, the Questions standing in my name on the Paper arise from the discussion which took place in your Lordships' House last week. I now call attention to the statement of the Secretary of State for War, made two years ago, which is the estimate that the noble Viscount made of the probable number of officers who would join the Special Reserve from the Officers Training Corps. Then I call attention to the statement of the Undersecretary of State for War in February of this year, which gives the result of the two years' working. The estimate and the results are widely different. Last week, as far as I could follow the noble Viscount's figures, he told us that from September, 1908, to April, 1912, 867 officers had joined the Special Reserve from the Officers Training Corps. But on March 6 the noble Viscount told us that since the formation of the Officers Training Corps 283 officers had joined the Special Reserve. It is really quite impossible to follow the noble Viscount's figures on this point. The Army List, however, will tell us whether the noble Viscount's plan is going to be a success or not. In the Army List we find the exact number of Special Reserve officers now serving in the Special Reserve Infantry. Then arises the question, Is that number adequate or not? I maintained last week that the number is wholly inadequate, and I have put on the Paper in detail to-day figures which show that on mobilisation the noble Viscount will find himself with two subaltern officers for every Special Reserve Infantry battalion. Last week the noble Viscount was not able to accept that figure; indeed he dissented from it altogether. I have now put down the calculation in detail, and I beg to again bring the matter to the notice of the noble Viscount by asking the Questions standing in my name.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOE WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE)

My Lords, the noble Duke begins by complaining that the Officers Training Corps has not produced more officers within the time during which it has been in existence. Seeing that it was not possible for anybody to get the "B" certificate until a little over two years ago, I do not think that complaint is very reasonable. I will give the figures of what the Officers Training Corps is producing, and it is producing up to expectations. As regards the noble Duke's general observation, I do not think I said that the 867 officers were for the Special Reserve. If that statement appeared, then I was misreported. I meant, and I think I said, that that number was the number of those who had taken commissions. But I will give the figures upon that in a moment.

There are two general observations which I wish to make before I answer the noble Duke's Questions. The first is that I think it very inexpedient to discuss mobilisation arrangements in a public fashion more than is necessary. I have gone to the utmost limit in what I am going to give to the noble Duke to-day. The noble Duke is quite entitled, of course, to challenge figures which have been publicly given and to ask for explanations of them, but I do not think it is quite right that he should debate them. Whilst we do not desire to put before the world our mobilisation arrangements, which have been made and are being made with great care, we are quite ready to give information. We have nothing we wish to conceal; and if the noble Duke or any other noble Lord chooses to call at the War Office and see the Adjutant-General—or myself, if he prefers it, though I think it is better that lie should get the information from the officer responsible—he will get information of a more full description than it is possible to give across the Table of the House.

My second observation is this. The machinery which has been called into existence may be working slowly—I never expected that it would work rapidly—but at any rate it is better than no machinery at all. We used to have no machinery for supplying this deficiency. During the South African War we got officers where we could, and some very excellent officers we did get, who did much better than those would have expected who lay stress upon the absence of training and considerations of that kind. But we have now got, not only the Officers Training Corps, but other arrangements which supply us with a pretty well assured prospect of being able to mobilise the Expeditionary Force and the rest of the Army much more easily than when we had no such machinery. And when you pass to the question of mobilisation generally, I repeat what I said before. Mobilisation for war is for every Power a ragged business. We have our peace establishment of Regular officers. There is practically no deficiency there. But when we pass to mobilisation we want a great many more officers. So does every other Power in the world. In France they mobilise largely with non-commissioned officers. Wellington mobilised with non-commissioned officers. We ourselves did not use non-commissioned officers at the time of the South African War, but we have used them on other occasions. Germany, through her compulsory service system, has a supply of Reserve officers which enables her to be more independent than other Powers. But no Power that I know of keeps a peace establishment of officers which would be sufficient on mobilisation in time of war.

I will now give the noble Duke the answers to his Questions, and I may say that the statement which I am going to read has been carefully prepared by the Military Secretary and the Director of Military Training, Sir Archibald Murray, in consultation with myself, and it has been revised by the Adjutant-General, and it goes to the utmost limit of the information which, in the public interest, we are prepared to give. If the noble Duke wants more information, I repeat that we shall be pleased to give it to him privately. The figures given by the noble Duke in his Questions are approximately correct, except as regards (b) in the second Question. That is the reference to the number required by Appendix VI of the Army Order of December 23, 1907, to pass to the Line battalion on mobilisation. The noble Duke refers there to the Fourth or Extra Reserve battalions, and it is not his fault that he has been misled. It is true that the Appendix he quoted lays down that four subalterns from each Extra Special Reserve or Fourth Battalion will join Regular battalions on mobilisation. That was originally intended and stated, and the noble Duke is quite entitled to refer to the statement. But in the course of the later developments of the mobilisation scheme this has ceased to be so, and these Fourth Battalions do not now have to part with any subalterns on mobilisation.

With regard to the statement I made on March 8, 1910, which is quoted by the noble Duke, I should like to explain that it had reference to the productiveness of the Officers Training Corps when it should have reached its full effect. That it could not do until 1914 at the earliest. The organisation has only been working a couple of years and is still in its early days. I prefaced my statement by saying that— The Officers Training Corps having boon in existence only a little more than a year, we had not yet seen its fruit. The basis of the Officers Training Corps organisation is that its members should obtain certificates "A" and "B," the concessions granted in respect of which would facilitate their taking Special Reserve commissions. Since the chief condition underlying the grant of these certificates is a period of four years' service in the Officers Training Corps, it follows that no considerable results can be looked for in the way of Special Reserve commissions up to the present. The figure given as to the actual number of commissions taken in the Special Reserve from the Officers Training Corps up to February 1, 1912, is substantially correct; but, as I have said, the full effect of the creation of that corps is not expected for another two years.

It is instructive, however, to notice the progress that the Officers Training Corps has made so far. In 1909 122 officers joined the infantry of the Special Reserve, of whom three came from the Officers Training Corps; in 1910 the figures were 168 and 48 respectively; in 1911 they were 199 and 107; and during the present year 92 officers have joined the Special Reserve, of whom 47 came from the Officers Training Corps. It will thus be seen that there 1ms been a steady increase in the numbers who have joined the Special Reserve, and that during the last sixteen months fifty per cent. of them have been provided by the Officers Training Corps. It seems unreasonable to judge an organisation by its output at some particular date when the productiveness o of that organisation has been shown to make a steady increase with every year i of its existence. It is true that a large proportion of those who have hitherto joined the Special Reserve of Officers endeavour to obtain Regular Army commissions, and that some of them are successful. But as they have to serve in the Special Reserve for a period of at least eighteen months before they can obtain Regular commissions, they are available during that time for the purpose that the Special Reserve of Officers is intended to fulfil—namely, to take their places in a Regular or Reserve unit on mobilisation. That is an extra asset which the noble Duke has not taken into account.

The steps that will be taken to provide officers for Special Reserve units in the event of mobilisation being ordered before the full output has been obtained from the Officers Training Corps have been fully considered. In completing the requirements of the Expeditionary Force as regards officers it has been found necessary to draw upon four sources—(1) non-commissioned ranks; (2) Special Reserve units; (3) Supplementary Reserve; (4) General Reserve. Investigation has shown that it is possible from these four sources to meet all the initial requirements, both Staff and Regimental, of the Expeditionary Force of six Divisions on mobilisation. The next step is to complete the diminished cadres of the Special Reserve units, and to make them up to an establishment sufficient to ensure the easy reinforcement of the Expeditionary Force with efficient officers and the constant and efficient training of the men so long as they remain in England. In the first place, there will always be a certain number of Regular non-commissioned officers who during their service have been recommended by their commanding officers as suitable to receive commissions on mobilisation and have taken their discharge, either compulsorily or voluntarily, before any national emergency has arisen. These men will be useful for work in the subaltern ranks of the Special Reserve, and a register is being opened to ensure their being obtainable when required. Any Supplementary Special Reserve officers who are not required for service with the Regular units will join Special Reserve units. It is also proposed, as in the case of Regular battalions, to grant commissions in the Special Reserve to a certain number of non-commissioned officers serving in those battalions on the Permanent Staff. That is, of course, Regular non-commissioned officers. It will be seen, however, that a good deal of reliance must be placed on the General Reserve and other units for the completion of the Special Reserve units.

It has been calculated that when the Expeditionary Force leave these shores complete in every particular as regards officers, there will be an initial deficiency in the Infantry Special Reserve units of about 1,100 subalterns. This is partly due to the number of officers we shall take from the Special Reserve for Regular battalions, and in this connection it may be pointed out that the Special Reserve subalterns that we have are a much more valuable asset to the Army as a whole than the Militia subalterns used to be, as the latter were not liable for service abroad. In fact, if we were not able to utilise the Special Reserve officers it is difficult to see how the additional subalterns for the Regular battalions on mobilisation could conveniently be provided. All the Regular officers belonging to the Special Reserve establishment in peace will remain with them on mobilisation, so that we are certain of having a good nucleus of teachers before the unit is made up of mere numbers. On mobilisation the companies of these Special Reserve units—I am speaking of the 74 Third Battalions—hange very much. They get filled up with men who have not attained the age of twenty and are too young to go abroad and with surplus Reservists, a large number of whom would be new to the unit. The unit would not be one in which the officers would know their men or the men their officers. That is inherent, and it therefore makes less difference that fresh officers are coming in. It must be quite understood that the Expeditionary Force makes no demand upon, and is not granted the services of, the Regular officers attached to Special Reserve battalions. Neither can it in any way draw upon the services of any of the officers of the 27 Special Reserve units who do not act as mere training schools during war.

There are at the present moment 124 Infantry subalterns on the General Reserve. Of these, however, some are known not to be available on mobilisation, but steps are being taken to purge the General Reserve of Officers of all useless members. Efforts are at the same time being made to fill their places by calling upon the members of the Officers Training Corps who have not found themselves in a position to take commissions in the Special Reserve. When a member of the Officers Training Corps reaches a certain age he decides whether his future work and his present circumstances admit of his accepting a commission in the Special Reserve or Territorial Force. If he finds that he is not able to do so owing to the calls upon his time made by the preliminary and annual training, he is approached with a view of ascertaining whether he is willing to accept a commission in the General Reserve. These commissions carry no obligation for annual training, and simply mean that he registers his name as liable to be called out on emergency, when he will form part of the officers' cadre of the Special Reserve units. While he is attached to these during mobilisation he will take up the training again which he dropped on leaving his school or University. Although there has not been intermediate training, that class of officer is a great deal better than the class of officer who was found useful in the South African War.

The present strength of the Officers Training Corps is nearly 25,000, and about 18,000 have left the corps after receiving a certain amount of military instruction, and it is considered that many of these may be willing to join the General Reserve. Besides these sources from which officers can be drawn for the Special Reserve units, there remain the training colleges. The senior division at Sandhurst, consisting of about 200 cadets, will be available at once, and possibly the cadets in the junior division, especially if the Sandhurst course is lengthened, might also be taken. But as all these cadets will be only half trained in a military sense they will not be used for the Expeditionary Force, but will be sent to help to complete the establishment of the Special Reserve units.

I have now gone through the different sources from which officers can be obtained in the case of a national emergency, but it must be borne in mind that the deficiency we are contemplating will only exist after all the Regular battalions have been brought up to war strength and all their seconded officers have been replaced. If we grant commissions to three noncommissioned officers per battalion and draft all Sandhurst cadets who have completed six months' training to the Special Reserve, we should obtain, roughly, 600 subalterns from these two sources alone; and if we also take into consideration the other sources of supply alluded to, notably the retired non-commissioned officer class, which will prove in time a fruitful source, it will be seen that material exists from which the deficiencies can be made good when the time comes. Even if the estimate we have made proves to be unduly optimistic, it is not too much to expect that, in the event of a supreme national emergency, feelings of patriotism would, as has always been the case in the past, induce a certain number of gentlemen to come forward and take commissions, and we may, I think, anticipate that, should their services he required, some 200 or 300 officers would be forth-corning in this way with whom we have no means of getting into touch at present, but many of whom would have had the advantage of the improved training now given in the Officers Training Corps. In the early stages of the South African War, during the month of April, 1900, 1,200 gentlemen volunteered their services as officers. From the foregoing it will be seen that though there is a considerable shortage of officers in Special Reserve units in peace time, there is every reason to believe that it can be made good in time of war to enable these units to fulfil their functions as feeding battalions.

There are two remarks I wish to add. The first is that this does not represent mere schemes in the air. This is what the Military Secretary's Department and the Training Department have been working at for the last eighteen months. The second remark is this. It may seem to the noble Duke unsatisfactory that we should not have officers ready to hand. But when, at any time in our history, have We ever been in the position of having them ready to hand? And when has any army, except the German Army, for the special reason which I have given, had its officers ready to hand? You always have that situation in time of war. All I can say is there is now more organisation, especially having regard to the difference which the Officers Training Corps is making, than we have had before. I do not say that it is ideal. It cannot be made ideal in a country where the voluntary system is the order of the day. And when you look back to Militia days and remember that the number of officers was dropping off year by year, for social reasons to which I alluded last Week, it is obvious that you could not expect to get officers unless under a new system. It was to meet that want that the Officers Training Corps was designed, and time will show whether it has been successfully designed or not. But take it as you will and put it as you may, there ought to be no difficulty, in a great national emergency, of doing what we have done in the past; and I hope we will have a still better chance in the future of getting sufficient officers with a sufficient amount of training to make them useful and brave officers in the work which they will have to do.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, the noble Viscount has taken a not very usual course in reading out a rather lengthy Memorandum to the House. But, despite the very full nature of the information which lie has given us, I very much doubt whether there is any man among your Lordships, unless it is the noble Duke, who is in the slightest wiser as regards the actual replies to the very succinct Questions which appear on the Paper. I have followed good many of these discussions, and have noticed that the noble Viscount's method of warfare is always to cover himself with a cloud of skirmishers in front in order to hide the main body, and when we come to the main body he withdraws at the most critical moment of the combat. I have not joined in several of these discussions of late so that we might avoid appearing to be constantly pressing the noble Viscount.

We have the advantage of two experts in this House—the noble Viscount, who is the author of a most abstruse work; and the noble Duke, who is the interpreter of it to your Lordships. Their disagreements are not really intelligible to all of us, and what I would suggest is that the noble Viscount should take one date which represents the past and a fair date representing the present, and give us the results. At the beginning of his remarks the noble Viscount said something about the facility of mobilisation now as compared with the time of the South African war. We all admit that the number of officers at that time was insufficient. It was the general resolution of Parliament that the number should be increased. I think that a fair date to take would be seven years ago, before the noble Viscount took office and at a time when the influence of the war had passed away—say January 1, 1905. I do not wish to give the War Office prolonged labour, but let us have simply the number of Regular officers, the number of Militia officers, and the number of Volunteer and Yeomanry officers on January 1, 1905. Then let us have the number of Regular officers, the number of Reserve officers, the number of Special Reserve officers, and the number of Territorial officers on January 1, 1912.

I sincerely hope that the advantage may lie with 1912. But the Return would have this advantage, that at all events we should be able to see whether the belief which the noble Viscount has frequently expressed, that he will be able to mobilise a much larger number of Regular troops, is justified. That has been challenged over and over again by the noble Duke, who has represented these officers as stage officers whom the noble Viscount moves about from the Special Reserve—where they are undoubtedly wanted, and, if they are not there, their places must be taken by non-commissioned officers when mobilisation takes place—to the Regular Army, which the noble Duke has shown requires all these officers in order to take the field. The Return would show us also I the position as to numbers, and it would leave it in our power to comment, if we thought it necessary, on the amount of training that Special Reserve officers will have had as compared with that of the old Militia officers. I hope that the noble Viscount will see his way to give us this very simple Return, and if he promises it I would, on my part, appeal to the noble Duke and my other friends to leave the controversy until we have got the whole of the facts, and then, if necessary, raise the matter in some form which will enable not merely this House but the country to understand the results of the discussion. I am afraid a great deal that fell from the noble Viscount will not be reported in the Press.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

What I have read shall be handed to the Press.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

The document will no doubt give us the facts, but we want them on a wider basis.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Was I correct in saying that the noble Viscount would have only two subaltern officers available on mobilisation for each of his Third Battalions?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

Correct in this sense, that there is a figure which I gave which would (if you take the number of subalterns there now) divide out, if divided by 74, at something like that. But quite incorrect if it means the provision we make on mobilisation. I explained the last time I spoke that under the system which we have now there is a growing number of officers from the Officers Training Corps who do not take commissions attached to a particular unit in the Special Reserve, but take them in a general list attached to the regiment to which the unit belongs. These do not train at the same time as the unit, but they release from training at other times Regular officers who train with the unit. If the noble Duke goes and looks at a Special Reserve unit training he will not find it short of officers, as he suggests. He will find that other officers have come in, and those other officers are only there because there are Special Reserve officers on the unattached list who release those officers and do their work at other times.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Does not the fact remain that if you mobilised to-morrow you would average in the Third Battalions two subalterns per battalion, and that if you mobilised the Fourth Battalions you would have six subalterns per battalion?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I differ from the noble Duke. I have explained that the list of subalterns does not at all represent what we should have on mobilisation.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

Will the noble Viscount tell me where I can find those subalterns in the Army List?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I have given the noble Duke the particulars to-day.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

It would be of additional value if the noble Viscount would put the establishment side by side with the figures which I have suggested he should supply.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

The Return for which the noble Viscount asks has been given for 1911 and 1905. My noble friend Lord Lucas gave it, and I think it was also given in the other House. If that Return is deficient in any points we could bring it up to date, no doubt, and cover the year 1912. But when you have got the Return it will not give all the information which the noble Viscount desiderates. You cannot compare unlike with unlike, and there is no analogy between the position as it was then and the position to-day. When my reply has appeared in Hansard the noble Viscount will find that it gives him the information he requires. But if he so desires we can bring up to date the Return which was given for 1905 and 1911.

House adjourned at Five o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.