HL Deb 20 March 1912 vol 11 cc552-68

*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD had the following Notice on the Paper—

To call attention to the statement of the Secretary of State for War on the 20th February 1912, "I never reduced any home battalions; what I did was to reduce the battalions abroad." (Official Report, 20th February, page 119.)

To ask the Secretary of State for War to define a home battalion of the Regular Army.

To call attention to the number of troops left in the United Kingdom in the event of the departure abroad of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, in the first Question which I have placed on the Paper I ask the noble Viscount to kindly explain to me what is exactly a home battalion of the Regular Army, and I ask the question for this reason. On February last the noble Viscount told us— I never reduced any home battalions; what I did was to reduce battalions abroad. That statement leaves me at a loss to understand what the noble Viscount means by a "home battalion." I have always regarded the Guards as home battalions, in the sense that they were stationed at home, but the noble Viscount has disbanded one Guards battalion and has sent another abroad. The result is a reduction of two home battalions. But, of course, the Guards are on a different footing for foreign service from the Line. A Line battalion stationed at home is referred to as the home battalion. The noble Viscount told us he never reduced any home battalions; but, on referring to the Army List for March, 1906, I find that four out of the eight Line battalions reduced were stationed at home at that moment; so I am puzzled to know what the noble Viscount means by a "home battalion," and before dealing with battalions left at home I venture to ask the noble Viscount, to define a "home battalion."

VISCOUNT HALDANE

The noble Duke has asked me a question which I think I can answer without very much difficulty if he will allow me to refer to what I said on the occasion which his question touches. In the debate in the other House on March 8, 1906, I pointed out in some detail that battalions at home fed battalions abroad, and I said that I should be guilty of an act of lunacy if I reduced battalions at home. The words I used were these— If you pass from personnel to units you find that whereas in 1896–7 there were 142 battalions of the Line, to-day there are 156 battalions, a very substantial increase. Some had been put on under the administration of the noble Marquess opposite for general purposes, and others had been put on for the purposes of the war. I continued— And of them [that is, of the 156 battalions] only 71 are at home against 85 abroad. The noble Duke will appreciate the significance of that— Looking a little more closely into the details of the increase, I find to-day that the Guards have been increased by 3 battalions and that 14 battalions of the Line have been added between 1807–8 and the present time. That is to say, we have 17 more battalions to-day than we had at that time, and the whole increase of 14 units of the Line has been used for the purposes of arrangements abroad. Then I went on— There was a rumour the other day in the papers that I had decided to recommend the abolition of 10 home battalions of the Line. I tried to describe that rumour correctly as a nidus equinus, which is a polite and classic way of calling it a 'mare's nest.' If I had decided to do anything of that kind, it would have been in military eyes tantamount to insanity. For many years past we have been working in this country under what is called the Cardwell system, and the theory of this system is that the best way of training your recruits is to link your battalion at home with the battalion abroad…The result of our system of training is that our battalions at home in time of peace are nurseries or training schools for supplying troops to India and the Colonies. In time of war it is different. That is what I said at that time, and the answer as to what a home battalion means is that it is a feeding battalion—a battalion which is there for the purpose of keeping alive and supplying with seasoned men a battalion which is abroad. On July 19, 1906, I explained it all over again, and if the noble Duke wishes to have the details he will find them in the report of the debate which took place in the other House on that day. As regards the Guards, there was a reduction of one battalion, but it was made for quite another reason, which was admirably explained by the noble Earl opposite (Lord Portsmouth) who was at that time Under-Secretary of State for War in Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's Administration. Lord Portsmouth then said— I now come to the question of the Guards. The noble Marquess the Leader of the Opposition, when he occupied the position of Secretary of State for War in February, 1897, in order to justify the increase of the G cards used these words: 'It must, however, be clearly understood that we are able to recommend this increase and to justify the expenditure which it involves only upon condition that we are allowed to make arise of the brigade to help us in overcoming our difficulties, and to require from it a reasonable contribution towards the relief of the present strain on the Army system.' The noble Earl went on to say— But this purpose was never fulfilled…They are not required for the Expeditionary Force, and they have no share in that other great duty of the Army at home—the providing of drafts for the forces that garrison the outposts of the Empire. The result of that view, which was expressed on July 26, 1906, and which exactly stated the policy, was that I battalion of the Guards was reduced and I was sent to Egypt. As I have said, in 1906–7 the position of matters was this: there were at home 10 battalions of Guards and only 71 battalions of the Line, and 85 battalions of the Line were in South Africa and other Colonies, in Egypt, and in India. In 1907–8 the position had not even then been got right. There were at home still 8 battalions of the Guards; 71 battalions of the Line were at home and 77 abroad. That was after the reduction of 8 battalions of the Line and I of the Guards had taken place. In 1908–9 the position was no better, because in consequence of disturbances in China an extra battalion had to be sent there. There were 70 battalions of the Line and 8 battalions of the Guards at home; there was in Egypt I battalion of the Guards, and there were 78 battalions of the Line abroad. But in 1909–10 we got the policy completely carried out and established the Cardwell balance. The result was that in 1909–10 the state of things was established which exists at the present time—namely, 8 battalions of the Guards were at home and I battalion abroad; 74 battalions of the Line were at home and 74 battalions of the Line abroad. I have now, I think, explained entirely what I mean by home battalions, and I have told the noble Duke what the state of things now is as compared with the previous state of things. I do not know whether the noble Duke wishes me to deal with the second part of his Question now, or whether he would prefer to say something upon it before I reply.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I am obliged to the noble Viscount for his answer to my first Question. But four battalions of the Line were at home when they were reduced. Were they not feeding battalions If 74 battalions of the Line are at home and 74 abroad the noble Viscount seems to think that that balance adds greatly to the safety of the United Kingdom. Personally I should have thought that if we had 84 battalions at home and 74 abroad we would have been in a stronger position.

I will now proceed to the second part of my Question, which is to call attention to the number of troops left in the United Kingdom in the event of the departure abroad of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force. By the statement based on mobilisation returns dated June 1, 1911, the number of troops left at home after the departure of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force is given at 410,000. The noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War speaking at a distribution of prizes to Territorials at Edinburgh on January 8, 1911, is reported to have thus described this force— If the whole of the Regular Expeditionary Force of this country were out of the country, we should still have 410,000 men left trained and organised for defence. We should have 100,000 of the Third battalions. Then there are the Regulars, Royal Engineers, and Garrison Artillery, the Territorials, coast defence troops, and finally there is a central force organised so as to proceed swiftly to whatever point is attacked. The 410,000 men described by the noble Viscount as trained and organised for the defence of the United Kingdom convey the impression of a great Army with a full complement of officers and men more than sufficient for all our needs. But when we come to examine these numbers in detail matters are by no means so satisfactory.

On the departure of the six Divisions we shall be left with four Regular Infantry battalions, three Regular Cavalry regiments, eight Royal Horse Artillery batteries, and nine Field Artillery batteries. These are the only organised units of Regular Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry left at home. There are besides shown on the Return many Regular details which in non-military language may be described as "odds and ends" and of no manner of use for a field Army. The noble Viscount told us on November 20 last that the central field force is organised partly of Territorial units and partly of Regular units. If the noble Viscount carries out this combination of Regular and non-Regular forces to which he is pledged, he can hardly do so with less than one Regular Infantry Brigade and three Cavalry regiments. We see, therefore, that all the Regular Cavalry and all the Regular Infantry battalions surplus to the requirements of the Expeditionary Force must be included in the central field force. That means that there will be no Regular Cavalry regiments or Regular Infantry battalions in Ireland, or in Scotland where there are important naval bases. London will be left without a single Regular Infantry battalion or regiment of Cavalry at a moment when the ranks of the Police are weakened by calling out the Army Reserve and the stress and strain of a great war are upon us. I do not believe that any Government will ever allow such a state of affairs. It shows the futility of talking about sending six Divisions abroad.

We have recently had some remarkable experiences at home which it would be folly to ignore. His Majesty's Government have employed troops in aid of the Civil power six times between June 26, 1907, and February 9, 1912. We have learnt by experience that we have in London a large hostile alien population. The First Lord of the Admiralty, when Home Secretary, took the field, or rather the pavement, in person not very long ago and was present at an engagement in Stepney, when he witnessed the discharge of some hundreds of rounds of ball ammunition down the streets of the metropolis. But far more serious were the events of last August. At that time His Majesty's Government found themselves compelled to employ a large number of troops in aid of the Civil power. The noble Viscount, speaking in your Lordships' House on August 22 said, in reference to the state of affairs then prevailing— It is obvious that even so, and even with the 58,000 troops we had at our disposal and ready, all of whom it was not necessary to use but the greater part of whom were used, it obviously was not possible to cover every point. Now the disturbed area was then limited to England and Wales. No troops were used in aid of the Civil power in Scotland, although troops were used and in considerable numbers at a later date in Ireland.

No one would seriously contend that internal disturbance cannot synchronise with external war. The probabilities are the reverse. We are bound, therefore, to consider what troops would be available to aid the Civil power after the departure of the Expeditionary Force. First come the Regular troops. By the plan of the noble Viscount to which he is committed, their place is in the central field force which is to swoop swiftly down on any point attacked. They cannot form the backbone of the central field force and at the same time be detached hither and thither to aid the Civil power. Again, their numbers are wholly insufficient. Why on February 8 last, there were seven Infantry battalions to say nothing of other troops employed in aid of the Civil power in Belfast alone, to enable a Cabinet Minister to deliver a speech in time of profound peace, and we are to be left with only four battalions during the excitement and tension of a great war. We know by experience, and by the statement of the noble Viscount, that last August the numerical equivalent of two Divisions was not sufficient to cover the whole ground when the area of disturbance was limited to England and Wales. Instead, of the equivalent of two Divisions we are to be left with four battalions and throe Regular Cavalry regiments none of whom can be detached front the central field force, and none of whom are consequently available for duty in aid of the Civil power.

Next come the Third and Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve. I will take the officer question first. The number of officers who remain at home must depend upon the number sent abroad. The noble Viscount has to make good a shortage of 600 Regular Infantry officers in the battalions of the Expeditionary Force previous to their embarkation. He proposes to draw upon the Regular officers attached to the Special Reserve for this purpose. The noble Viscount drew a distinction the other day between the Third and Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve. In answer to Lord Midleton he said— They will be taken from the 74 battalions which do not go abroad. They will be the 74 battalions at the depôts whose function is largely that of training though they do defence work. It is not like taking them from a unit which is going abroad. The Fourth Battalions are to go abroad; the noble Viscount has often told us that; consequently they cannot be available for home defence. On the point of officers, there is another reason which must have influenced the noble Viscount when he told us on March 6 that— He was not going to take the Regular officers from the Fourth Battalions who are to go abroad, namely, that he had done so already. All Regular officers have been withdrawn from the Fourth Battalions with the exception of the adjutants and the quartermasters. So much for the Fourth Battalions.

Each Third Battalion has five Regular Company officers, which gives a total of 370 available to meet the deficit of 600, leaving a shortage of 230 to be made good by another call on another Reserve of Officers before the Expeditionary Force sails. The noble Viscount stated on March 6 that— In the Reserve of Officers there were at present 791 Infantry officers after allowing 40 per cent. for officers who for various reasons may not be forthcoming. That figure by itself would wipe out the 595. But what is the real state of the case? There are at present in the Reserve of Infantry officers 129 captains and 38 subalterns who are resident in the United Kingdom and not now serving in any military force and have not left the Army more than three years. These 167 are the only officers in the Reserve of Officers qualified and available for duty as company officers in the battalions of the Expeditionary Force, but 167 is a very different figure from 791 and will not wipe out the deficit of 600. By drawing upon these Reserve officers and by making a clean sweep of all Regular company officers attached to the Third Special Reserve Battalions the noble Viscount cannot make good the deficit of 600 Regular Infantry officers for the Expeditionary Force, but must again draw on some other sources. There is but one other possible source of supply for officers sailing with the Expeditionary Force and who are to command companies in action within a fortnight of rejoining, and that is to take Regular officers away from Territorial battalions. Does the noble Viscount mean to do that? I hope he does. I think it is the only plan, because any other will wreck the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force by sending them into their first great action, upon which so much will depend, under the command of a lot of incompetent officers.

But then how are we going to be left at home for infantry officers? That is a question for the noble Viscount to explain, but I am afraid he will have to rely largely upon that class which he described the other day as— the people who in the case of the South African war came forward without being under any obligation to do so, and often rendered very useful service. The Third Battalions of the Special Reserve are to absorb all immature Line soldiers and incapable Reservists, and are estimated by the noble Viscount at a total strength of 100,000 men. Of these 50,000 are Special Reservists, and according to the estimate of the noble Viscount 55,000 are Regulars, but Regulars who are immature boys from the Colours—of these there will be upwards of 30,000—and unsound men from the Regular Reserve and the Line. These battalions are to act as fixed garrisons for the defence of naval ports. How can a fixed garrison move about the country in aid of the Civil power? Then they are to train recruits; but how can they train recruits when their instructors, the Regular officers, have been removed? These battalions, by their composition as well as by the duties assigned to them, are quite impossible for duty in aid of the Civil power or yet for home defence. Besides, the noble Viscount has told us that the Third Battalions of the Special Reserve are not for mobilisation. They form a large drafting pool. All the same the noble Viscount at Edinburgh included these 100,000 men amongst his list of troops trained and organised for defence. Their training is of the slightest; their organisation for defence, without an adequate supply of officers and non-commissioned officers, without transport and without any Brigade organisation, is nil. Before leaving the Special Reserve I would observe that the Return includes the 27 Fourth Battalions who must by the plan of the noble Viscount go abroad; that means a decrease of 15,000. Then the first contingent of drafts must leave, if not at the same time immediately after the Expeditionary Force for the base overseas; that means another 15,000 gone abroad—a drop of 30,000 all told. Again, the Return is calculated at a moment when the Regular Reserve is at its highest, but the Army Annual Return tells us that the first class Regular Reserve will drop by 40,000 men before the end of next year.

Lastly, we come to the Territorial Army, which would, of course, be embodied. Many questions have been asked as to the legal liability of the Territorial soldier being used in aid of the Civil power. On March 16, 1909, the noble Viscount was asked whether the men of the Territorial Army could be used to aid the Civil power to put down strikes or any kind of disturbances, and he replied— The Territorial soldier can be called upon to aid the Civil power only when he is under military law on the occasions set forth in Section 176 (6a) of the Army Act. The hon. Member must be well aware, from the full explanation I have given on the subject, that the Territorial Force cannot be called out or embodied in whole or in part in aid of the Civil power for the purpose of putting down riots or disturbances. The noble Viscount has referred us in this answer to that section of the Army Act which governs the Territorial Force in its duties in aid of the Civil power. Under the Army Act the Territorial Force can be used in aid of the Civil power when out for training or when embodied on permanent service. A man in the Territorial Force is a soldier enlisted under Section 10 of the Army Act, and when out for training or on embodied service is in precisely the same position as a soldier in the Regular Army except that the Territorial soldier cannot be sent out of the United Kingdom; that is the only difference. The question is, Do His Majesty's Government propose to use the Territorial Force in aid of the Civil power in the absence of the Expeditionary Force? For they have no other military force available. If they do intend to use the Territorial Army for this purpose they should inform the country and the officers and men of the Force. I should not wonder if this particular use of the Territorial Force came as a surprise to both. For this I cannot help thinking that the noble Viscount's answer, which I have already quoted, is partly responsible. The noble Viscount said that the Territorial Force cannot be called out or embodied in whole or in part in aid of the Civil power for the purpose of putting down riots or disturbances. That statement by itself has only one meaning—namely, you cannot use the Territorial Force in aid of the Civil power. But read it with the section of the Army Act quoted by the noble Viscount and it will mean the opposite. The country and many members of the Territorial Force do not trouble to read up subsections of the Army Act even when they are given a reference, and consequently have misapprehended the true meaning of the noble Viscount's statement. I cannot conceive any Government using the Territorial Army in aid of the Civil power, but the Civil power cannot be left unaided and unsupported. The question is what force is to discharge the duties in aid of the Civil power in time of war for which 58,000 men of the Regular Army were found insufficient in the limited area of England and Wales in time of peace.

The noble Viscount has already contemplated the impossibility of his own plan of sending all six Divisions abroad at one time, because on November 20 last he told us that— arrangements are also made to include in the central force two Divisions of the Regular Army if, when the necessity for taking expeditionary action arises, the Territorial Force is not considered capable of undertaking the duties of home defence without the aid of Regular troops. It is perfectly certain that such few Divisions of the Territorial Army which would be available to act as a field force cannot undertake to meet Continental troops without the help of far more than four Regular battalions, three regiments of Cavalry, and eight batteries of Horse Artillery. Two Divisions of Regular troops must remain for the central force and for aiding the Civil power.

Then as to the garrison of Ireland. I wish the noble Viscount would tell us if he really means to garrison Ireland in time of war by means of the boys of the Territorial Army, stiffened by the National Reserve but unaided by any Regular force. I am sure that the National Reserve will add a very stiff element to the Territorial Army. But I am not sure if the National Reserve is liable for service in Ireland. Perhaps the noble Viscount would tell us. Of course, common sense tells one that one Regular Division must remain in Ireland, so that three Divisions will be available for the Expeditionary Force. In conclusion I ask, What is the use of going on talking about a striking force of six Divisions when you know quite well you cannot strike with those six Divisions?

THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH

Before the noble Viscount replies, perhaps I might be allowed to put to him one or two questions with regard to the condition of the force which would remain behind provided the whole of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force had gone abroad. I will assume that you have 410,000 troops of sorts left in this country. Let us suppose that of that number you have 260,000 Territorials. Now the Territorial Army is organised, but I wish to ask the noble Viscount a question specially in reference to the remaining 150,000 men composed of Regulars and of Special Reservists. As far as I understand, these 150,000 men have no mobilisation equipment. I am not aware that there is any war establishment for these battalions. As regards horses, Colonel Seely stated in another place that the Expeditionary Force would require on mobilisation 44,000 horses and the Territorial Force 84,000 horses. But so far as I can discover, he made no allowance for the 8 Horse Artillery batteries of Regulars and the 33 field batteries of the Special Reserve and Regulars which will be left over in this country. I want to know how that matter stands, and how we stand as regards horses for the equipment of these men who will be left behind. Of course, 410,000 men may seem to the public a very large number of soldiers, and naturally they say, "This Army of 410,000 would be well able to deal with a possible invasion of 70,000 men." But, after all, we want to know that these 410,000 men are properly equipped and organised for mobilisation. I take it that they will largely form part of enormous depôts. It is obvious that when the Expeditionary Force leaves there must be considerable drains upon officers, and it would be interesting if the noble Viscount were able to give us some figures which would show what the Infantry portion of these 150,000 men is in numbers of officers and men excluding, of course, Garrison Artillery and Engineers. In other words, I hope that the noble Viscount may be able to tell us what mobilisation equipment there is for these 410,000 men. How would they be able to act? Would they be able to act as a military force, or would they be merely a mob of soldiers in depôts?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

The noble Duke raised some questions about officers which I think are scarcely covered by the terms of his Notice on the Paper, which relates to troops left at home. The other day, however, he raised the same question and I then gave him a very full statement of officers, which included some sources that he has not mentioned. My statement appears in Hansard, and I would refer the noble Duke to it. As regards the other matters to which he alluded, they come within the terms of the Notice standing in his name on the Paper, and I will answer them. The noble Duke has been haunted by many nightmares, some of which are more serious than others. He has made many permutations and combinations to show what a terrible position we might be in. All I can say is, If you take every possible thing that can happen, such as, for instance, the whole of the civil population, or a large part of it, rising in rebellion at the same time as an invasion takes place, you cannot provide for it. Moltke was once asked what provision he had made for three Powers attacking Germany instead of two. His reply was, "I have made none and Germany must take care of herself." And so the noble Duke and I will have to take care of ourselves without any assistance of an adequate description from the Government of the day if the civil population rises to an enormous extent in rebellion at the same time an an invading army lands upon these shores. Those are not contingencies against which it is possible for any Government to prepare.

Then as regards the Territorial Force, the noble Duke said that if it may conceivably be used for the purpose of putting down civil not it ought to be told so, and he said it did not understand so at the present time. The public know quite clearly that the Territorial Force cannot be called out or embodied for the purpose of putting down riot, but when embodied the soldier, be he Territorial or Regular, is in the same position in this matter. The noble Duke and I would be called upon at once to act as special constables if the State required our services, and while I think he would probably be a great deal more efficient than I should be, I should none the less be under a legal obligation to lend what assistance I could, and so it is with the Territorial Force. You cannot embody them for the purpose under the law, but when they are embodied they have to help the State and can be used just as freely.

I come to the other point. The noble Duke is haunted by the nightmare of the foreign water who might mobilise at Inverness. He has alluded to these waiters as dangerous persons. I think we can take care of the foreign water if the contingency arises. He then went on to the number of troops who would be left in this country if the Expeditionary Force had all gone abroad. Well, the Expeditionary Force may have gone abroad. If it has gone abroad rashly in the face of very great peril, that will be the responsibility of those who sent it abroad. You cannot say beforehand whether or not you will send abroad the whole of your Expeditionary Force. You may send only four Divisions. It is impossible to forecast these things or to base hypotheses on a state of circumstances which may be infinitely different from those we contemplate. But, if the whole of the Expeditionary Force had been sent abroad, there would remain 410,000 men. "But," asks the noble Duke, "in what condition?" The Territorial Force, he admits, is organised; but he asks, What about the rest? And the noble Earl, Lord Portsmouth, put to me the question, Where is your mobilisation equipment for the other 150,000 men?

I explained fully in debate last session what was the plan of the General Staff, the plan that had actually been worked out and arranged for as regards these men. The number of 150,000 is too high. About 100,000 is the number. They are the men who are in the 74 battalions, and these are the battalions which are allotted for the defence of places that require defence, particularly naval ports and other places which require garrisoning. They are distributed, according to a plan, all over the coast of Great Britain and Ireland, and their duties are duties of local defence. They are not designed to be put into brigades, nor do they require mobilisation and transport arrangements of the order that are appropriate to mobile troops. They are there for the purpose of port defence, and unless you had them there you would have to supply their places with some other force. They are not scantily trained men, as has been suggested. They are men not only of the Special Reserve, but of the Regular Reserve. There is a surplus of Regular Reservists on mobilisation which goes into this number, and if the noble Duke will refer to a Return which was given on February 26 last in response to a Question put in the other House he will find the details. There are nearly 91,000 Regulars who will remain at home after the Expeditionary Force has gone abroad; in addition there are 55,000 Special Reservists, and there are 2,174 of the Permanent Staff of the Territorial Force, and 259,264 of the rest. There are still 2,267 of the Militia Reserve Division, and that makes a total of 409,651. Of these Regular Reservists a considerable number are in the 74 battalions, which are brought up on mobilisation to the number of 1,100 or 1,200 apiece. They serve the purpose of training drafts. They are constantly taking in recruits and sending recruits out, and owing to their size and the way in which they are organised they are capable of fulfilling the double function of training troops and affording defence to those places which require this kind of defence. Of course, they have not got mobilisation equipment in the way of transport because they are not intended to be mobile, but they have all the other necessary equipment.

As to the horses required for the Cavalry, the scheme of classification of horses has been to a very great extent carried into operation. It has covered already a great part of the country. We have classified a great many more than enough horses to provide for the Regulars, and in a short time we shall have classified more than enough to provide for the Territorials; and there will still be a large number over to provide for wastage and for extra requirements. I quite agree that, like any other army in the world, we require more horses in war than we have in peace, but under this plan we shall get not only what we want but more than we want. We take every step we can to make up the number of horses required by the Cavalry. Last September we purchased 650 horses and added them to the establishment of the Regular Cavalry, and in the Estimates this year 20 horses have been added to every Cavalry regiment at home. If the noble Earl will look further at what was said in the Statement on the Estimates he will see that we provide for the Cavalry horses being of a better type than they have hitherto been. Up to now our Army has suffered because the horses were too young for their work, and there was, accordingly, great wastage. Four new training depots are being established, one in Ireland and three in this country, to which horses as they are bought for the Cavalry will be sent, and when they have been thoroughly hardened and trained, then, and not till then, will they go to the regiment. Some of the seasoned horses of the regiments will probably be boarded out under a new system which we are arranging, but they can be got back at a few moments' notice; and while they are being boarded out the younger horses will be becoming seasoned in the depots awl will be brought up to the mark. In that way we hope to have an adequate supply of horses for the Cavalry. As the noble Earl knows, there is a system now under which, for the purpose of encouraging horse-breeding, there is considerable expenditure on the part of the Board of Agriculture in stimulating horse-breeding, and our plan is to buy the horses young and send them to the four Cavalry training depots which I have described, and from there introduce them in a hardened condition into the Cavalry.

As regards the Artillery, it is not so easy. There you have to rely to a great extent on what horses you can get. Until lately we had these admirable bus-horses, which were a valuable stand-by. I am afraid we cannot reckon on these admirable horses much longer, and we are taking such steps as we hope will enable us to provide substitutes for them so as to keep the Artillery in a satisfactory condition. You do not, of course, want such highly-trained horses for the Artillery as you do for the Cavalry, but you do want good strong horses. One of the most anxious problems which we have at the present time is to keep our hand on a sufficient supply of hardened horses for the Artillery Still, I hope that the steps we are taking will result in its being solved. I think I have now covered the question about the horses. I would only add this, that all the 410,000 men are organised men. They are all in either the 74 Special Reserve cadres or in other cadres or in the Territorial Force. Besides that, in an unorganised form, you get what you may realise from the National Reserve. That Reserve has already in the very short space of its life reached about 70,000. That list is being classified. There is very little doubt that it will increase strongly in the future, and in that list there is a very large number of capable men on whom in an emergency we might rely to come forward and render assistance of various kinds. Some of them are highly trained non-commissioned officers who could take commissions, if necessary, at a pinch in the Territorial Force and in the Special Reserve. Others are men who would be invaluable for the seasoning of the Territorial Force, taking the place of untrained recruits and mobilising the Territorial Force up to its strength. I therefore think that, considering that the 410,000 men apart from that source numbers nearly six times the 70,000 which is the conceivable maximum against which you ought to provide, and having regard to the principles of naval strategy which were propounded the day before yesterday by my right hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty in his speech in the House of Commons, and to the fact that the Navy is our first, and, for that matter, our second line of defence, even when the whole of the Expeditionary Force had been sent abroad we are not left in such a condition as to give rise to fears or apprehensions of unknown terrors.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I asked the noble Viscount the question, how he is going to garrison London when the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force are out of the country. The noble Viscount has not given me any answer to that, nor to the question of the garrisoning of Ireland.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

You have available the Third Battalions, then you have the Territorial Force, and then you have a certain number of Regulars to draw upon very sparingly and carefully. The two great sources would be the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve.

House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.