§ *THE DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention to—
- 1. The following Table showing the number of men required from Section D of the Regular Reserve to complete the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force after October, 1913, according to statements supplied by the Secretary of State for War and by the Under-Secretary of State for War.
- 2. The number of men in Section D available for service abroad in 1913 after all the requirements of mobilisation have been supplied; and to move for Papers.
| Estimated strength of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve in 1913 (Lord Erroll's Return) | 106,372 | |
| Less number resident abroad on 1st January, 1912. (Statement of Under-secretary of State for War on Monday, 4th March, 1912. Official Report) | 8,230 | |
| 98,142 | ||
| Less 10 per cent, for casualties. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State, 15th November, 1910. Official Report) | 9,814 |
| Less number of Reservists required to bring the four home battalions and other Regular units left at home up to war establishment. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State, 15th November, 1910. Official Report) | 3,729 | |
| Less number required to replace combatant Regular Reservists who have been transferred from Regular Reserve to serve with Royal Army Medical Corps on mobilisation and are no longer available in the combatant ranks. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State, 20th February, 1912. Official Report) | 1,650 | |
| Less number required to complete deficiency in Category B. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State for War on 20th February, 1912. Official Report) | 6,467 | |
| 21,660 | ||
| Regular Reservists A and B available for Expeditionary Force | 76,482 | |
| Number of Reservists required for Expeditionary Force. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State for War, 30th May, 1911. Official Report) | 90,000 | |
| Deficit in Sections A and B | 13,518 | |
| Number required from Section D to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force in 1913 | 13,518 | |
| SECTION D, THE SECOND CLASS OF THE ARMY RESERVE. RE-ENLISTED RE-SERVISTS ABSENT FROM THE COLOURS FROM 9 TO 13 YEARS. | ||
| Estimated strength on 1st February, 1913. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State for War, 19th February, 1912. Official Report) | 29,862 | |
| Less 10 per cent, allowed for Casualties. (Statement of Under-Secretary of State for War, 15th November, 1910. Official Report) | 2,986 | |
| 26,876 | ||
| Less number required to make up the deficiencies of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve for the Expeditionary Force | 13,518 | |
| 13,358 | ||
| Less 9,840 time-expired Reservists to be enlisted into the Special Reserve battalions instead of Section D. (Statement of Secretary of State for War, 14th March, 1911. Official Report) | 9,840 | |
| Less 2,032 required for Depôts by Army Order, 23rd December, 1907 | 2,032 | |
| 11,872 | ||
| Available surplus from Section D for foreign service with Regular Army after mobilisation of six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force in 1913 | 1,486 |
§ The noble Duke said: My Lords, my present Questions arise from a discussion which took place in your Lordships' House on February 28 last as to the fitness for immediate active service of time-expired soldiers re-enlisting into Section D, which I describe as the second class of the Regular Reserve, and as to the number of men of this description required by the noble Viscount to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force. It is necessary to remember, in reference to this Section of the Reserve, firstly, that for the next four years it will be composed of men who are the product of the three-years Colour service term of enlistment, and, consequently, have been absent from the Colours from nine to thirteen years; secondly, that if the noble Viscount succeeds in re-enlisting, as he hopes to do, 30,000 men out of the 40,000 due to pass out of the Reserve by October, 1913, these 30,000 men in four years time pass out of the Reserve and cannot be replaced. They cannot be replaced because the noble Viscount has diminished the Reserve-creating power of the Army by reducing the number of men serving with the Colours by 37,000 since 1905. It is this reduction in the number of men serving with the Colours which necessitates the re-enlistment of these time-expired soldiers. As a matter of fact, if it had not been for the Reserve created by the three-years term of Colour service the Expeditionary Force of the noble Viscount, which has shed such lustre upon his military administration, would have been numerically impossible even on paper. It therefore seems to me that the noble Viscount, instead of denouncing the scheme of the three-years Colour service as preposterous, ought to be deeply grateful that the plan was ever tried.
§ The body of men in the Section D of the Reserve with which we have to deal for the next four years have been absent from the Colours from nine to thirteen years without doing any military training during the period of their four years' re-enlistment. Their musketry practice consists in two attendances on the range and in firing twenty-five rounds on each occasion. On mobilisation they will find themselves armed with a rifle of a different pattern to the one which they carried in bygone days when they were soldiering. Lord Methuen has told us that he found that this class of Reservist could not march on 410 active service, and has described them as more or less veterans. This combination of facts proclaims them at once as unfit for active service on the Continent with the Expeditionary Force within three weeks of mobilisation. The noble Viscount has not quoted any military authority to prove that such is not the case. The question is, How many of these re-enlisted Reservists, unfit for the duties assigned to them by the noble Viscount, must he include in the ranks of the Expeditionary Force? Upon that point the noble Viscount was reticent, on account of the secrets of mobilisation. Now the numbers of our Army are matters which must be, and are, within the knowledge of the public. I ventured to say, therefore, in my reply to the noble Viscount the other day, that I would put on the Paper of the House the figures with which we have already been supplied bearing upon the point. This I have now done. I propose to take the headings separately, and if the noble Viscount in his reply found it convenient to follow the same course I hope we may be able to understand why these War Office figures point on mobilisation to a very narrow margin in the Reserve, whereas we know that the noble Viscount reckons on an abundant surplus.
§ The estimated strength of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve in 1913 is 106,372; the number resident abroad is 8,230. Necessary allowance for wastage at 10 per cent. is 9,814. These headings need no explanation. The next deduction is 3,729, the number of Reservists required to bring the four home battalions and all other Regular units at home up to war strength. The four home battalions represent the backbone of the swiftly moving central field force upon which, according to the noble Viscount, we can rely with such certainty. These battalions, as well as the other Regular units, must be made up to war strength by 3,729 Reservists, who, being wanted at home, cannot be available for foreign service.
§ My next heading is 1,650 combatant Reservists who have transferred from the combatant ranks to serve with the Royal Army Medical Corps on mobilisation. I read in the Army Annual Return for 1912 that the full number of 2,000 Infantry Reservists who had been invited in 1909 411 to transfer to the Reserve of the Royal Army Medical Corps have not yet been obtained. However, 1,650 have been obtained, and it is certain that if these 1,650 men are withdrawn from the fighting line their vacant places must be filled by a similar number of combatant Reservists. My last deduction is 6,467 men, the number required to complete the deficiency in Category B of the Special Reserve. Category B is composed of men who are returned as supernumerary to the Territorial Army and who have undertaken to join the Special Reserve on mobilisation and to serve abroad. They are an absolutely essential part of the Expeditionary Force, which will be incomplete without them. We heard a great deal about them-once; we do not hear much about them now. The establishment is 7,448. The deficiency shown by the Army Estimates of this year 1912–1913 is as follows—Army Service Corps, deficit 5,513; Royal Army Medical Corps, 420; Army Veterinary Department, 524.
§ To sum up. The allowance necessary for wastage, the number of Reservists required for home Regular units, the number transferred to Army Medical Corps, and the number required to make good deficiencies in Category B amount to 21,660. The result, then, is that there are left available for the Expeditionary Force 76,482, but as 90,000 are required there is a deficit in Sections A and B of 13,518. This deficit of 13,518 represents the number required from Section D to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions. In the Table dealing with Section D I would only say, as to the second heading, that the War Office allowance of 10 per cent. for unfitness amongst time-expired Reservists is contrary to common sense, because it is the same rate which is found necessary for soldiers serving with the Colours. It is more likely to be 30 per cent.
§ The only other heading requiring any notice is the fourth—namely, the 9,840 time-expired soldiers required by the noble Viscount to complete the establishment of his Special Reserve battalions. I have already mentioned this point in your Lordships' House. The noble Viscount appeals to time-expired soldiers to enlist both into his Special Reserve battalions and into Section D. The supply of time-expired Reservists is limited to the number 412 who pass out of the Reserve in any one year. Of course, all men who enlist in the Special Reserve battalions, and the noble Viscount has assured us that few men go to Section D, must be lost to Section D. Finally, according to the War Office figures I have quoted we are to be left in 1913, after the departure of the Expeditionary Force, with less than 1,500 Regular Reservists available for the Army overseas, and those of the second class. The noble Viscount told us on May 4 last that he would have, in the event of mobilisation in 1913, a surplus of 27,000. I beg to move for Papers.
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE)My Lords, the noble Duke has laid before the House a Table, which he says is compiled from statements made by myself and by the Under-Secretary in the House of Commons and from Returns, showing what he considers will be the state of things as regards the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force should that take place in the year 1913, and he has added to that a further Table showing the number of men in Section D who will be available for the purposes of the Expeditionary Force. The noble Duke laid a similar Table before the House last May dealing with practically the same subject. I always treat the views of the noble Duke with profound respect, so I referred that Table to the department of the Adjutant-General, and I brought before the House the result of their Report, which was that the Table contained a trifling error of a little over 32,000 men. On this occasion I congratulate the noble Duke. I have referred his new Table to the department of the Adjutant-General and have got a further Report from them, and this time the error is not anything like as great.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDI would point out that the figures are not mine. This is not my Table; it is the War Office Table.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEThe noble Duke has misunderstood and quite unintentionally misrepresented the War Office figures. But, as I say, I congratulate him because on the present occasion the error is reduced to a trifle over 18,000 men, which is an improvement. This is a very 413 dry and tedious subject, but I think I shall be able to put shortly before the House the points which have misled the noble Duke. The noble Duke started off with the Return which was made in response to a Motion by Lord Erroll in 1909, and he has taken the figures as they appeared at that time. For instance, he says that 106,372 is the estimated strength of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve in 1913. According to that Table, that is quite true. We said at the time that we were dissatisfied with that state of things, which arose from the outgoing of the nine years enlisted men. It was only temporary, because the Table itself shows that the numbers went up afterwards. In order to meet the shortage at that time, or at any rate the small numbers at that time, we said we would resort to measures which we have since taken and which I have explained on former occasions to the House. We have allowed, in the case of suitable battalions where recruiting was very good, a considerable number of men to go to the Reserve before their time, and the result is that—not because the old Table was wrong, for it was based on the then existing state of things, but because of the new state of things—the figure to-day is not really the figure which the noble Duke has taken from the 1909 Report.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDCan the noble Viscount give us the figure? The figure of 106,372 is the one on which we have worked for some time past.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEThe noble Duke has worked on it, but we have since then taken extensively the step of enabling men to pass prematurely to the Reserve when the state of recruiting was so good that the shortage in the battalions was easily made up. In that way we have increased the Reserve by several thousands.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDWill the noble Viscount give us the figure?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI can obtain it for the noble Duke if he likes, but we have increased the figure by several thousands. My point is that it is misleading to take the figure of 106,372, what at best is merely an actuarial estimate, as if representing the ascertained facts. The next point is the figure of 3,729, which was the 414 number of Reservists required on January 1, 1910, to bring the four home battalions—that is to say, the unallotted battalions—up to war establishment. For very much the same reason that is an unreliable figure, and constantly changing. It is different now from what it was then. I will give the noble Duke a Table which will enable him to see where he has gone wrong.
Then the noble Duke speaks of 1,650 Infantry and Royal Garrison Artillery Reservists transferred to the Royal Army Medical Corps. He has deducted these as not being available for the purposes of the Expeditionary Force. But these should not be deducted, as they are part of the establishment of the Expeditionary Force. They are included in the 90,000 required for the Expeditionary Force, and the noble Duke has counted them in that way twice over. They are in the 90,000, and you cannot have them twice over. That is a mistake. But there was a much larger mistake in the noble Duke's last Table. The next point is this. The noble Duke puts the deficiency in Category B of the Special Reserve at 6,467, based on the 1911–12 establishment. If the noble Duke had looked at the establishment in the new Estimates for 1912–13 he would have found that it was 5,210, and not the figure he has given, and that the strength on February 1, 1912, was 988 all ranks, leaving a deficiency of 4,222. As, however, 680 out of that number are not required for the Expeditionary Force at all, the actual deficiency on Expeditionary Force requirements is 3,542, which, as we have already explained, will be made up by specially enlisted men.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDWill the noble Viscount explain what he means by specially enlisted men? Does he propose to enlist these men at the moment of mobilisation?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEYes; and I should explain that we have made considerable changes in the system of transport. The transport used to be horse transport. It has now become in large measure mechanical transport, and the drivers, instead of being horse-drivers, will be men specially trained in the driving of these mechanically-propelled wagons, some of which we are building and others of which we are subsidising. We are making special arrangements for enlisting skilled motor-drivers. 415 That is what I mean by specially enlisted men. The number of Regular Reservists available, admitting that the other figures used by the noble Duke are approximately correct, therefore becomes 84,599 plus the men who join Section B on premature conversion of service, and not 76,482. Then, finally, the full number of 9,840 time-expired Reservists to be enlisted into Special Reserve battalions instead of into Section D has been misunderstood by the noble Duke. Those are in addition to and not in substitution for Section D men, since they will be men of an age who will already have finished their time in Section D if they ever contemplated joining that Section of the Army Reserve.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDDoes the noble Viscount mean that the man must go to Section D before he goes to the Special Reserve?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANENot necessarily. The age fixed for the Special Reserve is higher. Men are going into the Special Reserve at a higher age than into Section D.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDMay not these men go into Section D in preference to going into the Special Reserve?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANESome men will not go into Section D because it does not suit them to take the obligation attached to that section.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDThen the noble Viscount has a competition between Section D of the Regular Reserve and the Special Reserve?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEThere is an abundance of old soldiers in the country and an enormous source from which to draw men, and we are not conscious of any difficulty in that direction. With regard to the figures in the noble Duke's Table, I have here a Table corrected in accordance with the criticisms which I have made, and the effect of it is that, instead of the state of things shown by the noble Duke, a very different state of things is disclosed. The noble Duke makes out that we would have to use up Section D men to such an extent in order to mobilise in 1913 that there would only be a surplus of 1,486 left over. According to the corrected Table, the 416 surplus left over is not 1,486 but 19,483. I will hand this Table to the Official Reporter to be added to my reply, so that the noble Duke may examine it.†
There is only one thing I should like to say in conclusion. I do not interfere in any way with figures made out on the responsibility of the Adjutant-General's Department. But I did suggest to the noble Duke before, and I make the suggestion again, that it is really impossible for any person who is not trained to the work and has not the materials for making out Tables like this to do it efficiently. The noble Duke falls into these mistakes not from want of zeal—we all know with what public spirit he has applied himself to this—but he obviously could not possess the materials for making out such a Table. I suggested before that when he prepared a Table again he might send it to me or to my private secretary or direct to the Adjutant-General, and I promised that the Table would be returned to him with the observations of the Department upon it and accompanied by a cor-
417 rected Table, and if that had been done we should have been saved two or three debates in this House on figures, which are very unprofitable. The noble Duke pours out figures like a torrent, and then I trickle forth a number in response, and I am afraid the result is not very profitable. In these circumstances I trust the procedure which I have suggested will commend itself to the noble Duke.
[†] TABLE. Estimated strength of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve in 1913. (Erroll Return) 106,372 Less number resident abroad—say the same as on 1st January, 1912 8,230 98,142 Less 10 per cent, for casualties 9,814 Less number of Reservists required to bring the four home battalions up to war establishment (assuming that the figure in 1913 remains the same as that in 1910) 3,729 13,543 13,543 Instead of 76,482, there are available 84,599 Number of Reservists required for Expeditionary Force, approximately 90,000 Number required for Expeditionary Force from Section D 5,401 To meet this Section D is estimated to be on 1st February, 1913 29,862 Less 10 per cent. for casualties 2,986 26,876 Less number required for Expeditionary Force 5,401 21,475 Less number required for depôts 1,992 19,483
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDI am much obliged to the noble Viscount for his answer, but I wish he could tell me what the estimated strength of the Reserve is going to be. The figure I have quoted is the figure which has always been given to us. As regards the deficiency in Section B, the figure I gave is the figure of the Under-Secretary of State for War himself. The noble Viscount has never told us how many men he wants for the mobilisation of the Regular troops at home. Does the figure 3,729 remain?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEWhat figure is that?
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDThe number required for the mobilisation of the troops at home.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEYes, that figure is practically correct. It is changed to this extent, that the Reserve of many of these home battalions varies from time to time. It is a quite unreliable figure to stand by, because it changes for the reasons I have given—that in the case of many battalions men pass prematurely to the Reserve and the Reserve of those battalions is larger than it would otherwise have been. The noble Duke may take it that I have not altered this particular figure in making my estimate of the error in his Table.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDThe noble Viscount has included those men in the 90,000?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANENo.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDUntil the noble Viscount can tell us what the difference is with regard to the figure of 106,372 I do not think we can arrive at the large surplus which the noble Viscount has stated.
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI have assumed 106,372 as the figure for working on. It is really a conjectural figure, and therefore if I had corrected it the noble Duke's error as to the surplus left over might have been greater.
§ THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTHWould it not be possible to bring Lord Erroll's Return up to date?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEYes, I think so; and if it would be of any convenience to noble Lords I will see if it can be done.
§ LORD AMPTHILLWhy will not the noble Viscount give us the actual figure of the estimated strength of Sections A and B?
§ VISCOUNT HALDANEI have not the actual figure with me, but I can say it is some two or three thousand over the 106,372, assuming that the latter figure turns out in 1913 to accord with the actuarial estimate.