Lords Sitting of 6 March 1912

Preamble
The LORD STANMORE—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
NOTTINGHAM MECHANICS INSTITUTION BILL. [H.L.]
  AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL COMPANY BILL. [H.L.]
  Read 2a (according to order), and committed.
LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
  MANCHESTER ROYAL EXCHANGE BILL. [H.L.]

    MIDLAND RAILWAY (LONDON, TILBURY AND SOUTHEND RAILWAY PURCHASE) BILL. [H.L.]
    WOKING DISTRICT GAS BILL. [H.L.]
    Read 2a (according to order), and committed: The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
  BIRKBECK SHARE AND DEBENTURE TRUST BILL. [H.L.]

    BORDON AND DISTRICT GAS BILL. [H.L.]
    SWANAGE GAS AND WATER BILL. [H.L.]
    YORK UNITED GAS BILL. [H.L.]
    WAKEFIELD GAS BILL. [H.L.]
    TEES CONSERVANCY BILL. [H.L.]
    Read 2a (according to order), and committed: The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Appointed: The Lords following, with the Chairman of Committees, were named of the Committee:

E. Crewe. (L. Privy Seal.)

D. Bedford.

D. Marlborough.

D. Northumberland.

M. Lansdowne.

M. Salisbury.

M. Bath.

E. Chesterfield. (L. Steward.)

E. Derby.

E. Denbigh.

E. Jersey.

E. Lauderdale.

E. Waldegrave.

E. Cadogan.

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E. Howe.

B. Camperdown.

E Dartrey

E. Lytton.

E. Carrington.

E. Cromer.

V. Knutsford.

V. Churchill.

L. Zouche of Haryngworth.

L. Barnard.

L. Balfour.

L. Ribblesdale.

L. Colchester.

L. Kintore. (E. Kintore.)

L. Belper.

L. Brougham and Vaux.

L. Kinnaird.

L. Hylton.

L. Fermanagh. (E. Erne.)

L. Reay.

L. Newton.

L. Welby.

L. Ludlow.

L. Ritchie.

L. Ilkeston.

L. Emmott.

All Petitions relating to the Standing Orders which shall be presented during the present Session referred to the Committee unless otherwise ordered.

COMMITTEE OF SELECTION.
The Lords following, viz.:

E. Crewe. (L. Privy Seal.)

D. Bedford.

D. Devonshire.

D. Northumberland.

M. Lansdowne.

E. Lauderdale.

E. Waldegrave.

E. Camperdown.

V. Churchill.

L. Balfour.

L. Ribblesdale.

L. Granard. (E. Granard.)

L. Kintore. (E. Kintore.)

L. Belper.

L. Brougham and Vaux.

L. Herschell.

L. Hindlip.

L. Newton.

L. Colebrooke.

with the Chairman of Committees, were appointed a Committee to select and propose to the House the names of the Five Lords to form a Select Committee for the consideration of each opposed Private Bill.

HOUSE OF LORDS OFFICES.
Select Committee appointed: The Lords following, with the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, and the Chairman of Committees, were named of the Committee:

D. Northumberland.

M. Bath.

M. Cholmondeley.

E. Chesterfield. (L. Steward.)

E. Clarendon.

E. Essex.

E. Stanhope.

E. Waldegrave.

E. Mount. Edgcumbe.

E. Beauchamp.

E. Camperdown.

E. Carrington.

E. Halsbury.

E. Plymouth.

V. Gordon.(E. Aberdeen.)

V. Cross.

V. Peel.

V. Knutsford.

V. Churchill.

L. Balfour.

L. Ribblesdale.

L. Colchester.

L. Rosebery. (E. Rosebery.)

L. Poltimore.

L. Kintore. (E. Kintore.)

L. Belper.

L. Monk Bretton.

L. Macnaghten.

L. Welby.

L. Burghclere.

L. Sanderson.

L. Colebrooke.

MANCHESTER ROYAL EXCHANGE BILL. [H.L.]
Report from the Committee of Selection that the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Price's Patent Candle Company Bill [H.L.] and other Bills do form the Select Committee for the consideration of the Manchester Royal Exchange Bill [H.L.]; read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bill to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bill.
NORTH KIILINGHOLME PIER BILL. [H.L.]
  MANCHESTER SHIP CANAL.
  (Petition for Bill.)
SWANSEA CORPORATION BILL.
  LONDON COUNTRY COUNCIL (TRAMWAYS AND IMPROVMENTS) BILL

    DUBLIN AND SOUTH EASTERN RAILWAY (NEW WORKS) BILL.
    NATIONAL ELECTRIC CONSTRUCTION COMPANY BILL.
    Examiner's Certificate of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee on Wednesday next.

NORTH ORMESBY, SOUTH BANK, NORMANBY AND GRANGETOWN RAILLESS TRACTION BILL. [H.L.]
  BRODSWORTH AND DISTRICT GAS BILL. [H.L.]

    DERWENT VALLEY WATER BILL. [H.L.]
    BRIGHTON CORPARATION BILL. [H.L.]
    HOVE CORPORATION RAILLESS TRACTION BILL. [H.L.]
    BRIGHTON DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL. [H.L.]
    BRIGHTON, HOVE AND DISTRICT RAILAILLESS TRACTION BILL.[H.L.]
    Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord Ashton of Hyde be proposed to the House as a Member of the Select Committee on the said Bills in the place of the Lord Hastings; read, and agreed to.

THE ARMY.
THE. DUKE OF BEDFORD*THE. DUKE OF BEDFORD rose to call attention to the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for War on 6th March, 1911—
That the total number of Regular Infantry officers required for the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force is 2,461, exclusive of those required for Staff appointments.
That the number of Regular Infantry officers serving at home in the 82 battalions, and who were by the January Army List of 1911 not seconded, was 1,998.
That the number of Infantry officers required for the four battalions remaining at home after the departure of the Expeditionary Force is 112.
That these figures show a deficiency of 575 Regular Infantry officers, exclusive of Staff and of any allowance for temporary unfitness;
and to ask the Secretary of State for War how the deficiency of 575 Regular Infantry officers for the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force will be made good on mobilisation.
The noble Duke said: These figures are now a year old, but there is no appreciable variation. I have referred to the Army List of last January and find that the number of Regular Infantry officers serving at home and not seconded is almost the same. There are still six Divisions in the Expeditionary Force, so that the demands made upon that number remain unaltered. I therefore use precisely the same table of figures as that given to me by the Under-Secretary of State for War on March 6, 1011. It is to the deficiency in the numbers of Regular Infantry officers trained with their battalions for the requirements of the Expeditionary Force to which I beg to draw attention. The War Office figures show a shortage of 463 Regular Infantry officers, and to this number must be added 112 officers required for the four home battalions, as mentioned by the Under-Secretary of State for War, making the total deficit 575 for the Expeditionary Force. This number must be an underestimate. No allowance is made for temporary unfitness for active service. If such unfitness amounted to but one per cent. of the 2,500 officers, the deficiency would be more than 600. Again, a number of company officers—I cannot give the exact figures—must be employed on mobilisation as Brigade Majors, as Brigade Signalling Officers, as A.D.Cs., and on other extra regimental duties, thereby creating vacancies in their battalions. In short, the deficiency of Regular Infantry officers on mobilisation for the requirements of the Expeditionary Force, as shown by War Office figures, must be well over 600.
I should explain that this large deficiency in Regular Infantry officers arises in great measure from the fact that the noble Viscount has not got Regular Cavalry sufficient for his Expeditionary Force, and consequently is compelled to employ Regular Mounted Infantry to act as Divisional Cavalry—that is in place of the Cavalry attached to an Infantry Division. The noble Viscount is compelled to deplete his Infantry battalions of both officers and men in order to create makeshift Divisional Cavalry. On the average the 78 battalions of the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force will find themselves 6 Regular officers short on mobilisation—that is a deficiency of one-quarter of the total complement of company officers per battalion. The noble Viscount, in dealing with the
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Army Estimates on March 14 of last year, said—
"There is no difficulty at all in mobilising as far as officers of the Expeditionary Force are concerned. But, of course, you would deplete to a very considerable extent the depots and the home estublishment."
But when we come to go into details and take the Infantry arm by itself we find, by figures supplied by the Under-Secretary of State for War, a deficiency of at least 600 Regular Infantry officers. I am anxious to learn from the noble Viscount himself how— mean from what sources—he proposes to supply the deficiency of 600 Regular Infantry officers as shown by the figures given last year by the Under-Secretary.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): The figures given by the noble Duke are substantially accurate. They are a little old, but the figures to-day, as he stated, are not materially different from those at the date he takes. The question which he asks is, in substance, this—How on mobilisation is the deficiency of officers, which, of course, will exist, to be made up? The peace establishment of officers is different from the war establishment. That state of things is true, not only in the British Army but in every Army, anti I think it always has been true of every army which has moved from a peace to a war footing at all times. Napoleon filled up his deficiency from non-commissioned officers, and, of course, if you do that you can do easily what is required. In the Peninsular War we had to make up a deficiency of officers on mobilisation, and we promoted a large number of non-commissioned officers in those days. In the South African War so many people came forward from all sources that it was not necessary to promote noncommissioned officers to fill up the deficiency, but that source always remains.
What I propose to do is to answer the noble Duke now for the moment apart from that source of supply, which is one that we undoubtedly should reserve to ourselves full liberty to resort to, getting as we should some extremely competent company officers from those who had passed through the ranks and had become noncommissioned officers. The Infantry officers in the General Reserve of Officers—which the noble Duke, of course, has not

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taken into account, because that exists only for mobilisation—number at present 791, after allowing 40 per cent. for officers who for various reasons may not be forthcoming. That figure by itself would wipe out his 575. But then ho would say, and say truly, that a number of these officers are of rather senior rank, of rank senior to the subaltern officers who would be required, and therefore you must not treat the whole of them as if they were readily available. But after deducting 40 per cent. there are 791 there. We are taking steps to increase this number by offering General Reserve commissions to ex-cadets of the Officers Training Corps. We have the more encouragement to do this because those who take commissions from the Officers Training Corps are now beginning to come in fairly fast. Already not far off 300 of the cadets of that corps have taken commissions in the Special Reserve—a very great change from the state of things eighteen months ago. The Infantry officers in the Special Reserve number 1,540 of all ranks, and allowance has been made in their establishment to admit of four subalterns per battalion passing to the Regulars on mobilisation. There are, outside those referred to in the noble Duke's question, 780 Regular Infantry officers with the Special Reserve battalions. These are the Infantry officers who were posted to those battalions to look after the training at the depot. If an order to mobilise were given, we should certainly take the course which we have always taken before of giving commissions to members of the senior class of Sandhurst, and that will probably provide between 100 and 200 Infantry officers. These sources, taken by themselves, will give enough to provide for mobilisation, but we still have behind that the possibility—a very practical one—of resorting to the class of non-commissioned officers; and, further, we have what proved to be a great resource in the South African War—I refer to the number of people who came forward without being under any obligation to do so, and many of whom rendered very useful service.
There is no difficulty in mobilising the Expeditionary Force. I admit that to do so we should have, in the first instance, to draw very heavily upon the Regular officers who may be left, but their places would be filled up from the General Reserve and from the other sources of which I have spoken, and there will also be a good provision for wastage. Mobilisation so far as officers are
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concerned is a ragged business in all armies. It is true that Germany is better off in this direction because of the system under which it gets the one-year trained officers who have gone on to the Reserve. Germany can use Reserve officers freely, but I think that is the only country which can put its hand on the exact number of officers required on mobilisation. In other countries you have to draw upon other classes. I will give the figures of the cadets of the Officers Training Corps who have taken commissions in the Special Reserve. Virtually the Officers Traning Corps had not become operative for this purpose until the end of 1908, but between July 1 of that year and March 31, 1911, 128 came forward and took commissions; between March 31, 1911, and July 1, 1911, 52 more had come in; and between July of last year and February 29 of this year 103 more had come in; so that 283 in all have taken commissions in the Special Reserve. Besides that there are a large number—well on to 500—who have taken A and B certificates and who have left the corps but who are on our list, many of whom will come forward in time of emergency although they do not want to train specially in the Special Reserve. The exact number of Infantry officers serving at home on January 1, 1912, was 2,788, which is rather more than the figure in the return quoted by the noble Duke. Though, as I have said, mobilisation is always a troublesome business, as regards officers we are better off than, so far as I know, we have ever been before; and behind all that we have the power of resorting to that most valuable class of non-commissioned officers on whom we have drawn in the past, and on whom we can draw, and no doubt always shall draw, if emergency requires it.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: The noble Viscount mentioned the fact that all armies need expansion on mobilisation, but that fact will not supply us with 600 Regular Infantry officers. Then the noble Viscount relies on the Reserve of Officers. I see by the Army List that more than half of these are Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors— that is, Field Officers. Then there are many senior captains who have retired from the Army years ago and are now no longer young. These Field Officers and senior captains are elderly warriors who have been on the shelf for some years and are impossible for company duties. Of the remainder

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many are now serving in the Yeomanry, in the Special Reserve, and in the Territorial Army. Others are seconded for service abroad. Others, again, are ex-Militia and ex-Volunteer officers who have passed to the Reserve on the abolition of these forces by the noble Viscount. These are not liable for foreign service.
Then the noble Viscount comes to the officers of the Special Reserve, which includes officers from the Officers Training Corps. By the Return of February 27, 1911, of Special Reserve subalterns, the number ought to be 1,915 but it is nothing of the kind, because the Return shows a shortage of 1,267. The number actually serving is given by the Return as 648. The January Army List shows no appreciable variation. By the Army Order of December 23, 1907, each Special Reserve battalion must send one subaltern to the depot on mobilisation. This means the withdrawal of 74 Special Reserve subalterns from their battalions for depot duties, leaving available 574. But 600 officers are required—result, a deficit of 26 and no Special Reserve subaltern left in any one of the Special Reserve battalions. As a source of supply the Special Reserve is insufficient, even if you chose to take every single subaltern away from the Force.
I have mentioned Special Reserve subalterns because to employ Special Reserve captains with the battalions of the Expeditionary Force would be not only most detrimental to the efficiency of the Army but grossly unfair to the Line officers. The Special Reserve officer is to rank on joining the Line as the junior of his rank—that is to say, a Special Reserve major would rank above the senior captain in a Line regiment, a Special Reserve captain above the senior Lieutenant in a Line regiment. In the latter case the senior subaltern in the Line will be deprived of the promotion which is due to him and for which he has qualified. That is hard lines on him. The Service will suffer by the supersession of a professional soldier by an amateur who has not served as many months continuously as the man over whose head he goes has served years.
Some substitutes for the Regular officers deficient from the Expeditionary Force
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may be obtained, but not in sufficient quantity. Now as to their quality—I mean their value as officers of the First Line. No one would deny that it is quite impossible to make good to our Regular Infantry on the very eve of battle the lack of 600 Regular officers who ought, under any proper war organisation, to have been trained continuously with their companies. Sir John French, commenting on the Infantry training in 1909, stated that—
"The absence of officers during company training when employed on signalling and mounted infantry duties was most injurious to efficiency."
But the noble Viscount proposes to supply the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force with 600 non-Regular officers, strangers alike to their regiments as well as to their duties, without any knowledge of the interior economy of a battalion and absolutely- ignorant of what the discipline of the Regular Army means. By the plan of the noble Viscount 600 non-Regular officers are assumed within three weeks or less of joining the Infantry of the Expeditionary Force to be capable of commanding a company in a decisive battle on the Continent. Now this is to assume an absurdity. I know it will be said that of course such non-Regular officers will only be employed as junior subalterns and that they will certainly not be put in any place of responsibility. That may be; but we are dealing with war and not peace conditions, and a junior subaltern may find himself commanding his company within twenty minutes of going into his first battle. Does the noble Viscount really suppose that the serving-non-commissioned officers and men of a Regular battalion would have any confidence in the leading of an officer just conic from some non-Regular contingent, about whom they know nothing save that he is obviously incompetent? In no concern outside our Regular Army as at present organised by the noble Viscount would experienced men and foremen who know their work well be expected to take their orders at a moment of supreme crisis from a boy who knows nothing at all about the business.
During the South African war, officers of the Regular Army were continually reproached, and most unjustly, with a lack of professional knowledge. Now it seems that the moment you go outside the Regular Army it is impossible to find a

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boy, though he has scarcely studied soldiering except as a pastime, who is not fit straight away to command a company of Regular Infantry in a general action. We spend millions a year on the training of the Regular Army and its officers because we say that training is essential, and then we send the Infantry battalions of our. Expeditionary Force into action with 600 non-Regular and untrained company officers, if they can be obtained, and even that is doubtful. Moreover, we are expected to accept them as of just the same value and as perfect substitutes for Regular officers. If that is not the organisation of defeat I know not what is.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: The noble Viscount has told us that a certain number of the officers to go abroad will be those trained in the Officers Training Corps. As the noble Duke said, 600 of them will be officers of the Special Reserve. Would the noble Viscount tell the House whether there is any limit within which officers of the Special Reserve may attain the rank of: captain, or, rather, whether there is any limit before which they may not attain the rank of captain; also what would be the minimum service in the Special Reserve which would enable a man to go abroad as a captain commanding subalterns in the Regular Army?
VISCOUNT HALDANE: The question of the noble Viscount has arisen, I think, through my not having made myself clear. There is no deficiency in the peace establishment of Regular officers for the Expeditionary Force at the present time. The deficiency arises on mobilisation, and you would make that up by sending the best officers you could get. You would not, at any rate to any large extent, take officers from the Officers Training Corps of the Special Reserve for that purpose. What you would do would be to draw upon the Regular officers belonging to the other establishments at home. There are 780 of them with the Special Reserve battalions. You would make your Expeditionary Force as perfect in officers as possible. For stationary work, such as training and so on, you would get a certain number of older officers from the General Reserve of officers, of whom there are 791 available after allowing 40 per cent. for those who would not come up. Then for the rest you would put officers who had
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gone through the Officers Training Corps and taken commissions in the Special Reserve. Some of those who are not attached to battalions but are on what is called the unattached lis—that is to say, they have been trained with Regular battalions at times of the year which suited them, and they have got their promotion and their commissions in the Special Reserve though not attached to the battalions. You have in that way a reservoir to draw on of those officers for Special Reserve work. There are already some 283 of them; and besides there are nearly 500 who have taken their certificates and are, therefore, to a certain extent trained, many of whom would be ready to come up in time of war, though they have not taken commissions, and would be available.
The effect of that would be that you would put the cream of what you had available into the Expeditionary Force. You would fill up according to the necessities, using the best men for the more important places and using your less trained men for the less important places; and where there is a shortage we intend to make use of some of these highly trained non-commissioned officers in whom the Army of this country excels. There is no doubt our non-commissioned officers, what ever our deficiencies are, are very good indeed, and many of them are admirably fitted to be promoted. The substance of the whole thing is that mobilisation is always rather a ragged business and would be so with us, but not more ragged with us than it is with other countries except Germany—which, as I have said, has an admirable system of Reserve officers—and certainly much less ragged than it used to be in the old wars which we managed successfully and in which we relied entirely on promoting non-commissioned officers. The Army Council has been at work hard on this problem for eighteen months past, and we are satisfied that we can mobilise and supply wastage. This answer is subject to the reservation that there is that amount of raggedness which I admit arises on the figures and organisation which I have given, and which is not peculiar to the army of this country; it applies to the army of almost every other country, and is due to the fact that there is a difference between peace establishment and war establishment. I have stated to the House the way in which the difference is to be made up.
VISCOUNT MIDLETON: The answer of the noble Viscount, then, amounts to this, does it not? That in order to supply the gap in the Regular Army it will be necessary to do by the Special Reserve just what was done by the old Militia with regard to men, and to take some of the best of the officers in order to fill up the gap in the Line.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: The noble Viscount is right about that. But the battalions of the Special Reserve from which they will be taken will be the 74 battalions which do not go abroad. They will be the 74 battalions at the depots whose function is largely that of training, though they do defence work. It is not like taking them from a unit which is going abroad.

OVER-INSURANCE OF SHIPS.
LORD ELLENBOROUGH LORD ELLENBOROUGH rose to call attention to some of the Reports of Courts of Inquiry into the causes of the loss of ships insured above their value, and to ask the Government whether they will order the Reports of the Courts of Inquiry into the causes of the loss of the "Carnedd Llewellyn," "Oxus," "Cadoxton," "Idle-wild," "Kingswell," "Gunford," "George," "Ouse," " Selworthy," "Cardiff Hall," "Hasland," "Everest," "British Standard," and "Dunsley," the judgments of the Admiralty Courts in the cases of the appeal of the owners of the "Idlewild," and of Paul Braun, who had been master of the " British Standard," and the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of the "Gunford," to be laid before the House.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the evils of which I am about to complain have, I think, been in existence since the time of Queen Elizabeth. There are traces of them in the "Merchant of Venice." What was Shylock thinking of when he used the words—
"Ships are but boards, sailors but men: there be land-rats and water-rats."
Had he said this in the nineteenth century or in the early part of the twentieth century I should have thought that he was thinking of taking out P.P.I. policies on Antonio's ships and then arranging for their destruction. I am about to call your Lordships' attention to the proceedings of some modern two-legged rats. That they
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existed in the time of George II is shown by the Preamble of an Act of Parliament passed in 1746, which states that—
"It has been found by experience that there are in existence many pernicious practices whereby great numbers of ships, with their cargoes, have been either fraudulently lost and destroyed, or taken by the enemy in time of war."
And that—
"By introducing a mischievous kind of gaming or wagering, wider the pretence of assuring the risk on shipping and fair trade, the institution and laudable design of making assurances hath been perverted, and that which was intended for the encouragement of trade and navigation has in many instances become hurtful and destructive to the same."
There is, therefore, nothing new about the crimes to which I am about to refer, but the methods of perpetrating them have been greatly improved upon.
My attention was first called to this class of fraud by a case that occurred when I was in Bombay in 1870. Two English shipbrokers, who were well connected and personally known to many of my friends in Bombay, made a pretence of loading with cotton a vessel called the " Aurora." which lay at anchor close to my ship. Bills of lading were signed in advance for cotton that had not been put on board, and money was raised on the security of these bills of lading. As it was clear that if the "Aurora" reached England the fraud would be detected, the two ship brokers agreed to pay the captain£1,500 and the carpenter£600 on condition of their sinking the ship. The "Aurora " left Bombay on April 11, and was set on fire by the carpenter on the 12th. The captain made no attempt to extinguish the fire, but got a boat out at once. The sea was calm. On the return of the crew to Bombay suspicions were aroused which resulted in a trial that caused a great sensation in that city. Eventually all four culprits confessed their guilt. The carpenter was sentenced to ten years' penal servitude, and the captain to fifteen, the chief conspirators, the two shipbrokers, receiving life sentences. Compared with present-day practitioners, who have raised barratry to a fine art and who manage to avoid punishment for their crimes, these men were mere bunglers.
Take the case of the "Selworthy." At about 5 pm. on March 17, 1910, when about eighty miles from the Canaries, a violent explosion took place in her after

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hold and a column of water rushed into the ship. The sea was calm. The crew took to the boats. After drifting about for about forty-three hours they were picked up and landed at Genoa, whence they travelled to Cardiff. Major Cooper-Key, His Majesty's inspector of Explosives, held art inquiry at Cardiff. and came to the conclusion that the explosion was due to a charge of high explosive, such as dynamite, which had been deposited in No. 4 hold, and that in his opinion the explosive could only have been so placed and fixed by a member or members of the ship's company. Now comes the question, Who was likely to profit by the crime that was committed? The managing owner gave evidence that the ship cost£8,000 in June, 1909, of which about two-thirds were left on mortgage. The total of the insurance amounted to£15,750. Major Cooper-Key, while acquitting the owners of any attempt to over-insure by misrepresentation, stated that the fact undoubtedly remained that the total loss of the vessel would be very profitable to them. Now in the case of the "Selworthy" it is evident that a crime was committed and that more than one person had a hand in it. Yet it was so skilfully planned that there was not enough evidence to convict any one.
I now come to the case of the "British Standard," of which most of your Lordships have probably heard, because it has been well reported by the Press. She was owned by Brown, Son and Company, who occasionally called themselves by other names, thus leading to confusion. They had previously lost the "Albion" and the "Duffryn Manor." The "Albion" was lost in May, 1908. The total insurances were£32,000, including disbursements, freight, &c. The outside value of the vessel was£16,500, exclusive of disbursements, freight, &c., the value of which is not stated in the report. Also, in addition to the above there were P.P.I. policies for£12,600. So that she was worth a great deal more at the bottom of the sea than on its surface. The cause of her loss was said to be that her steam steering gear jammed at the entrance to the harbour of Corcubion. The Court did not blame any one, but expressed a strong opinion on P.P.I. policies. The "Duffryn Manor" was wrecked on an island off the coast of Ceylon in May, 1909. An inqury was held at Colombo. The Court said"—
"An attempt was made by one of the witnesses called at the Inquiry to prove that the ship bad been deliberately wrecked."
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The Court did not accept this view, but, strange to say, their report did not touch on the all-important question of insurance. Mr. Brown originally intended to appoint Captain Vigers, who had lost the "Duffryn Manor," as master of the "British Standard," but as the underwriters objected the agreement with him was cancelled. The firm of Brown, Son & Company, consisting of Frederick Brown and his son Thomas, contracted to purchase a steamer at a cost of£32,500. As they had not got enough money to pay for her,£26,500 was left on mortgage to be paid off by instalments in four years' time. Their previous losses made it difficult for the owners to insure the "British Standard" at normal prices, but eventually an insurance was effected for£32,000 on hull and machinery, at eight guineas per cent.—two guineas above the average. Further insurances were effected which brought the amount up to£55,300, though, according to the owners' statements, the value at risk was only£46,378, so that£8,900 was to be gained if she went to the bottom.
The financial arrangements connected with this ship were exceedingly complicated. Frederick Brown was of German origin and was born in Heligoland. His brother Paul was a naturalised British subject and had originally been a German. Messrs. Brown on March 13 described Captain Paul Braun as a man with a long experience and a clean record. One of the underwriters objected to this statement, saying that Captain Braun had got the "Haxby" and the "Glenroy" on shore, and had had a collision when in charge of the "Lexington." At the inquiry it came out that Captain Braun had lost the "Frankfort" many years previously, and that his certificate had been suspended six months for losing the "Rook." The crew of the "British Standard" consisted of twenty-six men, belonging to fifteen different countries. At the trial evidence was taken through interpreters of Greek, Arabic, Italian, and also of Pigeon English for seine of the coloured men. One wonders what has become of the language test that was recently made compulsory in British ships! On May 25, 1911, when about fifteen miles from Cape Negro, not far from Rio Janeiro, the captain and some of the crew declared that she struck something. Others heard and felt nothing. The Court was of the

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opinion that the "British Standard" did not strike either a derelict, or submerged wreckage, or a rock, and gave reasons for this opinion that appear to me to be conclusive. No attempt was made to save the ship, either by using pumps or by closing watertight doors. Boats were ordered out at once. The Court said—
"If the master had promptly taken the measures available to keep the water out, the Court is of opinion that, whatever the cause of the water may have been, there is a strong probability that she would have been saved. The conduct and the omissions of the master and the chief engineer to make some effort to save the vessel indicate an absence of desire to save her."
They also stated that the evidence clearly established that she was prematurely abandoned. The Court also said that the master offered money to the second officer in order to induce him to support the master's story as to the loss of the vessel. Not being a criminal Court, it could only deal with the Master and chief engineer by fining them and suspending their certificates. The chief engineer's certificate was suspended for twelve months, and that of the captain for eighteen months. The former was fined fifty guineas; the latter 1,000 guineas.
Captain Paul Braun appealed against this decision to the Admiralty Court. According to The Times of February 8, the Admiralty Court stated that the conclusion was not unreasonable that the master was not sorry that the vessel was likely to sink if all efforts to keep her afloat were avoided, and that this attitude of mind was induced by the existence of the various insurances detailed in the report. The Admiralty Court found that the Court below was fully justified in finding that the ship was abandoned by the wrongful act and default of the master and in suspending his certificate. But, for technical reasons, the Admiralty Court reduced the 1,000 guineas that he had been ordered to pay towards the expenses of the trial to£350. At the Court of Inquiry at Cardiff, after passing sentence in the case of the "British Standard," Mr. Lewis said—
"Being of opinion that grave malpractices arise from, or are connected with, the over-insurance of vessels, I repeat, with the full concurrence of the able and experienced gentlemen who assist me, the observations that I made at this Court at a previous Inquiry. Over-insurance is not exclusively a private matter between insurers and insured. There are other parties affected whose interests are not protected and whose lives may be endangered
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—i.e., the members of the crew. Where a vessel is over-insured, one of the most powerful incentives for keeping her in good condition and seaworthiness is removed, and over-insurance also offers a dangerous temptation to persons and agents of persons who will gain by the loss of the vessel; whether lost through negligence, unseaworthiness, or foul play, the lives of the crew are imperilled. The effectual prevention of an unnecessary peril to seafaring men is worthy the attention of the Legislature."
Mr. Lewis, the Judge, then quoted from the Courts of Inquiry into the cases of nine over-insured ships lost under suspicious circumstances.
The " Guilford " had paid no dividends for seven years. The total of her insurances was£35,000, of which£6,500 were P.P.I. policies on the personal account of the managing owner. The Court found the value of the vessel to be£9,000 and of the freight£5,000. The managing owner, Mr. Briggs, appointed a man named Sember, who was originally a German, to command this ship. His chief qualification appears to have been that he had been ashore ever since his certificate had been suspended for the loss of the "Perthshire" twenty-two years previously, and that he might, therefore, have been expected to have forgotten how to navigate. Sember ran the ship on shore on three different shoals near the South American coast on three different days, and eventually lost her. Ten of her crew of twenty-six died in consequence of having been landed at an unhealthy place, after exposure. The managing owner said that he did not know of Sember's record. If what he said was true, it was culpable negligence on his part, negligence which was the indirect cause of the loss of ten lives. It was a duty that the owner owed to the crew to have known more about Captain Sember. There has been litigation as to whether the underwriters should pay the insurances in the case of the "Gunford." As that litigation reached this House, I think it would be presumptuous on my part to comment on it in the presence of noble and learned Lords who know so much snore about that part of the matter than I do. I have no sympathy with either of the litigants. All that I have to spare is expended on the ten men, who would not have lost their lives had their ship not been wrecked by an incompetent captain.
I now wish to call attention to the "Rowe" Steamship Company. This company had paid no dividend since its formation in May, 1905. On May 31, 1910,

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this company owned four vessels. It had the misfortune to lose two vessels on two consecutive days—the "Hasland" on March 29, and the "Everest" on March 30, 1911. As both vessels were over-insured the shareholders are much to be congratulated on their good fortune. The "Dunsley," over-insured to the extent of£9,800, was lost on August 30, 1911, off Bardsley Lighthouse, on her way from Appledore to Birkenhead. The Court of Inquiry was held at Cardiff and presided over by Mr. Lewis. I had intended to say a great deal about the "Dunsley" but as Mr. Buxton recently stated in another place that an application had been made for a re-hearing of the case, I shall only mention the sentence of that Court, which was that the master's certificate be suspended for twelve months; that Mr. Shotton, the superintending engineer, should pay£50; Edwards, the engineer,£100; and the managing owner, Mr. Hannibal Thomas, of Cardiff, was ordered to pay£1,500 towards the expenses of the Inquiry, which had lasted for twenty-one days. There is, of course, great difficulty in obtaining evidence at these Courts of Inquiry, as they are like inquests without a postmortem; but if in cases like the "Selworthy" and the "British Standard" convictions are unattainable, the law certainly requires alteration.
If a modification of the two clauses in Mr. Chamberlain's Bill relating to over-insurance had become law in 1884, the position of the owners of these ships would have been very different, as the over-insurance would have been forfeited to the Crown and the shareholders would have made no profit at all. Secondly, the underwriters would have been fined treble the premiums received by them. Another remedy would be to extend the scope of the jurisdiction of the Courts of Inquiry. They have at present the power to prevent a master mariner from exercising his pro-session by suspending his certificate. When a ship is lost in consequence of the misconduct or false economy of an owner, the Court might be given power to make him abandon his profession by ordering him to sell all his property in shipping within three months under penalty of its being forfeited to the Crown. Or sea insurance might be put on the same footing as fire insurance, which disallows claims above the actual value of the losses incurred. The reason why underwriters often insist on a
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high insurance is that old ships are now more liable to accidents than new ones, and that policies are free from particular average up to 3 per cent. Thus, if a ship is insured for£10,000, all average above£300 is paid by the underwriter, whereas if she is insured for'£20,000 the underwriter does not pay until it amounts to£600. In his speech in 1884 Mr. Chamberlain said that partial losses were to total losses as 20 to 1. I do not know what the present proportion may be. It has been suggested that underwriters and shipowners should agree to insure on the basis of full declared value on ordinary claims when dealing with old and worn-out ships, but only to insure up to 50 or 75 per cent. of that value for purposes of total loss. On the whole, however, I think it would be better to scrap such ships.
In proportion to our commerce, I believe that there are very few criminal cases similar to the "British Standard" and the "Selworthy," but there are, unfortunately, a much larger number of ships owned by men who, though taking no illegal steps, are indifferent as to whether their ships sink or float, who save too much money on repairs, and who over-insure crazy ships that ought to be scrapped. The latter class of owner is really the more mischievous. For instance, take the case of the "Carnedd Llewellyn," insured for nearly double her value and lost with all hands; whereas in cases like the "Selworthy" and the "British Standard" those on board take care that so-called accidents shall only take place in fine weather, with a minimum of risk to captain and crew. It may be urged that the number of ship-owners of this class is comparatively small, and that therefore legislation is unnecessary. I do not agree with this. There are other crimes that are seldom committed, but yet there are laws to check them. The loss of over-insured ships must fall on some one. As most underwriters flourish, they must get recouped for their losses by putting higher premiums on honestly run ships, so that the honest ship-owner has eventually to pay for the frauds of the dishonest wrecker. As long as the law imposes no check on the purchase of crazy and worn-out ships by single ship companies run by men of straw as managing owners, there will be some ships that are run dishonestly.
One of these men of straw, the owner of the "Queen Olga," recently swindled four

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master mariners into giving him£600 apiece for the privilege of commanding that ship. As, however, the ship herself was seized by mortgagees, their hard-earned savings disappeared. The former owner of that ship was sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment, but there is nothing to prevent him from resuming his profession of ship-owner when he comes out of gaol. Ship-owners may possibly object to the proposed extension of the powers of the Courts of Inquiry. I therefore suggest as an alternative that they be empowered to deal with malpractices themselves, through the instrumentality of a committee elected by ship-owners and shipping companies, with votes in proportion to the tonnage that they own. Such a committee should have power conferred upon it by Act of Parliament to order any shareholder or owner found guilty of misconduct to dispose of all his shares and property in shipping within three months, under penalty of forfeiture to the Crown. Magistrates and Law Courts should have power to refer such cases as the "Selworthy," "British Standard," and "Queen Olga," to this committee, much in the same way that they call the attention of the Law Society to the conduct of solicitors. Barristers can be disbarred, solicitors can be struck off the Rolls, medical men can be interfered with by what are practically committees elected by their own profession, and I think that similar powers might with advantage be entrusted to ship-owners, who would then be able to get rid of the black sheep who disgrace their calling. My object in asking that these Reports should be laid before the House is to put in an accessible form the case for changes, either in the law or in the customs prevailing between owners and underwriters, changes which would put an end to what has been a disgrace to Great Britain for a period extending from the reign of George II to that of George V.
THE EARL OF GRANARD: My Lords, the Board of Trade will be very pleased to grant the Return asked for by my noble friend, and it may be of interest if I state in a few words what has been the effect of the measure passed in 1909 with regard to the insurance of ships. Undoubtedly before that time there was a great deal of abuse in connection with the insurance of ships by persons who had no interest whatever in them, but since that has been made a criminal act it is believed that there has been very little insurance of this kind. As your Lordships are aware, under the Act of 1909 there is no attempt made to deal with over-insurance of vessels by owners themselves, but this question has been considered on several occasions by the Board of Trade, and even as lately as last year the Board wrote to four underwriting bodies asking them for their observations with regard to the "Gunford" judgment and the over-valuation of vessels for insurance. The replies sent to the Board of Trade were to the effect that more time was required to estimate the effect of the "Gunford" judgment. They also thought that underwriters should have a free hand as regards the valuation of vessels. The Board, in view of these replies from the different underwriters, were of opinion that at the present moment it would not be well to bring in any legislation. It may be pointed out that in none of the cases that have come before a Court of Inquiry has it been found that loss of life has been caused as a result of over-insurance. The reports of the different inquiries to which the noble Lord refers will be published and laid on the Table in, I hope, a couple of days.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.