THE NAVAL POSITION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.

HL Deb 02 July 1912 vol 12 cc298-336

^*THE EARL OF SELBORNE rose to call attention to the naval position in the Mediterranean, and to move for Papers. The noble Earl said: My Lords, it fell to the lot of my political colleague a year or two ago to have to attack His Majesty's Government on the subject of their naval policy. There is nothing further from the wish of my friends or of myself than that the naval policy of this country should ever be a Party question. Whether we are in opposition or in office, it is our most sincere hope that the naval policy of this country shall be a national policy. Therefore, while I shall endeavour to-night to express the grave anxiety which we feel in respect of the situation, as we understand it to be, in the Mediterranean, and while I shall not hesitate to lay our view of the case before His Majesty's Government, I have no intention of indulging in a Party attack. I hope it never will be necessary. If, unfortunately, His Majesty's Government should fail at some future time to rise to what we believe to be the height of national naval policy, it would be our duty to criticise them, and, if need be, to attack them; but it will be a far more agreeable prospect for us if we can give them and the present Board of Admiralty our whole-hearted support in pursuing a national naval policy.

I do not know how far His Majesty's Government will be able to give us information to-night. It is not my intention to embarrass them in what I know to be a very difficult situation, bearing, as they do, a great responsibility, but my friends and I thought that we should be failing in our duty if we did not take the earliest opportunity of laying before your Lordships' House our views on this question. In saying what I have to say I shall endeavour not to trespass into detail. I shall only deal with the broad aspects of the case. But before passing on I do wish to say a word on a matter that may be considered to be in the nature of a detail, but a detail so important that I should not like to omit mention of it. As far as I can judge, at present the most urgent need of the Navy is more men. There never has been any difficulty in recruiting the Navy or the Royal Marines, and I have no reason to suppose that there is any difficulty now. But the shortage of men which I fear does undoubtedly exist arises from the fact that the recruiting for the Navy is in boyhood, and the shortage exists to-day because sufficient boys were not taken into the Navy four or five years ago. I see that Lord Charles Beresford, who never wearies in endeavouring to remind his fellow-countrymen of the naval position as he sees it, has stated, in one of his communications to the Press, that this shortage began as long ago as 1904, and that in that year 10,000 additional boys ought to have been taken for the Navy, and that the necessary Vote was reduced for financial considerations. I had the honour to be First Lord of the Admiralty in 1904, and I do not know from what source Lord Charles Beresford derived his information. I can assure him and also the House that there is no foundation for that statement. I never during the time that I was at the Admiralty failed to ask my colleagues in the Cabinet to agree to that increase in the numbers borne in the Fleet which my naval advisers in each year considered necessary, and my colleagues never refused the addition asked for. It is possible that we made a mistake and did not ask for enough in 1904, though I am not prepared to admit that. But the statement is quite unfounded that knowing a larger addition to be necessary we chose a smaller number for financial considerations.

Before I pass on to deal with the principles at issue in connection with the Mediterranean, let me remind your Lordships what must always be the basis of the naval strategy for our country in time of war. The Navy should have one task and one task only, and that is to find the ships of the enemy and to destroy them. There never has been, there never can be, such a thing as local defence in connection with our Empire. In time of war the frontiers of our Empire are the sides of the enemy's warships and nowhere else, and the single task of the Admiralty and of the naval Commander-in-Chief must always be to seek those ships and to destroy them. That is why on another occasion and in another place I expressed the matter thus— The sea is all one; therefore the Navy must be all one, and the command of the Navy in time of war must be all one. There cannot possibly be divided commands in the Imperial Navy in time of war, for no effective offence can be made against any part of the Empire except through the ships of the enemy, and if those ships are destroyed in the Mediterranean, let us say, Australia and New Zealand are just as much protected in their territory, in their interests, and in their trade as is the United Kingdom; if, on the other hand, the enemy's ships are destroyed in the Indian Ocean, the United Kingdom and Canada are just as much protected in their territory, trade, and interests as South Africa or India.

But where, my Lords, will the enemy's ships be found? That will depend upon where the enemy of the moment think they can do this Empire the most damage. If they think that they are strong enough to meet the combined forces of the Empire on the high seas the enemy fleets will come out of harbour and seek battle without circumlocution; but it is more probable that the enemy will endeavour to effect a temporary superiority in some one sea in order to overwhelm a portion of our Fleet, with the hope of repeating the operation later on in another sea. Therefore as a necessary preliminary the enemy would endeavour to deceive us, to make a feint as it were, so as to draw our power asunder with the object of concentrating themselves and attacking one part of it. Or the enemy might think that we were most vulnerable in our territory, and that an invasion of some part of the Empire offered the best chance of inflicting a serious blow against our power. In that case, too, the object of the enemy would be to deceive us as to their real intention and to draw our Fleet to the wrong spot in order that the blow might be directed with success. Or, finally, the enemy may think that our trade and our food supply is our most vulnerable point, and they may turn all their attention to the destruction of our trade and the interception of our food supply.

Bearing these considerations in mind—for, my Lords, I believe them to be sound, and that naval authorities would admit them to be so—let us consider generally our position in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is the shortest route and the easiest connection with our Indian Empire. It is the shortest and the easiest route to the Australasian Dominions and for the whole of our Eastern trade. It is the only route from Europe to Egypt, the only route by which, if necessary, reinforcements and succour could be given to Egypt in time of difficulty. The volume of trade coming to the United Kingdom through the Mediterranean every year is simply immense. I am not going to throw statistics at the heads of your Lordships, because I do not think that that description will be disputed or considered to be an exaggeration. The volume of our Empire trade in the Mediterranean every year is, as I say, immense, and of that trade a very large proportion is food for the people of this country—not only food coming from the East, but food from the Mediterranean basin itself and from the Black Sea. This importance of the Mediterranean is not dependent only on the existence of the Suez Canal. The existence of the Suez Canal has immensely increased the importance of the Mediterranean to us, but our fathers long before the Suez Canal was even contemplated found the Mediterranean of such importance to us that they went through great sacrifices and made great efforts to acquire Gibraltar and Malta and to keep them when acquired. They acquired Gibraltar and Malta, and they retained Gibraltar and Malta because even in those days they regarded our influence and our power in the Mediterranean as essential for the well-being of this country. If that was so in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries, how far truer, my Lords, is it to-day in the twentieth century?

And let me remind your Lordships of two things in connection with Gibraltar and Malta. Gibraltar is Continental, and therefore it is liable to attack in the same way as any Continental fortress may be at any time according to the country in which it is situated and the Powers that are at war. But Malta is an island, and as such it is more, not less, liable to invasion than this country. After all, the seas round Malta may be fairly described as narrow seas in no very different sense from that in which we use the term in connection with England; but whereas the United Kingdom can only he invaded from the east, Malta is surrounded by military Powers, and invasion might come from north or south, from east or west, according to the Power with which we were unfortunately at the time at war. I can think of no island fortress in the world more surrounded, now happily entirely by friends, but more surrounded by Powers which have the strength for attack if it should unfortunately be their wish to do so.

That being what I may describe as the eternal and permanent position in the Mediterranean, how does the grouping of the Powers exist in it to-day? What is our strength in the Mediterranean to-day, according to our latest information, as compared with what it was in the year 1904? I take that year because it was the last complete year in which I had the honour of being First Lord of the Admiralty, and I think your Lordships will admit that that is a not insufficient reason for my taking that as any standard of comparison. In the year 1904 the famous Navy of France was very strong in the Mediterranean; so it is to-day. Italy had a Navy of great efficiency, but not of equal size to that of France; to-day the Navy of Italy is more important, more powerful, and larger than it was in the year 1904. Austria-Hungary had in 1904 a small Navy, always an efficient and brave Navy but a small Navy; next year or the year after the Navy of Austria-Hungary will be a very powerful factor in the Mediterranean, composed of a squadron of the best and largest and heaviest armoured battleships in the world. The Russian squadron in the Black Sea remains to-day in very much the same position in which it was in 1904. The Navy of Turkey is in process of resurrection. Therefore the material change so far as other Powers are concerned which has taken place in the Mediterranean in the last eight years is this: Austria-Hungary is emerging into a really important naval Power, and Italy is a stronger naval Power than she was eight years ago.

My Lords, what about ourselves? Let me take first of all the garrisons of Gibraltar and Malta. They are of secondary importance compared to the naval strength, but they are a necessary complement of and auxiliary to it, and they must not be omitted from oar calculations. The strength of the Artillery is the same to-day as it was then. There is, I believe, one company of Fortress Engineers fewer in Malta to-day than in 1904. But the great change has been in the battalions of Infantry. In that year the establishment of the garrison of those two fortresses was eleven battalions of infantry; at the present moment there are five at Malta and two at Gibraltar—a reduction of four battalions, or more than thirty-three per cent. of the strength. When I was at the Admiralty this question of the garrisons was gone into very carefully, and our advisers at that time were quite clearly of opinion that eleven battalions of infantry were the minimum for the requirements of Malta and Gibraltar. Yet at that time there was in the Mediterranean a magnificent British Fleet. There were no fewer than twelve battleships of the Line of the best type, four armoured cruisers and twelve other cruisers. To-day, according to the information we have at present, with these reduced garrisons there are no battleships of the Line. The squadron of battleships has for the moment disappeared from the Mediterranean. There are still four armoured cruisers; the other cruisers have shrunk from twelve to three in number. So in place of twelve battleships and sixteen cruisers, of which four were armoured, there are now no battleships and seven cruisers, of which four are armoured. I have not said anything about the torpedo craft, in which I believe there has been a reduction.

Before I pass on let me say a word about torpedo craft. It has been suggested, not, so far as I know, by His Majesty's Government, that our strength in the Mediterranean might be largely rehabilitated by an increase of torpedo craft. Torpedo craft are of very great importance as the complement of battleships and cruisers, but they never can be a substitute for either the one or the other. A much larger force of torpedo craft, even when supported by cruisers, can never maintain itself permanently against an inferior strength of torpedo craft if supported by cruisers and battleships. That is why all the great Powers in the world are united in their policy. If you want to be strong at sea the foundation of your strength must be in battleships, and battleships of the largest and most powerful type. Never let it be said, I hope, in our Parliament that torpedo craft can be regarded as otherwise than a mere auxiliary to the power of battleships.

If that is the position, let us apply the principles of naval warfare which I endeavoured to lay down in the first part of my speech to the situation in the Mediterranean if unfortunately we should be at war. If we were at war with a Power which had no strength in the Mediterranean, and during the whole of that war all the Powers in the Mediterranean remained neutral, a dangerous situation would not arise for us; but if we were unfortunately at war with one or more Powers, and those Powers had some strength in the Mediterranean, and if we had no allies on our side, the position would obviously be very serious. The seven cruisers could make no possible headway against the enemy forces in the Mediterranean, and it is quite obvious that the enemy would see that it was in the Mediterranean that they could deal us deadly blows. They would lay themselves out to destroy our trade, to intercept our food supplies, and to take Malta from us if they could. They would lay themselves out to send an expedition, if they could, to Egypt. I say nothing about the possible effects on India. But given the condition I have for the moment supposed, I do not think there is any responsible man who will not agree that our position in the Mediterranean would be deplorable. Now let us suppose that while unfortunately we were at war with Powers which had some naval strength in the Mediterranean we also had the good fortune to have on our side another Power or Powers which also had naval strength in the Mediterranean. It is quite clear that the position then would be immensely improved for us—it would be a very different position.

But, my Lords, there is no Power with naval strength in the Mediterranean which has not vast responsibilities in the Mediterranean of its own. In those circumstances we should be asking that Power to give its protection, not only to all its own vast interests in the Mediterranean, but to our interests there in addition. I ask your Lordships whether that would not be an enormous burden to put upon any Power; and however efficient, however loyal, that Power might be. I could not regard without the gravest uneasiness our position in the Mediterranean in those circumstances, because I am confident that the enemy would still regard the Mediterranean as our vulnerable point. They would still endeavour to get troops to Egypt. They would still endeavour to seize Malta by a coup de main. They would lay themselves out to destroy our trade in the Mediterranean and intercept our supplies of food. This country ought never to be in the position of having to depend exclusively, or practically exclusively, on the loyalty and efficiency and courage of some ally for the protection of all our interests in the Mediterranean. It is quite reasonable that there should be some division of responsibility between us—that whereas we should with their assistance be more responsible for our joint interests in another sea, in the Mediterranean they should be more responsible for their interests and ours, but not without some help from us. Never can it be right for us in the Mediterranean to depend only on the strong right arm of some friend.

After all, we have to look at this matter not only from the point of view of war. We hope that we never shall find ourselves engaged in a naval war. We are, happily, now on terms of excellent friendship with all great naval Powers in the Mediterranean, and we trust and pray that those terms of friendship will never be disturbed. Therefore let us consider the position through long years of peace. I should be the last man to say that the Battle Squadron should never be withdrawn from the Mediterranean for exercise in the Atlantic or elsewhere with the other Fleets. I think that would be a wholly unreasonable proposition. It is quite right from time to time that the Mediterranean Fleet should join with the other Fleets in great naval manœuvres. But I would ask your Lordships to consider how the prestige of this country would be affected if through long years of peace we cease to have any squadron of battleships in the Mediterranean. The word "prestige" has often been abused. I admit that. But it can also be used legitimately, and I do not think any more legitimate occasion for using it can be found than in connection with our position in the Mediterranean. The prestige of this Empire in the Mediterranean is just as solid a material asset to this Empire as the coal-mines of England or the gold in the Bank of England. It is a reality—a reality built up by two centuries of position in the Mediterranean. Through the whole of the eighteenth and the whole of the nineteenth century the races living round the basin of the Mediterranean have seen our Fleets, not in a position of arrogance, but pacifically, and now and again in time of war with success, bearing the traditions and the power of Great Britain with them, and that constant sight of our Fleets through generations has produced a profound effect on the minds of the people, civilised or uncivilised, who live in the Mediterranean basin—and far beyond the Mediterranean. That great historical fact is known to the peoples of India, it is known to the Far East.

What must be the effect on the minds of those people, on their imagination, on their estimate of our power, when after all these years, suddenly as it were, the flag of our country disappears from the Mediterranean? Let us not deceive ourselves. There will be no mistake on the part of other people or other races, however uncivilised or however ignorant, if we merely keep an inferior squadron of cruisers in the Mediterranean. They will know that something has happened. What they will not be able to tell. They can only form their own estimate that we would not have done it if we could have helped. Therefore, my Lords, I do not think that this question can be considered only from the war point of view. It must be considered from the point of view of our diplomatic strength in the civilised world, and from the point of view of our prestige in India and elsewhere, where we have such great responsibilities for the government of peoples. Only the other day the First Lord of the Admiralty, following up a train of thought which has been held by his predecessors for some time past, addressed an eloquent appeal to the peoples and the Governments of the Dominions, pointing out to them how they could most usefully and most efficiently take their share in the naval burden of the Empire. I thought that appeal was very wisely expressed, and with the thoughts at the bottom of it I am in hearty concurrence, because I believe that if we fail to organise an intelligent co-operation between ourselves and the Dominions in this matter we and they will also fail to have the power to work out our own national development without the interference of the foreigner. I believe that the whole future of the independent national development of the Empire depends upon the success of the organisation of co-operation in naval matters between the Dominions of the Empire and the Mother Country. What the First Lord of the Admiralty said to the Dominions was this— If you will take the outer guard of the Empire on your shoulders, we will be responsible for the inner guard. My point to-day is that the Mediterranean is part of the inner guard and not of the outer guard. In the Mediterranean the Dominions cannot help us except in the same way that the people of New Zealand helped us by putting their ship at the sole authority of the Admiralty in peace or war. That is the only form in which the Dominions can help us in the Mediterranean.

So far, my Lords, I have endeavoured to express the anxiety we feel on this side of the House about the position as we understand it. It is for the Government and the Admiralty as the advisers of the Government, if they admit the accuracy of the diagnosis, to bear the responsibility for the remedy. To-night I would only state briefly the conclusions to which I am forced. The first is that the garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar ought again to be increased. I do not speak of Egypt, because I have not that knowledge of Egypt which I have about Malta and Gibraltar, and because I know that the Prime Minister himself has recently had the advantage of communication with Lord Kitchener. But trading on the experience and the knowledge which I had at the Admiralty, I do appeal to the Government not to leave the garrisons of Malta and Gibraltar as low as they are now. But there is something more important than that. Behind there is a dilemma from which I can see no escape. Either it is necessary to withdraw the squadron of battleships from the Mediterranean or it is unnecessary. If it is not necessary to withdraw that squadron, then that squadron ought not to be withdrawn; it would be indefensible to withdraw that squadron if it is not necessary so to withdraw it. If it is necessary to withdraw it, then I say that we are one whole squadron of modern battleships short of what the requirements of the Empire demand. I can see no escape from that dilemma—none. If that squadron must be withdrawn, then we are short of ships and men. The situation is exposed to the whole world, and our duty is to replace that squadron at the earliest possible moment.

On the assumption that the withdrawal is necessary, then, my Lords, I plead most earnestly with His Majesty's Government for a national policy of replacement, of the enrolment of men, of the building of battleships once more to establish that position in the Mediterranean which we ought never for one single day to have lost. If you regard the Mediterranean, as I put it to you, as part of the inner guard of the Empire, if you estimate our interests in the Mediterranean in peace as in war as I have endeavoured to estimate them, then so long as this Empire exists and we are a great Power we ought never to be unrepresented in the Mediterranean by a squadron of modern battleships. I do not speak only for myself. I can say without hesitation that this is the view of the whole of the Party to which I have the honour to belong. Immense and intense as are our differences with you on the subject of domestic policy, if you will make that your national naval policy we will give you our whole-hearted and ungrudging support.

Moved, That there be laid before the House Papers relating to the naval position in the Mediterranean.—(The Earl of Selborne.)

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE)

My Lords, perhaps I ought to apologise for intervening at once in this debate, but I think it is better to do so in order to make clear to the noble Earl and to the House what are the limitations under which we are for the moment compelled to conduct it. We should have preferred, if possible, that the debate on this subject should have been postponed until the time, which I hope will not be a distant one, when we are in a position to describe our policy on the points to which the noble Earl has alluded more fully, and at the same time in the House of Commons and here. I gather, however, that I shall not be disappointing the noble Earl if on this occasion I do not make any definite declaration of policy. I desire to assure the House that that is not because we desire to conceal our views in any degree, but because the exigencies and course of business in another place render it impossible for us to make an immediate announcement of the various facts and matters which we have been engaged in considering. But, as I say, I hope that will not be long postponed. I entirely appreciate the desire which the noble Earl has expressed in no way to embarrass the Government in a matter which is as far removed from Party politics as any subject can be, and I thank him for the uniform discretion which he exercised in the course of his speech in travelling sometimes over very thin ice indeed.

I think it is desirable to point out that, vast as the importance of the questions raised by the noble Earl is, yet in one sense their discussion is not momentarily urgent, because as far as our existing position in any part of the world is concerned we are not afraid to declare that we consider that the security of the country is achieved. Of course there is a perpetual difference between ourselves and those in and out of the House who believe that this country is at any time subject to a sudden invasion in force; but I leave that topic aside, because not only is it not concerned with the particular matter raised by the noble Earl, but if those who hold that view are right no additions, however liberal, which we could possibly make to the Fleet would be a safeguard against that danger. Those who believe in that danger have a military remedy, and therefore the particular question does not fall within our purview to-day.

I would say a word first, in speaking of this question of our present security, upon the one point of detail which the noble Earl mentioned—namely, that with regard to the manning of the Fleet. He will remember that in making his statement on the Estimates my right hon. friend the First Lord laid special emphasis on this point. He announced that, in view of the exertions to increase their personnel which some rival navies had been making, he proposed an average addition of 2,000 men, which, if I remember right, enabled him to work up to 3,000, and he expressed his intention to make the fullest demand which necessity could require upon the House of Commons for an addition to the number of men. On this question of our present security, our security, that is to say, for the next two years, I will mention one or two facts. It has become the habit to describe the relative strength of the different naval Powers of the world exclusively in terms of great battleships, which, although they are perpetually advancing in size and in power, are still called after the first of their type and generally though loosely styled Dreadnoughts. But we have to remember that for the period of the next two years we can look to our pre-Dreadnought ships—such battleships as the Formidables, the King Edwards, and the two Lord Nelsons which almost approach the Dreadnought type—as being battleships which are not equalled in the navies of any part of the world except by the few of the latest type afloat. Then when we come for a moment to the Dreadnought type, taking March 31 of this year and the next, that being the agreed date which is taken for the purposes of comparison in most of the publications on the subject, we find, taking all Europe in the one column and ourselves in the other, that this year, 1912, we have sixteen battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought type as against fifteen possessed by all the other Powers in European waters. For purposes of this comparison I am leaving out the United States and all the other Powers which have ships not in European waters. Next year, taking the same basis of comparison, we shall have twenty-four ships of this type as against twenty-one possessed by all the other naval Powers in Europe. Those numbers it is also important to mention represent a distinct margin over the two-Power standard by which in the past we have been used to count. In these calcula- tions I am leaving out the Australian and New Zealand ships, although I could not pass by without agreement the acknowledgment which the noble Earl opposite expressed to the Dominion of New Zealand for the manner in which she placed her battleship at the disposal of the Admiralty.

It has been a somewhat common lament that the Dreadnought type of battleship was ever invented or built, on the ground that although when those ships were first on the sea they gave us an almost unprecedented paramouncy in naval strength, yet as time goes on and other Powers build similar ships we become relatively in a weaker position than we should have been in if that type had never been invented. That may be so, although I think there is a good deal to be said on both sides; but in any case it was, I think, clear that the invention of the turbine engine, the various improvements in the manufacture of steel, and many other causes made the construction of ships of that type practically unavoidable. The word "inevitable" has sometimes a rather unhappy significance. History points to a number of inevitable wars, of inevitable, partitions, of inevitable combinations of States in which in some instances the term has merely served either to gloss over unsuccessful diplomacy or to mask sinister ambitions of aggression or of acquisition. But when you come to changes which are due to the march of science I think it is reasonable and fair to use the word. Such changes as have taken place due to the making of the great ship canals of the world; such changes in warfare as may take place owing to the intervention of flying machines, and I venture also to think those changes which have taken place in conditions of warfare and in the status of different nations owing to the changes in the type of battleship—those may all properly be described as unavoidable changes. Therefore if I thought more hardly than I do of the existence of the Dreadnought type I should not venture to throw blame upon any Board of Admiralty for having been the first to initiate it in this country.

That is the present position, and it explains why, looking at the matter as a whole and apart for the moment from the particular question of the distribution of the Fleet, on which the noble Earl has dwelt, this question is not an immediately urgent one. But when we come to the immediate future, to such years as 1914 and 1915, the figures tell us a somewhat different story, and may compel us, if not to revise our old beliefs, at any rate to revise some of the old formulas upon which we have been in the habit of relying. The undisputed predominance which we now possess in ships of the pre-Dreadnought era will diminish as those ships grow older and in the battleships and battle cruisers of the Dreadnought type the figures will cease to be the favourable figures which I have read out for this year and the next. In the year 1914 the British Empire will possess thirty Dreadnoughts against thirty-nine of that type possessed by the other Powers in Europe.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

Does that include the Australian ships or not?

THE MARQEESS OF CREWE

I was again omitting those ships. In 1915 the British figure will be thirty-six, and for the rest of Europe fifty-one. As the noble Earl has pointed out, on those figures the two-Power standard becomes something of an unmeaning term. The two-Power standard was founded on the fact that there were at one time no more than two naval Powers whose combination we might possibly have to meet. It becomes evident from these figures that, without inventing what may be called in practice impossible combinations of Powers, you may conceivably find yourselves confronted with a combination which to meet at any particular point, or rather to meet at all points, might require the possession of a three-Power or of a four-Power standard, plus a margin. All the ships I have spoken of are being built of the same terrific type as the modern battleships and battle cruisers invariably are, and it is on that fact, of course, that the new conditions hinge. I am again confining myself to ships of the Dreadnought type in European waters, and not saying anything of the United States or of the South American States, some of which are also building them.

Now in view of these figures and of this assured future there are, it appears, three schools of thought upon whose beliefs the British policy might be framed. The first school in its most extreme form would say that at whatever cost we must maintain, and maintain everywhere, the same predominance which we have possessed in the past, and maintain it for immediate purposes. The second school of thought, taking a precisely opposite view, would argue that times have so completely changed that it is necessary for us to engage in definite military and naval agreements whereby particular areas may be, so to speak, guarded and policed by friendly Powers. The third school, taking a less extreme view than either, would trust to the almost certain outcome of any dispute which is likely to occur in Europe to provide us with support either for the complete safeguarding of our interests in a particular area, or at any rate for support sufficient to make up a deficiency in which we may find ourselves in a particular locality or sea.

There are no subjects like foreign policy and questions of Imperial defence for fulfilling the unhappy condition in which one finds oneself with various courses, three or more, open, to all of which not inconsiderable objections may be taken; and the disciples of these three schools—I think it cannot be denied—lay themselves open to criticism and to objection. Those who contend that it is necessary for this country to maintain naval predominance everywhere are necessarily confronted with the question of cost—a cost which may be almost by common agreement prohibitive, and cost of a kind which no Government would venture to suggest to the people of this country, if that predominance is to be carried out everywhere and to the fullest extent. The second school, those who are for alliances, have to encounter the whole weight of criticism which is directed against them for desiring to depart front the almost immemorial tradition of this country of not allying ourselves with any great European Power, a criticism which draws attention to the fact that if you undertake alliances with European Powers you can only do so by engaging in reciprocal obligations which may be of an onerous and dangerous kind. The third school, those who rely upon what is actually going to happen if unhappily a European war should occur—namely, that the almost certain outcome would be that it would be somebody's interest to assist or support us or take our place as a combatant—run the obvious risk of being told that they are relying far too much on chance, and are liable to be told that they are distorting the theory, mentioned by the noble Earl at the beginning of his speech, which was first prominently insisted upon by Admiral Mahan—namely, that the sea is all one and you cannot fix boundary lines to different oceans: that the different seas, whatever their colour, whether they be Red, or Black, or Yellow, or White, are still all parts of the same sea, and that if you have the command of the sea where-ever the enemy are, you have it everywhere. The partisans of this particular school will be told that they are distorting that theory for this reason, that they are assuming, not only that they will obtain the command of the sea, but that they will obtain it almost at once, and that they are forgetting that an interval may occur during which they are delayed or prevented from obtaining full command of the sea in the theatre of war which they choose to be the decisive one. During such an interval they may sustain almost irretrievable losses in some other parts of the world, even though, at some future time, they may be able to establish naval predominance in those also.

Those different schools appear to me to exhaust all possibilities of the coming state of things, if noble Lords will be so good as to apply those different theories to the particular subject which the noble Earl has brought up—namely, the Mediterranean. I told the House that I should not be able to make any further declaration of naval policy or distribution beyond that which has been made already, and, therefore, I will just venture to repeat to the House what the First Lord of the Admiralty said on March 18 with regard to this particular question of the Mediterranean. He pointed out, in the first place, that the Atlantic Fleet would for the future be based on Home ports instead of on Gibraltar, and that it would become the Third Battle Squadron, and would cease, therefore, to possess that share of interest in the Mediterranean which, when it was the Atlantic Squadron, it possessed. The Fourth Battle Squadron, Mr. Churchill went on, will be formed of the battleships now stationed in the Mediterranean, which will step into the place of the Atlantic Fleet and be based on Gibraltar instead of Malta. He added— This Battle Squadron will also be raised ultimately, and if necessary, to a strength of eight ships from six at which it stands at present. This Fourth Battle Squadron will, from its strategic position at Gibraltar, be able to give either immediate assistance in Home waters or to operate in the Mediterranean should naval combinations in that sea render its presence necessary or useful. Its movements will be regulated by the main situation. That is how the matter stands at this moment, and it is for the House to consider whether, in view of my right hon. friend's statement, it is proper to speak of the Mediterranean as having been evacuated. I think there is, if I may say so, a certain danger in taking a particular date, such as the noble Earl did in taking the date 1904, and making comparisons with the present date upon that basis. However, I pass that by, because I am not able to tell the House all our precise future arrangements in regard to the Mediterranean.

But I can assure the House that the importance of our general position in the Mediterranean and our needs and obligations there by no means escape us. The noble Earl said he would not give any figures to enforce that fact. It is not necessary, of course, to pile up figures to show that our trade from and through the Mediterranean is an enormously important one. My impression is that it is estimated that our trade, taking, of course, trade both ways—exports and imports—with the Mediterranean Powers, trade which is actually due to their Mediterranean position, is somewhere about £125,000,000 a year, and it is also, I believe, estimated that that part of the trade from beyond which comes through the Mediterranean—trade from India and from the Far East—amounts to something like £200,000,000 sterling more. And it must be remembered that this trade includes a substantial portion of the wheat which comes to this country, that it includes practically all the jute—I should think indeed all the jute—practically all the tin, and probably all, or nearly all, the rice. That being so, we are not likely to under-estimate the importance of safeguarding our Mediterranean trade.

Then there is the further point on which the noble Earl dwelt and upon which I have no dispute with him at all—namely, the point of what he rather reluctantly described as prestige, because he knows that that word has, in some connections, an unpopular sound, but which might be described as our moral credit which, in Europe and in our own possessions in the East and in other countries beyond the Mediterranean, may be held to be deeply involved by our policy there. At the same time, it is, I think, only fair to remind the noble Earl that for many years past, when the whole European political situation was an altogether different one from that which it is at present, and when European combinations and dangers to us in Europe were conceived to be of an entirely different kind, that, even in those days, it used to be a frequent subject of discussion whether in certain circumstances of war it might not be our wisest course to evacuate altogether the Mediterranean for the time being. I do not say that in order to, give the noble Earl or the House the impression that that evacuation is the course which I or which His Majesty's Government favour, but it is, I think, useful to mention the fact, which I think would be generally agreed as having existed, in order to point out that the whole subject of our position in the Mediterranean has been one which has been under discussion for fifty, or, for all I know, for a hundred years, and that varying opinions have been held upon it.

If the House will forgive me, I do not propose to touch in any way upon the points of great moment, I fully admit, which the noble Earl mentioned in relation to the military garrisons at Gibraltar and at Malta, or of that portion of the British Army which is now in Egypt; but I can assure him that these are points which we have been most carefully considering in relation to the whole subject, and that we fully recognise their bearing upon the entire problem which the noble Earl has dealt with. I have, in fact, no more to add under the limitations which I have, as I have explained, imposed on myself. I merely desire to repeat that we fully recognise the duty which rests upon us of giving, at the earliest possible moment, to the country and to Parliament the result of the inquiries, the investigations, and the consideration which we have been able to give to this subject of the Mediterranean.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH

My Lords, I find very little comfort in the speech of the noble Marquess. The withdrawal of our Fleet from the Mediterranean while a war is in progress on its coasts has attracted a certain amount of attention and has been much criticised. I do not blame the Admiralty for this withdrawal. Under present conditions it would have been inevitable at the commencement of a war, and I think it wise strategy to concentrate in time considering the smallness of the naval forces at our disposal. Unfortunately it has become necessary to admit in the face of Europe that we shall be unable to keep the Suez Canal open in war time to our trade and all that that implies without the assistance of an ally. When we abandoned the Mediterranean in 1796 there was no Suez Canal at the other end of it. On that canal we are now dependent for Australian beef and New Zealand mutton, to say nothing of grain from India and the East. In 1910 over 2,500 British ships passed through the Suez Canal of a gross tonnage of 14,000,000. Nor can we expect to get grain from the Black Sea if the Mediterranean is closed to us.

I think that our Chambers of Commerce might endeavour to bring home to the people the real effect of the abandonment of the Mediterranean, and I would suggest that their members should read over the evidence given before the Royal Commission on Food Supply seven years ago and take note as to how far the naval situation has been altered since then. I say the evidence, because I consider it more valuable than the Report, to which nearly all the members of the Commission made reservations. Two combined Fleets of different nations have, when acting together, never been as efficient as a single Fleet of the same numerical strength. Last year we were in imminent danger of immediate war. From our withdrawal from the Mediterranean and the further increase of German armaments I gather that the war clouds have not yet passed away. In case of a sudden outbreak it is infinitely better that the French and the British Fleets should act at a distance from one another, and that the British concentration in the Channel should be accompanied by a French concentration in the Mediterranean. At present the danger of acting together would be very great, as the battleships of one Fleet would run a great risk of being sunk by the torpedoes of the other. Not only would there be a loss of ships, but mutual recriminations might break up the alliance. The difference in language, signals, and signal books would be insurmountable unless the two Fleets had previously practised manœuvres together in time of peace. Think how quickly a naval officer must make up his mind as to whether to open fire or not. It is a question of seconds of time. M. Lanessan, a former Minister of Marine, in a recent article in the Action, talks of the necessity of the French Fleet being stationed in the Western Mediterranean so as to protect France against attacks made by the Triple Alliance, and deplores the departure of the French battleships from the Channel and Atlantic coasts as much as we deplore the abandonment of the Mediterranean.

Mr. Churchill said in the House of Commons that in the Mediterranean we had at present no battleships and only seven cruisers, ten destroyers, six torpedo boats, and five submarines. I hope that in the presence of this withdrawal from the Mediterranean no one will continue to assert that we have the command of the sea. We had it in 1906; we have lost it now—not by defeat, nor by the mismanagement of the money voted for the Navy, but by not spending money enough to keep us sufficiently ahead of Germany. Still, that command has not yet passed definitely into the hands of another Power. At present the command of the sea is in dispute, and in the case of war will have to be settled by the ordeal of battle. Unfortunately too many writers and speakers always assume that it will continue to be ours, especially in their discussions on the various Eastern questions. I would ask those who think that we still have the command of the sea if they think that our shipowners would dare to send their ships across the North Sea or to the Baltic at the commencement of a war with Germany. Would they run the risk of sending their ships through the Mediterranean if we were at war or in danger of war with a naval Power on that sea? Have they thought of the possibilities, risks, and difficulties of getting coal if we had to substitute the Cape route for that of the Suez Canal? It is the first step in the abandonment of our position as a Great Power; yet in the present state of our Navy as compared with that of other European Powers I believe it to be correct strategy. What is the use of spending money on Uganda if we are unable to keep the road open to that Colony?

Governments have never yet attempted to keep before the minds of the people the importance of our naval supremacy, and the present Government have with the utmost recklessness embarked in financial schemes which will make it almost impossible for the country to find the money necessary to maintain a sufficient Navy, yet they have received ample warning, both from Naval men and from competent civilian writers, of the danger they were incurring. In July, 1906, I told the First Lord of the Admiralty in this House that— The slackening off of ship-building on our part will have the opposite effect to that looked for. It will cause other countries to strain every nerve to get level with us. Therefore I submit that these reductions do not increase the chances of maintaining peace. And on April 17, 1907, I said— I was in Germany last autumn. The comments of the Germans sounded like a pæan of victory. England was showing signs of giving up the struggle … I ant afraid that for every £100,000 we have saved this year we may have to spend £1,000,000 afterwards. This was an under-estimate on my part. And on March 18, 1908, I warned the Government that the German newspapers met the reduction of our Navy Estimates in 1906 with derisive shouts of enjoyment at the sight of England putting her "hands up" to Germany at the first sign of the commencement of the financial struggle for the command of the North Sea; and that the departure from the Cawdor Programme was the greatest mistake that a Government could make.

I thought that the First Lord's speech when moving the Navy Estimates was an admirable exposition of the naval situation. He made, however, a still better speech at the Royal Academy Banquet. In some of the earlier paragraphs of that speech our naval position is described in language so accurate and terse that I cannot venture to improve upon it. These paragraphs give a faithful representation of the views of many seamen and civilians who have studied naval questions. And, as I cannot better the wording, I shall, with the permission of the House, repeat his words here before commenting on them, for I do not think they can be published or printed too often in a country in which a statesman has to convince an electorate of the soundness of his policy before he can carry it out. The First Lord said— At the Admiralty everything contributes and converges on one single object—namely, the development of the maximum war power at a given moment and at a particular point. Upon that precise object are directed all the sciences our age can boast, all the wealth of our country, all the resources of our civilization, all the patience, study, devotion to duty and the sacrifice of personal interests which our naval officers and men supply; all the glories of our history in the past, everything is directed upon this one particular point and object—namely, the manifestation at some special place in the compass of a few minutes of some shattering, blasting, overwhelming force. To grasp the full meaning of this passage it is necessary to have read the accounts of the Battle of Tsushima, especially that written by Captain Semonoff. Imagine the state of England if we were suffered a defeat of that magnitude. The First Lord of the Admiralty then went on to say— Under the shelter of this manifestation we may agree or quarrel as we please. We may carry on our own Party polities in perfect security. In fact, Mr. Churchill appears to agree with me in looking upon the political disputes of our different Parties as being of no more importance than the quarrelling of little children in a perambulator, who remain safe from material injury provided that their natural protector, which in this case is the British Navy, takes care that they are not run over by motor-cars driven by foreign chauffeurs.

In a further passage the First Lord said— The best way to make war impossible is to make victory certain. These words should be hung up as a motto, not only at every public meeting called by Navy Leagues, but at every assembly of Quakers and of peace associations. So far so good. But we expect from a First Lord not only words but deeds; and when we come to see what the First Lord means to do, I can only conclude that he intends to allow himself to be hampered by some of his colleagues. He unfortunately concluded his speech by saying— We see no difficulty in maintaining the main security of the country and in providing an effective margin for our security at all the decisive points without adding very greatly to the generous provisions which Parliament has made in the past year, and which it will doubtless renew in the years which are to come. When I first read those words I looked again so as to be quite certain that it was the same person who had said them, as they appeared to me to be quite inconsistent with the previous utterances. We have a great deal of lost ground to pick up, and it will cost a large sum of money to restore us to that undoubted command of the sea which we held when the present Government came into power six years ago. At the present moment the command of the sea is in dispute, and in case of war will not be decided until after severe fighting, as to the results of which the fickle goddess "Fortune" may have something to say. At present the success of an enemy is not impossible.

On June 26 the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that since 1908 Great Britain had launched nineteen armoured ships, and Germany had launched eighteen. It does not require much arithmetic to show that these figures do not constitute a two-Power or even a sixteen to ten standard, and that we have not ships enough "to make war impossible by making victory certain." Germany is to add about 15,000 men to her personnel during the next three years, while we are apparently intending to add only 3,000 to ours. There are two reasons why we require at least a two-Power standard "to make victory certain." The first reason is that only three-fourths of our ships can be counted upon as being always ready for an emergency, as under normal circumstances they spend an average of three months in dockyard hands. This is shown in detail in a Return which I moved for in 1909. Now, an enemy with a vastly superior military force would not require to have the use of the sea for more than four or five days, and could easily arrange to have all his ships ready on any one day, the exact day being a State secret. We therefore require to have at least four ships to an enemy's three on our coasts if we wish to be always able to meet him on terms of equality. As victory ought to be certain, it would be safer to have five than three. Had the Russian Baltic Fleet been able to reach the Eastern seas before Port Arthur had fallen, or before the Japanese had had time to refit, that battle might have had a different result. The Japanese lost very few men at Tsushima; that victory was bought with the blood of her army, who lost thousands of men in repeated assaults on Port Arthur—a sacrifice demanded by a Fleet that wanted time to refit before meeting a second enemy. Now, nineteen to eighteen does not allow a sufficient margin for vessels refitting during war.

The second reason why we require a two-Power standard in men as well as in ships is that many vessels must be detached to protect our commerce. There are also other classes of vessels to be considered besides battleships. We require commerce protectors, and it may be that the victory may be won by the side that has the best system of mine-laying and mine-sweeping or aviation. The recent proceedings at the Dardanelles are a useful object lesson. The Turks laid down mines in a panic without taking proper precautions, and for a whole month they were unable to send either their own or neutral ships through those Straits. It is to be hoped that we have better mine-laying and mine-sweeping systems than those in use in the Dardanelles. Innumerable accidents may happen, and we have at present no margin to draw upon. Had the result of Trafalgar been reversed Villeneuve, with his damaged Fleet, would have had to fight at least two more successful battles before he could have appeared off Boulogne, but under present circumstances our first defeat at sea would be our destruction.

I gather from his recent speeches that Mr. Churchill is thoroughly aware of the importance of the points to which I have referred. He has evidently assimilated the teaching of the naval officers with whom he has come into contact; but I am afraid that he has been hampered by other members of the Cabinet—by men who have seldom looked at a globe, and whose geographical studies since they left school have been limited to an examination of the boundaries of constituencies. Even if we escape total defeat we shall have to endure great suffering from loss of commerce and food supply. I warn Mr. Churchill's opponents in the Cabinet that their lives will not be safe in face of a starving and infuriated population; that the men responsible for defeat, if they escape being impeached for high treason, are very likely to be lynched, and even if they succeed in leaving this country they will have the finger of scorn pointed at them to the end of their days. Though it may sound strange, I think I may venture to say that I was present at the rocking of the cradle of the German Navy. For fifty years ago, when serving in the "Highflyer," and later on when serving in the "Shannon," I was a messmate and on friendly terms with two German military officers, who after several years' service in the Prussian Army had been sent to serve on board our ships of war to learn seamanship and naval discipline. One of them was Count Waldersee, a relative of the late Field-Marshal. Both of them were zealous students, and I admire the persistency of a nation which, from so small a beginning and within the limits of a lifetime has been able to bring into existence a Navy strong enough to imperil the existence of Great Britain. At the same time, I think that it would have acted more wisely if it had been satisfied with a Navy of one-third of its present strength and had left the cost of the remaining two-thirds to fructify in the pockets of its people.

In this century there is a financial strategy as well as a military strategy, and I should think it good financial strategy to expend the whole of our surplus of £6,500,000, not on ship-building only, but in increasing the number of our seamen. Then we may be able to reoccupy the Mediterranean. Strategy of that description would show Germany that her endeavour to make a Navy strong enough to destroy our food supply and thereby reduce us to the position of a vassal state is not likely to be successful. Then, again, I look upon it as legitimate finance to build the docks at Rosyth by means of money borrowed on terminable annuities, with about twenty years to run. After twenty years of existence a modern man-of-war is of little value, but the docks that I recollect in 1854 are still in use. Those that held the line-of-battle ships of that day have been lengthened and are now used for torpedo boats and for what are now considered to be small ships. A third method of raising the money necessary to hold the Mediterranean would be to expend on the Navy the money that is to be spent on that "rare and refreshing fruit" which is to be sold at the rate of 9d. for 4d. Let the Navy have the 5d.; let the 4d. remain in the pockets of the poor. If we are defeated at sea there will be no money available either for old age pensions or for insurance, as it will be wanted for the enemy's indemnity. I think it improbable that if we are once struck down we shall be ever allowed to get up again. Parts of Essex and Kent, including the North of the Thames, Dover, Folkestone, and the Isle of Thanet will be made into an Alsace-Lorraine so as to reduce Great Britain to the permanent position of a vassal state.

LORD LAMINGTON

My Lords, I doubt whether the noble Earl who initiated this debate will have had his anxiety allayed by the reply of the noble Marquess who leads the House. The noble Marquess seemed to think he had made a point when he said that in time of war it might be necessary to evacuate the Mediterranean. I do not suppose that anyone would dispute that for a second. The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, carefully stated that he was considering the position as it is in time of peace, and he added that it was just as essential in time of peace that our naval strength should be maintained in the Mediterranean as it might or might not be in time of war. The whole crux of the question is whether the Fourth Battle Squadron should have for its base Malta or Gibraltar. The Admiralty have decided that it shall be Gibraltar. In itself, if it were merely a question of the disposition of the squadron, no objection could be raised if the naval authorities or the Committee of Imperial Defence thought it necessary that the squadron should be moved to Gibraltar in place of Malta; but the fact of giving publicity to this intention shows that they really regard the abandonment of Malta as a strategic point. Otherwise it would have been perfectly unnecessary to make any statement on the matter.

There can be no doubt that this action will be greatly to lower our prestige. In his description of the three schools of thought as to what our naval strategy should be the noble Marquess implied rather that the second school of thought found favour with His Majesty's Government, and apparently the noble Lord who has just spoken approved of that policy. I confess I am one of those who view with great misgiving this desire to support ourselves and look for protection on a series of indeterminate alliances. We all favour ententes with foreign countries, but alliances, which so far as I know have no direct or immediate limits, seem to me full of danger and may bring us into serious entanglements. Therefore it was with great apprehension that I listened to the statement of the noble Marquess.

As regards the general question of our trade passing through the Mediterranean, the noble Earl who raised the question pointed to the various possibilities of raids being made on Malta, but I do not think he mentioned the Suez Canal. That is a point where it is most vital and essential to afford naval protection. For whilst the noble Earl described carefully the various trade routes affected—East Africa, Australasia, the Far East, India, the Persian Gulf, and so on—it must be remembered that there are 1,300 miles of Red Sea down which all this vast trade is concentrated, and also that trade route of 3,000 miles from Suez to Bombay, which is only protected by the East India Squadron, which has a further range as far as Singapore in the East. The result is that for months together the important port of Aden is often without a single ship of war. Before the Tripoli War broke out there was a time when there were seven Italian men-of-war concentrating at Aden Harbour, but not a single vessel flying the White Ensign. But apart from that, the returns at any time show that a far greater number of foreign warships go up and down the Red Sea or pass through by Suez than of His Majesty's ships. I am not wishing to argue that the East India Squadron should be increased. But if you have a weak and attenuated squadron in those waters, it is all the more essential to maintain our strength in the Mediterranean. It is dangerous indeed if you are going to withdraw the headquarters of the squadron from Malta to Gibraltar.

The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, gave us a very eloquent passage regarding the value of our prestige in the Mediterranean, and how far its influence made itself felt towards the East. I fully endorse those remarks of the noble Earl. I feel that our prestige there has very gravely fallen during the last few months. At the present time we do not give that protection to our commerce in the Mediterranean which France is able to give to hers; and when it is realised that our parlous condition there is due to weakness the effect upon our prestige will be much greater.

THE MARQUESS OF BRISTOL

My Lords, this question of our naval position in the Mediterranean seems to me to divide itself into two parts. The first is one of high policy—namely, as to how our Fleets should be distributed; the second is how any alteration in the present distribution will affect the safety of our interests as we have known them in the Mediterranean of late years. As to the first, why is it considered necessary to make any vital change? I take it that our present relations with France and the recent naval activity of our German neighbours are primarily responsible for the shifting of the centre of naval activity from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. But granting that there is some reason to increase our power in the North Sea, why should that be a reason for withdrawing all our battleships from the Mediterranean? What is the reason for this step? If there is a good reason why cannot it be given? And if there is no reason, why in the name of fortune do you not leave in the Mediterranean that squadron which has been our protection there for years?

I think the answer to that question is that those responsible for our safety think that, desirable as it may be for us to have a strong squadron in the Mediterranean, yet with things as they are in our political relations with certain countries it is even more desirable that we should have a certain strength in the North Sea. To secure that strength in that neighbourhood our Fleet is, I suppose—that we have not had from the noble Marquess in his reply—in their opinion insufficient without denuding the Mediterranean of the Mediterranean battleships. The question, therefore, hangs upon whether we have enough ships, not only to safeguard ourselves in the North Sea but also to keep a good strong Mediterranean Squadron. With every ship that has been added of recent years and every ship that is going to be added under the new Navy Law by our German neighbours to their Navy, the position is made increasingly difficult. It seems that, even with our present friendly relations, the Government believe that they require the whole of our strength available for the North Sea. What then would happen if, instead of one country only being our enemy, we were faced with a combination of that country and a European Mediterranean Power? In short, the Fleet is not up to that standard, either in ships or in men, which would be necessary to preserve safety in both of the areas I have mentioned. I am quite sure of this, that I have the whole of the Navy behind me when I say that it is in men principally that we are deficient at the present moment, and that it would be perfectly useless for you to go on building big ships unless you immediately enter a very large number of extra men so that they may be efficiently trained for these ships when you have built them. I feel that I am somewhat at a disadvantage in discussing this question, because as a retired naval officer I have not at my disposal any information as to what the plan of battle would be in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. I assume that the plan would be to concentrate the Fleet in the first instance somewhere to the west of Gibraltar. If after hostilities had begun we found that we had an enemy with a Mediterranean base, then I take it the Malta base which you are so lightheartedly abandoning now would become of immense value.

I now come to my second consideration as to how the safety of our interests will be affected by the withdrawal of our battleships from the Mediterranean. As we stand at present, I believe that the whole of the battleships have gone from the Mediterranean. But if I read aright the answer given by the First Lord of the Admiralty in another place, he said that this matter had not been finally determined, but that the ships had gone in a perfectly legitimate way—the way in which they had for years past been temporarily withdrawn from the Mediterranean to join up with the other Fleets for manœuvres. I certainly find no fault with that, if that is so. It is right and proper that our Mediterranean Fleet in conjunction with the other Fleets should carry out manœuvres. I was under the impression that the First Lord had said that no action would be taken which would prejudice the return of the battleships to the Mediterranean after the manœuvres until a debate had been held and the question threshed out. But I understand the reserves of ammunition, of guns and mountings and warlike stores generally, have been transferred from the Malta base to Gibraltar in contemplation of the carrying out of the scheme of redistribution foreshadowed by the First Lord of the Admiralty. That is a very serious matter.

In the course of this debate it has been pointed out that the ships of the Third Battle Squadron would, after this redistribution, be based upon some English port, but the ships of the Mediterranean Squadron would be based upon Gibraltar. I wish to point out what that really means. Whereas before, in case the real centre of the fighting was in the Mediterranean, you had two squadrons based on Gibraltar and Malta, you will now have only one squadron, and that probably a denuded squadron, based on Gibraltar alone. I have not been serving afloat for some time, so that I am not in touch with the latest development of these matters, but I knew something about the reserves and the building up of the reserves in Malta and Gibraltar. In the old days we used to store two-thirds of the reserves of gun mountings, stores, and ammunition at Malta and one-third at Gibraltar for the Mediterranean Fleet alone, and there was great difficulty at Gibraltar to find space in which to place that one-third. You are not allowed to put more than a certain amount of powder in one magazine, and the magazines have to be at a certain distance apart. There is very little available space for this at Gibraltar, and yet you are trying now to put a great deal more at Gibraltar than was ever placed there before. I do not believe you will be able to store at Gibraltar the reserves that will be necessary even for the Mediterranean Fleet alone, and much less for that Fleet and another Fleet in case of any necessary reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet. Then by your rearrangement you have what was the Atlantic Squadron but which is now the Third Battle Squadron, based in England. That means that if it was necessary in time of stress to get the stores for a reinforcing Fleet out to the Mediterranean again the whole of the stuff would be on the seas and open to the attack of the enemy. I call that a serious matter. For every ship you have to have special reserves according to the special armament and the special things that each ship ought to have, and they are also carefully arranged as to numbers so that the reserves for the same class of stores will give the right numbers when divided out amongst all the ships carrying that class of stores. It may be sometimes that ships arrive on the station requiring special reserves, in which case the reserves that they have out there are not suitable and have to be replaced by others. I remember that when I was out there as gunnery-lieutenant in the "Victoria" there was a ship called the "Australia" there. We went very carefully into the question of her reserves; she had a special type of mounting for a 9.2-inch gun. After I had left the Mediterranean I received a letter to this effect— You will be glad to hear that the mounting for which we have been agitating for the past three years for the Australia' has just arrived on the station. And the writer added— As you know, the 'Australia' has just left for America. If that delay is going to take place in time of peace, what is likely to happen in time of war when a whole new Fleet may suddenly be ordered into the Mediterranean? I submit that the Admiralty ought to be ready in peace time in the Mediterranean with the reserves for the ships they intend to use in the Mediterranean.

There is another point on which I desire to say a word or two, and that is with reference to the training of the officers and men. Gathered round the coast of England as they are at the present moment, they do not learn anything in comparison with what they ought to learn. They can only be efficiently trained by going abroad. Many officers seldom go in the smaller ships. There are big ship officers and small ship officers. You want various places abroad where you can train your officers and men and train them well in all their varying duties. They will not get that training by being kept concentrated together practically entirely off the coast of England. That is one reason, and I believe a vital one, for keeping a Fleet in the Mediterranean. We rightly place a great deal of reliance on our Intelligence Department, and we know how carefully they tabulate the coming and going of every ship, but that does not make up for the certainty that comes of having a Fleet on the spot when a crisis occurs. I will tell your Lordships a little story to illustrate my meaning. At the time of Fashoda, when, as we know, things were pretty strained, I was in command of a small ship in the Mediterranean, and just at the very height of that critical time I was sent from Malta to Genoa. I had started off in the early part of the afternoon, and just towards sunset, when I was off the south coast of Sicily, I saw a fleet of ships steaming eastward along the coast well out to sea. I put on all steam and made towards it to try and find out what it consisted of. As far as the Intelligence Department was concerned we had no notice that any fleet was in that neighbourhood. I steamed towards it and found it was a fleet of twelve battleships steaming due east. Having found this out, I made for the nearest port and telegraphed to the Admiral at Malta. The Admiral telegraphed to Lord Cromer, to the Foreign Office and to the Admiralty, to say he knew nothing about this squadron, and he asked what it was; did they know anything about it? Of course they very soon did know, but they had not got the information beforehand. This story shows how desirable it is to have a Fleet on the spot with steam up to be ready for perhaps the unexpected.

Then I want to know something as to the Government's real intentions. Do the Government really believe that what they are doing, apart from the question of trying to get out of building ships and increasing the men to the required number, is for the safety of the Empire? Quite recently there has been a change of Admirals in the Mediterranean. The late Commander-in-Chief was a full Admiral with a very large command under him. He has been succeeded by another full Admiral, but all the battleships have been withdrawn, and all that the present Commander-in-Chief has is an attenuated command fit only for a Rear-Admiral. What is the meaning of that? Do you mean to send the ships back into the Mediterranean or not? Are we in future to see a full Admiral steaming out of Malta with his flag at the main with two or three small cruisers? And that to show the flag in the Mediterranean! That is not the way to run the British Navy, and I am sure the British Navy will not appreciate a full Admiral being in command of such a squadron as that. Neither is it the way to maintain our prestige. Foreigners will understand the meaning of it mighty quickly. In conclusion, I would like to quote that well-known saying of Nelson's, that "there is no better negotiator for peace than a squadron of line-of-battleships." Is that the Government policy? If it is not the Government policy, I am quite sure it is the policy of the nation.

EARL BRASSEY

My Lords, I venture briefly to address your Lordships on the important subject fittingly introduced by Lord Selborne. His services to the Navy will always be remembered. I desire to associate myself in the fullest sense with the noble Earl in his observations on general policy. Strong at sea we should be friendly with other Powers, and depend on none. Our fellow-subjects across the sea are the only allies we need. We appreciate their loyal desire to help the Motherland. It is agreed on all sides that we cannot abandon the Mediterranean. We have an extensive trade. It is the highway to the Suez Canal.

It is possible to regard too seriously the changes proposed as affecting the protection of British interests in an emergency. The battleships which will be linked up with the Home Fleet as a Fourth Squadron will be based on Gibraltar. Fast battleships can steam from Gibraltar to Malta in less than three days. It is not necessary to cut down our force in the Mediterranean in order to bring up our Fleet in home waters to a sufficient standard of strength. There is a natural tendency at the Admiralty to over-estimate the forces which we may have to meet and to under-estimate our own resources. In the chapter on comparative strength in the last issue of the Naval Annual especial attention is given to the situation in Northern Europe as regards ships in commission. Our Home Fleet and the High-Sea Fleet are reviewed in detail. It is shown that the Fleets maintained by Great Britain in these waters are sufficient to meet any reasonable contingency. The comparison in the Naval Annual is limited to battleships. The cruisers should not be omitted. In all types, and especially the most powerful types, we have an overwhelming preponderance.

In the class of armoured cruiser we have seven ships of recent date, of battleship dimensions, 15,000 to 14,000 tons, heavily armoured and armed, with a speed of 23 knots. The list includes the "Shannon" and six of the "Duke of Edinburgh" type. We have ten more armoured cruisers, chiefly of the "County" class, highly efficient as ocean cruisers. These armoured cruisers, built at an aggregate cost of £17,000,000, are comparable in fighting efficiency to pre-Dreadnought battleships and should not be excluded from com- parisons of strength. The German North Sea Fleet has no ships to set against our armoured cruisers. It is not necessary to extend the comparison to the smaller vessels. In all classes we stand well. In conclusion, I am a supporter of the shipbuilding policy announced in Mr. Churchill's Glasgow speech. The laying down of ships is not resented in Germany. The discussions and comparisons are distasteful. If we steadily build the ships we require alarmists will be silenced and international relations will be improved.

THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE

My Lords, the noble Marquess at the outset of his remarks indicated to the House that in his view this discussion might well have been postponed for a time. I think he proceeded almost immediately to give us what seems to me a very good reason why the debate should not have been postponed. The noble Marquess told us—I think I quote his words correctly—that because certain matters were still under the consideration of his colleagues it was not possible for him to give the House any definite declaration of policy this evening. I infer from that that to some extent, at all events, this important question is still under consideration, and if that inference is one which I am justified in drawing I say it amply justifies my noble friend Lord Selborne in bringing the question before the House and the public, with the hope—I trust the reasonable hope—that the strong case which with all his expert knowledge he is able to lay before your Lordships will receive some attention from His Majesty's Government before their mind is finally made up.

The rejoinder of the noble Marquess, if I may be permitted to say so, though full of interesting matter, did not so far as the greater part of his speech was concerned meet very sufficiently or fully the argument of my noble friend. The noble Marquess gave us a disquisition upon naval strategy; he indicated at some length the opinion of the three different schools amongst which naval strategists may be divided, and he gave us a synopsis of the present naval strength of this country. But I observed that he was very shy of coming to close quarters so far as the Mediterranean was concerned, and it was really not till he had spoken for a full half-hour by the clock that he even referred by name to the Mediterranean at all. The noble Marquess objected very much to the expression the "evacuation" of the Mediterranean. I do not know whether evacuation is precisely the word which I should have suggested, but I am very much afraid that, although the mind of His Majesty's Government is still open with regard to certain matters of detail, the policy of the First Lord of the Admiralty holds the field, and although I do not want to describe that policy as a policy of evacuation, it certainly seems to me to come uncommonly near it.

My Lords, what are the facts? At this moment there are no battleships at all in the Mediterranean, and we are given to understand that if any are sent back they will be based on Gibraltar, and that duties and obligations will be assigned to them which will make it impossible for us to count them as really available for use in Mediterranean waters. That is, of course, a complete departure from our old policy. As the noble Lord who spoke just now told the House, we were used to a squadron based on Gibraltar and another squadron based on Malta. That is all to be changed. We are now to have only one squadron based on Gibraltar and available for occasional use only in the Mediterranean. We are making this change at a moment when other Mediterranean Powers are stronger than they ever were, and at a moment when war is actually proceeding in the Mediterranean between two Mediterranean Powers. I am bound to say that in my view the announcement of this new policy has had an almost bewildering effect upon all those who attach importance to the reputation of this country as a great Mediterranean Power. It is a complete departure from our old policy. Our old policy has been based upon the view that the control of the Mediterranean was essential to us. And not only is it a departure from our old policy, but it seems to me to amount virtually to an admission that that two-Power standard with a margin upon which we were encouraged to rely is completely abandoned. We are now apparently to be content with a one-Power standard, in this sense at all events, that in order to maintain a sufficient margin of strength in the North Sea we are compelled to take away from the waters of the Mediterranean the Fleet which throughout the whole of recent times has been stationed in those waters.

I wonder whether this new departure has really been considered in all its aspects by His Majesty's Government? I noticed a somewhat remarkable phrase in the peroration of the First Lord of the Admiralty when he announced this new policy to the country. He said— Whatever the times may be, I hope this island and its people will Come safely through them. Well, my Lords, some people may ask whether even the British Isles will come safely through such times if our principal trade route is liable to be closed against us. As my noble friend Lord Selborne pointed out, it might be possible for a foreign Power to strike us the heaviest blow of all in the waters of the Mediterranean. We have recently had some experience of the effect of the closing of the Dardanelles for a few weeks only. What will be the effect upon this country if that great trade route upon which we depend for nearly half of the wheat and corn which comes into this country is closed against us?

But, my Lords, the matter is surely one which not only concerns the British Isles but concerns the whole British Empire. And do not let us forget that this is not the first step in the policy of concentration and denudation which now finds favour with the Admiralty. A few years ago there was a wholesale withdrawal of the British flag from all the remoter stations, a general dismantling of remoter naval bases, a general disarmament of our defences. Now comes this further step. My Lords, what will be the effect of this policy upon our great Colonies, upon the Dominions who at this very moment are considering what they can do to help us to meet our Imperial obligations, when they find that while we are making these proposals to them we are—I am afraid it will so seem to them—shirking the old obligations which until now we have always honourably fulfilled? Then what of the effect which will be produced in India? What will the people of India think when they find that we are unable to hold the great highway which connects India with the British Isles? We were told not long ago in connection with the creation of a new capital in India that one of the recommendations of the step was that it was an intimation to the people of India that we intended to remain there. My Lords, I am by no means convinced that, even if we are to assume that this expectation is well founded and that the change of capital will create a favourable impression, as the noble Marquess anticipates, upon the minds of the peoples of India, this abdication nearer home will not produce an unfavourable impression of a much more serious description. Then consider the effects of this great change upon our international relations. What kind of an impression will be produced, for example, upon the mind of our allies in Japan, a maritime Power keen and quick to appreciate any failure of maritime strength on our part. With regard to France and Russia, I will only venture to say that I entirely concur with what was said by my noble friend Lord Selborne when lie reminded the House that those Powers have their own responsibilities, and I agree with him in thinking that it would be highly improper for us to expect them under any conditions to relieve us of responsibilities which are properly ours.

What, again, will be the result upon our diplomacy in the Near East. What of our position with regard to the Balkan Peninsula and in Asia Minor? What of the part we have taken in the affairs of Crete? Surely in regard to all these matters there is all the difference in the world between a diplomacy which is supported by a sufficient force at sea and one which is not. I do not know whether we may expect from the noble Marquess's statement that we shall be promised naval or military rearrangements which could be represented as in any sense countervailing the results of this withdrawal from the Mediterranean. There is the question of the Mediterranean garrisons, to which reference was made. They were, I believe, reduced by a third in 1906 and the defences were to some extent dismantled. But am I not right in believing that those changes were made upon the understanding that the Navy was strong enough to see that the proper reinforcements were provided for each different basis at the proper time? You may, perhaps you will, restore the garrisons to their old strength. But what will be the position of any additional troops whom you may place in Malta or in Egypt if the naval strength is not there to see to their safety? It would be a loss and not a gain of strength if we had a number of British troops locked up for a time either in Malta or in Egypt.

I must, I am afraid, add this further observation, that after listening to this discussion I remain with an uneasy feeling in my mind that after all, even after this disastrous withdrawal, we may not really be strong enough at sea. I can come to no other conclusion than that we have for some time past been lagging behind in the matter of naval construction, and I am still more convinced that in the matter of men there is a very serious deficiency to make good. In time of war it will not be possible to man ships as you may man them at a great Review by borrowing men from one ship or one squadron and putting them on board another. I earnestly trust that if this question be indeed still under the consideration of His Majesty's Ministers they will find it possible to do something to allay the profound uneasiness which has been created in the minds of most people by the announcement of this new policy. I agree with my noble friend Lord Selborne that the only solution to which we can look forward with a feeling that it will be a sufficient one is to be found in the re-establishment of our old position in the Mediterranean. We cannot in my view afford to retire from the honourable position which we have in the past occupied in Mediterranean waters. In the meantime, I trust that we may learn that His Majesty's Government have in contemplation some measures which, by adding to the strength of the Mediterranean garrisons, by re-establishing our defences, and by adding to the number of our ships, not perhaps battleships, in the Mediterranean, may mitigate the blow which I cannot help thinking has been struck at the reputation of this country as a great naval Power by the course which His Majesty's Government have, I think most unfortunately, determined to adopt.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE

I do not press my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, Two o'clock.