Lords Sitting of 28 February 1912

Preamble
The Lord PETRE—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
The Earl CATHCART—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.
The Lord TWEEDDALE (M. Tweeddale)—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.

CANVEY DEEP-WATER WHARE AND RAILWAY BILL. [H.L.]
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE): My Lords, I move that Standing Order. No. 92 be dispensed with in respect to a Petition of companies, bodies, and persons being and representing shipowners trading to and from the Port of London. The position is this. This Petition against the Bill was deposited three minutes late, purely by an accident. The promoters have no objection to the Standing Order being dispensed with, and in these circumstances I beg to submit the Motion.
Moved, That Standing Order No. 92 be dispensed with in respect of a Petition of companies, bodies, and persons being and representing shipowners trading to and from the Port of London.—(The Earl of Donoughmore.)
On Question, Motion agreed to, and leave given to present the said Petition.

FACTORY AND WORKSHOP BILL. [H.L.]
A Bill to repeal section one hundred and fifty seven of the Factory and Workshop Act 1901—Was presented by the Lord Ashby St. Ledgers; read la; to be printed; and to be read 2aon Monday next. (No. 6.)

SHOPS REGULATION ACTS CONSOLIDA TION BILL. [H.L.]
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: My Lords, I desire to make an appeal to the noble Lord who is to move in a few minutes the Second Reading of the Shops Regulation Acts Consolidation Bill. This is a
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Bill of twenty-two clauses and more than twenty pages, and it was only circulated to your Lordships this morning. I think in all he circumstances that this is not quite treating the House as it ought to be treated. I say nothing as to who is responsible. I understand that the Bill is only a Consolidation Bill, but still those who are interested would like to look through it. I am sure it would be interesting to the House to hear what the noble Lord has to say about the Bill, but the appeal I make is that after the noble Lord has made his statement in moving the Second Reading he should agree to a friendly Motion for the adjournment of the debate in order that we may be able to come to a consideration of the Bill with some understanding of it.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
THE PAYMASTER-GENERAL (LORD ASHBY ST. LEDGERS): My Lords, in moving the Second Reading of this Bill I have to apologise to your Lordships for the fact, mentioned by Lord Balfour, that the Bill was only circulated this morning. I do not know whose fault it is, but when I introduced the Bill last week I was under the impression that it would be circulated in time to give your Lordships sufficient opportunity of studying its details. In the circumstances I am bound to say that I think the appeal made by the noble Lord, that the debate on the Second Reading should stand adjourned, is a very reasonable one, and I would suggest that next Monday would be a convenient day upon which we might resume the discussion of the measure.
I do not think it is necessary for me to say very much at this stage, but I would like to emphasise the fact that this is really nothing but a consolidation measure. There are no extraneous matters introduced; there are no amendments of the existing Acts; and if your Lordships give the Bill a Second Reading I shall move that it be referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills which is to be set up on the Motion moved the other day by the Lord Chancellor. I understand that it would not be possible for any Bill involving extraneous matter to go before such a Committee; consequently your Lordships can rest assured that this measure is nothing but a Consolidation Bill pure and simple.

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It is desirable that the Bill should go through without any delay, for this reason. The Act which your Lordships passed last session dealing with the question of shops comes into operation on May 1. Previous to that date it will be necessary for the various local authorities to issue regulations. The central authorities—that is to say, the Home Office in England, the Secretary for Scotland in Scotland, and the Lord-Lieutenant in Ireland—will have to issue a circular to the local authorities and others concerned, pointing out the provisions of the new Act and showing in what way they must be complied with. It would be more convenient if it were possible to issue that circular with reference to a Consolidated Act than with reference to all the Acts which it is now proposed to consolidate. The shopkeepers themselves will no doubt be in considerable difficulty in understanding the exact provisions with which they ate now called upon to comply unless this Consolidation Bill is passed.
There are six Acts in existence dealing with this subject—the Act of 1892, which deals with the hours of young persons in shops; the amending Acts of 1893 and 1899; the Act of 1899, which deals with the question of seats for female assistants in shops; the Act of 1904, which introduced the principle of early closing upon a sort of voluntary basis; and, lastly, the Act of last session. All these Acts refer to exactly the same subject. There is necessarily a certain amount of overlapping, and it would be extremely convenient, both to the Departments and to the public, if a Consolidation Act were passed and passed before April if possible. I do not think that a study of this Bill will reveal any difficulties to any student of it. If your Lordships will glance at it, you will see that in the margin reference is given to previous Acts from which the clauses in the present Bill are derived. In many cases they are copied verbatim and, I think, present no difficulty whatever.
But there is one point of considerable complexity, and that is the question of the application of this Bill to Ireland, and it arises in this way. The Act of 1911, and, indeed, previous Acts, only applied to Ireland in part. The rural districts in Ireland were entirely excluded from the operation of the Act of last session. Consequently there is a difficulty in a Consolidation Bill—it is merely a matter of drafting,
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but it does present some complexity—as to how best the case of Ireland can be dealt with. One or two alternatives presented themselves to the draftsman. The one selected is to set out in the schedule those parts of the Act which apply to Ireland. I do not know that I can elucidate this very much. It really is a Committee point, and when the Bill goes before the Committee believe it is the practice for the draftsman to attend, and he will be able to explain to the Committee why he thinks this the simplest way to accomplish the desired end. However, my Lords, I think it is only reasonable that we should adjourn this discussion for a few days in order that your Lordships should have an opportunity of studying the Bill a little more at leisure, and I have pleasure, therefore, in agreeing to the adjournment until Monday.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ashby St. Ledgers.)
The further debate adjourned to Monday next.

THE ARMY.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD had the following Notices on the Paper—
To ask the Secretary of State for War to give—

The establishment and strength of officers by ranks of the seventy-four Third Battalions Special Reserve Infantry on the 1st February, 1912, exclusive of Regular Establishment.

The number of officers now serving in the seventy-four Third Battalions Special Reserve who transferred from the Militia.

The total strength of the non-commissioned officers and men of the seventy-four Third Battalions Special Reserve exclusive of Regular Establishment on the 1st February, 1912.

(a) The difference between strength and establishment;

(b) The number of non-commissioned officers and men under 20 years of age;

(c) The number of non-commissioned officers and men whose term of service expires before the 1st February, 1913;

and to ask for the same information in respect to the twenty-seven Extra Special Reserve Battalions.
To call attention to Section D of the Regular Reserve—

1. To ask the Secretary of State for War the number of men from Section D who would be required to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force in 1913.

2. If men serving in Section D of the Army Reserve are considered fit for combatant duties with the Expeditionary Force; and to move for Papers.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War the Questions standing in my name on the Paper. In the first set of Questions I merely ask for the numbers of officers and men in the Third and Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve, and I do not think any explanation is needed. My second set of Questions relate to Section D of the Regular Reserve. I ask the noble Viscount what number of men from this Section he will require to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force in 1913, and also whether he considers that these men in Section D are fit for competent duties with the first line.
At first sight Section D would not appear a very important part of our military forces. I think, however, I shall be able to show your Lordships that Section D raises some points vital to the efficiency of our Regular Reserve. Let me explain shortly what Section D of the Army Reserve is. Those men who, after having completed their full term of Colour and Reserve service—a total of twelve years for the Infantry—are willing to re-enlist within six months in the Army Reserve for a further period of four years are known as Section D of the Army Reserve. This Section D used to be called the second class of the Army Reserve in distinction to Sections A and B, known as the first class of the Army Reserve. Under the Reserve Forces Act of 1882 Section D men are referred to as the Second Division, and were "not liable to be called out on permanent service until directions had been given for calling out the whole of the First Division in Sections A and B." These words were repealed by Section 1 of the Reserve Forces Act of 1900, which stated—
"Men in the Second Division of the first class of the Army Reserve shall be liable to be called
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out on permanent service, notwithstanding that directions have not been given for calling out the whole of the first division on such service."
The result of the amendment to the 1882 Act is that both Divisions of the Army Reserve are now called out together. But the fact of calling out the Second Division at the same time as the First does not make the older men of the Second Division of the same fighting value as those in the First.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who then represented the War Office, informed me in November, 1010, that—
"Section D is not the second class of the Army Reserve. It is now always classed in the first class of the Army Reserve."
This means that the second quality is mixed with the first, and the blend described as first class only. The country cannot form an accurate estimate of the value of the whole Reserve except you differentiate between the men passing from the Colours direct into the Reserve and the men re-enlisting into a section of the Reserve on completion of their full term of Colour and Reserve service. I should like to see the Regular Reserve kept in two classes and called first and second class, a distinction every man can understand. The batch of Reservists with whom I am dealing are the product of the three years of Colour service and nine years of Reserve service term of enlistment. Hence their minimum period of absence from the Colours is nine years and the maximum is thirteen years. Of these men the noble Viscount estimates to have, in round numbers, 30,000 by October 1, 1913.
There are three matters in connection with Section D of the Army Reserve which should be considered—first, the source of supply and its limits; secondly, the numbers required by the noble Viscount front that section to complete the mobilisation of the six Divisions of his Expeditionary Force and other mobilisation schemes; and, lastly, the ability of Section D men to perform combatant duties. The source of supply must be limited to the number of men who pass out of the Regular Reserve year by year after completing their twelve years of Colour and Reserve service. The enlistment is optional and consequently uncertain, but men who are not in a position to lose 6,d. a day are pretty sure to re-enlist,

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provided always that they are passed as medically fit for active service. The outflow from the Reserve is now quite abnormal. When the extraordinary outflow ceases, then Section D must dwindle.
I ought to explain that last year the noble Viscount, when dealing with the Army Estimates on March 15, offered to time-expired soldiers of twelve years Colour and Reserve service three forms of re-enlistment—first, to re-enlist direct into the Special Reserve; secondly, to re-enlist into Section D of the Army Reserve; thirdly, on completion of four years in Section D, then to join the Special Reserve. The question arose as to whether men on completion of twelve years Colour and Reserve service would prefer to enlist into Section D, or go directly into the Special Reserve. On this point the noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, when Under-Secretary of State for War, took exactly opposite views. I infer, therefore, that their military advisers—I have no doubt they very well know their business—have given to each noble Lord precisely the advice which they knew would please him best at the particular moment. We all know how much pleasanter it is to get the expert opinion you want rather than the one you do not want. Lord Lucas, in a letter to the Press on July 8, 1910, wrote—
"Section D fills quickly whenever it is opened,"
and he added that—
"the Army Council base their conviction on years of experience."
But then what the noble Lord wanted to prove was the certainty of getting a large number of men in Section D.
Then comes the noble Viscount last year. He, on the other hand, cared nothing about the numbers of Section D, the point not being under discussion. His aim was to show an unfailing source of supply from which to fill the attenuated ranks of his Special Reserve battalions. So in explaining the Army Estimates on March 15, 1911, he stated that—
"Comparatively few men go to Section D,"
which shows that the noble Viscount has a supreme contempt for the convictions of the Army Council even when based on years of experience. The noble Viscount
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meant to make his plan fill the ranks of the Special Reserve, so he clenched his argument by stating that—
"The Special Reservists get better rates of pay."
Now, if the noble Viscount will inquire into this matter he will find that he has got his figures wrong. The 6d. a day of the Section D men mounts up to more by some 45 s. at the end of the year than the pay and all the allowances of the Special Reservist. Again, life in Section D means no military training and 6d. a day in your pocket for certain. The Special Reservist must undergo four weeks' training a year, during which time, if he offends against discipline, he will find himself mulcted of much of his money, and if he is absent will be apprehended as a deserter.
Our present position is that we have lost nearly 37,000 men from the Colours since 1905, and that 39,617 men (in round numbers 40,000) will pass out of the great Reserve created by Lord Midleton between October 1, 1911, and October 1, 1913, as shown by the Annual Report on the British Army published in 1911. Of these 40,000 the noble Viscount estimates that he will re-enlist in Section D in round numbers 30,000 by February 1913. All 1 can say is that if 30,000 a re re-enlisted the medical examination must be merely nominal. The Under-Secretary of State for War has informed us that no statistics are available on this point. In four years time this batch of 40,000 men who enlisted sixteen years before will finally pass out of the Army—a matter which may possibly affect the noble Viscount's successor more than the noble Viscount himself. The noble Viscount seems to have realised that these reductions in the Regular Army and its Reserve are rather too sweeping. So we see him now engaged in trying to keep together the numbers of the Regular Reserve by asking time-expired men in the big Reserve which he inherited from his predecessor to re-enlist for another four years. By this simple plan, if at all successful, the noble Viscount may pass on to his successor the task of building up again the Regular Reserve but without the material for which he is indebted to Lord Midleton.
Then as to the total number of Section D men required by the noble Viscount to complete the mobilisation schemes which he is pledged to the country to carry out.

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The noble Viscount requires, according to his statement on March 14, 1911, 9,840 (in round numbers 10,000) time-expired soldiers for his Special Reserve battalions. It is quite certain that if the men prefer to enlist into the Special Reserve—and the noble Viscount has told us that comparatively few men go to Section D—then Section D of the Army Reserve must be depleted. In estimating the strength of Section D in future 10,000 men must be deducted for service with the Special Reserve. The noble Viscount has set up a competition for time-expired soldiers between the Special Reserve battalions and the Army Reserve, and he must make allowance for its effect.
Then I beg to ask the noble Viscount the number required from Section D to proceed abroad at once with the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force if mobilisation takes place after October 1913. I must explain why I ask for the number in 1913. Next year Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve will be at their lowest, and the reductions in the Regular Army which the noble Viscount has initiated will have been realised. It is the weakest link in the chain by which the strength of the chain is determined, but for several years that link is not going to be appreciably stronger. In 1914 there will be an increase of 4,000 men in Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve; in 1915 another 4,000, and in 1916 another 1,000. A possible but by no means a certain addition of 9,000 men spread over three years is not going to make the whole difference to our position in the world as a military Power.
My last and most important point is the fitness both professional and physical of the Section D men for combatant duties in the First Line. It is well to have a clear idea of what the duties are which these reenlisted Reservists—that is, Section D men—will be required to perform. Let us assume that mobilisation takes place in view of a contingency which it is idle to suppose we contemplate as remote—namely, the employment of the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force on the Continent of Europe. These men will have been absent from their regiments and engaged in civil life for a minimum of nine and a maximum of thirteen years without any military training. Then, within at most three weeks of rejoining the Colours
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they will have to face the best of Continental troops. Will they be fit for an ordeal of that kind? Will they be a source of strength or of weakness to their units on the battlefield? That is the question I beg to put to the noble Viscount.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to Section D of the Regular Reserve.—(The Duke of Bedford.)
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, the noble Duke has not given me much time, as he only put down his Questions yesterday afternoon, but I think I am in a position to give him the desired information except on one point—I mean the information for which he asks as to the details of mobilisation. On that subject I think we ought to be stricter than we have been in the past. No other nation in the world gives its mobilisation details, and therefore I am afraid I cannot give the noble Duke this information. But I can give him a good deal of information in regard to the other points.
The first set of Questions which the noble Duke has put to me fall under three heads. Under the third head he asks for the total strength of the non-commissioned officers and men of the seventy - four Third Battalions of the Special Reserve, the difference between strength and establishment, the number under twenty years of age, and the number of non-commissioned officers and men whose term of service expires before February 1, 1913. He will find a great deal of this information, which, of course, he had not before him when he put down these Questions, in the General Annual Report of the Army which was published yesterday afternoon. He will there find a great deal of information directed to the points which he puts, but there are certain points which are not covered in the Annual Report. The Report, for instance, does not distinguish between the seventy-four Third Battalions and the twenty-seven Extra Special Reserve Battalions. I think it will be possible for me to get the information for which the noble Duke asks without putting an undue strain upon the persons concerned, but he will, I hope, be content to take it as from October 1 last. To get it as from February 1 would be to set the record officers to work at a time when they are very busy with other things, and the

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three months cannot make any material difference for the noble Duke's purpose. I shall be able to give him the information as from October 1 last.
Then as regards the first and second Questions which he puts to me. I can give him an answer as to those. The General Annual Report gives the establishment and strength of officers of the Special Reserve on October 1, 1911. It does not, however, give the numbers by ranks and does not distinguish those who were transferred from the Militia. Nor, again, does it separate the seventy-four Third Battalions and the twenty-seven Extra Special Reserve Battalions. But I think I can give him the information. In fact, there is a Return moved for in the other House which gives a great; deal of it, and I will see whether I cannot include in the Return the further point for which the noble Duke asks. Therefore I think I shall be able to give the noble Duke all the information he desires, except that it will be from October 1 last instead of from February 1.
Then I come to the point raised by his second set of Questions. As regards the requirements on mobilisation, that, for the reasons I have indicated, I hope he will not press for. I do not think t would be right that we should make public statements on that point. But I can tell him what the general position of things is. In the first place, there are 22,870 men in Section D at the present time, but we can to-day mobilise without these and have a substantial surplus over. Nor have I any reason to anticipate that we should be in a difficulty in the years which are immediately coming on. The noble Duke talked of the Reserve being there because of Lord Midleton's three and nine years system. No doubt that is quite true. The noble Duke also pointed out that the Reserve would go clown. Of course it will go down, because the men who will come in and drive it down are the nine. years and three years men of Mr. Arnold-Forster's régime—nine years with the Colours and three years with the Reserve. You therefore want a smaller Reserve for that time. But that system obtained for only a short period.
Then we get to the present system of seven years and five years for the Infantry, and six years and six years for the Artillery.
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But the seven years with the Colours and five years with the Reserve for the Infantry is the material point. On that we calculate for a Reserve which will amply cover what we desire. That Reserve is more elastic than it used to be, and for this reason. Though you know what you want for the requirements of all the units taken together, you are never sure how you stand about particular units unless you closely follow their changes. There may be, for instance, a regiment of Infantry where the commanding officer has been easy going and has allowed men to continue their service, and in that case the Reserve falls accordingly. There may be another where men have been allowed to go freely to the Reserve, and there the Reserve is large. Consequently we have to study each unit, and we encourage men in a unit which requires a large Reserve to go to the Reserve. In other cases we do not. The result is that while it is impossible for me to say what proportion of Section D is required, because the units do not depend on the same proportions, it is possible for us to keep our hand on the unit and to see that it is making a proper Reserve. A system of operations for this purpose was introduced a little more than a year ago.
Broadly speaking, the position is this. We have more than enough to mobilise without Section D just now. We may require Section D for individual units. We may require Section D in the future at the time of the transition, but I do not think that is likely to be materially so. The reason the Reserve will then be small is that the men will be serving for a longer time with the Colours and therefore fewer Reservists will be required to mobilise. When we are in the normal we have a quite sufficient Reserve, but it is good to have Section D and we shall always keep our hand on Section D, not only became there may be an unforeseen shortage in the Reserve but because there may be individual units which are required to be built up for the reasons I have given. Therefore, though this Section may seem superfluous, we propose always to keep our hand on Section D, expanding it and contracting it as seems most convenient. The noble Duke sees that I cannot properly answer the question of the number of Section D men we should use on mobilisation. I have no doubt we should use some for individual units, but we do not require Section D at present for the whole.

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Then I come to the question of how they are to be used. We should, of course, always use Section B men in preference to Section D—that is to say, we should take the men who have more freshly come from the Colours in preference to men who had been some time from the Colours. The noble Duke spoke of Section D men as men who had been a long time from the Colours. No doubt that is so in the case of men who have served for three years with the Colours and been nine years in the Reserve, but that is a class which is largely falling away. In the case of the seven years and five years service, it is obvious that your Section D men have not been a long time away from the Colours, and still more is that so in the case of those who have been nine years with the Colours and three years in the Reserve. A man enlists, say, at the age of eighteen and leaves at thirty. There is often several years' excellent service in him at that time, and he has only been away from the Colours five years and has been in the Reserve during that period. Under the system we now have we are satisfied that Section D contains a large number of useful men; otherwise we should not keep it alive.
Then as regards the number of trained men over twenty years of age available in a unit in peace time, that also is a varying factor which governs the number of Reservists required. The noble Duke knows that if we were sending troops to India we should not send men under twenty, and that would mean that we should require a larger number of Reservists. That is a varying factor which one has to keep in view, and which may govern the extent to which we keep up Section D. Another element which introduces a certain degree of variation which we have to watch closely is this. As I have said, in units, particularly in Infantry battalions, which have a large number of men over twenty in them serving with the Colours and a small Reserve, we allow men to transfer to the Reserve prematurely in order to keep up the Reserve of these units, but we never can tell for certain how many will avail themselves of that. In the good state of recruiting which obtains now we can always get recruits, but we do not know how many men in the Colours will go prematurely into the Reserve. I think I have now covered the bulk of the Questions which the noble Duke put to me. If
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there is anything I have omitted 1 have no doubt he will let me know, and I shall be happy to do my best to give him the information.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: I am very much obliged to the noble Viscount for his promise to give me the information about the Third and Fourth Battalions of the Special Reserve, and I should be very much obliged to him if he could differentiate between the Third and Fourth Battalions.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I can do that.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD: The noble Viscount was somewhat reticent as to the number of Section D men he would require with the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force. Possibly the noble Viscount would have no objection to my setting down on a future occasion on paper the figures which have been supplied by the War Office and which bear directly on this point, and asking him for further information. As regards the fitness of these men for service abroad, the noble Viscount alluded to the fact that in the future the three years Colour and nine years Reserve men would disappear. But at present Section D is composed of men who have been absent from the Colours from nine to thirteen years. The men of Section D were tried on active service in South Africa and were found there to be very unsatisfactory. With your Lordships' leave, I should like to read the evidence which was given on that point before the South Africa War Commission by Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny and Lord Methuen, because it has an important bearing on Section D. The following questions were put to Sir T. Kelly-Kenny by Sir G. Taubman Goldie—
Q.—Did you see much distinction in duality between Reservists and the men who in had been serving up to date?
A.—1 think there was a distinction in the older Reservists, the Section D, but in the case of the others who had not left the ranks long I did not see very much.
Q.—You did not hear of any difficulties as regards discipline?
A.—I did with regard to Section D—in fact, I experienced them myself; when they came up they grumbled a great deal.
Q.—But the other sections were quite up to the mark of the soldiers who were in the ranks before?
A.—I think so.
Q.—They had not lost their military habits?
A.—No, they had not; I could not trace anything against the Reservists I had.
Q.—Except Section D?
A.—That is so.
Then I come to the evidence given by General Lord Methuen. He was asked by the Chairman, Lord Elgin, as to the marching, and Lord Methuen replied—
"As soon as the weak men were weeded out and the troops were in condition there was no question as to the men marching well. I cannot ever recollect the men not being ready to do more than asked them to perform. I gladly include the Militia and the Volunteer companies in this statement. As long as the men are well fed and taken care of by their officers one need not fear stragglers. I except, as a rule, the men of Section D from the above remarks, as they fell out, and we left a good many behind at different places."
Q.—What does that mean with regard to Section D?
A.—They are men having special qualifications. I was going to say they are more or less veterans who go into Section D.
Q.—And he (a Section D man) is a man who has gone through the Reserve and is allowed to come back?
A.—Yes, and only for special reasons he is allowed to go on.
Q.— He may have fallen out because he was physically unfit?
A.—That is so, I think, because he was more or less a cripple.
Lord Methuen is more than satisfied with the marching and willingness of the men in the Regular Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers, but he especially excepts the men in Section D. He tells us they fell out and that he left a great many behind at different places. He describes them as veterans, and on the point of physical fitness he describes the type of man as a cripple. Sir T. Kelly-Kenny places them in a class by themselves, and that is what ought to be done now. The noble Viscount ought to differentiate between the men in Sections A and B and in Section D by calling the re-enlisted men the second class of the Army Reserve and not relying on them for First Line duties. The fact is the non-commissioned officers and men in Section D have been too long away from the Colours. Take the case of the noncommissioned officers. They pass to the Reserve and re-enlist in Section D with the same rank with which they left the Colours. A non-commissioned officer who has been in civil life for twelve or thirteen years must be unfit to command serving soldiers in action within three weeks of rejoining.
Again, I must remind the noble Viscount that whereas the men condemned by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny had been absent from the Colours from five to nine years, the men upon whom he relies will
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in some cases have been absent from nine to thirteen years, because they are the Reserve product of the three years' Colour service term of enlistment, thus not only intensifying but in some cases even doubling the unfitness due to the prolonged absence from the Colours on account of which Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny condemned the Section D men for active service. I can also quote a colleague of the noble Viscount. The present First Lord of the Admiralty, who speaks with a considerable war experience, said during the debate on the Army Estimates on March 5, 1910, whilst praising the Army administration of the noble Viscount, that—
"Men who had only been three years with the Colours and who had been away six, seven, eight, and even nine years frail the Colours could not be satisfactory soldiers on whom to rely at a moment of need."
But this is not a case of eight or nine years absence, but of twelve or thirteen. The noble Viscount has not produced any evidence to show us why men who were unfit for active service in South Africa after nine years of absence from the Colours are fit for the Expeditionary Force on the Continent of Europe after twelve or thirteen years of absence in civil life. The evidence of Field-Marshal Lord Methuen and General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny makes it absolutely certain that Section D men are not fit for service with the Expeditionary Force, and that to rely upon them for the fighting line is the organisation of defeat and not of victory.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: It is quite true that Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny took the line stated by the noble Duke, but at that time Section D was a much less organised body than it is now, and I think a great many of the men did not clearly understand that they could be taken back to the Colours and sent out to South Africa. Consequently there was a great deal of grumbling, and much of the evidence collected by the noble Duke turned on the grumbling.
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD*THE DUKE OF BEDFORD. Lord Methuen specially says that the Section D man was more or less a cripple and could not march, apart from his grumbling.
VISCOUNT HALDANE: I know he said that about some of them, but there was a

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great difference of opinion. The noble Duke has quoted Sir T. Kelly-Kenny and Lord Methuen. I should like to read an extract from the evidence given by General Sir R. L. Rundle—
Q.— Did you find that class of Reservist differ from another?
A.—No, not a bit.
Q.—We have heard from some witnesses that the Reservists, having been away for some time from their regiments, were not quite acquainted at first with the modern conditions or even with the rifle that they were called upon to use. Did you find any difficulty in that respect?
A.—None. I never found any difficulty. Of course, naturally there was a certain amount of rustiness; but that must be expected. It was fully made up by the increased intelligence and the extra age of the men who came back, and it very soon wore off.
I give that as the view of another distinguished General to show that even then there was not a consensus at all about the utility of Section D, and I have no doubt that to this hour there is a good deal of difference of opinion; but I think it is plain that, if a man has only been away five years from the Colours and is of the age of thirty or thirty-one, there is no reason to expect that he has forgotten very much. That is different from the case of a man who has been away for a longer
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period, and the normal of Section D will certainly be considerably shorter than that of the Section D men to whom the noble Duke referred and who are beginning to pass away.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE): My Lords, I understand that the Motion which is on the Paper for to-morrow is not going to be taken until Wednesday next, which involves there being no business on the Paper for to-morrow. Therefore, with your Lordships' approval, I suggest that the House should adjourn until Monday.
Moved, That the House do adjourn, except for Judicial business, until Monday next.—(The Marquess of Crewe.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House adjourned at ten minutes past Five o'clock, till To-morrow half-past Ten o'clock.