HL Deb 04 May 1911 vol 8 cc193-210
THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

had the following Notice on the Paper—

"To call attention to—

1. The deficiency in the 1st Class of the Army Reserve, Sections A and B, and in the 2nd Class of the Army Reserve, Section D, to meet the requirements of the Expeditionary Force in event of mobilisation in 1913, according to the following table compiled from statistics furnished to Parliament by the Secretary of State for War, and according to statements made by the Under-Secretary of State for War on 15th November, 1910.

THE NUMBERS OF THE ARMY, OF THE REGULAR RESERVE, AND OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN 1913.

By the Army Annual Return published in 1911 the total number of non-commissioned officers and men in the United Kingdom 121,143
There are 28,268 under 20 years of age in 121,143
(A)—From Peace Establishment.
Number of non-commissioned officers and men in the United Kingdom 121,143
Less number of non-commissioned officers and men under 20 years of age 28,268
Less 10 per cent. for casualties 9,287
Regulars available for Expeditionary Force 83,588
Number required from peace establishment for Expeditionary Force by Table 1, Memo. of 8th April, 1907 60,927
(B)—From Reserve.
Estimated strength of Sections A and B of the Regular Reserve in 1913 106,372
Number living out of the country by statement of Under-Secretary of State for War in November, 1910 7,198
99,174

2. The unfitness of the men of the 2nd Class of the Army Reserve, Section D, and of the Special Reserve, for the duties assigned to them in connection with the Expeditionary Force; and to move for Papers.

The noble Duke said: My Lords, in the Notice that stands in my name on the Paper I call your Lordships' attention to two points—the lack of quantity in the First Class of the. Army Reserve and to the lack of quality in the Second Class of the Army Reserve and of the Special Reserve to meet the requirements of the Expeditionary Force in 1913. I deal with non-commissioned officers and men only. My figures are taken from statements made by Lord Lucas when Under-Secretary of State for War on November 15 last, and also from the War Office Table dated April 8, 1907, which sets forth very clearly and in considerable detail the numbers required from the peace establishment, from the Regular Reserve, and from the Special Contingent for the Expeditionary Force. I am aware that there is a more recent Table than that, issued only last month, but it was dated June 1, 1910. This Table gives the total number of men required for the Expeditionary Force, but it does not differentiate between the numbers required from the peace establishment, from the Regular Reserve, and from the Special Contingent, and hence is valueless for my purpose. It is like substituting the comprehensive word "miscellaneous" for the separate headings of a financial statement, and produces the same impression.

The Table which I have put upon the Paper shows that on the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force in 1913 there will be a deficiency of 29,240 men in the First Class of the Army Reserve. This shortage is met in part by the men of the Second Class of the Army Reserve, whose estimated number in 1913 is 24,895. Assume that mobilisation takes place at the end of the trooping season—that is, in or immediately after the month of April, when all the drafts required for foreign service have been sent abroad. At that time there will be a total deficiency in all classes of the Regular Reserve amounting to 6,834. In the debate which took place before Easter the noble Viscount alluded to— a large number of surplus Reserve and the Special Reserve left in the country after the departure of the Expeditionary Force. The question I beg to ask the noble Viscount is this, Whence will this large number of surplus Reserve be derived in 1913, and why do War Office Returns supplied for our information show not a surplus but a deficiency? There will not only be a great deficiency in the quantity of the First Class of the Regular Reserve, but there will also be a great lack of quality in the Second Class of the Army Reserve.

The men comprising this class of the Reserve known as Section D of the Army Reserve were found by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny during the South African war to be unfit for active service. I have on a previous occasion quoted the evidence given by these two distinguished Generals upon this matter, but I failed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who then represented the War Office, to pay any attention to their opinion. I must therefore press the noble Viscount for an answer to this question. Why, if these Section D men were found unfit for active service in South Africa, should they now be considered fit for active service at a moment's notice with the Expeditionary Force in Europe and elsewhere? The noble Viscount knows that the reason why the men of the Second Class of the Army Reserve proved unsatisfactory in South Africa was due to the length of their absence from the Colours. I must remind the noble Viscount that whereas the men found by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny unfit for immediate active service abroad had been absent from the Colours from five to nine years, the men now relied upon by the noble Viscount to complete his Expeditionary Force will have been absent from the Colours from nine to thirteen years. The noble Viscount must be aware that he is counting upon men who will be the product of the three years with the Colours and nine with the Reserve term of enlistment, and that consequently the unfitness complained of by Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny will be not only intensified but in some cases more than doubled.

Now until the noble Viscount tells us some good reason for setting aside the evidence of Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny it is useless for him to expect us to accept the men of the Second Class Army Reserve as in any way fit for First Line duties against Continental or other troops within three weeks of mobilisation. However, the noble Viscount must include 25,000 Second Class Army Reservists in the ranks of his Expeditionary Force, and even then he will have to draw at once on his Special Reserve to complete his numbers. The noble Lord has assured us, in answer to a question put to him by Lord Curzon, that— He had the machinery and provision for keeping the Expeditionary Force in existence. Now that provision is the Special Reserve. There is no other; therefore it is well to consider that force in some detail. The noble Viscount decided to destroy the old Second Line, the Militia, and to create a new force, the Special Reserve. The noble Viscount has told us that he is satisfied that the new Special Reserve is a better force than the old Militia. We have lost the Militia but we have gained a better force, the Special Reserve, and pro tanto our military forces are the stronger. I should for a moment like to set the loss against the gain.

For instance, in the South African war 126 battalions of Militia were embodied, and there served abroad sixty-one battalions in South Africa and nine in the Mediterranean and Egypt. These seventy battalions expanded the Regular Army abroad by complete units. In short, they carried out the chief recommendation made by the South African War Commission on the need for means of expansion outside the limits of the Regular Army for foreign service. No one would contend that you can simply wipe out a force which supplied seventy battalions for foreign and active service and put nothing in its place without weakening your military strength. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has told us that the Special Reserve in its present form— is a far more valuable part of the military system than the old Militia, on which a considerable sum of money had to be expended. Tested by war experience we know the value of the Militia Force in the past. It was good for seventy battalions abroad besides more than fifty embodied battalions at home, and it supplied its own officers and non-commissioned officers.

Now as to the present value of the Special Reserve. This is quite certain, that whereas you had seventy Militia battalions actually serving abroad, now you have not got a single Special Reserve battalion fit for foreign service. For this very duty the noble Viscount designed the twenty-seven fourth battalions, and told us on March 14 last that they were to go abroad in the same way as the old Militia. All the same, there is not a single battalion in a fit state to go on foreign service, and there is not the smallest prospect of any becoming fit for that duty. The noble Viscount announced on March 14 last that he was going to raise the establishment of these battalions from 530 to 750 men. That means that the noble Viscount must get 5,940 more men for his twenty-seven fourth battalions. At present the whole Special Reserve Infantry is 7,228 men short of its establishment. It is not enough for the noble Viscount to tell us that he proposes to raise more than 13,000 additional recruits; he must also be prepared to show us how he is going to get them without injuring recruiting for the Regular Army, and how he is going to provide them with non-commissioned officers. Last March the noble Viscount proposed to divert men from joining the Second Class Army Reserve and to enlist them into the Special Reserve. Yes; but then what becomes of the Expeditionary Force when the Second Class of the Army Reserve is thus depleted by being put into the Special Reserve?

The whole Special Reserve numbers at present 60,957 non-commissioned officers and men; of these, by the statement of the Under-Secretary of State for War on November 15 last, 15,175 Special Reservists are required to form the Special Contingent of the Expeditionary Force and to proceed abroad at once on mobilisation. That leaves at home 45,782 non-commissioned officers and men of the Special Reserve; one-third of these must be recruits too young to serve abroad. I must further explain that this number of 45,782 would include the twenty-seven fourth battalions who are, by the statement of the noble Viscount, earmarked for foreign service. If the noble Viscount adheres to his statement of March 1 last and sends the twenty-seven battalions abroad they cannot be counted in the home force; that would diminish the home force by some 15,000 men, reducing the total at home to 29,280 including the immature and the unfit. I shall include the twenty-seven fourth battalions in the home drafting pool, because it is obviously impossible for them to serve abroad as battalions. But I must insist on this point, that these twenty-seven battalions cannot be counted as serving abroad as battalions and at the same time as forming part of the home drafting pool. It is for the noble Viscount to elect to which duty he definitely assigns them, but I do protest against his using them in two places at one time. It is certain that the noble Viscount would never have detailed these twenty-seven battalions for foreign service had he not required them abroad. Well, they are not available for foreign service. How, then, are their places to be supplied over seas?

If we recognise the failure of the Special Reserve to provide battalion units for foreign service we shall have in round numbers 45,000 men in the Special Infantry Reserve at home. That number, less one-third too young for foreign service, leaves 30,000 men. That number, again less 10 per cent. for wastage and unfitness and less the number required to sail with the Expeditionary Force in the first instance, would leave at the very outside 25,000 men available for immediate drafting abroad. There are no non-commissioned officers fit to go abroad with the drafts and take their places in the non-commissioned ranks on joining the Line regiments on service. This, then, is the fighting value of the Special Infantry Reserve at the present moment, but then it is a diminishing quantity. At first the establishment was to be 90,000 representing the whole Militia force transferred, and the noble Viscount credited the Regular Army with an additional 90,000 men; then the establishment came down to 70,000, and now the strength is about 60,000, and I read in the Army Annual Return published in 1911 that 7,803 fewer recruits were obtained for the Special Reserve than in the previous year. From 90,000 to 60,000 in three years is a pretty rapid descent down hill, and from the last Army Annual Report we have not yet reached the bottom. In spite of all this the noble Viscount told us that he— believed that the Special Reserve was a better force than the Militia; its numbers were less but it supplied what the General Staff had worked out as the requisites for finding drafts and providing for the wastage of war during the early period of a war. The numbers of rank and file of the Special Reserve are at present nearly 30,000 less than those of the Militia in 1905. We have been told that to supply the wastage of the Expeditionary Force during the first six months of a war 70,000 men will be required. Now if the General Staff work out a demand for 70,000 men and are well satisfied with providing 25,000 men to meet it, I do not think they are ever likely to be disappointed with the results of their administration, because they do not seem to appreciate the difference between success and failure.

Twenty-five thousand men are no very great quantity. Now as to their quality and their fitness for the particular duty for which they are required. They are to go abroad within a few weeks of the departure of the Expeditionary Force on active service in Europe or elsewhere. In a recent debate the noble Viscount refused to regard men with one year of continuous service with refresher courses as sufficiently trained to meet Regular Continental troops, and he considered that— if the doctrine were taken seriously it would spread alarm and consternation throughout the Army. These Special Reservists, with whom the noble Viscount is satisfied, are wanted for this particular purpose, and yet the noble Viscount gives some of them five and others of them three months of squad drill at a depôt, and it is noteworthy that the men of the battalions ear-marked for foreign service are the ones who receive but three months. That represents, or rather misrepresents, their term of Colour service. These Special Reservists are never trained with a regiment in the correct sense of the term. Their annual training of four weeks is but a skeleton training conducted with skeleton companies drilling in single rank, and never enough men in a company to carry out the minor tactics of company training.

Then as to musketry, there is only time to fire 80 rounds instead of the 250 required for the Regular soldier. Machine gun practice and signalling are unknown. The Special Reserve is the special invention of the noble Viscount, and consequently he must accept the product as fit for First Line duties or he would stultify himself. He told us before Easter that— His present military system gave a large number of highly trained Reservists, more highly trained than the Reservists of any other country in the world, who mobilise with your Regulars and make them efficient fighting battalions. That is true of the men of the First Class Army Reserve only where there will be a deficiency of upwards of 30,000 men. But we know from the evidence of Lord Methuen and Sir T. Kelly-Kenny that it is not true of the men of Section D, the Second Class Army Reserve, who are to number 25,000, and it cannot be true of the men and boys in the Special Reserve. No military Power would include in their First Line—that is, in their frontier force, and our Expeditionary Force represents our frontier force—men who have been a dozen or more years away from the Colours, or boys with five and three months of squad drill and no Colour service at all and only trained in musketry up to one-third of First Line standard.

I beg to ask the noble Viscount, first, if he expects us to believe that the men in the Second Class Army Reserve and the men and boys in the Special Reserve upon whom he relies for the requirements of his Expeditionary Force are really more highly trained than the Reservists of any country in the world; and, secondly, to show us from whence the 70,000 men are to be obtained to feed the Expeditionary Force during the first six months of a war. It is certain they cannot come from the Special Reserve. The War Office Returns tell us that they are not there. They must be in the same place as the large surplus of Regular Reservists alluded to by the noble Viscount. The noble Viscount will produce them from somewhere because he has told us that he will do so, but why not let us know from where, because after all, in spite of the secrets of mobilisation, they are bound to appear within the next eighteen months on the Army Estimates.

Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the deficiency in the 1st Class of the Army Reserve, Sections A and B, and in the 2nd Class of the Army Reserve, Section D, to meet the requirements of the Expeditionary Force in event of mobilisation in 1913, according to the statistics furnished to Parliament by the Secretary of State for War, and statements made by the Under-Secretary of State for War on 15th November, 1910.—(The Duke of Bedford.)

VISCOUNT HALDANE

My Lords, the limits of my poor capacity have prevented me from doing more than catch a few drops from the torrent of figures which the noble Duke has poured forth, but I have secured enough to catch the general drift of his arguments. It is the custom of the noble Duke to give us the advantage of seeing his speeches in print, sometimes in the form of letters to the Morning Post and occasionally in a pamphlet, and that is a great advantage, because it enables one to follow what otherwise it would not be easy to follow.

But I wish that the noble Duke, the next time he deals with such a question as the state on mobilisation in 1913, would pay a little attention to what has been explained by my noble friend Lord Lucas in this House and by myself elsewhere, which, I should have thought, could not have been misunderstood. We agree that in 1913, excluding Section D, the Regular Reserve will drop to about 106,000. We know all about that, and we have explained over and over again why it is so. It is so because the system of three years with the Colours and nine in the Reserve was altered by the late Mr. Arnold-Forster for a short period into nine years and three. That, again, was altered to what I believe a much better subdivision, seven years with the Colours and five in the Reserve, and since then you have got nine with the Colours and three in the Reserve. Naturally in 1913 you will find your figures drop, but that need not perturb you very much, because if your battalions are full of men trained for nine years it is clear that you do not require so much of the Reserve to mobilise. Therefore it is as broad as it is long; not quite, but nearly as broad as it is long. In 1913 the Reserve will drop, but you will be wanting a much smaller Reserve because your battalions will be full of men who have been nine years with the Colours. I have explained over and over again that the year 1913 has to be watched. It will be down temporarily, but the Reserve will rise immediately after that to its normal, because the five and seven years' system will be in existence. We have explained fully that we are quite aware of what will be the state of things in 1913, and that such provision has been made as will avert any danger connected with it.

But the noble Duke speaks of 1913 as if it would be the beginning of disaster. He ignores altogether that it is transitory, and that the state of things then will be due to circumstances and to a policy over which this Government have no control—a policy which existed for a short time and which has given rise to circumstances which cannot but be temporary. I will say no more about 1913, except to express the hope that the next time the noble Duke speaks on this subject he will do justice to the fact that his point has been answered and disposed of, as far as I can judge, in a manner which admits of no doubt. The noble Duke went on to say that his figures had been taken from Papers which the War Office had laid on the Table from time to time, and they showed a deficiency which he brings out in the account he has put before your Lordships as a sort of appendix to his Question as 6,834. The noble Duke has also given your Lordships a whole string of figures which he says are taken from War Office Papers and establish his point. Will your Lordships believe that the true result is that there is not a deficiency of 6,834, but a surplus of nearly 27,000?

I have thought it worth while to get out some figures, and I wish to take the opportunity of saying that I cannot be constantly putting that burden upon the hard-worked officials at the War Office. These figures have taken three officers the best part of a day and a half to search out, and I will give them to your Lordships. In the first place the noble Duke said he had not paid much attention to our Table showing the state of the Army in June, 1910. He proceeded on the Paper which was laid on the Table in 1907. I should have thought it would have been more prudent to examine a little closely the figures of the 1910 Return to see how far the figures of 1907 compared. But the noble Duke has not done that, and the result is that the whole of his figures are vitiated. I will take them one by one, because it is interesting to notice the differences.

The first point is a very minor one, and I will not dwell upon it; but the noble Duke, in the figures which he gives at the beginning of his Table showing the numbers of the Army to be 121,143, has omitted 851 warrant officers. It is a small point and I do not make much of it, but it shows how careful one has to be if one professes to be accurate. Next, under the heading "(A)—From Peace Establishment," the noble Duke gives the number of non-commissioned officers and men in the United Kingdom as 121,143, and then he deducts "less number of non-commissioned officers and men under twenty years of age," 28,268. From that one would believe that on mobilisation men under twenty were never sent abroad. The noble Duke has confused two things. We do not send drafts to India under twenty; but since 1899 the constant practice, under Lord Midleton, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Arnold-Forster and myself, has been to treat, for certain arms, for certain purposes, men of nineteen as fit to go even to India, and certainly to Africa and to the. Continent. We do not send men under twenty into the fighting line in the Infantry or the Cavalry, but, as I have pointed out, we should on mobilisation, following the established practice, use a very large number of men under twenty. The noble Duke has, therefore, made an altogether excessive deduction in his figure of 28,268.

But the noble Duke has done another thing in this connection. He has taken, not establishment as he ought to have done, but strength, in giving these figures. Establishment and strength, I am glad to say, are not the same thing. There is at this moment, owing to bad recruiting—the recruiting is, I am glad to see, increasing this week—a slight deficiency in the numbers of the pool, but no deficiency on the establishment. I should be sorry to contemplate it. It is undesirable to take your figures from strength, which may vary from day to day, instead of establishment, and the practice of doing this has led the noble Duke into a very great difficulty. He has put the number of men who leave the United Kingdom as drafts at 13,603, and he has said that these should be deducted; but he has overlooked altogether this fact, that, taking the trooping season with which he is dealing, while it is true that 13,603 are shown as drafts gone out, 12,369 men came home. Of course, there are men going out and men coming back. Most of them come to the Colours for a short time and then go to the Reserve, but there they are available, and if you deduct the drafts on one side going out you must take those who come home. Therefore the noble Duke's figures blunder by 13,000 at a stroke. No wonder he gets a deficiency where in the ordinary course of things there is a surplus.

I come to other points. The noble Duke has given the number of Regulars available for the Expeditionary Force as 83,588. That comes of taking the 1907 Return instead of, as he ought to have done, the 1910 Return, which shows the Army as it is under the seven and five years' system. If the noble Duke had taken that Return he would have found that his figure was wrong by no less than 7,000 men. The true figure is not 83,588 but 90,953. I come to another figure. The noble Duke gives the number required from the peace establishment for the Expeditionary Force by quoting Table 1 of the Memorandum of April 8, 1907. As your Lordships will see, it is 1907 again. There again he has taken it wrongly. He has taken the number available not the number required in 1907. The Return of 1910, which he ought to have taken, shows not 60,927, but 70,288 actually existing men detailed to the Expeditionary Force. I am sorry to trouble your Lordships with these figures, which I am sure are quite as difficult for you to follow as the noble Duke's; but I am bound to protest against figures being brought forward and going out to the public which seem to show that the position of things is such as would naturally very much disturb the public mind, whereas as a matter of fact we have the whole of the men, the fighting personnel, of the Expeditionary Force ready to mobilise at this moment.

I do not wish to trouble your Lordships with the whole of the details, but I find the figure of actual Reservists available for the Expeditionary Force is put down by the noble Duke at 80,896, when it should be 87,557, because whoever prepared these figures for the noble Duke has made an accounting blunder. There are a certain number of men taken from the Reserve and detailed for Medical service for instance. Of course, these form part of the Expeditionary Force just as much as if they were combatants. The noble Duke has deducted them because they are said to be required for those purposes. But he should have put them on both sides of the account. Though they are deducted from the number on one side, they are still going as part of the Expeditionary Force, and they are just as much a part of the Expeditionary Force as if they were fighting with the combatants. Again, as stated in the 1910 Return, 5,000 men for the A.S.C. and R.A.M.C. may be specially enlisted. The noble Duke is therefore wrong here by nearly 7,000. I should only weary your Lordships if I went through all the noble Duke's figures, but there is one particular point in which they are altogether misleading. They make out that the total Reserve will show a deficiency, but after the corrections that I have pointed out have been made instead of a deficiency of 6,834, as stated by the noble Duke, there is a surplus of nearly 27,000. I am not giving these figures recklessly. They have been carefully investigated, and are the result of very hard work in the Adjutant-General's department and the Actuarial department. As far as human skill and industry can make them, they are right. At least I am certain of this, that they are arrived at by going through the proper numbers, and by taking, not an antiquated document, but the most recent document as the basis of calculation.

The noble Duke has overlooked various things in this connection. In mobilisation you would not get much, but you would get a small amount for transport purposes by special enlistment, but in the substitution of mechanical transport it would be essential, not for transport in the fighting line, but the third and fourth transport, as it is called under the new system, to get highly skilled civil drivers for motor vehicles. This new system will to a con- siderable extent reduce the demand for horses, and also to a certain extent for men for the same, and this is also true of the medical. The general observation I would wish to make on the noble Duke's criticism of the Army is that he goes on the principle of counting noses. That is an archaic plan. We fight to-day with great units of mixed arms of Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, and so on, with their transport, medical service, and supplies, and unless you have those things your mobilisation will be the old archaic mobilisation which has long been superseded in Continental armies.

There is only one way to make the Army efficient, and that is to study the organisation of the units. It is all very well to have a large surplus of Infantry, but it is no good to you if you have not the transport and supplies and Artillery to make them effective. Your success on mobilisation turns, and must turn, on your having a proper provision of everything, and therefore the basis of study and the basis of criticism ought to be these large units. That is a problem which does not seem to attract the noble Duke, who goes back to the state of things in the old Militia days as if in the Militia days there was any proper system of mobilisation. Everybody knows there was none. It would have taken months to mobilise a proper Army in those days. We are trying to do the best possible with a system which will provide against wastage in war, and which will enable us to mobilise our Divisions in such a way as we could not do in the old days. I dare say there are many shortcomings and deficiencies, but among these are certainly not the deficiencies in the figures which the noble Duke suggests in the Question he has put down on the Paper.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Viscount for his reply to my Question, but I should like to be permitted to say a few words. First with regard to the question between the two Returns of 1907 and 1910. I beg to tell the noble Viscount that I could not make out anything in the 1910 Return, because you have not differentiated between the number of men you want from the Regular Reserve, the peace establishment, and the Special Contingent. You have lumped them together, and I have been unable to follow the Return. Will the noble Viscount lay on the Table of the House a Return made out precisely in the same way as the one of 1907? If he does that, everything will be clear. The 1907 Return gives all the information wanted.

The noble Viscount has told your Lordships that we are to send abroad men of less than twenty years of age. I admit that is news to me. If you take the number of men under twenty years of age and count them as available for the Expeditionary Force, that will give you a surplus in the Reserve at once. Then the noble Viscount said I had made a great blunder in taking 13,000 drafts leaving the United Kingdom during the trooping season and not counting the drafts returning. It is true you send out 13,000 to India and abroad, and bring others home again, but they are bound to go to the Reserve the moment yon have got them back. Therefore I hold that you must deduct those 13,000 in the way I have done. I asked the noble Viscount whether he considered the men of the Second Class of the Army Reserve fit for the Expeditionary Force. I do not think he has answered that question. As regards the Special Reserve, I think he admits that there are no battalions tit to go abroad now as battalions. That is certainly a very great disadvantage compared with what happened in the old Militia days. Then the noble Viscount expects after the year 1913 to have some rebound in the numbers of his Regular Reserve, but I do not think that that is anticipated to be more than 10,000 men, and as he is losing over 130,000 I think he will still find himself after the year 1913 short in the numbers of the First Class Regular Reserve. I am much obliged to him for his explanations, and I think that the great difference in our tables of figures would arise from the point of age for foreign service.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, I only rise to express the hope that the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for War will see his way to meet the views of the noble Duke by giving us, in some form in which we can judge of them, the figures which he has so largely quoted. The noble Viscount's military strategy, I have been told by colleagues in the House of Commons, is of the very first Parliamentary order. He involves the House and himself in a cloud of figures, covering his front as it were with so great a cloud of skirmishers that no one knows what operations are going on behind. One hon. member of the House of Commons said to me about the noble Viscount— His speeches paralyse our minds, and leave the reporters in tears. And he added that they were unable to follow his expressions, and could only come to the conclusion that he was himself perfectly satisfied and that he believed all those who were not satisfied ought to be ashamed of the part they were taking in criticising him.

What I feel is that these duels of figures, though they may be necessary, are only useful in so far as they give concrete facts on which we can judge. The noble Viscount has done two things undoubtedly which have tended to increase the Reserve. The first is that the medical measures which have been taken have decreased, at least I hope they have, very largely the wastage in the ranks. And the second great change he has made has been by adding the old Militia to the Reserve, which increases the Reserve largely on paper but by including a number of boys who are immature and insufficiently trained among Regular Reservists. But as regards Regulars everybody knows you cannot get a quart out of a pint bottle. The noble Viscount has decreased the battalions in number and strength, and therefore, except for the medical advantage to which I have referred, he has decreased the output of the Reserve. Nothing can alter that. No actuarial calculations can make his Reserve stronger than the Reserve produced by a much larger force. But what I think is of importance is that we should know what the Reserve is, not in 1913 but the normal. A duel has been going on to-night about 1913, but what we want to know is not what may be our weakness in a given year but what it is we can depend upon under the present system at the normal.

I wish to add one word of protest before I sit down. The noble Viscount told the noble Duke that, after all, the whole point was not numbers but the organisation for the purposes of mobilisation. The noble Viscount always speaks as if he had made a study of this organisation, of such an elementary fact as that, for the first time. This is a subject which for the last twenty years has been exercising the minds of successive Secretaries of State for War, and the noble Viscount has lived and flourished on their efforts; he has boasted of the results which they created; he has prided himself on having changed certain conditions and has thrown a very thin gauze over what he has destroyed, especially in the case of the Artillery, which he has had to set up again. Your Lordships pressed him time after time to restore the number of Artillery batteries. We were assured it could not be done, but now it has been done, and the strength of the Reserve in the Artillery in the normal will be entirely due to that. I protest against its being supposed that these subjects are being looked upon for the first time, though I will not say Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona. What we have now I endeavoured to show the other night in a paper which the noble Viscount has. If he challenges those figures, I am ready to argue them at any time; but he must not, of course, take the Arnold-Forster changes which were incomplete, without giving him credit for undertaking what he had in mind to do. I ask the noble Viscount to adopt a fair estimate and give us figures of which we can judge. That, I think, would put an end to these discussions and exchanges of broadsides of figures, which are very difficult to follow and which do not instruct the public as we desire they should be instructed as to the strength of the Army.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I would ask the noble Viscount whether he would be disposed to allow me to have a Return like the 1907 one made up to date?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I should have liked the 1910 Return to have been considered a little more first, but I will consider what the noble Duke says.

THE DUKE OF BEDFORD

I beg to withdraw my Motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

House adjourned at ten minutes past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow half-past Ten o'clock.