COUNTY COURTS BILL. [H.L.]

HL Deb 12 July 1911 vol 9 cc396-440

House in Committee on Recommitment (according to order).

[Lord BALFOUR of BURLEIGH in the Chair.]

Clause 1:

Jurisdiction of Judges and Registrars of County Courts.

1.—(1) County Courts shall, save as hereinafter provided, have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action which can be commenced in the High Court, notwithstanding that the debt, demand, or damage claimed is not limited to one hundred pounds or under.

(2) Where an action is commenced in a County Court which could not but for this section have been so commenced except by agreement of the parties, the action shall, if the defendant or one of the defendants makes an application for the purpose within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court, be removed into the high Court and shall proceed in London or in a district registry as provided by such rules.

(3) Nothing in this section shall extend the jurisdiction of County Courts as respects any action of ejectment, or in which the title to any corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments or to any toll, fair, market, or franchise is in question, or for any libel or slander, or for seduction or breach of promise of marriage, or as respects any action on a judgment in the High Court.

(4) Nothing in this section shall extend the jurisdiction of County Courts as respects actions of a class for the time being assigned to the Chancery Division or the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court, nor shall anything in this section affect any revenue proceeding or appeal.

(5) Where, in an action commenced in, or remitted to, a County Court, the defendant or one of the defendants counter-claims an amount of money not limited to one hundred pounds or under, and the plaintiff objects in writing in accordance with the provisions of section eighteen of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1884, the following provisions shall have effect:

1. (a) The plaintiff may, in accordance with County Court rules, apply to the judge for an order refusing permission to the defendant to avail himself of the counter-claim, and if on such application the judge is of opinion that the counter-claim cannot be conveniently disposed of in the pending action, or ought not to be allowed, he may make an order refusing permission to the defendant to avail himself thereof.
2. (b) If no such application is made, or the judge refuses to make an order refusing such permission, the whole proceeding shall, in accordance with rules of the Supreme Court, be removed into the High Court, and shall proceed in London or in a district registry as provided by such rules.

(6) Where any action or proceeding is, under this section, removed to the High Court, the record shall be transmitted by the registrar of the County Court to the proper officer of the High Court in manner prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court, and the action or proceeding shall thenceforth be continued and prosecuted in the High Court as if it had been originally commenced therein. The removal of any such action or proceeding shall not affect the validity of any order made or act done in the County Court prior to such removal, and any such order may be enforced by tie high Court as if it had been originally made therein, and the costs incurred prior to and of the removal shall be dealt with as the High Court or a judge thereof shall direct.

(7) Section one hundred and sixteen of the County Courts Act, 1888 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), which relates to costs in actions brought in the High Court which could have been commenced in a County Court, shall not apply to my action brought in the High Court which could have been commenced in a county court by virtue of this section or by agreement, but not otherwise.

(8) Section sixty-four of the principal Act, which confers jurisdiction on county courts by agreement of the parties to an action, shall not apply in the case of any action which may be commenced in a County Court under this section.

LORD GORELL

I move to delete from the end of subsection (6) the words, "and the costs incurred prior to and of the removal shall be dealt with as the High Court or a Judge thereof shall direct." This is a small Amendment necessitated by the fact that the provision which it proposes to delete is really covered by Clause 12. If your Lordships will look at that clause you will find that the Court which finally disposes of the matter has the power to deal with those costs. That was not noticed at the time the Bill was first drafted, but the draftsman and those who have considered the matter, including myself, think that the words might be omitted from subsection (6) of this clause as they are covered by Clause 12.

Amendment moved— Clause 1, page 2, line 33, leave out from ("therein") to the end of subsection (6).—(Lord Gorell.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (LORD LOREBURN)

The facts are as stated by my noble and learned friend, and I think the Amendment will be an improvement.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

On Question, That Clause 1, as amended, be agreed to,

THE EARL OF HALSBURY said

My Lords, on this Motion I have to move that Clause 1 be omitted from the Bill. It is a clause which has been debated once before in your Lordships' House, and the small attendance this afternoon indicates, I regret to say, that the importance of the subject is not fully appreciated. I wish to state my deliberate opinion that this clause, if passed, will cause serious injury to the general administration of justice in this country. There are, however, a great many clauses in the Bill which have my hearty support, but this clause, which in effect enacts that every proceeding shall begin in the County Court, would be to my mind most mischievous in its operation. It would be mischievous in more ways than one. It would be particularly hard on the class of person for whom the County Courts were originally intended—namely, people of small means seeking redress in respect of small questions which might properly be left to the County Court.

I feel the difficulty of arguing this question before a House which really is not familiar with the state of facts. From time to time the Legislature had added a great number of jurisdictions to the County Court, and although the Judges have most fairly and honestly tried to get through the work, a great number of small cases are from time to time delayed and cannot be carried through to a proper conclusion by reason of the great pressure on the County Courts. That pressure exists in a way which is very remarkable in one sense. Wherever there is a very efficient Judge—and there are many, I may say—he becomes as it were a favourite Judge, and his Court is overwhelmed with business. The Legislature, as I say, has thought fit to increase the jurisdiction of the County Courts. Of that I cannot complain, because the Legislature has done so and there it must remain; but this clause would further increase the number of cases to be taken in the County Court. I can only say that from all I hear it is not true that there is at present any delay in the superior Courts. The case as originally made out for some alteration of this sort was that the superior Courts had not the time necessary to try the cases, and that you ought to diminish the number of cases in the High Court by some sort of assistance. That case can no longer be made. The Legislature has thought right to add two more Judges to the Judicial staff, and I hear from the Lord Chief Justice and from everybody familiar with the facts that there is no such delay as was the subject of complaint before.

But by this clause it is intended to increase the quantity of business in the County Courts. If I am wrong, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor will correct me; but if that is not the intention, I fail to see what the object of the clause is. The County Court Judges have honestly tried to do what they can in overtaking their work, and many of them have sat until half-past ten o'clock at night hearing cases in order to get through their lists. County Court Judges have to fix their sittings at the different places on their circuit beforehand, in order that adequate notice may be given to the parties; and having fixed the days, they must get through their lists or adjourn cases, and it is these perpetual adjournments which inflict serious hardship and loss on the poorer litigants. I have in my hand a list of a large number of cases showing what the delay has been. On the last occasion when we were discussing this question the Lord Chancellor read—I do not know where the statistics came from—figures showing the number of hours during which County Court Judges sit.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I quoted the average number of days a year on which they sit. The figures will be found in the Judicial Statistics published every year. The average number of days on which a County Court Judge sits is 153 each year.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

I would point out that the only figures there given are as to the number of days on which the Judges sit. They are no doubt quite correct. But these Judges have circuits to cover. The time spent in travelling is not counted at all in the statistics, and from time to time they have considerable distances to cover. I think the Lord Chancellor, in the argument he founded upon those figures, was rather judging from his own experience of going from his own house to where he sits. These Judges have to travel considerable distances, and when they get there the two or three days fixed for the transaction of the business may, as is continually the case, prove not enough. Then what is the Judge to do? If he tries to get continuous sittings, the parties at the next place where he is due and to which they have gone with their advocates and witnesses have to be put off, and the expense is immediately made much greater for them than it originally was. But if the Judge adjourns the unfinished case, the witnesses, who are not necessarily in the immediate neighbourhood, and others have to be brought there again, and the result is to inflict a considerable amount of suffering on the poorer class of litigants. That is a very great scandal, and I think we ought to prevent its occurring. I must say I do not know what is the object of insisting that every case should begin in the County Court.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That is not the object of the Bill.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

I will quote to your Lordships a few dates showing what has happened in regard to County Court cases. I will hand my noble and learned friend the list so that he can verify the statement, but I do not wish to read out either the names of the parties or the County Courts.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I would ask my noble and learned friend whether he can state these cases on his own authority. I know that a number of cases were collected by an association connected with the law. They were statements of great grievances in the trial of cases, and they have nearly every one of them been exploded by subsequent repudiations by the parties concerned. When this matter was discussed before I asked my noble and learned friend if he would give us information of the cases. I am quite sure I could meet every one of them.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

My noble and learned friend is hardly serious when he asks me whether I can state these cases of my own knowledge. I will hand him the paper which I hold in my hand in order that he may have every opportunity of investigating whether the statements therein contained are accurate or not, but he would hardly expect me to say of my own personal knowledge whether A B was kept in the Isle of Wight six hours or not. I know nothing about the cases except what I am informed by those who have been careful in the collection of these statistics and whose statements I have every reason to believe are accurate. Here is one case—a case of wrongful dismissal—which lasted the whole of five days. Counsel states that they were obliged to go down from London on each occasion. The case started on December 1; it was adjourned until December 11; it was then adjourned until January 7, and again until January 16, and judgment was given on a subsequent date. Just observe. Five adjournments! The result of that, of course, is that the expense, is repeated five times. Here is another case. The dates of the hearing were July 16, September 29, November 2, December 9, December 10, January 6, January 7, February 1, February 4, February 13, March 14, and April 15—from July to April. And this in the quick Court for poor people! All these adjournments arose, as I have pointed out, from the crowding of the County Courts by these different cases.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Was the last case to which the noble and learned Earl referred a London case?

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

Yes, a Clerkenwell case. But I assure your Lordships that this is by no means confined to London. Then I take a case of an action remitted from the High Court for trial to the County Court—another of the forms in which the County Court has been overloaded. On February 5, the day fixed for the hearing, the parties, with their counsel, solicitors and witnesses, of whom there were eight or nine, attended at Waltham Abbey. At about 3 P.M. it became obvious that there was no probability of the case being reached, and upon application being made to him die Judge kindly granted a special day for the hearing in London. Accordingly, on February 22, the hearing began in London, and when the Judge rose at 4 P.M. the case was little, more than half way through. The Judge again gave a second special day. On Mardi 9 the hearing was resumed in London. Judgment, however, was reserved, and was delivered in London on April 1. These are not isolated cases by any means, and it appears to me that this is really defeating the whole object with which County Courts were set up. Lord Brougham's object was to confine the jurisdiction of County Courts much more than has since been the case. But be that as it may, the state of things at present creates continual annoyance and causes continual loss to small litigants, whose time is their money.

There is another matter in the Bill which seems to me very relevant to this. I think the poorer classes of His Majesty's subjects are quite as much entitled to the learning and independence of Judges as the richer. Yet by one of the provisions of this Bill it is proposed to remit certain cases to Registrars. These Registrars of County Courts may be solicitors or not; they may have no legal training at all. The proposal is that when the judge has no time to take these cases, or when there may be no particular reason why the Judge should take them, they should be taken by the Registrar. There are two objections to that. In the first place, the poorer subjects of His Majesty have the right to have their justice as good as the richer class of litigants; and, in the second place, Registrars are very often practising solicitors themselves. In my opinion it is not desirable that a local solicitor, who may have many connections in many ways with local interests, should decide these cases. The parties should have the advantage of a hearing by a perfectly independent Judge.

I see no reason whatever, and I have never heard a reason assigned, why Clause 1 should remain in the Bill. I have no objection to the other clauses. On the contrary, I think some of them are very great improvements. But why the Lord Chancellor should insist on everything beginning in the County Court; I cannot make out. It seems to me to be a distrust of the Junior Bar, and although I quite agree that the Bar exists for the public and not the public for the Bar, yet I do think the institution itself is most valuable in the administration of justice, and I think the great injury that would be done to the profession of the Bar by the passing of this Bill would have its reflex operation on the public generally, and would very greatly impair the administration of justice. For these reasons, my Lords, I beg to move that Clause 1 be struck out of the Bill.

Amendment moved— To leave out Clause 1.—(The Earl of Halsbury.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

My Lords, it is a matter of regret that the House should be so thin to-night, but this Bill was down yesterday and I postponed it until to-day for the convenience of the noble and learned Earl, because I was very anxious that he should have an opportunity of presenting his views. It is difficult to explain a law reform to laymen, but I will endeavour to explain this proposal as simply as I can. In the first place, the noble and learned Earl is completely mistaken if he thinks that this clause provides that all actions shall commence in the County Court. It is nothing of the kind.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

Yes.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I beg my noble and learned friend's pardon. The clause provides that County Courts shall, save as subsequently provided, have jurisdiction to hear and determine any action which can be commenced in the High Court notwithstanding that the debt, damage, or damage claimed is not limited to £100 or under. In other words, we say this—not that every action shall commence in the County Court, but that if you like you can commence an action in the County Court, which is a very different proposition. Now what is the present state of the law, and how small, except from the one point of view last adverted to by the noble and learned Earl, is the change which we seek to make? Let me make it quite clear. At present the jurisdiction of the County Court is limited to cases under £100, although, if the parties consent, any case above £100 can be tried there. That is the existing law. We propose nothing more than this. Instead of requiring what parties in hostility will seldom agree to, a consent to try a case of upwards of £100 in the County Court; instead of saying that the plaintiff and defendant must first come to an agreement that the case shall be tried in the County Court, we say that the plaintiff may set it down for trial in the County Court subject to the absolute unqualified right of the defendant, if he dissents, to have the case removed at once, absolutely on his own right, to the High Court. That is the whole extent of the change.

The reason for this change is very obvious. Cost is the curse of litigation. If I could do anything for the purpose of cheapening as well as simplifying litigation in this country I would willingly do it. The costs are very much greater in the High Court than in the County Court. I received yesterday a letter from one of the County Court Judges, in which he told me of many cases in. which people who were entitled to more than £100 dropped the extra sum in order to be able to bring their action in the County Court without the endless appeals and without the cost of kicking their heels about in the Assize Court or in London, which is prohibitive to people of limited means. My sole purpose and the sole effect of this clause is this. If the plaintiff and defendant agree beforehand, they can now have a case of upwards of £100 tried in the County Court. I propose that the plaintiff shall be at liberty to begin in. the County Court, and that the defendant, if he does not like it, shall have the absolute right to remove the case into the High Court. That is the whole extent of this reform which the noble and learned Earl says will produce disastrous results.

It is because I believe it is right and because it is bound up in the texture of this Bill that I say the clause is vital. Two years ago this House threw the clause out, at the instance of the noble and learned Earl, by a majority of five. Now what is the authority in support of this proposal to allow the plaintiff to begin in the County Court, leaving the defendant an absolute right to remove the case to the High Court? There was in the year 1879 a Bill brought before this House and referred to a Select Committee, which comprised Lord Cairns, Lord Selborne, Lord Hatherley, Lord Blackburn, and the noble Marquess the present Leader of the Opposition, although he may have altogether forgotten the circumstance. They reported the Bill to the House; and when we last discussed this Bill in Committee I gave your Lordships the reference to the number of that Bill and the year in which it was introduced in order that you might look it up. That Bill proposed exactly what I am proposing now. But it went further than I do, because I propose to limit this right. It is not to include cases of ejectment, actions for libel, and so forth, nor Chancery actions. Therefore I am more moderate than were Lord Cairns, Lord Selborne, Lord Hatherley, Lord Blackburn, and the noble Marquess opposite in the year 1879. I hope your Lordships will look that Bill up between now and Report and compare it with this Bill. If you do, you will see that I am more moderate than they were. This idea was also revived and reported upon in the year 1907 by the Committee of which my noble and learned friend Lord Gorell was Chairman. That Committee recommended it——

LORD ALVERSTONE

The majority of them. There was a dissentient Report.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

There was one absolute dissentient; the others were qualified. I have yet to learn what harm this proposal can do. It was reported on in the sense I have described in 1907. Where the Committee in 1879 were unanimous, there was one dissentient and some qualified dissent in 1907. What is the objection to this proposal? I may tell your Lordships that the solicitors are in favour of it——

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

That is not so.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I am not aware of any that are not.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

There is considerable dissent in the Law Society.

The LORD CHANCELLOR

The Law Society is in favour of it, and other law societies are in favour of it. Let me explain how it would work in the first instance. It is proposed that there shall be special Courts, special sittings so as to prevent the very delay which is now complained of—that there should be a sort of circuit in the country where these eases should be tried, the places to be approved by the Lord Chancellor for the time being. Who are the objectors? My noble and learned friend says that the Bar objects. I hope riot. The Bar has always been a liberal profession all through the history of England. I am quite certain that the Bar itself—I do not care whether its representatives on the Bar Council say one thing or another—will not object to this. In the first place, it would be very wrong to allow private interests to interfere with public interests. But apart from that, this proposal is in the interests of the Bar. In the County Courts solicitors have a right of audience, but in the High Court the Bar alone has a right of audience. I know it has been said that the reason why some shortsighted members of the Bar object to this proposal is that they would lose the exclusive right of audience in cases above £100. That undoubtedly would be the result of this clause. I do not believe that the Bar take that line, and, as I say, this proposal would not even injure the Bar. I remember when I was starting at the Bar how glad I should have been of the opportunity of having County Court circuits with small work and an opportunity for young men who will attend to their profession and study it to make their way in the world. I have seen numbers of men losing heart at the Bar because they had not this opportunity in small cases of learning their profession. In all the County Court districts there would be circuits which these men could attend. Again, it is never worth the while of solicitors in large practice to attend to these cases.

I am told by the noble and learned Earl that there is pressure on the County Courts at present. It is very odd that I have never heard of it. I am responsible for the business of the County Courts, and I aver this, that during the time I have been Lord Chancellor I have not had complaints of pressure of work except from two County Court Judges—only two out of the fifty-five—and I have satisfied myself that in neither of those cases was there any ground for the complaint. The Judicial Statistics show the number of days on which each County Court Judge sits. The average is 153 days in the course of the year. Would any of us, would the noble Marquess opposite or any busy man grumble at 150 days' work out of 365? I wish I could get off with even 270 days. This objection is absolutely hollow. There is nothing in it. The noble and learned Earl referred to certain cases. I think I know where he got those cases. They are the eases which were made the subject of complaint at the Bar Council, but every one who followed the matter knows that no sooner were those cases stated than up rose a number of persons who said, "You are quite mistaken; that is not so." I know one case myself to which the noble and learned Earl referred. It was a case in a Loudon County Court which lasted twelve or fourteen days, and which probably ought to have been dealt with otherwise—I think by reference to an official referee, for it was a very technical case. There must in every Court be cases which are wrongly so tried.

But we are on the point of overwork. The contention was that this case extended over twelve months because the Judge had not sufficient time. I wrote to the Judge and asked him how many days he sat in the year, and he replied "170 days and a few days more for preparing cases." He had no travelling because he was a London Judge. That is the only one of the particular instances I happen to know, and if the others are like that I do not think they will carry very great weight with your Lordships. Out of the thousands and thousands of cases which are constantly being tried you will, of course, now and again find cases in which the Court has not been able to give the desired despatch; but where the logic comes in of urging cases of that kind as a reason against the proposal I am making in this clause, which is to allow a plaintiff to begin in the County Court subject to the right of removal, is more than I can understand. If any proper complaint is made of overwork and inability to discharge business, there is already power in the Lord Chancellor to appoint extra County Court Judges; but I do not think the case has arisen. It would obviously be my duty, or that of any one filling my position, if there was any pressure, to make the necessary provision by appointing sufficient County Court Judges to transact the business.

One more point. The noble and learned Earl complained that our proposals with regard to the Registrar, who is nearly always an experienced solicitor, were unfair to poor people, for whose benefit Lord Brougham passed the County Court Act. But the fact is that there is now jurisdiction in the case of the Registrar to the extent of £2.

LORD ALVERSTONE

By consent.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes; £2 by consent to be tried before the Registrar. This dreadful Bill proposes that it should be increased to £5, by consent also, but any poor person who wishes to have his case tried before a Judge can have it so tried by refusing his consent to its being dealt with by the Registrar.

LORD ALVERSTONE

That is not in this Bill.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes it is. Then see who these Registrars are and measure the weight of this objection. A little time ago the noble and learned Earl himself brought in a Bill which extended by consent the jurisdiction of Registrars from £2 to £5.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

That was by consent.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes, by consent, and so it is in this Bill. Then the noble and learned Earl said that this jurisdiction should only be given to district Registrars or Registrars approved of by the Lord Chancellor. If I was pressed, rather than lose the Bill I would consent to that limitation. But, really and truly, who are these Registrars, who are trusted up to £2 and distrusted up to £5? In Bankruptcy cases they have unlimited jurisdiction. In other cases also they have a large jurisdiction. And, after all, if you have the safeguard that the Registrar is not to try unless there is consent, where is the mischief? I pass from that subject. The Bill is full of provisions consequential or related to this clause. I have put this proposal forward to endeavour to give poor people a chance of cheap litigation. I restrain nobody. I only enable where there is consent. I give a little presumption in favour of the jurisdiction and no more, and I am very sorry that the clause is objected to by a great authority for whom I have such a sincere respect. All I can say is that I did not know before what grave consequences would follow from such a small cause as the change in this respect which I propose.

LORD ROBSON

My Lords, my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor has stated that the change which he is proposing to make is a small change. It is, however, a significant change, and we have to deal not so much with the machinery of the change as with its effect and its result on the working of the Courts. My noble and learned friend says that all he is doing is to impose on the defendant in each action entered in the County Court the obligation of making an application to remove it to the High Court. The defendant, instead of merely indicating his dissent, will have in future to make a formal application involving costs. It may be a small matter, but it may result in a great removal of work from the High Court to the County Court. The object of the Bill is undoubtedly to bring about that transfer. Whether the machinery is adequate for the purpose or inadequate is a matter of argument. I think it will probably be inadequate.

But the question for your Lordships to consider is whether or not the change, great or small, is in itself necessary and desirable for the public convenience. That is the point. It is a very narrow one, and in the very few observations with which I shall trouble your Lordships I shall confine myself to what I may call the purely businesslike aspect of it. I am not going to defend the Bar, much as I feel tempted to enter on that alluring theme. I do not think the Bar will be found, in this case or in any other, to range itself in a way adverse to the public interest. The Bar has always contained, not only a large number of law reformers, but very nearly all the law reformers. The interests of the Bar are somewhat divided on this question, but without touching the question of the Bar at all I will ask, Is there any case, so far as the High Court is concerned, to take that first, why its work should be removed to the inferior Court? A short time ago there was an excellent case for relieving the High Court in one way or another of the great strain of work placed upon it. But the Government in that instance, very happily, as I think, decided to do for the King's Bench Division what it had done some years before very effectively for the Chancery Division, and two new Judges were appointed. The result is that the work of the High Court is not only well in hand, but is proceeding with a degree of rapidity which is rare in the annals of our judicial administration. So far, therefore, as the High Court is concerned there is no reason at all why its work should be transferred to other, and possibly overworked, tribunals. But turn to the County Courts, and here one must be guided by the experience of those who are actually at work in those Courts. What is the state of business in the County Courts? To me it seems to be almost beyond a doubt that in the principal County Courts the work is beyond the proper convenience of the Court. There are, of course, many Courts that are lightly worked, but there are others that are overworked.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Will you give me your authority for that statement?

LORD ROBSON

I will give instances in a minute which will show conclusively that there are County Courts that are overworked. My noble and learned friend said that County Court Judges sit on an average 153 days in the year. I should have thought that the controversies with which your Lordships and everybody have become familiar would have made us a little careful of the fallacies which lurk in averages. It is no consolation to a litigant who is enduring the inconvenience referred to by Lord Halsbury of not being able to get consecutive sittings for the hearing of his case to be told that he really has nothing to grumble about because in Devonshire and in Cornwall and in the rural districts of the Midlands the County Court judges are scarcely sitting at all. That is no consolation to him. It is un- doubtedly true that some Courts are under-worked and some are overworked. That being so, I daresay you may get an average which may tell one way or another, but it will not help us to an appreciation of the real difficulty.

Now what is the state of things in the overworked Courts? Let us look, as the noble and learned Earl opposite invited us to do, at the object of these Courts. The great law reformer to whom the noble and learned Earl referred, Lord Brougham, said he wanted to make justice pure, prompt, and cheap throughout the whole area of England. One cannot look at the cases set out in this document which I hold in my hand, issued by the Bar, without seeing that undoubtedly in many cases it is pure, prompt, and cheap, but I do not know that it is always satisfactory. What is this document, to which the noble and learned Earl opposite also referred? it contains statements made by twenty-seven barristers who were invited by the Bar Council to give them and the public the benefit of their personal experience in County Courts. I do not know that you can have better evidence in relation to a matter like this than these statements. Twenty-seven barristers are approached. They are not searched out by some eager litigant to give evidence favourable only to his own cause. They are gentlemen whose names can be given to the Lord Chancellor if he desires them, who speak from their own books, and who vouch for the authenticity and accuracy of the facts which they put into these statements. What do they say? Take the first. The case mentioned by the noble and learned Earl as being first on the list was a case of wrongful dismissal. It was a case involving character, and therefore it was fought strenuously and at length. A King's Counsel was sent down; and, by the way, that is one of the consequences of transferring jurisdiction from the High Court to the County Court. Cases may be of great importance though of small amount. It is stated that there were five adjournments of this case. Why? The reason is given in the next instance. There a barrister went down to a County Court which he mentions. He says— We arrived at 10.40. There were five other counsel besides myself. We were all summoned for ten o'clock. There were 200 judgment summonses which lasted from 11 A.M. until about 3 P.M. Those, by the way, are the persons for whom these Courts were constituted. I dare say they do not much appreciate the privilege, but it was for the poor debtor and the small creditor that the County Court was in the first instance formed.

There were in this particular Court no fewer than 200 summonses against debtors on that day. Imagine what that means. Imagine the number of persons who, at the loss of a day's pay, are obliged to attend the Court and hang about its precincts for hours. But those cases must be disposed of. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought fit to add to County Court jurisdiction other cases which were proper for the High Court, at all events, which involved the employment of eminent Counsel. In this instance the important cases had to wait. You may say that at all events the judgment summonses were disposed of. They were. But look at the figures. Two hundred judgment summonses disposed of in four hours! That is fifty per hour. It is very nearly a case per minute. I have no doubt it was pure; it was certainly prompt, and I hope it was cheap, but I cannot help thinking that a little more time might have been given to those 200 judgment summonses. With the immense mass of litigation before the Judge, and with the heavy cases awaiting his attention, it is not difficult to imagine that even the most conscientious and careful judge may be somewhat unduly hustled. There happened on this day what might have been expected. The barrister whose statement I have quoted continues— My case was called on at 5 P.M., and at 6.30 was adjourned for a fortnight, the other cases being all put off. Many of those cases were jury cases. Can you conveniently and wisely combine in one Court—because that is the real crux of the difficulty—litigation like that of judgment summonses with the heavy litigation which you are now putting on County Courts?

See what you have been doing in this direction for some years. I think it has been overdone. The County Court has been made the tribunal for all kinds of recent legislative measures—the Workmen's Compensation Acts, the Agricultural Holdings Act, the Land Tenure Act, the Factory Acts in very large measure—a great mass of litigation of that kind, part of which is really administrative. All that has been put upon the County Courts, and more apparently is going to be put upon them. This is bound to produce, not perhaps always, not throughout the whole year, but it is bound to produce at times in certain Courts a congestion of work. You cannot get at that by averages. You can only get at it by the experience of those who have suffered from the congestion. A few heavy cases may throw out of gear the work of the Courts for a considerable time. In dealing with the litigation of the poor you ought to make sure that at all times they have a ready and cheap access to the tribunals of justice. These twenty-seven statements by barristers are, of course, as the noble and learned Earl said, much too long, though they are, happily, concise, to quote at any length or other than in the most general way. They were originally made with regard to the question as to whether or no divorce jurisdiction should be given to County Courts. One barrister says— As far as the London Courts are concerned, I say without hesitation that they have already as much business as can be dealt with satisfactorily. The noble and learned Earl mentioned the case at Waltham Abbey. It is a really instructive case. He mentioned the number of times that it came up for hearing. It was remitted from the High Court. It began on February 5, and judgment was delivered, after many adjournments, in London on April 1. It was a horse case, and I see that during all that time the horse was standing at liberty.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

That was not the case I referred to.

LORD ROBSON

No, but I think one can gather the great inconvenience arising from such cases being tried in the County Court, where you cannot always get continuous sittings. Though there may be in the High Court delays in getting on the list, when you do get on you are sure of continuous sittings. But in the County Court you have great delays in getting on, and then you do not get continuous sittings. One barrister puts it in this way—that the pint pot of the Courts is overflowing with a quart of litigation; and he adds that it is impossible to get a record of the cases settled at any sacrifice rather than incur the expense of adjournments.

It was my duty as Attorney-General some time ago to make inquiry into the state of business in the High Court, and I confess I was shocked to find, from counsel and litigants whose accuracy I could not possibly doubt, what a number of cases were settled because of the delay. I have heard hon. members in the other House say, "Do not be afraid of little arrears here and there; they are always cleated up." Yes, they are. You can always settle arrears. You can always get rid of an excess of business in the Law Courts. All you have to do is not to hear the eases. The parties cannot keep litigation hanging over their heads for ever, and they often come to a settlement, though at great sacrifice to those who probably have a perfectly just case. That is the kind of danger that happens. You get in the County Court the small work of the poor impeded and delayed, and therefore made more costly; and the larger cases are also delayed and made more costly, and frequently settled at a sacrifice of justice. The great point which these cases show is the disadvantage of not being able to get continuous sittings.

Now my noble and learned friend says he will get continuous sittings. Under this Bill he is going to set up special sittings which may be continuous. What is the effect of that to be on the smaller work of the County Courts, and how can you be sure, with a County Court that has to move on circuit, that you will be able to keep to your special sittings? You may fix a two days' special sitting in one place and a two days' special sitting somewhere else; but you may be in the middle of a case in the first place at the end of the two days, but you must move on because you have all your people waiting in the next place. These barristers say that in spite of the disadvantages of the delays in getting on in the High Court, the great advantage of being able to get continuous sittings there makes up for any minor advantages that might attach to County Courts. Here are twenty-seven men of character and judgment and experience. They go, as they say, almost at random through their fee books to get a record of the adjournments and delays that they have had to experience, and they tell a story which shows that, in spite of what we hear about averages, in spite of generalities and statements which cannot be very precisely tested, there is a very unfortunate state of things in the busy County Courts, and it is the busy Courts that you are going to overload. The overworked Courts are generally those which have the best Judges. They are the men who will have the greater work in future.

I believe we shall have sooner or later to take in hand the question of improving and perhaps localising to a large extent the administration of justice in England. I am by no means sure that the old methods fairly worked out may not prove quite effective. I do not think the circuit system has really received a fair trial. My noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor referred to legal reforms. My experience of legal reforms was that of cutting down the Newcastle business from ten days to five, and when the number of cases had been diminished cutting down still further the number of days. There has been for years in the Judicial administration of England a refusal, I think a foolish refusal, of adequate facilities for the hearing of cases. I have seen it in the High Courts, I have seen it in the County Courts, and on circuit. We have undoubtedly done much to drive business from the Courts because we have not had, first, an adequate Judicial staff, and secondly, adequate local convenience. There are means of improving the administration of justice without adopting this method, which is to take from underworked High Courts work proper for them and put it on the shoulders of overworked County Courts, where it is not appropriate either to the machinery or the Judge.

LORD ALVERSTONE

My Lords, if I had followed my own inclination I should have abstained from taking part in this discussion. I am quite aware that I must differ from the views of the Lord Chancellor. He has told us to-night that he knows he is right, and of course when he says that with all the weight of Lord Chancellor——

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The object is to save litigants costs—that is what I know I am right in—instead of their being bled in the High Courts.

LORD ALVERSTONE

If I thought this Bill was going to economise costs I should support it, but one of the reasons why I cannot support it is that I am convinced that it will work in the other direction. I wish to say one word about precedent. It is suggested that this Bill is founded on the recommendation of the Committee of 1879 and on the Bill introduced by Lord Cairns. It really is not. That was a Bill which allowed every kind of action to be commenced in the County Court. This is a Bill which only takes some of the King's Bench cases and says they may be commenced in the County Court. I ask, If this principle is right, why are Chancery cases not treated in the same way? We are trying in the King's Bench Division and in the Chancery Division cases of exactly the same kind constantly. They are heard in exactly the same way, except that in the Chancery Division there are seldom juries. But if it is to be a principle in our system that any case may be commenced in the County Court, I say it should be applied quite as much to Chancery cases as to King's Bench cases. That has a material bearing on some of the suggestions made by the Lord Chancellor.

It is next said that this Bill is for the purpose of saving costs and to prevent poor litigants being bled. I should like to have heard some statistics in support of that statement. This clause would have the effect in certain Comity Courts of imposing upon a number of litigants great delays. Litigants who took advantage of this Bill would not have their cases heard on consecutive days, with the result that the costs would be increased. It is my opinion that the result of hearing this kind of ease in the County Court would be that hearings would be extended over a far longer time, instead of being heard consecutively from day to day as they would be on circuit or in London, with the result that the costs would be very much increased. Then the Lord Chancellor said there were now endless appeals. The effect of this Bill will be that there will be more appeals, because there is an additional appeal from the County Court. A case goes from the County Court to a Divisional Court, then to the Appeal Court, and, where that appeal is allowed, to the House of Lords. In this Bill there is to be an appeal on fact in cases above £100. At present there is no appeal on fact. That may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory, but the result will be that the number of appeals will be increased under this Bill and not decreased.

The Lord Chancellor said, quite truly, that the average number of days on which a County Court Judge sits is between 150 and 160; but I say with very great submission that the noble and learned Lord overlooks what the working of this Bill will be. It is in places like Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Newcastle, Leeds, Cardiff and Bristol where you have the most experienced County Court Judges. I know County Court Judges who are perfectly competent to try any case, and who are quite as competent to try a patent case as any Judge of the High Court; and there is no reason why a patent case should not be tried in the County Court. The Lord Chancellor says he proposes to have special sittings. I contend that if special sittings are taken they will strike at the root of the County Court system. I have communicated with several County Court Judges with reference to this Bill, and they tell me that their sittings are arranged for three and four months in advance. I am not now speaking of Judges who always sit in one place, but of Judges who go to our principal towns. The sittings of those Judges are arranged for months beforehand, and if special cases are to be taken they must be sandwiched in between the ordinary work arranged for; and if you have a case lasting five, six, or seven days, the result will be that you will have the ordinary sittings of the County Court postponed. Moreover, invite people to have cases to an unlimited amount tried in the County Court is contrary to our system. I respectfully say that it will not diminish cost. It will not diminish appeals. And if it is to be said that this reform is advocated because people are now bled in costs in the High Courts, that applies equally strongly to those cases which are now being heard in the Chancery Division, and you must, amend matters by stopping the causes which lead to increased cost if such exist. Therefore the first thing I have to say with reference to this provision is that von will find that it will work only in those places where there are experienced County Court Judges who have already ample work to do, and you will have the difficulty which is inseparable from our present system—that you will not be able to avoid adjournments which involve great expense.

I ask how it can be suggested, when you can in the High Court have these cases heard day by day without interruption and when you can on circuit have them heard day by day without interruption, that it is better to have a system whereby the hearing of these cases must be broken and must be interrupted? Then the Lord Chancellor said that he would appoint special Judges if necessary for the purpose of relieving the present County Court Judges. I object to the appointment of temporary or Deputy Judges. I do not believe in men being Judges one day and not Judges the next day.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

What I said was that I would appoint as many permanent County Court Judges as were necessary. I may further add that not only I but my predecessor and all Chancellors have always been in the habit of appointing Deputy Judges on occasions.

LORD ALVERSTONE

I quite understand that that has been the practice. But this particular amendment of the law if it be right, which is to allow King's Bench actions to be tried in the County Court, can only be properly worked in the large towns by an addition to the County Court Judges, or by the appointment of Deputy Judges. I trust that as far as possible poor litigants will be allowed to have a permanent Judge to try their cases, not a man who is a Judge one day and goes back to the Bar the next. There is a proposal in the Bill to give County Court Judges more time by allowing, Registrars to try cases up to £5. I quite understand that my noble and learned friend means by consent, but I do not think the Bill says so. I think that under the Bill a plaintiff can bring a case up to £5, and the defendant has to remove it if he does not wish it to be dealt with by the Registrar.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

He has to object.

LORD ALVERSTONE

The clause which deals with the extension of the jurisdiction of Registrars is Clause 5, subsection (1) of which runs— Any action in a County Court for a debt or liquidated money demand not exceeding five pounds may be heard and determined by the Registrar, unless any party within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed gives notice requiring the case to be heard by the Judge of the Court. That is exactly what I say. The plaintiff can bring any action for a debt or liquidated money demand not exceeding £5 to be determined by the Registrar, and the defendant has to say that he wishes the case tried by the Judge. With the greatest respect to the Registrars, I submit that the principle of our County Court jurisdiction is that the poor litigant shall have his case decided by a competent Judge. The noble and learned Lord may think that it is merely a question of sentiment, but it is not. The poor man wishes his case to be decided by a Judge just as a criminal likes to be tried by a Judge rather than by a Commissioner. I hope my noble and learned friend does not sneer at that feeling. You may say that it does not matter whether the Registrar hears such a case or whether it goes before the County Court Judge, but there are many poor litigants who think that it does make a difference; and although it is a most laudable desire to cheapen litigation and make it more expeditious, it ought not to be done at the expense of the County Court system. I submit to your Lordships that the result of this particular amendment of the law will be that a number of cases which ought to be tried in the High Court and on circuit will be tried in the County Court, and I further submit that it is not the fact that they will be tried more cheaply or more expeditiously. I believe the expense will be greater owing to the number of adjournments which must be involved and the greater number of appeals.

I really have to say something for the High Court of Judicature. I am sure my noble and learned friend does not mean to disparage the High Court, but he has said to-night things which will be understood as meaning that these cases can be just as well tried in the County Court as in the High Court. I do not think so. I speak at any rate with some experience in the matter. I do not consider that the trial of such cases in the County Court will be satisfactory. From the point of view of the Judge's note they will be most certainly not satisfactory. I have had hundreds of appeals before me from County Courts, and the difficulty has frequently been that the notes taken have not been sufficient to enable us to deal properly with the matter. If these cases are heard in the County Court they will either involve the Judge in much greater labour and deliberation than at present, or will be heard in a way which will not be satisfactory when it comes to the Court of Appeal. There will also be great congestion of business in the Courts where these important cases are tried. I submit that the proper course would have been to increase the facilities for trial in the High Court and not persuade people to have High Court actions tried in the County Court. If it is said that at present there are cases being tried in the High Court which ought to be tried in the County Court and that thereby people are being involved in extra costs and delays, let us have information that will enable us to form an opinion upon that, but I must say it is contrary to my experience.

The clause under discussion imposes no limit. Any action, whatever its amount, may be commenced in the County Court. It is not a small change. I agree with my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor that if it was merely a small matter it would not be worth debating; but I believe the practical result will be that both plaintiff and defendant will desire to have their case tried by a particular County Court Judge, who will try their case at the expense of the other litigants in this sense, that the cases of the other litigants will be delayed and the days which ought to be appropriated to the regular County Court business will be taken up by this other business. I am quite satisfied that the suggestion that King's Bench actions cannot be tried in the County Court without delay is well founded. It is very easy and very taking, and produces great effect outside, for the Lord Chancellor to talk about being here on behalf of the poor and to say that we are opposing him. But he has done nothing to show that the effect of the alterations would be to cheapen legislation or to lead to a more satisfactory administration of justice.

LORD GORELL

My Lords, I ask your Lordships' indulgence while I make a few observations upon this clause. This matter has been present to my mind now for some years, and I had the privilege of presiding over the Committee whose Report formed the basis of this Bill. I think I shall be able, therefore, to put some matters before your Lordships which have not up to the present received from those who oppose this clause adequate consideration. I wish to supplement, if I may, what my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor said about the change which it is sought to produce by this Bill. It is easy to speak, as some speakers have done, as if this was in effect an attempt to compel people to go to the County Court. It is nothing of the kind. The present law, as laid down by the Act of 1888, is that persons may, by a signed consent, take any common law case into the County Court. They could do nothing more under this Bill, except that this Bill enables the persistent plaintiff to get over the difficulty which he experiences when he proceeds to ask the defendant to consent. Though it is not easy to get defendants to consent, they may be ready, when the case is once brought in the County Court, not to object to its being taken there.

The first general observation I should like to make is this, that this being not a compulsory matter but a means for facilitating getting a case taken in the County Court unless the other side objects, there will be no congestion. If there were any danger of delay through congestion the parties would immediately decide not to go to the County Court but to begin the case in the High Court. Any idea of congestion would be at once got rid of by the parties not using the County Court. And if the plaintiff began his case in the County Court the defendant, if he thought he was going to incur more costs or experience snore inconvenience by the case being tried there, could remove the case to the High Court. I think that is a complete answer to the Lord Chief Justice when he suggests that there will be congestion and that this proposal will add to the difficulties which the County Courts already experience. It is suggested by the Lord Chief Justice that if this extension is right it ought to apply to Chancery proceedings. That is not really sound, if I may respectfully say so, because, although that was contemplated in Lord Cairns's Bill, Chancery proceedings generally involve a large amount of property, and people would not be disposed, I think, to bring such cases in a Court whose officers were not familiar with the forms involved in Chancery proceedings. That was the reason given to me by one of the Chancery Judges on the question of Chancery proceedings when I was presiding over the Committee. Another point that is forgotten is that in great centres of population, in Lancashire, for instance, there is a local Chancery Court——

LORD ALVERSTONE

That is not a County Court.

LORD GORELL

I agree, but there is a Court with unlimited jurisdiction in Lancashire. I venture to assert that the demand which has existed for this change is one which there is no prospect of meeting M the High Court. This proposal is not even so recent as the Lord Chancellor thought. He had probably forgotten that the proposal was first made by the celebrated Judicature Commission of 1870, whose labours resulted in the present Judicature Acts and the present constitution of the High Court. The majority of that Commission recommended precisely the same thing as the Lord Chancellor is recommending to-day. I have an extract from their Report before me. They say— Subject to the power of transfer, these Courts [County Courts] should have unlimited jurisdiction. The power of transfer, as far as I can follow it, was that if a £50 claim was brought the defendant should have the right of removal. So that for forty years this proposal has been before the country. It was also recommended by the Committee to which I have referred and over which I presided, and it is important to bear in mind that that Committee included one of the most experienced County Court Judges and also one of the most experienced County Court Registrars, the latter being an ex-president of the Law Society, both of whom were in favour of this proposal. That point seems to me of importance when your Lordships remember that the only objection we have heard to this clause to-day is that it will lead to congestion.

My noble and learned friend Lord Robson mentioned a certain number of cases selected—over how many nears and from how many cases I do not know—by certain members of the Bar who object to this proposal. I have informed your Lordships that two of the most experienced persons you can find on a subject like this do not see any of these difficulties. I ask your Lordships to remember that if this proposal does lead to blocking of the Courts the parties will not go there. The plaintiff need not go there, and the defendant can remove the case. But, as I have said, there is no real reason to think that this congestion will occur. One word more about the Report of the Committee over whom I presided. There were nine members on that Committee. One dissented, four qualified their assent to the proposal, and four were absolutely in favour of it. The four who qualified their assent were in favour of it if greater facilities were afforded by the High Court, but we have looked in vain from that time for such facilities as really meet the difficulties of this particular class of case. The only change that has been made has been to increase the Circuit facilities on the last place on the Assize.

LORD ALVERSTONE

I am not aware of any suggestion which has been made which has not been carried out in the King's Bench Division.

LORD GORELL

The suggestion in the Report of the Committee was that facilities should be given to enable people to get their cases tried more quickly.

LORD ALVERSTONE

I would point out that we have increased the Civil facilities at several towns in the Autumn Assize, and have recently taken further powers of doing so. We have readjusted the days, and given Manchester and Liverpool a practically continuous Civil Judge. We have given these facilities at all places where they are required.

LORD GORELL

I admit that certain changes have been made in regard to the business at the last Assize towns on the circuit. But there are only two Assizes per annum at almost all these places. That is utterly out of date and unsatisfactory, and that is the reason why there is this demand for an increase in the powers of the County Court. The demand has been growing and is still growing, and unless this clause is adopted you will find it grow to a far more sweeping extent.

LORD ALVERSTONE

Will the noble and learned Lord tell us the demand?

LORD GORELL

I will deal with that point when I come to it. There is this further point, that this Bill has been before the country for a considerable time and that this clause, which is the only clause substantially objected to, has been considered by the law societies. These societies have had it fully before them, and I have myself seen the president and ex-president of the London Law Society, who have been in communication with all the other law societies in the country. A great variety of Amendments were suggested by those societies, all of which passed through my hands and were mostly put into the Bill before its recommitment. There has been no suggestion from first to last that this clause did not meet with the approval of all the societies in the country, and I believe I am correct in saving that it is approved by all the Chambers of Commerce.

This proposal is made on the grounds of convenience and cost. With regard to convenience, can it be suggested in these days of the telephone, telegraph and rapid railway travelling that two Assizes a year in the great majority of the circuit towns in this country are adequate? It is true that cases can be heard more frequently in some of the big centres, but the great bulk of towns in the country get an Assize only twice a year. Is it reasonable that that should be the only facility in a country like this for getting cases of substance heard? By consent a larger number of cases every year are brought to the County Courts than are brought to the High Courts on Circuit. In 1905 there were 947 cases brought in the County Court by consent; in 1906, 961; in 1907, 724; and in 1908, 685. Those are cases over £100 brought by consent. The number of cases brought to the High Courts on Circuit were: in 1905, 751; in 1906, 620; in 1907, 580; and in 1908, 658. Those figures are not quite comparable, because the first figures are of the number of plaints issued and the second of cases tried; but I have searched in vain to find how many of the plaints issued in the County Courts were actually tried. But the fact remains that by consent a larger number of cases are brought every year to the County Courts than are actually disposed of in the High Courts on Circuit. What becomes, therefore, of the suggestion that the transference is to a Court already so much blocked?

On the question of cost, I had placed before me for the purpose of the Divorce Commission a vast amount of evidence upon the respective costs of County Courts and High Courts. One witness gave the figures of 77 cases taxed by him as High Court Registrar in the north of England. He also filled the office of Registrar of the County Court, and had taxed 47 cases of the extended jurisdiction of the County Court, and I gathered from his evidence that substantially the class of case was the same as taken at the Assize. The result was very remarkable. The largest figure of the cost in the High Court was £320 and the lowest £35, the average being £108. In regard to the County Court cases, the highest figure was £106 and the lowest £8, the average being £30. I venture to suggest that that is probably the true representation of the position with regard to the business of the two Courts, and you cannot wonder, if people can get their cases tried for £30, £40, or £50 instead of £120, £130, or £150, they are apt to seek the Court which is at their doors and where their cases can be heard so cheaply. Both in the matter of convenience and cost there is sufficient to explain why we find people consenting to go into the County Court.

It is interesting to point out how much England is behind other countries in facilities for bringing cases rapidly, economically, and locally. I have taken the trouble to investigate the state of matters in France. In France there are 375 tribunals of the High Court covering the whole country, and in every one of those tribunals you can bring your suit, no matter how much is involved.

LORD ALVERSTONE

Does the noble and learned Lord recommend the judicial system of France to this country?

LORD GORELL

No; but I recommend the facilities. In Germany there is a local High Court for every 250,000 of the population, and the result is that the parties can get their case always heard within not more than thirty miles from where they live. In Holland there are twenty-three local High Courts. I suggest that the first objection to the clause, which is that it will so block the Courts that poor people will be placed in a difficulty, overlooks the provision ill the Bill of extended powers to the Registrars. That has been somewhat flouted because it is said that poor persons have the right to have their cases heard by the Judge. So they have, and I was very strong on the Committee in suggesting that nothing should be done to take away from the poorest person the right to have his case tried by the Judge. Consequently the Registrar's powers only come in where the parties do not object. Judgment goes for the plaintiff in 98 per cent. of the cases under £3 in the County Court, and——

LORD ALVERSTONE

This Bill does not touch those cases.

LORD GORELL

It gives the Registrar, unless the parties object, power to deal with all that mass of work. It is really only a question of proof, and if this jurisdiction is given to Registrars by extending the amount to £5, you will cover the vast majority of cases that come to the County Court, and the Judge will have so much more time in which to do his work. The other point which has been misunderstood is this. The Bill contemplates that the Judge shall have power to have the larger work taken at central places, not merely on special days, but at special places. The great difficulty that County Court Judges meet with is that they have to go compulsorily to every one of the small places. There may be no work to do or very little work, or there may be a great amount of work; but if they found at any place where they are sitting that there is a substantial case to be heard, the particular proposals in this Bill will enable the Judges to say that the case ought to go to a central place. By the arrangements in this Bill there will be a large power of concentrating the work at various centres, thereby getting rid of the difficulties which arise in connection with adjournments, and enabling the decent work, as one might say, over £50 to be taken on continuous days at one place.

There are other provisions in the Bill which deal with the saving of time. Small places need not be visited if there is no work, and in certain circumstances cases will be concentrated; and, lastly, the increase in the powers of Registrars will enable County Court Judges to have more time. There is another point under the consideration of His Majesty's Government—I refer to the question of committals. If the view presented by a part of the Committee were to be carried into effect—that committal for debt should in certain cases be abolished—a vast mass of the work of County Court Judges would go. I venture to suggest that the only opposition to this clause is based on a few statistics collected by a certain number of persons over I do not know how long a period. Of course it is easy to find such statistics under the present system; but, even so, the number of cases mentioned is exceedingly small, considering the millions of cases taken in the County Courts. I submit that the various provisions in the Bill meet the objections that have been made, and that the proposal contained in this clause is one that ought to be adopted.

I have been asked whether there was any demand. My answer is that I believe the whole of the law societies are in favour of this change, and they represent the business community in a large sense. I believe also that the whole of the Chambers of Commerce are in favour of it, and if your Lordships do not accept some such proposal as this it is my firm conviction that much more sweeping proposals will be brought forward. There is a demand in the country for local and cheap facilities. Is not that illustrated by the large amount of business which Parliament has put upon County Court Judges? I venture to suggest that this clause ought to pass, and I urge that your Lordships' House should assist in carrying through a reform which has been demanded during many years.

VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYN

My Lords, the subject before your Lordships has been discussed so ably and so completely by the noble and learned Lords who have taken part in the debate that I do not for a moment wish to express any opinion of my own on the merits of the question, which is one with which I am quite incompetent to deal. But I must say, having listened very carefully to the whole of this discussion, that what has struck me most is the extreme difficulty in which members of your Lordships' House who, like myself, are laymen are placed in deciding which way to vote. There is unquestionably, as the noble and learned Lord who has just sat down has said, a strong feeling in the country, in commercial circles at any rate, in favour of greater and cheaper facilities for dealing with litigation locally. When I was President of the Board of Trade—some time ago now—I well remember that chambers of commerce were continually urging that there should be legislation in the direction of giving greater facilities for the hearing of cases locally, and I believe that feeling still continues.

Everybody will sympathise, and I am sure my noble and learned friend Lord Halsbury will sympathise as much as any one, with the demand in the country for cheaper and more easy justice. It is, I understand from the Lord Chancellor, in order to give some effect to that demand that he has introduced this measure which your Lordships are discussing to-day. The noble and learned Lord placed before us his arguments in favour of Clause 1, to which my noble and learned friend Lord Halsbury has taken exception. I will only notice one of the remarks which the Lord Chancellor made. He told your Lordships that he regarded this clause as vital to the Bill, and I think I am right in my recollection that when a similar Bill was before your Lordships two years ago [July 26, 1909] and this clause was struck out on the motion of my noble and learned friend Lord Halsbury the Lord Chancellor at once dropped the Bill. I have not heard from any noble and learned Lord in the course of this debate any objection to the other proposals in the Bill. In those circumstances I would venture to submit to your Lordships that it is really a matter for our consideration whether to-day we ought to come to a vote on the Amendment of my noble and learned friend behind me, much as I respect his high authority in these matters. Mitch as I respect that authority, I do question whether we ought to go to a vote to-day on his proposal, which would put an end to this Bill.

What is the position? We have had a debate which I venture to say has left me in considerable doubt. I should very much like to have an opportunity of going over the report of that debate and weighing the arguments used on each side more than it is possible to do merely from listening to the debate. My noble and learned friend gave no notice of his intention to move the omission of this clause, and it was not anticipated, I suppose, by the great majority of your Lordships' House that such an important debate as this would come on to-day. Consequently we have a very thin House, too thin, I venture respectfully to suggest to your Lordships, to deal properly with so important a matter, and I would earnestly and respectfully ask my noble and learned friend whether he would not be content for the present with the debate which has taken place, and not press his Amendment now, but renew it, if he thinks fit, on the Report stage, by which date we shall have had time to consider the arguments on both sides, and be able to come to a more considered judgment upon the question. I venture to make this suggestion, being extremely desirous that no opportunity should be lost of attempting to bring to the people cheaper and more efficient means of obtaining justice than are available to-day.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY

I am not quite certain that I follow my noble friend's suggestion, but if it is that I should withdraw my Amendment for the present and renew it, if I think proper, on Report, I have no objection to that course. I quite agree that the House is a very thin one to decide upon so important a question raised without notice. It was, indeed, a surprise to me yesterday when I found this Bill on the Paper. I had been sitting all day judicially, and I found out quite accidentally that this particular Bill was on the Paper, and I asked my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor to postpone it until to-day, because I had none of the papers with me at the moment. If the understanding is that I withdraw the Amendment only until Report, I have not the least objection. I think it very reasonable that your Lordships should have more notice and be able to consider the matter more fully. Therefore I withdraw the Amendment now, but I wish to give very definite notice that I shall renew the matter on Report.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 2:

Transfer of Actions from County Court to High Court.

2.—(1) If during the progress of an action commenced in a County Court by virtue of the preceding section it shall appear to the judge that the action would be more conveniently disposed of in the High Court, the judge may by order remove it into the high Court: Provided that no such removal shall take place without the consent of the Lord Chief Justice or such other judge of the King's Bench Division of the High Court as shall be prescribed by rules of the Supreme Court, such consent to be obtained in manner prescribed by such rules.

(2) Where an action is removed to the High Court under this section the provisions of the last preceding section as to actions removed under that section to the High Court shall apply.

(3) Nothing in this or the preceding section contained shall affect any enactments now in force as to the transfer of actions from a county court to the High Court.

LORD GORELL

The Amendment standing in my name is to omit from subsection (3) the words "now in force," and to insert "in force at the commencement of this Act." The subsection will then read, "Nothing in this or the preceding section contained shall affect any enactments in force at the commencement of this Act as to the transfer of actions from a County Court to the High Court."

Amendment moved— Clause 2, page 3, line 18, leave out ("now in force") and insert ("in force at the commencement of this Act").—(Lord Gorell.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I accept the Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 3 agreed to.

Clause 4:

Extension of Jurisdiction under the Lunacy Acts, 53 and 54 Vict. c. 5.

4. The power of a judge of County Courts to make an order authorising a person to take possession of and sell or realise the real and personal property of a lunatic under section one hundred and thirty-two of the Lunacy Act, 1890, may be exercised where the value of the real and personal property of the lunatic is under five hundred pounds, and the order may be made upon the application of any relative of the lunatic or of the clerk to the visiting committee of the asylum in which the lunatic is detained as well as upon the application of the clerk of the guardians or a relieving officer as in that section provided; and, where a judge makes an order under that section, he shall, for the purposes of the sale or realisation of the property of a lunatic, have power to make any such order as a judge of the High Court is empowered to make under section one hundred and thirty-three of that Act. Section sixty-eight of the principal Act shall apply to any proceedings under section one hundred and thirty-two of the Lunacy Act, 1890, as amended by this section, as if such proceedings were an action or matter under section sixty-seven of the principal Act.

THE EARL OF DUNMORE had an Amendment on the Paper to insert the words, "or of the clerk to the visiting committee of the asylum in which the lunatic is detained."

THE LORD CHAIRMAN

I am informed that per incuriam the printers at the previous stage inserted in the clause the words which Lord Dunmore now proposes. The words are therefore actually in the Bill. I do not know whether the Lord Chancellor and Lord Gorell will accept them.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Will you tell us what they are?

THE LORD CHAIRMAN

Lord Dunmore's Amendment is to put in the words "or of the clerk to the visiting committee of the asylum in which the lunatic is detained." Those words are actually in the clause as reprinted. I am informed that they were inserted without any authority. Perhaps the best course in the circumstances would be to hear what the noble Earl has to say for the words, and those in charge of the Bill can then say whether the words shall stand or not, and I will put the question accordingly.

THE EARL OF DUNMORE

I put forward this Amendment on behalf of the London County Council six weeks ago. Its object is to enlarge Clause 4 in order that the County Council as the lunacy authority may have power to make an application to the County Court Judge, in addition to the other authorities named in the clause. I might point out that lunatics when received into the county asylums are classified in the first instance as paupers. A lunatic would continue to be classified as a pauper as long as he was chargeable to the board of guardians even if he possessed property, and if the guardians were recouping themselves from that property and paying the cost of his maintenance to the visiting committee. Under Clause 4 as it stands Poor-law officials are empowered to make application to the County Court to appoint some one to administer the estate of a lunatic, but this provision does not extend to County Council officials. It is quite evident, therefore, that the effect of the clause would be this, that where a lunatic is classified as a pauper his estate would be administered through the medium of the board of guardians, and the man would continue to be classified as a pauper, although his estate might be amply sufficient to defray the whole cost of his maintenance. This Amendment proposes to remedy this by enabling County Council officials to make an application direct to the County Court Judge in order that where a lunatic has sufficient property to defray the cost of his maintenance he should not be classified as a pauper. The Amendment is a very simple one. It is non-controversial, and I move it entirely in the interests of the patients. I trust the noble and learned Lord will see his way to accept it.

Amendment moved— Clause 4, page 4, line 7, after ("lunatic") insert ("or of the clerk to the visiting committee of the asylum in which the lunatic is detained."—(The Earl of Dunmore.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

There seems to have been some misunderstanding in reference to this Amendment. I do not know who was to blame. As I understand, the object of the Amendment is not to prevent the extension of the jurisdiction to larger cases of property, but to allow an application to be made by the clerk to the visiting committee of the asylum in which the lunatic is detained, the object being that the visiting committee of the asylum may cause the property to be applied to defray his keep. In the circumstances I suggest that the words should remain in the clause as they have inadvertently been inserted, and before Report I will make inquiries and find out whether there are any objections. I will communicate with the noble Earl before the Report stage.

THE LORD CHAIRMAN

I am afraid the putting of the question is not very easy, as the House had not intended to authorise the insertion of the words, although they are in the clause. Perhaps I had better put the question "that the words be here inserted," and if we are agreed to that at this stage there will be no difficulty.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD GORELL

The next is an Amendment, after the words "Section 68 of the principal Act," to insert the words appearing in my Amendment. It is a purely drafting Amendment suggested by the draftsman, who considered that it was not desirable merely to refer to a section without explaining what that section was. The words which I propose to insert simply describe what the section relates to.

Amendment moved— Clause 4, page 4, line 21, after ("Act") insert ("which relates to the transfer to the Chancery Division of actions exceeding the jurisdiction of a County Court").—(Lord Gorell.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I accept the Amendment.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 5:

Extension of Jurisdiction of Registrar.

5.—(1) Any action in a County Court for a debt or liquidated money demand not exceeding five pounds may be heard and determined by the registrar, unless any party within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed gives notice requiring the case to be heard by the judge of the court.

(2) In addition to the jurisdiction conferred by the last foregoing subsection, a registrar may, in any case where the sum claimed or the amount involved does not exceed five pounds, by leave of the judge and subject to County Court rules, on the application of any party, unless any other party objects, hear and determine the case.

(3) Where a defendant gives notice in the prescribed manner that he admits his liability on a claim, but desires the decision of the court as to the time and mode of payment thereof, the registrar shall have power to determine the question and enter up judgment.

(4) The powers as to entering up judgment conferred on the registrar by sections ninety and ninety-two of the principal Act shall authorise hint to exercise, in accordance with the terms of those sections, the powers of the judge as to making orders for the recovery of possession of small tenements, and of rents or mesne profits, or both, under section one hundred and thirty-eight of the principal Act.

(5) In any case where the registrar has power under the principal Act or this Act to hear and determine a case or to enter up judgment he shall have power to make such order as to payment by instalments as the judge might have made, and to exercise any other power which the judge might have exercised, and, subject to the provisions of this Act with respect to appeals, any judgment entered up by the registrar in pursuance of the principal Act or this Act shall, to all intents and purposes, have the same effect and shall be enforced and enforceable in the same manner as if it had been a judgment of the judge of the same court.

LORD ALVERSTONE

I should like to ask the Lord Chancellor why in subsection (1) he does not require the leave of the Judge, which would be, of course, a protection, whereas in subsection (2) he does. I do not see why there should be a difference. Subsection (1) says that any action in a County Court for a debt or liquidated money demand not exceeding £5 may be heard and determined by the Registrar unless any party objects. That I quite understand. But in subsection (2) it is enacted that in addition to the jurisdiction conferred by the foregoing subsection, a Registrar may, in any case where the sum claimed or the amount involved does not exceed £5, hear and determine the case "by leave of the Judge." I do not quite understand why, if the leave of the Judge is wanted there, it is not wanted in subsection (1).

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

If the action is for a debt or liquidated money demand not exceeding £5, the consent of the Judge is not asked. The difference is between dealing with debts and liquidated money demands and other claims which are not liquidated.

LORD ALVERSTONE

I do not see why the leave of the Judge is wanted in one case and not in the other.

LORD GORELL

A Registrar might act under this Act when the Judge is not there as to debt, but I do not think he could act as to the other cases unless the Judge was present.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clause 6 agreed to.

Clause 7:

Special sittings for the trial of actions over £ 50, &c.

7.—(1) Special sittings, for the trial of such actions and matters as under this section are to be tried at such special sittings, shall be held at such County Courts, and at such times, as may from time to time be appointed for the purpose, and every judge of County Courts shall, in accordance with the directions of the Lord Chancellor, appoint places and times at which such special sittings are to be held.

(2) There shall be tried at such special sittings—

1. (i) all actions as to which jurisdiction is conferred on County Courts by the County Courts Act, 1903, or by this Act, where the debt, demand, or damage claimed or counter-claimed exceeds fifty pounds;
2. (ii) such other actions or matters triable in a County Court as may be prescribed by order of the Lord Chancellor;
3. (iii) any particular action or matter which the judge may by order direct to be so tried;

unless in any case the judge thinks fit for special reasons to make an order to the contrary.

(3) The Lord Chancellor may by order direct that any actions or matters required to be tried at special sittings and commenced in any court specified in such order at which no such special sittings are held, shall be transferred to any court specified in such order at which such special sittings are held, whether or not the judge of the first-mentioned court is judge of the last-mentioned court. Where any such order is made, any such act ions or matters commenced in the first-mentioned court shall be transferred to the last-mentioned court in manner prescribed by county court rules; and the court to which such actions or matters are so transferred shall have the same jurisdiction as respects such actions and matters as it would have had in case they had been commenced therein, and the judgment of that court shall have the same effect as if the judgment therein had been the judgment of the court in which they were commenced.

(4) All such incidental, consequential, and supplemental provisions as may appear necessary or proper for the purpose of carrying this section into effect may be made by county court rules.

(5) The appointment of special sittings shall not prevent the judge from hearing and determining any such actions or matters as are in this section mentioned on any day appointed for the general business of the court, where any such action or matter can be so heard without interference with the general business of the court.

(6) This section and the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding any provisions in any general or local Act providing for the trial or hearing of any actions or matters at any particular County Courts, and inconsistent therewith.

LORD ALVERSTONE

This clause raises a rather important point. It is an important clause for this reason, that it interferes with the existing state of things. Under the Act of 1903 the limit was raised from £50 to £100. Now it is proposed to have special sittings, and at these special sittings, according to paragraph (1) of subsection (2), shall be tried all actions as to which jurisdiction is conferred on County Courts by the County Courts Act, 1903, or by this Bill, where the debt, demand, or damage claimed or counter-claimed exceeds £50. The result of that is that the existing law with regard to actions between £50 and £100 is altered, and they are to be tried at special sittings. I do not understand on what ground that change is made, because I do not know that there has been any difficulty in trying cases between £50 and £100 any more than lower amounts. Therefore I would like to know why those cases are to be taken out and sent to special sittings. The next paragraph in the same subsection gives power to try at such special sittings such other actions or matters triable in a County Court as may be prescribed by order of the Lord Chancellor. Would my noble and learned friend tell me what are the sort of actions he contemplates he should send for trial at special sittings? I do not quite see, if actions above £50 are to go to these special sittings, what are the other matters that can be sent there by the Lord Chancellor.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

The fact is, in order to prevent delay and to get a Bar together and in order to have a sort of small County Court Assize, we propose that there shall be special sittings set apart. The other work is not to be interfered with. The special sittings were prescribed for four classes of cases. The first is cases between £50 and £100—the extended jurisdiction conferred by the noble and learned Earl's Act of 1903. Second, any cases which become triable by virtue of this Bill—that is, cases above £100 by consent. Third, such other actions or matters triable in the county court as may be prescribed by the Lord Chancellor. I do not remember which particular class I was contemplating, but I will give an illustration. It might be the existing equity jurisdiction, or the existing bankruptcy jurisdiction, or workmen's compensation trials—that class of work. I can quite understand that it might appear to the Lord Chancellor for the time being desirable that there should be a general order requiring that class of work to be tried at a special sitting in order not to interfere with current work. Fourth, any particular action or matter which the Judge may by order direct to be so tried.

Clause 7 agreed to.

Clauses 8 to 24 agreed to.

Clause 25:

Amendment of s. 116 of the principal Act as to costs.

25. For the proviso to section one hundred and sixteen of the principal Act (which relates to costs of actions brought in the High Court which could have been commenced in a county court) the following proviso shall be substituted:— Provided that if in any action founded on contract the plaintiff shall within twenty-one days from the service of the writ, or within such further time as may be ordered by the court or a judge thereof, obtain an order under Order XIV of the Rules of the Supreme Court, that he be at liberty to sign judgment for a sum of twenty pounds or upwards either unconditionally or unless that sum is paid into court or to the plaintiff's solicitor, he shall be entitled to costs down to and including the time of the payment or signing such judgment according to the scale for the time being in use in the Supreme Court, unless the court or a judge thereof otherwise orders.

^*LORD GORELL moved to delete from the proviso the words "ordered by the Court or a Judge thereof," and to insert the words "allowed in that behalf." The noble and learned Lord said: This Amendment is to enable the Registrar of the High Court to do what can at present only be done, I understand, by the Judge. There is a decision which I think is sufficient in point, to make it very doubtful whether under the words "ordered by the Court or a Judge," as to time, in consequence of the Judge being the only person who can certify for costs in the High Court, the time could be extended by a Master of the Supreme Court. The suggestion is to give the Master power to extend the time and give the plaintiff the costs unless the order is to the contrary. The insertion of this Amendment would enable the Master to extend the time and not necessitate proceedings before the Judge to do that. The idea is to let the Master deal with the matter as lie is the person who gives an order under Order XIV in the first instance, and therefore ought to have power to extend the time.

Amendment moved— Clause 25, page 14, lines 11 and 12, leave out ("ordered by the court or a judge thereof") and insert ("allowed in that behalf").—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

LORD GORELL

The other Amendments to this clause are consequential.

Amendments moved— Clause 25, page 14, line 16, leave out ("be entitled to costs") and insert ("unless it is otherwise ordered, be entitled to his costs of the action") Clause 25, page 14, line 18, leave out from ("Supreme Court") to the end of the clause.—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 26 agreed to.

Clause 27:

Payment of Judgment Debts.

27. Where a judgment has been obtained in a county court for a sum of money and no order is made as to payment by instalments, the money shall, if the court so directs, be paid by one party to the other, subject to the lien, if any, of his solicitor, instead of being paid into court as required by section one hundred and five of the principal Act. Where money is directed to be so paid the judgment shall not be registered pursuant tow section one hundred and eighty-three of the principal Act unless and until the party entitled to the benefit of the judgment gives notice to the registrar that the same remains unsatisfied.

^*LORD GORELL moved to leave out, at the end of the clause, the words "unless and until the party entitled to the benefit of the judgment gives notice to the Registrar that the same remains unsatisfied," and to insert the words in his Amendment. The noble and learned Lord said: The object of this Amendment is to rectify a slight error which was caused by introducing an Amendment to the original clause. The original clause allowed of money being paid direct to a person instead of being paid into Court, and there are provisions requiring every judgment to be registered. If the money is paid direct to the party, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to register. The clause provides that where money is directed to be so paid the judgment shall not be registered unless and until the party entitled to the benefit of the judgment gives notice to the Registrar that the same remains unsatisfied. When that provision in the clause was brought to the attention of some of those familiar with the working of these matters it was pointed out that that left the plaintiff the power to leave his judgment unregistered, and that it was not desirable, as registration was in the interests of the public, that that should be allowed. Therefore the proposal now is to leave out the words from "unless and until" to the end of the clause, and to insert the words standing in my name. That is to say, the clause as amended will provide that unless the money is forthcoming within a short time the judgment must be registered, and it is suggested that it is to the advantage of the public that that should be done.

Amendment moved— Clause 27, page 14, line 34, leave out from ("Act") to the end of the clause and insert ("if before the expiration of fourteen clear days from the day of trial, or from the day of entering judgment, or the date of the registrar's allocatur for costs, whichever is the latest, proof shall have been given to the registrar in the prescribed form that the judgment has been satisfied").—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 27, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 28 agreed to.

Clause 29:

Extension of 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43. s. 151, to orders as well as judgments.

29. Section one hundred and fifty-one of the principal Act shall apply to orders obtained in a County Court in the same manner as to judgments so obtained.

LORD GORELL

This is merely a drafting Amendment which suggests again that it is better to describe an Act than only refer to it.

Amendment moved— Clause 29, page 15, line 13, after ("Act") insert ("which relates to the removal of judgments from a County Court to the High Court").—(Lord Gorell.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 29, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 30 agreed to.

Clause 31:

Juries.

31.—(1) The following provision shall be substituted for section four of the County Courts Act, 1903:— The number of jurymen to be empanelled and sworn shall be eight, and accordingly the word 'eight' shall be substituted for the word 'five,' in section one hundred and one and section one hundred and two of the principal Act, where it last occurs in each of those sections.

(2) A summons under section one hundred and two of the principal Act may be served by registered post.

LORD ALVERSTONE

Would o the Lord Chancellor be good enough to inform us what is the meaning of this? "Eight" was substituted for "five" in Section 4 of the Act of 1903. At present I do not see what is wrong with the Act of 1903. Perhaps the Lord Chancellor would tell us.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Section 4 of the Act of 1903, which was intended to raise the number of jurymen from five to eight, also took the form of substituting eight for five in Section 102 of the Act of 1888. The result was not only to; raise the number of jurymen from five to eight, but also to raise the maximum fine from £5 to £8, and at the same time it left the sum payable by the party requiring the jury at 5s. instead of 8s. These mistakes are here corrected.

Clause 31 agreed to.

Clauses 32 and 33 agreed to.

Clause 34:

Protection of sheriff, &c. selling goods under execution without notice of claim by third party.

34. Where any goods in the possession of an execution debtor at the time of seizure by a sheriff, high bailiff, or other officer charged with the enforcement of a writ of execution, are sold by such sheriff, high bailiff, or other officer, without any claim having been made to the same, the purchaser of the goods so sold shall require a good title to the goods so sold, and no person shall be entitled to recover against the sheriff, high bailiff, or other officer, or anyone lawfully acting under the authority of either of them, except as provided by the Bankruptcy Acts, for any sale of such goods or for paying over the proceeds thereof, prior to the receipt of a claim to the said goods: Provided that nothing in this section contained shall affect the right of any claimant who may prove his title to any goods so seized and sold to recover the net sum realised by the sale of such goods from any person in whose hands such proceeds may be or to whom they may have been paid.

LORD GORELL

I move to insert after "writ" ["sheriff, high bailiff, or other officer charged with the enforcement of a writ"] the words "warrant or other process." This is a small Amendment to make the clause apply not only to a writ but also to a warrant and other process.

Amendment moved— Clause 34, page 16, line 41, after ("writ") insert ("warrant or other process").—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Clause 34, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 35:

Additional powers of County Court under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906.

35.—(1) Where any money paid or to be paid into a county court in pursuance of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, is applicable for the benefit of an infant, the judge of the county court may, on application made in accordance with rules under that Act, make any order for the appointment of a guardian or guardians and as to the custody of the infant winch the High Court might make, but any application or order so made shall be subject to removal or appeal to the High Court in accordance with section ten of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886.

(2) Rules under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, may provide for conferring on the judge or registrar of a county court the like powers of making orders for the examination of witnesses and persons and for discovery and inspection of documents in proceedings under that Act as are exerciseable as respects actions in county courts.

(3) Where an infant entitled to money paid into a county court under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, dies before reaching the age of twenty-one, then, if no direction has been given as to the disposition thereof for the benefit of other dependants in the event of his death before reaching that age, the court may, without letters of administration, distribute the sum amongst such persons as appear to the court, upon such evidence as the court may deem satisfactory, to be entitled by law to receive such sum, subject, if that sum, after deducting proper funeral expenses, exceeds eighty pounds, to the obtaining from the Commissioners of Inland Revenue of a receipt for the legacy duty payable thereon, or a letter or certificate stating that no such duty is payable.

Provided that where the principal value of the estate of the infant exceeds one hundred pounds any sum paid under this section without letters of administration shall be liable to estate duty as part of the amount on which that duty is charged, and the County Court may, before making any such payment, require a statutory declaration by the claimant, or by one of the claimants, that the principal value of the estate (including the sum in question) does not, after deduction of debts and funeral expenses, exceed the value of one hundred pounds, or the production of a receipt for the estate duty payable thereon.

LORD GORELL

I move to leave out, at the commencement of subsection (3), the words, "Where an infant entitled," and to insert "In the event of the death of any person entitled as a dependant." This subsection is meant to provide that the Court which gives the workmen's compensation may deal with the matter without letters of administration being taken out if the infant dies without any direction having been given as to the disposition of the money awarded to him. That was the way in which it originally stood. The object of the Amendments standing in my name to this clause is to extend this beyond the case of an infant. It is suggested that when in these circumstances anybody dies who has had money awarded in a workman's compensation case, which is always of a limited amount, it should not be necessary to take out letters of administration. This Amendment has been recommended by the senior County Court Judge, and I think it is a reasonable one.

Amendment moved— Clause 35, page 17, line 31, leave out ("Where an infant entitled") and insert ("In the event of the death of any person entitled as a dependant").—(Lord Gorell.)

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

I agree that the Amendment is a reasonable one. The only person who might object would be the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but as he is not here I do not know that we need anticipate trouble or difficulty. I do not object to the Amendment, subject, of course, to any question that may arise hereafter in regard to it.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Amendments moved— Clause 35, page 17, lines 32 and 33, leave out ("dies before reaching the age of twenty-one"). Clause 35, page 17, line 34, leave out ("thereof") and insert ("of such money") Clause 35, page 17, line 35, leave out ("his death before reaching that age") and insert ("the death of the person entitled thereto") Clause 35, page 17, lines 38 and 39, leave out ("such sum") and insert ("the same") Clause 35, page 18, line 5, leave out ("infant") and insert ("person so dying").—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendments agreed to.

Clause 35, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining Clause agreed to.

Schedule:

LORD GORELL

I move to include, under the heading "Extent of repeal," Sections 150 and 153. It has been suggested by the draftsman that it would be better to specify these sections in the Schedule, although any one would see at once that they were already repealed. It is really recapitulation.

Amendment moved— In the schedule, third column, after line 31, insert ("Sections one hundred and fifty and one hundred and fifty-three").—(Lord Gorell.)

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Before the House resumes, may I intimate that on the Report stage I hope to suggest an Amendment in Clause 20 dealing with the appointment and qualifications of Registrars.

LORD ALVERSTONE

The noble and learned Lord will, I presume, put on the Paper the Amendment regarding Registrars of which he has just given notice?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR

Yes.

Report of Amendments to be received on Tuesday next and Bill to be printed as amended (No. 130).

House adjourned at Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, a quarter past Four o'clock.