§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDMy Lords, I rise to call attention to—
I am not surprised that at present the prevailing opinion is that our military forces are fully adequate for the requirements of home and Imperial defence. That impression has been produced upon public opinion by the Government constantly and continuously assuring us that we possess armies on a scale quite unprecedented in our history. For instance, the Secretary of State for War told us in 1908 that so far from having reduced the Regular Army he had added 90,000 men to its strength. In January, 1909, when addressing his East Lothian constituents, he told us that—
- 1. The numbers of the Regular Army and Regular Reserve.
- 2. The numbers required to complete the Expeditionary Force of six Divisions.
- 3. The number of troops left in the United Kingdom in event of the departure of the Expeditionary Force on foreign service.
He could now mobilise four Divisions of the Expeditionary Force by touching a button, and he had the weapons, stores, and men to mobilise all six Divisions and have a surplus over.In explaining the Army Estimates in 1909 the right hon. gentleman promised us a Regular Reserve of 200,000 men. In October, 1910, at the Cutlers' Feast at Sheffield, he announced that the Expeditionary Force would mobilise at about 180,000 men, and on the same occasion the right hon. gentleman added—What we get at home is a Force that would compel the enemy to come in such large numbers that the Fleet would either destroy them, or, if they come in small numbers, our Territorial Force and a very considerable number of Regular troops, Which in any event we should have at home, would be able to fall upon them and crush them by their weight.Finally, in December last at Grimsby we were informed that we had 580,000 troops organised in twenty Divisions of ten Army Corps.It is interesting to compare the numbers of officers and men shown as available for national defence by War Office Returns and Army Estimates with the figures mentioned by the Secretary of State for War in the speeches to which I have referred. It is necessary to remember that the policy of reducing the Regular Army initiated by the Government in 1906 will not be fully 112 realised until 1913. Consequently all calculations regarding the numbers of the Regular Army must be based on the strength of the Regular Reserve, not as it now is when a diminishing quantity, but as it will be in 1913 when the reductions have touched bottom. We were assured in 1908 that 90,000 men had been added to the strength of the Regular Army. If that had been the ease these men would have passed in due course from the Colours into the Regular Reserve, and would have remained available in the first class Army Reserve till 1920. War Office Returns, such as the Army Annual Return, 1906, and the Army Estimates of 1910-1911, and the Army Reserve Return of March 31, 1909, show that the Regular Army, with the Regular Reserve and the Militia, if it had remained at its strength as in 1905, would have been 87,626 men stronger than the Regular Army and the Regular and Special Reserves will be in 1913. The addition of 90,000 men in 1908, therefore, results not in an increase in numbers in 1913 but in a diminution of 87,626 men. We ought to have 90,000 more men available, according to the Secretary of State for War; but according to War Office Returns we shall have nearly 90,000 men less—a difference of some 180,000 men.
I next take the case of the Regular Reserve of 200,000 men, which was promised to us by the Secretary of State for War when introducing the Army Estimates for 1909. This Reserve in 1913 will be made up of the three following groups: Of the first class Army Reserve, with a strength of 106,372, as estimated by Lord Erroll's Return; of Section D of the Regular Reserve, hitherto known as the second class Army Reserve, with a strength estimated by the Under-Secretary of State for War at 24,985; and of the Special Reserve, with an establishment of 70,000 non-commissioned officers and men. These three separate groups, when added together, will give a gross total of 201,537. But this number of Regular Reservists can only be obtained by assuming that the Special Reserve will always be up to its full establishment of 70,000 men, which it is not now and never yet has been. It is also necessary to ignore the fact that the Special Reserve depends for its existence on the enlistment of boys of 17, and that War Office Returns show that one-third of our Special Reservists—that is, 20,000—must always be boys of under 20, and not available for foreign service. Let me give 113 your Lordships an instance as to the age of these promised Regular Reservists. Last week at the West London Police Court a deserter from a Special Reserve battalion was brought up. His age proved to be 15 years and 9 months. The magistrate said—
This is a more child dressed up as a soldier. As ho is tot16 years old I cannot deal with him. He must go to the Children's Court at Westminster.But that child on mobilisation is counted—this is an absolute fact—as a Reserve soldier of the Regular Army!As regards Section D, hitherto known as the second class Army Reserve, this section of the Reserve is composed of those men who, on completion of twelve years of Colour and Reserve service, can be persuaded to re-enlist for a further period of four years. The number of 24,985, the estimated strength for 1013, must be pure guess-work, because the re-enlistment is voluntary. The men may re-enlist or they may not, according to the circumstances of the moment. Last July the Under-Secretary of State for War hoped to get from 15,000 to 20,000 of these men by 1913. Now the noble Lord reckons on almost 25,000. It is the abnormal outflow from the great Reserve created by the noble Viscount, Lord Midleton, which alone justifies any such expectation. When that extraordinary outflow ceases, then Section I) must dwindle, because there will be far fewer time-expired Reservists eligible for re-enlistment. The noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War has told us that the men in Section of the Army Reserve will be required for instant, service with the Expeditionary Force. I should like to ask the noble Lord if he can tell us any good reasons for considering these men fit for this duty, because I can quote excellent reasons to prove the contrary. To do so, I must refer to the evidence given by General Sir T. Kelly-Kenny and Lord Methuen as to the value of Section D men during the South African war. The evidence is lengthy, but my excuse for quoting it is that it bears upon a point of extreme importance—namely, the adequacy or the inadequacy of the Regular Reserve provided by the Government for the requirements of the Expeditionary Force. If the Regular Reserve is wholly insufficient to complete the Expeditionary Force, then that Force becomes impossible, and the whole military edifice of the Government collapses 114 and must be reconstructed from the foundation.
The question, then, is, Would these 25,000 men—whom, by the way, you have not yet got, but in the event of your getting them—would they be fit to go on service with the Expeditionary Force? The evidence which I ask your Lordships to allow me to read supplies the answer. The following questions were put to Sir P. Kelly-Kenny by Sir G. Taubman Goldic—
Q.—Did you see much distinction in quality between Reservists and the men who had been serving up to date?A.—I think there was a distinction in the older Reservists, the Section D, but in the case of the others who had not left the ranks long I did not see very much.Q.—You did not bear of any difficulties as regards discipline?A.—I did with regard to Section D—in fact, I experienced them myself; when they came up they grumbled a great deal.Q.—Dut the other sections were quite up to the mark of the soldiers who were in the ranks before?A.—I think so.Q.—They bad not lost their military habits.A.—No, they had not; I could not trace anything against the Reservists I had.Q.—Except Section D?A.—That is so.Then I come to the evidence given by General Lord Methuen. He was asked by the Chairman (Lord Elgin) as to the marching, and Lord Methuen replied—As soon as the weak men were weeded oat and the troops were in condition there was no question as to the men marching well. I cannot ever recollect the men not being ready to do more than I asked them to perform. I gladly include the Militia and the Volunteer companies in this statement. As long as the men are well fed and taken care of by their officers one need not fear stragglers. I except, as a rule, the men of Section D from the above remarks, as they fell out, and we left a good many behind at different places.Lord Methuen was further questioned as follows—Q.—What does that mean with regard to Section D?A.—They are men having special qualifications. I was going to say they are more or less veterans who go into Section D.Q.—And he [a Section D man] is a man who has gone through the Reserve and is allowed to conic back?A.—-Yes, and only for special reasons ho is allowed to go on.Q.—He may have fallen out because he was physically unfit?A.—That is so, I think, because he was more or less a cripple.Lord Methuen is more than satisfied with the marching and willingness of the men in 115 the Regular Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers, but he specially excepts the men in Section D of the Regular Reserve. Sir T. Kelly-Kenny also emphatically puts Section D men in a class by themselves. The fact is that men in Section D—that is, the second class Army Reserve—have been far too long away from the Colours. They must have been nine years, and may have been thirteen years, absent from the Colours. Now a Cavalry soldier, who has not been on a horse for twelve years and weighs several stone heavier than when he left the Regiment, would be what is termed a "little out of practice" when he first starts riding, and that in the presence of the enemy. Your Lordships may rest assured that there is no Commanding Officer in the Regular Army who would not far rather take his Regiment on instant active service without Section D men in the ranks than with them.Last November the noble Lord told us that—
Section Section D is not the second class of the Army Reserve; it is now always classed in the first class of the Army Reserve.It is always open to the Secretary of State for War to call black white and white black, and the Army Council must agree with him, but that is the only plan on which the second class Army Reserve can he converted into the same value as the first class Reserve. It is a case of mixing up the second class with the first class and calling the blend first class. As regards the service strength of Section D, the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War allows on the mobilisation of the second class Army Reserve the same ten per cent. rate for wastage as he does for serving soldiers. Men with the Colours live under the eye of the surgeon, under the very best of sanitary surroundings. Men in Section D are some twenty years older than the men with the Colours and have had to shift. for themselves for many a long year without food, clothing, and medical attendance provided by the State. Moreover they have often been engaged for years in work and trades which impair both eyesight and hearing. I accept the ten per cent rate, because I am calculating strictly on War Office data, but at the same time I cannot refrain from pointing out that it is clearly contrary to all common sense to allow the same rate for unfitness with men of the second class Army Reserve as for men serving with the Colours.116 To sum up our promised Regular Reserve of 200,000 men. First you begin by reducing the Regular Reserve from 137,000 to 106,372—a reduction of 30,628 noncommissioned officers and men. Then you suppose that all Special Reservists are of the same value as Regular Reservists, and that you have got 70,000 men in the Special Reserve, although you have not got that number. Next you assume that 20,000 boys in the Special Reserve are old enough for instant foreign service, although they are not. Finally you reckon that 24,985 men, whom you have not yet got, in the second class Army Reserve—that is Section D—are fit for active service abroad, although the experience of the South African war has proved that they are not.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDYou assume it because you promised a Regular Reserve of 200,000 men. I am suggesting to the noble Lord how he gets them. The noble Lord will admit that the Government promised a Reserve of 200,000 men?
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDI next come to the numbers required to form the Expeditionary Force, which, according to the Secretary of State for War, is to mobilise at about 180,000 men and have a surplus over. By the War Office Table of April 8, 1907, and by War Establishments, 19091910, the total strength of officers and men, including two Mounted Brigades since added, is 171,095. The Secretary of State, in his speech at Sheffield, mentioned 180,000 men, but that figure includes the Special Contingent, which ought to number 15,173 men. Last November the noble Lord informed us that the deficiency in the Special Contingent amounted to 6,622. I take the numbers of the Army of 1909 as given in the Army Annual Return dated 1910 as a standard of comparison, because that is the last complete Return now available. I refer to Table 1 of the Army Memorandum of 1907, which gives the composition of the Expeditionary Force, and to answers given by the Under-Secretary of State for War last November. I find Section A and B of the Regular Reserve—that is, the body of men hitherto known to us as the first class Army Reserve—would 117 in 1913 be 15,637 men deficient of the requirements of the Expeditionary Force. But assuming that mobilisation takes place in or after the month of May—that is, after all foreign drafts have gone abroad—then, by the answers of the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War last November, an additional 13,603 men over twenty years of age would be required from the Regular Reserve to complete the numbers of the Expeditionary Force. This makes a total deficit of 29,240 men in the first class of the Regular Reserve for the requirements of the Expeditionary Force. The deficiency of 29,240 men is met to a limited extent on paper, but cannot be overcome in any way in the field, by the 22,100 men, the estimated strength of Section D less ten per cent. allowed for casualties. The result, then, is that all sections of the Regular Reserve, including 22,400 men of Section D, will not suffice for the requirements of the Expeditionary Force after the drafts have gone abroad by 6,834 men.
In this connection I would venture to remind the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State of his statement on July 7 last year, when he said—
In 1913, when the Regular Reserve will be at its lowest, we shall require no Special Reservists to bring the Regular battalions up to the full war establishment. We shall only require them subsequently for drafts and a successive series of drafts so that there will be time to mature.I hope the noble Lord will disclose to us the source front which he draws these Regular Reservists upon whom he relies with such confidence to more than complete the Expeditionary Force, because the Returns supplied to Parliament show, not a surplus, but a deficit of nearly 30,000 men in the first class Army Reserve, and of nearly 7,000 if Section D men are added. But common sense tells us that men who have left the Colours for twelve or thirteen years must be quite unfit to take their places in the ranks, some serving as non-commissioned officers, in the First Line and go into action within a few weeks of mobilisation. Now this deficit must be met by the Special Reserve and by the men in the Territorial Army who have agreed to serve abroad on mobilisation. I assume that the whole six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force are to go abroad made up to a strength of 180,000 men, and will leave a surplus over.
LORD LUCASI am sorry to interrupt the noble Duke again, but would he mind telling me what figures he takes when he makes that calculation as to the number of serving Regulars available on mobilisation?
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDThey will be found in War Office Table of April 8, 1907. Now for the surplus. First of all, it is recognised that if the Expeditionary Force is to be of full value in a great emergency it must proceed abroad as a whole within two or three weeks of the outbreak of war. It is obviously essential that the whole weight of the striking force must be thrown into the scale of battle at one moment, or the opportunity will be irretrievably missed. To dribble the Expeditionary Force abroad by slow degrees because you want it for home defence is to ensure the defeat of the Expeditionary Force in detail overseas. Besides, to retain the striking force for home defence is a breakdown of all our military machinery and a confession of inability to take the offensive overseas. The Secretary of State for War has informed us that we have 580,000 men organised in twenty Divisions of ten Army Corps. Six Divisions go abroad. How many would be left at home? This simple sum worked out by War Office figures gives the following answer. On the departure of the Expeditionary Force we shall be left with seven Regular Infantry battalions, three regiments of Cavalry, and some 15,000 men of the Royal and of the Special Reserve Artillery. These numbers are easily obtained by subtracting the number of battalions and regiments tabled to go abroad with the Expeditionary Force from the total number serving in the United Kingdom, as shown by the Army Annual Return. In the same way it is easy to calculate the number of Regular Infantry officers available for duty at home by subtracting the total tabled to go abroad with the Expeditionary Force from the total serving at home, as shown by the January Army List. It is, of course, necessary to deduct all Infantry officers shown in the Army List as filling Staff appointments and seconded—for instance, a large number required for Mounted Infantry duties, then a large number employed with the Territorial Army, from which they cannot be withdrawn on mobilisation. The result is startling. It is this. If the Expeditionary Force went abroad, taking with it every officer belonging to the seven home battalions, then the Expedi- 119 tionary Force would still be 150 Regular Infantry officers short of its requirements, and not a single Regular Infantry officer would be left with any Regular battalions at home. According to the War Office Returns the plan won't work.
On the departure of the Expeditionary Force the lesser half of the home Regular troops must be sent at once to garrison Ireland—that is, 7,000 Artillerymen, three battalions, and one regiment of Cavalry for the whole of Ireland, leaving in Great Britain one Regular Infantry Brigade of four battalions, two Cavalry regiments, and some 8.000 Artillery details. So much, or rather so little, of the Regular Army is left for home defence according to the War Office Tables, but referred to by the Secretary of State for War as a—
very considerable number of Regular troops which in any event we should have at home.Now the words "in any event" must include the event of the departure of the whole Expeditionary Force. It is true that on mobilisation all Special Reservists become, not by virtue of any efficiency but by magic of a War Office order, of the same fighting value as Regular soldiers. It is the intention that the Special Reserve shall receive all the unfit from the Line and all the unsound from the Regular Reserve. You may go on adding the unfit to the immature and the untrained to the unsound as much as you please and call them Regular soldiers if you like, but you cannot improvise Regular officers. Neither can you hastily change a drafting depot into a battalion of the Regular Army and use it as such in action against the pick of Continental troops without meeting with (lire disaster. I am glad that this fact has now been recognised by the military authorities.The Secretary of State for War definitely stated, on June 27 last, that the Special Reserve is not for mobilisation. We need go no further. But until that statement was made, I had always assumed that the 27 fourth battalions of the Special Reserve were to be used as battalions. It seems, however, that the Secretary of State for War has consigned them to the general drafting pool. I am not surprised, for this is their condition. Their establishment is only 530 men, and many battalions are not up to establishment. By the Army List for January, 1911, out of an establishment of 28 officers per battalion every single battalion is at least 10 officers 120 deficient, one is short by 20 officers, and two more are each 18 officers deficient. By Appendix VI of the Army Order of December 23, 1907, each of these 27 battalions must send on mobilisation four subalterns to the Regular battalions to help meet the deficiencies of the Line, thereby reducing the number of subalterns available for service with the 27 fourth battalions of the Extra Special Reserve to 12. That is a fraction less than half a subaltern to each battalion. These battalions have no Reserve. On mobilisation their numbers are not even augmented by the unfit and the useless from somewhere else. They have no Brigade organisation and they have no transport. They are mere nucleus battalions, but nucleus battalions without any provision for the addition of men on mobilisation although ample for the subtraction by drafting to the Line. It is certain that, owing to the great shortage of men in the Regular Reserve and to the great shortage of officers in these Extra Special Reserve battalions, that they must be absorbed into the general drafting pool. By the last War Office Return the whole Special Reserve Infantry is 1,357 subalterns deficient from an establishment of 1,915; that is to say, there are 558 subalterns where there ought to be 1,915.
So I pass from the Special Reserve, which by the decision of the Secretary of State for War and by the necessity of its composition can be used for drafting purposes only and not for mobilisation, to the Territorial Army. The Territorial Army, although it is our second line in time of peace, will become in time of war our first and only line of military defence after the Regular Army has gone abroad. On the departure of the Expeditionary Force a part of the Territorial Army must be at once sent to garrison Ireland. The present garrison in Ireland, when brought up to war strength—and I am dealing with war conditions—would be about 36,000 Regular troops. But it would be only reasonable when replacing Regular by Territorial troops to increase that number. At least 45,000 men of the Territorial Army would be required on permanent duty as a garrison for Ireland. This suggests the possibility of the employing of the Territorial Force in aid of the civil power. I understand that under no circumstances can the Territorial Army be employed for this duty. The Secretary of State for War, in answer to a Question on March 16 last, stated that— 121
The Territorial Force cannot be called out or embodied in whole or in part in aid of the civil power for the purpose of putting down riots or disturbances.The seven Infantry battalions and three regiments of Cavalry left at home are certainly inadequate by themselves for the duty of aiding the civil power throughout the whole of Great Britain and Ireland in time of war. Last year the Government used troops in aid of the civil power in considerable numbers and for a considerable period. Quite recently troops fired 500 rounds of ball cartridge down the streets of London, again in aid of the civil power, and this time in the presence of the Home Secretary himself, and all this in time of profound peace. So it would seem idle to deny that the military force which replaces the Regular Army in the United Kingdom during the stress and strain of war may be required for this very difficult duty.As 45,000 men of the Territorial Army would be required to garrison Ireland, we should be left with 212,257 Territorial soldiers in Great Britain, according to the present strength of the Territorial Army. But that strength is a diminishing strength, as I shall presently show. Moreover, in 1913 the whole batch of recruits who joined the Territorial Army when enlistment was first opened for that force in 1909 will become time-expired. But of this gross total of 212,257 men a portion only can be made available to act as the swiftly moving central field force described by the Secretary of State for War as ready at any moment to crush the Continental invader by sheer weight of numbers. Deductions must be made for men who are physically unfit, for absentees at home and abroad, for men who have emigrated, for recruits untrained, for boys of tender years, of whom there are a vast number in the Territorial Army, and, lastly, for men who have agreed to serve with the Army Reserve on mobilisation and have consequently been absorbed by the Expeditionary Force, thus depriving the Territorial Army of some of its keenest and best soldiers. Then large numbers—I cannot give figures, because these are the secrets of mobilisation—must be allotted for coast defences and for garrison duties in Great Britain, from which it is obviously impossible to remove them in time of war. Take the case of the garrison of London. We have only four Regular Infantry battalions left in Great Britain, two Cavalry regiments, and some 8,000 Artillery details.
122 Are you going to leave London without a single Regular regiment? We know by experience that we have in our midst a hostile alien population armed with the most deadly weapons, and very ready to use them. We know that the ranks of the civil police will be depleted by calling out the Army Reserve, because many policemen are Army Reservists. We know that the Territorial Force cannot be used in aid of the civil power: neither is it fitted for that duty. Of course, garrisons cannot hastily abandon their posts and go flocking haphazard to any expected points of invasion. I suggest to the Under-Secretary of State for War that, after making all these inevitable deductions—and the noble Lord cannot deny that they are inevitable—the famous swiftly moving central field force cannot exceed 50.000 men, including Regular troops if any are available.
Now the Imperial Defence Committee has told us that the Territorial Army should be in the proportion of four to one against an invading force in order to ensure success. Sir John French has told us—it is in his evidence before the Norfolk Commission—that—
You must have an enormous preponderance in numbers to overcome deficiency.According, then, to the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee and to the evidence of Sir John French, our available home Field Army of 50,000 men would have no chance against a force of 15,000 Continental invaders, because we should not have the necessary superiority of four to one. Sir Ian Hamilton, in his last book, writes as follows—If defeated the Territorial Force would go absolutely to pieces for a time.What is going to happen in this interval of time? I presume the occupation of London would be one of the incidents. If you send abroad the six Divisions of the Expeditionary Force, as you claim to be easily able to do, then by War Office Returns and by the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee you cannot hope to deal successfully with 15,000 Continental invaders in Great Britain. In Ireland a force of 10,000 men would be certain of success. This would be the state of affairs according to War Office Returns and the opinion of the Imperial Defence Committee; but the Secretary of State for War tells us—I think between these three lines of defence, the first and second naval lines and the military line— 123 behind this triple line of defence we are pretty well protected, and it is a nervous person, I was going to say a cowardly person, who gets into a state of blue funk over these things.If we consider for a moment the state of the Territorial Army I think we shall understand the reasons which have induced the Imperial Defence Committee to advise us that the proportion of four to one is essential for safety. We know that in the Territorial Force last November there were 83.346 boys of less than twenty years of age, and that among them there were thousands of boys less than seventeen years old. In April, 1910—that is the last complete Return rendered to Parliament of the musketry of the Territorial Army [Cd. 5018]—there were 100,000 officers, noncommissioned officers and men not qualified in musketry. We must remember that a Territorial soldier can qualify in musketry without ever having fired upon a full distance range. The question has often been asked but never yet answered by a plain "Yes" or "No," Can a Territorial soldier qualify in musketry by firing a certain number of rounds without ever hitting the mark? As far as I can make out from the Regulations, the answer is "Yes." It would be interesting to know how many of these marksmen are now in the Territorial Army. I do not consider these facts discreditable to officers and men of the Territorial Army in the least. They are inseparable from the nature of the Force. The Territorial Army consists of a mass of patriotic citizens who soldier as much as they can in their spare time on the go-as you please and do-as-you-like plan. For instance, last summer 1,321 officers and 24,000 men did not attend camp at all, so there is sonic latitude allowed in the matter of training. I asked the noble Lord how many officers and men had missed two trainings out of three. The noble Lord explained that to ascertain this number would entail laborious research. I am not surprised that no record is kept at the War Office of officers and men who miss two or three trainings, and are, therefore, scarcely trained at all, because the authors of the Territorial Army never contemplated the Force beginning to carry out military training with any strictness till after war has been declared. General Cowans, the present Director-General of the Territorial Force, said on January 19 last that—The Territorial Force was what the Secretary of State himself had called it, a half-baked Force.Anyhow, the present state of the Territorial 124 Army is a source of sincere satisfaction to its authors. Indeed, it is exactly what they desired. At least the noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War is reported to have said on December 16 last—The Force was slowly and steadily going forward and was fulfilling the best expectations of the best critics at the present time.The Territorial Force was 1,514 officers and 44,106 men deficient on January 1 last. That is a drop of very nearly 12,000 men since last April.The noble Lord the Under-Secretary of State for War is not the least disturbed by the fact of a diminishing intake now and the certainty of an extraordinary outflow in two years time, because on December 16 last he said—
They had this year felt so encouraged that they were prepared to spend considerably more money on the Territorial Force than they had spent previously.These increased grants are, no doubt, designed to check this wasting of the Force. But any effect they might have had in that direction wilt be cancelled by the recent declaration that invasion is impossible. If officers and men have good reason to believe that they will be required to defend their hearths and homes, those who are patriotic will honestly try to make themselves efficient for the expected day of battle. Tell them to sleep quietly in their beds and not to be disturbed by bogies of invasion, tell them that an invasion on even the moderate scale of 70,000 men is practically impossible, and then you will very soon take the whole heart out of the Territorial Army. The Territorial Force deprived of any serious purpose will be regarded, and rightly, as a play-about Army. Yet for all that it seems likely that we are to see a further financial starvation of the Regular Army in order to keep the Territorial Force alive. The financial position is this. War Office Returns and Army Estimates inform us that if half a million more money is spent on the Territorial Army the result will be that in 1913 we shall have Army Estimates as high as in 1905, but 87,676 men fewer amongst those forces which were then available for foreign service. The only setoff against this reduction of nearly 90,000 men in our foreign service line would be the number of men in Section D of the Army Reserve, re-opened for enlistment last year.I cannot refrain from expressing a hope that there will be no more reductions in the 125 Regular Army for the sake of the Territorial Force. For my own part I have always regretted, and I have always opposed, the sweeping reductions made in the Regular Army and the total destruction of the Regular Militia in order to create a force which does not begin professional training till after war has been declared, which cannot be used in aid of the civil power when embodied at home during the absence of the Regular Army, which is forbidden by law from operating in an enemy's country, and whose use, since invasion on even moderate scale has just been declared by the highest naval authority to be impossible, is most obscure. But additional grants have been definitely promised to the Territorial Army. The Government must contemplate higher Array Estimates than in 1905 with the certainty of nearly 90,000 men fewer in the foreign service line, or else they must still further reduce the Regular Army in order to finance the Territorial Force.
My Lords, I have dealt with these questions of numbers entirely according to the Returns of the War Office, taking the greatest care never to travel beyond them or to use any figures except those supplied by the Government. In no respect do these War Office Returns support the confident anticipations of the Government, least of all in regard to the Expeditionary Force. War Office Returns show that this Force will be absolutely impossible in the numbers represented to us by the Government. I know no greater boon to a commercial nation than a well-founded sense of security. But assuredly no evil is more dangerous than a false sense of security which rests, not upon facts and upon figures, but upon promises and predictions.
LORD LUCASMy Lords, this debate certainly marks a milestone in the progress, or perhaps I should say in the understanding of Army Reform in this House. Though the noble Duke does not praise us for what we have done, there is for the first time in his speech to-night, and in the form in which he has put the Notice on the Paper, a tacit admission on his part that we are carrying out what we set ourselves to do—namely, the organisation of an Expeditionary Force of six Divisions, with its Cavalry Division and lines of communications. If five years ago anybody had discussed an Expeditionary Force of that size, lie would have been considered mad. Had you conducted 126 this debate five years ago you would have been discussing, not the possibility of mobilising six Divisions, but the bare possibility of mobilising three, and you would have had great difficulty in doing that and giving them their proper complement of all arms. [Viscount MIDLETON dissented.] The noble Viscount shakes his head. We have discussed it so often. There was a large superfluity of some arms, but the whole difficulty from the point of view of mobilisation on the outbreak of war was that you had not got sufficient of the more requisite arm of all—Artillery. We have got it now.
The noble Duke based his case, not upon our present position, but upon what the position would be in the year 1913. I gathered from his speech that that is the year which he brings under review. It is the year which he referred to in those articles of Iris which we read during the summer, and it is, we understand, the year in which, in his opinion, we are going to be put to the test. I should like first to say something about our military position in the year 1913. That position will not have been caused by us. It will be one of our inheritances. The reductions which we have made in the Infantry will not in the slightest degree affect our position in that year. If we had not reduced tire battalions and they had continued to exist, not one single man who would have been enlisted into them after the time when they were, as a matter of fact, disbanded could have passed into the Reserve, and it is the condition of the Reserve in 1913 that constitutes, as I understood the noble Duke's speech, the position of danger.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONWhy? Will the noble Lord explain what he means?
LORD LUCASFor the reason that all the men who were in those battalions were absorbed into other battalions, and no man enlisted in 1906 could have affected the Reserve in 1913.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONSurely the men who would have enlisted in these battalions in 1906 would have been passing into the Reserve in 1913.
LORD LUCASBut that is after the critical moment. The position with regard to 1913 is this. We have at the present time—I confine myself to the Infantry, because it is only in the Infantry that the 127 position is difficult—we have in the Infantry men serving under three different terms of service. From 1002 to 1904 men were enlisted for three years with the Colours, with the option of extending to eight years, and nine in the Reserve. All the three-years men who are now with the Colours are, therefore, the men who have extended and may be called eight-years men. From 1904 to 1906 the terms of service were nine years with the Colours and three in the Reserve, and there are a considerable number of nine-years men. After 1906 we returned to what I think has been the best all-round 'term of service—seven years with the Colours and five in the Reserve; and ever since then we have had none but seven-years men in the. Infantry. The men who pass into the Reserve in the years 1910, 1911, and 1912 are the eight-years men who enlisted in 1902, 1903, and 1904. The difficulty about the three-years system was that you did not get enough men to extend. Therefore we find that the eight-years men who will be passing into the Reserve during the three years previous to the critical moment of 1913 will only average 5,500 instead of from 10,000 to 12,000, which is about the normal annual outflow of men into the Reserve. Then in the year 1012 comes the end of the eight-years men who enlisted in 1904, and it is not until 1914 that the nine-years men begin to conic in in any numbers, so that you have a gap during the year 1913 between the end of the eight-years men and the beginning of the nine-years men. The result is that in 1913 the total number of men who pass into the Reserve will be only 2,677, and consequently the Reserve drops to 106,372. Then in 1914 the nine-years men who enlisted in 1905 begin to pass to the Reserve and also the seven-years men who began to come in in 1906. The result is that you get a double flow of men into the Reserve.
I should like, having explained that, to call the attention of the House for one moment to the way in which the noble Duke makes up his figures. I think I am right in saying that he takes the normal number of men serving with the Colours as being available on mobilisation. He takes the lowest point which the Reserve ever reaches, and he adds those two together to show that there would be a deficiency. But I should have thought it would not require a very profound student of military matters to realise that when you have the tap which allows men to pass from the Colours to the 128 Reserve practically turned off, you will have a very much larger number of seasoned men available with the Colours than at any other time. It is true that in 1913 the Reserves will be low, and it is because the men who in normal circumstances would be with the Reserves will be with the Colours. Therefore the position, if you look at it only from the Reserve point of view, is not half so bad as it looks, because you have a much larger number of matured men serving with the Colours than at ordinary times. Then in order to complete his figures, although the noble Duke is discussing the year 1913, he takes the Territorial Force in 1910, and he takes their musketry standard of 1909. He pays no attention whatever to what may be the outcome of the Territorial Force Reserve, the Veteran Reserve, then, when, as we think, the Territorial Force will be much nearer its establishment than it is at the present time.
The position in 1913 is going to be extremely abnormal, though even if it were left as it is there would not, from the point of view of mobilising the Regular Army, be any danger, and we could do it perfectly well. But, of course, these unevennesses are things that one wants to get rid of if one possibly can, because if you are only to pass 2.600 men to the Reserve in one year and 16,000 men the next year, it is going to knock all your recruiting to pieces, and you will be below establishment. So we are going to do what has been done before with success, namely, allow men who are with the Colours—we are not going to put any pressure upon them—to go to the Reserve prematurely. That is to say, some of the 16,000 men who will be passing out in 1914 and some of the 21,000 men who will be passing out in 1915 will be allowed, if they wish, to go into the Reserve in 1913. That was done in the time of the noble Marquess, Lord Lansdowne, and met, as I have said, with success. By that means, if we can stimulate the flow into the Reserve it will not affect the general position on mobilisation, but it will help us to equalise the number of recruits who are wanted, and the drafts to India, and other matters of that sort.
We have also taken steps of another kind. We have increased the additional numbers, or the pool, considerably. It is already very nearly double what it normally is, and we shall probably, before we have done, treble it. This is a second string to our bow if we 129 do not get sufficient numbers to transfer. I will explain the pool. It is allowing the establishment of the Infantry battalions at home to be exceeded, to recruit beyond their establishment, and it really will have the same effect as raising the establishment of the Infantry, and it is clone with the object of tiding us over the bad time and of meeting the big outflow of men into the Reserve. Therefore the position in 1913, as far as we can see, will not be so bad as the noble Duke makes out, and, in the next place, we shall probably by these means approach to something about the normal.
Now I come to the question of the general position of this country both in regard to the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force and our position after the Expeditionary Force has left these shores. As to that I state what the position was in June, 1910. We have, as a matter of fact, got later figures, but sonic of them are not checked, and I prefer to give figures that have been checked throughout. The position last December was a little different from this, but not different in essentials. In June, 1910, we had 124,129 Regulars. Of those there would be detailed to the Expeditionary Force 68,141, leaving at home 55,988. Then comes the Regular Reserve, the strength of which at that time was 136,663. You have to deduct from that ten per cent. for wastage and unfitness. The noble Duke challenges that ten per cent., but it is the actual deduction which we have found by experience it is necessary to make. You have also to deduct further, some 7,000 odd Reservists who are serving abroad and not available on mobilisation. That brings down the numbers to 116,811. Some 81,000 of these men are required, leaving 34,871. Then there is the Special Reserve, consisting of 65,106 men, and there would be required 5,691 of those men already enlisted, leaving a total of 59,455. Then you have the Territorial Force, 260,981 men; the Militia and Militia Reserve, 4,076; and the Regular Reserve from abroad, who would not be available on mobilisation but would be thrown in as the war proceeded, 7,225. That gives you your Expeditionary Force, and it gives you also 422,596 men, of whom 98,084 would be Regulars and Regular Reservists—that is, after deducting the ten per cent. It will be seen, therefore, that for the purpose of the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force last June there was an ample margin in every particular. The 130 55,988 Regulars do not by any means all represent men under twenty years of age. Similarly with the Regular Reserve, there are 34,000 men left over. That is the figure which will be altered when we come to the normal in that respect. The position last June was abnormal. When we come to the normal, the Regular Reserve instead of being 136,000 will, according to our calculations, be 126,000, and that will make the surplus left at home 24,000 instead of 34,000.
The noble Duke asks me about Section D. We have had some discussion upon that before. It is impossible to say how many men of Section D will be employed, for the reason that the requirements of different Infantry battalions vary so much. It may be possible that the gross total of Section A and Section B men may be quite sufficient to mobilise the whole of the Regular Infantry, but it is possible that there will be a certain number of battalions which will have to fall back on Section D again, because Section A and Section B may, for the reasons I have given, be abnormally low. Therefore it is impossible to say what the position would be in regard to Section D, but under normal circumstances Section D will number 26,000 men. The surplus of the Regular Reserve not absorbed by the Expeditionary Force, after deductions fir men abroad, will give you 24,000 men left over, which is within 2,000 of the figure required for Section D. I think that shows that our position with regard to the mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force both now and when we reach the normal is perfectly secure. We could at the present moment mobilise the whole of the six Divisions, and, with a certain amount of improvisation in arms which are not; the fighting ones, we could get the Cavalry Divisions and the lines of communication complete. Our chief difficulty is in the Army Service Corps, but our needs there are being decreased every day by the introduction of mechanical transport. Really the only important thing in which we should have to make a certain amount of improvisation is in the matter of the Royal Army Medical Corps, where we should want 1,000 men.
On the question of the Reserve, it is perfectly true that we have stated that we have 200,000 men at the present moment who are liable by their terms of service as a reserve for the Regular Army, but, after 131 all, the basis of our scheme has not been that they should be immediately available. The reason why we converted the Militia into the Special Reserve was that they should give us the means of replacing wastage, and that the supply should last over a considerable period. There lies the crux of the whole thing. Out of the 98,000 Regulars left at home when you mobilise, a number of those men will be Section D men, who, to take the worst estimate, would not be men whom you would desire to have until, at any rate, you had given them a certain amount of training. There will be the immature soldiers and the Special Reservists. Those men are not intended to be immediately used on mobilisation. They would not be used until they had had a certain amount of training on embodiment. The result is that you have a very large reservoir there which will be gradually ripening, and which will enable you in three months, six months, or in a year or two years, as you want them, to maintain your Expeditionary Force in the field. We have never thought that a great part of those men would be immediately available, and we have not intended that they should be.
I pass to the question of the Special Reserve. The noble Duke occasionally when he lets himself go, gets quite lurid on the subject of the Special Reserve. I remember a good many things that he said in his article in the Morning Post on the subject of the Special Reserve. However, he has not said very much about them this afternoon. It has always been the contention of the critics of the Special Reserve that that Reserve was simply a funnel through which men passed on their way into the Regular Army. All that we have said was that it was impossible to say at the time exactly what was going to be the effect, but that, as far as we could see, there would be a certain number of men who would remain and serve out their time as Special Reservists. We have now available a certain basis of calculation—though it is not very much—upon which some comparison of the Special Reserve with the old Militia can be made. The average number of men of the Militia who used to pass on and enlist in the Regular Army was 42 per cent. In the last two years 47 per cent. of the Special Reserve have passed on to the Regular Army, so that there is only a difference between the two of 5 per cent. It therefore looks as if the 132 old conditions under the Militia are, in that respect at least, being reproduced under the Special Reserve. Another satisfactory point is that the result of another year's work shows that the percentage of men under twenty years of age has decreased. Last year I think it was two per cent. over what it used to be in the Militia. This year it is just about the same as in the Militia in 1905—namely, twenty-seven per cent.
This is the crucial point with regard to the Special Reserve: If we do not get a sufficient number of men of the Special Reserve to stay on, and if the contention of the noble Duke and other critics should prove to be true that it is simply a funnel, then we will frankly admit that the Special Reserve will have failed in the purposes for which it was intended. But, as far as we can see, the position as it was in the old Militia is being more or less reproduced. We do not consider that satisfactory, and when my right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War makes his statement in introducing the Army Estimates in another place, he will take the opportunity of announcing certain modifications and alterations which we are going to make in the Special Reserve for the coming year. But, generally speaking, according to the reports which we have received about them, the Special Reserve is a success. There is no doubt that it is a much better Force compared with the old Militia. Of course, they are the same in a great many particulars. The age of enlistment is the same, the physical standard as regards measurements is the same, the percentage under twenty is about the same, and the percentage who join the Regulars is about the same; but, on the other hand, the Special Reserve men are longer and better trained. We find, as a result of last year's training, that it is those battalions which have the smallest number of old Militia men in them which are best reported upon from the point of view of efficiency. Again in the very severe test that we put them to by calling them out for the last Manœuvres and making them do work which they would not have to do on mobilisation because we brought them straight up and made them march the day that they joined, which could not happen to them on mobilisation—they acquitted themselves well, and were favourably spoken of by the officers who had to do with them.
133 There is one point in particular as to which a considerable improvement is noticeable—that is, the general physical soundness of the Special Reserve. The physical standard as regards measurements is the same, but, having regard to the liability of the men to serve abroad, great care is taken to ensure a higher standard of health as well as greater efficiency. The noble Duke is in the habit of saying that the Special Reserve is an altogether inferior force. I would remind him that we insist on their bringing references when they join, which was not done in the Militia. Nevertheless, I have seen them described by the noble Duke as being the "conscripts of hunger," as being drawn from a lower strata of humanity, and as being the unemployed or the unemployable, whereas the Militia was said to be the only force which was capable of carrying out the arduous duty of reinforcing the Regular Army abroad. Be that as it may, the Militia was not without its faults. I was told a story which I think will be of interest to the noble Duke because it concerns his battalion. In 1893 there was a Brigade of Militia, training at Aldershot. In that Brigade was the noble Duke's battalion, as well as the battalion now commanded by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury. At the end of the training, out of this Brigade 140 men decided to volunteer for enlistment in the Regular Army, and they were sent up to undergo medical examination. Fewer than six of those men were accepted, the others being rejected. Another interesting point is this, that last summer during the three training months we were rather surprised to observe that there were more men being invalided out of the Special Reserve than were joining it. On inquiring the reason we found that, owing to the strict medical test now applied, a very large number of the old Militiamen who had transferred had to be invalided out of the service. There is no question at all that the Special Reserve is better trained, that the physical health of the men is better, that the standards are altogether higher, and that the Special Reservists are in a far better position to fulfil the important role that we have assigned to them than the old Militia ever were.
I pass from that to the question of officers. I never have, I hope, held out any very rosy picture with regard to the supply of officers. It has always been a 134 very difficult problem, and there is no doubt that we have not solved it yet. We have sufficient officers for the purpose of mobilising the six Divisions, but we have not got anything like the number on the scale of supplying wastage over a considerable time. There is one satisfactory feature, and that is the working of the Officers Training Corps.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWill the noble Lord state the deficiency in officers in the various branches of the Service?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYFor the information of the country.
LORD LUCASI did not mean that. When the noble Marquess speaks of the deficiency of officers in the different branches of the Service, does he mean for the Expeditionary Force?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYWe understand that there are not sufficient officers. I am anxious to find out the extent of the deficiency—whether the Regular Army is deficient in officers, and, if so, how many; whether the Territorial Force is deficient in officers, and, if so, how many; and also whether the Special Reserve is deficient in officers, and, if so, how many.
LORD LUCASI can give a certain number of the figures, but not all. In the Regular Army there is, practically speaking, no deficiency; in the Territorial Force, the deficiency in June last was 1,514; and in the Special Reserve the deficiency, though I have not got the figures, is very considerable, especially in the subaltern ranks, which is where we most want them
§ LORD AMPTHILLMay I ask the noble Lord whether he is counting the Regular officers who are serving in the Special Reserve twice over?
§ LORD AMPTHILLAre these officers counted for the purposes of the Regular Army as well as for the purposes of the Special Reserve? They appear twice in the Army List.
§ LORD AMPTHILLAre you counting one officer as two officers?
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYUnder the present Regulations there are a large number of Regular officers attached to Special Reserve units. I have reason to believe that in many cases they are deficient in numbers; that is to say, the full establishment of such Regular officers has not been secured. If that be the case, then that ought to count as a deficiency in the Regular Service as well as a deficiency in the Special Reserve.
LORD LUCASI understand that the point now is the counting of the deficiencies twice over. But, whichever it is, I think the deficiencies, if any exist now—and of that I am not quite certain—in the supply of Regular officers for Special Reserve battalions will shortly be made up. There is one satisfactory feature, and that is the working of the Officers Training Corps. It is of considerable size now, and the movement is being taken up with the greatest keenness in the public schools and Universities. Ninety-six officers have already taken commissions in the Special Reserve, and 242 in the Territorial Force. Another satisfactory feature is that, partly through the existence of the Officers Training Corps, the Universities have taken more interest in the Army than they used to do, and the supply of University candidates for the Regular Army has increased considerably.
I do not wish to go into a long and detailed exposition with regard to the Territorial Force. I maintain absolutely the truth of my previous statement which the noble Duke quoted, that the improvement which the Territorial Force has shown during the past year has been very marked indeed. It has been remarked upon by all the very distinguished Regular Officers who command it directly, or under whose command it comes, or who have had the opportunity of seeing it and inspecting its work in the field. As I have said, we are perfectly satisfied with the improvement that is being made. The system is by no 136 means complete yet. We are still at work devising fresh means for improving its efficiency and its training, but there can be no question that it is fulfilling the purpose for which it was originally designed. We should have in this country, therefore, during the early period after mobilisation, the time when the Territorial Force would be at its weakest, 422,000 men, of whom 98,000 would be Regulars. When we reach the normal that will be reduced by 14,000, but again may well be increased by the Territorial Force, and that will give you, not what the noble Duke said was required by the Committee of Imperial Defence, a Force of four to one, but of six to one, as compared with that which any possible invader might bring against it. There are not, therefore, on these figures any grounds for saying that our provision for home defence, in the event of the Expeditionary Force leaving these shores, is in any way inadequate.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONMy Lords, the difficulty one feels in following the noble Lord is not that he has not conscientiously endeavoured to meet the very detailed criticisms of the noble Duke behind me. If I may venture to say so, I think the noble Lord makes a mistake in attempting to defend every item of the indictment that has been made against him. In the first place, I do not think he can satisfactorily do so, and, if your Lordships will pardon me, I will endeavour to draw together the figures in the noble Duke's elaborate and admirable statement which have not been shaken in the slightest by the noble Lord's reply. In discussing the position in 1913 the noble Lord tried to prove that if the men of the battalions which were disbanded by Mr. Haldane seven years before had not been disbanded there would not have been a larger Reserve than there would be after they had been disbanded. No amount of elaborate argument can possibly prove that, if you disband nine battalions of 700 men apiece, even if you distribute those men among other battalions, the men you would have enlisted in those battalions, at the rate of 300 a year, would not have passed into the Reserve.
LORD LUCASMy point was that they would not be in the Reserve in 1913, which is the year the noble Duke has laid stress upon in his criticism as being the dangerous period.
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONThe noble Duke's point was that by 1913 all the three-years men would cease to pass into the Reserve, and that all the men who would have passed into the Reserve if Mr. Haldane had not broken up those battalions would not be forthcoming. But I do not wish to elaborate that point. I protest against the tone of exaggeration in which the noble Lord imitates the Secretary of State for War in statements which he cannot possibly make good, which do not deceive anybody who knows the facts—though I am sure the noble Lord genuinely believes them himself—and which are entirely at variance with all the figures which can be culled from official documents. I will give an instance. The noble Lord congratulated the noble Duke on having made a step forward and on having treated as a serious matter the probable power of the country to send six Divisions abroad. I do not intend to be drawn into a duel as to what it was possible to do a short time ago and what it is now possible to do. What we want to be assured is that the six Divisions which are spoken of can be sent abroad, and that when they have gone there will be at home a force which can be mobilised. I challenge in every particular the statement that the noble Lord has advanced a single man on the numbers who could be mobilised five years ago, except with regard to the Reserve which was then being made up but which could not be made up fully until the men enlisted by the noble Marquess could have gone to the Reserve. I throw that out as a challenge, and I will make it good on any occasion and against any competitor. I say that His Majesty's Government have not advanced one single Regular since that time, except in regard to those whom we enlisted but who had not then become effective. But that is not the point which I rose to make.
The noble Duke's figures as to what the strength of the Expeditionary Force could be have not been disproved in any single particular by the noble Lord. The noble Duke took for his text the statement of the Secretary of State that we are 90,000 men stronger now, and that we can, therefore, send 160,000 men abroad. That number has lately been advanced to 180,000. The noble Duke proved by figures that, taking into consideration the Special Reserve, you are not 90,000 men stronger, but 87,000 men weaker. You cannot have it both ways. You have reduced the Army Reserve by 138 31,000 men. You say you are going to make that up to some extent by taking in Section D men of more than twelve years' service. It was equally open, with an Army Reserve of 136,000 men, to take in Section D men and make that number up to 160,000. Therefore, in so far as you make a comparison you are weaker by the 31,000 men you have knocked off than you were when you came into office.
To place against the reductions shown by the noble Duke there is the fact that the Special Reserve is now available for foreign service. I was very much struck with the account which the noble Lord gave of the increased care now being taken to secure the medical fitness of the Special Reserve as compared with the old Militia. I by no means desire to pass any sort of stricture on the usefulness of that Force. But I would point out that the noble Lord, while he was eloquent as to the power of the country to send these six Divisions abroad, did not deal with any of the points I am now going to mention. In the first place, the noble Duke alleged that when the Expeditionary Force had been sent abroad, every Infantry Regular officer in the country would have been taken, and that you would have left at home a large body of heterogeneous troops, men serving with the Colours who were unfit to go abroad, some Reservists who had been abroad and had come back, and others—98,000 in all. I ask, Is the noble Duke correct when he says that every Infantry Regular officer would have left the country and that these troops would remain without a Regular officer to command them?
§ VISCOUNT MIDLETONThen I would suggest to the noble Lord that he should give us distinct figures in support of that. If the noble Duke is correct, it is a most serious statement. It is one that requires to be refuted, because it involves the whole question of the usefulness of the force left at home. Again, we ought to be told what number of boys enlisted at seventeen are included in the estimates of 200,000 for the Regular Reserve, and what number of the 426,000, after you have taken the Special Reservists you mean to send abroad, are men whom you really can turn out for service at home. Then, again, what about the officers of the Special Reserve? The noble Marquess asked a question on that 139 point, and I think we ought to have been told whether it is true that the Special Reserve is so deficient in officers that it could not be mobilised in case of invasion. It is a serious error that we should be told that there are 200,000 men in the Regular Reserve when the figures include boys of seventeen belonging to the Special Reserve who could no more be employed as Regular Reservists than if they had never joined. The citation of these large figures, such as 426,000 troops remaining in England, is misleading. We ought to know how many of that large force have got officers, and for how many there would be Artillery left in the country. Not a word was said about Artillery—a most important point. I do not ask how many would have transport and equipment, but on the occasion when the noble and gallant Field-Marshal Lord Roberts brings forward his Motion I shall press for an answer to the question—What is the military composition of the troops that will remain after these six Divisions have gone abroad, and how many of the 426,000 could be mobilised to-morrow as an organised force with proper officers?
I do not wish to say a word to-night to depreciate any of our forces, but I do ask your Lordships to remember that, even in the elaborate answer prepared by the Under-Secretary, he has not for a moment disputed the great reduction in Regulars, the great reduction in the Army Reserve, the great reduction in the Artillery, and the fact that corps which you cannot organise in a hurry have been reduced below the level at which they were left in 1905, and lie has by no means shown us that this great heterogeneous body of troops which he mentions exists except on paper, because we do not know that they have the requisite number of officers and scientific corps. When we return to this matter, as we must do, I hope we shall be told whether there is an adequate defence force after the six Divisions have gone. I hope the noble Lord will not mind my pressing him on a subsequent occasion to release us from this mass of figures and show us perfectly clearly what is the military force available in the country after the six Divisions have gone, taking only into account those men who could really be paraded and for whom officers and the proper equipment of scientific corps could be found.
§ LORD AMPTHILLMy Lords, when I asked the noble Lord the Under-Secretary 140 if he was counting officers twice over lie replied in the negative, but I thought his answer was given rather hesitatingly. I would ask the noble Lord to give his careful attention to this point when he returns to the War Office. You cannot open a single page of the Army List on which Infantry regiments appear without finding that the officers are counted twice over—namely, under the Regular battalions and under the Special Reserve battalions. At any rate, it would seem to the ordinary observer that they are counted twice over, and I would ask the noble Lord to look into the matter when lie is again verifying figures which are supplied to him.
LORD LUCASI venture to think that so simple a mistake as that could not be made by anybody who had the faintest knowledge of the Army List. I think the noble Lord will see against the names the figure 3 to show that they are serving with the third battalion.
§ LORD AMPTHILLThere are also the figures 2 or 1.
LORD LUCASSome distinguished officers appear a dozen times in the Army List, but they are not counted a dozen times.
§ LORD AMPTHILLI am referring to officers whose names appear twice over under the heading of the same regiment.
§ LORD HAVERSHAMMy Lords, a question has been asked as to the deficiency of officers in the Army at the present time. I can give the information from page 27 of the Annual Return of the Army. In the Cavalry of the Line there ought to be 752 officers; there are 732. In the Artillery there ought to be 1,128; there are 1,070. In the Infantry of the Line there ought to be 4,682; there are 4,550. The noble Duke referred to the men in Section D and quoted the words of two General Officers who had had Section D men under them. Let me ask him to look at this return. He will there see that in the whole strength of Section D there are only 111 men—a mere bagatelle of the whole—over 40 years of age.
§ THE DUKE OF BEDFORDThe expected strength of this Section in 1913 is upwards of 25,000. It is hoped to raise it to that number. It was closed for one year, but it has since been re-opened for enlistment.
§ LORD HAVERSHAMI am taking the last Return, and the figures I have given represent the state of affairs at that time. What is going to take place in the future it is impossible to foresee. I would observe, further, that it is incorrect to designate the Territorial Force as one composed of immature boys. The Territorial Force is 260,000 strong. Of that Force those under seventeen only number 2,079. It is impossible correctly to designate the Force in the way the noble Duke did because there happens to be a small percentage under seventeen. The noble Duke, and the noble Earl, Lord Portsmouth, are continually asking questions as to how many of the men are under twenty years of age. The fact of a man being under twenty does not make him an inefficient soldier. There were thousands of soldiers under twenty who fought in the Battle of Waterloo, and numbers of soldiers from eighteen to twenty 142 were sent to the Crimea. Even to-day, if you look in The Times, you will see that at Sydney the Government there have passed a law by which every man after the age of eighteen shall be enlisted for the defence of his country and properly trained. These young men do just as well as men much older. I cannot follow the noble Duke in his elaborate attack on the Territorial Force. Who would suppose that if we were likely to have an invasion of this country we should send an Expeditionary Force of 180,000 men abroad? According to the noble Duke, we are to assume, not only that we should send 180,000 men abroad, but that the Fleet would be pierced and that we would be left without anything but the Territorial Army to rely upon. Such a supposition is absurd.
§ House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.