HL Deb 13 December 1911 vol 10 cc975-87

*THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH rose "To ask the Secretary of State for War when it was decided by the Army Council that there should be a peace establishment as well as a war establishment for the Territorial Force; and, if the peace establishment is 250,000 men, why County Associations have been continuously urged to raise in time of peace the full war establishment of 315,000 men which they had been led to believe would be the absolute minimum for a Home Defence Force consistent with safety, thereby considerably adding to the difficulties of an already sufficiently difficult task; further, to ask the Secretary of State for War whether his attention has been called to a speech delivered at Tiverton by the late Financial Secretary to the War Office, in which he stated that— 'We are now provided in every way so that within forty-eight hours of an alarm being given the Territorial Force could stand forth absolutely equipped with everything it might need to (ace any invasion or sudden emergency that might arise '; "whether the 'absolute equipment' includes the complete war establishment of men and horses which will presumably be required if the Territorial Force is ' to stand forth absolutely equipped with everything it might need to face an invasion '; whether this view is supported by the G.O.C.'s. in-Chief; whether he can tell us if there is any single unit in the Territorial Force that could be so equipped within a much longer period than forty-eight hours; and whether it would not be well to give instructions to the Under-Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary to the War Office, and the Paymaster-General of the Forces, to refrain from making such absurd statements, which, if any reliance is still placed on the pronouncements of our ever-changing Ministers, can only have the effect of lulling the country into a state of false security."

The noble Earl said: My Lords, I have ventured to give notice of this Question, because it raises the matter of two recent pronouncements of members of His Majesty's Government, pronouncements which seem to me to raise a very serious question, and, considering the present difficulties of those who are responsible for running the Territorial Force, call for explanation. The Secretary of State for War recently referred to the peace establishment of the Territorial Force as consisting of 250,000 men. I want to know when it was decided that there was any peace establishment of the Territorial Force at all. I had always understood that the Home Defence Force was, in itself, a peace established Force, and that it was put there for the purpose of defending the country. In the original scheme the numbers of the Territorial Force were put down at 315,000 men. From debates that have taken place here we know that a great many members of this House look upon that number as totally inadequate; but those of us on whose shoulders has been placed the responsibility of organising the Territorial Force accepted that figure as being the number recommended to the Army Council by the military experts who advised the Government, but we have always understood that 315,000 men is the minimum of safety in the matter of our defence force.

I think it was during last session that the noble Viscount referred in another place to the small margin that he had said must exist between the full establishment and the actual numbers in order to provide for the coming in and the going out of members of the Force that annually takes place, and I remember that I went so far as to suggest that the establishment should be increased in order to cover that margin. I ask, When was this settled? Why should we have been given the duty of raising this Force when we have never been informed that the peace establishment of the Territorial Force consists of 250,000 men? Take the case of the county of Staffordshire, where at one time we had practically our full establishment. At present we are not quite up to that standard, though we have 94 or 95 per cent. Surely the noble Viscount will realise as fully as we do the difficulties facing us in the immediate future. The first four years have conic to an end, and we are at our wits ends to know how it will be possible to keep up the establishment with the large number of men who will go out. It seems to me that when they understand that 250,000 is our peace establishment they will say, when we ask them to sign on again, "Why worry? We have now more than the numbers of our peace establishment." That will be one of the difficulties, and I cannot understand why it is necessary at this late hour to inform us that 250,000 men is the peace establishment, when we have been engaged all the time in endeavouring, in a time of peace, to raise the full establishment of 315,000 men.

The second part of my Question refers to a speech recently delivered at Tiverton by the late Financial Secretary to the War Office. It was of such an amazing character that I hope the noble Viscount will be able to give us some satisfactory explanation of its meaning. These are the words which Mr. Acland used— We are now provided in every way so that within 48 hours of an alarm being given the Territorial Force could stand forth absolutely equipped with everything it might need to face any invasion or sudden emergency that might arise. I should like to give your Lordships, if you will allow me, my experience with regard to this question of mobilisation. As far back as January 31, 1910, I addressed a series of some thirty questions to the Secretary to the War Office dealing with details of mobilisation. I sent a covering letter showing the difficulty that we should have in the case of sudden mobilisation, and pressed the importance of the point that secretaries to County Associations should have clearly defined what in that event they would have to provide and what, would be supplied by the military authorities. I wrote again on June 2 of that year, and seven days later received an acknowledgement to the effect that the matter had not been forgotten and that it was hoped that a reply might shortly be sent. In acknowledging that letter I asked what interpretation might be put on the word "shortly." This letter I followed up with one on December 28, 1910, and on December 31 I was informed that definite replies would be sent to the questions as soon as certain details connected with the Territorial Force mobilisation had been decided. It does not require a Sherlock Holmes to deduce from these facts that in the opinion of the War Office the word "shortly" means "any period of time over eighteen months." To the original questions I have so far had no reply.

I want to emphasise the fact that while we are told that we can be absolutely equipped in forty-eight hours it has taken more than two years for the Secretary to the War Office to tell us what we arc to provide in the event of mobilisation. Colonel Seely, in an answer to a Question on this subject in another place said, "It is purely a question of finance." How can this possibly be confined to a question of finance? If it is a question of finance on which alone we depend in case of invasion, the only interpretation to be put on it is that if the enemy comes the Secretary for War hopes he will have sufficient funds to bribe the invader to go away. Then I would like to know what absolute equipment" means—whether men and horses. We know something about horses. I do not wish to emphasise the difficulty in that respect, but there is a Biblical comparison which I think might fairly be made. I think it was Rab-shakeh who said to Hezekiah, "I will give you a horse if you will find a rider to put upon it "; but our modern Rab-shakeh says, "You give me a horse and I will put three riders upon it." While no doubt that particular horse would be fully equipped with regard to riders, there is nothing to show that the rest of the establishment would be equally complete. Therefore it would be interesting to know how far this "absolute equipment" is carried out by actual facts. I also ask whether this view expressed by the Financial Secretary is supported by the G.O.C.'s-in-Chief. I think the answer in another place was that those reports were confidential. But surely we, who are engaged in raising this Force and are supposed to hand it over in a state of efficiency, at least have a right to know whether a statement like this, made by a representative of the Government, is really accurate.

There is one minor point in connection with mobilisation to which I would like to refer. A great deal no doubt depends on the efficiency of the officers, and we very often hear criticisms of the officers of the Territorial Force. The examination now imposed upon all officers who are going up for promotion is, I believe, much the same as that which a subaltern in the Regular Army is asked to pass. The difference, of course, is this—with the Regular subaltern it is his job, with the Territorial officer it is not. No doubt it is necessary that there should be some form, and very likely mime very severe form, of examination. The complaint I have to make is that these books on which they are examined are not obtainable. The answer given over and over again to those who go in for these examinations and desire these works is that the books are either obsolete or out of print, at any rate they are not obtainable. Take as an illustration the "Field Service Pocket Book," and the "King's Regulations." I believe that for the first time candidates for these examinations have been allowed to take the "Field Service Pocket Book." I know the case of a man who wrote for a copy. The examination began on December 4 and on December 1 he received an intimation that the book was not obtainable. The same thing happened with regard to the "King's Regulations." I believe that the answer to this objection of mine is that these two books are merely provisional, and are under revision; but when you remember the class of men that you examine, it seems very hard on them that they should be examined in books that may be altered to-morrow.

I will give your Lordships one of several instances. The man I refer to is a builder in rather a big way of business. He is employed all day, and therefore has to work at the subjects for the examination in the evenings. It is very hard if he cannot actually obtain the books in which he is going to be examined. I know the great discouragement thus given to Territorial officers, and when we find, as I believe was the case the last time, that some 50 per cent. of the candidates fail, no doubt there is a very good explanation for it. I would like to press very strongly that those who are to be examined should have an opportunity of obtaining the books in which they are to be examined. On my general Questions, I do hope the noble Viscount will be able to give us some consolation and undertake that our great difficulties will not be added to by statements such as those to which I have referred.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (VISCOUNT HALDANE)

On the last point to which the noble Earl has referred with regard to the examinations and the books, if the facts be what he says I heartily agree with him. It is very wrong if people are examined on books which are obsolete. Unfortunately, I have had no notice from the noble Earl of this matter and have had no means of inquiring, but I shall make inquiry—

THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH

I did not give any notice to the noble Viscount of this point, because the examination is over. Perhaps he will have time before the next examination to go into the matter.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

Yes; but I think the noble Earl might have given me notice before raising it in this House, because it goes out, and I have no means of revising it; but I shall make stringent inquiries to-morrow. If I bad had notice I should have been glad to make some inquiries and to give this House sonic assurance one way or the other.

THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH

I am sorry I did not give notice, but there have been Questions asked about it in another place. Had I known that the noble Viscount required an intimation beforehand I should certainly have given it to him.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I certainly required an intimation. I now come to the other point. The noble Earl asks when it was decided by the Army Council that there should be a peace establishment of 250,000 for the Territorial Force as distinguished from a war establishment. The answer is that it has never been so decided. I have never either said or suggested anything of the kind, and the references as to myself having spoken of these things arc not supported by any words which the noble Earl quoted, nor could he find words used by me to that effect. That I have said is that the Territorial Force is unfortunately below its full establishment at this time. I have said there is no magic in 315,000 men, but it is the duty of everybody interested in the Territorial Force, and particularly of those who are responsible for it, to work in every way they can to get it up to the full establishment. But we always knew that there would be periods, and it might be prolonged periods, when we should not be up to the establishment. But it is no use talking of that, and saying that the end of the world has come. Then the noble Earl has quoted me as having said in February, 1907, in introducing the Territorial scheme in the House of Commons, that it might well be that there would be periods during which the numbers would not be very much more than a quarter of a million. Even so, I added, we were not to lose heart, but were simply to take that as the state of things we had to deal with, and work as hard as we could to get the full establishment. But I have never for a moment suggested at any time that there is a peace establishment of a quarter of a million as distinguished from a war establishment, or talked such nonsense as somebody seems to have put into my mouth and which the noble Earl has got hold of.

THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH

I will send the noble Viscount the quotation which I took front the report of his speech which appeared in The Times a little while ago.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

The Times is very unlike itself if it has made me say that there is a peace, as distinguished from a war establishment, and that the number was a quarter of a million, and that the Army Council had so decided. I am sorry if the noble Earl has been misled into thinking that I have said anything of the sort, and no reporter was justified in representing anything of the kind as my words. It is of the essence of the Territorial Force that it should have only one establishment and we have always maintained that every one responsible should endeavour to get the numbers up to that amount. The only thing that has been said, and said all along, is that you cannot expect to be always up to a war establishment, and that, even if you went down to 250,000, that is no reason for losing heart or despairing of your Force. You have got something that is very good to work on even with these numbers, and it should only be a reason for your working no less strenuously in order to get your full numbers. That is all I have to say about this myth of the two establish merits.

THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH

I ant very pleased it has been cleared away.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I am glad to have been of assistance to the noble Earl in this matter. With regard to the next question, there again the noble Earl has quoted the late Financial Secretary as having said that the Territorial Force was absolutely equipped with everything it might need to face any invasion or sudden emergency that might arise. I have looked at several reports of the speech and I do not wonder that the noble Earl has been misled by some of them, because they are mostly about six lines long. But I did see some eighteen to twenty lines long, and it is clear that my hon. friend was referring to what he was speaking about—namely, that, he had provided money sufficient to enable mobilisation to be complete in forty-eight hours. My hon. friend maintains that he did, before he left office, provide that money, and. I have reason to think he is accurate in that statement. He did not say that everything was complete and ready. I quite agree with the noble Earl that there are many things that will have to be done before you have got perfect machinery for mobilisation, but I have made careful inquiries from those who know the Territorial Force, and they tell me that the only-difficulties that remain are wagons and horses.

As regards horses, a very large part of the country is now far advanced with the operations of a new scheme for providing horses, and it is only a matter of a very short time before the bulk of the horses will be provided for the Territorial Force. They are already provided for the six divisions of the Regular Army and the Cavalry Division. The work ought to be completed within a very few months, and in many places the horses have been sufficiently marked out to mobilise the Territorial Force. As for three men going on one horse, of course we all know that for ordinary training the Territorial Force authorities hire horses, and those horses serve very often for three successive trainings. If these were the only horses it would be three to one, but on mobilisation that has nothing whatever to do with the state of things as you have a right to take horses, and the only question is, Have you classified them, censused them, marked them down, and are they there? There will be a horse for every man who requires a horse; and, as I say, that process is far advanced. There has always been a controversy about wagons. In the provision of wagons the noble Earl has worked with distinguished success; he has raised numbers, and his is one of the most efficient Associations in the country. I do not know whether he has raised this question, but a number of the Associations would like to have a certain type of wagon. We have always said that for your first line of transport you must have these wagons, and many of these have been sent to them; but we have told them that for the rest they must mobilise, as is done in Switzerland, with civilian carts and wagons—that they must mark them down, and they have done that. Wagons were never in discussion very much; there has been more real question as to horses, and as far as I know the horse problem is now very close to a final solution.

What else is there about mobilisation? The rifles, the guns, the ammunition, the clothing, the equipment are there. I inquired to-day, "How does it stand with the Territorial Force if we were ordered to mobilise at once?" The answer was that the Infantry could be sent at once to their stations. That ought to be done within twenty-four hours in the existing state of things. Until the horse supply is quite complete it might take four days before the mounted arms were properly supplied—of course where the horse census is very far behind it would naturally take longer, but it ought not to take longer than that. But the mobilisa- tion of a Citizen Force is never the most precise and beautiful thing, and never can be the same precise thing that the mobilisation of a Regular Force is. You do not spend the same money on it, but you get a very effective mobilisation. The stations are defined, the units are marked out, the orders given to assemble arid to concentrate, they go in detachments and arrive at the place of assembly, and in that way this Force is mobilised, and I am told that the Territorial Force could be mobilised very rapidly. I am giving the noble Earl the answers I got to-day on inquiry at the proper department. I am far from saying that the mobilisation of a Citizen Force can anything like approach the beauty and precision of the mobilisation of a Regular Force, but what we want is expedition with a due regard to public safety. I think I have covered the points raised by the noble Earl. I am sorry if some reporter has taken words of mine and turned them into suggestions showing this difference between peace establishment and war establishment. The noble Earl has raised a splendid contingent in his part of the country, a contingent which is a model for the Territorial Force. I trust that what I have been reported to have said will not affect the exertions of the noble Earl, because I think I have shown him that what has been attributed to me is mythical.

LORD NEWTON

My Lords, I intervene for a moment, not to continue the discussion which always does arise on these occasions with reference to the position of this Force, but merely to point out what seem to be some discrepancies in the speeches recently made by the Secretary of State for War. In a speech at Tranent at the end of September the noble Viscount said that he was going to use the Territorial Force for all it was worth the first day of war. "For all that it was worth" obviously implies that it was worth a very great deal. But more recently I observe that in a speech made to the 6th Battalion of the City of London Rifles on December 1, he asserted that a compulsory force of men trained for four or six months, in the opinion of his best advisers, would be of no use. I feel disposed to ask the noble Viscount whether when he made the first statement he was guided by the opinion of his best advisers, or possibly it was the opinion of his second best advisers.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I said it would be of no use opposed man to man to Continental troops trained for two or three years.

LORD NEWTON

But the report which I read terminated with the word "use." Therefore I do not see that the argument is materially affected by the addition made by the noble Viscount. But what I want to know is whether he was equally guided by the opinion of those best advisers when he made the speech saying he was going to utilise the Territorial Force from the first day of war, because it is perfectly evident that if in the opinion of the best advisers men who have been trained for four or six months are of no practical use, they arc not likely to have a high opinion of the value of men trained for a period of only about two weeks. This being presumably the view of the best advisers of the noble Viscount, I should like to ask him what is their opinion of the Special Reserve, the special force which happens to be trained for that particular period? So far from drawing the conclusion which my noble friend does in his Question that there are a number of persons in this country who are lulled into a state of false security by virtue of these somewhat conflicting statements, to me they only create the impression that the noble Viscount, with his accustomed ingenuity, is doing his best to conceal the breakdown of the system for which he himself has expressed so much admiration.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON

My Lords, have only one question to ask, and that is whether the noble Viscount relies on the statement of Mr. Acland, or whether he admits, as by implication lie does, that that was an overdrawn picture of the condition of the Territorial Force. I am not going into the difficulties which we discussed, on a recent occasion, but I put it to the noble Viscount that these extravagant statements as to our preparedness—statements which Financial Secretaries and Under-Secretaries who file through the War Office and imbibe Lord Haldane's optimism deliver with absolute conviction while they stand, so to speak, by his side, but the moment they are emancipated they seem to cast oft a good deal of that which they have imbibed and so readily assimilated—these extravagant statements, from his own point of view, from the point of view of the obvious reaction which must come whenever the Force is examined by somebody who has not got the paternal interest in it which Lord Haldane has, ought to be checked. Nothing has clone more to handicap us on this side of the House in supporting all that is best in the system which he has set on foot than the fact that an amount is claimed for it such as no system of voluntary service could hope to obtain. The late Financial Secretary to the War Office is reported to have said that within forty-eight hours the Territorial Force could stand forth absolutely equipped. I wish to see it in that condition. So far as my noble friend behind me and others on this side of the House can, we will assist the noble Viscount to do it. But we know that the matter has not been accomplished yet, and I put it to him that it is not only unwise but misleading that these statements should be made.

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I have explained what the late Financial Secretary said—namely, that he had provided the money. What lie was thinking of was the fact that at the time we had a good deal of money. It so happened. It does not so often happen at the War Office, and one of the things required was to supply certain things to the Territorial Force. That was clone, and the money was set aside, and my hon. friend who was leaving us naturally looked back with pride at having supplied sufficient money to enable the Territorial Force to be mobilised in forty-eight hours completely equipped. Whether he was sanguine in that view or not, I do not say, but lie had seen to the money. As regards the point raised by Lord Newton, I was speaking solely of men put against Continental trained Regulars.

LORD NEWTON

But may I ask, Whom else would they be expected to fight?

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I said that, in the opinion of my best advisers, men who had been trained from four to six mouths were not fit to meet, man for man, Regulars who had been trained for two or three years; and I have never suggested that the Territorial Force should meet them man for man. The whole point of the Territorial Force is that you have vastly superior numbers to anything that could be landed in this country. That is a very different proposition, and I do not see any inconsistency in what I said in the two speeches referred to by Lord Newton. It may be my stupidity, but I cannot see the inconsistency. As for assuming a sanguine attitude, in the face of all the gloomy predictions which come to me from all hands about the Territorial Force, what else can I do but endeavour to preserve a decent equanimity.