Lords Sitting of 6 April 1910

Preamble
The Lord WYNFORD—Took the Oath.

STANDING ORDERS COMMITTEE.
Report from, That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the
London County Council (Tramways and Improvements) Bill
ought to be dispensed with, provided that all powers to construct Tramways Nos. 1, 1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 2, 2A, 3, 3A, 4, 5, 5A, 6, 9, 11, 11A, and 11B be struck out of the Bill:
That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the petition for a Bill by the
Railway Passengers Assurance Company
ought to be dispensed with, and leave given to introduce the Bill:
That the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the petition for an additional provision in the
Glasgow Gas Consolidation Bill
ought to be dispensed with, and leave given to the Committee on the Bill to insert the additional provision:
And that the Standing Orders not complied with in respect of the petition for a Bill by the
Belfast Corporation
ought to be dispensed with:
Read, and agreed to.

AMMANFORD GAS BILL. [H.L.]
The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES The CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES informed the House that the Promoters do not intend to proceed further with the Bill: Order of the Day for the Second Reading read, and discharged: Ordered that the Bill be not further proceeded with.
SURBITON URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL BILL.
Brought from the Commons, read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
LORD THURLOW.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR informed the House that he had received from the Registrar in Bankruptcy of the High Court of Justice, a certificate under the Seal of the said Court, stating that the Right Honourable Thomas John Hovell Thurlow Baron Thurlow, of 53, Egerton Crescent, Brompton, in the county of London, being a Peer of the Realm, was adjudicated bankrupt on the 21st day of March, 1910: The same was ordered to lie on the Table.

SOMALILAND.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the evacuation of the Somaliland Protectorate by His Majesty's Government; to ask for information from the Secretary of State for the Colonies; and to move for Papers. I feel that I need offer no apology for bringing this matter to the attention of the House. The abandonment—for that is what it amounts to—of a strip of territory 300 to 400 miles in length and some 200 miles in width, with a population of between 200,000 and 300,000 people, with some of whom we have been in treaty relations for eighty years and over the majority of whom we have exercised a definite protectorate for more than a quarter of a century, is a very serious matter. It is serious, at any rate, for the inhabitants of the country itself, it is serious in its effects upon the policy and prestige of His Majesty's Government, and it may conceivably in its consequences be serious in relation to contiguous parts of our Empire in Africa. Your Lordships will, I think, agree that an incident like this ought not to pass without full discussion in one or other House of Parliament, and without ample vindication by the responsible Minister of the steps that have led his Government to arrive at this momentous decision.
There have been already in the present session of Parliament two necessarily somewhat perfunctory discussions on the subject in the House of Commons, but since then a Blue-book has appeared which has for the first time given us the opportunity of discovering what the policy of the Government in its various stages has been. So far as I can understand we are now confronted, not merely with a res judicata, but with a res gesta. The evacuation has taken place or is taking place at this moment. The British flag has been withdrawn, and the steps

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which have led to that are detailed in this Blue-book that I hold in my hand. I do not suppose many of your Lordships have read through this book, but I venture to say that those who have will have found it a rather painful and discreditable tale. It leaves a distinctly unpleasant taste in the mouth of those who have perused it, as it has been my duty to do, from cover to cover.
Somaliland is a country which has entailed upon us great sacrifices. We have expended there a large number of valuable lives and much treasure. I believe that our total expenditure on Somaliland during the last twenty-five years has amounted to between £3,000,000 and £4,000,000. Now, what is the result of it all? We capitulate to the Mullah; we hand the country over to him and leave him master of the situation; we disband the force of native troops that we have laboriously, but with great success, raised in the country itself; we leave the people who are somewhat euphemistically called friendly tribes but whose attitude is now, I suspect, of rather a different description—we leave them to the tender mercies of their enemies; and atone blow we wipe out the creditable and successful work of twenty-five years. This is a policy that may be capable of explanation, and even of good defence; and it is for that purpose that I venture to interrogate His Majesty's Government this afternoon. At any rate, it is not a state of affairs that can possibly be regarded with indifference by members of the Legislature of this country.
I need not embark upon any lengthy excursion into ancient history. We may have been wrong when in the year 1884, under the then Government of Mr. Gladstone, we assumed the Protectorate of Somaliland; yet for my own part I think that the reasons for this action at that date were very strong, just as I think good reasons can be found for almost each successive stage in our occupation ever since. Your Lordships will remember that at that time we had just overturned the native government in Egypt which, under the rule of Ismail Pasha, had expanded itself in directions far outside the natural and legitimate boundaries of Egypt proper. Egyptian troops had planted themselves at Zeila and Berbera and other places in Somaliland. Accordingly it became our duty to take their place, and for this reason.
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In the first place, we had to prevent the anarchy that must have ensued from the dissolution of the governing power; secondly, we had to protect the food supply of Aden, which is largely derived from the ports on the Somaliland coast; and, thirdly, we desired to avoid the danger of the encroachments of foreign Powers' upon the flank of our main line of communication to India. Those were the reasons which in 1884 led the Government of that day to assume the Protectorate, to occupy a long strip of territory on the coast with posts, to plant officers and garrisons in certain places in the country, to conclude certain treaties with the various tribes, and, later on, also to conclude boundary conventions with the neighbouring Powers of Italy and France and Abyssinia.
After that date the administration passed through various phases which I can summarise almost in a sentence. Until 1898 the administration of Somaliland was under the Government of India, and it was at that time that I had the good fortune to visit the country myself in company with Sir Charles Nairne, then Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Presidency, by the Government of which the administration of the Protectorate was conducted. Those were the halcyon days of the Protectorate. The trade was considerable, the tribes were peaceful, no Mullah had arisen on the scene, and the finances of the country were in a very flourishing condition. In 1898, for reasons into which I need not now enter, the administration was transferred to the Foreign Office, and in 1905 to the Office over which the noble Earl the Secretary of State for the Colonies presides. It was about the year 1899, just after the Foreign Office had taken over the administration, that the Mullah began to give trouble. This Mullah, who seems to me to be less mad than anybody to whom the attribute has ever been assigned, was originally a hanger-on in the bazaars of Berbera. I am not sure that he was not even a teacher in a native school. The succeeding ten years have, as everybody knows, been years of incessant irritation and conflict between us and him. Three or four expeditions have had to be conducted in the country, with varying success; and finally these military operations culminated, as we then thought, in a crushing defeat which was inflicted upon the Mullah by General Egerton, a capable

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officer whom I remember we sent from India and who did inflict a very crushing defeat upon the Mullah at Jidballi in the month of January, 1904. The Mullah then retired into Italian territory, and I suppose the Government of that day, as all Governments are apt to do, hugged to their breast the fond illusion that they had got rid of him for ever.
That brings us to the time when the present Government assumed office—namely, 1905. For the first year or two nothing particular seems to have occurred; but we gather from the Blue-book that it was about the middle of 1908 that the Mullah who had all the while been utilising his period of retirement in Italian territory to recuperate his position, to spread his propaganda, and to undermine the loyalty of the native tribes, once again threw off the mask and exchanged an attitude of dubious hostility to His Majesty's Government for one of open defiance. He then called upon the British authorities to withdraw their posts from the interior, and he had the audacity to forbid us to take steps against the unruly tribes in our own sphere of influence. It is a rather difficult thing to condense in a speech the contents of a prolonged correspondence in a Blue-book extending over ninety pages of print, but I hope I shall do no substantial injustice to the case of His Majesty's Government if I state that the stages by which we have arrived at the present conclusion appear to me to have been the following.
The views of His Majesty's Government are first stated in a despatch dated November 30, 1908, which is printed on page 25 of the Blue-book. At this point their attitude was still of a somewhat tentative and cautious character. They were not prepared for a great expedition against the Mullah, and there, if I may say so, I think they were quite right. They were prepared to hold the Berbera-Burao line and to order military reinforcements from Africa, but they hinted at the ultimate evacuation of Burao and threw out the suggestion that it might be possible to subsidise the Mullah much in the same way as we subsidise refractory tribes and headmen on the North-West frontier of India. The next occasion on which their policy is stated is a few months later, in a telegram dated March 12, 1909, and appearing on page 41 of the Blue-book. Here they have made
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a substantial and notable advance, or perhaps I ought rather to call it retirement, in their attitude. They now say in this telegram that the cost of the transport of the troops whom they had sent was so great that a reconsideration of their policy is forced upon them. They openly hint at a policy of complete withdrawal, they revive the idea of subsidising the Mullah, and they ask the very pertinent question whether it may be possible to arm the friendly tribes, who might otherwise be left to look after themselves. In reply to these indications of their policy the attitude and advice of the local Commissioner are, from the Blue-book, quite clear. Let me say that Captain Cordeaux, the officer in question, is a gentleman whom I have never met, with whom I have had no communications, but who, in the opinion of all those who know Somaliland, is not only the officer best acquainted with the conditions of that country, in which he has served, I believe, for ten years, but he is an officer well known for his sobriety of judgment as well as his loyalty to the Government which he has served.
THE EARL OF CREWE: Hear, hear.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Captain Cordeaux's views, condensed as I shall endeavour to condense them from a great number of telegrams and despatches, were apparently as follow. In the first place, he was under no illusion as to the policy of the Mullah. Twice over—on pages 13 and 31 of the Blue-book—he states that the Mullah had never abandoned the idea of eventually becoming the master of Somaliland. That is, he clearly indicated to His Majesty's Government the scope of the Mullah's ambitions.
THE EARL OF CREWE: What was the date of that?
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am referring to Captain Cordeaux's memorandum dated October 7, 1908, and appearing on pages 12, 13, and 14 of the Blue-book, and to his despatch dated January, 1909, and appearing on page 31. For these reasons the Commissioner did not believe in the professions of friendship that sometimes came from the Mullah. Neither did he believe, for very good reasons, into which I need not enter now, in the policy of subsidising that person.

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He pointed out, however—and this is very significant—that the Mullah had not gained and was not gaining strength, and that, if firmly resisted, he believed that his power would recede. Secondly, Captain Cordeaux laid great stress—and this fact, too, is significant in view of what has occurred since—upon the feebleness and lack of cohesion amongst the so-called friendly tribes, thereby giving a sort of warning to His Majesty's Government of the danger of expecting them to stand up alone. Thirdly, he outlined, I think quite clearly, what he described as a middle course, which he advocated and which was this—a continued military occupation of the interior and particularly of the Berbera-Burao line, with a view of fulfilling our obligations to the tribes, of reassuring them, and of checking the possible advance of the Mullah. Above all—and it is to this that I respectfully invite the attention of your Lordships—he most strenuously opposed the policy of evacuation. On three occasions—at pages 42, 43 and 52 of the Blue-book—those views are repeated.
Perhaps I may be allowed to read to your Lordships the two last pronouncements because they are very significant. In the despatch appearing on page 43, dated March 8, 1909, Captain Cordeaux says—
"In fact, I do not think that an evacuation would be possible at any time or under any circumstances until the Mullah's power has been finally broken either by the present measures, or by a successful expedition."
And on page 52, at the end of his telegram dated April 3, 1909, he says—
"I do not hesitate to say withdrawal in face of an actively hostile Mullah would be disastrous not only to our tribes but also to our prestige throughout North-East Africa."
From these quotations, which I might easily supplement, the attitude of the Commissioner, I think, stands out quite clearly. He most loyally carries out the instructions which he receives from His Majesty's Government, but he cannot bring himself to recommend a policy which he regards as disastrous to the best interests of the Protectorate. He states the counter policy which he himself advocates, and he repeatedly pleads most urgently against evacuation. It must have been evident from this that His Majesty's Government would not find a very willing, although a perfectly loyal, executant of their policy in the Commissioner.
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At this point occurs a hiatus in the Blue-book which I believe I am in a position to fill. I believe that at this stage His Majesty's Government turned to the Resident at Aden and sought his advice. He is an officer who served under me in India. Again in this case I have had no communication whatever from him, either directly or indirectly. My information comes from an entirely independent quarter at a great distance. As I have said, I believe that at this stage His Majesty's Government turned to the Resident at Aden and asked him whether he could assist them in the policy of evacuation on which they had apparently resolved. I am told that General De Brath was himself as strongly opposed to this policy as was the Commissioner on the spot. However that may be, the Government then had to look elsewhere, and accordingly we find, from the Blue-book, that they sent out two very distinguished officers, Sir Reginald Wingate (the Governor-General of the Soudan) and Sir Rudolph Slatin, who, of course, have had great experience of a somewhat analogous situation in the Soudan, and they asked them for their advice. The full instructions to these officers, dated April 15, 1909, are printed on pages 52 to 55 of the Blue-book, and from them it is evident that the full policy of evacuation had been decided upon by the Government, or rather, of what they somewhat euphemistically describe as "coastal concentration," which apparently means evacuating the country but leaving some faint vestiges of your authority in some few selected places along the coast.
The only passage in these instructions to which I would ask your Lordships' leave to refer is the concluding sentence, because again it is very significant in view of what has happened. The Government—page 54 of the Blue-book—say to Sir Reginald Wingate—
"Should the Mullah increase his prestige, either by our partial or complete withdrawal, by our failure to deal effectually with him, or by some success on his part, it will be urged that the results may be disastrous for British influence outside Somaliland itself. On the Juba River, the frontier of the East Africa Protectorate, there are powerful and turbulent Somali tribes, and if once they were set in motion by the Mullah the consequences might be most serious for the East Africa Protectorate, while our prestige in the other countries in North-East Africa, such as the Soudan and Uganda, might be injuriously affected. In any recommendations which you may make, you will no doubt bear this aspect of the question in mind."

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And then the Secretary of State concludes by saying that he will anxiously await the recommendations of these officers. My Lords, we are in exactly the same position. We are anxiously awaiting them at this moment. As to what those recommendations were not a single member of your Lordships' House, from the Blue-book, has the slightest means of ascertaining. These two officers went out to Berbera. They spent, I believe, six weeks in the country, in the course of which they made a short journey into the interior. They sent envoys to the Mullah, and received an envoy in return from him. On June 15 the Secretary of State telegraphs that he is still awaiting the report of Sir Reginald Wingate with interest, as we are at this moment; and in July that officer came back to London, and apparently his report must have been in the hands of the Secretary of State shortly afterwards. Are we not entitled to ask, so much stress being laid upon the authority of these officers, the anxiety of the Secretary of State to receive their report being more than once repeated, the action of His Majesty's Government having presumably been affected by the advice received by them—are we not entitled to ask, Where is this report? Of what character was it? Why has it not been laid before Parliament? If the whole of the report cannot be given may not extracts from it be placed before us? If that is impossible, is the Secretary of State in a position to tell us this afternoon what was its general character and purport? From the Blue-book the only hint that we get as to what its character may have been is in a telegram of September 2, on page 61—a telegram from the Government to the Commissioner of a very cautious description. They say that it is not practicable at that time to outline their policy in full; they admit that the Mullah has been much discredited; they still cling to the idea that the "friendlies" can be encouraged to defend themselves; and they suggest a gradual and cautious reduction of the force in Somaliland.
Then occurs another gap of two months—from September till November of last year; and on the twelfth of November—page 71—there is a telegram in which the full policy of the Government is finally disclosed. We now learn that the East African reinforcements are to be withdrawn; that the local battalion—the local battalion, I may
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mention, Was of local troops, partly Somali, which had been organised. I and trained to a relatively high point of efficiency for many years in the country—is to be disbanded; that coastal concentration is to be adopted as the policy; and that our administration is to be limited to two or three important towns on the coast which are only to be occupied by small garrisons in the future. At this stage His Majesty's Government were wise enough to realise that the execution of such a policy as this would be very distasteful if not impossible to the Commissioner, and accordingly the Secretary of State very generously offers him promotion in another sphere of activity. Again the noble Earl adds that he is "anxiously awaiting his reply." So, my Lords, are we. I should very much like to see what we have not been permitted to see—namely, what was the reply of the Commissioner to that telegram. A little later there is a telegram dated December 18—page 74 of the Blue-book—in which the important condition is added that the evacuation is not to be carried out unless and until the friendly tribes can reasonably be said to be in a position to hold their own against the Mullah, or to be free from the risk of serious attack by him.
Finally, in January of this year General Manning, who, of course, has a unique experience of the country because he has fought several campaigns there, was sent to Berbera to carry out the policy of evacuation. The instructions to him, which are printed in the Blue-book on page 75 and dated January, 1910, contain a full résumé of the policy of the Government, the only addition to what I have previously said being that it is now recognised that some time may elapse before evacuation can take place. The first telegram from General Manning is received on February 12 of the present year. It is on page 84 of the Blue-book, and I call attention to this because it is really a very remarkable document. General Manning tells us, as the result of his first inquiries on the spot, that he found the tribes broken up into several parties—that is to say, no longer a powerful and coherent force. The Mullah, he says, is not the man he was in 1903 and 1904, and his policy does not contemplate invasion of our Protectorate. Well, my Lords, does it not occur to you that these were the precise local conditions which we had been working and waiting for for years; that

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they are the very conditions which justified, not the policy upon which His Majesty's Government were so anxious to embark, but a reconsideration of that policy in the direction of the views put before them by their advisers on the spot? But so far from these views having that effect, they only led His Majesty's Government to the conclusion that the evacuation could be carried out with even greater speed than had previously been contemplated. Accordingly a day was fixed last month for the retirement to the coast, and, for all we know now, the movement may be at an end and all evidences of our occupation of the interior may have ceased to exist. There the Blue-book ends, and for subsequent information we have to turn to the columns of the daily Press.
In our newspapers the day before yesterday there appeared a telegram from Aden to the effect that the Mullah had slaughtered 800 friendly natives, had captured their stock, and that the friendlies were fleeing towards the coast. I have seen no denial of that in the newspapers since. On the contrary, it was confirmed, at any rate in the newspapers that I saw, yesterday morning and this morning. If that be true—and no one would be better pleased than myself to know that it is not—if that be true, it is the melancholy first fruits of your policy of coastal concentration and evacuation of the interior. I ask your Lordships, what then are the conclusions to which the rather hurried and imperfect survey of the negotiations which is all that I have been able to place before you lead us? They are, I think, these. In the first; place, the policy of evacuation—whether it be right or wrong I cannot offer an opinion without further information—is not, so far as the Blue-book goes, supported by a single expert officer familiar with the country. Secondly, it is openly disapproved of by the Commissioner and by our Resident at Aden, General De Brath. Thirdly, we do not know at present what are the views of the distinguished officers who were sent out from the Soudan to advise His Majesty's Government; and, fourthly, we do not even know what are the views of that considerable authority, General Manning.
I think the narrative leaves upon us the impression that the evacuation has been carried out at the precise moment
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when it was least required. The Mullah, as described by everybody, is a receding, not an advancing force, and apparently forces of a disintegrating character are at work among his followers which might at least have been left alone to pursue their natural course. Then, again, the narrative leaves upon me at any rate the impression that the evacuation has been conducted with quite unnecessary speed—I had almost said with indecent precipitation; and the very considerations of delay and caution which His Majesty's Government wisely insisted upon in some of the passages I have read appear to have been lost sight of in what must have been almost a stampede to the coast. I am afraid that the only steps which have been taken by the Government to meet the perils of this situation have been to put arms into the hands of some of the friendly tribes both on the East and the West, and to remove the prohibition that has hitherto existed upon their procuring arms from the neighbouring French port of Jibuti. That is a very risky policy, because for years we have been endeavouring to prevent this contraband traffic in arms from this French port. Now apparently we are encouraging our own tribes to go and do that which for years we have successfully implored the French Government to prohibit and have prevented our own protected tribes from doing. I believe you have handed out a large number of rifles both to the Eastern and Western tribes. What is the good of handing rifles to men who have never had a rifle in their hands in their lives? It would not be very successful in our own country; it is deplorable in a country like Somaliland. What will happen? The whole of these arms you have given to your Eastern tribes on the border where the Mullah now is will go—I expect the greater portion of them have already gone—into the possession of the Mullah; those on the western side will pass into the hands of the Ogaden and other tribes on the Abyssinian frontier. Thus what will almost assuredly happen will be that every one of these 1,000 or 2,000 rifles, or whatever the number may be, that you have distributed will at a day perhaps not very far distant be turned against ourselves.
I would now ask your Lordships to survey for a moment what will be the probable consequence of evacuation. In the first place I take the consequences upon the

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spot. At the very moment when this Mullah was apparently discredited, when there had arrived this message from Mecca—this authoritative message from Mecca—saying that he was, from the religious standpoint, an impostor and a sham, and when his forces are falling away from him, you give him this tremendous impetus. What does he do? He turns against the Dolbahanta. The Dolbahanta will immediately realise that they have to do with a strong man. They will all be his men in a year's time and probably less, and with his forces thus augmented he will hurl himself against the tribes on the Western side whom we have successfully protected all these years and who will no longer be able to resist him. In other words, you give the Mullah an opportunity of sweeping the Protectorate from end to end.
I do think that we are bound to consider the feelings and attitude of these friendly tribes themselves. I was looking up just now the terms of the Treaties of Protection which we concluded with these tribes in the year 1884. I cannot find them at the moment, but it comes to this, that in return for the assurances that they gave us that they would not enter into treaty relations with or cede their territory to foreign Powers, we solemnly guaranteed to them the gracious protection and favour of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress. Those were the words of the treaty. What will these tribes say to us? What are they saying at this moment to our officers? They are saying, "You told us that you would give us the gracious favour and protection of your illustrious Sovereign. Upon that we have relied for twenty-five years. You would not allow us arms; you have turned us from men into women"—that is the phraseology that they employ in their own country—"and now you desert us and leave us to be looted by our hereditary foes. It was formerly a source of pride to us to be British subjects, but what was then a pride has now become a stigma and a reproach." I am not talking in a rhetorical vein. I am stating to you exactly the words which are now being used by the tribes to the British officers in Somaliland. What is the upshot of it all? You have by this act, be it justifiable or not, blackened the name of Great Britain in that country; you have taken away from these tribes the possibility of relying upon your pledged word in the future.
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Then the Secretary of State tells us in the Blue-book that the Government are going to withdraw our entire administration to the coast. I venture to ask the noble Earl, What does that mean? Have the Government any clear idea as to what they are driving at in this matter? The position up to date has been this. We have had six officers stationed in the interior of Somaliland—at Burao, Odweina, Ber, Hargeisa, and Sheikh—each with a small body of police. One might infer from the discussion in the House of Commons that these were isolated posts, so to speak, in the desert. They are nothing of the sort. They are settlements to which under our Protectorate the natives have been encouraged to go in large numbers; they have built houses there, and have carried on a prosperous trade. Burao, one of these places, which barely appears on the map, is a bigger place than Berbera, and Hargeisa also is a place of considerable size. In a moment all these places are to be destroyed. The flag is taken down, and the work of twenty-five years is thrown away. You tell us that you are going to concentrate at a few places on the coast. I wonder if I might ask the Secretary of State to explain what he means. What are the places he is going to concentrate at?
There is talk in the Blue-book about keeping the flag flying at Berbera, Zeila, and Bulhar, but there seems to be some inclination to evacuate Zeila and Bulhar and to maintain our position at Berbera alone. Perhaps the noble Earl will be able to tell us what are the intentions of His Majesty's Government in the matter. But whether you retain your officers at one place or two or three, what are they going to do? You talk in the Blue-book about fortifying the position. Does that mean that British officers with or without a number of troops, are to sit down on the coast at Berbera and twiddle their thumbs and wait there while the Mullah overruns the whole country or while the friendly tribes are eaten up, and do nothing? It seems to me that all the arguments for the evacuation of the interior apply equally to the evacuation of the coast, and that when you have cleared out from the places where alone you can do good to your protected tribes, it is useless to keep officers on the sea shore. There may be some point in the proceeding which I have not apprehended. Anyhow, I venture to ask for information on the point.

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My own fear is that there is not likely to be any more finality about this policy of evacuation than there has been about the various policies which have preceded it. Experience teaches us that evacuation in those parts of the world is often of a rather precarious and delusive character. It is ignominious at the time and not effective in the future. We have been trying evacuation for the last hundred years in place after place in Asia and Africa. We have tried it in the Soudan, in the Transvaal, in Afghanistan, in Chitral, and in Tibet. In each instance a strong case could be made out. Pate has taken us back to some of these places, and he would be a bold man who would say it would never take us back to the remainder; and he would be a bold man too who would say that by this act of evacuation we have said the last to Somaliland.
But is not there a wider issue involved—namely, the effect it will have on your policy in the other portions of the British Empire? These considerations are not irrevelant, because they were present to the mind of His Majesty's Government themselves. That is clear from the passage which I read out a little earlier from the instructions to Sir Reginald Wingate. They ask him to advise what the effect might be in the Soudan, in Uganda, and elsewhere. What the reply to that request was we have not been told. I should like to learn from His Majesty's Government whether they have received any reassuring information on this point, and I should also like to be certain that our very good friends the Italians in their neighbouring sphere of influence are not disconcerted and will not be injured by that which we have done. You must remember that news of this sort runs with the rapidity of a prairie fire throughout the country. News will get about that we have broken out pledges, that the friendly tribes have been deserted and slaughtered, and the very considerations of expediency and expense which appeal so strongly and not unreasonably to us here are perfect gibberish to them. They do not look upon retreat as a symbol of far-sighted policy, but as a mark of military discomfiture and defeat. I venture to say that throughout East Africa there will be but one opinion—namely, that the Mullah has won and that we have lost. In the short discussion that took place in the House of Commons the other day, in replying to a charge
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which had been made by an hon. member of that House, Mr. Baird, who speaks from an intimate knowledge of Somaliland—a charge to the effect that we had left the friendlies to their fate—the Under-Secretary for the Colonies indulged in a rather swelling period, no doubt well suited to a peroration, about maintaining the honour and integrity of the Empire. To cat out 68,000 square miles and 300,000 people from the British Empire may be, from our point of view, a very small sacrifice. It may not matter to us a snap of the fingers. But, my Lords, it may be of importance, it may be vital, it may be the whole of their existence, to the people whom you thus excise. Then as regards the honour of the Empire, I am not certain that we are the best judges of the matter. I should like to hear the views entertained by the elders and the chiefs of the tribes themselves.
I do not wish to pursue this matter further. My speech has been made with a view really of asking for information from His Majesty's Government. I may, perhaps, have done them an injustice in some of the suspicions in which I have indulged. If that be so, it arises from the gaps in the Blue-book, for which they and not I am responsible. Until we have heard what their case is I am loth to condemn their policy outright, but on the face of it it looks as though this policy had been carried out against the advice of their expert authorities, and as if it had been executed with extreme and indefensible precipitation; and I think it is very difficult indeed to resist the conclusion that our friendly tribes have been left in the lurch, that it is not we but they who will have to pay the price, and it may be a further consequence that a not inconsiderable blow will have been inflicted upon the prestige of our Empire in regions far outside the borders of Somaliland itself.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, as I had the honour of administering the affairs of the Somaliland coast for some five years, and being, as far as I can see, the last Governor of Bombay present to-day who had that responsibility, perhaps I may offer a few remarks, not so much following upon what the noble Lord has said or with any idea of putting forward a suggestion as to the best thing to be done now, but as illustrating the inadvisability of under-

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taking responsibilities in a country like this far beyond where our own traders wish our responsibilities to go. I take it that the theory is not a very unsound one that the Flag has followed trade rather than trade has followed the Flag in the case of the British Empire. In the case of the Somaliland coast, how did we get there? The Egyptian garrison had to be withdrawn and we undertook to do that for them, and to maintain the three ports mentioned by the noble Lord—Zeila, Bulhar, and Berbera. When I visited them on first going out I found the British officer at Bulhar living under the same roof as his horse. That was the kind of accommodation provided for the British officer on the coast; and as far as I remember the whole force that was maintained on the coast during the time that I had the administration was half a battalion of native infantry. And what was our object? Simply to provide beef for the garrison at Aden. The trade was infinitesimal, and there was no object in extending our responsibilities.
There is, a few miles inland, a natural feature, which I insisted should be observed as the natural limit of our responsibilities. It is a waterless tract, and if a swashbuckler happened to get beyond that natural frontier and hauled up the British flag, I took care that it was hauled down. I saw no reason why the money of India or of England should be expended on military operations in that country, and as long as I had anything to do with it there were no military operations. I do not think we lost one scrap of trade, the responsibilities of the Government were of a limited character, and jurisdiction did not run beyond the ports. If a caravan came down and a malefactor was handed over to the British officer at the port, he reported to Aden and subsequently to Bombay, and asked what he was to do with him. The wisdom of the Government of India eventually decided—not the Government of Bombay; we would not take the responsibility—what was to be done with that malefactor. Sometimes he subsequently found himself in Aden gaol and sometimes on the Andaman Island. How he got there, by what process of law, I do not know, but he did get there and justice was done. But the great thing was to refrain from extending our responsibilities in the country. Since then very heavy responsibilities have been
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pushed far into the country over tribes that did not at that time touch upon the trade of the ports, and I cannot help thinking that the Government have been launched into heavy responsibilities in connection with treaties which were quite unnecessary.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: The treaties were earlier.
LORD HARRIS: They were earlier as regards the tribes on the coast.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: There have been none since.
LORD HARRIS: It was quite unnecessary to go beyond the natural feature to which I have referred, and it is only since the administration of the country passed out of the hands of the Government of India that these difficulties have arisen. That is the impression I have formed, and I mention it now as an illustration of the heavy responsibilities which this country is forced into. The trade of the country is infinitesimal, and I do not think it is justifiable for a country with the burdens of Empire that this country has to have undertaken these responsibilities—responsibilities which are usually thrown upon us by one of the two Departments not generally regarded as spending Departments, namely, either by the Colonial Office or the Foreign Office. Subsequently large numbers of men have to be employed for the purpose of protecting the natives who grow up and also the trade that grows up in these places, and the blame is cast upon the War Office. I have only ventured to speak because of my personal experience on the coast and my firm belief that with a cautious policy it would have been possible to avoid both the heavy expenditure of the last few years and the far more serious loss of life.
THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (THE EARL OF CREWE): My Lords, the noble Lord opposite said with great truth that we had no reason to complain of the raising of this subject from the Bench opposite. It is quite true that it is one of great importance, and I should be the last to complain on behalf of the Government that the noble Lord has brought it forward. I might, however, complain, I think, of the inaccuracy of the

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terms in which the noble Lord's Question is framed. He speaks of the evacuation of the Somaliland Protectorate, and in the course of his speech he seemed to imply that a country was evacuated even though you retained possession of several towns on the coast. While the noble Lord was speaking I could not help thinking how unfortunate it was that he had not lived in the reign of Mary Tudor, because he would have been able to console that unfortunate Sovereign for the loss of Calais by explaining that France having been previously evacuated the retention of Calais made no real difference.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Evacuation is your term.
THE EARL OF CREWE: Of the interior.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: That is the whole point of my argument.
THE EARL OF CREWE: But my point is that evacuation of the interior is not the same as evacuation of the Somaliland Protectorate. But the point is not one of supreme importance. The noble Lord complained that this was not merely a res judicata but a res gesta before an opportunity was given to the House to discuss it. That was an inevitable concomitant of the circumstances. The time when the evacuation of the interior could safely be made was necessarily left to the judgment of those on the spot, and to have made it a subject of discussion in Parliament before it was clear when the actual steps of withdrawal from these advanced posts could be made would, as I think the House will see, have very possibly involved considerable danger. It was due to the tribes concerned that the first news that they should get of our withdrawal from the advanced posts should be made to them by those on the spot whom they knew and trusted, and that they should not hear it from the extremely inaccurate sources of information from which it might otherwise have reached them.
The noble Lord, in his masterly way, went through a rapid sketch of the earlier history of Somaliland, and I am relieved therefore from following him in that survey; but he did not state that this particular policy of concentration of force on the coast was the definite policy of the Government of that day after the operations which were terminated by the victory of
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General Egerton at Jidballi. I do not think I shall be contradicted by noble Lords opposite who know the circumstances when I say that it was the intention of the Government of the time to concentrate precisely in the manner in which we are concentrating at this moment. The noble Lord spoke of his speech as a series of interrogations. I think it contained a good deal besides interrogation. It contained a good deal of insinuation, and it contained no small measure of denunciation. The noble Lord spoke somewhat slightingly, and I am bound to say somewhat strangely for him, of the swelling periods used by my right hon. friend the Under-Secretary for the Colonies. But he himself indulged in the course of his speech in no small amount of rhetoric, and I think he would have done better to pitch his speech in a somewhat lower key and if he had waited to denounce us for blackening the name of England until he had had an opportunity of considering a little further what the facts of the case really are. In considering this whole question you have to look at what the character of Somaliland really is. It is unique within the Empire, so far as I know. It is certainly, and happily, unique as regards those parts of the Empire which it is my duty to supervise. The noble Lord who spoke last, Lord Harris, spoke of the Colonial Office as being one of the Offices which was apt to lead the country into ill-considered commitments. I can assure him I have never been able to regard Somaliland in any sense as a Colony, or, indeed, as a proper subject for the administration of the Colonial Office.
LORD HARRIS: Hear, hear.
THE EARL OF CREWE: The problems of Somaliland, since I have been at the Colonial Office at any rate, have been of a purely military character, and it is altogether impossible to compare that country, for instance, either with the older African Colonies or with the five great newly-established Protectorates and Colonies where we have to deal with problems of transport, agriculture, education, improvement, and civilisation generally. Somaliland is no country such as those. It is a stony desert interspersed with wells, round which during the dry season a purely pastoral people, the descendants of Ishmael and Esau, I do not say by direct heredity but so far as their habits are concerned,

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cluster; while in the rainy season they wander with their flocks and herds to the various pools formed by the rains, for the purposes of pasture. There is no settled civilisation of any kind, and when the noble Lord speaks of such places as Burao as though they were small imitations, say, of Bombay, he is unintentionally conveying to the minds of your Lordships an impression very far removed from the truth.
As your Lordships know, from 1901 to January, 1904, when General Egerton won his victory, we were in continual combat with the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah, and the cost of fighting him at that time amounted to between £2,000,000 and £3,000,000. I entirely agree with the noble Lord opposite that the epithet "mad" is the last which ought to be applied to that remarkable man. If he were in this country he would certainly not be debarred from being a member of your Lordships' House—at any rate on the ground of insanity. But it is also true that the Mullah of to-day is not at all the Mullah of the years 1901–1904. The noble Lord mentioned but did not dwell upon the remarkable fact of the Mullah's denunciation by the head of his particular Mahomedan sect at Mecca. The effect of that denunciation was two-fold. It undoubtedly affected the minds of his own followers; it diminished his influence with them, and caused a great many to desert. But its effect was more important and infinitely more far-reaching upon the minds of those who are spoken of as friendly tribes; and for this reason. Up to that time the Mullah had been regarded as possessed of something of a divine mission, and even those who were most harassed by him and were prepared to fight against him were disturbed by the reflection that in doing so they might, to use a phrase from the Bible, haply be found fighting against God. Now it is not so. Such prestige as the Mullah continues to possess is the prestige merely of a successful free booter. He has with him a force which is formidable because it is, perhaps, more experienced in raiding and more reckless than other Somalis.
I should like to remove at once one impression which your Lordships might have gained from an observation of the noble Lord. I am sure he did not intend to impart prejudice into the discussion, but it
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is the kind of observation which may prove to be very misleading. He spoke of these wretched Dolbahanta who are attacked and massacred by the Mullah. The Dolbahanta are much the same people as his own tribes, just as good fighters and as ready to raid him as he is ready to raid them; and when absurd telegrams such as that which the noble Lord quoted about 800 friendly natives being slaughtered are read out as though they conveyed the real facts of the case it is extremely important to correct such a statement at once. Anybody reading that telegram would imagine that the Mullah's dervishes had raided some tribe and had slaughtered in cold blood 800 unarmed people without resistance. That, I think, is the inference which would be drawn from the telegram, and it was the inference which the noble Lord opposite tried to push home to the utmost. What really happened was that an armed combination of tribes had an engagement with the raiding party of dervishes—there is no evidence that the Mullah was there—in which, according to our information, a large number on both sides were killed, and it is evident that the friendly tribes got the worst of it because they had to retreat. That is what is called "fleeing towards the coast." It only shows how necessary it is to be cautious in believing such statements as those which the noble Lord quoted.
The noble Lord made one observation which somewhat surprised me. He said that he approved of the action of the Government in not sending an expedition to defeat the Mullah. Later on the noble Lord, as the great apostle of the forward policy in all parts of the world, stated his faith that withdrawals of any kind might have to be and would have to be paid for in the long run. But in this particular case he seemed to think that His Majesty's Government were right in not undertaking a fresh expedition against the Mullah when he became active at the beginning of last year. When the Mullah became active last year we initiated a policy which from its very nature could not be a permanent policy. He became more active and made some formidable raids. We therefore collected a number of troops, if I remember aright 1,200 was the number in all, from the different Protectorates—from East Africa, from Uganda, and Nyasaland—and sent them to reinforce the Somaliland Protectorate forces and to act as a backing for the tribes. That policy clearly could not be a permanent

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one, because it was evident that those troops could not be indefinitely spared from their own Protectorates; and I quite admit that I was glad when it was found possible, by the despatch of Indian troops for the purpose of carrying out the withdrawal from the interior, to send our own Colonial troops back to their respective Protectorates.
And it could not be a permanent policy for other reasons. What happens when a raid takes place is this. The pastoral tribes are out in front of the regular positions with their flocks and herds. They wander far afield. They are apt to take a fatalist view, to go wherever pasture is likely to be, and to chance the possibility of their being raided from one side or the other; because it must not be supposed that all the raids that are likely to take place upon tribes in our Protectorates are necessarily inspired by the Mullah or have anything to do with him. Therefore, the only way in which those flocks and herds and those with them can be really protected against raids is by sending armed parties to guard them. I think your Lordships will see that that is a policy which as a permanent policy is altogether an impossible one to pursue. It is impossible for us, I think, to look forward to sending armed parties of British troops to guard herds of camels or of cattle to the end of time against the inter-tribal raids which always have taken place in Somaliland and I take it always will take place there, considering the character of the people. If you do not do that, if you merely concentrate your troops in advanced posts, say at Burao, with other smaller forces thrown out in front, it is almost certain that at a favourable time of the year, that is to say during the rainy season when the raiders can travel fast, raids will take place and cattle will be carried off and those with them killed before it is possible to overtake those making the attack. Therefore, if you pursue the policy of keeping a considerable force on the edge of these comparatively fertile—though fertile is, I think, a Avoid dangerous to use in connection with any part of Somaliland—spots where flocks and herds are grazed, you will find yourselves obliged permanently to guard those grazing grounds. One might attempt an almost fanciful analogy as to what would take place, supposing cattle-driving had become a permanent custom in the West of Ireland, if it was considered necessary not merely to pursue and arrest cattle-drivers, but to
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absolutely guard by two or three members of the Irish Constabulary every herd of bullocks which might be grazing on a farm in Roscommon. That being so, if it is impossible to continue the half-and-half policy of attempting to check raids in a fashion, which could not be described as generally successful, only two other policies remained. One policy which might have something to recommend it, was to send out an expedition regardless of cost, which was bound to be great, and try to corner the Mullah, and, in the classic phrase, "smash him"; the other was to take the step which we have taken in withdrawing to the coast.
Although the noble Lord endeavoured to show that those who had been at different times responsible either directly in connection with the government of Somaliland, or indirectly, differed from our policy, I think I can safely say there is nobody who has had anything to do with Somaliland of late years who has not recognised that the ultimate alternative must lie between a costly expedition such as I have indicated and the step which we have actually taken. The noble Lord who raised this question mentioned Captain Cordeaux's views. I am glad to have the opportunity of expressing my opinion of the remarkable services rendered for a long time and in discouraging circumstances by Captain Cordeaux in Somaliland, and I have shown my sense of those services by transferring him to a post which I hope he will find in every way more agreeable and less surrounded by almost impossible problems than the one which he has just left. It was undoubtedly Captain Cordeaux's view, as the noble Lord pointed out, that on the whole, an indeterminate policy being impossible, the best thing would be to make an expedition against the Mullah; but for the reasons I have stated, and apparently they are concurred in by the noble Lord, we did not consider that desirable. When I say I have stated the reasons I ought to add that the probability of the success of such an expedition, if success meant capture of the Mullah, was extremely remote. The great expedition which terminated in January, 1904, did not succeed in catching the Mullah. If I remember aright, there were 7,000 rifles of British troops in Somaliland at that time, and yet the Mullah got away, and anybody who studies the geography of the country will readily understand why. The noble Lord mentioned our Italian friends who are our neighbours there. An expedition of that kind, I think, could

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only be successful if the Italians on their side were prepared to take very costly steps indeed in blocking all possible outlets to the South by which the Mullah could get away, and I have no reason to suppose that they any more than we, although they, of course, and the tribes in which they are interested are subject to continual raids and attacks by the dervishes, would desire to engage in any enterprise the cost of which undoubtedly would have to be measured in millions.
Then the noble Lord ingeniously argued that if it were true that the Mullah's prestige really was less, then that was a reason for staying in the country rather than for retiring to the coast. He argued it, I think, on the grounds that if the Mullah's power was broken we might proceed to establish something of a regular orderly administration in Somaliland throughout our Protectorate. I believe that to be an idle dream. I do not believe you could ever in Somaliland, considering the nature of the people, their habits, and their combative disposition, establish or attempt to establish anything of the nature of what would be called British administration throughout the country. Nor do I believe that you would be conferring the slightest benefit on the tribes if you did try. It is not in the least what they want. Our experience has brought us to believe that what the tribes mainly desire is to be left alone. They do not want to be administered by British political officers, and they would greatly prefer to be left to manage their own tribal affairs in their own way, even though such a state of things involved occasional intertribal fights of the kind which have been familiar. The noble Lord said, or implied at any rate, that the friendly tribes were wringing their hands at the notion of seeing us depart to the coast. I can only say that my information—and I suspect it is better than the noble Lord's—is precisely in the opposite direction. Of one thing I am quite certain, that no suggestion of any appeal for us to stay reached us in any shape or form.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: There has not been time.
THE EARL OF CREWE: The noble Lord says there has not been time. It is quite evident that if such appeals had been made to the officers there, they would have held their hand and informed us of the fact. On the contrary, I think that it is undoubtedly
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the case—I do not say there may not be individuals who would have preferred us to remain—that the great majority of the tribes in the Protectorate are not sorry that we are retiring in this way. They prefer, as I have said, to be left to manage their own affairs. The noble Lord asked me one or two definite questions. He asked about General De Brath. The noble Lord was in error as to the time at which General De Brath was communicated with. It was not before the Mission of Sir Reginald Wingate and Slatin Pasha. But there was an idea at one time of employing General De Brath to carry out the work which has since been carried out by Sir William Manning, and in the event the task was entrusted to Sir William Manning and not to General De Brath. Neither was it the case that when we asked Sir Reginald Wingate and Slatin Pasha to be good enough to go and make the inquiry, which they did, we had then decided that this withdrawal could now be carried into effect. It was in order to bring fresh and experienced minds to bear on the possibility of that policy that we asked Sir Reginald Wingate to go.
The noble Lord asks why we have not published the report of Sir Reginald Wingate. The noble Lord knows as much about confidential reports as I do, and he is well aware that when a special inquiry is made in such a manner as that, it is frequently impossible to publish the terms of the report. I do not say that there are not parts of it which might be printed, but I do not think it would be desirable to do so. I do not think it would be fair to the authors of the report to do so, because the most valuable parts of it are undoubtedly of a confidential character and such as I should not be prepared in fairness to them to print. But I can say this, that the result of their report was such as to impress upon my mind and upon the mind of the Government the uselessness and the impossibility of attempting to maintain the present state of things; and from that point of view I do not hesitate to say that the mission of Sir Reginald Wingate helped us greatly in arriving at the conclusion at which we did arrive and upon which we are now acting.
I think I have dealt with most of the points raised by the noble Lord, but I should like to say this. All through the consideration of this most anxious and difficult question the cardinal point in our minds was that we must not leave the friendly tribes to be

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swept away by a hostile invasion by the Mullah, and if I had not been satisfied in my mind that an invasion of that kind could not take place I for one should not have agreed to the policy. But that is not to say that I suppose that, if we withdraw, a period of complete peace would settle down on the country and that inter-tribal fights of the kind which our presence, unfortunately, has done so little to prevent and raids of the kind which have taken place, would not continue to take place. It was evident that that was bound to be so. But we certainly felt that it was our duty to see that the tribes within our Protectorate were, so far as we could compass it, placed in a position of self-defence. There has been no question, as the noble Lord appears to think, of handing out rifles to people who cannot use them. A number of people in Somaliland now—too many I am afraid—are trained to the use of the rifle, and they will, I hope, find that the possession of those arms will enable them to hold their own in those fights which, as we are afraid, will from time to time take place; but there will be nothing like the great sweeping invasion which the noble Lord mentioned. The phrase he used was that the tribes were abandoned to the Mullah. Nothing of the kind. From the information we have, we regard it as out of the question. It is doubtful, I think, if at any time the Mullah would have undertaken a great sweeping invasion of that kind if he had been in a position to do it, and undoubtedly now he is weaker and the friendly tribes are stronger. I have only, in conclusion, to say this—
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: Could the noble Earl tell us about the policy at the places on the coast?
THE EARL OF CREWE: I beg the noble Lord's pardon. We are holding Berbera, Bulhar, and Zeila. It has been among those on the spot a question as to whether it was desirable to hold Bulhar and Zeila. As at present advised, my own opinion is that it would not be wise to give up the retention of a small garrison at both those ports. The noble Lord will understand that I say that without prejudice to what decision may be reached on further inquiry, but at present the three ports and not the one only, are being held. What, in conclusion, I desire to say is this. We find that the policy of occupation and administration has, in our opinion, altogether broken down. We have not really succeeded in protecting
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the tribes against raids on their stock, although we have gone to great expense—last year we spent something like £100,000—in endeavouring to do so. The two possible policies are those of a great military re-occupation of the country and of the withdrawal to the coast which we have undertaken. What I want to impress upon noble Lords is this, that if at any time it is desirable to carry out the former policy, to bring a great force of 8,000 or 10,000 men to sweep the whole country to its borders, you will be in practically no worse position for doing that now than you would be if we had held on to the posts in the interior. The immense amount of transport required for an expedition of that kind and the great preparations which have to be made would not be practically helped by the retention of these small military posts, with, say, half a battalion of men and some stores at one and the other. Therefore, if the noble Lord's melancholy prognostication is right, and some day you desire to send a great military expedition there, you will be practically in very much the same position as if you had decided upon that course a year ago. That, I think, is an important point to bear in mind, because I regard this whole proceeding as a piece of military strategy or policy or whatever you may please to call it—not in the least as a great political event, and only so far political because the attempts at a political administration of the country have in our opinion broken down.
I am sorry that the noble Lord spoke precisely in the terms he did. He was in the dilemma which befalls eloquent orators from time to time, that he could not denounce us as he did for our conduct without helping to do some of the mischief which he particularly wished to avoid. If a skilled speaker like the noble Lord, standing at the Table of this House, accuses His Majesty's Government of base desertion of friendly tribes, of the abandonment of those to whom we are bound by ties of honour, and of a general course of action which is a disgrace to the Empire—if a noble Lord does that, there is some risk that those to whom that point of view had not occurred before may take it from him. Therefore I wish that the noble Lord had not, as I say, couched his denunciation of us in quite so high a key, but had been content to approach the matter in a somewhat more moderate spirit. I can assure him that the whole question has been one of ceaseless thought and anxiety to us, and we have taken the course

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we have—a course which I absolutely deny involves any disgrace whatever to the Empire—in the belief that it was the only course open to us in relation to a country—and here I entirely agree with the noble Lord who spoke last—into which we went as we do sometimes, without thought of the consequences and without considering whether we were doing either ourselves or the inhabitants of the country any real service in taking the course we did. In our opinion it is time to put a stop to that, and I believe that in so doing we shall be supported by the sober public opinion of the country.
LORD LOVAT: My Lords, the noble Earl has called Lord Curzon to task for accusing the Government of deserting a number of friendly tribes in Somaliland. I fail to see that the noble Earl has in any way combated that statement. The noble Earl stated that he had persuaded himself that no sweeping invasion of the country was possible, but he failed to give us any reasons to justify that opinion. So far as we know, since the withdrawal was effected 800 friendlies have been killed. Well, that is a good start—
THE EARL OF CREWE: That is scarcely a fair way to put it. A fight took place in which a large number on both sides were killed. I cannot say what the numbers were, but to speak of that as a massacre or slaughter seems to me to be entirely contrary to the fact.
LORD LOVAT: I do not know how many men it is necessary should be killed in order to constitute a sweeping invasion. But, at all events, this is a pretty good start. We now learn that the Government are going to hold the three ports. That looks as if the position on the sea coast was not regarded with absolute calm. The noble Earl seemed to entirely leave out of the situation, or to deal with very cursorily, the intermediate policy as advocated by Captain Cordeaux on page 42 of the Blue-book. The noble Earl seemed to regard that as being an entirely impossible method of holding Somaliland, and he wished to make out that it was necessary to keep a large force of men in order to protect the cattle. I would point out that until the recent arrival of the Sirdar there had been no raiding at all, although Hargeisa was very lightly held. But since word got out that we were going to evacuate, the Dolbahanta
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and other friendly tribes have lost many lives and some 8,000 camels. Seeing that Captain Cordeaux has laid down that this intermediate policy is the most desirable to pursue—
THE EARL OF CREWE: He did nothing of the kind. The intermediate policy was the policy which we have been pursuing up to this time. I do not think the noble Lord will find anything in the Blue-book or anywhere else which implied that Captain Cordeaux regarded that as a policy which could be permanently pursued.
LORD LOVAT: Has Captain Cordeaux gone back upon that opinion? I can only go by his opinion as expressed on page 42 of the Blue-book.
THE EARL OF CREWE: At the time, yes.
LORD LOVAT: That policy seems to be a policy which met with success, and it involved no great expenditure of money or loss of life or of cattle to the inhabitants concerned. The point I want to get at is the attitude of the noble Earl towards these raided tribes themselves. He says there have been no appeals that we should remain. In 1885 we withdrew our garrison from a place not more than 150 or 200 miles from Hargeisa. I do not think there were any great shouts for those troops to remain, but within a few years of our withdrawal this district was twice invaded and no fewer than between ten and twelve thousand people were massacred. These Somalis are fully aware of what happened then, and that there is every chance that they will meet with the same fate at the hands of the very people who raided this district over twenty years ago. Under our protection these tribes have changed from a pastoral people to tillers of the soil. The result is that they have lost their habit of being fighting men, and in that respect are only a third of the value of the remaining Somalis who carry arms. They have built themselves houses and prospered under our œgis, and they will regard our taking away the troops as a gross betrayal. I know from personal experience that it is extremely difficult to teach any of the Somalis how to shoot, and the distribution of rifles among them is simply, as Lord Curzon pointed out, giving those guns away to be picked up by the Mullah on any day he may choose. Already 8,000 camels have gone from the one side, and the Dolbahanta have suffered the loss of 800 men.
THE EARL OF CREWE: Where does the noble Lord get his information about the 8,000 camels?
LORD LOVAT: I believe that is the number; and if the noble Earl will inquire he will find that the statement is correct.
THE EARL OF CREWE: The noble Earl is aware that figures which come from Somaliland have to be taken with considerable caution?
LORD LOVAT: I am quite aware of that. Then as regards our prestige, matters are not so satisfactory in the centre of Africa to-day that we can suffer this loss of prestige through the abandonment of friendly tribes. I do not know that we can say that in certain portions of the Soudan the condition is absolutely satisfactory. I do not suppose the fact of our withdrawing the whole of our garrison from Somaliland will cause these people to think that England is stronger to-day. Then how are we going to reconcile our attitude in Somaliland with the continual outcry we make over the question of the Congo? To my mind it is nearly a parallel case. I am sorry that we are not to have any information as to Captain Cordeaux's views on the situation to-day. Judging from what appears on page 42 of the Blue-book he favoured the intermediate policy, and as far as one can make out that policy has met with considerable success.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I do not want to make any mystery about Captain Cordeaux's views as far as I know them. I think I am representing them correctly when I say that he believed it would have been possible at one time to take a regular expedition against the Mullah without going to the enormous cost which others, and which I am bound to say we at home, conceive would be involved, and he desired, as the noble Lord sees from the Blue-book, that an intermediate policy should be carried out in the hope of the Mullah's power breaking down in the interval, of which there were signs of its doing. Although I have no right to speak as to Captain Cordeaux's opinion at this moment, I have no reason to suppose that he believes that the course we are taking is not practically the only course possible to us in the circumstances in the absence of a really active and forward policy.
LORD LAMINGTON: My Lords, one or two points require a little further elucidation. One has reference to the question raised by Lord Lovat in regard to our attitude towards the friendly tribes. The noble Earl opposite, at the beginning of his speech, said it would not have done to have promulgated beforehand that we intended to retire to the coast, and that it must be left to the officers on the spot to announce to the tribes that the action was to be taken and when it would be taken. Later on he remarked that there had been no objection raised on the part of the tribes or that no pronouncement to that effect had been made on the part of the officers. But, as Lord Curzon said, they have not had time to object. Then the noble Earl said that if the tribes had objected no doubt the officers on the spot would have reconsidered what action they should take. At one moment you are not going to give them any opportunity of expressing their views as to whether or not they want the protection continued, and at the next moment, according to the noble Earl, the officers on the spot would be in a position to reconsider the matter or to place it before the Government if the tribes did object to our leaving the country. I do not quite know which course it was intended by the Government should be adopted. But the strong point to my mind is that these are tribes with whom you have entered into definite treaties; yet you are not going to announce beforehand your intention of breaking these treaty undertakings. Why are they not to be given an opportunity of saying whether the treaties should be maintained or not? The noble Earl does safeguard the position to this extent, that he says that if the officers on the spot in making the announcement found that the tribes did object then those officers would be in a position to reconsider what action should be taken. That seems to me to be rather contradictory.
I think one very serious point is the fact that we are not to have the views of Sir Reginald Wingate and Slatin Pasha. I can quite understand that where issues connected with foreign countries are involved these reports are confidential, but a report of this character has not those elements of seriousness and of danger. It surely could only deal with the relative position between ourselves and these tribes in Somaliland. Why, therefore, are we not to be informed of the opinions

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of Sir Reginald Wingate? The noble Earl stated that His Majesty's Government were convinced of the uselessness of maintaining the present state of things. He did not say that was the opinion of Sir Reginald Wingate, but only that that was the Government's deduction founded on the report of that gentleman. But what we should like to know is what Sir Reginald Wingate's opinion was on the question of retirement. The noble Earl challenged Lord Curzon with being well known for an aggressive policy.
THE EARL OF CREWE: The word I used was "forward" policy—a less offensive word, I think.
LORD LAMINGTON: But that is a very different thing from retiring from a position which you have already gained and in connection with which you have entered into treaty arrangements with other people, especially when your withdrawal places those people in a position of great disadvantage.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, the noble Earl opposite began his observations by a criticism on the speech of my noble friend behind me which was, I think, somewhat instructive. He took exception to the terms of my noble friend's Motion, and said that it was quite erroneous to suggest that anything which can be properly described as the evacuation of the Somaliland Protectorate by His Majesty's Government was in contemplation or in progress. The noble Earl explained that there was no question of evacuation—it was merely "coastal concentration"—and that we were going to retain Berbera, Zeila, and Bulhar; and the noble Earl seems to think that retaining these three ports is the same thing as retaining your hold on the Somaliland Protectorate. I can assure him that, in the view of those most familiar with the subject, that is very far indeed from being the case.
Then the noble Earl rather deprecated the warmth and energy of my noble friend's language when he depicted the results which are likely to follow from the evacuation of the Protectorate; and he suggested that those remarks might have a more unfortunate effect out of doors. I am afraid that I must point out that no words that can be used in this House by my noble friend or by anyone
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else are likely to have anything like the effect in Somaliland or in the regions adjoining Somaliland of the mere bald announcement which no doubt has by this time flown over the whole of the country—that it is the intention of His Majesty's Government to retire from the Protectorate.
I do not suppose that there are many of us who look back with entire satisfaction to the history of our relations with Somaliland. The noble Earl spoke of liabilities which we incur without thought of the consequences. The noble Earl was rather hard, I think, upon his own predecessors in title, because the Protectorate of Somaliland was assumed by Mr. Gladstone's Government in the year 1885, and I think it would be hardly just to describe that obligation as having been incurred without cause and in a thoughtless manner.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I think perhaps I ought to explain. I do not say that the Government of 1885 may not have made mistakes like all other Governments, but what I consider was an unfortunate commitment was the attempt to introduce into Somaliland what is known as the policy of "peaceful penetration" and direct administration of the country rather than adopting the policy followed in regard to the hinterland of Aden, where the people are allowed to govern themselves.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: People even ask why we should ever have gone to Somaliland at all. I was looking a few hours ago at a somewhat out-of-date atlas in the Library of your Lordships' House, and I observed that there was a legend inscribed on the Somali Protectorate running as follows, "Myrrh, frankincense and other aromatics." I do not think it has ever entered anyone's head to go to Somaliland for anything so attractive. But I have heard that we had an excuse for going there because the Protectorate produced mutton for the garrison at Aden. That was to some extent a substantial argument, but the real reason why we went there—and I think it is much better to say these things quite frankly—was that we could not afford to let anyone else go there.
At the time when Mr. Gladstone's Government undertook the Protectorate a great débâcle was proceeding in Egypt. There was much activity on the part of several Powers

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which were engaged in staking out claims for themselves in different parts of the world, and we, it seems to me very properly, came to the conclusion that we could not afford to allow any foreign Power to possess the seaboard opposite the great Imperial stronghold of Aden, and for that reason the Protectorate was assumed. It is quite true that our interests lay mainly on the seaboard, but it can be easily imagined how difficult it became to restrict our activity absolutely to the seaboard itself. And the fact remains that the Government of the day—I do not desire to treat this subject in any way from a Party point of view, but it was the same Government that assumed the Protectorate—thought it their duty to enter into these treaties with some of the loyal tribes. My noble friend quoted from memory, and I think not inaccurately, the text of one of these treaties. I happen to have it by me. May I read the actual words?
"The British Government is desirous of maintaining and strengthening relations of peace and friendship with the tribes, and in compliance with their wish undertakes to extend to them and to the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress."
Those words were surely not mere idle words, nor could they have been so interpreted by those who were aware of their existence. They seem to me to be entirely inconsistent with the theory that we had no liabilities in those days extending beyond the coast line.
Another reason which led us away from the coast was that it became necessary to delimit the boundaries of our spheres of influence with France and Italy; and that happened which almost always must happen in such cases. If you exclude other people from a certain area, in spite of yourself you assume responsibilities for that which takes place within the area from which other people are excluded. The old policy in those days, unless I very much misunderstand it, was a policy based upon excluding the influence of other Powers from the Protectorate, upon keeping open the principal trade routes within a reasonable distance of the ports, and affording to the friendly tribes protection consistent with the terms of the treaties of 1885. The whole situation however was, of course, entirely altered by the appearance on the scene of the Mullah. We might very well have rubbed alone on the old lines
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but for that. But when the Mullah appeared on the scene and raided the whole country, and even, as the noble Earl knows, threatened Berbera itself, our hands were forced, and we were compelled to do more than we had done before. That, I think, explains the point dealt with by my noble friend Lord Harris, who mentioned that there had been a certain development of our policy subsequently to the period in which the Government of Bombay had been charged with the administration of Somaliland. It was entirely in consequence of the appearance of the Mullah that those disastrously expensive operations took place which occurred in the years 1901, 1902, and 1903, operations which ended with General Egerton's success at Jidballi—a success which we all then hoped would put an end, at any rate for a considerable time, to the mischievous activity of the Mullah.
The noble Earl told the House that at that time the policy of the then Government, of which I had the honour to be a member, did not differ greatly from the policy which His Majesty's Government have in view at the present time. I am afraid I must tell the noble Earl that the difference was rather greater than he supposes. I have some recollection, and some knowledge based upon documents, of the policy which was in the contemplation of the Cabinet in 1904. What were the principal points in that policy? In the first place, we sent out General Swaine, who had a special knowledge of the tribes, with instructions to take charge of the Protectorate, and to arm and organise the tribes in such a manner as to render them able to protect themselves "after a time." I lay stress upon those words, because that clearly indicated that we conceived it would take a considerable period of time to accustom the tribes to the idea of taking care of their own safety. It was at that moment that we began to give arms to the tribes, which until then had been refused arms on the ground that we were precluded from allowing arms to pass into their hands under various international agreements with which the noble Earl is acquainted. In the next place, the principal caravan routes were to be kept open, there was to be a moderate subsidy given to the tribes, and, what is most important, we contemplated the retention of a nucleus of Regulars at

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Berbera, while two battalions of Indian troops were to remain for the present at any rate at Bohotleh. Unless I am greatly mistaken that is a correct description of the policy of the Government of 1904, and it seems to me to differ materially from the policy which has been described to us this evening by the noble Earl opposite.
THE EARL OF CREWE: May I ask a question? The noble Marquess mentions the retention of some Indian troops at Bohotleh. That was not intended to be a permanent arrangement?
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: No.
THE EARL OF CREWE: Except for that I confess the noble Marquess has, if I may say so, given a description more or less of what we are doing at this moment.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Then am I to understand that the principal caravan routes are to be kept open, and that a British officer is to have charge of the Protectorate and to arm and organise the tribes so as to render them able to protect themselves?
THE EARL OF CREWE: That is what we hope has been done—that the tribes are now in a condition to defend themselves against outside attack.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The operation must have been a wonderfully rapid one.
THE EARL OF CREWE: A great many of the tribes have been armed. Ever since the date of which the noble Marquess is speaking there has been a distinct tribal Militia. I cannot say it has been entirely successful, but so far as the arming of tribes is concerned that has gone on—I do not say on a very large scale—ever since.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The noble Earl may take it that the policy of 1904 was based on the assumption that although we could not give complete protection to the tribes—because there never could have been any intention of following every herd of cattle that goes to drink at a watering place to see that somebody does not raid it—we did not contemplate a retirement from the
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obligations imposed upon us by the treaties of 1885.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I do understand that at that time it was contemplated that there should be no troops of any kind at the coast, that the tribes should be encouraged to defend themselves, and that the keeping open of the caravan routes was not to be carried out by troops in the service of His Majesty but by the tribes themselves.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The best way in which I can put it is this. I remember distinctly that we had before us then the policy of what is now called coastal concentration, and after considering it we deliberately put it on one side. Of that I have no doubt whatever. We did so in great measure because we believed that the effects of such a policy upon our position in Abyssinia and in the Soudan would be most unfortunate. I remember, indeed, that we consulted Lord Cromer on the subject—I regret that the noble Lord is not in his place—and that he expressed an opinion adverse to the policy of retirement.
Then I turn to the policy of His Majesty's Government. I am not at all sure that I ought to use the word policy in the singular, because, as far as I understand these Papers, the Government have had two policies before them and that within a recent time. The policy which we find described in the Blue-book, page 62, is a policy for the gradual and cautious reduction of the military force, and there is that most remarkable passage—I am not sure whether my noble friend quoted it—in which the Colonial Office informed General Manning that—
"the evacuation is not to be carried out unless and until the friendly tribes can reasonably be said to be in a position to hold their own against the Mullah."
It was quoted a few days ago by the representative of the Colonial Office in the other House of Parliament. Is that the present policy of His Majesty's Government?
THE EARL OF CREWE: Undoubtedly.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Does the noble Earl maintain that at this moment, when we are receiving accounts of bodies of friendly tribesmen being cut up, these tribes can reasonably be said to be in a position to hold their own?
THE EARL OF CREWE: I did not wish to waste time, but perhaps I had better read the telegrams. In a telegram, dated March 18, and received in the Colonial Office on the 20th of that month, Sir W. Manning stated that he had received information that the Mijjertein Isa and Mahmoud on March 7 raided the Mullah's live stock, capturing 1,000 camels near Halin, killing many dervishes, and capturing twenty-three rifles. That was a success. Then comes the failure of which the noble Lord spoke. In a further telegram dated March 29, Sir W. Manning stated that he had on that day received information of an attack by the dervishes on a party of the Yahelli combination of Hadega, that the friendlies were surprised by a large force, and that there were many killed on both sides. He stated further that the friendlies had retired to Eil Dab, and that among the killed were two chiefs. That is not quite the same thing as the sort of massacre which was described in the newspapers.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I did not refer to a massacre. I desire to impress upon the House that the evacuation which is taking place is something different from that gradual and cautious operation which is contemplated in the Papers on the Table of your Lordships' House. We have pressed for information as to the opinion of those who may properly be described as experts in connection with this question. The noble Earl gave us, and we are grateful to him, the opinion of Captain Cordeaux. If I did not misunderstand it, I think we might claim Captain Cordeaux as an advocate of what I think my noble friend behind me described as the intermediate policy as distinguished from the abrupt and radical policy which His Majesty's Government are pursuing. Then we have asked, and asked in vain, for the opinions of Sir Rudolph Slatin and Sir Reginald Wingate. The noble Earl gave us a shred of information on that point. He told us that their reports impressed on his mind the necessity of evacuation, but what we should like to know is whether that was the course advocated by these two distinguished officers themselves. That is quite another matter so it seems to me, because the noble Earl, with all his knowledge of administration, will not, I think, claim to be a military authority in regard to questions of this sort.
Then with regard to the tribes, I agree with my noble friend behind me that the
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moment for this operation is ill-chosen. We have it in evidence that the Mullah, I think the expression was, is not the same Mullah that he formerly was. He has evidently lost a considerable amount of prestige, and it seems to me that if ever there was a moment when time was upon our side and when we ought to have conducted the operation of withdrawal with at any rate a decent amount of deliberation, such a moment had arrived in the history of Somaliland. I am bound to say that while I deplore the effect of the decision of His Majesty's Government insofar as the inhabitants of Somaliland themselves are concerned, I deplore it much more on account of the remoter consequences which in our belief it is likely to have. It is a step which will certainly have been watched and taken note of over the whole of that part of Africa, and I am much mistaken if its effect will not be to strike a serious blow at the authority and good name of this country.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, after the exhaustive speech of the noble Marquess to which we have just listened it is, of course, unnecessary for me to attempt to cover any large extent of ground; but there are one or two small points as to which I have been challenged on which reply seems necessary. One is a very small point which concerns nobody but myself. The noble Earl opposite accuses me of being a consistent and, I think he said, a foremost champion of the forward policy. I should like to put my reputation in that respect in the hands of the noble Viscount the Secretary of State for India who sits beside him. He is aware of the policy which the Government of which I was the head pursued in India, and he will agree that the last attribute that could possibly have been ascribed to that policy was that of forward.
THE EARL OF CREWE: The noble Lord mentioned that among the retirements we should have to pay for were those from Cabul and Chitral. That surprised me, because I thought he was in sympathy with the policy which prompted those retirements. I should have been the last to speak of his policy as forward until he made that remark.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I should like to recover my reputation in the estimation of the noble Earl. I said that Chitral and Afghanistan were cases where

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in the one instance the policy of evacuation favoured by the Government of the day had been abandoned by their successors, and we had been compelled to go back, and where in the other it would be rash to prophesy as to the future. However, that is neither here nor there. There is another small point of fact about which I should like to put myself straight. There has been some dispute as to what has happened as the direct consequence of this evacuation of the interior of Somaliland. There has been a little controversy as to what has occurred in the case of these unfortunate Dolbahanta. The noble Earl represents the matter as an ordinary incident of tribal warfare—that these people attacked the Mullah's force and secured some momentary advantage, and the Mullah's force attacked them in return and they were defeated. It really is very much more than that. These Dolbahanta are people whom we have always kept up as a buffer between the friendly tribes and the Mullah. The evacuation takes place, and the first thing the Mullah does is to fall upon these people in our sphere of influence.
THE EARL OF CREWE: That is not so. There has been a good deal of desultory fighting between the Mullah and the Dolbahanta for some time past. What really happened is that the Dolbahanta are now so well armed that they thought themselves strong enough to go and attack the Mullah.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I dare say my information comes from a source quite as good as the noble Earl's. The second case occurred on the other side of the frontier. It is the fact that as soon as the Ogaden tribes on that portion of the frontier heard that Sir Reginald Wingate was coming out—and they knew pretty well with what general instructions he was coming—they started raiding the tribes in our area.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I am sorry to again interrupt the noble Lord. But may I ask how he knows that the Ogaden tribes knew what Sir Reginald Wingate's instructions were, and, even if they did, how it would have helped, because when Sir Reginald Wingate went out no instructions were given for withdrawal to him or to anybody else?
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I do not want to carry on a dispute across the floor of the House. But the intention of His Majesty's Government to retire has
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been for some time anticipated and known in Somaliland.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I think not.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: I am speaking on the authority of those who have recently been in the country, who have just come from the country and have had contact with the tribes to which I refer. I am assured by them that these incidents have occurred since the intention of His Majesty's Government to retire became known. I mention it in illustration of the argument that the news of evacuation, and still more the effect of evacuation, have already had consequences which we should all deplore. One other word about the tribes. The noble Earl tells us that the tribes have always been armed. I believe he is not altogether correct in that statement.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I did not say that the tribes have been armed in the sense that every man, or anything like every man, has been armed, but a certain number of them have had arms undoubtedly.
LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON: No, the fact is that there has been a small tribal Militia. Not only have the tribes not been armed but we have deliberately refused to allow them to obtain arms, and it is due to this that they are in the impotent position that they are incapable of withstanding the Mullah or anybody else. Then the noble Earl said that his opinion is that the tribes wish us to go. I can assure him, from information derived from those who are in direct contact with the tribes, that that is not the case. So far from the tribes wishing us to go they are dismayed at the announcement of our intended withdrawal. The condition of affairs as depicted by the noble Earl is not really in accordance with the facts of the case.
One other point. The noble Earl seemed to think that of the three policies about which we have been talking—the policy of an expedition, with which none of us would agree; the policy of evacuation, which is the policy of His Majesty's Government; and the intervening policy, that recommended by the Commissioner on the spot—the third of these was an undesirable policy because it only consisted of occasional movements of troops to prevent raids, and because it might be attended with some idea of extending ordinary civil administration

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in the country. Lot me assure the noble Earl that that is not the case. So far from these troops being employed for occasional excursions to prevent raiding, what really occurred was that at the places where the British officer and his troops were stationed there was a state of settled order and peace, and on the Western part of Somaliland not a single case has occurred in which our friendly tribes have been raided. That is what their influence has effected. As regards civil administration, no more than the noble Earl would I recommend for a moment introducing among these wild nomad tribes what we would call ordinary civil administration. These officers never did that, and no one would argue that they should. What our officers did was to compose inter-tribal quarrels, and in this way they were effective in preventing raids; and by withdrawing them now the peace of the interior is gone.
The noble Earl told us that this was not a great political event. It may not be to him
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or to His Majesty's Government or to any one in this country. But I do venture to say that it is a great political event to the people out there to whom we are referring. I cannot help noticing that the noble Earl has refrained from saying one word about the treaty obligations under which we are placed. He has not met in any way the charge that we are breaking the ancient pledges we have entered into with these tribes, and he has said nothing as to the effect that may be exercised upon our prestige in the neighbouring parts of Africa. The impression left on my mind by the debate is that there is even less to be said for the case of the Government than I had inferred, and that the policy of evacuation, even if it be a policy of evacuation only of the interior, is likely to be attended with all the unfortunate consequences which I have ventured to anticipate. I beg to withdraw my Motion for Papers.
House adjourned at a quarter past Seven o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.