Lords Sitting of 7 July 1909

CARDIFF CORPORATION BILL.
Report from His Majesty's Attorney-General received, and ordered to lie on the Table.
BRISTOL UNIVERSITY BILL. [H.L.]
  WAKEFIELD CORPORATION BILL. [H.L.]
  Commons Amendments considered, and agreed to.

  LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY BILL.
  CARDIFF CORPORATION BILL.
  GREENOCK CORPORATION BILL.
  GLAMORGAN WATER BOARD BILL.
  OXFORD AND DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL.
  EDGWARE AND HAMPSTEAD RAILWAY BILL.
  Moved, That the order made on the 18th day of May last, That no Private Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after the 30th day of June next be dispensed with, and that the Bills be now read 2a; agreed to, and Bills read 2a accordingly.

  EDGWARE AND HAMPSTEAD RAILWAY BILL.
  CARDIFF CORPORATION BILL.
  GREENOCK CORPORATION BILL.
  GLAMORGAN WATER BOARD BILL.
  Committed: The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

OXFORD AND DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL.
Committed for Tuesday next.

GLAMORGAN WATER BOARD BILL.
Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the City of London (Street Traffic) Bill and other Bills, do form the Select Committee for the consideration of
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the Glamorgan Water Board Bill; read, and agreed to: All Petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the Petitioners praying to be heard by Counsel against the Bill to be heard as desired, as also Counsel for the Bill.

EDUCATION (SCOTLAND) FUND.
Petitions for an Address to His Majesty, praying him to withhold his assent to the Minute of the Council of Education in Scotland, dated 3rd June, 1909, of the Provost, &c., of the Burgh of Partick; — School Board for the parish of Clarkston; — Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (IRELAND) PRO- VISIONAL ORDER (No. 3) BILL.
Moved, That the order made on the 18th day of May last, That no Provisional Order Confirmation Bill brought from the House of Commons shall be read a second time after the 30th day of June next be dispensed with, and that the Bill be now read 2a; agreed to; Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed.

THE TERRITORIAL FORCE.
THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH rose to ask His Majesty's Government whether the Territorial Force is intended to be able to meet an invasion in the absence of the striking force, or only a raid; and to move for Papers.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in putting this Question to my noble friend and in moving my Motion, I have no intention or desire to occupy much of your Lordships' time. I do not think it can be said with justice or truth that there is any assembly more well disposed towards, and who have done more by individual action for, the Territorial Force than your Lordships' House, and therefore my Question cannot in any way be considered as casting suspicion upon either the success of or our good wishes towards the Territorial Force. But it is undoubtedly true that within the last eighteen months the purpose for which the Territorial Force was created has assumed a much more ambitious character.
My right hon. friend the Secretary of State for War recently made two very

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important statements in regard to what he considers to be the purpose of the Territorial Force. In explaining the Army Estimates in February, 1908, my right hon. friend said—
"The Territorial Army is designed to free the Regular Army from the necessity of remaining in this island, to fulfil the functions of home defence, and to permit greater freedom to the Navy";
and speaking at General Baden-Powell's lecture at the Royal United Service Institution in the autumn of last year he went so far as to say that—
"The essence of the duty of a Territorial Force is to protect against possible invasion, and in that way to render invasion unlikely."
My noble friend the Under-Secretary of State for War, in a speech at Warwick Castle in March of this year, went even further than that, for he is reported in The Times to have used these words—
"The nation had placed the grave responsibility upon the Territorial Army of undertaking, if need be, the defence of the country against a foreign invasion, even in the absence of the Regular Army upon foreign service."
Now I should like to ask my noble friend, if, as I presume to be the case, he is correctly reported, whether he was speaking for himself or for the War Office, because it does appear from these statements that the purport of the Territorial Force has assumed a much more ambitious character.
The view when I was at the War Office—a view, if I may say so, to a considerable extent inherited from the theory which was expounded by Mr. Balfour in May, 1906—was that granted we possessed command of the sea invasion was not probable, and that what we had to protect ourselves against was not invasion, but a raid. If the view of the War Office now is that the Territorial Force is designed to resist invasion it seems to me that we have cause for very considerable anxiety, and for this reason. I think there is now very little support for the theory which Mr. Balfour expounded in 1906. I also have a shrewd suspicion—once bitten twice shy—that that will be the first and also the last occasion upon which the Committee of Imperial Defence will make any official statement to Parliament upon this matter. Within very recent time considerable and material facts have occurred. The debate of last November brought home to the people of this country that, as Lord Roberts said on that occasion,
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a serious invasion of this country is not only possible but probable. I would remind your Lordships that that is not the opinion only of Lord Roberts, perhaps the highest authority we have at the present day, but also the opinion carefully stated by Sir John Ardagh before the Norfolk Commission. Within a very short time—and I would observe that this is no question of party politics that we are discussing—within a very short time the whole weight of military opinion has come round to the view that an invasion of this country is within the region of probability.
But, apart from that, there are other influences and other facts which we have to bear in mind. First and foremost, it would be idle for any one to say that at the present moment the country has that confidence in the Navy which it had a few years ago. I am not referring to the personnel; but it is pretty clear that without Colonial assistance we cannot maintain the two-Power standard—I care not in which particular way you choose to read the two-Power standard. But, even with Colonial assistance, we can hardly expect the Colonies, human nature being what it is, to submit to a condition of things in which they are to provide Dreadnoughts in order to police the English Channel. I feel, and I think it is the general feeling outside, that what we have to confront is an attack upon the heart and the centre of the Empire itself. And even supposing that with the assistance of the Colonies we could maintain the two-Power standard, I think it is hardly conceivable that when we were engaged in a really serious war those Colonial contributions in the way of battleships would not be required by the Colonies themselves to protect their own shores. I think, also, that when statements are made as to the extreme difficulty of landing troops it ought to be remembered that in 1854 the Allies in the Crimea, in the old days of row-boats, landed in a single day 52,000 men and eighty-three guns, 300 miles from our own base and only thirty miles from the Russian base at Sebastopol, without a single catastrophe. I think that is a solid and substantial fact which ought to be borne in mind.
I see that Lord Haversham has a Notice on the Paper in which he attempts to raise the question of finance. I do not think, with regard to the protection of this country from invasion, that the question of cost is of first-rate or even of second-rate importance. We must be secure against invasion at all

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cost. As has been pointed out before by experts in the matter, to protect this country by the Navy beyond a certain point is far more costly than by a combination of both the Army and the Navy. In dealing with naval finance you think in millions. A battle ship costs about £1,250,000. The whole cost of the Territorial Army at the present moment is only £3,500,000. It seems to me that if you could stiffen and strengthen your Territorial Force by Regulars or otherwise you would get more results for your money in that direction than by putting the whole of your eggs into the naval basket, and practically relying entirely on the Navy.
The question I wish specially to ask is this—Have the Government provided for the contingency of the striking force being abroad? Have we yet had it stated by any independent military authority that in the case of a serious war—and that is a contingency we are bound to consider and provide against—the Territorial Force would not in those circumstances have to confront an invasion by picked Continental troops, and to confront them within a few weeks of the commencement of the war? It is admitted that the Territorial Force is not a competent force for that purpose on its peace training. That is admitted. It was not admitted as regards the Volunteers and the Yeomanry, though it might have been, but we have, as it were, a statutory and legal declaration to that effect in regard to the Territorials, because they are to receive their six months training when the national emergency arises. That being so, is it not certain that with the present feeling in the country, which would probably be intensified in the case of a great national emergency, the striking force would never be allowed to leave unless the country was satisfied that there was a sufficient force at home to afford protection against invasion? Where then is your striking force?
It is, of course, impossible to provide against every conceivable contingency, for the dangers of the British Empire are of an unusual and extraordinary character. The Empire is so scattered that nobody can tell where or at what time grave difficulties may arise. Suppose the striking force for imperative reasons had to go to India. That would probably be the time when a Continental Power wishing to get something from this country would bring pressure to bear, and if we had our striking force
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in India, or at the Cape, or elsewhere, I maintain that in the present uncertainty and with the great increase in ship-building going on in foreign countries which alters the balance of naval power in Europe, we should be in a difficult and critical position. I am anxious to know what is the position which the Government assumes with regard to this matter. We know that it would not be so easy to arouse enthusiasm for recruiting if the men in the Territorial Force were told that they were only to protect this country against raids or to perform garrison duties; but, whatever may be said by those in authority, I do not believe that the people of this country would ever be satisfied that the striking force should go abroad unless they felt that they had a sufficient Army at home. Therefore in order to make your striking force a real potent striking force you must create security in the mind of the British public that they have an Army at home of such a character as can meet foreign troops and meet them in the event of a naval disaster; for, as the Secretary of State has said and as all tacticians know, there always will be a great element of uncertainty and risk in naval warfare. For that reason I beg to ask my noble friend whether the Territorial Force is intended to be able to meet an invasion in the absence of the striking force.
As to my Motion for Papers, in the special Army Order of September 12, 1906, which allotted to the General Staff the direction of general policy in Army matters and which went into considerable detail, the function of the General Staff was described as the training and preparation of the Army for war. Surely we have now some right to ask that we should have presented to us the opinion of the General Staff. A very interesting Report has been published on the Forces of the Crown, but, like many Reports of that kind, it is more remarkable for its omissions than for its commissions. There is one thing conspicuously absent. Although it touches very gingerly on the Territorial Army, it does not state what we want to know—namely, what are the functions of the Territorial Army, and whether that Army is efficient and fitted for the functions which it has to perform. We should like to know the opinion of the General Staff upon this matter. We should like to hear from them whether they consider that foreign troops may not confront the Territorials during the first few weeks of a war. We should like to know whether

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they say that the training would be adequate. Let us bear this in mind, that to protect this country against invasion it is not men but soldiers we want. You cannot have a better example of the comparative inefficiency and inutility of hastily-raised levies, inspired, it may be, by the highest patriotism, and by the greatest pluck, than what happened during the Franco-German War.
I should like to ask my noble friend for certain figures, and if he cannot give them this afternoon I hope he will endeavour to do so before next Monday's debate. Can he state the number of Regulars who would be left in this country after the striking force had gone abroad? Can he give the number of Regulars who would so be left of not less than one year's service? And can he also state the number of officers on the active list who would be left in this country—I expressly wish the noble Lord to exclude what are called the Reserve of Officers? If my noble friend cannot give me the precise figures I should be glad if he would give the practical numbers. I thank your Lordships for the attentive hearing you have given me, and I beg to put the Question and move the Motion which stand in my name.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Papers relating to the Territorial Force.—(The Earl of Portsmouth.)
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (LORD LUCAS): My Lords, my noble friend has put a number of questions which are difficult to answer because he has left out of account a thing of which we, in everything we have said or thought on the subject o f the Territorial Force, have always taken the greatest account; and that is the question of the time that must elapse before we can consider the Territorial Force capable of meeting highly-trained troops in anything like equal numbers in the field.
My noble friend referred to what Mr. Haldane had said and to what I had said, and asked me to explain a sentence which he quoted from my speech at Warwick. I think, as far as my recollection serves me, that I qualified the statement that the Territorial Force might be called upon to meet unassisted an army of foreign invaders by the observation that that was an eventual possibility which the Territorial Force must contemplate. We have always considered
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that the Force must have a longer period of embodied training than it gets under peace conditions. That is well worth taking into account, not only when considering the Territorial Force as organised at present, but also as under the different system we are going to discuss next Monday. We have always said that there must be a considerable period of embodied training before the Territorial Force is fit to take the field. It is impossible to answer the question unless that consideration is weighed. If the noble Earl asks whether the Territorial Force ever will be capable of meeting an invasion, the answer certainly would be Yes.
THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: I want to know now—at the present time.
LORD LUCAS: Then my answer to that is unhesitatingly No. The Territorial Force is not at present fit to meet anything like equally the most highly-trained Continental troops. That is bound to be the case. On the other hand, when the Territorial Force has had this period of embodied training, there is no doubt that it would be as good as any other troops in the world for its purpose. I do not understand my noble friend when he says that the position is changed since he was at the War Office. We have not changed in the least in our view of what the Territorial Force is capable of. We have always taken the line that when considering the question of an invasion, the existence of the Navy and of all our military forces must be taken into account, and I do not see what useful purpose can be served by discussing the safety of this country from invasion from the point of view solely of the efficiency of the Territorial Force.
I think, too, that it would be useless to attempt to answer my noble friend in regard to the point he raised dealing with the absence from this country of the striking force. The question of how our naval and military forces are disposed must be taken into consideration, and can be taken into consideration, only when the occasion arises—when the war takes place. My noble friend asks for the opinion of the General Staff upon the efficiency of the Territorial Force. I do not know that the General Staff is, from its formation, necessarily the right means of expressing an opinion of this sort. My noble friend will see, on reference to the Report of the Esher Committee, with which I know he is familiar,

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that special steps were taken for obtaining the highest possible military criticism upon the value and efficiency of our military forces. It was for that purpose that the Inspector-General was appointed; and if my noble friend wishes to have expert military opinion upon the efficiency of the Territorial Force, he cannot do better than consult the Return which has just been published, containing the report of Sir John French upon the inspections he has been making during the past few months. The other questions of my noble friend are, I think, precisely the same as those which have been asked previously, and to which I have three times replied to Lord Hardinge that I regret I am unable to give the answer.
LORD NEWTON: My Lords, I am somewhat reluctant to interfere in the domestic differences between the two noble Lords opposite, but the one thing which is comparatively clear is that the Territorial Army is at present distinctly the most mysterious force that has ever existed in the history of the civilised world. A large portion of last session, and, if I am not mistaken, a considerable portion of the previous one, was taken up by lengthy inquiries, directed principally from this side of the House, as to the objects and functions of the Territorial Force. To whom were those inquiries addressed? Why, to the noble Earl who has brought forward this Motion to-day. It was the noble Earl's duty to reply to those inquiries, and yet he calmly tells us now that he has not the least idea for what purpose the Territorial Force exists.
The speech of the noble Earl is, in my opinion, a great advance upon his previous performances, and if I had made it myself I do not know that I could have uttered sounder sentiments. In fact, were I of a conceited disposition I should almost be inclined to infer that the noble Earl had been studying some of the numerous speeches I myself have made on this particular subject. I think his speech may fairly be said completely to justify the opinion which I expressed regarding him last year—namely, that he was a person in whom much greater confidence could be placed than could be placed in his former chief the present Secretary of State for War. The noble Earl, at any rate, has seen the error of his ways and has been converted.
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With regard to the inquiries he has made of the noble Lord who represents the War Office, I am afraid that my noble friend cannot have been following our proceedings with the attention he usually bestows upon them, or he would have realised that there was no possibility of extracting an answer from the Government on this point. These questions are in the category of inconvenient questions. If you answer them you have to disclose very unpleasant and perturbing facts, and in such a case the invariable formula is that it is contrary to the public interest to give the information required.
But, however that may be and whatever may be the merits of the noble Earl's speech, it is hardly appropriate at this time to anticipate the important discussion which is to take place next Monday and Tuesday. If the noble Earl, however, desires to see the Territorial Force made really serviceable he is bound to support the Bill of the noble and gallant Earl, Lord Roberts. And if his intervention in debate has served no more useful purpose than that, I conceive it a distinct gain that the noble Earl, who only recently was one of the trusted officials of the War Office, has been converted to the justness and fairness of the views which I, in common with many noble Lords, have expressed during the past two or three years.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, I only want to ask a question of the noble Lord who represents the War Office. I understood him, in the course of his remarks, to refer the House to the recently issued report of the Inspector-General in regard to the present condition of the Territorial Force. I, like most of your Lordships, have read that Paper, but I did not succeed in finding any very complete account of the condition of the Territorial Force. Reference is made to a memorandum on the inspections of the Force carried out during the spring of the year, but when you come to details it appears that the Inspector-General was able to visit only the West Riding Territorial Division, upon which he comments in very favourable terms. That inspection was in the highest degree satisfactory and encouraging, but I do not gather that any other divisions of the Territorial Army have been inspected. Perhaps the noble Lord will set me right if I am wrong.
LORD LUCAS: At the top of page 21, at the commencement of Sir John French's memorandum on the inspections of the Territorial Force, he mentions his recent inspection of the Territorial divisions and mounted brigades. I forget the exact number which he had actually inspected at the time he wrote this memorandum, but they amounted to a considerable portion of the Territorial Force. He has been very hard at work most of the winter, and his memorandum is based on what he has seen of approximately one-half of the Force.
THE EARL OF PORTSMOUTH: My Lords, I was rather glad that the noble Marquess opposite, who had also read the report of the Inspector-General, had come to the conclusion, which I stated in my speech, that it is exceedingly niggardly in giving information as to the efficiency of the Territorial Force. My desire was —I am afraid I have not been able to elicit much from my noble friend on the point— to ascertain what is the purpose of the Territorial Force. My noble friend has told your Lordships that at present the Force is inefficient, but that it may be efficient after embodiment for six months. Whether the Force will have an opportunity to attain efficiency depends, therefore, upon the consideration and politeness of our opponents. I am sorry that the noble Lord cannot give any information as to the number of Regulars and the number of officers. I regret it for this reason, that when information of that kind is withheld the public inevitably draws the conclusion that the state of affairs is not satisfactory, and that produces a far greater feeling of distrust than if some approximate numbers were given which would have a very reassuring effect upon public opinion. In these circumstances I have no option but to withdraw my Motion.
Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

THE ARMY—NATIONAL SERVICE.
LORD HAVERSHAM: My Lords, I rise to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War whether he has seen the estimate of the numbers and cost involved under the scheme of training proposed by the National Service League which has just been published by the League, and whether he accepts this estimate; if not, whether he is in a position to give any official estimate
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of the cost of the scheme in question. I also move for Papers. I have not the slightest intention of in any way anticipating the important discussion which is to take place next week, but I think the information for which I ask is indispensable to an understanding of the question which will then be the subject of debate.
Moved, That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty for Memorandum on the published estimate of the cost of the scheme of training proposed by the National Service League.—(Lord Haversham.)
LORD LUCAS: In answer to my noble friend I should like to say that we do not in the least accept the published estimate of the National Service League. We have had prepared a criticism of it, and as I think it is important that your Lordships should have the criticism in good time before Monday's debate arrangements have been made that printed copies shall be in your Lordships' hands to-morrow. I have with me a certain number of advance proofs, and if any noble Lord cares to have one I shall be glad to supply it.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

CATTLE DRIVES IN IRELAND.
Moved, That there be laid before the House a Return showing the number of cattle drives during the years 1907 and 1908, and the first quarter of 1909, and showing the number of persons convicted or bound to the peace, and their occupations (The Viscount Hutchinson (E. Donoughmore)); agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

STAGE PLAYS (CENSORSHIP).
Commons Message considered (according to order)—Moved, That this House do concur in the Resolution communicated by the Commons: That it is expedient that a Joint Committee of Lords and Commons be appointed to inquire into the censorship of stage plays as constituted by the Theatres Act, 1843, and into the operations of the Acts of Parliament relating to the licensing and regulation of theatres and places of public entertainment, and to report any alterations of the law or practice which may appear desirable (The Lord Denman); agreed to; and a Message

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ordered to be sent to the Commons to acquaint them therewith.

IRELAND (CATTLE DRIVES).
Return respecting: Laid before the House (pursuant to order of this day), and to be printed. (No. 102.)

THE ARMY.
Memorandum respecting: Laid before the House (pursuant to Address of this day), and to be printed. (No. 101.)
House adjourned at twenty minutes past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, half-past Ten o'clock.