Lords Sitting of 8 August 1907

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
North Staffordshire Railway Bill.—The King's consent signified; and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
London County Council (Tramways and Improvements) Bill.—Read 3a, with the Amendments; a further Amendment made; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
Paisley Corporation Order Confirmation Bill.—Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

PETITIONS.
  BUTTER AND MARGARINE BILL.
  Petitions to be heard by Counsel for amendment of; of the Exeter Grocers' and Provision Dealers' Association; The Grocers' Association of Mullingar, Ireland; The Caerphilly and District Grocers' Association, comprising 50 members of the Trade; The Llandudno and District Grocers' Association; The Tynemouth and District Grocers' Association; read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
  MERCHANT SHIPPING (TONNAGE DEDUCTION FOR PROPELLING POWER) BILL.
  Petitions to be heard by Counsel against; of Newport Harbour Commissioners; and Port Talbot Railway and Docks Company; read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  COLONIES: ANNUAL.
  No. 534. Gold Coast (Report for 1906).
  BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES.
  Annual Report of proceedings under the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act, &c., &c., for the year 1906.
  POST OFFICE (PERU).
  Agreement between the Post Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Post Office of Peru, dated 22nd February, 1907, 3rd May, 1907.
  ALIENS ACT, 1905.
  Returns of alien passengers brought to the United Kingdom from ports in Europe or within the Mediterranean Sea during the three months ended 30th June, 1907; together with the number of expulsion orders made during that period requiring aliens to leave the United Kingdom.
  METEOROLOGY.
  Second Annual Report of the Meteorological Committee to the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, for the year ended 31st March, 1907.
  TRADE REPORTS: ANNUAL SERIES.
  No. 3888. Mexico. Presented (by Command), and ordered to lie on the Table.
  COUNTY COURTS.
  County Court Rules, 1907.
  PHARMACY (IRELAND) ACTS, 1875 AND 1890.
  Order in Council, dated 6th August, 1907, approving of a regulation made by the Pharmaceutical Society of Ireland. Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.
  DIVORCE BILLS.
  Return respecting: Laid before the House (pursuant to Order of 16th July last), and to be printed. (No. 163.)
  POST OFFICE SITES BILL.
  Amendment reported (according to order), and Bill to be read 3a To-mormow.

EVIDENCE (COLONIAL STATUTES) BILL.
THE EARL OF ELGIN: My Lords, I need only say a very few sentences in explanation of this Bill. It is brought in in order to remove a grievance which exists in the Colonies from the fact that at present Colonial laws are regarded in English Courts as foreign

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laws for purposes of proof, and have to be proved by the oral evidence of an expert. This inconvenience was mentioned by the Governor-General of the Commonwealth in 1905 to the late Government, in a case in which a man had been acquitted in England of embezzling his wife's money on the ground of absence of evidence that the Married Woman's Property Act had been adopted in Victoria, and the Ministry of the Commonwealth, through the Governor-General, drew the attention of His Majesty's then Government to the case, and to the advisability of its being considered whether legislation should not be undertaken to remove this inconvenience. The matter was under consideration by the late Government, I believe, but no Bill had been introduced when they left office. The present Government has therefore had the matter before them, and we have introduced the Bill to which I have now to ask your Lordships to give a Second Heading. This Bill provides that copies of all Colonial and Indian laws shall be received as evidence in English Courts if purporting to be printed by the Government printer without further proof, and makes it felony to print, or to tender in evidence, a false copy of any such law. Your Lordships will observe that this applies to laws passed in British Possessions, and the term "British Possessions" is defined in the Bill to mean any part of His Majesty's dominions exclusive of the United Kingdom, and, where parts of those dominions are under both a central and a local legislature, shall include both all parts under the central legislature and each part under a local legislature. But there is a proviso also in the Bill that His Majesty may by Order in Council extend the provisions to Cyprus and other Protectorates so that they may have the advantage of them. This Bill has been presented in the other House of Parliament and has been passed without objection. I may mention that it was considered by a Standing Committee of the House, and the only material alteration that was made in it was an alteration in a penalty that appears in one of the clauses of the Bill. Under these circumstances I ask your Lordships to give it a Second Reading.
Moved "That the Bill be now read 2a"—(The Earl of Elgin.)
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: It seems to me that no possible harm can be done by the Bill. I confess that some part of what the noble Lord says the Bill accomplishes appears to me to be unnecessary, but I presume he has had advice on the subject, and that he has decided that it is necessary in all the respects he spoke of. But I should have thought that in dealing with a Commonwealth case it was not necessary to prove what the Commonwealth law was, because the Court of Appeal is sitting in theory as a Commonwealth Court.
LORD ALVERSTONE: My Lords, I should like to say that I think there is a real necessity for the Bill which the noble Lord has introduced. Only a short time ago there was a very important case before us in which there was not the smallest doubt of the existence of certain Australian statutes, but the law officers of Crown were obliged to admit that they could not rely on those statutes because they had not got formal proof of what the law was. I am quite certain that in the interests of justice it is necessary that the Bill which has been introduced to your Lordships should be passed.
On Question, Motion agreed to. Bill read 2a, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Monday next.

BUTTER AND MARGARINE BILL.
House in Committee (according to order).
[The Earl of ONSLOW in the Chair.]
Clause 1:—
Drafting Amendments agreed to.
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2:—
THE PRESIDENT OF THE BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (Earl CARRINGTON)in moving an Amendment to enable any officer of the Local Government Board to take samples, said that the object of the Amendment was simply to give the inspectors of the Local Government Board power to enter the factories, as it was thought better to stop the addition of harmful preservatives

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at the factories rather than by taking samples at the shops when the article had been distributed from the factory to the retailers.
Amendment moved—
"In page 2, line 13, after the word 'Fisheries' to insert the words 'or of the Local Government Board.'"—(Earl Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 3 agreed to.
Clause 4:—
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHasked whether the noble Lord in charge of the Bill would explain why milk-blended butter, which was to be known under some name or another to be invented by the Board of Agriculture, and which almost by universal consent seemed to be a very deleterious and objectionable substance, was to be allowed to have more water in it than ordinary good butter, or even than margarine. He knew that it was rather a controversial point, but he would like to hear from the noble Lord exactly the reasons which had induced the Government to give way on behalf of that particular substance.
EARL CARRINGTON: accept the definition that I can hardly this stuff is deleterious and harmful, but I may perhaps answer the noble Lord's question in this way: The limit of water allowed in butter is 16 per cent. and the limit allowed in margarine is 16 per cent. also. Margarine is different stuff from butter; it is a manufactured article and is completely different from butter. But if you limited the amount of moisture or of water in this milk-blended butter, or whatever it may be called in days to come, to 16 per cent., it would not be milk-blended butter at all, it would be simply butter itself. Therefore the only difference between milk-blended butter and butter is that the milk-blended butter is allowed to have 24 per cent. of moisture, while the percentage of moisture in butter is confined to 16 per cent. If the water was pumped or squeezed out of this milk-blended butter it would become butter.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Are we to understand that the only
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difference between the two substances is that the one contains 8 per cent. more water than the other?
EARL CARRINGTON: This manufactured stuff is butter with milk pumped into it—squeezed into it—and of course in milk there is a great percentage of water, and that makes this manufactured article different from butter. That is the only difference between butter and milk-blended butter. Milk-blended butter is butter with milk blended with it, pumped into it, and the consequence is of course that there is more moisture in it than there would be in ordinary butter.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHsaid that he was somewhat comforted by the speech of the noble Lord, because he had received a letter that morning which informed him that milk-blended butter was mainly composed of cocoanut oil. He was glad to hear on the authority of the Board of Agriculture that that was not the case. With regard to the other part of the noble Lord's speech, if there was really no difference between butter and milk-blended butter excepting the extra 8 per cent. of water in the latter, it seemed to him the strongest argument for putting them all on the same footing.
Clause 4 agreed to.
Clause 5:—
EARL CARRINGTON: The next Amendment which stands in my name is one for the insertion of a new paragraph (j) in Section 5 to the effect that butter, margarine, or milk-blended butter containing a preservative prohibited by any regulation made under the Act, or an amount of preservative in excess of the limit allowed by any such regulation, should be included in the list of articles the importation of which is made an offence by Section 1 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1899. Preservatives are certain acids and other things which are put into this stuff to preserve it, and the object of the Amendment is to prevent boracic acid and other preservatives being put in to a dangerous extent.
Amendment moved—
"In page 3, line 36, after the word 'purpose' to insert the following new paragraph:—'(j) Butter, margarine, or milk-blended

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butter, which contains a preservative prohibited by any regulation made under this Act or an amount of a preservative in excess of the limit allowed by any such regulation.'"—(Earl Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 6:—
EARL CARRINGTON: I move to leave out the words "curd in samples," and to insert the words "any milk-blended solid other than milk-fat in any sample." That is a technical Amendment, and is intended to give the Board power to determine the amount of either milk-casein or milk-sugar, which in butter shall be regarded as presumptive evidence of adulteration, and the Amendment is moved because it is not clear that the word "curd" includes both these articles.
Amendment moved—
"In page 4, line 32, to leave out the words 'curd in samples,' and to insert the words 'any milk-blended solid other than milk-fat in any sample.'"—(Earl Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
EARL CARRINGTON: I also move, in line 33, to leave out from the word "butter" to the end of the clause. There is a proposal to substitute a new clause for the provisions left out.
Amendment moved—
"In line 33, to leave out from the word 'butter' to the end of the clause.—(Earl Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 6, as amended, agreed to.
After Clause 6.
EARL CARRINGTON: I beg to move to insert a new clause. The words proposed to be added seem very formidable, but there really is nothing in them. The clause is only re-drafted and made much longer, and is intended to carry out the intention of paragraph (b) of the provisions of Clause 6. Paragraph (b) was accepted as an Amendment on the Report of the Commons, but it is not very clearly
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expressed, and the Government propose to insert this new clause in its place.
Amendment moved—
"After Clause 6 to insert the following new clause:—

'(1) The Local Government Board may, after such inquiry as they deem necessary, make regulations for prohibiting the use as a preservative of any substance specified in such regulations in the manufacture or preparation for sale of butter, margarine, or milk-blended butter, or for limiting the extent to which, either generally or as regards any particular substance or substances, preservatives may be used in the manufacture or preparation for sale of butter, margarine, or milk-blended butter.

'(2) Any regulations made under this section shall be notified in the London, Edinburgh, or Dublin Gazette as the case may require, and shall also be made known in such other manner as the Local Government Board may direct.

'(3) Any person who manufactures, sells, or exposes or offers for sale, or has in his possession for the purpose of sale, any butter, margarine, or milk-blended butter which contains a preservative prohibited by a regulation under this section or an amount of a preservative in excess of the limit allowed by any such regulation, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act.'"—(Earl Carrington.)

New clause agreed to.
Clause 7:—
EARL CARRINGTON: I beg to move after the word "margarine" to insert the words "or on any package containing margarine, or on any label attached to a parcel of margarine." That is to say, the printed word "margarine" is to be inserted on any package or label as well as on the wrapper in which the margarine is actually handed to the customer in the shop.
Amendment moved—
"In page 5, line 7, after the word 'margarine' to insert the words 'or on any package containing margarine or on any label attached to a parcel of margarine.'"—(Earl Carrington.)
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9—
EARL CARRINGTON: I move to leave out the words "used as a description of

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or in connection with milk-blended butter" and to insert "approved as a name under which milk-blended butter may be imported or dealt with." This clause is intended to limit the power of the Board to approve all these fancy names. As the clause stands, it does not limit the Board's power in the matter of milk-blended butter.
Amendment moved—
"In page 6, lines 2 and 3, to leave out 'used as a description of, or in connection with milk-blended butter' and insert 'approved as a name under which milk-blended butter may be imported or dealt with.'"—(Earl Carrington.)
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH: Does the noble Lord intend to christen this stuff himself, or to remit it to a Committee as has been suggested, or can he give us some idea of what sort of title is to be conferred upon this stuff before we lose control altogether of the Bill?
EARL CARRINGTON: I have had a sort of informal meeting with noble Lords opposite, but we have not come to any definite arrangement as to the name. I shall be only too happy to meet any suggestions that may be thrown out by noble Lords opposite.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Clause 11:—
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNin moving an Amendment excepting the administrative county of London from the operation of Clause 11, said that perhaps the best way of explaining the meaning of the Amendment was to road the clause as it at present stood—
"Section 8 of the Margarine Act, 1887, shall have effect as if the words 'inspector of weights and measures' were inserted after the word 'nuisances.'"
Section 8 of the Margarine Act of 1887 was to the effect that margarine and so on that was imported was to be duly consigned as margarine—
"And it shall be lawful for any officer of His Majesty's Customs or Inland Revenue, or any medical officer of health, inspector of nuisances, or police constable authorised under Section 136 of the Food and Drugs Act to procure samples for analysis."
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One would have supposed, therefore, that there were surely sufficient officers already who were entitled to ask for samples. But in the House of Commons it appeared that in Grand Committee—of which there was no report—this Clause 11 was inserted, the result of which was that in addition to all the officers he had mentioned, the inspector of weights and measures was authorised to ask for samples of margarine. What the special connection of the Inspector of Weights and Measures was with margarine and milk-blended butter he did not know; all he could say was that he was very glad he did not sell either margarine or milk-blended butter, because there were five or six different persons who would be authorised to go into his shop and ask for samples. His natural inclination would have been to move to strike out the clause altogether, on the ground that there were plenty of persons already authorised for the purpose. Surely police officers, medical officers of health, and others, who were already authorised were quite sufficient to ask for samples, but oven presuming that on the general question there was some reason for the addition of inspectors of weights and measures he thought there was a special reason why that should not be done in the case of the administrative county of London. In all other boroughs the inspector of weights and measures was appointed by the borough council, the same authority which appointed the inspector of nuisances, but in the administrative county of London the inspector of nuisances was appointed by the boroughs and the inspector of weights and measures was appointed by the London County Council; therefore if their Lordships inserted these words and added no qualification at all, in the administrative county of London they would be creating a duplication of authorities who would have the right to ask for samples. Therefore it seemed to him that, at all events, if they were going to multiply the number of officers who might apply for samples, there was no reason for multiplying the number of authorities who might instruct an officer to call for those samples.
Amendment moved—
"In page 6, line 19, at the beginning of the clause, to insert 'except in the administrative county of London.'"—(The Earl of Camperdown.)
LORD CHEYLESMOREin supporting the Amendment, said that in the small boroughs outside London in many instances the same gentleman performed the duties of inspector of nuisances and inspector of foods and drugs as performed the duties of inspector of weights and measures. The clause, as it stood, would no doubt be of great benefit to the small boroughs outside London, but it would on the other hand not be of benefit to the administrative county of London, for the reason that the noble Earl had given. It would introduce a second authority to administer the Act for London. He could not help thinking that that would be a source of great annoyance to the small traders in London, and it meant also increasing the rates. He had never heard any complaint regarding the way in which the duties of these officers were carried out. As their Lordships were probably aware, there were twenty-eight boroughs in London at the present moment, employing some fifty or sixty inspectors of nuisances to carry out the Act, and a proof of the effectual way in which they carried out their duties was the fact that on the average some 5,000 samples of butter and margarine were taken in each year. The other inspectors were appointed by the London County Council, and if they were introduced into the Bill there would be that dual control which he had mentioned. He therefore hoped that the noble Earl the President of the Board of Agriculture would accept the Amendment, alike on the grounds of economy, of the annoyance that would be caused by this dual inspection, and of the friction that might arise between the two local authorities in administering the same Act.
EARL CARRINGTON: My Lords, I am rather surprised at Lord Camperdown having brought forward this Amendment, because, if I may be permitted to say so, I should have thought that in his well-regulated mind, if this provision had not been in the Bill, it would have been exactly one of the faults which he would have naturally—and I think quite rightly—found with the Bill itself. This clause practically is only to clear up a doubt in the existing law, and all it attempts to do is to make the law uniform, which I think the noble Earl will acknowledge is a desirable thing in itself. The effect of
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the noble Lord's Amendment would only be to leave the doubt which exists now still existing in London, and I do not think that he would wish to be the author of such a proposal, or the person who insisted on such a state of things continuing. Every weights and measures inspector in England is qualified to take action under every section of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act of 1889, but not under Section 8 of the Margarine Act of 1887, with regard to which there is a doubt as to his powers Clause 11 removes this anomaly, and if this Amendment is accepted, as I said before, it would continue the anomaly as far as London is concerned. The object of the Amendment, the noble Earl told us, is to prevent the London County Council from employing their weights and measures inspectors to take samples in London in place of the inspectors of the boroughs.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: Not in place of—in addition to.
EARL CARRINGTON: In addition to the inspectors of the boroughs. As the noble Earl said, the inspectors of weights and measures are appointed by the London County Council, while in boroughs they are appointed by the other authorities, and I can assure the noble Lord, who has just done two years such good service as Mayor of Westminster, that there is in no way any attempt to promote friction or cause any annoyance to those boroughs which are doing such signal service for London. The only object of the clause is to clear up the doubt which exists at present in London, and I hope in the interests not only of the borough councils, but of the London County Council itself, that the noble Earl will not press or insist upon his Amendment.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNassured the noble Lord that words failed him to express his sense of the great personal compliments which had been paid to him, but in spite of those compliments he was afraid that the noble Lord had not quite appreciated the object of his Amendment. The noble Earl had said that the words were put in solely to do away with a doubt. His (Lord Camperdown's) objection was of quite a different kind. It was

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that the words created a confusion and a conflict of jurisdiction. It was quite true that so far as all the other boroughs of the country were concerned the clause merely authorised asking for samples by another of their officers. But in London, as he had already pointed out, the effect of the clause would be quite different.
Clause 11, as amended, agreed to.
Clauses 12 and 13 agreed to.
Standing Committee negatived. The Report of Amendments to be received To-morrow; and Bill to be printed as amended. (No. 164.)

MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS AMENDMENT BILL. [H.L.]
Order of the Day for Third Reading read.
Moved "That the Bill be now read 3a"—(Lord Ampthill.)
He was afraid that he must press his Amendment.
On Question whether the words "except in the administrative County of London" should be there inserted, their Lordships divided:—Contents, 58; Not-Contents, 28.

CONTENTS.

Northumberland, D.

Plymouth, E.

Cheylesmore, L. [Teller.]

Richmond and Gordon, D.

Powis, E.

Clinton, L.

Rothes, E.

Collins, L.

Ailesbury, M.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Dawnay, L. (V. Downe.)

Lansdowne, M.

Verulam, E.

De Mauley, L.

Salisbury, M.

Waldegrave, E.

Ellenborough, L.

Zetland, M.

Kenyon, L.

Churchill, V.

Kinnaird, L.

Camperdown, E. [Teller.]

Falkland, V.

Lawrence, L.

Cathcart, E.

Falmouth, V.

Lovat, L.

Cawdor, E.

Hill, V.

Ludlow, L.

Clarendon, E.

Hood, V.

Monk Bretton, L.

Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Muskerry, L.

Newton, L.

Drogheda, E.

St. Aldwyn, V.

Oriel, L. (V. Massereene.)

Fortescue, E.

Ranfurly, L. (E. Ranfurly.)

Haddington, E.

Alverstone, L.

Robertson, L.

Halsbury, E.

Ampthill, L.

Saltoun, L.

Hardwicke, E.

Ashbourne, L.

Sanderson, L.

Mount Edgcumbe, E.

Avebury, L.

Sherborne, L.

Northesk, E.

Balfour, L.

Onslow, E.

Barrymore, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Loreburn, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Selby, V.

Glantawe, L.

Granard, L. (E. Granard.)

Crewe, E. [L. President.]

Allendale, L.

[Teller.]

Blyth, L.

Hamilton of Dalzell, L.

Ripon, M. (L. Privy Seal.)

Colebrooke, L.

Haversham, L.

Coleridge, L.

Hemphill, L.

Courtney of Penwith, L.

Pirrie, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Denman, L. [Teller.]

Sandhurst, L.

Carrington, E.

Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

Swaythling, L.

Portsmouth, E.

Templemore, L.

Eversley, L.

Weardale, L.

Althorp, V. (L. Chamberlain.)

Fitzmaurice, L.

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

THE EARL OF GRANARDsaid that before the Bill was read a third time he wished to explain the position of His Majesty's Government in reference to it. The Bill, from a draftsman's point of view, was not quite all that His Majesty's Government would desire, and in case the Bill was to be re-introduced next year in its present form His Majesty's Government considered that some amendment would be necessary, although they entirely agreed with the principle of the Bill.
On Question, Bill read 3a, and passed and sent to the Commons.

CRIMINAL APPEAL BILL.
Order of the Day read for House to be put in Committee.
Moved, "That the House do resolve itself into the said Committee."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE EARL OF HALSBUBY: Before the House goes into Committee, I would like to take this opportunity of saying a few words in regard to some of the provisions of this Bill, because really the explanation I wish to make is one that is not applicable to any of the Amendments that I have to move. I am anxious to explain why I do not move a great number of Amendments which appear to me to be appropriate to the Bill as it stands. I confess I entertain very grievous doubts whether the Bill would prove workable, even if it were amended to the extent to which I had wished to amend it. Bui I have felt that if I had moved all the Amendments which are in my mind to move—for example, upon the question whether or not the Court of Appeal, if constituted, ought to have before it the witnesses, for reasons which I gave on the Second Beading, and which I do not mean to repeat—I quite think that if that Amendment were carried it would be absolutely fatal to the Bill. I quite agree that where you are dealing with the enormous amount of work which undoubtedly would arise if such an Amendment were to pass into law, and if the Bill were to be loaded also with the necessity of having all the witnesses who had been heard before in the original trial, it undoubtedly would be fatal to the Bill, and I assure my noble friend on the Woolsack that it is not my desire—at all events, by indirect means—to wreck the Bill. I am anxious, if it is to pass, that it should pass with as little difficulty in its administration as it is possible to procure. I associate myself with my noble friend in his appeal to your Lordships that one should not be supposed to be excluded from discussing the questions arising here by reason of not being a lawyer. I believe that many of the questions which arise, and which are very broad questions—questions both of policy and of ordinary experience of life—are questions on which your Lordships are quite as well qualified as any lawyer to decide, whether you have been trained as
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lawyers or not. No doubt a great many of your Lordships have been, in the course of presiding at quarter sessions, very familiar with the administration of justice in the very form in which this Bill brings the matter before one's mind. The only difference, I think, between my noble friend and myself is that I do not think that a lawyer ought to be excluded from having an opinion on the Bill, and that seemed to be rather the tendency in his mind. I think he was good enough to exclude myself from the category of those persons who are always against any amendment, but he attributed that attitude to lawyers generally. I think he was unjust to his profession, because I have heard of Sir Samuel Romilly, who was a lawyer, and I have heard of Jeremy Bentham, concerning whom it is hard to calculate the amount of amendment of the law for which he was responsible, to a greater degree perhaps than anybody else. Whatever may be the real questions we have to determine here they are not technical at all. I have not the least notion how it can be said that any part of this discussion shares any technicality at all. The broad question is whether, when a person has been tried, and tried openly and in the presence of a person who will direct a jury in point of law and to some extent guide their judgment, he ought to be tried again—and, as I understand, the idea of the Bill is that he should be tried again by a Committee of Judges, and tried in private. I disapprove of that. I want to make that protest: but inasmuch as there seems to be a desire in some quarters that there should be what in other aspects they avoid as much as they can—namely, a new trial—I desire that that new trial should be as efficient a new trial as it can be. I only want to make one protest. The noble Lord said that there was apparently in some minds an idea that you could get perfect wisdom and perfect knowledge in a human tribunal. I do not suppose so at all—indeed I go further than the noble Lord, because my impression is that if the first jury made a mistake the second Committee might make a mistake too, and, as I have already said, I do not imagine that you will get what is supposed to be one of the great objects to be achieved by this Bill if you have such a trial as the Bill contemplates before a Committee of Judges.

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That is all the protest I wish to make. I have abandoned any idea of amending the Bill in any sense which would be inconsistent with the whole idea of the Bill, and therefore I give up the idea of doing what I had intended to do originally, because I think it would be an indirect way of destroying the Bill.
Let me say with regard to the Amendments I have put down—although I do not wish to discuss them at this preliminary stage—that a good many of them seem to me proper to be suggested to the noble Lord, but if he will not take them as they are, or modify them in any way, I will not press them to a division. They are not intended to obstruct the Bill in any way, but I merely suggest them to him as what I think would be desirable, and if he will take them and mould them in any way according to his fancy I shall be quite content. If not I shall not press them to a division. But there is one Amendment which I must press, and which I will deal with when it comes. On that Amendment I am afraid I shall have to divide the House, because I fear that my noble friend upon the Woolsack and myself are irreconcilably opposed on the particular matter dealt with. I, however, wish the noble Lord to understand, with regard to the other Amendments, that if he will not accept them as they are, or moderate them, I shall certainly not divide the House upon them.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR (Lord LOREBURN): I should be indeed wanting in courtesy to the noble Earl if I did not say a few words in answer to the remarks he has made to your Lordships. I am very sensible of the handsome manner in which he is treating me with regard to this Bill. I hope to be able to accept some of his Amendments, and I should be very glad if I could accept more. I will only say, with regard to the view that the legal profession ought not to be excluded from consideration of this Bill, that that thought never entered into my mind. I should be very ungenerous indeed, and a very unworthy son of the Bar, if I ever entertained such an idea. All I mean is that this ought not to be exclusively regarded as a legal question. There are questions of policy on which lay judgments are just as good as legal judgments, and all I meant when I took the liberty of warning
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the House against a too implicit reliance upon legal authority was this—that if you search for yourselves the history of legal reform, there is no one who is familiar with it who will not say that with the best intentions and the highest motives the greatest among lawyers have distinguished themselves by resisting the most obvious and necessary reforms. That has been the systematic tendency, and I may mention one instance which occurred only four or five years ago. Before that a man could not give evidence in his own behalf in a criminal Court—an idea scarcely credible. The noble Lord brought in a Bill to amend that state of things, and I had the happiness I to assist him. With regard to that measure there was an almost universal chorus of protest among the members of the legal profession. Not more than five years have elapsed since that measure was passed, and I do not think that any-one practising at the Bar or above it would deny that that legislation of four or five years ago has been a most conspicious and real success. It was so stated by the Lord Chief Justice of England last year.
I will not further trouble your Lordships now, but I thought I ought to say a few words to acknowledge the spirit of my noble friend's remarks.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee.
Clause 1:—
THE EARL OF HALSBURYin moving an Amendment substituting the Lord Chancellor for the Lord Chief Justice as one of the nine Judges constituting the Court of Criminal Appeal, said that as this was one of the Amendments to which he had already referred, he thought he ought to say upon it that the whole theory of administration of justice had been to make the Lord Chancellor the Minister of Justice, and it appeared to him that the present Bill was somewhat irregular in dislocating that arrangement and remitting the power in a great measure to the Lord Chief Justice. He was sure that the Lord Chief Justice would not suppose that there was the least idea in his (Lord Halsbury's) mind that he was not perfectly able to do anything that could properly be done, or that his remarks had any reference in any way

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to a sort of precedence of the hierarchy. But he thought this was an attempt to undo what had been done in the Act of 1875, and to displace the Lord Chancellor from doing what in his opinion he ought to do. The Lord Chancellor ought to be the person to decide upon questions such as this, where they were dealing with selection and so on, and it would be a reversal of the policy that had been found to be useful hitherto to substitute the Lord Chief Justice in the present Bill. For that reason he moved the Amendment, but for the reasons he had already given it was an Amendment which, although he moved it, he would not persist in unless the noble Lord (the Lord Chancellor) himself acquiesced in it.
Amendment moved—
"In page 1, line 9, to leave out 'Lord Chief Justice' and insert 'Lord Chancellor.'"—(The Earl of Halsbury.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I hope I can meet the noble Earl in regard to this Amendment, and in regard to two or three of those which follow. I agree to what he says about the Lord Chancellor being the responsible person relating to the administration of justice. But this is an appeal relating to criminal justice As a matter of fact since the time of the Star Chamber the Lord Chancellor has always kept out of criminal trials, and he being an Executive Officer very wisely so acts. Therefore the Lord Chief Justice would practically work the Bill, if I may use a popular expression, but still, in the matter of the selection of Judges, all the Judges will be selected with the consent of the Lord Chancellor or by the Lord Chancellor. If the noble Earl will accept this I think it might meet his views—instead of substituting the Lord Chancellor for the Lord Chief Justice perhaps he will take these words, "appointed for the purpose by the Lord Chief Justice with the consent of the Lord Chancellor." I think that would meet his point and I am quite prepared to move that if the noble Earl will agree to it.
THE EARL OF HALSBURYacquiesced.
Amendment in the form suggested by the Lord Chancellor agreed to.
THE EARL OF HALSBURYin moving an Amendment substituting the Lord Chancellor for the Lord Chief Justice as the authority vested with the appointment of the Judges constituting the proposed Court of Criminal Appeal, said that in the same section there was a question of the constitution of the Court. He confessed that he was not able to understand why nine Judges should be selected. He thought that it would be a much more appropriate thing that all the Judges of the King's Bench should be Judges in the Criminal Appeal Court; it gave a larger area of choice. He left the question of the selection untouched, or at all events to be dealt with in the way that the Lord Chancellor had suggested, and he wished to enlarge the area within which Judges might be selected for the Court of Appeal. He thought that that proposition had the advantage that great difficulty might be found if it were confined within the narrower limits, and it would be better to widen the area, because it was to be remembered that this was one of the cases in which the mere fact of delay, even a short delay, might be very serious indeed. Taking the case of capital offences the postponement of the decision of any appeal would be an unmixed evil. Nothing could be worse than what they saw in certain countries in that respect. He did not wish to particularise countries, but there were some countries in which the appeal was not heard until a year or two after the offence was committed. That was an unmixed evil, and of course if the area of selection was narrowed it rendered it more likely that there would be delay than otherwise. For that reason he suggested—although he had not himself put down an Amendment—that the whole of the King's Bench Judges should be members of the Court of Appeal.
Amendment moved—
"In page 1, line 14, to leave out 'Lord Chief Justice' and insert 'Lord Chancellor '."—(The Earl of Halsbury.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Last year all the High Court Judges were proposed—all the High Court Judges, I think, and all the Court of Appeal.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: That would include the Equity Judges.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes, but the reason the change was made in

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the House of Commons—and it was strongly represented to me—was that it was desirable to have picked—selected—Judges—I mean not picked and selected by the Government at all, but with the consent of the Lord Chief Justice, so that you should have Judges on a rota, familar with the criminal business, and with real knowledge and experience in working this Act, which of course has undoubtedly difficulties in it. I hope that it will be allowed to remain as it is. The number is surely ample—nine in all. They may sit in three divisions. Three Courts may sit at once. It is quite certain, I think, that there will not be any pressure of work, or any arrear of work, with three Courts able to sit for that purpose. I therefore hope that the noble Earl will be content with a similar Amendment to the one which I suggested before, inasmuch as this relates, after all, to the selection of Judges, which has been always heretofore a function performed by the Lord Chancellor. I therefore suggest that it will be sufficient to say "the Lord Chief Justice of England with the consent of the Lord Chancellor." Will not that be a satisfactory solution?
LORD ALVERSTONEsuggested that the Lord Chancellor should consider the matter between then and the Report stage. At the present time under the Crown Cases Reserved Act, there were always five Judges, and he thought it would be desirable in the present case to have more than three. He was rather disposed to think that the better course would be to make all the Judges of the King's Bench Division members of the Court, but to leave their selection and the decision as to who should sit from time to time with the Lord Chief Justice with the consent of the Lord Chancellor. That was what was practically going on at the present time, because he himself had the duty of selecting, as Lord Chief Justice, who should sit as Judges in Crown Cases. He did not suppose that the Lord Chancellor wanted to be troubled with the matter at all, and he was rather disposed to think that the better course would be to have all the Judges of the King's Bench Division, and to leave the selection of the others to whomever the Lord Chancellor thought right. He had no desire whatever to intrude himself at all in the matter of the selection of Judges, in the ordinary sense
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of the word, but he was quite satisfied that the selection of the members of the Court for the actual working of this Bill from day to day must be left in the hands of the Lord Chief Justice; otherwise the Bill would become unworkable.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I need hardly say that I will consider the matter very fully in the sense my noble and learned friend suggests. I will speak to him about it in the interval if he will allow me, and meanwhile I propose that the Amendment should be left as I have suggested, with the understanding that it may be altered on Report after consultation.
LORD ALVERSTONE: In the first two cases?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Yes.
On Question, Amendment in the form suggested by the Lord Chancellor, agreed to.
LORD ALVERSTONE LORD ALVERSTONE moved an Amendment of which the Earl of Halsbury had given notice. He thought that it would be better that if the Lord Chief Justice was not able to preside the senior member of the Court present should be the President of the Court.
Amendment moved—
"In page 1, line 23, to leave out the words 'such member of the Court as the Lord Chief Justice directs' and to insert the words 'the senior member of the Court present.'"—(Lord Alverstone.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think that is very satisfactory, and I think I can accept that now.
On Question, Amendment agreed to.
Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Clause 3:
THE EARL OF HALSBURYin moving an Amendment providing that a certificate should be obtained from the Judge who originally tried the case that it was a fit case for appeal, said that it was the Amendment upon which, in the remarks

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he had addressed to the House before their Lordships went into Committee, he had intimated that he should have to ask the House to give an opinion. The Amendment made it a condition that the opinion of the Court of Appeal should not be applied for without the certificate of the learned Judge before whom the person was tried that it was a fit case for appeal. It seemed to him that in order to render it possible to work the Bill care must be taken not to admit frivolous appeals from the 12,000 persons who were tried last year, and the equivalent number, or something like it, who would be tried in the year to come. Was it possible to suppose that everybody would not try as much as they could to get an appeal? Probably they would think that they had some chance, at all events, which at present they had not, and of course they would appeal. Why should they not appeal? It was said, "Oh! but then the Court of Appeal will refuse." But his object was to prevent an application to the Court of Appeal except upon some reasonable grounds, and he submitted to their Lordships that nothing could be more reasonable than that. It was an argument with which they were very familiar in the Courts in civil cases—whether the Judges themselves were satisfied with the verdict. But he did not ask to go so far as that, but merely wished that the Judge should say whether it was a fit case for appeal. It appeared to him that that was the only possibility of making the Bill workable at all. If they allowed a whole flood of appeals to overwhelm the Court of Appeal, not only was the whole litigation of the country sacrificed to get at the one out of 12,000 who ought to have an appeal, but it seemed to him that they would very much imperil the respect for the course of justice if they allowed everybody—even those who might have been convicted half a dozen times before—to have the right of appeal. He put the proposition in the baldest form before the House. Perhaps he might be permitted to use the weapon which the Lord Chancellor himself was fond of using, and to say that this was not a question at all for lawyers. He put it to the plain common sense of the House, what would be the inevitable result of allowing unlimited appeal, because that was what it came to unless they had some check of that sort? He begged to move.
Amendment moved—
"In page 3, line 6, after the word 'appeal,' to insert the words, 'and upon the certificate of the Judge who tried him that it is a fit case for appeal.'"—(The Earl of Halsbury.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, this is an Amendment which really is of a very serious character. When the Bill was first introduced into the House last year the right of appeal was given without qualification, without reserve, without any preliminary permission from anyone being obtained, and that is the state of things that now exists in civil cases. My idea at that time was to place the person whose life, reputation, or liberty might be at stake in as good a position as the person who had £50 or £100 at stake, and if the Law Courts are open to the person who has a small sum of money at stake, ought they not all the more to be open to the man for whom everything he possesses, and all his chances of happiness or prosperity in the future, are at stake? That was the way in which the Bill was first introduced last-year. There was unlimited right of appeal. I was pressed and I gave way—I do not know whether unduly so, I hope not—but I accepted the suggestion that it should only be with the leave of the Court of Appeal, and that appears in the Bill. Accordingly, the Bill as it stands at the present moment provides that no man can appeal unless he gets the leave of the Court of Appeal. There is that safeguard against frivolous appeals. About the number of them I will say a word in a moment. Now an additional permission, which was not mentioned last year, is proposed to be inserted by the noble Lord, and not only is the leave of the Court of Appeal to be obtained, but also the permission of the Judge before whom the case is tried.
THE Earl of HALSBURY: Pardon me—that it is a fit case for appeal—that is all.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I beg pardon—I accept the correction—that it is a fit case for appeal, which is exactly the same thing as giving leave of appeal. Surely you will always give leave of appeal if it is a fit case and you will never give leave to appeal if it is not a fit case. Accordingly when you say that there is to be a preliminary bar, namely, that you cannot appeal unless you get

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the permission of the Judge, and he thinks it is a fit case, it is adding a second safeguard, which, as I venture to submit, is perfectly unnecessary to the exercise of this right, attenuated as it was from the original aspirations that I had, and it is doubly placing a person convicted of a crime at a disadvantage as compared with a person mulcted in damages, or with money at stake. Now what is the effect of the clause? It is putting two gates across the road, or making a man go through two nets before he can get through. I do not, with all respect, see what the reason of that can be, except one reason, and that is the reason of over pressure of business. Have you not an ample safeguard when you say that there can be no appeal unless the Court of Appeal gives leave? Apart from the question of plethora of business—I leave that aside—is there any reason that justice demands why you should not be content with one safeguard, namely, that the Court of Appeal itself should give preliminary leave? The question reduces itself to this. The point is as to whether, for the sake of saving expense and avoiding pressure of business and plethora of work in the Courts, you are to put in this second safeguard for the purpose of barring some who otherwise might have an appeal, and that is a point to which the noble Earl alluded. I begin by saying that there is a great number of persons convicted who know they are guilty, and who plead guilty, and if you examine the Home Office Returns—I am sorry to say I have not got them before me now; I had them last year but I did not appreciate that this point would to-day be raised—your Lordships will find that the number of appeals for mercy, for diminution of sentence, and complaining of unjust convictions are very far less than 1,000. I do not remember the numbers, but they are not very very numerous.
THE Earl of HALSBURY: Between 600 and 700.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think that is about right—600 or 700. We have it therefore that the number is 600 or 700. Now let us further examine what the nature of those cases is. They are quite short eases, nearly all of them; your Lordships have sat at quarter
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sessions, and you know that most of the criminal trials are quite short and simple things, and it would not take long to decide whether leave of appeal should be given; you would immediately say, "It is quite obvious this cannot be allowed," and, as has already been said, there are only about 600 or 700 of them altogether. I ask your Lordships not to put an additional bar, and when you are giving a boon—for it is a boon, relieving the feeling of apprehension in the country, which I think is based upon the generous idea that in principle it is better that several guilty men should escape than that one innocent person should suffer—I hope there will not be any unnecessary bar placed in the way of this Bill, and that notwithstanding the admitted and immense authority of the noble Earl in this House I may be able to secure a majority.
LORD ALVERSTONEsaid that the speech which the House had just heard from the Lord Chancellor made it necessary that he should trouble their Lordships again with a few observations. He had no intention of repeating the speech he had made last year, especially as he was rejoiced to find that it had made such an impression upon the Leader of the Opposition that he had actually remembered it. He wished to enter a very respectful protest against the suggestion that because he and others ventured to think this Bill required amendment they were opposing reforms of the law. He appealed to his own record, and he was certainly not aware that on any occasion he, although a lawyer, had opposed reforms of the law which had turned out afterwards to be salutary. Certainly his recollection did not concur with the Lord Chancellor's with reference to the state of public feeling at the time when Lord Halsbury's measure was introduced. There was an enormous mass of professional feeling in favour of that Bill. He wanted to bring the mind of the House back to the point suggested by the Amendment of Lord Halsbury. It only applied to appeals upon questions of fact. Lord Halsbury did not propose to interfere with the unlimited right of appeal for mis-reception of evidence, non-reception of evidence, or misdirection of the jury; therefore in the case of an unfair trial, or an improper ruling upon a matter of law, there would be a right of appeal.

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But what Lord Halsbury had said, and what he (Lord Alverstone) ventured to submit to their Lordships the Government ought to consider was that they ought to lock at the whole question when they were dealing with appeals upon fact. It would be brought out in relief when they considered, as they would in a few minutes, an Amendment as to whether there should be an unconditional right of appeal in capital cases. He could conceive nothing really worse in regard to trials for murder than that they should be invariably—as they would be—tried again before three Judges. But what really would happen? As the Lord Chancellor had said, in the case of a very large proportion of those who were convicted—an extremely large proportion, he believed about 95 to 96 per cent.—there was no question at all about their guilt. Under the present Bill no costs were incurred, counsel might be assigned, and there was therefore every temptation to persons to appeal, especially in the case of those familiar with crime, hardened offenders who had had experience of Courts of Criminal Law. He must again strongly press upon their Lordships that which had never met with any answer from the Lord Chancellor or anybody to whom the argument had been addressed. He felt most seriously the peril in which innocent people would be placed if it was known that there was an appeal upon all cases, even with the leave of the Court. He was satisfied that at the present time it was a great safeguard to innocent people, and a great safeguard to people who were guilty but against whom there was no clear evidence, that juries were told that they ought not to convict unless they were satisfied that the prosecution had made out their case, and that they were the final arbiters on matters of fact. The Lord Chancellor, if he would pardon him for speaking plainly on the matter, had likened this Court of Criminal Appeal to a Court concerned with Civil proceedings, and had said that one was concerned with life or liberty of the subject while the other was concerned with money—with matters involving perhaps £5 or £10. If that was the real comparison, he would go with the Lord Chancellor heart and soul, but he would again point out that the position in criminal cases was entirely different from that in civil cases. In criminal cases there were no two sides. It
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was the glory of English law that the prosecution had to make out their case, and that the prosecution were told that the onus was upon them of proving their case; juries were told by Judges of Assize, over and over again, that they were to be satisfied that the case was made out by the prosecution, and that there was no onus upon the prisoner to answer anything unless that case was made out. It must impair the feeling on the part of juries of reluctance to convict in cases of doubt if they thought that their convictions could be set right upon appeal by superior Judges—superior lawyers. That was where the peril of the innocent man came in. Juries, knowing that there was a right of appeal, would be more willing to convict in doubtful cases, and the Court of Appeal would then have no witnesses before them, and they would be obliged to say, "Well, there has been a conviction by a jury who have heard and seen the witnesses, and we think we ought not to interfere in the matter." He had mentioned this last year, and the only observation that he could remember which had been made in reply, was that his fears were absolutely ill-founded. He had had twelve months more experience since he made the speech in question, and he had had the opportunity of talking over the matter with those of his friends who were responsible for the administration of justice, and who desired to see that nobody but guilty people were convicted, and they all felt that this unlimited appeal upon questions of fact would create very serious dangers. There was no such appeal known to the law even in civil cases—namely, that where there had been a trial by jury, Judges were to reverse the findings on fact of the jury. The Lord Chancellor had said—and he entirely agreed—that the motive of the present Bill sprang from generous feelings. He hoped the Lord Chancellor did not exclude those who differed with him from sharing in those generous feelings. They all desired that every possibility of injustice in the administration of the law should be done away with. In the last few years, no doubt, cases had occurred which had roused the public mind. In one and all of them an appeal on fact would not have been of the slightest use, because in some cases the evidence was overwhelming, and in other cases there had been improper trial, which would be dealt with by the Bill as a matter of law.

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There was power on the part of the Home Secretary to refer any case to the Court of Appeal, and he asked the Lord Chancellor not to suggest that he and those who thought with him were trying in any way to wreck the Bill. He himself wanted to see it passed. There were many things in the Bill which were most excellent. But as regarded appeals on matters of fact, he thought they ought not to go too far, and take a step which they could not go back upon. It did not seem to him unreasonable that in matters of fact the Judge should be allowed to say, "I think this is a case in which there should be an appeal." He must reluctantly put himself in opposition to the Lord Chancellor in respect of this matter. He desired to assist him always in matters of reform, and he only opposed him on this occasion because, with his great responsibility in these matters, he felt that this unlimited power of application for leave to appeal in matters of fact was going to hamper the Courts for no useful purpose. He thought the Bill went far beyond the necessities of the ease, and for that reason he asked the Lord Chancellor to pause before he said that he would not accept the Amendment.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sorry to trouble your Lordships with a second speech, but the intrinsic importance of the case, and the fact that I cannot conceal from myself that the fate of the Bill rests upon the decision of this matter, leads me to ask your Lordships' indulgence, for a few minutes, in order that I may say a few words further in answer to what has been said by the Lord Chief Justice. Really the speech of the Lord Chief Justice was a speech against allowing an appeal on questions of fact at all. That is what the pith and marrow of his argument was. It was a concession to weakness, and one which therefore might be granted with some safeguard which otherwise would not be justifiable. Now what is the reason—if I may be excused for repeating myself—what is the real reason for saying that there ought not to be an appeal upon questions of fact? There is always an appeal in civil cases upon questions of fact.
THE Earl of HALSBURY: I cannot agree to that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My noble friend will admit that the Court is open to receive an application for appeal in civil cases, and that is all I ask here. I ask for the same right in criminal cases as already exists in civil cases. The Court is open to receive an application for appeal in civil cases; I ask that it should be open to receive an application for appeal in criminal cases too. Decisions of Courts on questions of fact are constantly being reversed or corrected in Courts of Appeal. What does the Court of Appeal in England do all the year round, sitting in two divisions, except correct the mistakes in decisions on fact or in law which have taken place at trial? And the fact that they are so occupied, and that they are constantly reversing decisions of the Courts below, and then that their decisions in turn come to your Lordships' House—and we are working very hard here—shows that there is a liability to error. I want to argue this not as a matter of feeling but as a matter of reason. There is a liability to error which affects Courts, Judges, and juries in the same way as it affects all of us, the only difference in the case of your Lordships' House being that as there is no Court of Appeal to sit over us our errors are never detected and exposed, as very often they might be if there was a Court of Appeal over us. That is the case in civil Courts. Will anyone explain to me by what miracle of nature the same men sitting as Judges, when they don the scarlet and ermine and are accompanied by trumpeters at Assize Courts—
LORD ALVERSTONE: The question has nothing to do with trumpeters.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I withdraw the expression at once. I had no idea of saying anything offensive.
LORD ALVERSTONE: The question depends upon entirely different considerations.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: When they appear in their dignity as Judges in a Criminal Court why are they more free from liability to error than they are in a Civil Court? That is what I cannot understand, and I have never been able to understand it. That is precisely one

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of those points which I say the lay mind can judge as well as anybody else. It cannot be said that the Judges are inspired in the one case and not in the other. They do their best, and show great learning and great knowledge, and they have earned the confidence of the civilised world. That I fully admit, and no one feels it more than I do; but there is liability to error, and if it exists in civil cases, and demonstrably exists, why are we to suppose that it never exists and that infallibility is substituted when the scene is changed to a Criminal Court? But it is only partial infallibility after all, because it is admitted that there ought to be an appeal upon points of law, although it is not admitted that there ought to be an appeal upon points of fact. The argument appears to be that when you go into a Criminal Court the Judge and the jury may make mistakes upon points of law but cannot make mistakes upon points of fact.
I would like to say one word about the theory that if you do not stop cases on their way to the Court of Appeal you will put in jeopardy the innocent. Just let me appeal again to the lay mind. I have done so already, and I am ashamed to repeat it, but I must do so, for I am really practically alone in fighting this Bill, because after all it requires technical knowledge What on earth—if I may ask the question—is the ground for supposing that a jury will not do their duty, but will sacrifice innocent men, merely because they know that with the leave of the Court there may be an appeal? I do not believe that that will be so, and I put it to every one of your Lordships whether it is in the least degree human, or likely, or in accordance with our nature, that when we are sitting as a jury or as Judges trying a man for his liberty or his life—whatever you please—we are going to say at the back of our minds, "Oh, there is a Court of Criminal Appeal, and the prisoner can get an appeal possibly: therefore we will not give the same attention to the case that we would otherwise give." Is this true of human nature? Is it true of Judges, or of juries, or of Chairmen of Quarter Sessions? I submit that it is not, and if that is the only argument then the only argument for not allowing appeals upon questions of fact disappears.
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Let me correct one more thing. What is asked by this Amendment is that the Judge who presided at the trial should certify that it is a fit case for appeal. What case? Not merely trials of fact; his certificate must be obtained not where it is a question of fact alone, or mixed law and fact, but upon any other ground which appears sufficient. If this Amendment were accepted you might discover afterwards some new evidence (some crushing conclusive evidence) and yet, the certificate of the Judge not having been obtained, it would be impossible to have an appeal against the verdict of the jury. I respectfully submit to your Lordships that this is an Amendment which ought not to be allowed, and that it is really an Amendment of a very serious kind, and one which is likely to have most serious effects upon a Bill which I hope your Lordships all desire to see passed.
The EARL of HALSBUKYregretted having to speak again on the subject, but he thought the Lord Chancellor had failed to understand the objection of the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chancellor was arguing as though only one single mind was applied to a particular case. That was not so at all. It had happened again and again that juries were very much divided—some being for conviction and some for acquittal. There was not an assize and not a sessions in which that condition of things did not arise. What was the temptation when they had that condition of things, and when they had, perhaps, one member of the jury objecting on one side or the other, whether for acquittal or conviction? Was it not a temptation for the jury to say, "Well we are not agreed, but the Court of Appeal will set it right; let us return our verdict in accordance with the opinion of the majority "? It seemed to him that that would almost invariably happen. The noble Lord upon the Woolsack would not appreciate, apparently, what their objection was. The analogy which had been evoked over and over again as between the Civil and Criminal Courts was no analogy. The Lord Chancellor himself could not deny that there was no analogy. In the one case they had a plaintiff and a defendant, but in the other case there was simply a prisoner on trial, with whom the sympathy always rested, because he was on

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his trial, and every Judge on the Bench and every Chairman of Quarter Sessions told the jury, "You must not convict unless the case has been brought home beyond all reasonable doubt." When the jury were told that, that was one thing; but if they disagreed under this new provision it would be said, if there were a majority for conviction, "Oh, do not let us discuss it any more, because the Court of Appeal will set it right." Was not that a thing likely to mislead people? He thought it was, particularly if the jury had been kept very long in Court, under conditions which were not always conditions of extreme comfort. He could not help thinking that under such circumstances it was not in human nature not yield to such temptation.
LORD ASHBOURNEsaid that his noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor had remarked that it might be that late in the day new evidence of a startling character might be found, and that it might be found after the certificate of the Judge had been given. It might also be found after the decision of the Court of Appeal refusing the appeal. But there was always the Home Office open. If anything new turned up which required investigation the Bill wisely provided that the jurisdiction of the Home Office remained unimpaired. The real point that struck him in the Amendment of his noble and learned friend Lord Halsbury was this: Why was it regarded as wise or common-sense to exclude from giving an early opinion upon a trial that had taken place the Judge who had tried it and who knew most about it? Why should not the Judge who had presided at the trial, who had listened to every atom of the evidence, who knew every point that had been stated, be encouraged without delay to give his opinion? He approved of the Bill in principle, though some of the details were in his opinion open to criticism. It was an important subject, and it was a very great experiment. He had no doubt whatever that later on the Bill would require amendment, but he desired the Bill now to pass in the best form possible. It was not in dispute that there should be a Court, of Criminal Appeal. The Amendment did not challenge that there was to be an appeal upon any legal point. Nor did the Amendment challenge that it was open to any person convicted to
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appeal against his sentence. That was not in question. All that was in controversy was whether it was wise and reasonable to permit the judge who had presided at a criminal trial to say whether the case was a fit case for appeal. Surely if their Lordships would look at the common sense aspect of the question, and put aside everything relating to technicality and law, the Amendment was reasonable. Here was a great change in which 10,000 or 12,000 persons who had been convicted were suddenly told, "You may appeal not only upon law, not only upon your sentence, but upon the facts." The Bill itself showed that that was so wide as to be dangerous, and if 10,000 or 12,000 people, the great majority of whom it was to be assumed were clearly guilty upon a perfectly satisfactory trial, were told without qualification that the Appeal Court was open, it was obvious that unless leave to appeal was required it would flood the tribunal.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I gave it as a concession last year.
LORD ASHBOURNEsaid he supposed the concession was given because it was thought to be just. The Bill was brought in this year, and they were now dealing I with the Bill in an amended form—he thought in an improved form in many particulars—but the changes introduced to meet the obvious suggestion that the Courts would be flooded and congested to an unworkable point, showed that the Courts could not be left open without some check, and that leave must be given by somebody. He submitted that that was common sense. There was further, the safeguard that if a man appealed wildly, recklessly and without grounds, he was admonished that his sentence might take an upward tendency instead of a downward tendency. That was a further check. Was it not a wise element of safeguard to introduce this also—not to forbid an appeal, but to say that the Judge who tried the case might give his opinion that it was a fit case to be brought into the Court of Appeal? He himself was unable to see any valid reason why the experience, the observation, and the ability of the Judge who tried the case might not be brought in to aid in this great question.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: It is, in Section 8.
LORD ASHBOURNEsaid he was aware that the Judge might be asked to give his report, and he hoped on the Report Stage to present an Amendment upon that, and to require that in every case the Judge be asked to give a report of his opinion. He was quite conscious of that clause, and he thought it was imperfect because it was incomplete. He was quite alive to the fact that the Court of Appeal might, and of course in nine cases out of ten would, ask for such a report. The point he was on now was why should not the Judge, when all the facts were present to his mind, when he knew everything connected with the case and every point, not give an opinion and say whether such and such a case was fit for an appeal? They must have some confidence in those who fulfilled the great position of Judges. He admitted that there was a distinction in the position of Judges presiding at assizes. The Judges who went on circuit filled the great position of King's Bench Judges and they also would supply those who would sit in the Court of Criminal Appeal. Was it not reasonable to permit those Judges of Criminal Appeal when they had presided at a trial to say, "This is a fit case to go before the Court of which I may myself be a member?" The Lord Chancellor had spoken about the distinction between civil and criminal courts. Of course there was a difference, but there was a considerable analogy, and they had a right to take the teachings of that analogy as far as it went. In a civil case they must all bear in mind that if the verdict of the jury was set aside the consequence generally would be a new trial. There were other Judges, of course, besides King's Bench Judges, and that was a matter that might suggest a certain measure of criticism. Chairmen of quarter sessions and recorders were often men of great ability, and often men with a considerable knowledge of law. They presided at many trials but of course they were not in the same position, or clothed with the same rank or authority, as King's Bench Judges; but he was not aware how any ready distinction could well be drawn between them, although, if any could be suggested, he would himself be quite willing to consider it. The Lord Chancellor had alluded to this Amendment as if it were some startling and novel reform suggested by his
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noble and learned friend. This reform was not a suggestion of yesterday, or of to-day, or of the year before. It had been dealt with as far back as 1879 by the Royal Commission on the Criminal Law Code—a great Commission presided over by Lord Blackburn and other distinguished judges—recommended this very thing, that the leave of the Judge who presided at the trial should be obtained. There was a Select Committee of the House of Commons about twenty years ago recommending the same thing. It was not novel—it was what one might expect to find in a criminal code. He himself was not at all wedded to the particular words that found their place in the present Amendment, but he would himself desire—because he thought it would be in furtherance of justice and common sense—to utilise in every reasonable way the opinion and the knowledge of the Judge who presided at the trial.
There was a point which should never be lost sight of in reference to the advantage of this Bill, and the openness of the Court to appeals upon questions of fact. That was the Home Office. He did not know the figures, but he had seen in the papers in the last few days that there were some 2,000 petitions or more presented to the Home Office every year. There might be more—he did not know the exact figures. But power was given in this Bill to the Home Office to refer any case which came before it to the Court of Criminal Appeal. What a number of cases that at once gave, without the permission or leave of any Court or any Judge, that might find their way into the Court of Criminal Appeal. The criminal had only, instead of presenting his petition through the machinery of this Bill, to present a petition to the Home Office, and if the capable and trained advisers of the Home Secretary were of opinion I that there was a fair reasonable case made, they had perfect jurisdiction under this Bill to send the appeal on to the Court of Criminal Appeal without anyone's consent or anybody's leave. The question in his opinion was one of importance. One of the great difficulties in the Bill was as to its workability. He was quite in favour of the Bill giving the relief that it sought to give, and setting up a Court of Criminal Appeal but the great question was—would it be workable?

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The danger of its being unworkable would be found very soon after it passed into law. If it was blocked by a great rush of appellants and petitioners, it would be imperilled. It would be a great difficulty for the Judges to succeed in coping with their work, and in laying down and methodising their rules. He was of opinion that the Amendment suggested by his noble and learned friend, or some such Amendment, would be desirable, because it would tend to make the Bill work more smoothly, and to make its provisions capable of application without so much friction and difficulty, and he thought it might tend to check the presentation of petitions in frivolous cases, where there was very little chance or prospect of anything but disappointment awaiting those who had unwarily presented very thoughtless petitions.
LORD COLLINScould not help think-that the Lord Chancellor, to some extent, failed to appreciate the character of this Amendment. He thought that, rightly understood, it was calculated to give full effect to the avowed intention of the Lord Chancellor himself. It was agreed on all sides that this was a great new departure. It was the granting of an appeal on questions of fact in criminal cases. It was therefore clearly advisable, and the Lord Chancellor had admitted it, that that right ought to be fenced about with adequate safeguards. The Lord Chancellor had based his arguments largely upon the analogy of civil cases. But in civil cases they had to deal with points of law, and in a sense sometimes questions of fact became points of law. Where the element of misdirection entered, or even where the verdict was thought to be against the weight of evidence—both those heads were treated as headings of law, and the error was accordingly as to a point of law. But still the Courts in civil cases had felt that where the question, although nominally one of law—giving the right to ask for a new trial—was really a question of evidence, the first and most essential factor in dealing with that by the Court was to ascertain the opinion of the Judge who had tried the case. All those who had sat in Courts of review knew that where the question in review was, as it
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sometimes was, though not so often as it was upon other grounds, as to whether or not the verdict was against the weight of evidence, the first thing that was insisted upon was the necessity of finding out what was the opinion of the Judge at the trial. He admitted that nowadays, when Courts were sitting in London to review cases while the Judges were on circuit, it was very often difficult or impossible to ascertain what the opinion of the Judge was, but still the theory was that it ought to be known, and immense weight was attached to it when it was known. But now they were not dealing with civil cases—questions of pounds, shillings and pence—they were dealing with a more important issue, the liberty, the character, or, it might be, even the life of the prisoner. Therefore, it seemed to him that as it was regarded as a useful provision in civil cases, it should be regarded as an indispensable provision in criminal cases, and that it should only be on the certificate of the Judge that appeal should be allowed. Here the ultimate question was, aye or no, did the jury go wrong in point of fact, did they disregard the evidence, and it was essential that the person best entitled to give an opinion upon the matter should be consulted. Therefore he thought they were giving full effect to the principles stated by the Lord Chancellor, and assimilating the Bill in that respect—as he desired it should be assimilated in other respects—to the civil procedure of the country. He made these observations with no desire to oppose any obstacle to the passing of the Bill, though in many respects he confessed he did not think it was quite so good as that introduced by the Lord Chancellor upon the recommendation of the Beck Committee. As, however, he had been Chairman of that Committee, it might be that he was somewhat prejudiced in favour of its recommendations.
LORD COLERIDGEremarked that the last speaker had expressed a wish to assimilate the present Bill to the procedure in the civil Courts, and he had introduced the fact that the Courts of review in this country desired first of all to know, as a guide to their decision, what was the opinion of the Judge who had tried the case. The noble Earl had

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forgotten the procedure in the present Bill. If he would read Clause 8 he would see that—
"The Judge or Chairman of any Court before whom a person is convicted shall, in the case of an appeal under this Act against the conviction or against the sentence, or in the case of an application for leave to appeal under this Act, furnish to the Registrar, in accordance with the Rules of Court, his notes of the trial; and in the case of an appeal against sentence only, and in any other case if he thinks it desirable in the interests of justice to do so, or if required by the Court of Criminal Appeal, shall also furnish to the Registrar in accordance with Rules of Court, a report giving his opinion upon the case, or upon any point arising in the case."
Therefore it seemed to him that if the Bill remained as it was, unamended, it did in this matter assimilate the criminal procedure of the future to the present procedure in regard to civil cases. But the noble Lord wanted to differentiate the two proceedings, and to say that in criminal matters the report of the Judge should be a bar to the appeal. He would like to ask the noble Lord whether he would wish to introduce that principle into appeals in civil matters. The noble Lord had sat long in Court of civil appeal: would he like, looking back upon the past, to have said that in any case where the Judge had reported in favour of the jury, that should be a bar to the Court of Appeal entertaining the idea as to whether or not the verdict was against the weight of evidence? It seemed to him that the noble Lord in his argument, trenchant as it was, forgot the provisions of Clause 8. He would like to ask one question. The Court of Criminal Appeal under the Bill was enabled to hear fresh evidence, and it was given large powers to enable it to do so, because it was considered that only on the power of hearing and summoning fresh evidence could justice be done. What power, if this Amendment was carried, was given to the Judge of first instance either to hear fresh evidence, or to summon fresh evidence for the purpose of assisting his mind? None. Therefore his certificate must be based, and based solely, upon the evidence called at the trial before him, excluding the possibility of having recourse to any fresh evidence or having any powers placed in his hands to enable him to summon fresh evidence, or to see fresh documents for the purpose of enlightening or guiding his mind. It seemed to
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him, therefore, that if this Amendment was carried, it would absolutely defeat the whole object of the Bill. The Bill was introduced last year and this year, owing to what? Owing to the existence of grave dissatisfaction at this very provision of the law which the noble Lord now wanted to introduce, namely, that the Judge of first instance should have to give leave before any appeal on a point of law could come before the Court of Criminal Appeal. That was the object of the movement outside in the public world; it was the object of that movement to get rid of that initial difficulty, and to enable persons to appeal without that bar being placed in their way.
LORD ALVERSTONE: That only relates to matters of law, not of fact.
LORD COLERIDGEsaid that he was perfectly well aware of that, but if there was dissatisfaction in the public mind that there should be a bar in matters of law, would there not be a still greater dissatisfaction in the public mind if there were to be a bar also in matters of fact? It seemed to him that the proposed Amendment cut at the root of the Bill, and he trusted that before the Amendment was carried, some of the objections with regard to its working might be answered.
LORD HEMPHILLsaid that it was impossible to hear the speeches that had been made by the noble Lords opposite without being struck with their great importance and ability. But at the same time those speeches appeared to him to be not ad idem to the Amendment now before their Lordships, because the Amendment required that the Judge at the trial should give a certificate of leave to appeal, superadded as he read the Amendment—
THE Earl of HALSBURY: "Fit case for appeal."
LORD HEMPHILLsaid that as he read the Amendment, it was to been certificate that it was a fit case—that was to say, in substance it was liberty to appeal.
THE Earl of HALSBURY: No, no—"fit case for appeal."
LORD HEMPHILLsaid he had not the Amendment before him, but the sense of it was as he had stated. How would the fact of the Judge's giving a certificate that it was a fit case, answer the objection so forcibly put by the Lord Chief Justice? The Lord Chief Justice said that if the jury were indolent or doubting—or if some of them were indolent or doubting—they might be influenced to consent to a verdict, thinking that it would be ultimately in the power of the Court of Appeal to alter or reverse that verdict. He did not see how the fact of the Judge at the trial being required to give a certificate would in any way obviate that. As it was, leave to appeal must be given by the Court above. If there was no leave of appeal required by the Court above, or no application for leave to appeal contemplated, then indeed he thought that it would be very reasonable that there should be a certificate given by the Judge who had heard the case that it was a fit case. There was one argument more, which to his mind had not been anticipated, or at least put forward, by their Lordships. Would it not be placing a Judge in a very invidious and odious position to throw upon him in a capital case the odium of refusing a certificate that it was a fit case? He could not imagine a more painful position for a Judge to be placed in in a case of treason, in a case of capital felony, or in
a case involving some aggravated political issue, than that he should be called upon to withhold from the prisoner the opportunity of going to a higher Court. The noble Lord, Lord Coleridge, had pointed out that this certificate of the Judge at the trial precluded the possibility of any advantage arising from after-discovered evidence. It was impossible to answer that question. It was impossible for the Judge at the trial to be assured that something might not turn up which would alter the aspect of the case. He could very well understand noble Lords being against appeal in criminal cases at all. He thought that was a question which was open to a great deal of debate, but it seemed to be conceded by noble Lords opposite, and especially by Lord Ashbourne, that it was desirable that there should be an appeal in criminal as well as in civil cases on matters of law. On that postulate he said with the utmost respect that this Amendment was unnecessary, that it was more than unnecessary, it was mischievous, and that it would place the Judge who was called upon to exercise that discretion in a most odious and invidious position.
On Question whether the words "and upon the certificate of the Judge who tried him that it is a fit case for appeal" be there inserted, their Lordships divided:—Contents, 54; Not-Contents, 32.

CONTENTS.

Northumberland, D.

Plymouth, E.

Burton, L.

Richmond and Gordon, D.

Powis, E.

Cheylesmore, L.

Sutherland, D.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.)

Clinton, L.

Waldegrave, E.

Clonbrock, L.

Ailesbury, M.

Collins, L.

Lansdowne, M.

Churchill, V.

Dunboyne, L.

Salisbury, M.

Falkland, V.

Ellenborough, L.

Zetland, M.

Hill, V.

Fairlie, L. (E. Glasgow.)

Hood, V.

Kenyon, L.

Camperdown, E.

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Lawrence, L.

Cathcart, E. [Teller.]

Lovat, L.

Cawdor, E.

St. Aldwyn, V.

Ludlow, L. [Teller.]

Doncaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensberry.)

Muskerry, L.

Alverstone, L.

Newton, L.

Eldon, E.

Ashbourne, L.

Ranfurly, L. (E. Ranfurly.)

Haddington, E.

Atkinson, L.

Robertson, L.

Halsbury, E.

Avebury, L.

Saltoun, L. s

Hardwicke, E.

Balfour, L.

Sanderson, L.

Northesk, E.

Barrymore, L.

Waleran, L.

Onslow, E.

Braye, L.

Zouche of Haryngworth, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Loreburn, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Beauchamp, E.

Selby, V.

Carrington, E.

Crewe, E. (L. President.)

Portsmouth, E.

Allendale, L. Blyth, L.

Ripon, M. (L. Privy Seal.)

Althorp, V. (L. Chamberlain.)

Colebrooke, L.

Coleridge, L.

Fitzmaurice, L.

Pirrie, L.

Courtney of Penwith, L.

Glantawe, L.

Sandhurst, L.

Dawnay, L. (V. Downe.)

Granard, L. (E. Granard.) [Teller.]

Swaythling, L.

De Mauley, L.

Templemore, L.

Denman, L. [Teller.]

Hamilton of Dalzell, L.

Tweedmouth, L.

Elgin, L. (E. Elgin, and Kincardine.)

Haversham, L.

Weardale, L.

Hemphill, L.

Welby, L.

Eversley, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

THE EARL OF HALSBURYin moving the omission of the proviso at the end of Clause 3 giving the right of appeal to a person convicted upon a charge involving sentence of death, said this Amendment was one which he thought would receive the assent of a great many persons who were favourable to the passing of the Bill. It was an Amendment which was proposed at the very last moment, not under the authority of the Government at all, giving an absolute right of appeal to every person capitally convicted. Let anyone imagine what the condition of things was. This was a thing about which there could be no doubt—that everybody, under these circumstances, would appeal. It was impossible to exaggerate the evil that would be done by that. The postponement of the execution of the sentence was one evil, no doubt, but he thought that a much greater one was the sort of feeling that must be induced by every person who was convicted, appealing and having the matter discussed over again whether or not the conviction was proper. He did not want to repeat what he had said before, but nobody who had witnessed a trial for murder in the English Courts would have failed to recognise the minute and severe care with which everything was done, and to say that there should be an appeal against sentence of death in every case was really to him intolerable. It was not in the purview of the Bill originally, and he did not think the Lord Chancellor could think it would aid the administration of justice to have such a right of appeal as that introduced.
Amendment moved—
"In page 3, line 13, to leave out from the word 'law' to the end of the clause."—(The Earl of Halsbury.)
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will tell your Lordships exactly what my feeling is about this. What I am saying is not in the least, I assure the noble Earl, affected by anything except a cool view of the whole clause as it stands. I should
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not have offered any strong resistance to the proposal to omit this clause, were it not for the consideration of the Amendment that has just been passed by the House. If that is persisted in by the House, what will be the result assuming the Bill passes? The result will be that you will have a man sentenced to death, and not allowed to go to the Court of Appeal by the interdict of the Judge who tried the case. Just think of the situation that is created by that. I think it would be a very unfortunate result, and for that reason alone I hope this Amendment will not be persisted in. Think of the situation created now. A man is tried and sentenced. Feelings are aroused—and wise men take account of feelings and try and persuade the world, and satisfy it, as I think we do, that justice is openly and fairly administered. A man is tried and sentenced. There is a good deal of doubt about his guilt or innocence. The Judge, very able, very honourable, and very upright, is supposed to have taken a "view," and he says, "No, this is a painful ordeal, but I do not see that it is a fit case"—and it would be stopped from going to the Appeal Court.
THE EARL OF HALSBURY: Why should it not be?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I know the noble Earl thinks it should not, but I think that that creates a situation which might lead to strain, and which would not be in the interests of justice. That is my only feeling in regard to this clause.
LORD ALVERSTONEwished to point out, if the Lord Chancellor would not think him impertinent, that his Lordship had really overlooked the provisions of the Bill. Every case of murder must be tried at the assizes, and therefore, in the first place, was presided over by one of the King's Bench Judges Every case of murder went at once to the Home Secretary and was most carefully considered

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by him, and he consulted the Judge, and by Clause (a) of Section 19 that case could be sent at once by the Home Secretary for Appeal. Therefore the suggestion of barring a man's appeal was not consistent with the Bill. But he would respectfully point out that there was something to be said on the other side. The Lord Chancellor had said that because the House had inserted the Amendment which had just been carried, this clause ought to stand. Could there be anything really worse than that there should be, as there would be in every murder case, for there was nothing to prevent it—an appeal lodged by someone, and got up, as the Lord Chancellor knew perfectly well was very often the case, by people who had not any knowledge of the case. He was satisfied that in no case where there was any doubt would any Judge of the High Court say that it was not a fit case for appeal; and even if he did, the Homo Secretary could send it there at once over his head. Therefore, he thought it was not quite giving fair weight to what the House had decided to say that that decision made any difference in the present case.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am not in the least chiding or complaining. I am a Member of the House, though I very seldom vote with the majority—I hope I may some day. But I accept, as every man does, the decision of the House, and I have not made any complaint. I am only trying to point out the result. It is quite true that every Judge who tries a case will do his duty. I believe he will, whether there is an appeal or not, do his very, very best. But we all know that it is precisely because the very best Judges, with the very best intentions, take "views" that appeals are necessary.
LORD ALVERSTONE: In murder cases?
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: They do take "views," and they might perfectly honourably make mistakes in murder cases as well as in other cases. But at all events there is a feeling that you cannot get to the Court of Appeal. I had the Home Secretary in my mind. What you can do is this. You can get to the Court of Appeal by leave of the Home Secretary, and the consequence is
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you are just re-introducing the very system that is thought so unsatisfactory. I hope the noble Earl will think that I want to act loyally towards him, and I do not suppose it is any use our offering opposition to the noble Earl if he wishes to go to a division.
LORD ASHBOURNEsaid he did not like to hear the Lord Chancellor speak as if the reason was all on his side of the House and the voting all on theirs. Let them take the particular Amendment, and consider it by itself, on its own merits and its own words. That was the way the clause stood until almost the last hour of going to Committee.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: But for the last Amendment I should not have resisted it.
LORD ASHBOURNEsaid he quite recognised that, but the Amendment introduced in another place was not defensible on its own merits. It weakened the sense of responsibility in the very case where it was most desirable that that it should be kept, so that the jury should feel that they were the arbiters of a man's life or death, and that upon them rested an immense responsibility which could not be devolved upon anybody else. The interest of the unfortunate criminal would be, of course, to rush into the Court of Appeal, and everyone would see that, that was a matter which was evidently open to the gravest objection, and the proposal could not stand serious criticism. If any Judge felt that in such an immense question as a man's life any kind of doubt was involved, he would at once say, "This is a fit case for appeal." If he did not do it, all the man had to do was to send in a memorial to the Home Office, and if the Home Office thought there was any kind of reason for an appeal, the matter would go to the Court of Criminal Appeal.
Clause 3, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 4:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I think this clause wants alteration, and I imagine the noble Earl will agree with me that it does. I am very happy to agree with him in any way, and I hope

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he will agree with me in this. I propose the Amendment that I have inserted in the Paper, so that the clause shall read in this way:—
"The Court of Criminal Appeal on any such appeal against conviction snail allow the appeal, if they think that the verdict of the jury should be set aside on the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence, or that the judgment of the Court before whom the appellant was convicted should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision of any question of law, or that upon any ground there was a miscarriage of justice."
Amendment moved—
"In page 3, line 22, to leave out from the word 'on' to the word 'or' in line 24, and to insert the words 'the ground that it is unreasonable or cannot be supported, having regard to the evidence."
"In line 27, to leave out the words 'or fact or of mixed law and fact,' and insert the words 'or that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
THE Earl of HALSBURY: I quite agree with that.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I do not know whether I am too particular', but I think it is best to put in the words "warranted in law by the verdict." It may be that it is implicitly contained in the clause, but I think it is best to insert those words.
Amendment moved—
"In page 4, line 1, after the word 'sentence' to insert the words 'warranted in law by the verdict.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Clause 4, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 5:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: This is very much the same, my Lords; it is really to carry out what is the purpose of the clause. I beg to move.
Amendment moved—
"In page 4, line 9, after the word 'proper' to insert the words 'and as may be warranted in law by the verdict on the count or part of the indictment on which the Court consider that the appellant has been properly convicted.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Further drafting Amendments agreed to.
Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 6 agreed to.
Clause 7:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I wish to put in a provision that the rules that are to be made shall enable any convicted person to present his case and argument in writing instead of by oral argument, and that any case or argument so presented shall be considered by the Court. That will make it unnecessary for an appellant who is a poor man either to attend and appeal himself or to send a solicitor; he may send a written application.
Amendment moved—
"In page 5, line 28, after the word 'conviction' to insert the words 'such rules shall enable any convicted person to present his case and his argument in writing instead of by oral argument if he so desires. Any case or argument so presented shall be considered by the Court.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 8 agreed to.
Clause 9:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The purpose of this Amendment is this; according to the Bill as it stands now evidence may be taken by the Court, and I think this is quite clear—that no sentence ought to be increased by reason of any new evidence that is not before the jury.
Amendment moved—
"In page 7, line 14, to leave out subsection (J). In line 19, after the word 'Court' to insert the words 'provided that in no case shall any sentence be increased by reason of or in consideration of any evidence that was not given at the trial.'"—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 10 agreed to.
Clauses 11 to 14 agreed to.
Clause 15:—
LORD ALVERSTONEsaid he did not wish to move a formal Amendment, but he hoped the Lord Chancellor would kindly consider this clause between then und the Report stage. He was quite satisfied that in its present form it would never work, and that it was only interposing the Registrar to put papers in order for the Court. But his real objection was that if the Bill was going to be worked—as he was sure it would be—loyally and effectually, it was the Court of Appeal which ought to decide whether a case was one which should be dealt with summarily. He did not like deputing or delegating to any official, however good he might be, the duty of picking out certain cases and saying that they were so unsubstantial that they ought to be referred to the Court at once for decision. He thought the Lord Chancellor would bear him out in saying that very often it was impossiable to tell, until a case had been partially inquired into, whether or not there was any substantial point in it, and he thought it would be putting the appellant at a disadvantage if the Registrar was to be allowed to pick out cases and say, "These appear to me to be frivolous, and they ought to be dealt with summarily." Let the Court do its work itself. It was important work, and ought to be gravely done, and feeling, as he did, that this was a new jurisdiction of a very important character, he objected on principle to anybody under the status of a Judge saying that cases were such that they should be dealt with in a summary way. He was sure it would increase the work, and he hoped the Lord Chancellor would be kind enough to consider, between then and the Report stage, whether that subsection ought to stand. If it did stand, it would require either very considerable additional enactments, or else to be supplemented by rules.
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I will of course consider the matter, and I shall be very glad if my noble and learned friend will speak to me about it. Of course the purpose of the clause is, not to allow the registrar to decide anything, but if he sees anything which is really absurd—as for example a claim to appeal on the
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ground of some great public event or anything of that sort—he may show it to the Court in order that the Court may deal with it. It is, after all, only a very small matter, but as I say, I am quite willing to consider it.
Clause 15 agreed to.
Clause 16:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I have a small Amendment to move with reference to the matter of the shorthand notes; I want to put in the words "directed to be made by the registrar."
Amendment moved—
"In page 10, line 29, to leave out the word 'required' and insert the words 'directed to be made by the registrar."—(The Lord Chancellor.)
Amendment agreed to.
Clause 16, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 17 agreed to.
Clause 18:—
THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I want to say a word if I may—but I am afraid the noble Earl (Lord Halsbury) is away—about this clause. I should like upon Report to make a little alteration in the clause. I think it is anomalous that the Court of Criminal Appeal should sit, and that their registrar should sit alongside of them as one of the Rule Committee, and that there should be different people, clerks of the peace and so forth. I think the form of words ought to be varied, so as to bring in "with the consent of the Lord Chancellor, with the advice and assistance of the Committee hereinafter mentioned."
LORD ASHBOURNE: A point that occurs to me is this. I am sure it is a mere slip, but this clause provides that the Rule Committee may act by any five of their number, and according to the way the clause is drafted it is quite possible to make up the five without putting on a single Judge.
LORD ALVERSTONE: That would be met by the alteration which the Lord Cnancollor proposes.
Clause 18 agreed to.
Remaining clauses agreed to.
Standing Committee negatived. The Report of Amendments to be received on Monday next, and Bill to be printed as amended. (No. 165.)

FATAL ACCIDENTS (DAMAGES) BILL [H.L.]
House in Committee (according to Order).
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHsaid he knew it required a certain amount of indulgence on the part of the House for him to raise any question in connection with this Bill, because, after all, it was purely a legal matter, and he did not know whether or not he ought to appeal to the noble Lord in charge of the Bill for an answer. The noble Lord (Lord Courtney) had made himself responsible for the Bill, and had introduced it at a very late period of the session, and under circumstances which, he thought, were not altogether convenient. But it might be that the point on which he wanted information was one upon which only someone learned in the law could satisfy him. The words of Clause 1 were very wide. They enacted that there should not be taken into account any sum paid or payable on the death of a deceased person—deceased by accident, of course, that meant—under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after the passing of the Act. They had all recently had very serious obligations put upon them, as householders, with regard to their domestic servants and others, if they should happen to meet with death in the course of the discharge of their service. The point he wanted to put was this. Supposing, as a prudent man, he had insured his servant's life against accidents, and he was killed. He thought he was right in supposing that if he paid the premiums, and took out the policy in his own name, the amount insured would be paid to him, and he could use it as a set-off against the amount in which he was cast for damages. For instance, if the verdict of the jury said that the widow was to have £500, and he had taken out a policy for £300, he understood that in that case he would only have to pay £200. Against that he had nothing to say. But if, before the passing of
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this Act, he had givem his servant the premiums, or had taken out the policy in his servant's name, then would not the effect of the Bill be that he would not only have to pay the whole £500 which the jury awarded to the widow, but that the widow would also get the proceeds of the policy of insurance? If that were so, he thought it was very unfair, and at any rate he thought they ought to know what they were doing. That was the first of the two questions to which he wanted an answer. Then there was a larger question even than that. Men dealt with then-savings in different ways. Some men were provident by laying up sums year by year, and investing them. He could understand a man young in life thinking he had a better chance of getting a better sum for those he might leave behind him by taking that course than by insuring his life, and if it was the case that a man did that, and accumulated a considerable sum, and left it behind him, would not that be regarded as a set-off in the same way as if he had taken out a policy of insurance? He spoke with diffidence, but he understood the definition of Lord Campbell's Act was this—that the damages given were not to be sentimental damages, but that the widow, or other person left behind, was to be put in the same pecuniary position as she would have been in if the husband had not been killed. Now if the interpretation of the law was amended—as he was afraid it was—by the Bill, he thought they would be giving a wholly undue preference to thrift by insurance as compared with thrift by any other means. He did not wish to enlarge upon it—he was painfully aware that it was a matter which was perhaps rather too intricate and subtle for a layman to deal with—but he thought that considering the number of people affected by the Act which had been passed last year, obliging them to pay compensation in the case of the death of their servants, the case was one of sufficient importance to have been dealt with earlier in the session, and with greater deliberation than was possible at the present time. However, he had done his duty in calling attention to the matter, and he would feel very much obliged if those who were really responsible would answer his question.
LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITHsaid the noble Lord had appealed to him,

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but he had also, at the same time, appealed to a higher authority. He confessed that he himself was not so learned in the law as to be able to give the noble Lord a perfectly satisfactory answer. But in answer to the first Question, he might say that the Bill, of course, only applied to actions taken under Lord Campbell's Act, and the effect of it was simply that in assessing the damages which might be obtained by the friends and dependants of a deceased man under that Act there should not be deducted from the amount of damages payable to the deceased's representatives any amount which might be paid under a policy of insurance taken out on the deceased man's life. In the case put by the noble Lord, of a man taking out a policy to provide against a loss which might be sustained under the Workmen's Compensation Act of last year, there could be no doubt that in such a case the master took out a policy of insurance, and the master received the amount of that policy of insurance, which helped him to pay the compensation awarded. In that sense it was deducted from the amount which he had to pay, but it was not deducted from the amount received by the deceased man's representatives. That, he took it, was the right view of the case. Then the noble Lord had suggested that possibly a master might have taken out a policy and given it to his servant. If that was the case—and he confessed he thought it was an extremely unusual and unlikely case—then a question might arise as to whether the representatives of the man would not be entitled both to the policy and to the compensation. But if such an unlikely case should occur—he was not aware that it had occurred—it was one which could be immediately rectified, because the policy could be dropped, and a new policy taken out in the name of the master, to insure him against the loss to which he was subject, in certain events, under the Act, and to the extent of that policy he would receive the money to help him to pay the compensation which would otherwise be payable by him without any such help. Then the noble Lord had asked whether the provisions of the Bill did not give preference to thrift by insurance as against thrift by saving. He had no doubt it was open to question whether there should be any deduction whatever from the compensation paid to the representatives of deceased men
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through negligence of another, on account of the fact that the deceased man had saved money. But this Bill was directed expressly to the injustice which had arisen under the operation of Lord Campbell's Act in respect to policies of insurance, which he might remind their Lordships had been dealt with in two private Acts this year. It was to that purpose, and to that purpose alone, that the Bill was directed, and it was that evil alone which was sought to be remedied. A further Bill might hereafter be necessary to make the law logical in all its application, but he submitted that it was no reason for delaying the present Bill to say that it was possible to conceive of other cases in which the operation of the law of damages told improperly against thrift exercised by a man who saved money otherwise than by taking out a policy of insurance.
LORD ALVERSTONEthought that the noble Lord had answered the questions of Lord Balfour of Burleigh, but he himself would have liked to hear something about the provisions of the Bill itself. It appeared that a man might be absolutely insured against the very accident that killed him, and yet the master might have to pay compensation in full, even though the dependants of the deceased man might be receiving the full amount awarded under the policy of insurance. That principle might be right or it might be wrong, but it was a principle to which he did not think the House ought to assent without argument.
LORD STANLEY OFALDEKLEYquite admitted that if a man insured his servant, and took out the policy of insurance in the name of his servant in January of this year, the policy to run to December, there might he a few months during which the servant might get the amount insured under that policy and also get compensation. But that was a very transient risk, because of course no employer would in future dream of taking out a policy in the name of his servant. Therefore it was a very accidental and chance risk that might arise, and not one of any great importance with reference to permanent legislation.
THE LORD CHANCELLORsaid that this was a Bill which both he and the other members of His Majesty's Government

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were very anxious to see passed. The noble Lord (Lord Balfour of Burleigh) had asked—he did not know whether he was aware of it—questions in reference to one of the most difficult points of the law, namely, the measurement of damages. He would answer the noble Lord's questions in three sentences. The noble Lord's first question was whether, if he insured himself against having to pay damages to a servant under the new Act, he would have to pay not only the damages to the servant, but also the money he got from the insurance policy. No, he would get that for himself. The second question was whether, if he were bountiful enough to hand over to his servant a policy taken out at his own cost, the servant would then get the benefit of that policy. Yes, because he would have made a present to the servant, and it was his own act which had conferred that benefit upon the servant. The third question was, what was the difference in fairness between the case of a man killed by the negligence of another, he being himself a wealthy man, leaving his dependants well off by invested money, and the case of a man who had insured his life? The answer to that was that under Lord Campbell's Act the law took into account the sum of money, or the other advantages, left to the widow and children. But in the case of an insurance policy, there was a difference in some respects, because it was a policy effected against the accident, the benefit of which only arose upon the death itself, and to give that benefit to the person who was in the position of being the defendant in the action would be to give the benefit to the wrong-doer—the person guilty of negligence.
Bill reported without Amendment. Standing Committee negatived; and Bill to be read 3a to-morrow.

SALMON AND FRESH WATER FISHERIES BILL [H.L.]
Commons Amendments considered (according to order).
EARL CARMNGTON: My Lords, I have only one Amendment to move, and that is an Amendment to Clause 4 of the Bill. That clause prescribes the machinery for making Provisional Orders under this Bill. The procedure is that the Board
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must make a local inquiry before making an Order. After the draft Order is made they may hold a second local inquiry if objections are made to the Order. The clause has been amended in the Commons so as to provide that the Board must hold a second local inquiry if the county council object to the Order, and, therefore, the clause would read thus—
"The Board of Agriculture and Fisheries may, if they think it expedient, and shall if any county council objects to the draft Order, hold a local inquiry by an inspector or other officer of the Board with respect to any objections made to the draft Order, and shall after considering all such objections and the Report of the officer who held the inquiry (if any) thereon, settle the terms of the draft Order."
I beg to move that the Commons Amendments be considered. The other two Amendments on Clause 6 are merely privilege Amendments, which I need not read, inserting the words, "at the expense of the county councils." I beg to move that the Commons Amendment to the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Bill be agreed to.
Moved, "That the Commons Amendments be agreed to."—(Earl Carrington.)
LORD NEWTONasked why the Amendments did not appear on the Paper. The explanation of the noble Earl might have been extremely lucid, but he could not follow it altogether. The method adopted on this occasion did not seem a satisfactory kind of precedent, and he would be glad if the noble Lord would be good enough to explain why the Amendments had not been printed.
EARL CARRINGTON: If the noble Lord wishes, I can take it to-morrow, but the Amendments are really very formal—there is really nothing in them—and the one I tried to explain to the House is the only one that requires explanation. The others are merely privilege Amendments, and I therefore hope that the noble Lord will not raise any objections.
LORD NEWTONsaid he did not want to raise any objection, but it seemed to him rather an unbusiness-like way of doing things. He hoped the same principle was not going to be applied to all the other Bills which were coming before the House.

PUBLIC HEALTH BILL.
Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.
LORD ALLENDALE: My Lords, I am glad to think—and I am sure your Lordships will all be very much relieved to hear—that this formidable-looking Bill of 95 clauses—formidable, I think, at any time of the session, but especially when introduced into this House at this period of the session—will not necessitate any long introduction from me. I must, indeed, frankly admit that I should not be capable of giving it even if it were necessary for me to do so. It is a Bill which I think has been agreed upon substantially, and I have no doubt that Lord Onslow will be able to explain to your Lordships a little more about it than I can.
From time to time, as your Lordships are aware, particular local authorities bring in Bills for local Acts containing various provisions as to sanitary and police matters. These provisions are carefully considered by a Special Committee of the House of Commons, called the Police and Sanitary Committee, and also by the Chairman of Committees in the House of Lords. The consequence is that there are a number of clauses the provisions of which are seldom or never refused by Parliament when local authorities apply for them. The Police and Sanitary Committee have on several occasions in recent years referred in their Reports to the desirability of including in a Public Act many of the provisions which are so frequently introduced into Bills for local Acts and accepted by Parliament. Some of the clauses in this Bill are adoptive, and arrangements can be made under which they, or such of them as are needed in a particular district, can be put in force. The local authority will be able to obtain the benefit of those clauses of this Bill which will apply to their particular locality without being obliged to promote a Bill in Parliament at considerable expense. I believe the Lord Chairman agrees to the expediency of this being done, and it will be remembered by your Lordships that on the 7th March last my
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noble friend Lord Onslow called attention to the large number of local Acts which were passed in recent sessions for private Bills introduced for conferring sanitary powers upon particular authorities, and that he asked whether the time had not arrived for the extension of the Public Acts. In reply my noble friend Lord Carrington expressed sympathy on behalf of the Government with the object of the present Bill.
It may be mentioned that a somewhat similar Bill to this was passed in the year 1893, amending an Act of the same character of 1875. This has proved of very much service, and up to the end of last year I may say that 965 urban and 360 rural authorities had adopted the whole or portions of the Act. The present Bill was introduced into the House of Commons by Mr. Wilson, who at present occupies the position of Chairman of the Police and Sanitary Committee, which at one time, as your Lordships know, was occupied, to the great advantage of the public, by Lord Fitzmaurice. This Bill has undergone considerable revision in Standing Committee in another place, and all clauses likely to be controversial have been eliminated, while various necessary alterations were made in other clauses at the instance of the Local Government Board and of the Secretary of State. The Bill was supported by the Government in the House of Commons, although it was a Private Member's Bill, and it was starred by the Government at the Report stage, as they think it very important that the Bill should be passed this session, and if it had not been starred, as your Lordships are aware, there would have been no chance of its being made law this session.
The Bill is divided into ten parts, which deal with such matters as streets and buildings, sanitary provisions; infectious diseases, common lodging houses, recreation grounds, police, fire brigades, sky signs and hoardings, and other miscellaneous subjects. As I say, care has been taken to eliminate any clauses that might have led to controversy. Clause 3, which is rather an important clause, provides that on the application of the local authority the Local Government Board, or, as regards police clauses, the Secretary of State, may declare any

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section to be in force in a particular district, and that, as I have said before, will obviate the necessity and the great expense of local authorities coming to Parliament for special Bills.
It appears to be unnecessary to go further into the provisions of the Bill, even if there were time to do so. As I say, I believe it contains no novel or controversial proposals, and the Government cordially hope that it will be passed this session. I see that Lord Onslow has put down a notice that in the event of the Bill being read a second time by the House it be referred to a Select Committee. The Government, on the understanding that such Committee would meet forthwith and examine the Bill with a view to see that it answers its purpose—the purpose which I have described generally to your Lordships—and also on the understanding that the passing of the measure would not be endangered, would be prepared to assent to that course. But of course it must be realised that if any serious objection is taken to the Bill, or any substantial alteration made, it will be quite impossible for the Bill to become law this session.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 2a."—(Lord Allendale.)
THE Earl of ONSLOW: The noble Lord has very truly said that when I inquired whether His Majesty's Government would be disposed to accept a Bill amending the Public Health Act I was received with much sympathy by the President of the Board of Agriculture, but was afforded very little hope that anything would be done. However, by the enterprise of the gentleman referred to in the other House of Parliament who prepared this Bill, the Bill has now been laid upon the Table of your Lordships' House. I regret that some clauses, at any rate, which the noble Lord described as being possibly contentious have been struck out of the Bill, because I think many of them would have been of considerable value. However, I welcome the Bill as far as it goes, and I am glad that its Second Reading has been moved, not by a private Member of your Lordships'" House, but by the noble Lord who represents the Local Government Board. The reason I shall presently ask your Lordships to send the Bill to a small
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Select Committee is that in the course of its passage in another place it has been materially altered in many points of drafting. It was originally intended to represent the clauses which are usually introduced into private Bills as revised by the Police and Sanitary Committee in another place, and by my Department in your Lordships' House, but it bears now upon it the stamp of the drafting of the Local Government Board, and I think that before your Lordships pass it into law it is very desirable that the Bill should be carefully examined—not upon any material points of policy or of procedure, but mainly to see that it falls in line with the various local Acts which have been passed in different parts of England. I think that a Bill of this kind is desirable every few years, and I hope, therefore, that your Lordships will give it a Second Reading. I also hope that you will accede to the Motion which I shall presently make, in regard to which I will undertake that it will be a very short time before the Bill is returned to your Lordships' House. The acceptance of my Motion will save your Lordships' time, because the matters with which the Bills deals will be fully discussed in Committee, and your Lordships will then have an opportunity of considering the Report of the Committee, and furthermore the referring of it to a Committee will in no way interfere with any noble Lord who may wish to add to or amend the Bill doing so at a subsequent stage.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I am very glad that the noble Lord intends to move that this Bill be referred to a Select Committee. An inquiry of the kind may afford a very valuable opportunity to any noble Lords who desire to make suggestions in regard to the Bill. My attention was drawn to it by some friends of mine who mentioned to me a particular clause of the Bill. It is Clause 75, which deals with the question of recreation grounds. That is a clause which, as drawn, appears to put it in the power of local authorities to make use of premises connected with these recreation grounds for the purpose of carrying on a trade in intoxicating liquors. That seems to me to be a very dangerous permission, and I think the matter requires to be looked into. But this led me to make some inquiries into the Parliamentary history of this

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Bill, which is really rather a remarkable one. The Lord Chairman said something a moment ago of the enterprise which had been shown by its promotors. Let me tell your Lordships how that enterprise operated. I am told—and the noble Lord who is in charge of the Bill will no doubt correct me if I have been misinformed—that the Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on the 1st July. It then contained 142 clauses. The Committee dealt with it in one sitting. There were alterations covering 65 pages. During half the time no quorum of the Committee was present. The question of the regularity of the proceedings was afterwards raised in the House of Commons, and the Chairman of the Committee admitted fully that there had been irregularity. The Bill was thereupon re-committed. It came back to the House on the 29th July with 97 alterations, and it was not reprinted until the Report stage of the Bill had been taken at half-past three in the morning. The particular clause in which I have taken a slight interest was never before the House of Commons at all. It was not in the Bill at all on the occasion of the Second Reading, and when the Report stage was reached at an early hour of the morning the clause in question was not in print. We hear a great deal in these days of the manner in which we transact our proceedings, and I venture to think that if we ever have to make a collection of the curiosities of Parliamentary life the case which I have described to your Lordships will deserve a place in our museum.
LORD FITZMAURICE: Perhaps I may be able to throw a little light upon some of the points which have been mentioned, and I venture to do so because my noble friend who introduced this Bill mentioned my name in connection with it, I having been some time Chairman of the Police and Sanitary Committee of the House of Commons, from the prolonged labours of which Committee this Bill has originated. Year after year, not only in the year in which I was Chairman, but long before and after, Reports came from that Committee under the chairmanship of such men as Mr. Walter Long (who I think may really be said to have been the founder of these proposals), Sir Henry Fowler, Mr. McKenna, and others, suggesting that the time had come when all these multifarious clauses which were put
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into private Bills, and in regard to which a certain similarity of practice had grown up, should be incorporated, as in 1890, in one Bill, so as to save the local authorities the enormous expense and waste of time which they are put to by each of them individually having to bring in private Bills of their own. Nevertheless it was only gradually that agreement could be come to upon many of these questions. But now at length, owing largely to the labours of the gentleman whose name has been mentioned, and of whom I think no praise can possibly be too high—I mean Mr. Wilson—the present Bill has been prepared. I had the advantage of Mr. Wilson's presence on the Committee, and—I say it in no spirit of flattery—any success the Committee obtained under my chairmanship was very largely due to his presence and assistance; and he very naturally, in the course of time, became chairman of it. Now the time has come, I think in the opinion of everybody, when those clauses can be, with great public advantage, incorporated in one Bill, following the precedent of 1890. If any criticism can be made it is that probably this might have been done with advantage some years ago. But there were certain rather controversial questions involved in these matters; and, when the Bill was brought in, I understand that some of those matters, which still remained slightly controversial, were in the Bill. They, however, fortunately, as I should think, for the progress of the Bill, though on its merits I regret them, were removed at one stage or another in the House of Commons in order to facilitate the undisputed passage of the Bill. I allude more particularly to what are known as the milk clauses of the Bill, with regard to which there was an old controversy, which I was in hopes had terminated, as to what were the powers to be given to local authorities to inspect dairies and other places outside their own jurisdiction. I understand, however, that the President of the Local Government Board has got another Bill which, even if it does not pass this year, will deal with this question very largely, and will certainly be brought before Parliament next year. Then there was also a question about slaughter-houses, with regard to which, I may remind the House, the noble Lord brought in last year a Bill with which I personally had every sympathy. But there again controversy arose, because there was a

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very powerful interest represented by the butchers of the country, who thought, like Alexander the Coppersmith of old, that their industry was going to suffer some great harm; and those clauses also were removed. Then there were clauses relating to a matter which I remember because it was more prominent than any other while I was chairman of the Committee—clauses relating to that very interesting and exciting topic as to when a common drain was to become a sewer. I am sure the Lord Chairman will agree with me that that question has caused in its time, and to him personally no doubt as Chairman, a very great amount of trouble and anxiety. But I understand that those clauses have also disappeared, because at length, after many years, it has been found possible to get a decision from the High Court to clear away the interesting accumulation, if I may use the expression, of legal rubbish which had got piled up around this apparently simple but really very complicated question. Therefore, the net result is, that by this decision the Bill practically became an undisputed Bill; and, although I think nobody can possibly complain of the noble Marquess' (the Marquess of Lansdowne) having called attention to what passed in the House of Commons, yet, as a matter of fact, the explanation is very simple, namely, that when this Bill really got into Committee and at subsequent stages it had become practically an undisputed Bill, and as people considered that there was going to be no controversy in the Committee, it was thought that it would be allowed to pass through in the rather rapid—and I admit theoretically peculiar—manner which the noble Marquess has not unnaturally mentioned to your Lordships' House. I hope I have been able to give the explanation of those circumstances; and if there are any cases like that which was mentioned just now of power to grant licences for alcoholic liquors having crept into the Bill in some unobserved and objectionable manner, I think the Committee will have no difficulty in dealing with them. But I most earnestly hope that, after the years of labour given by the Police and Sanitary Committee of the House of Commons, this Bill may be allowed to pass into law. And I hope your Lordships will also allow me to say that the Government, in starring this Bill, have desired to show that the charge which is occasionally
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made—as I think unjustly—against those who sit on this side of the House and against this Government, that they are bringing in large and controversial measures and forgetting the large and important, though humbler, class of legislation which deals with the social interests of the people and those matters which come home to them in their hearths and homes, is not a just one, and that one proof of it is that the Government has taken under its protection, with every desire of passing it even late in the session, this long and, I venture to say, important Bill in order that it may find its way at last on to the Statute-book.
On Question, Motion agreed to. Bill read 2a accordingly.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: I now move that the Bill be referred to a Select Committee. And, in doing so, I venture to say that I hope your Lordships will not expect the Select Committee either to re-insert any of those somewhat controversial clauses which have been referred to, or, I am afraid, to deal very exhaustively with the question raised by the noble Lord the Marquess of Lansdowne. I quite agree that it is a very important question, and one which it would be better to leave to the House. As I said before, the House will have ample opportunities of considering the Bill at a later stage; and I am looking merely to the work of the Committee to put it into proper drafting shape, so that your Lordships may, when it comes back from the Committee, consider any important points of policy which may arise upon the Bill.
Moved "That the Bill be referred to a Select Committee."—(The Earl of Onslow.)
LORD ALLENDALE: As I indicated in the few remarks which I made in moving the Second Reading of the Bill, I concur on behalf of the Government with the proposal of the Lord Chairman to refer the measure to a Select Committee. With reference to the remark made by the Marquess of Lansdowne a little while ago, I have just been informed that the clause in question to which he took exception, although for some reason it was not printed in the Bill, had been in print for a month, and had been discussed by the Committee; but, owing to some

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informality, it was not included in the Bill.
On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

FINANCE BILL.
Read 3a (according to order), and passed.

VACCINATION BILL.
House in Committee, (according to order.)
Clause 1:—
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHsaid he desired to move to leave out of line 11 the words "either parent or such other person as the case may be "in order to insert" he." The purport of the Amendment was to put the Bill back into the very form in which the Government introduced it in the other House of Parliament. On its introduction, it was stated perfectly correctly that the Bill was intended to substitute a statutory declaration for the certificate of exemption now to be obtained by the conscientious objector, and it put the responsibility of making that declaration upon the same person as was responsible for the custody of the child, upon the only person subject to the penalty, thus maintaining the law on a perfectly logical basis. It had the additional advantage claimed for it of giving a fair chance of exercising the privilege. Assuming that the English law should be what it was made in 1898—he was not going to raise any controversial question on that—he thought the original proposal of the Government would be a better method of carrying out the law than that which now obtained in the Bill. In some mysterious way during the passage of the Bill through the other House of Parliament a change had been imposed upon the Government. He believed it was contrary to their will that they should be obliged to accept the proposal which entitled either parent to make the declaration. It was not easy to find out the reason for this change, for there was no official record kept of the proceedings in the Standing Committee. It was not possible to refer to any volume of Hansard, but he had had,
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by accident, put into his hand a paper called The Vaccination Inquirer. It was not a class of literature which he generally spent much time in reading, but he was bound to say for its credit that it was extremely useful on this occasion, and it gave what he had no doubt was as correct an account as they could make it of the proceedings in the Committee. It was, at any rate, perfectly clear that both the President of the Local Government Board, Mr. John Burns, and Dr. Macnamara, his Parliamentary Secretary, did all they possible could to prevent the Committee adopting the Amendment. They and others used, in his opinion, very cogent arguments against it. They pointed out that it was a revolutionary change in English law, and that up to the present it had been a universal proposition that the primary responsibility for the child rested on the father. The father was the responsible person to see that the child went to school and that he or she was vaccinated, and the law looked to him to carry out all the obligations of parentage. He thought it was obviously right, and so far as he had seen from the paper the only argument that was used against it was that it might take the father from a day's work to make the statutory declaration. He doubted even whether that was correct, because the next speaker said that there were 30,000 persons in England qualified to take the declaration which the parent now had to make, and surely on a Saturday afternoon, or at some time when the father was at leisure, he could make the declaration. If it were to be a choice between the two parents as to who was to walk any distance to do it, surely it would be fairer and more right that the obligation should be put upon the father than upon the mother, who had a great deal to do. He was hopeful that, after what Mr. Burns and Dr. Macnamara had said in the other House and in the Committee, they would not have to go to a division upon the subject. He had, however, another argument to use. He thought, as their Lordships knew, it was wrong that the Scottish law should be changed and assimilated to the English law. He was beaten upon that largely by the influence of the noble Viscount on the front bench, who made a speech which had great power with their Lordships. The force of the speech was

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that it was not competent to make a difference between English and Scottish law. He now appealed to those who were influenced by the argument. If they were going to keep the law in the two countries the same, they must put the Bill back into the condition in which it was introduced. It was the Government's first proposal that the obligation should be put upon the male parent, and that was their deliberate opinion still, because, after the proceedings of the Committee, they introduced the Scottish Bill in the same form as they originally introduced this Bill. If they were sinners, they were impenitent sinners. He appealed to them to adhere to their original view and to be consistent. He would not labour the point, but he hoped he would hear that the Government were willing to accept the Amendment.
Amendment moved—
"In line 11, leave out the words 'either parent or such other person as may be' and insert the word 'be'"—(Lord Balfour of Burleigh.)
LORD ALLENDALEsaid the Government could not accept the Amendment. The provision as to the parent or other person having the custody of the child making application for exemption was governed by Section 2 of the Vaccination Act, 1878, and the effect of that was to render it necessary for the father, under ordinary circumstances, to obtain the certificate of conscientious objection, he being the person liable for prosecution for neglect to have the child vaccinated. The mother was not as the law stood in such a case eligible to attend. The Bill proposed to substitute a statutory declaration for the certificate of exemption required under the Act which had been referred to. The Bill, as introduced, followed the terms of Section 2 of the Act of 1898, and it would, under ordinary circumstances have rendered it necessary for the father to make the declaration just as he had hitherto been the person to obtain the certificate of conscientious exemption. Lord Balfour said he wished to restore the Bill to that condition. It was altered in Standing Committee. The Government were beaten over it, and they proposed to take their defeat. An Amendment in Committee was proposed by Mr. Pickersgill to substitute for the word "he" the words "either
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parent, or such other person as the case may be," and as he had said, it was carried. The considerations which had been urged by Lord Balfour of Burleigh were present to the Government's mind when the Bill was framed, but there could be no doubt although the noble Lord minimised it, that cases did occur in which it was inconvenient and difficult for the father to attend and obtain the exemption certificate, and the mother could more readily do so. It had to be borne in mind that, if the father desired to have the child vaccinated, he could have it vaccinated, even though the mother had made the declaration. The feeling in favour of so altering the Bill as to allow either parent to apply for exemption was very strong, both in the Standing Committee and in the House of Commons itself, and the Government were of opinion that the decision of the Committee reflected the view of the majority of the House and that the Bill, as amended should stand. Lord Balfour had tried to draw an analogy between the English and Scottish Bills. He did not know exactly why there should be two Bills, but he assumed that this was necessitated by the fact that there already existed some difference in the procedure on each side of the border. At all events he was only concerned with the English Bill. He was not conversant with the practice of vaccination in Scotland, but he presumed that the procedure there was in some points different from the procedure in England. He would remind their Lordships that the English Bill had been through the House of Commons and that objection was taken in their Lordships' House to the Scottish Bill on Second Reading, owing to its having been introduced at a late period of the session, and not having been through the House of Commons. He did not know what might be done in another place with regard to assimilating the two Bills. The Government had considered the Amendment very carefully, and they thought the Bill, as amended, and which they believed to be the overwhelming opinion of the House of Commons should now stand.
VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYNthought the noble Lord who had just sat down had really made out his noble

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friend's case. He had stated that the view of the Government itself was that the obligation should remain on the father as it was imposed by the Vaccination Act, and as, no doubt, it ought properly to remain. The Government held that view so strongly that they actually brought in the Scottish Bill in their Lordships' House precisely in that form, although they had been beaten in the matter in the Standing Committee of the House of Commons. He thought it was perfectly obvious that they ought to adhere to the law as it at present stood and that the father ought to be the person to obtain the statutory declaration. He had heard it urged as a grievance that under the present law the father had to lose a day's work for the purpose of attending the petty sessions, where alone he could obtain the certificate of exemption. That was possibly an objection with some force in it, but anyone could make a statutory declaration before the persons qualified to receive it at almost any hour of the day or night. Only the other day a labouring man came to him about his dinner hour, and of course he willingly received his statutory declaration. Any magistrate would do the same, so that there could be no difficulty about the matter so far as the father was concerned, and he hoped their Lordships would retain the obligation on the father.
THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Earl of CREWE): I am bound to say, in spite of the manner with which the noble Lord introduced the Amendment, that I cannot myself regard it otherwise than as a small
matter. My noble friend behind me has stated what has occurred in the House of Commons, and there is no doubt there is a very strong feeling that, as a simple matter of convenience, it is an advisable thing to allow the mother, who must be assumed for this purpose to be acting for the father, to make this statutory declaration. I do not know whether noble Lords opposite are afraid that domestic jars might arise if one parent held one view and the other another. I remember many years ago when I was a candidate for Parliament that a person who was canvassing on one side or the other visited a house and asked a little girl: "What does your father do?" The reply was: "What mother tells him." "Certainly, if a father was in such a position and allowed the predominant partner to make the statutory declaration even although he was in favour of vaccination, I feel he would only have himself to thank. I cannot feel that this is an important matter. The principle involved—that the person who is liable should be the only person to make the statutory declaration—sounds very reasonable, but, when you come to examine it, I confess I do not see any particular reason why it should not be made the subject of an exception if that exception is for the public convenience. Under those circumstances and holding the view we do, I am afraid we must resist the noble Lord's Amendment.
On Question, whether the words proposed to be left out should stand part of the clause, their Lordships divided:—
Contents, 25; Not-Contents, 30.

CONTENTS.

Loreburn, L. (L. Chancellor.)

Allendale, L.

Granard, L. (E. Granard.)

Blyth, L.

[Teller.]

Crewe, E. (L. President.)

Colebrooke, L.

Hamilton of Dalzell, L.

Coleridge, L.

Haversham, L.

Beauchamp, E.

Courtney of Penwith, L.

Nunburnholme, L.

Carrington, E.

Denman, L. [Teller.]

Pirrie, L.

Craven, E.

Elgin, L. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

Sandhurst, L.

Portsmouth, E.

Tweedmouth, L.

Erersley, L.

Weardale, L.

Althorp, V. (L. Chamberlain.)

Fitzmaurice, L.

Glantawe, L.

NOT-CONTENTS.

Northumberland, D.

Salisbury, M.

Cawdor, E.

Clarendon, E.

Ailesbury, M.

Camperdown, E.

Donoaster, E. (D. Buccleuch and Queensbury.)

Lansdowne, M.

Cathcart, E.

Mount-Edgeumbe, E.

Hood, V.

De Mauley, L.

Onslow, E.

Hutchinson, V. (E. Donoughmore.)

Dunboyne, L.

Plymouth, E.

Ellenborough, L.

Powis, E.

St. Aldwyn, V.

Lawrence, L.

Vane, E. (M. Londonderry.

Ludlow, L.

Waldegrave, E. [Teller.]

Balfour, L.

Sanderson, L.

Churchill, V. [Teller.]

Burton, L.

Waleran, L.

Falkland, V.

Clinton, L.

Proposed word there inserted.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid that the Bill provided that a parent or other person might make a statutory declaration, and that then he should be free from liability to fine or punishment. The question was, what was to be done with that declaration after it was made. There was nothing in the Bill to say what was to be done with it. He did not know whether there was anything in the Vaccination Act. It was just possible there might be. He observed, however, that in the Scottish Bill the Government had made most careful provision for what was to be done with the statutory declaration. In the English Bill they had made none, though, of course, it might be that there was something in the English Vaccination Act which dealt with the point. If there was not, he begged to move the Amendment of which he had given notice, which would make certain provisions as to how the declaration was to be kept and copies furnished, and so on.
Amendment moved—
"In page 1, line 15, after the word 'district' to insert the words, 'Every vaccination officer to whom any statutory declaration shall be delivered under this Act, shall enter a minute of such declaration in a book to be kept by him for that purpose, and shall at all reasonable times allow searches to be made in such book, and upon demand give a copy under his hand of any entry therein on payment of a fee of sixpence for each search, and threepence for each copy, and shall be entitled in respect of each such entry to receive from the guardians the same sum as would be payable to him in respect of the registration of the successful vaccination of the child to whom such entry relates.'"—(The Earl of Camperdown.)
LORD ALLENDALEthought he could satisfy the noble Lord on the point. They did not propose to interfere with the Act of 1867 with regard to the question. Clause 24 of the Act provided that a register should be kept; and that upon demand copies of entries should be given on payment of 6d, for each search and 3d. for each copy. The
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Registrar, under the Act, received 1d. in respect of every child and another fee of 3d. in respect of each certificate. The present Bill did not propose to interfere with that. It was hardly necessary for him to say that the vaccination officer was not the person who performed the operation of vaccination. His duties were to act as a sort of registrar of vaccination for the district for which he-was appointed, to see that all the children in his district were accounted for, to look up defaulters, and so on. He was required to keep a report book and register in which were entered particulars with regard to every child coming within his cognisance. The form of vaccination register was prescribed by the Local Government Board, and that would be slightly altered after the Bill was passed. It contained an entry of the date of the certificate of exemption under Section 2 of the Vaccination Act of 1898, and when the Bill was passed, the column would be altered to make it refer to a Statutory Declaration. It would be seen therefore that there would be a register of declarations, and there did not appear to be any sufficient reason to require a special book to be kept for that purpose. He thought the column in the present register would be sufficient, nor did there seem to be any need for provision to be made for searching, as that was already provided for under the Act of 1898. The Amendment seemed to be proposed in the interests of the vaccination officers who feared that the Bill might diminish their incomes, but it might be presumed that the law would relieve them of some amount of their work in connection with defaulters. It was not anticipated, as he pointed out on the Second Reading of the Bill, that the number of persons who would obtain exemption on account of conscientious objections would be materially increased. That was one of the objections raised when the Act of 1898 was passed, and it had not proved to be the case. The number of applicants for exemption in proportion to the number of parents had: remained steady, varying

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from 5 to 4·8 per cent. The vaccination officers were paid by fees, but he would remind Lord Camperdown that, if their remuneration was considered inadequate, the fees might be increased either by the guardians with the concurrence of the Local Government Board or by the Board itself.
LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGHsaid that there was no doubt a register under the Act of 1867, but would that necessarily involve entries under this Bill, and would it be certain that there would be an obligation to let anyone have an examination of the register? Of course, it was a technical point of drafting, and, if the representatives of the Local Government Board told them that the thing would be done under any circumstances, then of course the Amendment would be superfluous, but they wanted to be quite sure that the statistics would be kept and would be available to any honest inquirer on payment of a fee.
LORD ALLENDALEsaid he could assure the noble Lord that it was so. The vaccination officers would be bound to keep a record, and it would be available to any reasonable inquirer.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNsaid that might be so, but as far as he could hear the noble Lord had said that in the Act of 1867 it was provided that a record should be kept of vaccinations. This Bill dealt with the question of statutory declarations. If it was necessary that there should be a statutory obligation with regard to vaccinations, why was it not necessary here? Of course, if the noble Lord said he was perfectly certain it was not necessary to have anything of the kind, it might be so, but, after all, they were dealing quite differently with this Bill from the manner in which they dealt with the Act of 1867.
THE EARL OF CREWE: I understand that the obligation which at present exists to place in a column of the register notice of all persons who have obtained certificates of exemption, in the manner now provided by law, will automatically be extended to those who obtain them by statutory declaration. I will, however, inquire, and if there is any doubt, my hon. friend will doubtless clear it up on the Report stage.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Bill, as amended, reported.

VACCINATION (SCOTLAND) BILL [H.L.]
Amendment reported (according to Order), and Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.
PROBATION OF OFFENDERS (No. 2) BILL.
Amendments reported (according to Order); and Bill to be read 3a To-morrow.
RELEASED PERSONS (POOR LAW RELIEF) BILL.
Read 3a (according to Order), and passed.

NATIONAL PORTRAIT GALLERY— RISK OF FIRE.
LORD GLANTAWEsaid he desired to ask the Questions which stood on the paper in the name of Lord Weardale, viz.: "Whether His Majesty's Government were aware of the grave fire and other risks to which the National Portrait Gallery was exposed by reason of the close proximity of the canteen and prison belonging to St. George's Barracks, whether they would take steps, as in the case of the National Gallery, to isolate the National Portrait Gallery by the transference of those buildings to some other position in the area occupied by the barracks; and whether His Majesty's Government would in the event of a decision to remove the barracks to some other locality, have due regard in the allocation of the vacant space to the claims of the National Portrait Gallery, and the urgent necessity for some increase in the accommodation provided for the National Collection of Portraits?"
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of PORTSMOUTH): In reply to the Question which has been addressed to me, I should like to inform the noble Lord that we are not prepared to admit that the proximity of St. George's Barracks to the National Portrait Gallery does involve any greater danger of fire or similar risks than the proximity of other buildings which are also in the neighbourhood. I have gone

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into the matter very carefully, because I sympathise with the object Lord Weardale has in view. The "Garrick" public-house is nearer to the Gallery than the canteen referred to by my noble friend. However this may be, my noble friend will be glad to hear that, as St. George's Barracks are entirely inadequate and unsuitable for their present purpose as the Central Recruiting Depot in London, another site has been selected in Old Scotland Yard with a view to the provision of new buildings which are to be erected thereon by His Majesty's Office of Works. I should like to inform my noble friend that the recruiting authorities at the War Office are willing on these conditions to vacate St. George's Barracks. We do not wish to raise any difficulty in the way of abandoning St. George's Barracks, but before we do so we must be put in a position of being provided with suitable accommodation elsewhere and in the neighbourhood. I would remind my noble friend that he must direct his further artillery at His Majesty's Office of Works, with a view to getting them to grant the additional accommodation which is demanded by the National Portrait Gallery Trustees. I should like to inform my noble friend that I entirely agree with him, and I hope His Majesty Office of Works will be able to agree.
LORD WEAEDALE: I thank my noble friend for the answer he has given on behalf of the War Office, but I desire to point out that the canteen actually abuts the wall of the National Portrait Gallery, and that so late as July 10th last, a fire broke out in the chimney of the canteen, and there was great danger of fire to the National Portrait Gallery itself. There was a large accumulation of debris entered the Gallery. Therefore, it is a matter of urgency and should be dealt with at once. I am well aware that other branches of my inquiry refer to another Department of State, and I would ask the representative of the Board of Works whether he can give us any light whatever with regard to giving further accommodation for the extension of the National Portrait Gallery. I would point out that the erection of the National Portrait Gallery was due to the munificence of a private individual and that all the nation has
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furnished is a site, and in my judgment a very inadequate grant year after year. Nevertheless a very fine collection of National portraits has been gradually acquired, and if it was unfortunately damaged, it could never be replaced. There seems to be some hope, according to the statements of the Under-Secretary for War, that the Board of Works will at all events allocate to the National Portrait Gallery some portion of the site for the future extension of the Gallery.
LORD ALLENDALE: I have been asked by Mr. Harcourt to answer any questions raised on this matter. Fire and other risks have been very present to the First Commissioner's mind for some time, and he is considering a scheme-in conjunction with the War Office and other Departments whereby some of the military buildings may be provided for elsewhere, in consequence of which risk would be diminished and accommodation secured for the future extension of both galleries. I understand that negotiations are proceeding, and it is hoped the scheme may be settled within the course of a few months. I cannot say any more than that. With regard to the canteen to which Lord Weardale has referred, I would remind him it is in a remote corner of the building, and although the prison adjoins the National Portrait Gallery, I believe there are no windows looking into the National Portrait Gallery. The risk in case of fire is not quite so great as it might seem. I can only say that negotiations are proceeding, and it is hoped some arrangements will be made.
LORD WEARDALE: With regard to the prison to which my noble friend has referred, and its proximity to the National Portrait Gallery, I would point out that an unfortunate incident occurred; two years ago. A prisoner escaped and made his way into the National Portrait Gallery, and, by its proximity, was able to get out by the front door and escape altogether. Consequently, there are-other risks besides those of fire.
THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: I hope this new building in Scotland Yard will be worthy of the Army. I know that the provision of proper recruiting stations has a most excellent effect in other parts of the country, and I hope the same example will be followed in the

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case of the new London depot. I think it would be of great interest if the Under-Secretary for War could arrange for a plan of the new buildings to be left in the Library in order that we might see it.
THE Earl of PORTSMOUTH: I will do what I can.
House adjourned at half-past Eight o'clock till To-morrow, Twelve o'clock,