Lords Sitting of 3 March 1905

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with:—North British Railway (General Powers).
Also the Certificates that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:—Great Central Railway [H.L.]; Great Central Railway (Pension Fund) [H.L.]; Shepton Mallet Gas Company (Electric Lighting) [H.L.].
And also the Certificate that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have not been complied with:—Blackpool, St. Anne's, and Lytham Tramways [H.L.].
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.
Marylebone Chapels Bill [H.L.]. Report from His Majesty's Attorney-General received, and ordered to lie on the Table.
Llandrindod Wells Urban District Council Bill [H.L.]; Hastings Tramways Bill [H.L.]; Wellingborough and District Tramroads and Electricity Supply Bill [H.L.]; Blackpool, St. Anne's, and Lytham Tramways Bill [H.L.]; Mullingar, Kells, and Drogheda Railway Bill; Heckmondwike Improvement Bill; Hammersmith, City, and North-East-London Railway Bill; Wigan Corporation Bill. Examiners' Certificates of non-compliance with the Standing Orders referred to the Standing Orders Committee on Thursday next.
Great Central Railway Bill [H.L.]; Great Central Railway (Pension Fund) Bill [H.L.]; Bridgewater Canals Bill [H.L.]; Metropolitan and Great Central Railway Companies Bill [H.L.]; Southend and Colchester Light Railways Bill [H.L.]; County of London Electric Supply
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Company Bill [H.L.]; Mexborough and Swinton Tramways (Extension of Time) Bill [H.L.]; Oldham and Saddleworth District Tramways Bill [H.L.]. Read 2a, and committed. The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.

  COLONIES: ANNUAL.
  No. 445. Leeward Islands (Report for 1903–1904).
  Presented (by Command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  BANKRUPTCY (IRELAND).
  Returns of the Official Assignees of the King's Bench Division "in Bankruptcy," in Ireland, and of the Local Courts, Belfast and Cork, for the year 1904.
  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

NEW BILLS.
  MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT (1882) AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.] (No. 18.)
  A Bill to amend the Married Women's Property Act, 1882; And

  PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION BILL [H.L.] (No. 19.)
  A Bill for the better prevention of corruption.
  Were presented by the Lord Chancellor; read 1a; and to be printed.

  COMMITTEE OF SELECTION FOR THE STANDING COMMITTEE.
  Report from, That the Committee have nominated the following Lords to serve on the Standing Committee:

  L. Archbp. of Canterbury.

  M. Salisbury. (L. Privy Seal.)

  E. Halsbury. (L. Chancellor.)

  D. Bedford.

  D. Devonshire.

  L. Archbp. of York.

  D. Northumberland.

  E. Vane. (M. Londonderry.) (L. President.)

  M. Winchester.

  M. Lansdowne.

  M. Linlithgow.

  M. Bath.

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  E, Clarendon. (L. Chamberlain)

  L. Balfour.

  L. Monson.

  L. Kenyon.

  E. Derby.

  L. Stewart of Garlies. (E. Galloway.)

  Denbigh.

  E. Stamford.

  L. Ribblesdale.

  E. Chesterfield.

  L. Harris.

  E. Jersey.

  L. Ranfurly. (E. Ranfurly.)

  E. Lauderdale.

  E. Carnwath.

  L. Rosebery. (E. Rosebery.)

  E. Stanhope.

  E. Waldegrave.

  L. Kilmarnock. (E. Errol.)

  E. Portsmouth.

  E. Spencer.

  L. Poltimore.

  E. Malmesbury.

  L. Denman.

  E. Westmeath.

  L. Oranmore and Browne.

  E. Belmore.

  E. Onslow.

  L. Kintore. (E. Kintore.)

  E. Minto.

  E. Stradbroke.

  L. Leigh.

  E. Cawdor.

  L. Elgin. (E. Elgin and Kincardine.)

  E. Camperdown.

  E. Lichfield.

  E. Yarborough.

  L. Belper.

  E. Dartrey.

  L. Brougham and Vaux.

  E. Lytton.

  E. Ancaster.

  L. Kinnaird.

  E. Crewe.

  L. Lawrence.

  V. Falkland.

  L. Wolverton.

  V. Sidmouth.

  L. Sandhurst.

  V. Gordon. (E. Aberdeen.)

  L. Aberdare.

  L. Norton.

  V. Hutchinson. (E. Donoughmore.)

  L. Reay.

  L. Tweedmouth.

  L. Northbourne.

  V. Hampden.

  L. Herries.

  V. Cross.

  L. Monkswell.

  V. Knutsford.

  L. Ashbourne.

  V. Llandaff.

  L. Thring.

  V. Goschen.

  L. Macnaghten.

  V. Ridley.

  L. Ashcombe.

  V. Churchill.

  L. Hawkesbury.

  L. Bp. London.

  L. Stanmore.

  L. Bp. Hereford.

  L. Davey.

  L. Bp. Rochester.

  L. Burghclere.

  L. Zouche of Haryngworth.

  L. James.

  L. Heneage.

  L. Windsor.

  L. Ludlow.

  L. Clifford of Chudleigh.

  L. Avebury.

  L. Alverstone.

  L. Barnard.

  L. Allerton.

  L. Saltoun.

  Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.

  NATIONAL DEFENCE.
  *LORD ELLENBOROUGH: My Lords, I rise, in accordance with the notice standing in my name on the Paper, to
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  call the attention of the House to the dangers that the country may be exposed to during the last few hours that may precede a declaration of war, or during the first few days of a contest with a first-class Power; and to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty if he and his naval colleagues are of opinion that the present laws of the country are such as to enable; them to check, if they wished it, the dissemination of news, and to take all other necessary precautions, not only against attacks that might be made on our men-of-war, or on our harbours for the purpose of closing them, but against invasion; and, if not, whether he will consider the desirability of bringing the subject before the Committee for Imperial Defence with the view of appointing a Committee of specialists, partly consisting of naval and military officers, to consider what alterations should be made in our laws for the purpose of securing our own coasts and our own harbours against surprise before the commencement of hostilities and during the earlier days of a war, such Committee to have power to hear evidence both with closed doors and in public, and to report confidentially as well as publicly.
  If what is now called the blue-water school have their own way, and if, in consequence of this, we only keep up a small Army, we shall be running a far greater risk of an invasion, during the last few hours of peace, or during the first few days of a war, than when the war is in full swing, when our scouts and cruisers may be expected to be in their proper stations, backed by battleships held in reserve in positions unknown to the enemy. I take this opportunity of congratulating the noble Earl and his naval colleagues on the improvements that have recently been made in the stationing of our Fleets, and in the constitution of the reserve squadron, which will now be more rapidly available in case of emergency. These changes will have the effect of lessening the dangers to which I am about to refer.
  But before I proceed let me say how sorry I am that the noble Earl is leaving the Admiralty. During his long tenure of the office of First Lord a great many valuable and important reforms have been carried through which will have a

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  far-reaching effect for very many years to come. I am sure that he will carry with him the good wishes of all with whom he came in contact at the Admiralty, and that we all hope his administration of South Africa will be as successful as his administration in Whitehall.
  The failure of Admiral Togo's attempts to bottle up the Russian fleet in Port Arthur with sunken merchant ships, and of the American attempts to close the harbour of St. Jago, has shown that it is by no means easy to block the entrance of a fortified harbour by sinking vessels in certain selected spots while under a storm of shot and shell, and that it would be much easier to perform this operation in time of peace. Portland and Portsmouth are particularly exposed to this form of attack. Anywhere between the Point and Southsea Castle the sinking of a single ship would block the entrance to Portsmouth Harbour, so that no large vessel would be able to enter or leave that port. Of course such an obstruction could be removed in time, but a great many important events might happen in the interval. For instance, the enemy's ships might obtain the command of the sea.
  There are other methods by which an unexpected attack may be made and which would be attended with but little danger to the assailants in time of peace. For instance, vessels with the appearance of merchantmen might very well enter such estuaries as the River Thames, steam up as far as Tilbury, turn round again and strew mechanical mines on their way down. The Solent might be blocked in a similar manner from the Needles to the Nab. A vessel might enter Portland Roads, look as if she wanted a pilot, throw mines overboard and steam out again. The French papers say that their submersible vessels can remain under water for twelve hours without causing discomfort to their crews. This means that during the winter months they can remain beneath the surface all day and only come up to breathe at night. The North Sea is probably quite broad enough to protect us against their incursions, but the Channel certainly is not.
  The question also arises as to how far submarines may be allowed to make use
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  of neutral bases such as Ostend or Flushing, and what methods could be adopted to prevent them from creeping about in neutral waters among Dutch and Belgian islands, within a three-mile limit. Some modifications in international law will probably have to be made. Port Arthur experience also shows that ships at anchor at roadsteads such as Spithead, or Plymouth Sound would be very liable to be attacked by torpedoes. The 18-inch torpedo now coming into general use is a far more effective weapon than the 14-inch torpedo used at Port Arthur on February 8th. The 18-inch torpedo has a greater range, and would, I think, probably sink any battleship it might strike instead of merely disabling her for a time. We are, I think, in far greater danger when all our Fleets are assembled at Spithead for a naval review than at any other time. The position of all our ships are shown on charts that can be bought for a few pence. A night attack made by fifty or more torpedo boats might sink all our available battleships and destroy our naval supremacy at a single blow. The celebrated attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was made by twelve torpedo vessels, and the Russians have not yet got over the results of it. It is, I think, a great mistake for us to shut our eyes to the possibility of such an onslaught and to its consequences. At the very time at which we feel most inclined to be vainglorious and to boast of our strength, our very existence is dependent on the forbearance and good faith of our neighbours.
  Whether we are at war or whether we are at peace, all the forts that protect our naval anchorages should be constantly kept on a war footing as ready to open fire as if they were ships in commission. Precautions that were not required ten or twenty years ago have become indispensable now that new weapons and new methods of warfare have been invented. When war does come, it will probably give as little notice as an earthquake. I do not, however, wish it to be understood that I think it necessary to keep all our sea-coast forts bristling with 12-inch guns. They are very expensive and take a long time to build. After the war had lasted a fortnight, the fear of anchored mines would probably deter an enemy from directly attacking any of our naval bases

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  with battleships. An intermediate type of gun, such as the 7·5-inch or 6-inch would have power enough to pierce unarmoured vessels, and, if mounted in sufficient numbers, would prevent him not only from removing or destroying our mines or laying down explosives of his own, but from reaching any narrow channel which he might wish to block by self-destruction. It would be absurd to wear out the bore of a 12-inch gun in doing work that could be done by a lighter weapon.
  The fittings and gun mountings of the heavier guns on shore should be of exactly the same pattern as those used on board ship, so as to be interchangeable. Spare guns should not be kept in store, but should be mounted in sea-coast forts ready for immediate action before hostilities commence, ready to replace the worn-out or damaged guns of battleships as the war progressed, or to be sent abroad for use in a siege. If when the war began the Japanese had not had 11-inch guns in their sea-coast forts, Port Arthur would have held out much longer. I may say here, however, that I think that when the war had lasted a fortnight, if no great naval disaster had happened to us by that time, our existing Fleet, thanks, in a great measure, to the present First Lord of the Admiralty, would be found strong enough to deal with almost any hostile combination. We may have to endure much suffering and heavy losses, but I feel assured that we should eventually get the best of it.
  If a naval surprise of the description I have referred to was successful, and our battleships were blocked up or destroyed, we might expect to have to meet an invasion. Many of our countrymen form their opinions of the number of ships and of the quantity of tonnage required to transport an Army from the amount made use of when we had to send troops to the Cape. This I look upon as quite a mistaken estimate. On a long voyage overcrowding would injure the health of the troops, but on a short trip there is scarcely any limit to the amount of overcrowding that infantry can undergo without impairing their efficiency. Besides, the same steamers could cross the Channel several times in a day, using the fire-hose to clean the ship on the return voyage. During the South African War some ships,
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  such as the "Bavarian," carried close on 2,000 men. Such vessels could easily carry 5,000 men or even more across the North Sea or Channel. See what numbers are carried in fine weather by excursion steamers.
  It has been said that in case of an invasion the enemy would be able to bring very few horses, and that he would therefore have to fight at a disadvantage with his infantry unsupported. I think that he would bring his guns, and that at first he would endeavour to occupy a large extent of country, so as to be able to seize horses, carts, and saddlery, mount his staff officers and scouts, and relieve his men from the toil of moving their guns with drag-ropes. The mobility of such artillery would, of course, be very much less than that of ordinary field batteries but the guns could be moved by captured horses quite as fast as our heavy artillery was moved during the South African War. In these days of long range, it is not necessary to change the position of guns in action as often as it used to be in the days of short range. It is also a fallacy to suppose that it would be necessary to assemble a large army in any one place before embarking it. Continental nations keep large garrisons in many of their seaport towns. Troops mobilised for autumn manœuvres in the vicinity of a large harbour would attract but little notice in this country. Detachments could leave different ports and arrange to meet on our own coasts so as to act together. If they chose they could land in different places and meet and support one another afterwards.
  In the olden days it was almost impossible for sailing vessels to work in concert when out of sight of one another. But at present full-powered steamers, with the help of telegrams, Marconigrams, and other modern inventions, can assemble, make a sort of Clapham Junction at any previously selected place, and time their arrival to a minute. All ships now carry chronometers whose error on Greenwich mean time is known to a few seconds. Of course, fogs and bad weather may interfere with their meeting, but, after all, fogs and bad weather are the exception and not the rule. It is unsafe to rely on them alone when in presence of an adversary who is prepared to run

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  risks. Our torpedo vessels and submarines would undoubtedly do their best, but their unsupported efforts might not be very successful. Troopships full of men are not quite unarmed in presence of a destroyer. Splashes from the stream of lead they could pour out from the men's rifles would be very likely to enter the conning tower, the sighting holes in the shield, interfere with the aim, and disable the officers in charge. In fine weather they could make use of any artillery or pom-poms that might happen to be on board. Under electric light night becomes as day. I think I am correct in saying that during the present war, with the exception, perhaps, of the "Asahi," which has since been repaired, no ship under full steam has yet been struck by a torpedo. Twenty-two destroyers appear to have been at Port Arthur. They have all been accounted for. But not one of them ever succeeded in breaking through the screen of fighting ships that formed the escort of the Japanese transports. The theory that a fleet of escorted transports would certainly be scattered or sunk by a squadron of unsupported destroyers that was in vogue before this war began would appear to require some modification.
  In 1866 the King of Hanover received an ultimatum giving him twenty-four hours notice in which to answer. When he inquired where his troops were and where those of Prussia might happen to be, he found that Prussian officers had asked and obtained permission to send troops through his territory from Schleswig-Holstein to Minden. By the simple process of stopping on the road, the Prussians had seized the town of Harburg and several other important positions in the very heart of his dominions. There was nothing to be done but to endeavour to march the Hanoverian Army out of the country as quickly as possible. After a most gallant fight they were forced to capitulate. The Kingdom of Hanover came to an end. A similar catastrophe may await us if we do not take sufficient precautions. Steamers full of concealed troops might take up berths one after another in some of our harbours and commence to disembark at a predetermined time in different places. If simultaneous attempts to sink our battleships and to block our harbours
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  were successful, the enemy might then be able to protect his transports from torpedo attacks, and so reinforce the invading army. A lost battle between London and the sea-coast would inflict untold misfortunes on the inhabitants of these islands, both in their public and private capacity. Such an event must never take place. If we keep up our present armaments I do not think that it ever can take place unless our Navy is surprised at the commencement of a war. If defeated, we should have to accept a dictated peace, the terms of which would probably include the transfer or destruction of the rest of our Fleet, the payment of hundreds of millions of money, and the surrender of the greater part of our possessions beyond the seas. Once the ægis of our protection was withdrawn, the conquest of such dependencies or colonies that the enemy might happen to want could be undertaken by him at his leisure. Our adversary might even insist on retaining a portion of the county of Kent or of Yorkshire. Such an idea may appear to be preposterous to some of your Lordships, but it is not more preposterous than the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germans would have appeared to Frenchmen before 1870. Now, I am sanguine enough to believe that an attempt at invasion would probably fail. Still, I do not think that the odds against it are thirty to one. Supposing that it did fail, and that the enemy lost 100,000 men, that is less than one-thirtieth of what France or Germany claim to be able to put in the field. Such a loss would have but little effect on the result of the war, while if the enemy succeeded it would be death to us as a nation. The stakes would not be equal. We should be in the position of the Athenians after the battle of Aigos-Potamos.
  It is said that even Homer sometimes nodded, but our Admiralty must never be caught nodding. I believe that the noble Earl and his naval colleagues are pretty wide-awake, but the Admiralty routine should be such as to ensure that it should never be taken unawares. Considering that a lieutenant or a sub-lieutenant is always on duty when a flagship is in company with the squadron that her admiral commands, and that the Admiralty at Whitehall is a sort of glorified flagship, the supreme flagship of

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  a fleet of flagships, I do not think it is too much to expect that a post-captain should always be on duty at the Admiralty both night and day whether in war or peace. I do not mean to say that he should always be walking the quarterdeck, but that some one of that rank or above it, authorised to act in the name of the Admiralty in cases of emergency only, should always be on the premises, ready to ring what I may call the Admiralty fire-bell. Proper living and sleeping accommodation should be found for such officers, just as is done at the Foreign Office for those clerks whose business it is to attend to despatches in cypher that may arrive at night.
  I look upon the habit of taking an occasional week-end holiday as a very good one, for I think that change of air and scene enables many men, especially those who are advancing in years, to retain their health and capacity for work for a longer period than would otherwise be the case. Therefore I do not wish to interfere with the week-ends of the Naval Lords of the Admiralty. I think that the Intelligence Department, with the addition of some officers specially appointed, should undertake this work, and that space should be found to lodge them at the Admiralty. I also think that, if possible, the two senior Naval Lords should have house-room at the Admiralty, not for their own convenience, but for the convenience of the service. Unfortunately, however, the week end absence of nearly all the officials who are connected not only with public Departments but with all large private enterprises, gives a grand opportunity to an enemy who might commence his operations late on Saturday night, or early on Sunday morning, more especially if that particular Sunday was succeeded by a Bank Holiday. Some of the railway telegraphs, those, for instance, that are in use with the object of facilitating traffic, would still be open, and if they are kept in connection with our Government offices, dockyards, principal harbours, camps, garrison towns, and also with such anchorages at which our men-of-war may be temporarily lying, we should have a much better chance of being forewarned and prepared. I have heard that some such arrangement has lately been made with the railway
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  companies. If so, I think that it ought to be generally known.
  If a possible enemy, while meditating on the chances of war, felt quite certain that any attempt to obtain some initial successes by surprise would result in failure it would remove a temptation to commence hostilities, and make for peace. Therefore, I think it desirable that the world in general should be acquainted with some of our precautions against surprise. But many of our preparations to resist sudden attack should, of course, remain State secrets. Some military men are desirous of handing over the garrisoning of our naval fortresses to the Admiralty. The Navy is, I understand, taking over the mining operations. It might also be of assistance in the look-out and signalling departments, but with those exceptions I am strongly opposed to any further change. The sailors would be wanted at sea. In the meantime, however, I think that the Navy has a right to expect that the Army will always look upon the forts that surround our naval bases as frontier fortresses, ready to open fire on a possible enemy at a very short notice. A twentieth-century sea-coast fort should always be as ready for action as a man-of-war at sea. The last person likely to be deceived by a sham or empty fort is an enemy who has had the opportunity of studying it in time of peace.
  Whenever a foreign squadron enters any of our harbours it would appear discourteous to make special preparations by manning and arming forts. There should be no need of preparation. The forts should always be ready.
  The Admiralty and the War Office have power to make regulations dealing with most of the points to which I have alluded. But there are, I think, many precautions that ought to be taken that are beyond their powers, and which would require special legislation. Last year the progress of science rendered it necessary to pass laws relating to wireless telegraphy. If similar special legislation concerning the publication of news is required, it is better that it should be carefully considered in time of peace, lie dormant until wanted, but ready to be brought into operation without a moment's delay whenever war might appear to be

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  imminent. The Admiralty is, I think, the proper Department to have these powers, because it would probably take longer to issue a Royal Proclamation or an Order in Council than an Admiralty notice. When a crisis arises, Parliament may not be sitting, and even if it is, we all know that laws cannot be passed with the same rapidity that was possible a few years ago. Besides, hurried legislation is generally bad legislation. The law might not be altered until it was too late. In other words, it would be a case of locking the door after the horse was stolen.
  There ought also to be some local regulations for guarding our harbours against surprise. If the existence of such regulations were known to pilots and to seamen frequenting the port, less annoyance would be caused when such precautions were necessary. By annoyance I mean that our own ships would be less likely to be fired at by our own guns. These regulations should have the force of law when called into existence by the Admiralty. No pilots except those who are British born should ever be allowed to exercise their profession on our coasts. I do not think that even naturalised British subjects should be permitted to act as pilots. Such naturalisation would often be only skin deep. We should rely on the real, and not on the electro-plated article.
  The doctrine of "Mare Clausum" will have to be partially revived in our next naval war. The Japanese have, I believe, already done so to a certain extent by cautioning ships to keep clear of the Pescadores. To protect us against invasion and to save our battleships from destruction, the three-mile limit must be extended to the enemy's shores. It would be scarcely possible for our admirals to protect the country properly if they are not allowed a free hand both in the North Sea and Channel. We ought also to be able to deal in a summary manner with neutral yachts and merchant ships, that might act as scouts, on a real or pretended voyage. During this war the Japanese have been wonderfully successful in concealing the positions of their battleships and larger vessels. Whenever the Russians made a sortie from Port Arthur the Japanese battleships always turned up from somewhere
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  before the Russians had got very far. We do not yet know for certain what ships were engaged in the various actions. The Japanese Press laws must be worth studying. While not permitting the publication of certain war news, they allow of a considerable freedom of criticism. Should we be equally successful in keeping secret the whereabouts of our ships under our present laws?
  When, the Dogger Bank incident took place we played our cards face up, exposed to the view of a possible enemy. It was, perhaps, well in that case that the Russians should know that we were ready to strike. But if we had wished to act otherwise, if we had wished to play our cards unseen—that is, if we had wished to move our ships without its being known—could we have done so in the present state of the law? I doubt it very much. I have not come down to this House with a cut-and-dried Bill of my own dealing with all the problems to which I have alluded, for I do not consider that any one man in Great Britain is capable of drafting such a document in a satisfactory manner. Such a Bill, I think, would require to be drawn up with the assistance of two naval officers, well acquainted with the details of the Russo-Japanese War and with our own manœuvres, in conjunction with two military officers of similar standing and experience. They would require the aid of a lawyer of repute and ability, and of a Parliamentary draftsman before a Bill could be produced which would be likely to be of practical use. Such a Committee, before reporting, would have to examine harbourmasters and other persons with local knowledge, such as managers of docks, railways, and telegraphs. It would also have to call before it gentlemen of the Press, as cases might occur when it might be necessary to check dissemination of news, and this would have to be done in such a manner as to give the minimum of annoyance. As it would be most undesirable to give any possible enemy information which might disclose the weak points in our armour, the Committee should have power to hear evidence, not only in public, but also with closed doors, and to send in a confidential as well as a public Report if it thought proper to do so.

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  I have seen some complaints in the German Press about the changes in the stationing of our Fleets. The writers of these articles take quite a wrong point of view. The alterations in the stationing of our ships are a compliment to the efficiency of the German Navy, and ought to have the effect of augmenting the respect that the two nations feel for one another. Had we, on the contrary, taken no notice of the increase in magnitude and efficiency of the German fleet, I could well have understood that some German naval officers would have felt hurt at our self-satisfied complacency. I am also glad to see that the manœuvres for 1905 and 1906 are to take the practical form of exercising our Fleets in the oceanic strategy of passing from peace to war. I am now asking that equal attention should be paid to the tactics of passing from peace to war on our own coasts. There is, unfortunately, a belief in this country that some premonitory growls will always give us time to prepare for the tiger-spring of war. We may feel the claws and teeth first. The growls will come afterwards. I beg to put the Question standing in my name.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE): My Lords, I have to thank the noble Lord for the very kind manner in which he spoke of the Department over which I have had the honour of presiding during the last four years. I was aware when I read the noble Lord's Question on the Paper that it raised matters of great importance; but I was not fully prepared for the great extent of field over which he proposed to travel. I do not propose to discuss the very interesting and old question whether this or any other country is liable to sudden attack from a friendly Power at a moment of profound peace, when there is not a diplomatic cloud upon the horizon. Nor did I propose to discuss the adequacy or otherwise of the standard of naval strength which, by common consent, has been maintained by Parliament in recent years. Nor can I speak at any length upon the general question of invasion which the noble Lord has raised.
  I cannot, however, pass by what he has said without some observation. I do not share all the views that he expressed
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  on that subject. I think he has greatly underrated the difficulties which would face a naval invader, because he has been considering, not the case of our having lost the command of the sea, but of invasion when the struggle for the command of the sea has not yet commenced. I do not think he would get many naval officers of experience lightly to undertake the responsibility of such an invasion under the conditions which he adumbrated. It is a matter that has engaged the most constant and unremitting attention of the Committee of Imperial Defence; and, generally speaking, the more the question is examined the more it results in the conclusion that the whole thing depends on the command of the sea. The temporary loss of command through negligence or accident for a few hours never would put such an opportunity in the way of an invader as would enable him to land in this country a force sufficient to maintain itself and to subdue, the military power of this country.
  The whole experience of the existing war between Russia and Japan lends force to the truth of that conclusion; for any one who has followed that war in its naval aspect must have seen the possessing nervousness that haunted the Japanese so long as there was a Russian fleet in being, and they had troops which they wanted to transport. Every naval incident, from the beginning of the war to the taking of Port Arthur, really hinged on a question of transport of troops, the Japanese wishing to get their troops across, the Russians wishing to prevent them; and never did the Japanese take any serious risk in the matter at all. There are matters embraced in the speech and Question of the noble Lord that I would like to say a few words about. He has reminded your Lordships that in war there always will be two periods, a period of war and a critical period of suspense before war, the period when it is uncertain whether war will take place or peace can be preserved. Now there is no doubt that it is that preliminary period which causes the most anxiety to all those who are responsible for these matters; the problems which would confront the Admiralty or the War Office in war are comparatively simple. It is this emergency period, when Governments will be most

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  anxious to take no step which would precipitate a war which might have been avoided, and when they are in doubt as to the real and ultimate intentions of the Power with whom their relations are strained—it is that period which gives rise to the greatest anxiety.
  The noble Lord asked whether the present laws enable us to check the dissemination of news, and to take all other necessary precautions against attacks and invasion. As far as I am aware, I do not know of any strengthening of the law or any change of the law that is necessary to enable the Admiralty and the War Office to do all that it is their duty to do in respect of those other necessary precautions to which the noble Lord alludes. The questions embraced under the words of his Question fall within the responsibility of the Admiralty and the War Office. I believe their powers are quite adequate to safeguard the interests of the country in respect of those other necessary precautions; and whether those necessary precautions are taken or not is not a question, in my opinion, of change or amendment in the law, but of whether the Admiralty or War Office are adequate to the duty which is imposed on them.
  When I pass to the other point, whether the present laws of the country are such as to enable them to check, if they wish it, the dissemination of news, I know I am confronted by a problem of the greatest difficulty, and a matter of the most serious import. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is a question which, as much as any that I know of, must command the study of the Committee of Imperial Defence. But I would go much further than that; it is a question not only for the Committee of Imperial Defence, or for the Government of the day, it is a question for the Opposition of the day, for the whole of Parliament, and for the whole of the Press also. This is not a question which, in my opinion, can be settled by any Government on its own responsibility, or by Parliament acting as a Parliament and distinct from any Party lines; it is a matter on which Parliament must invoke the patriotic co-operation and collaboration of the Press; and it is from that point of view that I ask both Parliament
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  and the Press to begin to study this question, and to think of the solution to which we ought to look forward, because I am not exaggerating when I say that the most patriotic journalist, without a thought that he was doing his country any harm, might in the day or two which precedes war publish news which might mar the whole issue of the naval campaign of this country.
  That is the position of the law as it at present stands. It is a position with which no public body of men of this country, whether politicians or journalists, can be content; and I thank the noble Lord for having given me an opportunity of trying to impress on my fellow-countrymen the importance of a question which has hitherto been too much neglected in this country. Again I would point to the experience of the Japanese War. I believe—I am not in the confidence of the Japanese Admiralty—that if you were to ask them with regard to the command of the sea which they have obtained, and on which the whole issue of the war for them must eventually depend, they would say that what they have done could not have been done unless they had had full powers to prevent the dissemination of news affecting the movements and the positions of their ships. And it is with that object-lesson before my fellow-countrymen that I ask them to study this question.
  *EARL SPENCER: My Lords, the circumstances in which we are placed to-day are peculiar, for I feel that we may perhaps have heard for the last time the First Lord of the Admiralty address your Lordships in his official capacity. I should like, therefore, to say something with regard to the Admiralty and the Board of which the noble Lord is the head. I think every one will agree with me that no one could elucidate a difficult and complicated subject better than the noble Lord, or make a statement more complete on all naval matters brought before your Lordships. I will go further, and say that the Board over which he has presided has been remarkable for many important changes in the organisation and administration of the Navy, most of which, personally, I entirely agree with. Of course, I have always wished there could have been a little more economy in regard

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  to the finances of the Navy, but now on this occasion I can congratulate the noble Lord and the Board of Admiralty on the fact that for the first time for many years there is shown a very considerable and large reduction in the Naval Estimates. I congratulate the noble Lord on that, and I lament that we are losing his services at the Admiralty, for we might even hope for still further reductions in the future Estimates of the Navy without impairing in the slightest degree that great force whose efficiency it is so important to keep to the highest level.
  The noble Earl has dealt very ably with Lord Ellenborough's speech. I am afraid that if people believed absolutely all that the noble Lord said in that speech they would hardly be able to sleep in their beds owing to the many dangers he has depicted. As far as I understood him, he advocated that the matters he brought forward should be dealt with in a Bill. That would be a longer Act of Parliament than any hitherto framed. In reality you must trust to the Board of Admiralty to deal with all these matters. I confess that I myself have confidence in them; I believe they would take these matters into consideration, and if the time came that they would be as capable of dealing with them as Naval Boards in the past. A great deal has been done in order to meet those very difficulties and those new phases of naval warfare to which the noble and gallant Lord has referred. Why is it we have increased the defences of so many of our ports? Surely it is to protect our ships against such attacks? Why have we got such an enormous fleet of torpedo destroyers, and why have we introduced these new vessels, the submarines? These were all new methods in order to increase the defence of the country and in order to guard better against such incu sions as the noble and gallant Lord foresees.
  I have only one word to add as to the subject mentioned in the last part of the noble Lord's speech. We know, as the noble Lord has said, that even a very patriotic Pressman might do an infinity of harm by giving certain naval movements just before the breaking out, of war. How that should be dealt with it is difficult to see. We know that the Japanese have, by their precautions, kept secret almost all their intended movements
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  both on land and by sea. I have great confidence, as the noble Earl opposite has, that the patriotism of the Press and the public would support any well-devised scheme for protecting the Fleet and the country from dangers of this sort; and in that, I think, we must rely rather than on legislation. It may be that some legislation might be necessary; but I think the best way, as the First Lord of the Admiralty put it, is rather to depend on the good feeling of those concerned. I think your Lordships are indebted to the noble Lord for raising this very interesting subject, and to the noble Earl for another of those able and lucid speeches which your Lordships have so frequently had occasion to appreciate.
  The subject then dropped.
  House adjourned at twenty minutes past Five o'clock, to Monday next, a quarter before Eleven o'clock.