Lords Sitting of 17 May 1904

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
The LORD CHANCELLOR The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificates from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have been complied with:—Tramways Orders Confirmation (No. 2) [H.L.]; Gas Orders Confirmation (No. 1) [H.L.].
And also the Certificate that the further Standing Orders applicable to s the following Bill have been complied with:—Plymouth Corporation.
The same were ordered to He on the Table.
Gomersal Gas Bill; London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway Bill; Bexhill Water and Gas Bill; Littlestone-on-Sea and District Water Bill; Colney Hatch Gas Bill. Reported, with Amendments.
Sheppy Gas Bill; Richard Jaeger's Patent Bill [H.L.]. Reported, without Amendment.
Great Central Railway Bill; Doncaster Corporation Bill. Read 2a and committed. The Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
Holywood Tramways Bill [H.L.]; North Wales Electric Power Bill [H.L.]; Bristol Corporation Bill [H.L.]. Read 3a and passed, and sent to the Commons.
Chippenham Gas Bill. Read 3a with the Amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Various Powers) Bill. Brought from the Commons; read la; and referred to the Examiners.
Gosport Water Bill [H.L.]. Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments.
North Staffordshire Railway Bill. The King's consent signified; and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
Bristol Tramways (Extensions) Bill [H.L.]; Midland Railway Bill; Baker Street and Waterloo Railway Bill; Wolverhampton Corporation Bill; Harrow Road and Paddington Tramways Bill;

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Oakengates, Dawley, and District Joint Water Board Bill [H.L.]; Humber Commercial Railway and Dock Bill. Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills; viz., M. Winchester, M. Exeter, E. Dartmouth, E. Belmore (chairman), L. Digby; agreed to, and the said Lords appointed accordingly. The Committee to meet on Thursday the 9th of June next at Eleven o'clock; and all petitions referred t" the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bill to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.
Manchester Corporation (General Powers) Bill [H.L.]; Manchester Corporation Tramways Bill [H.L.]; Torquay Tramways Bill; Charing Cross, Euston, and Hampstead Railway Bill; Soothill Nether Urban District Tramways Bill; London and North Western Railway Bill. Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills: viz., E. Strange (D. Atholl), E. Westmeath, L. Mendip (V. Clifden), Deramore, L. Hawkesbury (chairman); agreed to, and the said Lords appointed accordingly. The Committee to meet on Thursday the 9th of June next at Eleven o'clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.
Education Board Provisional Order Confirmation (Birmingham) Bill [H.L.]. Committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Thursday next.
Pier and Harbour Provisional Order (No. 1) Bill [H.L.]. Amendment reported (according to order), and Bill to be read 3a on Thursday next.
Canal Rates and Charges (Regents Canal) Order Confirmation Bill [H.L.]; Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 6) Bill [HL.]. Read 2a (according to order).

PETITIONS.
  WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (METRIC SYSTEM) BILL [H.L.]
  Petitions in favour of; of town, city, and county councils of; Barrow in Fur-ness; Canterbury; Chelmsford; Chester; Deptford; Huddersfield; Islington; Lewis-ham; Macclesfield; Radnorshire; Salford; Workington; Worthing; Wandsworth; Worcestershire Chamber of Agriculture; Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland; Liverpool and District Society of Incorporated Accountants. Read, and ordered to lie on the Table.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  Fourth Report of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.
  ACCIDENTS.
  General Report to the Board of Trade upon the accidents that have occurred on the railways of the United Kingdom during the year 1903.

  MINES AND QUARRIES (GENERAL REPORT AND STATISTICS FOR 1902 PART IV. COLONIAL AND FOREIGN STATISTICS).
  Statistics relating to persons employed, out put, and accidents at mines and quarries in the British Colonies and in Foreign Countries, edited by Sir Clement le Neve Foster, D.Sc, F.R.S.
  Presented (by Command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  UNION OF BENEFICES (METROPOLIS) ACT, 1860.
  Scheme of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners for effecting the union of the benefice of St. John, Fitzroy Square, in the Metropolis, and the benefice of St. Saviour, Fitzroy Square, and for effecting certain other measures incidental to or arising out of such union. Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and to be printed. (No. 80.)

  ARKLOW HARBOUR.
  Report of the Arklow Harbour Commissioners, and "Statement of Accounts

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  for 1903. Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.
  Prevention of Corruption Bill [H.L.]; Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, Amendment Bill [H.L.]; Prize Courts Bills [H.L.]. Reported from the Standing Committee without Amendment, and to be read 3a on Thursday next.
  Street Betting Bill [H.L.]. Reported from the Standing Committee with a further Amendment. The Report of the Amendments made in Committee of the Whole House, and by the Standing Committee, to be received on Thursday next.

NEW BILLS.
  MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT (1882) AMENDMENT BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, was presented by the Lord Chancellor; read; and to be printed. (No. 82.)
  SEAMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' FALSE CHARACTERS BILL [H.L.]
  A Bill to amend the law relating to the falsification of seamen's and soldiers' certificates of service or discharge, and to false statements made, used, or given in connection with entry or enlistment into His Majesty's Naval, Military, or Marine Forces—Was presented by the Viscount Hutchinson (E. Donoughmore); read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2aon Tuesday the 7th of June next. (No. 81.)

MONUMENT TO LORD SALISBURY.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, I do not think that the Motion which I have placed upon the Paper can come as a surprise to any of your Lordships. I think, indeed, your Lordships would have been astonished if His Majesty's Government had not taken some such step as that which we are taking this evening. Your Lordships will recollect when at the beginning of this
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session we met here for the transaction of business our first thoughts were of the great loss which this House and the country at large had sustained by the death of the late Lord Salisbury. On both sides of the House feelings of regret and respect for his memory were expressed; and upon this occasion I do not think I am wrong in anticipating that, without any reference to Party considerations, your Lordships' House will be unanimous in desiring that this mark of respect should be shown to Lord Salisbury's memory; for, although he was a great Party leader, we have a right to think of him, now that he is no longer here, not so much as a Party leader, but as a great servant of the State, a great public man who gave his unrivalled gilts and abilities ungrudgingly to the service of his country. It has always been the custom of Parliament upon occasions of this kind to look at the matter from this standpoint.
When Lord Salisbury's illustrious colleague, the late Lord Beaconsfield, was taken from us it was Mr. Gladstone who moved in the House of Commons a Resolution similar to that which I have to move this evening; and when in time Mr. Gladstone himself disappeared from the scene of which he had been so bright an ornament for so many years, it was Mr. Balfour, the present Conservative Prime Minister, who moved the Resolution in favour of the erection of a monument to his memory. Therefore, my Lords, in view of the unanimity which I believe prevails in your Lordships' House, I shall not attempt a lengthened panegyric of Lord Salisbury; for, indeed, it would be impossible within the compass of such a statement as I have a right to make this evening to deal adequately with a career so long and with services so splendid as those which he rendered. Lord Salisbury was no less than fifty years in Parliament. Of these fifty years twenty were spent as a Minister of the Crown. During thirteen of them he was Prime Minister and Leader of this House, and during eleven of those years he bore the double burden of the Premiership and the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a double burden which I venture to think no mortal shoulders could bear for long with impunity. It is no exaggeration to say

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that you will find that during the history of that long life there was no single chapter that was idle or unprofitable.
In public life Lord Salisbury was conspicuous and distinguished among his peers. He was a great debater, a with full authority. Those of us who great master of language, but he never had that high honour will not readily condescended to the arts of the demagogue, forget the privilege which we enjoyed of He never was content with a mere forensic being his colleagues. Of Lord Salisbury's triumph, but he compelled the attention other attainments I will only say this, of those who listened to him, not by that if the world of politics had not studied effects or by elaborate ornaments claimed him, he would have been, beyond of style, but by the spontaneous expression of a powerful and original intellect, I am tempted to add that you will find that same style, with all its force and all its merits, in the despatches which he has left behind him, and even in those official minutes which, as his successor, it has often been my good fortune to read. He was a Leader of this House who commanded the universal respect of your Lordships. He had a keen appreciation of the constitutional position of the House of Lords, and a keen respect for its great traditions; and he never took part even in those of our debates which might have seemed the least interesting without adding to them something of his own which rendered his contributions to our discussions memorable and instructive. As a Minister I suppose Lord Salisbury will best be remembered owing to his successful conduct of our foreign affairs during a lengthened period. He was a wise and prescient director of our foreign policy, and if I had to single out any one particular quality by which he was distinguished I should say that that which most impressed those who were associated with him was his calmness and self-restraint even in circumstances of the greatest difficulty. We can all of us re collect occasions, some of them of comparatively recent occurrence, when peace and war trembled in the balance, when a single false step or a single careless word might have involved this country in a dangerous catastrophe, and when if that catastrophe was avoided it was certainly due to the prudence and wisdom with which Lord Salisbury discharged the duties which belonged to his high office If at the present moment we stand high amongst the Powers, if our word is respected, if our goodwill is desired, it is surely because Lord Salisbury laid deep and strong the foundation of that inter-
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national reputation of which he was a faithful and jealous guardian.
Of Lord Salisbury's wisdom in counsel only those who had the high honour o f serving with and under him can speak with full authority. Those of us who had that high honour will not readily forget the privilege which we enjoyed of being his colleagues. Of Lord Salisbury's other attainments I will only say this, that if the world of politics had not claimed him, he would have been, beyond all question, a conspicuous figure in the world of literature or science. But, my Lords, beyond all things his life, public and private, was characterised by splendid qualities of devotion to duty, of independence of judgment, of absolute unselfishness, of incapability of any sordid aims or unworthy methods, and by the loftiest patriotism. The value of such a public man cannot be measured merely by his achievements either in diplomacy or in legislation. Such a man leaves his mark upon the public life of his country, by his example and by the manner in which his conduct serves to raise the standard of public life. Surely we may say of Lord Salisbury that his example and his manner of conducting the public affairs of this country have left their mark upon the nation. The nation, I believe, recognises Lord Salisbury as one worthy of the highest honour which it could pay him, it desires that his memory should be commemorated by the erection of a suitable monument to him; and it is, therefore, I believe, with the entire approval of our fellow-countrymen at large that I venture to move on behalf of His Majesty's Government the Resolution standing in my name.
Moved, "That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty praying that His Majesty will give directions that a monument be erected in the Collegiate Church of St. Peter's, Westminster, to the memory of the late Right Hon. the Marquess of Salisbury, with an inscription expressive of the high sense entertained by the House of his rare and splendid gifts, and of his devoted labours in Parliament and in great offices of State."—(The Marquess of Lansdowne.)
*EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I rise to second the Resolution which has been submitted to your Lordships by the noble

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Marquess the Leader of the House, Here, where the memory of the great statesman to whom the Resolution refers is so fresh, and where he had such a commanding influence for a long period of his life, very little need be said in favour of the Resolution. The noble Marquess has spoken in feeling, eloquent, and appropriate terms of the late Lord Salisbury. He stood in a very different position towards Lord Salisbury from that which I occupied. Lord Lansdowne was a colleague of Lord Salisbury in the government and the Cabinet, and, there fore, he could speak with the greatest possible authority as to the influence, power and skill with which Lord Salisbury fulfilled all of his many high duties. I never had that high privilege. I had only once for a short time an official connection with Lord Salisbury, and that was as a member of a Commission nearly forty years ago. But it is right that not only those who shared Lord Salisbury's views in politics but those who were opposed to him politically should speak on an occasion of this sort. In this country we do not raise monuments to statesmen as Party politicians. We believe the man to whom we propose to do this honour has done great services to his country and is honoured by the nation at large. It is, therefore, I think, appropriate that one of those who has been all his life in opposition to the noble Lord should rise and make a few observations as to this Resolution. It is not always that we give monuments at public expense to our Prime Ministers. During the last century, I think, we had as many as twenty Prime Ministers, and of these only six received public monuments at the public expense. Some of those were in office as Prime Minister a very long period. Mr. Pitt's tenure of office was the longest, though most of his career, of course belongs to the eighteenth century Then there was Lord Liverpool, and next to him in this respect comes Lord Salisbury, who ended his career in the twentieth century. Mr. Perceval lost his life while he was in office, and was only Prime Minister for a very short time.
As to the impression Lord Salisbury, made on the people and on those who opposed him, I entirely endorse what the noble Marquess said. He had tran-
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scendent ability, an ability which, if he had not been born in the sphere of politics, would have given him preeminence in both science and literature, In his political career I have often noticed the charm and adornment which his literary pursuits gave to all his great orations. Besides that, Lord Salisbury was a man of great political courage; he had the courage to propose and to support measures which he thought ripe for the country, and he had another quality which was somewhat remarkable. Holding high and lofty ideals on many matters, he not infrequently showed almost a singular disregard of what I may call the commonplaces of life, which sometimes led him to say things which startled both friends and adversaries alike. There was one quality of his to which I will venture to refer which, I think, is of the utmost importance in a great statesman he always observed astern loyalty to what was done in Parliament. When he was certain that Parliament was carrying out the determined wishes of the people of this country, even if he had opposed them, and was still in opposition—if he felt that the country had resolutely settled on a particular policy, Lord Salisbury did not try to upset it, even when he had the greatest power with his numerous supporters in this House and the other. I have said that it is necessary that the support of this monument should be national. On three occasions when Leader of a great Party he obtained great majorities when appealing to the country and this goes far to establish his claim to a national memorial. I feel that we ought to render honour to a man who has added honour to the long roll of Prime Ministers whom we have known in this country. We are bound to give this public tribute to what he has done for the nation with energy and devotion throughout his long and distinguished career. I beg to second the Resolution.
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Ordered that the said Address be presented to His Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (METRIC SYSTEM) BILL. [H.L.]
[THIRD READING.]
Order of the day for the Third Reading read.
LORD BELHAVEN AND STENTON: My Lords, in moving the Third Reading of this Bill I wish to make an earnest appeal to His Majesty's Government to give every facility in their power for the further progress of this measure. I make this appeal on two grounds. In the first place, the Select Committee of your Lordships' house to which this Bill was referred, received many Amendments from the various Government Departments, and they have embodied in the Bill the whole of those Amendments. Then there is the great support the Bill has received throughout the country, which is shown by the enormous number of petitions in its favour which have been sent in. The town, city, and county councils which have presented petitions represent a population of over 8,000,000. Fifty chambers of commerce have petitioned, as well as forty-two trades unions, representing 300,000 members, sixty teachers' associations, the inspectors of weights and measures in eighty districts, and thirty retail trades associations. Several chambers of agriculture and farmers' associations have also petitioned, and I may add that the whole of Scotland, as represented by the Scottish Chamber of Agriculture and the Highland Society, is with us. The petitioners too, include a vast number of engineers and manufacturers of all sorts. I think these facts prove that there is a very strong feeling in the country in favour of the adoption of the metric system.
Moved, "That the Bill be now read 3a"—(Lord Belhaven and Stenton.)
On Question, Bill read 3a; an Amendment (Privilege) made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

COTTON AS CONTRABAND OF WAR.
LORD AVEBURY: My Lords, I rise to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it is the case that the Russian Government has declared cotton to be contraband of war; whether His Majesty's Government recognise their
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right to do so; and whether any, and, if so, what steps have been taken in the matter. This declaration is a new departure. It may be that it only applies to a certain description of cotton which, is used for explosives, but, however that may be, the interests concerned are very important, and they are anxious for information.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, we received a few days ago from our representative in St. Petersburg a telegram announcing that the Russian Government had given notice that cotton was to be added to the list of article declared to be contraband of war. We were not given any particulars with, regard to the categories of cotton covered by this notification, and we have, therefore, thought it desirable to make is quiries on this subject. Of course there would be all the difference in the world if the notice applied only to cotton in a form in which it might be converted easily into combustibles, and not to cotton generally. We have not yet received any answer to our inquiry, and I should prefer, for the present at any-rate, to avoid expressing any opinion with regard to the question of right. If I receive any information, I shall be glad to communicate with the noble Lord.

TIBET
*EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I rise to call attention to recent events in Tibet, and to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information to give to the House. It is not quite a month since we had a debate-of some length on this important subject; but since then some grave, and, I might almost say, disastrous, events have taken place which impel me to ask for further information before the holidays. I am not going into the whole question of the policy which led the Indian troops and this Mission into Tibet. We-have already had a long discussion upon that, and I stated on the last occasion that I addressed your Lordships upon it that we on this Bench endorsed the views which were put forward by my noble friends Lord Reay and the Marquess of Ripon as to the policy which led to this Mission. I venture to say that the

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events which have since happened strengthen the belief that we were right. I shall not, however, refer to the points then raised. In my opinion from the very first it was impossible to expect that this Mission would continue to be a peaceful one. I understand now that time after time there have been serious conflicts, in which happily we have not incurred any great loss, but in which the unfortunate Tibetans have suffered very seriously. There has been, I fear, renewed complication. The Mission has been again attacked, and our troops, the escort of this so-called peaceful Mission, have been obliged to clear the villages round in self-defence, and very serious fighting has taken place.
I would refer to the several stages of this subject. On 6th October there was a question of advancing to Gyangtse. At that time the Government informed the Viceroy that an advance to Gyangtse was authorised if a complete rupture of negotiations at Khambajong proved inevitable. That was followed by another stage which began on 6th November when the advance was sanctioned under very special conditions. Those conditions were contained in a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy; they were that the step should not be allowed to lead to permanent occupation of the country or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form, that the advance should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and that as soon as reparation was obtained a withdrawal should be effected. The next stage was on 13th April, when there was an important debate in another place, in the course of which the Prime Minister made a strong speech on the subject. He said—
"The telegram of 6th November was most carefully considered by the Cabinet before it was sent. It represented a policy—not a departmental policy of the Secretary of State in Council—but the carefully thought out views of the Government. It represented their views on (6th November, 1903; it represents those views in April, 1904; no change whatever has occurred; and I do not think that any change is likely to occur."
He concluded with these remarkable words—
"My hon. friend who spoke last but one seems to think that circumstances will be too
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strong for us, and that we shall be driven on from one stage to another, until nothing short of permanent annexation is reached. Well, I contemplate no such unhappy contingency, and were it to occur I should consider it one of the greatest misfortunes that could possibly happen to the Indian Government or to this country."
A few days later there was the debate in your Lordships' House, when the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a similar declaration of policy. The noble Marquess concluded with some words of caution which, perhaps, it is only fair that I should read. He said—
"I do not by that mean to say that whatever happens we are never to move an inch beyond the limits therein laid down, but the policy was adopted after the fullest consideration and by it we shall be guided in dealing with the future aspects of the question."
I should like to know whether the policy enunciated on those occasions is the Government policy of to-day. There was another discussion on this subject on the 12th of this month, when an important decision was announced by the Secretary of State for India. The right hon. Gentleman said that the Government had arrived at the conclusion that recent events in Tibet made it inevitable that unless the Tibetans consented to negotiate at Gyangtse the Mission must advance to Lhasa. This was qualified by the statement that the Government of India had been authorised to give the Chinese Amban notice that if no competent Tibetan negotiator appeared in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a period to be fixed by the Government of India, steps would be taken to negotiate at Lhasa itself.
That is a very rapid change in the decision of His Majesty's Government. It is not for me to say what is necessary at the present moment. That is a matter entirely for His Majesty's Government who have full information on the subject which we in opposition do not have. I would like to hear what the noble Marquess has to say as to the policy which is hereafter to guide us in reference to this subject. This is a matter of the utmost importance in view of similar occurrences in India in years gone by which have led to serious disaster. I accept in full what the noble Marquess stated on a previous occasion with reference to Russia, and

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will not now further refer to that phase of the matter. But I should like to know what our relations are with China. We hear in other places statements with regard to the co-operation of China in order to bring about a complete settlement of this difficulty. What is the nature of this co-operation? We have heard rumours that the Chinese Amban has at last reached Lhasa, after, I might almost say, long months of wandering in the dismal districts between China and Lhasa, and we also learn that he is going to meet Colonel Young husband. Then we hear rumours that he has done nothing to prevent the attacks on us by the Tibetans, and that four of his servants or those of Captain Parr have been murdered by Tibetans. I should like to know what our relations are with China; whether we are in close touch with the Chinese Government at Pekin; whether they are helping us to settle this difficulty, and whether any attempt has been made by the Amban to try and influence the Tibetans, and prevent these attacks upon us. I sincerely hope that the Government will be able to give the House information, both with regard to the position of the Mission at this moment and to the future policy they intend to carry out in Tibet.
*THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of HARDWICKE): My Lords, the noble Earl prefaced his remarks by saying that he would not enter into the reasons for the despatch of the Mission into Tibet. He told the House that he adhered to the views expressed by his noble friends Lord Reay and Lord Ripon on the occasion of a recent debate on this question. I have a very clear recollection of that debate, and I do not think that the views expressed by Lord Reay were at all consistent with those expressed by the noble Marquess Lord Ripon. The noble Marquess objected to the Mission absolutely, and implored His Majesty's Government to withdraw it. Lord Reay did no such thing. He merely asked for information as to the object of the Mission, and we willingly promised him all such information as we could give, and Papers were laid on the Table. I have ventured to recall this small point because it is a little difficult to know what view noble Lords opposite take of our policy with regard to Tibet.
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There was only one point which the Government of India and His Majesty's Government had to consider before deciding to send an expedition to Tibet, and that point was simply this. Were all attempts to get into communication with the authorities at Lhasa to be abandoned? Were we to have no redress, simply because we could not get into communication with the authorities, for offences committed against Indian subjects, for the pulling down of our posts on the frontier, and for the non-adherence to a convention agreed to between the two countries? His Majesty's Government decided that that position was intolerable, and that the only way to remedy that state of affairs was to end it. They, therefore, decided to send a Mission into Tibet. The House will recollect that in the first instance we sent Colonel Younghuband to Khambajong, just over the Tibetan frontier. The Mission was decided on in April, 1903. It remained at Khambasjong for many weary months. There were certain Tibetan officials there, but they informed Colonel Young husband that they could not converse with him, neither could they pass on any communication he might give them to the Dalai Lama. They said they were prevented by tradition and by their religion from having any communication with the Mission at all. His Majesty's Government then decided that the Mission should advance to Gyangtse, and that advance, as the noble Earl has pointed out, was sanctioned in the telegram of November 6. That telegram clearly laid down the policy of His Majesty's Government. The Mission arrived at. Gyangtse on 12th April last. It has waited patiently for the Chinese Amban and for duly accredited Tibetan envoys, but they have not arrived. Colonel Young husband's force has been attacked on various occasions, and, as the noble Earl has pointed out, it has been necessary to remove Tibetans from certain posts that they occupied to the danger of our position.
That brings us to the situation as it is at present, and I would like incidentally to remark that the difficulties that have recently arisen, and the hostility that has been shown towards this Mission by the authorities at Lhasa, do not prove that the policy of His Majesty's Government was wrong, but rather that they had a

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danger to face which events have made easier for the public to realise. The principal question which the noble Earl addressed to His Majesty's Government was, What is our present policy? He endeavoured to show that the Government's policy, as declared by the noble Marquess and by the Prime Minister in another place, had undergone a sudden change in the decision that has been come to, to allow the Mission to advance as far as Lhasa if within a reasonable time delegates do not come to Gyangtse. I do not know on what statement the noble Earl bases his contention. Nothing has ever been said, so far as I am aware, by any member of His Majesty's Government that debars us from going to Lhasa if all our attempts at negotiating at Gyangtse fail. The policy of the Government is contained in the telegram of 6th November, which I will read to the House—
"In view of the recent conduct of the Tibetans, His Majesty's Government feel that it would be impossible not to take action, and they accordingly sanction the advance of the Mission to Gyangtse. They are, however, clearly of opinion that this step should not be allowed to lead to occupation or to permanent intervention in Tibetan affairs in any form. The advance should be made for the sole purpose of obtaining satisfaction, and as soon as reparation is obtained a withdrawal should be effected. While His Majesty's Government consider the proposed action to be necessary, they are not prepared to establish a permanent Mission in Tibet, and the question of enforcing trade facilities in that country must be considered in the light of the decision conveyed in this telegram."
So far as I am aware, no other policy has been enunciated and there is nothing to debar our going to Lhasa. The next declaration on the part of His Majesty's Government to which the noble Earl referred was the answer given by my right hon. friend the Secretary of State in the other House on the 12th instant. In that answer my right hon. friend said—
"His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that recent events in Tibet make it inevitable that, unless the Tibetans consent to negotiate at Gyangtse, the Mission must advance to Lhasa. The Government of India have been authorised to give the Chinese Amban notice that, if no competent Tibetan negotiator appears in conjunction with him at Gyangtse within a period to be fixed by the Government of India, we shall take steps to negotiate at Lhasa itself. The Government of India have at the same time been informed that His Majesty's Government do not intend I in any way to depart from the policy laid down
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in the telegram to the Viceroy of the 6th November last."
I do not think it is possible for me in more definite terms to state what the views of His Majesty's Government are. The Government have clearly declared their view that it is not desirable permanently to occupy Tibet or permanently to interfere in the internal affairs of that country. But it is necessary to point out that circumstances have changed during the last few days. We are no longer in Tibet on a peaceful Mission; we are at the present moment at war with Tibet; and until we have by force of arms vindicated our position, and shown the Tibetans that we are not to be trifled with, His Majesty's Government ought not to be called upon by noble Lords opposite to give any definite pledge as to the exact form the settlement will take when hostilities are concluded.
The noble Earl asked what was the exact position of the Chinese Amban. I do not think it would be possible for a more difficult question to be put to any member of the Government. The Chinese Amban is at the present moment at Lhasa. He has had correspondence with Colonel Young husband, and has declared that he is doing his best to get transport, and that he will come to Gyangtse at the earliest possible moment. But we have to face the fact that he has never arrived. The noble Earl has asked for information about the Chinese official whose servants were brutally murdered. They were the servants of Captain Parr, who is in the employ of the Chinese as a Customs officer, and is, I believe, under the orders of the Chinese Amban. With regard to the question as to Chinese co-operation, which is also difficult to answer, I think I am correct in stating that the Chinese are very anxious that we should come to a settlement with the Tibetans. They recognise that the Tibetans have given us grave cause for dissatisfaction, and that unless we are able to persuade the Tibetans to allow the Chinese representative to come to Gyangtse to discuss matters with us we shall be justified in advancing to Lhasa to conduct the negotiations there.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, the noble Earl who has just sat down has endeavoured rather to turn the

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questions of my noble friend by starting fresh point s. The noble Earl asked what was our view of the policy of the Government in respect to this expedition to Tibet, and he rested the greater part of his defence of the expedition on events which had happened to the Mission whilst it was still occupying a peaceful position. He talked about the length of time that the Mission was kept waiting and of the insults that it received from the Tibetan authorities. Our objection to the Government's policy starts from a much earlier period. What- was the original cause of this peaceful Mission? There were, I think, three causes put forward—first, the unwillingness of the Lama at Lhasa to receive the letters of the Indian Government; secondly, the removal of certain pillar posts on the frontier; and, thirdly, disputes about the grazing rights on the two sides of the frontier. I admit that these are subjects which would naturally give rise to feelings of annoyance on both sides. What we find fault with is that the Government settled on this Mission without fully realising what it was certain to lead to. The question really was, was: it worth while, for the sake of the advantages that might be gained, to run the; grave risks which such a Mission involved? The chances of difficulty and I danger were far greater than any possible benefit that could be gained by India or by Great Britain from the efforts of the Mission. It seems to me that on this occasion, as on many others, the Government have proved themselves confirmed optimists. They always look for that to happen which could only happen under the most favourable circumstances. They never seem to regard the possibility of any operation in which they are engaged going wrong. Just as they thought, in the case of the South African war, that the Boers would not fight, so, apparently, they thought in the case of Tibet, that the Tibetans would also be found unwilling to fight, and that it was only necessary to, make a sufficiently big demonstration on I the Tibetan frontier to bring the Tibetan' authorities to their bearings. By this Mission to Tibet the Government of India seem to me to have brought us almost to an impasse. Whichever way we turn difficulties of the gravest character are to be found. If we retire the dangers as
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well as the difficulties are patent to the most casual observer but if we advance; to Lhasa and find the Lama is not there, is it proposed to follow him into the misty regions beyond? And, having got to Lhasa, will the process of retirement to which you are pledged be found easy? I feel that a great deal more explanation is required than the Under-Secretary has given.
The noble Earl said that my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition had questioned him as to the position of the Chinese Amban. I think my noble friend's question went a great deal further. It had reference to the relations of His Majesty's Government with China at this moment. How far, he asked, have His Majesty's Government received the support of the Chinese Government from Pekin or elsewhere? The position of the Chinese Amban is of small importance. The real question is, how does China look upon these warlike operations within, the territory of its vassal? Does it approve of them? Is it going to support you in bringing force to bear on the Lama at Lhasa, and in requiring concessions from the Lama? And will China be willing to see a Resident placed in parts of Tibet, which is only too-likely to be involved by the course you are taking? I know the delicacy of speaking on this subject at this moment, and I can assure the House that I would not say a word to increase the present difficulty, but if the Government call for the support of men of all Parties to get them out of this trouble the least they can do is to take the country into their confidence and tell us exactly the position and the policy they mean to pursue.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lords, the noble Lord who has just sat down has attacked Colonel Young-husband's Mission from its first inception, and, not for the first time, we have had it suggested that the causes which led to the despatch of that Mission were causes so trivial and insignificant that we might well have declined to take notice of them. Well, no doubt, if you take them one by one they are small matters; but

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it is the cumulative effect of these acts of insolent aggression that the Government of India has had to take into consideration. I do not think it is just to the Government of India to suggest that they dealt in a precipitate or vindictive manner with the aggressive conduct of the Tibetans. On the contrary, the Government of India showed itself extremely long-suffering, and it was not until its patience had been tried to breaking-point that it was determined to take some measures to vindicate our authority on the Tibetan frontier. So far from failing to realise the seriousness of the task which lay before us, it was because we realised that Colonel Young-husband's Mission was a service of danger and might involve us in collision with Tibet that we sent with Colonel Young-husband that considerable escort, the presence of which was so much criticised by noble Lords opposite as inconsistent with the peaceful character of the Mission. But for the presence of that considerable escort the Mission would undoubtedly be at this moment in a position of danger which I hope I may say it actually is not.
*EARL SPENCER: It could not have gone.
THE MARQUESS OF LANDSDOWNE: Then the noble Earl throws us back on the alternative of again turning our face to the smiter and allowing the Government of India to be absolutely contemned. In regard to our relations with China in connection with Tibet, let me repeat again that from the first we have done our utmost to secure the co-operation and concurrence of China; and we certainly did secure the concurrence of China before the earliest steps were taken. And at this moment, so far as professions go, China is doing what she can to bring the Tibetans to reason. It is with that object the Amban has been sent to Lhasa. It is the presence of the Amban which is the outward and visible sign of such power as China has. If the Amban has not arrived at Lhasa until after interminable delays and wanderings in remote; regions, if at this moment he is at Lhasa desiring to come down and negotiate with
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Colonel Young husband nod unable to do so because the Tibetans steal his transport from him—all that is evidence which I proves conclusively how impotent the Chinese Government is to control the action of the Tibetans, and how little we can rely upon their aid in extricating us from the position in which we now find ourselves. We are in constant communication with the Chinese Government. We have given them every opportunity of assisting us through diplomatic channels; but I am afraid that the measure of their ability to assist us is the power of the Amban, who, as we all know, is more or less a prisoner at Lhasa.
I take it the Leader of the Opposition has brought this subject on because he desires to elicit once more from us a declaration of our Tibetan policy, not in setting up the Mission, but so far as the future is concerned. As the representative of the India Office has said, our policy remains the same. I venture to suggest it is not likely that when His Majesty's Government have deliberately adopted and announced a policy they should be driven from it merely because their Mission has been attacked by a lot of ragged barbarians in a remote region adjoining the Indian frontier. We do not so lightly as that abandon the policy we have arrived at. With regard to the advance to Lhasa, the noble Earl suggested that in itself denoted a change in policy. I express the contrary opinion. It seems to me that, whether at Gyangtse or at Lhasa, the policy remains the same policy — the policy of obtaining a satisfactory settlement from the Tibetans and reparation for the injuries they have done to us. So far as we are able to reassure the noble Earl by telling him that our policy remains what it was, I am very glad to give him that re-assurance; but, of course, so far as the operations now in progress are concerned, we must reserve to ourselves a certain amount of discretion in carrying them to a conclusion which will be honourable and satisfactory to ourselves.
House adjourned at a quarter before Six o'clock, to Thursday next, half-past Ten o'clock.