Lords Sitting of 21 June 1904

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Various Powers) Bill. The LORD CHANCELLOR informed the House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn. The order made on the 13th instant discharged, and Bill committed for Tuesday next.
Radcliffe Tramways and Improvement Bill. The LORD CHANCELLOR informed the-House that the opposition to the Bill was withdrawn. The order made on Thursday last discharged, and Bill committed.
Gas Orders Confirmation (No. 1) Bill [H.L.]. Reported from the Select Committee, without Amendment, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
Oakengates, Dawley, and District Joint Water Board Bill [H.L.], now Oakengates and Dawley Joint Water Board Bill [H.L.]. Reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
Baker Street and Waterloo Railway Bill. The King's consent signified; and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.
Crystal Palace District Gas Bill. Reported, with an Amendment.
Southend-on-Sea Gas Bill; Brymbo Water Bill; Great Central and Midland Joint Railways Bill. Reported, with Amendments.
London and [North-Western Railway Bill. The King's consent signified; and Bill reported, with Amendments.
Mullingar, Kells, and Drogheda Railway Bill; Donegal Railway Bill. Reported, without Amendment.
Bexhill Water and Gas Bill. Read 3a with the Amendments; a further Amendment made; Bill passed, and returned to the Commons.
Clyde Navigation (Works) Bill, Brought from the Commons; read 1a; and referred to the Examiners.
Tynemouth Gas Bill [H.L.]. Returned from the Commons agreed to, with Amendments.
Acton Improvement Bill. Returned from the Commons with the Amendments agreed to.
Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill [H.L.]. Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Five Lords appointed a Select Committee on the Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No, 3) Bill [H.L.] and other Bills do form the Select Committee for the consideration of the Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill [H.L.] so far as relates to the Walton-on-Thames Order; read, and agreed to. All petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bill to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bill.
Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 3) Bill [H.L.]; Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 6) Bill [H.L.]; Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 2) Bill [H.L.]; Doncaster Corporation Bill; Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway (Steam Vessels) Bill; Barnet District Gas and Water Bill; Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill [H.L.] (Walton-on-Thames Order). Report from the Committee of Selection, That the Lord O'Neill be proposed to the House as a member of the Select Committee on the said Bills in the place of the Lord Cranworth; read, and agreed to.
Electric Lighting Provisional Orders (No. 4) Bill [H.L.] (Kingswood Order opposed); Tramways Orders Confirmation (No. 1) Bill [H.L.]; Water Orders Confirmation Bill [H.L.]; Gas and Water Orders Confirmation Bill [H.L.]; Thames River Steamboat Service Bill; London United Tramways Bill; Strabane, Rap-hoe, and Convoy Railway Bill. Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills; (viz.): E. Lauderdale (Chairman), E. Bradford, L. Clements (E. Leitrim), L. Chesham, L. Elphinstone; agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly. The Committee to meet on Monday the 4th of

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July next at Twelve o'clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.
Gas Orders Confirmation (No. 3) Bill [H.L.]. Amendments reported (according to order), and Bill to be read 3a on Thursday next.
Canal Rates and Charges (Regents Canal) Order Confirmation Bill [H.L.]. Read 3il (according to order), and passed, and sent to the Commons.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  BOARD OF AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES (AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS, 1903).
  Report on the Agricultural Returns relating to acreage and produce of crops and number of live stock in Great Britain; with summaries for the United Kingdom, British Possessions, and Foreign Countries; and particulars of prices, imports, and exports of agricultural produce.

  IRISH LAND COMMISSION (PROCEEDINGS).
  Return for the month of February, 1904.
  Presented (by Command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  GREEN WICH HOSPITAL AND TRAVERS' FOUNDATION.
  Statement of the estimated income and expenditure of Greenwich Hospital and of Travers' Foundation, for the year 1904–1905. Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.
  MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT (1882) AMENDMENT BILL [H.T.].
  Reported from the Standing Committee without Amendment, and or to be read 3. on Thursday next.
  NAVAL AND MILITARY MEDALS BILL [H.L.]
  Reported from the Standing Committee without Amendment, and to be read 3a on Thursday next.

  SUPPLY OF ELECTRICITY BILL [H.L.]
  The following Lords were named of the Select Committee: M. Bath, E. Ellesmere, L. Colchester, L. Stanley of Alderley, L. Wolverton.
  The Committee to appoint their owm Chairman.

  CHANTREY TRUST.
  THE EARL OF LYTTONrose, in accordance with notice, "to call attention to the administration of the Chantrey Trust; and to move for the appointment of a I Select Committee of this House to inquire into the matter, and, if necessary, to make recommendations." He said: My Lords, the subject of the Motion which I have placed on the Order Paper is very different from the matters which usually occupy your Lordships in this House, and it has nothing whatever to do with current politics. I offer no apology, though, for bringing it forward, because it is a matter of great national importance which has aroused considerable interest in the country of late, and one with which your Lordships are very specially qualified to deal. The case I have to present is that of a very generous legacy which has been left by a private individual in trust for the nation, but which has been administered in so partial and narrow a sense that the nation has not reaped the full benefit of his generosity. I do not come here, my Lords, as an art critic, and I have no intention of giving to your Lordships a lecture upon the merits or shortcomings of particular artists or their work. I shall endeavour, so far as I can, and it is not altogether easy to do so, to confine myself to points which would be worthy of your consideration if the subject of the Trust were any other subject than that of art.
  For nearly twenty years now the administration of this fund has been the subject of comment and criticism in art circles. I have no new facts to offer, and I do not base my case upon any recent I event of special importance. My justification for bringing the question before Parliament at all rests upon three grounds —(1) the accumulation of evidence over i a series of years to the effect that the intentions of the testator in this matter I have not been fully carried out and

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  that the interests of the nation and of art generally have been sacrificed to those of the particular association of artists who belong to the Royal Academy; (2) the growing tide of hostile criticism which at the present moment is finding vent in almost every organ of public opinion in the country; and (3) the continued refusal of the Royal Academy to meet any of the charges which are brought against them or to give any explanation of their conduct, and their repeated assertions that they are responsible to no one, and that probably those who criticise them are actuated by motives either of wounded vanity or jealousy. When the administration of a public fund is attacked upon public grounds and when evidence is produced in support of the attack, I hold that the administration of that fund should be submitted to public investigation, and to make such an inquiry there is nobody in the country more competent or better suited than a Committee of your Lordships' House.
  I do not ask you to-day to express any opinion upon the merits of the question. I do not ask the Government to take any steps on their own account. I only ask that when you have heard some facts which I shall place before you, you will say that the Royal Academy, in so far as they are in the position of trustees of the nation, shall not be allowed to evade responsibilities which would be required of any other body placed in a similar position, and that you will allow the whole matter to be inquired into and investigated in a judicial, impartial, and thorough manner by a Committee of this House. Though many of your Lordships are probably familiar with this question, I think it is necessary that I should first of all explain exactly what the Chantrey Trust is. Sir Francis Chantrey was an artist and sculptor who died in the year 1842, leaving the greater part of his life's earnings for the encouragement of art in this country. The interest of the money which he left, which amounted to about £2,000 or £3,000 a year, was entrusted to the President and Council of the Royal Academy for the purchase of works of fine art in painting and sculpture of the highest merit which had been executed in this country.
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  The will is expressed in the clearest possible terms, and both the powers and the limitations of the trustees are very clearly set forth, but as I have here a copy of the will itself it would perhaps be better if I quote Sir Francis Chantrey's own words. He says—
  "And the clear residue of the same monies shall be laid out by the President and other members composing such Council for the time being, of the Royal Academy, or of such other society or association as aforesaid, when and as they shall think it expedient in the purchase of works of Fine Art of the highest merit in painting and sculpture that can be obtained, either already executed or which may hereafter be executed by artists of any nation, provided such artists shall have actually resided in Great Britain during the executing and completing of such works, it being my express direction that no work of art, whether executed by a deceased or living artist shall be purchased unless the same shall have been entirely executed within the shores of Great Britain.…. And my will further is that such President and Council, in making their decision, shall have rogard sololy to the intrinsic merit of the works in question, and not permit any feeling of sympathy for an artist or his family, by reason of his or their circumstances or otherwise, to influence them. And I do hereby further direct that such President and Council shall not be in any manner obliged to lay out and expend in every or any one year, either the whole or any part of the monies so paid over to them for the purpose aforesaid, or any accumulations that may arise therefrom, but that the same respectively may from time to time be reserved and accumulated for a period not exceeding five successive years, if such President and Council shall see occasion.…. And I furthor declare my will to be that the President and Council of the Royal Academy, or of such other society or association as aforesaid, do and shall within the succeeding year next after any work shall have been purchased by them as aforesaid, cause the same to be publicly exhibited for the period of one calendar month at the least in the annual exhibition of the Royal Academy, or in some important public exhibition of Fine Arts, the same to be selected by such President and Council, subject to such regulations as they shall think fit and proper."
  Now, my Lords, you will see from the passages I have read that the trustees are at liberty to purchase the work of any artist who has lived and worked in this country, whether he is at the time alive or dead. They are charged to have regard solely to the intrinsic merits of the works in question, and to buy for no other reason. They are. to exhibit the pictures after they are purchased, and they may accumulate their monies for five years, if they so desire, in order to be able to afford to purchase a really first-rate picture. In

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  all these particulars the will is clear and precise. It was a fine idea of Sir Francis Chantrey's that the money which he had made in art should go back to art after his death. He hoped and believed that in time his name would be associated with a collection of the finest works of art which have been executed in this country. His conception was that of a truly national gallery of British art. Think, my Lords, what an opportunity was there. Think of the great artists who have worked and lived in this country, of whom we are so justly proud, men whose works might have been collected together for the benefit of posterity and associated for ever with the bountiful generosity of Sir Francis Chantrey. It was a great opportunity, and yet we have to contrast with that ideal the reality of actual fact. The name of this great patron and benefactor of art has come now to be associated with a collection of pictures which, in the opinion, I may say, of almost everyone, is a mere byword and mockery. There is one other passage which I think I ought to quote from the will with reference to the housing of these pictures—
  "And it is ray wish and intention that the works of art so purchased as aforesaid shall be collected for the purpose of forming and establishing a Public National Collection of British Fine Art in Painting and Sculpture executed within the shores of Great Britain in the confident expectation that, whenever the collection shall become or be considered of sufficient importance the Government or the country will provide a suitable and proper building or accommodation for their preservation and exhibition as the property of the nation, free of all charges whatever on my estate."
  This generous man had a simple faith in the generosity of others, and he never doubted for a moment that his action in this matter would be recognised and would be followed up by the Government of his country. His expectations in that respect were realised, but not from the quarter to which he looked, and it was left to the generosity of another private individual, Sir Henry Tate, to give money for the erection of a building in which the works purchased with Sir Francis Chantrey's money could be housed. About ten years ago, when the Tate Gallery was built, the pictures which h d been purchased out of the Chantrey Fund were handed over by the Academy
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  to the Tate Gallery, and it is on the pictures which hang now in the Chantrey Rooms in the Tate Gallery, and on those which do not hang there but which might be expected to hang there, that the whole case against the Academy is founded.
  This is not a matter of taste alone. If it were, I should not bring it before your Lordships. Parliament can do a good deal, but even Parliament cannot compel the Royal Academy or any other body to have good taste, and Parliament is not a body qualified to decide as to who has and who has not good taste in this country. But I think I can prove that Sir Francis Chantrey's intentions have not strictly been carried out either in the letter or the spirit. In the first place, as I read from the will just now, only pictures of the highest merit were to be bought, and I think I can prove that that at any rate has not been carried out. Even if the principal pictures in the Gallery painted by Royal Academicians themselves, for which very high prices were paid, were works of the highest meritr—and I shall prove in a moment that a good many of them were nothing of the kind—still it would be impossible to say the same of a large number of very stupid little pictures bought for paltry sums of from £20 to £50. I could read to your Lordships a list of a dozen names of artists whose works are in the collection which I think your Lordships will never have heard of before and which are unknown to art critics and connoisseurs in this country. Is it likely that, if these pictures were of the highest merit, if they were the best works of art existent in this country, the names of those who painted them would not even be known to art connoisseurs in the country?
  The will says the works of dead as well as of living artists may be bought, but only in one instance has this been done. In every other case hasty purchases from the exhibition of the year have been made. The one case in which the work of a dead artist was purchased was a large sacred picture by Hilton, which was bought in the first year that the Trust came into operation. Hilton was an artist who; died in 1839. His picture is not one of great importance. It cannot have added very great interest to the collection. But if an indifferent picture by Hilton may

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  have been bought, why might not masterpieces by, say, Cotman, Constable, Turner, and other artists who were alive at the time of Hilton have been bought also, and, to go back further, pictures by Raebura, Crome, and others, who were alive at the same time as Hilton, and who died only a few years before him. In fact, the purchase of that picture is one of the mysteries of the collection, and it is not clear precisely on what grounds it was bought. With the whole range of works of art executed in this country to choose from, in almost every case have purchases been made from the exhibitions of the Royal Academy. The exceptions are few and are interesting as showing what the trustees—the President and Council of the Royal Academy—might have done if they had been so disposed; but in twenty-seven years there are only four exceptions to this rule. One is the picture of an Academician, two others are pictures of men who subsequently became Academicians, and the fourth of an outsider.
  Conceive a private collector who had £2,000 or £3,000 a year to expend in collecting pictures. Suppose one of your Lordships were fortunate in having that money to spend on that object. Is it likely that you would content yourself with going to the exhibition of the Royal Academy year after year and buying, let us say, the best picture there, without going to a single sale and without in fact visiting any other institution? Is it possible that you could get together in that way a collection of pictures which would be in accordance with the instructions and wishes of Sir Francis Chantrey? By this policy, from which they have only departed in four instances, this fund left by Sir Francis Chantrey has come to be used as a sort of prize fund for the exhibition of the Royal Academy. Your Lordships will understand how dependent they naturally are for their very existence on the success of their annual exhibition. Well, when they make it known that they do not intend to purchase out of this fund pictures exhibited anywhere else, they naturally give a very strong inducement to artists to send their pictures for exhibition at Burlington House. I do not say whether this policy has arisen from misunderstanding of the terms of the will or by intention. That is a point
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  which the Committee, if appointed, will have to go into; but, whatever their motive, the result is the same. The result is that these pictures which now hang in the Chantrey Rooms of the Tate Gallery, instead of being the finest works of art produced in this country, are nothing ing more or less than a selection of the exhibits for twenty-seven years in the Royal Academy.
  Not even in every case have the best pictures of the Academicians themselves been bought. That is rather a difficult question to go into here, but I may mention one or two cases which I think will prove what I mean. I suppose really the most notorious instance was the picture of the late President of the Royal Academy, Sir John Millais, the picture probably known to all of your Lordships called "Speak, speak." I doubt if there are any people in this country who would say that that was the best picture Millais painted, or if there are many who would deny that it was the very worst. Then, again, there is the case of a man called North, a very well-known water-colour painter, a man who for many years has painted excellent pictures in water colours, none of which have ever been purchased. But a few years ago he was elected a member of the Royal Academy, and subsequently one of his pictures was bought out of the Chantrey Fund, not, however, one of his well-known and admirable water colours, but a large picture in oils of a very indifferent character. Now, my Lords, I ask: Was it probable that the best picture of a man who was famous as a water-colour painter should have been a work in oils?
  I may quote one other instance, one of their purchases is a landscape picture by a very well-known portrait painter, an Academician. Probably it will be as well if I do not mention the name; it is not very essential to my point. He is a portrait painter, and this was a landscape picture which was bought for £800. The companion picture to that, also a landscape painting of the same character, size, and merit, was commissioned by a picture dealer for £400, half that which was given out of the Chantrey Fund for the picture in question. Some years later that picture came into the market at an art sale, and was bought by a private

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  individual, who, knowing that £800 had been given for the companion picture by the Chantrey Trustees, thought he was making a very good bargain when he purchased it for £100. Since that occasion this picture has twice again come into the market, once soon after it was purchased, but it was bought in for £90, and the last time was last summer when it came up for sale at Christie's and was bought in for £20. I understand Christie's have offered £30 as approximately the value of the picture. Have we any reason to suppose that the nation made a better bargain when it bought the one picture for £800 than the private collector when he bought the other for £100, and could not get rid of it for £20?
  But if their purchases have been strange, the pictures they have not bought have been stranger still. Whilst they have purchased pictures by men whose names would probably be unknown to your Lordships, those whose works they have not bought include men of the highest reputation, the most famous artists who have worked in this country during the last fifty years. What would Sir Francis Chantrey have said if he had lived to see this national gallery of pictures after twenty-seven years without a single work by Burne-Jones, Rossetti, Madox Brown, Holman Hunt, Legros, Alfred Stevens, Whistler, and many other artists I might name? There is not a single example of these artists in the collection. I am well aware that pictures of some of these artists when they were first painted were not received very favourably; in fact, that they had very few admirers ', indeed. But my point is this, that there must have been since that date many Councils of the Royal Academy containing men who did admire those works, men who have publicly said that they admired them. It cannot be said that they have no admiration for this school, because one of the first purchases they made was a picture by Rooke, who was at that time an assistant to Burne-Jones. If, therefore, they will buy the picture of a mere assistant of that school, is it not strange that they should not buy some of the pictures of the master himself?
  My point, therefore, is that there have been men on the Council of the Academy who have admired these pictures, and I ask why have they not bought them?
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  The only explanation which fits the facts is that these artists did not exhibit their pictures at the Royal Academy. There are other explanations which have been put forward, but they cannot be sustained. In the first place, it has been alleged that the trustees were obliged by the terms of the will itself to buy pictures from the Royal Academy. I would not refer to that except that it has been set forward by an Academician himself in defence of the action of the Academy, but I have read to your Lordships the terms of the will, and there is no sort of obligation on the trustees to buy out of the Royal Academy, or out of any other exhibition. All that Sir Francis Chantrey laid down, and very properly laid down, was that when the pictures were bought they should be exhibited in order that the public might have an opportunity of seeing them. It has also been suggested that pictures by these men were not available for purchase, but any reference to the records of the sales at Christie's and elsewhere will immediately dispose of that contention, for it will then be found that pictures by these artists have come up for sale over and over again, and in almost every case at prices well within the range of the fund, and considerably lower than those which have been paid for some of the pictures which are included. There have been plenty of pictures available for purchase had the trustees been so disposed, but they have preferred to patronise their own exhibition and to buy at top prices pictures which, if they were now placed on the market, would probably not fetch half what was paid for them.
  I shall be asked, What can now be done? What could a Committee do if it were appointed? I may be sanguine, but I am inclined to think a good deal could be done. I have not very much sympathy, not very much patience with those who admit that things are bad and then refuse to take any steps to remedy them. I am inclined to think that a Committee, if appointed, could do a good deal. In the first place, they could secure some answer from the Royal Academy to the charges which have been brought forward, some explanation of the methods which they have hitherto adopted. That in itself would be interesting and desirable. Then their next

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  business would be to examine the charges which have been brought forward to see whether they are justified, and when they have done that I believe they will find that the narrow groove into which the trustees have settled down for many years is the result of circumstances which are avoidable, the result of conditions which they have imposed on themselves, which prevent them from attending sales and going about the business as any art connoisseur on his own account would do, and which prevent them from taking a wide and generous view of their duties. I think that a Committee could make recommendations which the Royal Academy themselves would be quite prepared to carry out. I think they would clear up many misunderstandings and much uneasiness which prevails at the present moment in art circles, and that the result of their deliberations and Report would be that this fund would be administered more efficiently in the future. I will only say, in conclusion, that if the cause of art is to flourish in this country, if generous acts like those of Sir Francis Chantrey are to be encouraged, then Parliament should show itself ready to investigate alleged abuses and to watch over the distribution and the use which is made of monies left for a very definite purpose. Therefore, I finally appeal to your Lordships, in the name of the public, and in the interests of art generally, to accept my Motion.
  Moved, "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the administration of the Chantrey Trust; and, if necessary, to make recommendations."— (The Earl of Lytton).
  THE EARL OF WEMYSS: My Lords, I rise now because I believe that what I am authorised to say will tend to greatly shorten this discussion. My noble friend, no doubt, knows of this little book which I hold in my hand. It is an indictment by Mr. MacColl of the Royal Academy, and in this book there is set out the will of Sir Francis Chantrey. The noble Earl has not read the beginning of it. The first passage of importance is to this effect, that his estate shall be devoted to the encouragement of British fine art in painting and sculpture. Therefore, it
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  is for the encouragement of British art, and not for the purpose of making a collection of English pictures that the Trust exists. The charge against the Royal Academy amounts to this, that bad purchases have been made, that they have missed chances which they might have embraced, and that they have not purchased pictures of painters who ought to have a place in this collection. As regards bad purchases, I have no doubt many of your Lordships, as picture collectors, could recall occasions when your purchases in after years scarcely stood the test of time and inspection. Who is there who can say he has never made bad purchases, or that all his purchases are to his satisfaction? As to missing chances, we all miss chances to buy at the right moment. On one occasion I myself lost the chance of securing a work of Albert Dürer for £120 which was subsequently sold to the Berlin Gallery for £5,000. These are the sort of chances individuals lose, but when it is a case of a body which has to be got together to consider the purchases the case is more difficult.
  The main charge brought by my noble friend is that painters who ought to be included in this collection are not represented. I have been to the Tate Gallery lately, and I quite admit that there are many pictures there which have been bought under the Chantrey Bequest which I certainly did not like, and which probably ought not to have been bought; but when this inquiry, assuming it is granted, takes place, no doubt good reasons will be given for the purchase of pictures which generally would not be popular. I thought it right, being interested in art, to put myself in communication with members of the Royal Academy in connection with this question, and I think it much better than giving any ideas of my own that I should give to your Lordships the results which I have jotted down of the conversations I had with members of the Academy as to the non-purchase of pictures and the missing of chances. This is what they say: The conditions of the will make purchases difficult. No commissions are allowed: that is to say, they cannot order a picture from a painter, they cannot buy until the picture is exhibited. Thus pictures

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  have not been got that they would gladly have bought. Alma Tadema's pictures were always purchased before they were exhibited. Burne-Jones's pictures at his best time were always painted on commission, and he had on commission more than he could execute. Whistler rarely exhibited work of first importance. Everyone is not agreed as to his position as an artist, but I think all will agree that his etchings are splendid. Rossetti and Madox Brown practically ceased producing purchasable works before the Chantrey Fund was available. Alfred Stevens painted few pictures. A portrait of his was bought for the National Gallery. Now, as to the management, this is their explanation: The Council is a shifting body. What one set of men might consider desirable another might object to. The Council for the time being is the final authority Purchases have been made elsewhere than at the Royal Academy—namely, at Grosvenor House and the New Galleries; but the best men, as a rule, send pictures to the Royal Academy, and purchases consequently are best made there.
  The Council of the Royal Academy are accused of a breach of trust and of jobbery. If they were really good jobbers they would purchase only pictures painted by Royal Academicians, yet out of 105 purchases named in the book I hold in my hand only twenty-seven were the work of Royal Academicians. I do not think that can be called jobbery. The Royal Academy, so far from being opposed to inquiry, court it, and are most anxious that this should be gone into. Whether my noble friend I when he gets his Committee will get any noble Lords to serve with him I cannot tell. Personally, I should be sorry to serve on it. For what have the Committee got to do? The members will have first of all to go to the Tate Gallery and consider every picture there, and take a vote probably on some as to whether or not they would have purchased them themselves. Having settled that point, they will then have to find out now. many pictures they might have preferred to those purchased in the course of fifty or sixty years. Some of those pictures with which a comparison would be necessary may have gone to America, Australia, New Zealand, and other coun-
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  tries; so that if the Committee fulfil I their duty, which is entirely one of comparison between what has been purchased and what has not, they will have to travel all over the world. If, however, there is to be a Committee, I hope a good Committee will be appointed, and I wish them joy of the work before them.
  LORD DAVEY: My Lords, being one of the trustees of the Chantrey Fund, though I have nothing to do with the functions of the Royal Academy, it is, I think, right that I should say a few words, because as the Motion is framed I understood it to be an attack on the administration of the Chantrey Trust. I ought to point out that Sir Francis Chantrey's will vested the residue of his property in trustees, of whom I have at present the honour to be one, but the duty of the trustees is confined to taking care of the funds and of handing over the income each year to the Royal Academy for the purchase of works of art, as the noble Earl has described. The amount of the fund is, I think, a little over £2,000 a year, and your Lordships who are in the habit of buying pictures know that if you went to Christie's and invested in pictures of the best known and most celebrated masters of the British school, living and dead, £2,000 a year would not go very far. It is true that the Royal Academy may request the trustees to accumulate the money till a large sum is obtained, but they do not conceive that to be the best mode of executing their trust.
  What I desire to point out to your Lordships is that Sir Francis Chantrey vested the selection of works of art absolutely in the Royal Academy, or, rather, I should say, in the Council of the Royal Academy. I do not doubt that the noble Earl and any Committee over which he presides would make a. much better selection and execute the discretion which Sir Francis Chantrey vested in the Royal Academy better than they have done; but I venture to ay that that is no reason for displacing the Royal Academy, and I am glad to gather from the noble Earl's remarks, that the Committee which he asks your Lordships to appoint is a mere Committee of inquiry to make recommendations which the Royal Academy may or may

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  not adopt, and that he has no intention of altering the disposition of Sir Francis Chantrey's will, which could only be done, of course, by an Act of Parliament. I am not able to go in detail into the questions brought forward by the noble Earl, but I think there are two or three observations which he omitted to make. In the first place, he did not draw attention to the clause in the will which the noble Earl below me mentioned, namely, that no works are to be bought on commission. Commissions cannot be given to any artist to execute works for the Chantrey trustees. Your Lordships are aware that the greatest painters of the present time, at any rate, generally work on commission, that their works are ordered and are purchased long before they leave their studios. That is almost invariably the case with artists who are most celebrated at the present time, and the Council of the Royal Academy have been advised that not only can they not order a work on commission, but that they cannot even purchase an unfinished work in the artist's studio. That advice may have been wrong, but it is advice they have received from legal persons competent to give it. No doubt the works of the greatest masters of the English school from time to time come into the market, but in order to purchase at Christie's or elsewhere, where these pictures are sold, you must have the money in your pocket, and the prices for which works of this character are sold at Christie's are rather beyond the comparatively modest means of the Chantrey Fund. It would require the accumulations of some years to pay such prices as one sees in the newspapers and knows from one's own experience are given for the works of the greatest artists in the British school.
  There are two conceptions of the way in which the Chantrey Trust could be carried into effect. One way would be to form a gallery of the greatest masters of British art. The Royal Academy did not conceive that that was the best mode, in the interests of art, for executing the trust reposed in them, and they did not think, having regard to the amount of money at their disposal, it would be wise to confine themselves to the purchase of a comparatively small number of the works of the greatest artists. The other
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  way in which the Chantrey Trust might be employed consistently with the terms of the will was in the encouragement of British art by purchasing the pictures of promising young and unknown artists. The noble Earl shakes his head, but I venture to say that in my opinion that would be in perfect consistency with the trust which is reposed in them, and the Royal Academy in most cases have executed their trust in that way. They have bought from time to time what they conceived to be works of the greatest merit from artists who are comparatively unknown.
  I have seen and enjoyed a good many pictures in my time, and have been fortunate enough to buy a few of my own, but I do not pretend to be an art critic, and I should be the last person in the world to take part in a discussion as to the comparative merits of one artist over another. I myself am acquainted with the Chantrey collection, and I certainly think that, whatever the opinion of the noble Earl may be, he used rather an extravagant expression when he called the Chantrey collection a byword and a mockery. I must say I think that was an extremely exaggerated expression, and that it was not one which on reflection the noble Earl would be prepared to abide by. Nor do I think he was accurate when he said the Chantrey Trustees had not fulfilled their trust either in the letter or the spirit. That, of course, is a matter of opinion, and I certainly should not be disposed to ask your Lordships to express any opinion on that point.
  As the noble Earl below me has told your Lordships, the Royal Academy are perfectly prepared to meet an inquiry if your Lordships think fit to appoint a Committee, and, indeed, will welcome one, because they are satisfied that they will be able to give a satisfactory account of their proceedings. But I must say the inquiry seems to me to be of a difficult character. The noble Earl opposite, I gather, does not propose that it should end in bringing in a Bill to alter the Chantrey Trust, and when one thinks of the sort of evidence that the Committee will have to inquire into one does not envy the position of noble Lords who will serve on it. They will, of course, have

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  complaints that pictures of some particular artist have not been purchased. I ought to tell your Lordships that the Trust has only been in existence since 1877, and that 105 pictures have been bought. It will be said by gentlemen who are interested in galleries other than the Royal Academy, that pictures ought to have been bought out of their galleries instead of out of the Royal Academy;, and you will have other persons, amateur art critics, who will come forward and explain their views on the shortcomings of the Royal Academy. As, however, no opposition is offered on the part of the Royal Academy to the appointment of this Committee, I do not think it is necessary for me to detain your Lordships further.
  THE FIRST COMMISSIONER OF WORKS (Lord WINDSOR): My Lords, I think my noble friend behind me may be satisfied in having brought a question before your Lordships which is of very great interest, certainly, to those who are concerned with the position which modern British art should hold relatively to the modern pictorial art of the world. I do not propose, in the very few remarks I have to offer on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to follow my noble friend in the first part of his speech, in which he, I think, with great skill navigated the deep waters between what I may call the shoals of individual taste and the rocks of authority. It is a neighbourhood which I do not wish to find myself in, as very keen controversies are easily aroused near it. But the question which presents itself to the Government is really this: Has the noble Earl in moving this Motion made out a prima-facie case for some inquiry? The Government have no intention whatever of attempting to pre-judge this question, nor of expressing any opinion as to the merits or demerits of the actual works which have been brought under the Chantrey bequest. The point which they have to express an opinion about is whether, as I have said, a prima facie case has been made out for some inquiry.
  The noble Earl opposite submitted a list of reasons given to him by members of the Royal Academy for the course they have taken while on the Council, and while responsible for the carrying out of
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  the Trust, and I venture to think that this very list of reasons justifies my noble friend behind me in bringing the Motion before the House. There are matters, which I think a Committee of this House would clear up, quite unconnected with the duty which the noble and learned Lord opposite playfully suggested that the Committee would have to undertake. It is perfectly clear that it has been in the minds of members of the Royal Academy Council that it was necessary that pictures bought under this bequest should be pictures exhibited in the Royal Academy. I venture to think that a Committee appointed by this House might with perfect propriety make it clear that under the terms of the will the Council of the Royal Academy were taking too narrow a view of their duties, and that there really were not those limitations upon their choice which they have, no doubt, perfectly honestly believed existed.
  There is another instance I would give. I do not throw it out as a suggestion, because I have not got to make suggestions, but it has been said that the Council of the Royal Academy is a shifting body, that the whole Council has to come to some agreement, and that it is very difficult in those circumstances to make a choice in any way the same as anindividual with knowledge and authority could make. Why should not the Council of the Royal Academy appoint a managing director? What happens in a company of directors? They do not lessen their authority by any such steps as that. They do not lessen their responsibility, but they appoint one who looks into matters for them, and whose advice they naturally pay particular attention to. I cannot see any reason why the Council of the Royal Academy should not appoint one eminent artist who would give his particular attention to carrying out the terms of Sir Francis Chantrey's will, and who might give most valuable advice to the Council, who otherwise are likely to take the line of least resistance, and perhaps buy pictures, not because they are particularly admired, but because they are not very strongly objected to.
  Certain difficulties have, no doubt, presented themselves to the Council of the Academy in carrying out this Trust. In their rules and regulations they have

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  possibly put unnecessary limits to their choice, and in the interests of Sir Francis Chantrey's own wishes, in the interests of British art which this collection is meant to encourage, it is perfectly possible, I think, that a Committee of this House, on inquiry, may be able to persuade: the Council of the Royal Academy to take a broader view than they have done hither to of the duties which have been handed over to them. I have no more to say on behalf of His Majesty's Government except that they do think that a prima-facie case for an inquiry has been made out by my noble friend, and that they do not propose to oppose the Motion which he has made, and which I am glad to hear those who have been specially speaking for the Royal Academy have no intention of opposing either. I trust and believe that, however difficult may be the task which is set them, my noble friend may be enabled to appoint a Committee which will be able to come to conclusions and to offer suggestions that it will not be out of the power of the Council of the Royal Academy to adopt.
  THE EARL OF CARLISLE: My Lords, I should not wish to detain the House were it not that the noble Earl who moved this Motion wrote an article in a e weekly paper, a copy of which was sent to me, and which other noble Lords no doubt received, in which he made a statement which I think ought to be corrected. He said—
  "Since it was taken for granted by Chantrey that some trouble would be expended on the work of selection, an additional sum of £300 a year was bequeathed to the President for his £ pains."
  I think anyone who reads the will of Sir Francis Chantrey will see that this bequest to the President had nothing c: whatever to do with the administration p of the Chantrey Trust. It was made specially, without any condition whatever, for his own absolute use and benefit. It was made at a time when there was no salary attached to the office of the President of the Academy, and what a points this out more strongly is that a subsequent bequest of £50 to the Secretary hi of the Academy had the condition of looking after the affairs of the Trust attached to it. At the death of Sir Francis Chantrey the Academy paid over
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  this salary of £300 to the President, who enjoyed it for thirty years before the Trust came into operation. Therefore, I do not think it can be fairly said to have been given for the administration of the Trust. I think that this mistake illustrates a little the spirit in which this inquiry has been made. It seems to me that it has assumed so hostile an attitude that it is likely to a considerable extent to do away with the good which this Committee may effect.
  I quite agree with the noble Lord in thinking that this Committee may do considerable good in assisting the work of the Council of the Academy, and possibly in enabling them to do away with some of the regulations they have made. But I cannot think that this Committee can possibly alter the character of the work. It cannot possibly make a Committee of the Academy other than academic. It seems to me extremely natural that the Council of the Academy should prefer academical works to others, not necessarily because they "job," but because they believe them to be good, The Academy are supposed to elect into their body the best painters and to hang on their walls those pictures which they consider to be best, and you can hardly expect them to pass a vote of censure on themselves by buying something which is exactly opposite to what they like. I very much agree with some, at all events, of the criticisms made by the noble Earl; but I do not know what will be gained by putting them forward. He tells us that numerous works that are universally admired now were not bought, but if the trustees of the Chantrey Bequest or any other public body had bought those works when they were painted they would have been met by universal execration by the organs which now complain of the administration of the Trust. Some of the critics of the administration have gone so far as to say that works by Holbein and Vandyck might have been purchased under the Trust, but that surely is to reduce the argument to a reduclio ad absurdum. Surely Sir Francis Chantrey cannot be supposed to have intended old masters to be bought out of his bequest. It seems almost common sense to suppose that it was contemporary art that he meant to encourage.

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  As to the criticism with regard to the prices paid, the noble Earl surely cannot have noticed that portion of the will in which Sir Francis Chantrey says expressly that the prices to be paid shall be liberal and shall be wholly in the discretion of the President of the Council of the Royal Academy. The noble Lord has told us what Sir Francis Chantrey's intentions were. We can only judge them by the will. He took great pains to say that it was to be in the hands of the Academy. He was an Academician himself, and knew all about the Academy; and not only did he put the Trust in the hands of the Academy, but he provided that if that body ceased to exist the Trust should be administered by such other society as might be formed by its last members. It was plainly Sir Francis Chantrey's intention to leave the administration of the fund in the hand of the Academy, and I do not know exactly, if your Lordships' Committee object to that, into whose hands you would put it. It is a very doubtful question. I hope this Committee will succeed in the objects which Lord Windsor has put before it, but I think it would be well that in starting their labours they should not hope entirely to alter the character of the bequest.
  THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, there is other important business before the House, and I think we seem to be all of one mind with regard to the Motion of the noble Lord. I do not, therefore, intend to take up your Lordships' time. I think we are all indebted to the noble Earl for having brought this subject before the House. It is one which has attracted a great deal of public attention lately, and the noble Earl has treated it in language of great moderation, and has been careful to avoid any imputation of unworthy motives to the Council of the Royal Academy in the manner in which they have discharged their duties. On the other hand, it is impossible to exaggerate the strength of the feeling which prevails in favour of some inquiry into the manner in which those duties have been performed, and it is satisfactory to know that the Council of the Royal Academy itself desires that such an
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  inquiry should take place. I think, therefore, we have every reason to anticipate that the inquiry will be productive of useful results. I was not at all alarmed by the gloomy forebodings of the noble Earl, Lord Wemyss, who described to us the hopelessness of the task which we were assigning to the members of this Committee. He drew a picture of them reviewing not only the purchases of the past, but lost opportunities of purchasing which have now become merely historical. I venture to express the hope that if this Committee is appointed they will concern themselves with the future rather than the past, and that they will not, if I may use the expression, break their teeth upon lost opportunities, or upon purchases which in the eyes of many people have been of a disappointing character. I desire to say only one word with regard to what fell from the noble and learned Lord opposite. I understood him to suggest that the scope of the inquiry should be in some way or other limited. I do not know whether that will be the case. The noble Earl has not formulated the exact words of his Motion, but I gather that he intends to move that a Select Committee should be appointed to inquire into the administration of the Chantrey Trust, and, if necessary, to make a recommendation. [The Earl of LYTTON assented.] If that Motion be put to your Lordships and carried, I take it that the Committee will be able to make their inquiry and to offer any recommendations they please without restriction. It will be when we have those recommendations before us that we shall have to consider in what manner they should be dealt with.
  On Question, Motion agreed to, and ordered accordingly.

  THE WAR OFFICE RECONSTITUTION COMMITTEE.
  THE DUKE OF BEDFORDrose to call attention to the Report of the War Office Reconstitution Committee, and to ask for information. He said:—I beg to call your Lordships' attention to the Report of the War Office Reconstruction Committee. Many of the recommendations of the Committee have already

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  been acted upon by the Government, I but we are not aware if it is their intention to adopt the whole of the Report. Business-like in its brevity, the Esher Committee spares details. Consequently it requires explanations which can be best elicited by questions. I agree with the Committee that their scheme of administration must be taken as a whole, and that, loyally worked, it will succeed, but that "interference with the principles upon which it is based will necessarily destroy its benefits." I sincerely trust that the Government may be able to inform your Lordships that it is their intention to adopt the Report in its entirety —a hope not inconsistent with a wish for information and for assurances on certain points which seem to call for safeguards.
  I must remind your Lordships of the sequence of important events which preceded the appointment of the Esher Committee. First, the outbreak of war in October, 1899; then the general election which took place in November, 1900, when the Ministry was recast, Mr. Brodrick succeeding to the War Office. In December, 1900, the Clinton Dawkins Committee was appointed to inquire into the administration of the War Office and they reported in May. 1901. A year after, in May, 1902, peace was declared. The Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into the military preparations and other matters connected with the war in South Africa in September, 1902, reporting in July, 1903. I find in the Report of the Royal Commission on the South African War the following reference to the Report of the Clinton Dawkins Committee—
  "The recommendations of the Clinton Dawkins Committee can hardly be said to have been carried out until the permanency on which it insisted is more fully secured."
  That reference is made especially to the War Office administration. The Commissioners, referring to the whole military system, express regret that—
  "they are not satisfied that everything is being done to place matters on a better footing in the event of another emergency."
  Added to the Report are two notes, one by Lord Esher suggesting the reconstruction of the War Office, and one by Sir George Goldie. Sir George Goldie writes—
  "I heartily concur in the hope expressed in paragraphs 270 and 272 of the Report that the
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  state of affairs in 1899 cannot recur. This hope on my part is a wish and not an expectation."
  The opinions I have quoted were recorded nearly four years after the commencement of the war, and two years after the Report of the Clinton Dawkins Committee. It is clear that the War Office needed reconstruction, but that, if left to the War Office, reform would be postponed till that convenient season which always comes too late. July, 1903, when the Royal Commission reported, was not a moment when the nation could sit down and rest. Last summer signs were not wanting of the storm which has now burst in the Far East and will revolutionise all the problems of naval and military strategy in that quarter of the world. Under these circumstances the Government decided to tolerate no further delay, but at once to rebuild the War Office on a cleared site. I cannot agree with the criticism that the Government has acted with undue haste. On the other hand every single circumstance called for immediate action, and I desire to thank the Government for their promptitude.
  Coming to the Report itself, I would begin by referring your Lordships to Table A, which is on the third page of the third part of the Report. Table A is described as a diagram showing the proposed system for dealing with questions of Imperial Defence. Commencing at the very head, we have the Sovereign, Parliament, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister (President of the Committee of Imperial Defence), then the Committee of Defence with its two sub-headings. The first sub-heading gives the members representing the. Army, the Navy, India, and the Colonies, etc., the etc. opening a wide door. The second sub-heading shows the secretariat for the collation of information for the Defence Committee, and for the maintenance and custody of records. The evidence given before the South African War Commission has, of course, a very direct bearing on the changes proposed by the Esher Committee. One of their most important recommendations, and one which has been adopted, is the abolition of the office of the Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Brodrick, in his evidence before the South African War Commission, expressed the opinion that this office must be retained, and that

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  there is no possible substitute for the supreme power of the Commander-in-Chief. In the right hon. Gentleman's own words—
  "The sentiment of the Army is and always has been to look to the Commander-in-Chief."
  I altogether dissent from that view, and I cordially concur with the emphasis laid by the Esher Committee on the allegiance of the Army to the King. It is the King whom the Army serves. It is the King's Commission officers hold. It is the King's shilling that recruits accept. It is to the King alone that the Army looks as its national Commander.
  Alike to Crown and Parliament the Secretary of State for War is responsible. But has not that responsibility which Parliament demands from the Secretary of State for War been affected by the recommendations of the Esher Committee. In the first place it is affected by the interposition between Parliament and that Minister of the Imperial Defence Committee, of which, so far as I can make out, he is not necessarily a member. I say "not necessarily" because the Esher Committee insist on the absolute discretion vested in the Prime Minister as to the selection and variation of the members of the Defence Committee. (Report, Part I. p., I.) In the second place it is affected by the association of the members of the ArmyCouncil with him as colleagues. I quote paragraph 5, page 5, and Part II. of the Report—
  "The responsibility of the Secretary of State for War to Parliament and to the country for the administration of the military forces will in no sense be diminished, but it will be shared by the members of the Council."
  How can the military members of the Army Council share the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War to Parliament? No doubt the Secretary of State will speak with his military colleagues at his back, and this association will strengthen the authority of his utterances. The point is whether this addition to his authority has not been secured by dividing his responsibility. We all desire decentralisation, but decentralisation must not lessen the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War to the Crown and Parliament. I trust that the Government will be able to assure your Lordships that none of the changes impair the constitutional safeguard that the Secretary
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  of State for War is individually responsible to the Crown and Parliament for every detail in the administration of his Department, whether he knew the facts or was ignorant of them.
  Parliament alone can determine the question of the principles of our military policy. All depends on this. It is a point which has baffled the War Office in the past, and will, if not decided, baffle it in the future. To illustrate my meaning I cannot do better than quote the evidence of General Sir Coleridge Grove, before the Royal Commission—
  "One thing I hold to very much is that whatever is determined should not be a confidential matter between the Government and the War Office authorities. It should be a thing that is received and adopted by the country and is known in exactly the same way as we have the naval programme."
  The position to-day is that we have no settled military policy at all. All is uncertainty, indecision, inconsistency. In March, 1901, Parliament accepted Mr. Brodrick's view of home defence expressed in these words—
  "In the first place, when talking of homo defence, let us not confuse our minds by considering the position and action of the Navy. The Navy is obviously our first line of defence, and if in matters of war there could be any certainty we might dispense with an Army for home defence altogether. It may be that invasion is an off-chance, but you cannot run an Empire of this extent on an off-chance."
  The right hon. Gentleman then asked the sanction of Parliament to the maintenance of military forces here at home amounting to 680,000 men, 435,000 of whom were enlisted for home service only and could not be sent abroad. That was the military policy of three years ago, based upon the principle of not confusing the mind by considering the position and action of the Navy. In March, 1904, Parliament agreed to the Prime Minister's opinion of home defence stated as follows—
  "It is true indeed that many of us have come to the conclusion that invasion of this island by a large Regular force capable of undertaking its conquest is, if our home forces are kept in anything like an adequate state, and, above all, if the Navy is kept in anything like an adequate state, for after all this is really a naval question, that invasion is a dream, an illusory danger, and not one of the contingencies against which it would be right or proper to ask this country to make costly provision."
  That is the military policy of to-day, which calculates the naval and military

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  resources of the country not upon their respective but upon their joint merits. It is idle to expect economy, efficiency, or reform in War Office administration until Parliament sanctions a well-defined military policy and accords to that policy the same measure of continuity which has been allowed during past years to the naval programme.
  Continuing down Table A, I come to the Cabinet. I assume that nothing can alter the collective responsibility of the Cabinet, and that no Committee of the Cabinet appointed for a particular purpose can have any responsibility separate and distinct from that of the whole Cabinet, and if this applies to the new Defence Committee it can have no responsibility of its own. The Cabinet, as a body, has not the time for continuous consideration of questions of Imperial defence. For this reason Lord Salisbury established the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the Duke of Devonshire. From the first an air of mystery hung about the meetings of this body. We have it in evidence from the late Director of Military Intelligence, General Sir William Nicholson, that he was never summoned to attend its meetings; that, in his own words—
  "So far as ho was aware, nobody attended them, and he knew nothing of the Committee, except that he believed the Duke of Devonshire to be its President."
  The new Defence Committee created by the present Prime Minister will discharge very different duties. It is to foresee Imperial strategical requirements, to harmonise naval and military policies, to co-ordinate Imperial defence in relation to such different Departments of State as the Admiralty, the War Office, India, and the Foreign and Colonial Offices. It is by far the most important outcome of the Esher Committee. At present we do not know very much about the constitution of the new Defence Committee. The Prime Minister is the President, and he can summon to its meetings any Minister or servant of the State, apparently at his absolute discretion, although it seems that associated with him on this Committee are the Secretary of State for War and the First Lord of the Admiralty. We are not aware, however, if the Foreign
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  Secretary is a member or not, but we do know that diplomacy and military and naval preparations ought to be interdependent. It would be well that the country should be informed what Ministers, if any, will attend the meetings of the Defence Committee ex officio regularly and as a matter of course. It would seem that to this Committee will be summoned members of two kinds, namely, Ministers who are members of the Cabinet, and members of the Defence Committee who are not Cabinet Ministers. I presume that members of the Defence Committee, not being Ministers, cannot vote on the decision of any question, but will merely state their views as expert advisers.
  Our Imperial strategy is far more complicated than that of any other country, and therefore the Esher Committee proposes to attach to this Imperial Defence Committee, which not only varies with each change of Cabinet, but may fluctuate with the predilections of its President, a permanent secretariat, and this proposal has, I believe, been accepted by the Government. The secretariat is composed as follows:—(1) A permanent secretary, appointed for five years and renewable at pleasure. (2) Under him, two naval officers, two military officers, two Indian officers, with, if possible, one or more representatives of the Colonies, their appointment being limited to two years. In reference to the two Indian officers, are they to be necessarily officers of the Indian Army or officers of the British Army in India, or may they be what is known in India as military civilians?
  I recognise the need for a Defence Committee and the very great advantage of having the Prime Minister at its head. The problems which the Defence Committee will have to consider involve not only naval and military questions, but also Colonial, Indian, and international questions. Naval strategy is a question for the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty. Military strategy is a question for the General Staff, but national strategy, in its broadest, most comprehensive aspects, is a matter for the Imperial Defence Committee. In theory, then, the duties of the Defence Committee appear distinct and self-contained.

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  but in practice it will not be easy to draw a line between military requirements which appertain to the Defence Committee and military requirements which are the particular province of the Army Council. Hence there seems to me some danger that this staff of the Defence Committee will overlap and conflict with the Chief of the Staff of the War Office. Will the dividing line be drawn by the Prime Minister (President of the Defence Committee) and the Secretary of State for War, for would it not be dangerous to leave the definitions to their respective subordinates?
  I am puzzled to know how the Defence Committee and the Army Council will work together. Lord Esher's Committee organises for war and not for peace. Assume therefore that before a campaign the Defence Committee requires plans from the Army Council. The Army Council submit a plan, which I will call plan A. The Defence Committee reject plan A on international and diplomatic grounds and require another plan from the Army Council. A second plan is submitted, plan B which the Defence Committee accept. War ensues, and plan B proves to be a failure. With the wisdom which comes to us after events, we see clearly that plan A ought to have been the course adopted. Where would the responsibility for the adoption of plan B rest?
  I now pass beyond Table A and come to the Army Council. The Army Council which has been appointed in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee, consists of four military members and three civilian members. I accept with confidence and without any question the allocation of duties made amongst the military members by the Committee. It is to the changed position of the three civilian members to which I would draw your Lordships' attention. Beginning with the Secretary of State, I gather that the Secretary of State is no longer the dictator but merely a colleague presiding over colleagues. He can no longer overrule his Council, which, from evidence before the Royal Commission, appears to have happened in the past. If he dissents from a decision taken, has he to resign office as the other members are expected to do in accordance with para
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  graph 7, Part II, page 5, of the Report? This paragraph reads—
  "The decisions taken will stand, and the Council's orders will be issued in the name of the Council as a whole. It thus becomes the duty of any military member or members of the Council, who may dissent from a decision taken, either to resign or to accept a share of the responsibility for the action involved. While, therefore, loyalty to the service should prevent any member from retaining office if what he considers the vital principles of the policy is contravened, loyalty to colleagues will prevent the opinion of individual members from becoming known outside the Council room. Dissent by any member, who does not thereupon resign, is by that fact annulled and he must accept his share of the consequent responsibility."
  By whom are the members of the Army Council appointed? If the Secretary of State for War recommends them for appointment his colleagues are really his nominees. By whom are members of the Army Council removed? There are failures everywhere, and there must inevitably be some upon the Army Council. I cannot accept the doctrine of the infallibility of the Army Council. What, then, is the procedure by which an inefficient member can be removed?
  The Under-Secretary of State, who has not apparently hitherto taken any active part in the War Office administration, now becomes the civil member of the Army Council. In the words of the Report of the Committee—
  "The absence of any administrative duties must be exceedingly distasteful to any energetic Under-Secretary, and, where a capable and experienced occupant of the post is available, force is unnecessarily wasted."
  I am sure your Lordships will agree that that paragraph is highly applicable to the present Under-Secretary of State for War. As regards the Financial Secretary, he is now transferred into the finance member of the Council. But I doubt whether in practice it will be found that the Financial Secretary becomes the mere colleague of the other members of the Army Council and that he ceases to occupy his former position, described in the Report as that of—
  "an independent critic with special powers of access to the Secretary of State."
  I cannot help thinking that he will remain, in spite of his change of name, the Financial Secretary. I am sure that the following paragraph is full of importance, but as I cannot make out its meaning I

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  must refer to the noble Earl for an explanation—
  "The Finance Member is the equal of his colleagues on the Council, his subordinates are those of all other members as their subordinates are his."
  It reads more like a creed than a constitution.
  We learn from paragraph 13, Part III. of the Report, that the Army Council as a whole is responsible for the welfare of the soldier. At the same time I note the reply given by the Secretary of State for War to a Question put to him in Parliament before Whitsuntide regarding the tent accommodation for the Militia. Nothing affects the comfort and the welfare of men in camp more than the character of the tent accommodation. But the Secretary of State for War replied that that was a matter for the general officer to settle locally and that nothing was known about it at the War Office. Here is an instance of decentralisation relieving the Secretary of State and the Army Council of all responsibility in a matter concerning the welfare of the soldier. If the Army Council is to be really responsible for the welfare of the soldier there must be a link between them and the men in the ranks. I suggest that that link should be supplied by means of District Advisory Boards composed of Commanding Officers, whose duty would be to report through the General Officers Commanding in Chief to the Army Council any circumstances concerning the welfare of officers and men under their command which, in their opinion, should be brought directly to the notice of the Council. Reports so made should be forwarded by the General Officers Commanding in Chief with comments, but without alteration or delay.
  At first sight I admit that the need for such Advisory Boards is not obvious. I therefore support my suggestion by quoting from the evidence of General Sir John French before the South African War Commission. General Sir John French, when asked his opinion by the Commission as to the value of the present cavalry sword, replied—
  "I think the present cavalry sword is the very worst that could be used for any mounted troops at all."
  Sir John French had commanded a regiment, but as Commanding Officer he
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  had never disclosed his opinion of the weapon on which the men under his command would depend in action. It would not have been consistent with his duty as a Commanding Officer to have said to his superior officers that which he stated in evidence before the Commissioners. Is that desirable in the interests of the service and of the men? I submit that it is not. Hence my suggestion for bringing officers commanding regiments into close touch with the Army Council.
  Admirable as Lord Esher's scheme is from an administrative standpoint, we must not forget that our Army is a voluntary one, dependent for its existence upon its popularity with the people of this country and with the men serving in the ranks. We learn from the Report who is responsible for the various items which make up Army administration. But we learn nowhere who is responsible for making the Army and the conditions of service popular. But until the Army is made popular with the friends and relations of soldiers—and it is not so now— you stand a chance of having created a brilliant and elaborate military administration for the purpose of administering a numerically insignificant Army.
  THE UNDER - SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Earl of DONOUGH-MORE): My Lords, I think no one in your Lordships' House will deny the right of the noble Duke who has just addressed us to raise this subject, and I desire at the outset to personally thank him for the kindly spirit towards the War Office which he has displayed. The noble Duke prefaced his remarks by expressing a hope, which was also expressed by Lord Esher's Committee, that the Government would adopt the Report which they had made in its entirety. It may be convenient if I state briefly how far we have been able to carry out that Report up to the present time. Of course I do not wish it to be understood that the Government regard the Esher Report as a written constitution for the War Office, but in its broad principles we have been able to carry it out to a very great extent. Inside the walls of the War Office we have practically organised the institution upon the principle recommended in the Report.

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  The Defence Committee has been constituted on the lines recommended by the Esher Committee, and the nucleus of a permanent secretariat has been appointed. What has not been done, and what cannot be done as yet, is to organise the local staffs of the Army on the lines recommended by the Esher Committee. That organisation depends on a larger question still under the consideration of His Majesty's Government—the organisation of the Army itself; and until a decision has been come to on that point we are naturally unable to proceed with the organisation of the district staffs, But a small start has been made. Three brigadiers have been appointed to the Aldershot command. There are some exceptions to the recommendations of the Esher Committee. One is the arrangement for the organisation of the Auxiliary Forces, and the other is the decentralisation of the work of the Military Secretary at the War Office. The latter decentralisation cannot take place yet, for the obvious reason that the new district staffs do not yet exist. But a Committee has worked out the scheme of decentralisation in detail, and their Report is now under consideration.
  The noble Duke asked whether the responsibility of the Secretary of State for War has not been affected by the interposition between him and Parliament of the Committee of Imperial Defence. The answer is most emphatically No. The Defence Committee is a Committee of the Cabinet which assembles to permit the whole intelligence of the nation to be placed at the disposal of the Prime Minister, who is, and always must a, be, the real Minister of Defence. The Prime Minister is the Chairman of this Committee of the Cabinet, and the Secretary of State is a member of the Cabinet; and his power, therefore, cannot be unduly interfered with. As to whether the responsibility of the Secre- tary of State will be weakened by the association of the members of the Army Council with him as colleagues, the reference to the Esher Committee was to organise a system at the War Office on the lines of the present Admiralty system. Broadly, the Government will certainly follow that system. The Board of Admiralty is constituted by Letters Patent, which would tend to take away
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  the responsibility of the First Lord by making his colleagues share it with him. There is however an Order in Council giving to the First Lord of the Admiralty certain powers and assuring him of pre-eminence among his colleagues. That system has always worked well. At the War Office there is a patent naming the seven members of the Army Council and the Secretary of State as President of the Council. It is proposed to have an Order in Council for the War Office which will do nothing to affect the administrative responsibility of the Army Council. All orders will be issued in their name, but nothing will be done to impair and everything will be done to preserve the sole responsibility of the Secretary of State.
  The Order in Council is now in draft, but its final form has not yet been determined. I am authorised to say, however, that in that Order in Council the Secretary of State will have preserved to him certain specific business and a general supervision of all business and he will be empowered to distribute the business at the War Office among his colleagues. I cannot better explain the object we have in view than by reminding your Lordships of Part I., Section 2, paragraphs 9 and 10, of the Esher Report, which I will read—
  "The Hartington Commission stated (§ 82) that 'the complete responsibility, to Parliament and the country, of the Secretary of State for the discipline as well as for the administration of the Army, must now be accepted as definitely established.' At the same time, it was premised that, in practice, the responsibility of the Secretary of State appears to be still, in some aspects, less real than that of the First Lord of the Admiralty. It is now clear from the evidence given before the War Commission that real power ha3 been divorced from responsibility, with results injurious to the military advisers of the Secretary of State, and fatal to his authority with his colleagues in the Cabinet.
  "We consider that, as a first step in the reconstruction of the War Office, the position of the Secretary of State should be placed on precisely the same footing as that of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and that all sub-missions to the Crown in regard to military questions should be made by him alone."
  We adhere to the policy suggested here and fully intend to carry it out.
  In the past there have been certain statutory powers vested in the Secretary of State and in the Commander-in-Chief

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  A Bill will shortly be presented to Parliament to bring those statutory powers into accordance with the new order of things.
  With regard to the Government's policy of home defence, we adhere absolutely to the declarations of the Prime Minister; and I am authorised to say that in principle we shall adopt the suggestions made by the noble Duke as to the reduction of the Regular Army at home. We hope to compensate for the reduction of numbers by an increase of efficiency. The question of the Auxiliary Forces I cannot enter into now, as the situation has been considerably altered by the Report recently presented. It would be unreasonable to ask His Majesty's Government to make a definite pronouncement at the present moment. As to the constitution of the Committee of Defence, the freedom of action of the Prime Minister in summoning the Committee will be preserved. There will be no regularly attending members of the Committee at all, except the Prime Minister, and he will be free to summon anyone he likes to the meetings of the Committee. It is inconceivable that anyone having special knowledge of a subject about to be discussed by the Committee would not be summoned to the meetings. As to whether members of the Defence Committee who are not members of the Cabinet will be able to record their opinions, the opinions of individual members of the Committee are not recorded now, but only the decisions of the whole Committee. The decisions of the Committee as such have no legal force, but only when they become the adopted decisions of the Cabinet. It is now intended to appoint only one Indian officer to the Committee, and I cannot say how this officer will be chosen; we shall take the best man wherever we can get him.
  The noble Duke has suggested the danger of disagreement between the secretariat of the Defence Committee and the Chief of the Staff at the War Office. But that is not a probable danger. On questions which do not concern the War Office there can be no risk of conflict and on questions that do concern the War Office it is impossible to suppose that the Chief of the Staff would not be I present at the meetings of the Defence
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  Committee. There will be, I know, no legal obligation to summon him, though it is difficult to imagine that the Prime Minister would refrain [from doing so. The Chief of the Staff when present as a member of the Defence Committee, being allowed to give his opinion, is on a perfect equality with the other members of the Committee. There are two purposes served by the secretariat—first, to record decisions, and, secondly, to place specialised knowledge of previous proceedings at the disposal of the Committee. There are hardly any opportunities afforded for the quarrelling to arise. But I do not deny that if General Smith and Mr, Jones in the future want to quarrel they will doubtless be able to find opportunities, and no possible safeguards that you could provide could prevent it. The hypothetical case put forward by the noble Duke is not one likely to be forthcoming. If any particular plan is rejected by the Defence Committee that rejection gets no force whatever unless it is endorsed by the Cabinet, and the Cabinet have a perfect right to override a decision. The Cabinet are responsible, and it is right constitutionally that they should be.
  It was asked also in respect of the Army Council whether in the case of dissent from colleagues the Secretary of State should resign. I think not. There are two precedents that can be argued from. In the case of a difference in the Board of Admiralty the members of the Board resign and not the First Lord, and in the case of the Cabinet the Prime Minister does not resign, though his colleagues do. I imagine that the same rule will obtain in the Army Council. The noble Duke asks by whom the members of the Army Council are appointed. They have been appointed by Letters Patent, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, who is thus the mouthpiece of the Cabinet. I presume that if it ever becomes necessary to dismiss a member of the Army Council, the proper procedure will be to issue Letters Patent revoking the previous issue, or to issue fresh Letters Patent containing different names. As regards the Financial Secretary, I know that in that particular we have departed from the precedent of the Admiralty, but we

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  believe that the arrangement we have made will work perfectly well, and that it will be of assistance to us to have the Financial Secretary at our meetings as a colleague. So far, I can assure the noble Duke there has been no friction between us such as he appears to fear may arise in the future. As regards the sentence quoted by the noble Duke, that the Finance Member is the equal of his colleagues, and so on, I confess I have some difficulty in satisfactorily explaining that somewhat cryptic phrase. What I imagine it means is this. I can conceive two possible explanations of the sentence. One is that, individually, members of the Council have no authority whatever. We do, I confers, sometimes give decisions off our own bat, but everything is done in the name of the Army Council, and all subordinates in the War Office are subordinates and officials of the Army Council, and not subordinates and officials of any particular member of the Army Council, although for the purpose of transacting the business they are put in certain departments under certain definite heads. That, I think, is the meaning of the sentence in the Report to which reference has been made. Possibly some more ingenious person may be able to find another explanation, but it has not struck my mind up to the present. Your Lordships will understand that the Financial Department at the War Office has been considerably split up. Every member of the Council now has a financial official to whom he can refer all financial questions. Technically, it might be said, therefore, that whilst, let us say, the financial department connected with the department of, say, the Adjutant-General consists of a number of individuals who are the subordinates of the Adjutant-General, at the same time they are subordinates of the Financial Secretary, because they are in the financial department, the financial department being very firmly linked on the military side to the Department whose affairs they have to look after. It is possible that I that proposed reform may have been in the mind of the Commissioners when they wrote that sentence, and that is a reform which is being carried out.
  The last point raised by the noble Duke was as to the difficulty of maintaining the popularity of the Army in the country,
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  and he suggested a system of District Advisory Boards. My Lords, I hope that such a system will not be necessary. According to the recommendations of the Committee, the officers will be circulating a great deal more between the War Office and the districts than they have hitherto done. Moreover, it will be the duty of the Inspector-General to go about the country, to be "our eyes and our ears" as it has been said, and he will be able to keep us thoroughly informed of what is going on in the districts. That, combined with the ordinary intelligence of members of the Army Council—which I am sure the noble Duke will not deny to us, although he denies us infallibility—should ensure our being kept properly in touch with the Army, and I have no fear myself that any system of District Advisory Boards such as he has advocated will be necessary.
  I think I have now dealt with all the points raised by the noble Duke. I should like, in conclusion, to say a word on a matter purely personal to myself. The members of the Esher Committee have recommended some great and far-reaching reforms, especially in the Financial Department, and they have given as a reason for those recommendations a picture of what I might call "financial irritation," of the existence of which I have not been able to find any great evidence. They have said some very hard things indeed about the Civil Department of the War Office. Though I am very grateful to the Commissioners for outlining the particular scheme which we have been able largely to carry out, I wish to dissociate myself from the reasons they have advanced for the reforms recommended by them in the Financial Department of the War Office. I have been at the War Office but a short time. and I confess that when I went there last October I had ringing in my ears the stock statement that certain unthinking people are only too ready to make, condemning the civil side of the War Office, and maintaining that every useful reform must necessarily be met with a solid block when it reaches that Department. A very few days at the War Office convinced me of the absolute error of that view. I found, if possible, more keenness for reform on the civil side than in any other part of the Office. When you have a body of intelligent men, selected from

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  the best you can get by the stiffest examinations, and when they find that they are part of an institution not organised on the most businesslike lines, surely it is but natural that they should be only too eager to alter the system of administration with which they are connected. Bearing in mind the belief that certainly exists in many quarters that the officials connected with the civil side of the War Office are not a body of devoted public servants who make the public service their chief interest, I thought it would be wrong of me to allow this opportunity to pass without dissociating myself from the statements to which I have referred.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, I think the House will be very grateful to the noble Duke for having raised this question, and for the way in which he has dealt with it. He touched on some of the most important points connected with the Report of the Esher Committee; he asked for information and explanations with regard to those points; and I think I may also say that the House listened with the greatest interest to the speech of the Under-Secretary of State, who endeavoured, in an extremely frank spirit, to reply to the questions of the noble Duke, and gave a great deal of very interesting information for which both this House and the public outside will be grateful. I cannot quite accept the optimistic views of the noble Earl as to how the details of the new scheme are going to work, but I think I may most fairly express the opinion of all of us when I say that we are very glad to recognise the spirit in which the Under-Secretary spoke as testifying to the general spirit in which the Government are about to give effect to the Report of the Esher Committee. We were also very glad to hear the remarks of the noble Earl with regard to the financial side of the War Office. I also felt that undue criticism and condemnation was passed on the civil side of the War Office; I know that it has caused very great soreness—I think justifiable soreness—and I cannot help believing that the remarks made by the noble Earl, speaking, as he does, as the representative of the Government, will do a great deal to alleviate that feeling and to facilitate the working of the Department in the future.
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  I should like to ask for a little more information on one or two further points. This Esher Committee is the answer to the Report of the Commission presided over by my noble friend Lord Elgin. It is really an acceptance of the Report of the Commission; it represents the acceptance of the views put forward by Lord Elgin and his fellow-Commissioners; and the Esher Committee was appointed in order to find a remedy for the condition of affairs which Lord Elgin's Commission found so seriously to demand the attention of the country and of the Government. But the Esher Committee was also something else. It was an admission of the failure of the system of Army organisation suddenly adopted when we were still in the throes of war. The basis of the recommendations of the Committee is, as stated by the noble Duke, the adaptation to the War Office of the system in vogue at the Admiralty. I have no doubt that there is great justification for such an adaptation, as the Admiralty has undoubtedly worked much easier and better than the War Office. But I do not think that you can quite assume that because a certain system has worked well in connection with the Navy it must necessarily work well in connection with the Army. You must always remember that there exists an enormous difference in the conditions of service in the Army and in the Navy. In the Navy the spirit of the service is the spirit of the service as a whole. The Navy is not divided, as is the Army, into regiments, garrisons, and so on. The spirit largely proceeds from the fact that so long as officers and men on a particular ship are together, they work together loyally and frankly and cling together, but when the ship goes out of commission and they cease to be attached to that ship they have no longer the sentiment of the ship: they are again merged in the service as a whole. Then there is another point. In the case of the Navy, you have your officers and men continually serving under conditions similar to those that they would experience in war. They are continually running the same risks, and they are continually having thrown upon them vast responsibilities for the non-fulfilment of which they would be visited, and most properly so, with the severest penalties. That

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  is a condition that you cannot obtain in the same way in the Army. Small expeditions there may be from time to time, but the great bulk of the Army in time of peace cannot be subjected to the tests to which officers and men would be subjected in time of war. Consequently it is much more difficult to select men, to give responsibility to the people who deserve it, to get out of the groove of promotion by seniority, and to give full weight to good service and proved capacity properly to discharge duties. Therefore, while I welcome the adoption of the pattern of the Admiralty, I wish to put in a word of caution against the idea that because a particular system is adopted therefore all will go well in future.
  Now, my Lords, there are two or three points to which I wish to refer, one of which has been dealt with by the noble Duke and also by the noble Earl, while the other two have not. The first point is the question of the supremacy of the Defence Committee. I thought the noble Earl in that respect drew rather too glowing a picture of the absence of friction that was certain to be found in it, and that he somewhat minimised the amount of responsibility which might be taken off the shoulders, not only of the Secretary of State for War, but also of the First Lord of the Admiralty—because, I take it that the Defence Committee will be just as influential with regard to the desires and actions of the Admiralty as those of the War Office. If you establish this most important body— and it is evident that the Esher Committee think it most important, because it crops up continually throughout their Report—if you strengthen it, put upon it all important Ministers, make the Prime Minister its chief, and appoint to it permanent chosen members representing the Army, the Navy, the Colonies, and India, it is quite evident that all really important matters both of the War Office and of the Admiralty will be taken to the Defence Committee for consideration and ultimate decision, or at any rate for approval. But if that is the case, will not some responsibility necessarily be taken off the shoulders of the Minister at the head of the Admiralty and of the Minister at the head of
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  the War Office? In the very nature of the case it must be so. The responsibility will no longer be as between the particular Minister at the War Office or at the Admiralty and the Prime Minister; it will be with the recommendations of the War Minister or the recommendations of the Naval Minister as accepted or modified by the Defence Committee, and the responsibility will lie with the Defence Committee when that decision is accepted by the Cabinet as a whole. I quite admit that you keep your Cabinet responsibility. I do not dispute that; but I do think that the individual responsibility of the Ministers of the two particular Departments concerned must necessarily be affected, as I think for the worse, and that it will make them, in some cases, less careful of decisions to which they may arrive within their own Departments.
  Then the noble Earl scouted the idea of possible quarrelling between the secretariat or the permanent department of the Defence Committee and the War Office. There again I do not take so cheerful a view. By your scheme the Prime Minister is to be the head of all these matters—head not merely as head of the Government, but as head of the Defence Committee. He will be the person with whom all this permanent staff of the Defence Committee will be in constant communication. Is it not likely that when a plan is proposed or is about to be proposed by, say, the Admiralty, that the secretariat of the Defence Committee will have some sort of views on that particular subject, and that it will go, in the first instance, direct to the President of its own Committee—that is, of the Defence Committee—with its views before the Admiralty itself has had an opportunity of putting forward its side of the case? And in the same way with regard to the War Office. Then supposing you had a subject taken up by the War Office and the Admiralty together, you might have the secretariat differing, and I cannot but think that there would be considerable friction in the daily working of the scheme. I am not in love with the idea of making the Prime Minister ex officio President of this Committee. It may be that from time to time you will have a Prime Minister who is interested in Defence matters, but in other cases

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  you may have a man who is not only not interested in them, but who looks upon questions of defence as questions to be decided only in one particular way. I do not think that that would lead to smooth working between the Defence Committee and the two Defence Departments. It would be far better to keep the Prime Minister in his present position of supremacy over the Cabinet, as being the last authority to whom reference can be made when matters of dispute arise. For instance, supposing there was a difference between the Admiralty and the War Office and the Defence Committee. To whom would you refer the question? The Prime Minister, as President of the Defence Committee, would necessarily take the view of the Defence Committee. Hence there would be no independent appeal at all from these three bodies supposing a difference of opinion arose. Personally, I think that the greatest blot on the Esher Report is to be found in the proposals for the constitution of the Defence Committee, and particularly in this proposal that the Prime Minister should be the perpetual President.
  Now, my Lords, I pass to a subject which the Under-Secretary of State put aside on the ground that there was another Report on the matter before your Lordships' House, namely, the Report of the Norfolk Commission. But the question of the Auxiliary Forces was also an important subject dealt with by the Esher Committee, and the part of the Report already adopted and acted upon; has made a great change with regard to the position of the Auxiliary Forces, a change of which I, for my part, am not at all disposed to approve. It is rather a curious fact that on the 17th February of this year the Auxiliary Forces were for the first time given an independent representative at the War Office. Within a few weeks—I forget the exact number—the Report of the Esher Committee came out, and the privilege which the Auxiliary Forces had enjoyed for only a few weeks, but which even in that short time had been a great advantage, was taken away. Under the recommendations of the Esher Committee the Auxiliary Forces were deprived of this special representative and were put back under the Adjutant-General.
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  The whole history of the management of the Auxiliary Forces by the War Office shows that there is always great friction between the representatives of the Auxiliary Forces and the Adjutant-General. The Adjutant-General is a professional soldier, and for the greater portion of his time he is obliged to look at the work of the professional soldier from a professional soldier's point of view. The Volunteers and the Auxiliary Forces, however, are not professional soldiers, and must be regarded from a somewhat different point of view. In the first place there is an enormous difference between the conditions of one Volunteer regiment and another. You have one regiment formed of clerks in a great city; you have another composed of artisans; a third consists mainly of labourers in a county, with the various companies scattered over a large area at a vast distance one from another. You cannot apply one general rule to the Volunteers, or lay down one particular way in which to deal with them. There must be great elasticity with regard to the requirements imposed upon Volunteers. There is, for instance, the question of camps. It was laid down that all Volunteers were to go into camp for fourteen days in the year. That is an excellent thing provided you can get them there, and provided they can afford to go there, but to make that an absolute condition of efficiency involves the loss of large numbers of good Volunteers who would prove themselves extremely useful. You must not deal with Volunteers on any hard and fast lines. The proper system to adopt is to judge them by results. Let the commanders of the various volunteer regiments bring their regiments to a proper state of efficiency by whatever means they choose, provided they do bring them to a state of efficiency. If they can produce their men properly efficient and properly trained I do not think you ought to hamper them by strict regulations as to the particular number of days they are to spend in camp, or as to how they shall attain that efficiency. The Volunteers are the cheapest of all our forces; I believe they cost less than £7 per head per annum. The encouragement of the Volunteer Forces becomes all the more necessary in consequence of the Report of the Norfolk Commission. That Report not darkly

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  hinted that we should have to fall back on conscription. The Government at once stated that they had no idea of conscription, and that they were not going to propose it. That being the case it is all the more necessary to make the Volunteers as numerous and as efficient as you can, and to give them all the encouragement possible. A great deal can be and I hope will be done for the Volunteers. Proper ranges and sufficient ammunition with which to practise, the opportunity of organisation in units, local training grounds near the particular parts of the country to which they would be sent in time of war—these are the sort of things which ought to be done for the Volunteers. They cannot be done without money, but I believe the first thing you have to do, if you are to give permanence and encouragement to the Volunteers, is to see that they are properly represented at the War Office, and that in the War Office they have a department of their own, presided over by a man who understands their condition as well as the ordinary routine of the professional soldier. I go even further, and say that the Volunteers have a right to have a representative on the Army Council itself. It may be that it is not possible to add to the number of professional men on the Army Council. If that be so, I would suggest that you take one at any rate of your civilian members—say the Under-Secretary of State—and let him represent the Volunteers on the Army Council, so that they may have a representative on that important body in the future.
  There is one further point of criticism which I think is a sound one, because it is a matter in which you have departed from the precepts of the Admiralty, and that is in regard to promotions. It seems to me that it is an extraordinary thing when you have formed this new Army Council, having upon it four military men carefully chosen as the most capable men available for the purpose, together with the Secretary of State, the Financial Secretary, and the Under-Secretary of State, that from that Council should be withheld altogether the question of promotion. That is not the case at the Admiralty.
  THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (The Earl of SELBORNE): I beg my noble friend's pardon. The First Lord of the Admiralty is solely and exclusively responsible; for promotions.
  LORD TWEEDMOUTH: But that is not so here. In this case you have a special committee. The difference is this. In the Admiralty there is no special committee appointed to deal with promotions. In the case of the Army, what is now proposed is that four generals-commanding and the Inspector-General shall deal with promotions. In the case of promotions under the rank of major, the generals commanding in the various districts will deal with the promotions. Consequently you will have the general commanding a particular district responsible for the promotions in the regiments under his charge which may be abroad. In cases of promotion over the rank of major, the duty is given to s committee formed of the four generals commanding, plus the Inspector-General. It does seem to me to be a curious thing that you should give the control of the Army to this new board, and take away from it the whole duty of the rewarding of merit, and the duty of making itself acquainted with the value and the respective merits of the different soldiers in. the Army. As I understand it the present system is that in the case of the higher promotions, the Military Secretary sends three names to a specially appointed committee of three officers, and that committee recommends to the Secretary of State who is eventually responsible for the appointment. Under the system recommended by the Esher Committee, the system I have just described is the method of promotion. It departs from the method followed in the Admiralty, and as it seems to me it departs from that method to no advantage, because it will diminish the authority of the Board by setting up an imperium in imperio.
  I do not pretend to have put forward any very connected criticism of the Report which has been laid before us, but I hope what I have said has been in a fairly reasonable spirit. I assure your Lordships that it has beer, said

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  entirely with a desire to facilitate the working of the War Office under its changed conditions, and not in any way with the object of putting stumbling blocks in the way.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I am sure the House is greatly indebted to the noble Duke for having raised this discussion, and I believe the country will profit considerably when it reads the very practical remarks which have been made from both sides of the House. I shall not detain your Lordships for more than a moment. I wish merely to ask one or two practical questions with regard to the constitution of the Army Council. I understood the noble Earl to say that in the first place the constitution of the Council is defined by a patent and that the distribution of the duties is hereafter to be laid down by an Order in Council. That, at all events, was the recommendation of the Esher Committee. I venture to hope that His Majesty's Government will consider the matter very thoroughly before they pass an. Order in Council distributing the different kinds of business to different members of the Council. Observe what will happen. If you distribute the work in this way you will stereotype the exact position of individual members of the Council. I believe the practice at the Admiralty is—I know it used to be— that the distribution of the business to the members of the Board depends entirely on the First Lord, who can distribute business to or take business away from any particular member and attach it to another, according as it seems best to himself. I think the position to be given to the noble Earl the Under-Secretary is that of supervising fortifications.
  THE EARL OF DONOUGHMORE: No, new barracks.
  THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: The supervision of new barracks, and, I believe, of chaplains. I am quite sure the noble Earl will supervise barracks with the same ability that he will manage chaplains, but I would venture to suggest that it would be far better to leave it to the Secretary of State to divide the business in the War Office as he thinks
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  best, and that he should not he bound hand and foot by an Order in Council.
  Then, my Lords, there is another point on which I would ask for information, and that is with regard to the financial position of each member of the Council. I The Esher Committee attributed great importance to the fact that each member of the Council should be able to expend; his own Votes, and, as I understood the noble Earl to-night—and I think it was proposed by the Esher Committee—that he should be able to send for financial assistance if he required it. Of course it is a much simpler thing that an individual member of a board should have complete control over the money matters connected with his Votes, and under such a system business would naturally proceed much more rapidly. It is apparently intended, or at all events it is possible I under this proposed plan, that there should be no financial check on any member of the Council in regard to the Votes I with which he is charged. I merely wish to know whether that is the plan which it is proposed to adopt. I do not think it is the system prevailing at the Admiralty at the present time; I know it used not to be. In former days when any proposal was made for, say, an increase in the number of men, or for raising the boys, or for anything of that sort, it was for the Naval Lord to put forward his proposal, then the Civil Lord, it being a matter of personnel, had to say where the money was to come from, and that enabled the Board to arrive at a decision I as to what should be done. The difference according to the plan now proposed, if I am correct, is that a certain member I of the Board would be able not only to I make a proposal, but also to carry it out and to spend the money involved without consulting his colleagues unless he should see fit to do so. I merely put the question; I daresay I am wrong; but I want to know exactly what will be the financial position of each member of the Board.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: My Lords, I do not propose to go into all the important subjects which have been raised tonight, but there is one point upon which I wish to express my opinion, and it would probably be fairer that I should do so before my noble friend opposite replies. There is very little to add to

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  what has been so well said by my noble friend behind me in respect of the question upon which I wish to make a few observations, viz., the proposal that the Prime Minister should always be the President of the Defence Committee. I have not a word to say against the Prime Minister being President of the Committee when he chooses to take upon himself that position, but having, unfortunately, lived to see a great many Prime Ministers, I have not discovered that the majority of them would either have desired that position or perhaps been very fit to take it. Putting aside a great soldier like the Duke of Wellington, I really do not remember any Prime Minister in my lifetime who would have had a particular taste for the special duties involved in the position of President of the Defence Committee except Lord Palmerston and my noble friend Lord Rosebery. That being so, is it desirable that you should by a regulation or Order in Council, or whatever it may be, tie down the Prime Minister to take this position, thus imposing upon him very j grave and responsible duties? I think not. In my opinion, it would be far better to allow the Prime Minister, who must have a controlling hand over this and all the other business of his Cabinet, to decide for himself whether he should take that position or not. The position of the Prime Minister in the present day is one of extreme difficulty. The amount of labour thrown upon him is very great indeed, and it is almost impossible for him to exercise that general supervision over the whole administration of the country which it is so very desirable the Prime Minister should exercise. I doubt whether the duties of the Prime Minister in respect of that general supervision have been fully discharged as they ought to be since the time of Sir Robert Peel. We know that Sir Robert Peel himself said that he found it almost impossible to discharge the duty. It is true that Mr. Gladstone in his first Government carried out that superintendence to a large extent, but, so far as I know the manner in which public affairs have been conducted, I do not think that since that time the supervision which is so essential for the proper working of the Government of the country has been exercised by the
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  Prime Minister, or that it possibly could have been. If there be anything in these remarks, surely it is not wise to enact that the great labour involved in the position of President of the Defence Committee should necessarily fall upon the Prime Minister. I understand that that is the proposal. I doubt whether in any case the Prime Minister would be the best person for the post, and I am certain that the holding of the position would inevitably interfere with the discharge of his proper duty, viz., that of the general superintendence of the administration of the country, in which, of course, is included the administration of the Army and Navy. On these grounds I venture to express the gravest doubt whether you will promote good administration, either generally or in the Army and Navy especially, by providing that this duty must necessarily be undertaken by the Prime Minister.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: My Lord, my noble friend beside me dealt so fully and sufficiently with the points raised by the noble Duke behind me that I do not propose to travel over the same ground. I wish, however, to notice a few of the observations that have fallen from noble Lords opposite since my noble friend addressed the House. In the first place, I wish to say a word as to the question of promotions, on which the noble Lords opposite made some remarks. I understood him to express considerable alarm at the idea that promotions up to a certain rank were to be handed over to general officers commanding districts. I understand that the decentralisation of the work which has hitherto been performed in the Military Secretary's office has not yet been carried out, and that for the present that work is being done at headquarters. But, whatever is done, I think the noble Lord, may take it that the business of the officers who command in the districts will be not so much to make actual promotions as to recommend officers to the Secretary of State for promotion. However, the point is one which has not yet been finally disposed of and I do not, therefore, desire to say more upon that subject.
  The noble Lord spoke with great conviction of the necessity of adequately

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  representing the Auxiliary Forces at the Secretary of State, and it is certainly our War Office. I think there will not be two opinions on that point in the House; and I am almost tempted to remind the noble Lord that when I had the honour of being connected with the War Office I was responsible for the appointment of an officer, who, I believe, was eminently persona grata to the Auxiliary Forces— General Turner, and who has enjoyed their confidence for some years past. I cannot, however, agree with the noble Lord that it is desirable that the Auxiliary Forces should have a special representative on the Army Council. I think that proposal argues a certain want of appreciation of the principle upon which the Army Council is formed. The Army Council represents the whole Army. The work is divided according to the subjects—the different branches into which Army work naturally falls — but the Army Council does not consist of members who can in any sense be regarded as the representatives of different arms or sections of the Army. On the other hand, in the new organisation, provision is made—I think adequate provision—for the representation of the Auxiliary Forces. There is to be a high official under the Adjutant-General entitled the Director of Auxiliary Forces, and that high official is given direct access to the Secretary of State in regard to questions concerning the Auxiliary Forces. Under him are three subordinate officer representing respectively the Yeomanry, the Militia, and the Volunteers. I am able to add also that it is the intention of the Secretary of State to appoint a certain number of officers belonging to the Auxiliary Forces to serve on the general staff as well as in the department of the Quartermaster-General. I think, therefore, that the House may rest assured that the interests of the Auxiliary Forces are not likely to be overlooked.
  Now, my Lords, for a moment I pass to what has been said with regard to the position of the Secretary of State. I think it is fair to say that there is a certain amount of ambiguity in the language of the Report of the Esher Commission upon that subject; but there is no doubt in our minds as to the position which should be assigned to the
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  Secretary of State, and it is certainly our intention that nothing in these new arrangements should in any way derogate from the responsibility which belongs to him as a member of the Cabinet and as a Minister of the Crown. He will not be merely one member of a Board with six colleagues, but he will be, as, indeed, is the First Lord of the Admiralty, in a position of well-defined and assured superiority. I thought that the noble Lord opposite was correct when he told us that it did not follow necessarily that because a particular system succeeded in the administration of the Navy that system was bound to succeed equally in the administration of the Army. There are points of essential and deep-seated difference between the two services, and it does not follow that because a certain arrangement is good for the Navy it must therefore prove successful in the case of the Army. But there is this undoubted fact, that the Admiralty system has worked well, and has inspired a great amount of public confidence; therefore I think it was only natural that the Esher Commission should recommend that the Admiralty system should, so far as possible, be adopted in connection with the Army.
  Noble Lords opposite have expressed considerable apprehensions with regard to the results of the existence of the Committee of Imperial Defence. They will remember that the Defence Committee has been for nearly ten years in existence, but I take it that the particular point to which criticism is directed is the fact that the reconstituted Defence Committee is to be given a small permanent secretariat of its own, which will give it a continuous corporate existence which did not belong to the old Defence Committee. It is, in the first place, apprehended that the existence of such a Defence Committee, with its permanent secretariat, will create friction between the Committee and the two great Departments of defence—the War Office and the Admiralty. The idea seems to be that the Prime Minister, fortified by the assistance of a body of experts who will be placed immediately under his direction, is likely to override the two Departments which have hitherto had the management of military and naval questions. As my noble friend said, if you

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  have tactless and quarrelsome officials you will have friction and bad blood. But I do ask your Lordships to consider whether there is not another aspect of the case which should be taken into account. So long as the Admiralty and the War Office and the Treasury were not brought together in this way, you were always exposed to the kind of sparring which goes on between rival Departments which are not brought into close immediate contact. It seems to me that the great advantage of this newly-invented machinery is that it brings together at one table, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, representatives of the Treasury, the Admiralty, and the War Office. The different members of the Government have really a very much better chance of obtaining fair and full discussion for their proposals than they had so long as these controversies were carried on upon the old lines of inter-Departmental discussion and correspondence, terminated perhaps by a hurried conversation round the Cabinet table. I feel bound to say, so far as I have been able to observe the new machinery at work, that it promises not to increase friction, but to diminish it, and to conduce to a much more effective conduct of public business. The noble Marquess who spoke last told us that in his opinion it was most undesirable that the Prime Minister should be President of the Defence Committee.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: I said it was undesirable that he should be necessarily President.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Well, I think the answer to that is that I am not aware that it is necessary that he should invariably be President of the Committee, though I hope he always will be.
  THE MARQUESS OF RIPON: The Esher Committees say it is.
  THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I must ask the noble Marquess not to assume that every proposal within the compass of the Report of the Esher Committee necessarily represents a proposal of His Majesty's Government. The noble Marquess will remember that for a time
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  the noble Duke on the Cross Benches (the Duke of Devonshire) was President of the Defence Committee; and it may be that at some future time the Prime Minister of the day may prefer to devolve those duties on some colleague rather than assume them himself, but that is a matter as to which I will not undertake to prophesy. I quite agree with the noble Marquess that the calls upon the time and attention of the Prime Minister are enormous, and that we should shrink from taxing his powers of work so far as we possibly can spare him, but I do not know that of all the important duties which the Prime Minister has to perform any is really more important than the work which this Committee has to undertake, and unless for personal reasons, owing to his particular idiosyncrasy, he feels himself unfitted for work of the kind, I for one shall continue to believe that that work is more likely to be performed with advantage by the Prime Minister himself than by anyone in a less responsible position.
  Now I must ask your Lordships to bear with me while I say a few words in support of what was said by the Under-Secretary of State for War at the close of his speech in reference to that part of the Esher Report which describes, or purports to describe, the relations existing at the War Office between the military and the financial officials of the Department. I find that the Report of the Esher Committee states that the existing arrangements have led to the control of military policy by the civilian branch of the office; that the financial department has wielded the power of finding available funds when a policy is favoured, and of suggesting difficulties in other cases; that the War Office is divided into two camps whose occupants regard each other with mutual suspicion; that the responsibility of the military heads has been rendered nominal, and that the Secretary of State has been led to give decisions upon a partial presentment of a case. My Lords, that picture is one which I regard as a distorted one, and which has been much resented by, I believe, both the camps to whom reference is made. It is naturally most resented by the members of the financial department, and upon two grounds. In the

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  first place, I suppose, owing to the circumstances under which the inquiry was conducted, no evidence was produced in support of these complaints, and in the second place these complaints were accompanied by the proposal that a large number of the gentlemen thus attacked should be deprived of their position in the War Office. I have had some opportunity of watching the manner in which these gentlemen have been in the habit of performing their duties, and I say unhesitatingly that nothing has, at any rate of recent years, been further from their thoughts than to claim any right of controlling the military policy of the War Office. But to quote the opinion expressed by the Dawkins Committee, which has been referred to this evening, it is absolutely necessary that the Secretary of State should have under him a staff for the purpose of watching and controlling the military expenditure. If that staff is really to assist the Secretary of State it seems to me most unadvisable that its action should be fettered by too pedantic an insistence on the necessity of all civilians abstaining from any criticism of what can be described as in a sense military policy. It is not, after all, so very easy in all cases to draw a sharp and clear line to show where financial policy ends and military policy begins. The most important questions are often mixed questions, and have to be decided with reference not only to military, but also to financial considerations; and considerations of the latter class have to be very much borne in mind when we remember the manner in which our military and naval expenditure has been growing during the last few years. Now, I believe that it would be very detrimental to the interests of the public if you altogether barred the civilian side from offering their criticism upon the ground that that criticism touched, in no matter how slight a degree, questions of military policy.
  After all, in the past—and it is in regard to the past that this complaint has been made—just consider what has been the position of the soldiers and the civilians in the War Office. You have had distinguished soldiers brought in to take up these headquarters appointments after, no doubt, a very brilliant military career, but in many cases without any special aptitude
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  for or experience of administration in the proper sense of the word. On the civilian side you have had men who have perhaps been fifteen or twenty years in the office, highly trained officials, thoroughly knowing both the military and the financial side of the work, who have been able to point out the pitfalls with which all schemes of Army reform are surrounded, and who have naturally felt it their duty, when they were able usefully to do so, to warn or to make suggestions. I fear that if we interpret too strictly the desire to exclude the civilian element from all voice in these matters the military side of the office will lose much useful guidance and the public will suffer. There is yet another consideration. You may make what arrangements you please, but you cannot get away from civilian control at the last; and if that control is not to be found within the War Office it will have to be found outside the War Office, at the Treasury, which is much less sympathetic and a much sterner taskmaster than any Accountant-General at the War Office, and which certainly will not allow itself to be warned off on the ground that its criticisms involve some slight inroad on the domain of military policy. I can only say, so far as the personal question is concerned—and I am sure I shall be borne out by others who have served in the War Office—that the officials on the financial side—I will mention particularly the Accountant-General, Mr. Marzials, and his subordinates—were gentlemen not only of the greatest ability and financial knowledge, but also of great tact and of the most considerate character, who were quite incapable of obtruding their criticisms as to military matters, if the ever made them, in a manner in the least aggressive or offensive to their military colleagues. That is the way, moreover, in which they were regarded by their military colleagues who served with them and who, as I have said, read with considerable regret the charges made against these gentlemen in the Report of the Esher Committee. I can only express my hope that under the new system the Army will be as well and as faithfully and tactfully served by those entrusted with its financial administration as it has been

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  in the past. I will not further occupy your Lordships' time, but I felt that I could not do otherwise than say a few words in defence of gentlemen whose excellent services I for one have had many opportunities of appreciating.
  House adjourned at a quarter before Eight o'clock, to Thursday next half-past Ten o'clock.