Lords Sitting of 10 March 1902

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House, That the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificates from the Examiners that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have not been complied with:—
Mexborough and Swinton Tramways.
Hastings Tramways.
Newcastle - upon - Tyne Corporation Tramways Extension.
Birmingham and Midland Tramways.
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

YSTRADFELLTE WATER BILL [H.L.]
Witnesses ordered to attend the Select Committee.

NORTH AND SOUTH SHIELDS ELECTRIC RAILWAY BILL [H.L.]
The King's consent signified; and Bill reported from the Select Committee, with Amendments.

L. Elgin (E. Elgin) (chairman),

E. Bradford,

E. Stamford,

L. Carew,

L. Shute (V. Barrington).

BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION WATER BILL [H.L.]
Report from the Select Committee, That the Committee had not proceeded with the consideration of the Bill, the opposition thereto having been withdrawn: read, and ordered to lie on the Table: The orders made on the 13th and 27th of February last discharged; and Bill committed forthwith.
DARLEY DALE WATER BILL [H.L.]
Report from the Select Committee, That the Committee had not proceeded with the consideration of the Bill, no parties having appeared in opposition thereto; read, and ordered to lie on the Table: The orders made on the 13th and 27th of February last discharged; and Bill committed.
LIVERPOOL GRAIN STORAGE AND TRANSIT COMPANY BILL [H.L.],
  BIRMINGHAM CORPORATION WATER BILL [H.L.],
  Reported, with amendments.
RENFREW HARBOUR BILL [H.L.],
  RHYMNEY RAILWAY BILL [H.L.],

    TYNESIDE TRAMWAYS AND TRAMROADS BILL [H.L.],
    NEWCASTLE AND GATESHEAD WATER BILL [H.L.],
    BAKER STREET AND WATERLOO RAILWAY BILL [H.L.],
    Committed; the Committees to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.

NOBEL'S EXPLOSIVES COMPANY, LIMITED (ARDBER WORKS WATER SUPPLY), BILL [H.L.]
The Chairman of Committees informed the House that the promoters do not I intend to proceed further with the Bill: Ordered that the Bill be not further proceeded with.
RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.
  MISCELLANEOUS: No. 4 (1902).
  Sugar Conference at Brussels; Des-patch from the British Delegates inclosing copy of the Convention signed on 5th March, 1902.

TRADES REPORTS.
Annual Series: No. 2747—Columbia (excepting Panama district).
Presented [by Command], and ordered to lie on the Table.

FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT, 1890.
1. Order in Council of 6 th March, 1902, entitled the "China (Whangpo River Conservancy) Order in Council, 1902."
2. Orders in Council of 6th March, 1902, applying the provisions of "The Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884," to the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

EXTRADITION ACTS, 1870 TO 1895.
Order in Council of 6th March, 1902, giving effect to the Anglo-Belgian Extradition Treaty, signed 29th October, 1901, and ratified 6th December, 1901.
BRITISH SETTLEMENT ACT, 1887.
Order in Council of 6th March, 1902, relating to the transfer of British New Guinea to the authority of the Common-wealth of Australia.
LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.
Order in Council of 6th March, 1902, further postponing until the 1st July, 1902, the operation of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, in the City of London.
ASSIZES ACTS, 1876 AND 1879.
Orders in Council of 6th March, 1902, constituting Spring Assize Counties Nos. 2 and 3.

BANKRUPTCY COURTS (IRELAND).
Returns of the Official Assignees of the Court of Bankruptcy in Ireland and the local courts, Belfast and Cork, for the year 1901.
Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

LONDON WATER BILL [H.L.]
A Bill I for establishing a Water Board to manage the supply of water within London and certain adjoining districts, for transferring to the Water Board the undertakings of the Metropolitan Water Companies, and for other purposes connected therewith—was presented by the Lord James of Hereford; read 1a; to be printed; and to be read 2a on Thurday next. [No. 27.]

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR — LORD METHUEN'S REVERSE.
EARL SPENCER: I should like to ask whether His Majesty's Government have any news to communicate to the House from South Africa.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Lord RAGLAN): My Lords, the following telegrams have been received at the War Office from Lord Kitchener—
Pretoria, 10.30 a.m., March 8th.
"I greatly regret to have to send you bad news about Methuen. He was moving with 900 mounted troops under Major Paris and 300 infantry, four guns, and one Pom-Pom from Wynburg to Lichtenburg, and was to meet Grenfell with 1,300 mounted troops at Rovirainesfontein on the 8th.
"Yesterday morning early he was attacked by De la Rey's force between Tweeboseh and Palmietkin11. The Boers charged on three sides.
"Five hundred and fifty mounted troops have come into line at Maribogo and Kraaipan. They were pursued by Boers for four miles from scene of action.
"They report Lord Methuen, Major Paris, guns, baggage, etc., were captured by Boers. Lord Methuen when last seen wag a prisoner.
"I have no details of casualties or any further information at present. Will keep you informed, and would suggest your delaying publication till I can send you definite news.
"I had already arranged to send troops to this district.
"I think this sudden revival of activity on the part of De la Rey is in order to draw off troops pressing De Wet."
Pretoria, March 9th.
"Major Paris has come in with remainder of men to Kraaipan. His report is that the column was moving in two parties, some with ox wagons left Tweebosch at 3 a.m.; mule wagons an hour later.
"Just after dawn Boers attacked. Before reinforcements could reach them the rear screen broke; meantime a large number of Boers galloping up on both flanks. These were at first checked by flank parties, but a panic and stampede of mules had begun and all the mule wagons with a terrible mixture of mounted men rushed past the ox wagons. All efforts to check them were unavailing.
"Major Paris collected some forty men and occupied position a mile in front of ox wagons, which were then halted. After gallant but useless defence the enemy rushed into ox wagons, and Lord Methuen was wounded in thigh.
"Major Paris, being surrounded, surrendered at 10 a. m.
"Lord Methuen is still in Boer camp.
"Casualties as follows—
KILLED.
"Lieutenants G. R. Venning and T. P. W. Nesham, both Royal Field Artillery; Lieutenant G. Hartley, Steinacker's Horse, and thirty-eight other ranks.
WOUNDED.
"Colonel J. G. Wilson, 3rd Battalion York and Lancaster Regiment, dangerous; Captain J. D. Outram, 3rd Battalion Highland Light Infantry, severe; Lieutenant M. Dennis, Yeomanry, severe; Lieutenant Nash, Cape Police, severe; and Lieutenant R. H. Logan, Yeomanry, severe; and seventy-two other ranks wounded, not yet received.
MISSING.
"Captain Tilney, 17th Lancers, and 200 others; but many of them are probably amongst those who have come into line.
"Lieutenants Nesham and Venning were killed whilst gallantly serving their guns with case."
EARL ROBERTS: My Lords, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and one

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who in South Africa had full opportunities of estimating Lord Methuen's military qualifications as a commander, I feel that it would be unfair to him, and discouraging to the other commanders in the field, were I not to make, on the occasion of this unfortunate occurrence of which we have just heard, some expression of my appreciation of Lord Methuen's services during the war. When I arrived in South Africa in January, 1900, Lord Methuen was being subjected to very adverse criticism on account of his failure to force the Boer position at Magersfontein. One of the questions I had to decide was whether I should recommend that Lord Methuen should he recalled to England, or whether I should continue to employ him as one of my divisional commanders. I resolved to wait until I could see Lord Methuen myself and the troops under his command, and perhaps have an opportunity of personally inspecting the Boer position. The Boer position occupied a front of some eight miles across the railway. It was very difficult country, and completely blocked the road towards Kimberley. Lord Methuen found himself there with about 12,000 men, thirty-five guns, and only 1,000 mounted troops. His orders were to relieve Kimberley; and, influenced by the belief that the garrison and the inhabitants of Kimberley were in far greater straits than eventually turned out to be the case, Lord Methuen decided that he must make an effort to get to them. He saw that to attack by day would involve very heavy loss, and he decided to try a night attack. Night attacks are proverbially risky. But on this occasion the enemy were most certainly surprised, and there seems some reason to believe that, if the Highland alignment had not been broken by the thick bush and the deployment of the men thereby prevented, it is possible he might have succeeded. But I confess that when I had made a careful survey of the Boer position I came to the conclusion that Lord Methuen had been given an almost impossible task. When I arrived at Modder River on February 11th with a view of operating for the relief of Kimberley, I had at my disposal 45,000
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men and 136 guns, and of these men 6,000 were mounted. This enabled me to make a wide turning movement, which with Lord Methuen's smaller force was impossible, and the success which was attained on that occasion was due to the greater mobility and strength of the forces which I had under my control. I came to the conclusion, therefore, that Lord Methuen could not be blamed for the failure to relieve Kimberley, and I decided, therefore, to keep him in his command. From that time until the present, which is more than two years, Lord Methuen has carried on his work with zeal, intelligence, and great perseverance. He has not had a check; he is beloved by his men; no work is too hard for him or for them. I feel sure that the House will be deeply grieved with me at what has occurred. I ask you to agree with me in my sympathy for this gallant officer in his present unfortunate position, and to reserve any adverse criticism on what has taken place until we have definite information as to whom the responsibility rests on and who is to blame for what has occurred. Of one thing I have no doubt—Lord Methuen has on more than one occasion assisted, helped, and looked after General Delarey's wife and family; and I am sure, from the desire to act in a humane and civilised manner, which General Dalarey has shown throughout the war, that Lord Methuen will be taken every care of by him.
EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I hardly like to allow the interesting speech which has just been made to be heard by your Lordships without adding a few words. I am quite sure your Lordships have no necessity to assure the gallant Field-Marshal that no one at this moment would criticise, in the slightest degree, any action of Lord Methuen's during the war, or the continuance of him in his high command. We all appreciate very much the feeling which the noble and gallant Earl the Field-Marshal has shown in what he has said. We have the deepest possible sympathy for one whom we always knew as one of the most zealous soldiers in this country, and we have followed with the deepest possible interest his career in South Africa.

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It is not for me or any one of your Lordships to offer or hint at any criticism on the action which took place in the earlier period to which the noble and gallant Earl referred. We are sure that the noble and gallant Earl was justified in the confidence which he afterwards placed in Lord Methuen. Everybody in this country will deeply regret the misfortune that has happened to him, and feel the deepest possible sympathy for Lord Methuen. I thought I should say these few words after what the noble and gallant Earl has said, because it would, I am sure, be very distasteful to your Lordships if anyone in this House failed to feel the fullest sympathy for Lord Methuen.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND LORD PRIVY SEAL (The Marquess of SALISBURY): My Lords, I am sure that the feeling in this House will be one of sincere sympathy with the generous and graceful language which has been used by the Commander-in-Chief, and which has been reciprocated by the noble Earl opposite. This would not be the time, even if the time ever occurred, to enter into any examination of Lord Methuen's actions. We are quite certain that he has displayed on this occasion, as he always has, the greatest gallantry, and that he deserves the highest sympathy of His Majesty's subjects. I have only risen to enforce the suggestion of the noble Earl the Commander-in-Chief that we should defer any criticism of the very sad intelligence which has reached us until all the details are more fully before us and we can speak with greater confidence of matters which are far from clear at the present moment. We are convinced that Lord Methuen has done his best, and has been the victim of a most melancholy coincidence; and I am sure he will feel that in his misfortune he has the sympathy and also the admiration of his fellow-subjects with whom he has lived and for whom he has worked.

JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE— COLLECTION OF FEES.
Ordered, That on and after the first day of April next the fees charged at this House be collected by means of stamps.
That the Clerk of the Parliaments do communicate with the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury as to, the provision of stamps, and any other steps necessary for carrying this Order into effect.
Then it was moved to resolve that the following new Standing Order be made, viz.:—
Ordered, That in lieu of the fees heretofore charged, the fees contained in the Schedule hereto be taken in this House by stamps on the documents specified in the said Schedule, except in the case of parties petitioning for leave to sue in formâ pauperis, and that, except in such cases, none of the said documents be issued from or received at the Parliament Office, unless it shall have been duly stamped.

SCHEDULE OF FEES.

£

s.

d

On Order of Service

1

0

0

On Recognizance

1

10

0

On Petition not referred to Appeal Committee

1

10

0

On Joint Petition, from each party thereto

0

15

0

On On Petition referred to Appeal Committee (including report thereon)

3

0

0

On Cases lodged, including laying case on the Table, Bar fee, and Counsel attending

*12

0

0

On Motion Paper to set down for hearing, including entering Appeal on Cause List

2

0

0

On Judgment

3

0

0

(NOTE.—The stamps are on sale at the, Fees Office, House of Lords.)
*£8 10s. of this amount, representing the, Bar fee and the fee for Counsel attending at the hearing, will be repaid to the parties or their agents in cases in which the appeal, after being set down for hearing, is withdrawn before being heard at the Bar. A similar course will, be adopted with regard to any other overcharge.
—(The Lord Chancellor); agreed to; the said Order to lie added to those now applicable to appeals in this House, to be numbered. XI., and to be printed. [No. 28.]

CORONATION HOLIDAYS.
LORD AVEBURY: My Lords, I beg to ask the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government have considered the advisability of proclaiming general holidays on the occasion of the Coronation and the day of the procession; and

841
if so, whether he will state, for the convenience of the commercial community, the course which it is proposed to adopt. I believe it is the general wish of the mercantile community that day of the Coronation should be observed as a general holiday. As regards the following day, that of the procession, the streets will no doubt be very crowded, and the London banks are unanimously of opinion that it would be impossible for them to carry on their regular business. I believe that those engaged in commerce consider that, under all the circumstances, it would be desirable that both days should be proclaimed as holidays. At any rate, it would be a convenience to all concerned to know done the intentions of the Government.
THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY: I am afraid I must ask for a little delay. The measures which are proposed are taken under a, Statute which has the honour of popularly bearing the noble Lord's name, but it does not stand alone. There is another Statute which has to be interpreted at the same time, and that process, as the nobel Lord knows, does not always result in a lucid of the exposition of the law. I can only inform the noble Lord that we are quite conscious of the circumstances to which he has referred, and the considerations which have influenced so many important persons in the commercial community of London. There are certain legal questions which are under the consideration of the law officers at the present moment, and as soon as it is possible, it is, I believe, the intention that an Order in Council shall be issued dealing with the matter. No unnecessary time will be lost. I cannot, however at the present moment, give a more definite answer, without danger of misleading those whom I address.
LORD AVEBURY: I will repeat the Question at any time convenient to the noble Marquess.

PLUMBERS' REGISTRATION BILL [H.L.]
Read 3a (according to order); an Amendment made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

REMOUNT DEPARTMENT—REGISTRATION OF HORSES FOR WAR.
LORD HARRIS: My Lords, I rise to call attention to the report of Lieut.-Col. Birkbeck, Assistant Inspector of Remounts in South Africa, and to ask if His Majesty's Government contemplate of extending the system of registration of horses for war purposes. It may be convenient that I shall explain, for the information of the House, the system of horse registration. Your Lordships maybe surprised to hear that not more than fifteen years ago there was no such thing as a Remount Department, and no such person as an Inspector - General of Remounts. What we should have done in those days if there had been a sudden and large demand for horses, such as we have had in this war, I cannot conceive. At that time there was an officer who was responsible for the purchase of horses for the Royal Artillery, but each Cavalry Colonel bought for his own regiment. There was no central organisation whatever. Soon after I went to the War Office in 1886, a Report came before me with regard to the purchase of Hungarian horses for one of the Egyptian campaigns, and I remember that the experience then gained showed how almost useless such animals were when brought in large quantities out of a grass country with no corn in them, and how much more useful and efficient for making war were horses fed on corn and trained on hard work. General (then Colonel) Ravenhill, who was the officer charged with the purchasing of horses for the Royal Artillery, proposed that a Remount Department should be established at headquarters, together with a system of registration of horses, the idea being that upon payment by the War Office of a certain sum per annum as a retaining fee, owners might be induced to register their horses for purchase by the Department, at a fixed price, on mobilisation. I was able to convince the War Office that the scheme was a sound one. The establishment of a Remount Department and of a system of registration of horses was then approved, but it took some time to persuade owners that it was worth their while to register their horses. General Ravenhill, however, had a very intimate knowledge

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of horses and horse dealing, and also a very persuasive tongue, and in a comparatively short time he was successful in inducing several large omnibus, tramcar and other companies to register a very large number of their horses. I believe I am within the mark when I say that one company alone registered as many as 2,000 horses. The registration fee was fixed at 10s. a year, and the system was started under very favourable circumstances, Masters of Hounds and gentlemen in that position also coming forward, and registering animals of the hunter class. At the beginning of the hostilities in South Africa there were something like 15,000 horses on the register, and it would be very interesting if the noble and gallant Lord who represents the War Office could tell us how many of those horses were taken up for the purposes of the war. In his Report Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck speaks of the value of these trained, corn-fed horses as compared with untrained grass-fed horses. He adds—
"It may well be stated here that it has been absolutely impossible latterly to attempt to train remounts; they have passed through the Remount Department's hands far too rapidly to enable us to do more than keep back any which appeared more than ordinarily wild, and the remainder have gone to the Cavalry depôt or to the ranks, just capable of being ridden and no more."
In comparing the different horses Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck says—
"Nothing has really come up to the English horse for Cavalry and draught. Notwithstanding change of diet and climate, he has worked and stood hardship better than any."
He goes on to state that much of the wastage of horseflesh is due to the fact that animals are bought, probably off grass (except English horses), kept in kraals till shipped, and, after having spent a month on board, are landed and kept generally a week or ten days at the coast, where they can get only enough exercise to keep them in health and not enough to harden them, and make them really fit, after which there is the long journey up country to a high altitude, followed often by immediate issue to units and hard work. Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck continues—
"It is this combination of circumstances against which the English horse, whose muscles are developed by continuous work to a much greater degree than stock or prairie horses, has,
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more than others, been able to stand up. And, this, I think, points to the necessity of a much larger supply of trained Cavalry and Artillery horses being always kept up in a time of peace. A regiment of Cavalry should be able to go on service with its ranks full of trained horses, with, further, a sufficient percentage to cover loss by sea, and yet leave behind with the reserve squadron a considerable surplus of horses, either temporarily incapacitated or in training, which can be drawn upon to remount them during the campaign. So long as we have the great omnibus companies to fall back upon, we need never want for a supply of Artillery horses."
On page 41 your Lordships will find a telegram from the General Officer commanding the lines of communication at the Cape to the Secretary of State for War, in which he states that—
"The English omnibus horse is also very good."
The Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Birk-beck provesincontestably that the corn-fed English horse is of infinitely more value-than anything we can buy abroad fed on, grass. This is the first official Report we have had on the results of the system of registration introduced some ten years ago, and I submit that we are bound to conclude from it that the system has beers a success. The whole secret of the business is corn and work. I think it would have been extremely useful if, when the war broke out, instead of 15,000 horses, we had had 100,000 horses on the Register. As to the expense, if we had had that number of horses registered it would have meant £50,000 a year, or, to put it in a different way, it would, if the horses had been registered for ten years, have added £5 to the price of each horse. That may sound expensive, but it would have been very cheap for us if we had had 100,000 horses so registered at the beginning of the war. I submit that it would not have been a waste of money, for we should have had fit material and should have been able to make war effectively. It, is bad policy to put unfit horses into the field when, with the expenditure of a few pounds more, you could make certain of getting horses in good condition. I do not know what answer the noble and gallant Lord is going to give, but I sincerely trust that he will inform the House that the Secretary of State has decided to extend the system of registration. I beg to ask the Question standing in my name.
LORD RAGLAN: My Lords, my noble friend has given your Lordships an account of the original formation of the Remount Department at the time when he occupied the position at the War Office which I have now the honour to hold, and he has expressed the hope that the system of registering horses for the use of the Army in the event of an emergency will be greatly extended. It is impossible in a question of this kind to exaggerate the importance of condition; horses in good condition bear a sea voyage tar better, and, of course, condition is a sine quâ non in the field. The greater part of our difficulty in South Africa has been due to the fact that, owing to pressure of circumstances, the Commander-in-chief there has been obliged to make use of a very large number of horses which were not in a fit condition. The registered horses are divided into two classes—namely, riding and draft horses. In the case of riding horses the registration system has not been altogether very satisfactory, and the class of horses obtained has not been quite what we should like to have seen. There is, however, no dispute as to the excellence of the draft horses obtained in this way. The omnibus horse, in addition to providing a good deal of amusement at home and of interest to the soldier, has shown himself to be one of the very best animals for artillery purposes. These horses are very strong, are hard worked, and are fed liberally by the companies, and they ale as hard as possible. We have in this year's Estimates taken a sum of money for extending the system of registration. There are strong doubts, however, whether this system can be extended very largely and the same class of horse be got without increasing the registration fee. Moreover, the object of registration is to get a sufficient number of horses to meet the first demands on mobilisation. The noble Lord talked about 100,000 horses, but I think that number would be out of the question. To meet the first demands on mobilisation we require to lay our hands on 14,000 or 15,000 horses, but subsequent purchases would naturally have to be made in the open market. Bearing these two points in mind, we will proceed, in all probability, in the direction the noble Lord wishes.
846
The noble Lord spoke of £50,000 a year. This, after all, is a very considerable sum, and it must be remembered that the peculiarity of the British Army is that it never knows what sort of war it will next be called upon to wage. For instance, you may have a war in the West of Africa, where you require nothing but camels, and another up the Nile, in which your means of transport would be whale-boats. The noble Lord may rest assured that we have the matter under our serious consideration.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, my noble friend Lord Harris, in calling attention to this Report, did so for the purpose only of speaking on one matter in which he has taken particular interest, namely, the system of registration of horses. I quite agree with the noble Lord that it is an excellent plan to push the registration system as far as is possible. It is especially suitable for the obtaining of heavy draft horses for artillery and transport purposes, but I do not think His Majesty's Government have taken full advantage of their opportunity in this respect, for in the case of the London County Council not more than one third, or a quarter, of the horses that were placed at the disposal of the Government by that body were taken by them, though they were of the very class which have proved so serviceable in South Africa. I do not think, however, that this system will provide us with all the horses we are likely to want in any war. The number likely to be obtained by registration is, after all, comparatively small. If we had relied upon it in the present war, in which such an enormous number of horses are required, we should have been deluding ourselves into a position of false security. This Report is a most serious document, and one which must bring home to all who read it the terrible position we were in at the beginning of the war, and the want of foresight and judgment displayed in the preparations for the war. Indeed, I look upon this Report as a monument to warn people of the way not to do things.
This White Paper contains two sets of documents. There is, first, the Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck. I do not think that Report takes us very far, because it is dated as far back as July, 1900. In the second place, there are the telegrams which have passed between the

847
Generals in the field and the authorities at home. The Report opens by stating the position of affairs in Cape Colony at the commencement of the war, and Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck states that on the declaration of war the strength of the remount animals in Cape Colony was two horses, 402 cobs, and 866 mules. That was the total reserve of horses provided in Cape Colony in October, 1899, at a time when His Majesty's Government had been carrying on negotiations with the Dutch in South Africa, which they knew ran the risk of terminating in war. It has been said that it was impossible for the Government to accumulate any great body of men in Cape Colony and Natal, because it would have given offence to the Boers, and because it would have met with criticism from the Opposition. I do not think that argument can be used against the accumulation of more than two horses. It seems to me that the Government might have secured the option of a great number of horses in South Africa. Throughout these Reports you find that among the very best class of horse for service in South Africa has been the native African horse, which is accustomed to all the surroundings. As far as I can gather, no steps whatever had been taken, in spite of the fact that His Majesty's Government has been on the verge of war, at any rate for four or five months, to secure for the future use of the troops in South Africa any considerable body of horses, either by purchase or by option, supposing war were to break out. Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck states in his Report—
"This capacity for efficient expansion in time of war is lacking in the Remount Department. Its only representatives who could be spared from the regular home establishments for service in Cape Colony have been Staff Captain Mackenzie, R.A. (since dead) and Staff Captain H.S.H. Prince Francis of the remainder of the war establishment, not a single one has had any technical training or previous experience in the Department, and many of them, fifteen out of thirty-five officers, now employed have not even had experience with the mounted branches of the Service."
Is not that a terrible revelation as to the condition of the Remount Department in South Africa during the first five or six months of the war? Lieutenant-Colonel Birkbeck goes on to state what are the particular duties required of the remount officers. He says—
"The special work required at the seat of war is (1) landing and classification of animals;
848
(2) purchase; (3) forwarding by rail to the advanced depôts; (4) issuing to units, in all of which a knowledge of horses and stable management, on a large scale, is necessary."
It is perfectly clear that hardly any of the men under Lieutenant - Colonel Birkbeck's authority were endowed with either the knowledge or the experience to enable them to fulfil their important duties, I will not say well, but even decently. I submit again that it would have been very easy to have got together, at the beginning of the war, a body of non-combatants well experienced in the landing, classification, and purchase of horses, who could have undertaken these duties efficiently, and have obviated the necessity of weakening the forces in the field by delegating officers to this work.
The next point to which I would draw attention is contained in the telegrams which follow at the end of the Report, and some of them are very remarkable. Lord Roberts, telegraphing from Paardeberg on February 24th, 1900, said—
"Please arrange for early and steady supply remounts for batteries of Horse Artillery, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Mounted Infantry. Without mobile force I can do nothing in this country."
Again, telegraphing from Poplar Grove, on March 9th, 1900, Lord Roberts said—
"Am anxious to bring your notice urgent necessity for constant supply horses being sent to South Africa. Owing to want of forage and hard work a great many have been lost during the last mouth. Success campaign so materially depends on mounted troops being efficient, that trust there will be no want of good, serviceable horses."
The point I want to insist upon with regard to these demands is, that at that time there were, in South Africa, any number of horses. I have been informed by a Member of your Lordships' House, Lord Denman, who has served in South Africa, that at one time —during the months of August and September, 1900—an area of fifty miles round about Harrismith was overrun with thousands and thousands of horses of excellent quality. But he and the troops in the Harrismith district, as, indeed, throughout the whole of South Africa at that time, had the strictest orders not to take the horses, and not even to purchase them. We heard at the time of the last election that every vote given to a Liberal was a vote given to the Boers. I maintain that every

849
horse left to the Boers at the beginning of the war was a fighting man given to the Boers. As far as I can make out, it never occurred to the people at home that it would be desirable to seize these horses until towards the end of December, 1900. On that date, the Secretary of State for War telegraphed to Lord Kitchener—
"It is felt here that you should not hesitate to commandeer all available horses in Transvaal and Orange River Colonies. Consult Sir A. Milner, and report whether any similar steps are desirable in districts of Cape Colony, which may be placed under martial law to check the enemy's advance."
But, in the meantime, General De Wet had paid a visit to the district and had swept up the best of these horses. The Boer General had no scruples about seizing them, and he took them without paying for them, and used them as mounts for his own men and for those of his compatriots. When the British policy changed, and the military authorities began to commandeer horses, they found that all the best horses had been appropriated by De Wet, I think that two points on which we have a right to demand explanation are, first, why, at the beginning of the war, steps were not taken to secure horses in South Africa, and, secondly, why so long a time was allowed to elapse when the war did begin before the opportunity of taking a full number of the horses that were running about the country was used. The information conveyed in the White Paper is sufficient to fill us with wonder and regret that, through want of better care and management, so much should have been done to prolong the war and to cause loss and suffering to our troops in South Africa.
LORD HARRIS: I desire to express my thanks to the noble and gallant Lord who represents the War Office for his reply, and to say that I am very glad to hear that the system of registration is going to be extended, if only with regard to draft horses. With regard to the number of 100,000, that was simply a round figure which I used. I must not be held too tightly to it. At the same time, I am still of opinion that if it were possible to get 100,000 corn-fed horses on these terms, it would be much more advantageous than obtaining from foreign countries horses which are not in condition.

THE BRUSSELS SUGAR CONVENTION.
LORD PIRBRIGHT, in rising to "call attention to the Brussels Sugar Convention, and to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether by Article VI. of that Convention, Spain, Italy, Roumania, and Sweden are freed from the obligation imposed by Article I., as far as production bounties are concerned, as well as from the undertakings embodied in Articles III. and IV., as long as they do not export sugar; whether this Article VI. not only exempts them from the obligation entered into by the other signatory Powers, to abolish direct and indirect bounties on production as well as exportation, and, in contravention of Article III. enables them to impose any surtax in excess of the maximum of six francs fixed by that Article, but further exempts them from the action of the Penal Article IV., and whether the effect of Article IV. will not enable Spain, Italy, Roumania, and Sweden to exclude, by their bounties on production, sugar coming from the other countries parties to the Convention who have agreed to abolish all bounties direct or indirect," said: My Lords, the question of sugar bounties is so important that I feel I need not apologise for bringing the matter before your Lordships. A few days since we were informed that the Convention of Brussels was about to be signed owing to the decided action of the British Delegates, but after seeing the document I have come to the conclusion that for "decision" the word "concessions" would be an appropriate substitution. Reading the Treaty carefully, it must be admitted to be a most self-contradictory document. Forty years have elapsed since it was decided that sugar bounties ought to be abolished. Since 1862 no less than nine conferences have taken place, and four Conventions have been signed, with the gross result that sugar bounties now are more obnoxious in form and more dangerous to our West India Colonies and British refiners than they were in 1862. It is evident that each one of the Conventions was directed to the abolition of bounties, direct and indirect bounties on exports, imports and production. In the last Convention of 1888, which, in conjunction with the noble Marquess at the head of the Government, I had the honour of signing on behalf of Great Britain, the first clause distinctly stated that all

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bounties, direct and indirect, should be abolished. Turning to the present convention —I have not the translation here, but only the French copy—I find that Article 1. says—
"Les Hautes Partie Contractantes s'engagent à supprimer à dater de la mise en vigueur de la prèsente Convention, les primes directes indireetes dont bènèticieraient la production ou l'exportation des sucres, et à pasetabhr de primes de 1'esPece pendant toute la durèe de la dite Convention."
That is simply a repetition in somewhat longer words of the Article in the Convention of 1888; but what 1 want to call your special attention to are the words "la production," because it will be found that the declaration against bounties on production is distinctly violated in the succeeding Articles of the present. Convention. The reason "la production" was introduced was that, as a matter of fact, bounties on production were the origin of the bounty system. Sugar bounties owe their origin to Napoleon I. In 1806 Napoleon 1, anxious to promote French industry, and still more anxious to injure British industry, established bounties on production in France. Though at first attended with little success the French bounty system has made gigantic strides, and at the present moment the sum given by France in bounties amounts to £4,000,000 sterling a year. I only cite this fact to show the great importance attached to bounties on production. Article VI. of the present Convention exempts Spain, Italy and Sweden from the engagements under Article I., II., and III., so long as they do not export sugar. What does that mean? It means that these three Powers are able to give bounties on production. That is to say, they can, by these bounties on production, prevent the importation of any other sugar. There can be no other interpretation placed upon these words. A climax of absurdity is reached when they say, "so long as they do not give bounties on export." If they gave bounties on export they would come under the Penal Article IV., which says—
"Les Hautes Parties Contractantes s'engagent à frapper d'un droit spècial,à 1'importation sur leur territoire, les sucres originaires de pays qui accorderaient des primes à la produetion ou à 1'exportation."
Although it is distinctly stated that all countries giving bounties on production
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or exportation of sugar shall be visited with the penalties of Article IV., yet these three Powers are specially exempted from the action of that Article, with the result that their markets are closed against our Colonial sugar.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANDSOWNE): Exempted only so long as they do not export. The moment they export they come under the Penal Clause.
LORD PIRBRIGHT: If they do export they are punished, but if they do not they are rewarded by being allowed to give bounties on production. It is impossible to conceive a more ridiculous state of things. Such action can only be directed against this country, for it is not, likely that Spain, Italy, or Sweden would import beet sugar, for they produce beet sugar; the only sugar they would import would be cane sugar, and the country that produces cane sugar is Great Britain. Then it has been stated that a success had been secured by our delegates by the reduction of the surtax from fifteen francs to six francs. So far from that being a success, I consider it one of the most unfortunate features in the whole Convention. It has always been understood in every Conference, notably in the last one, over which I had the honour to preside, that the surtax was the worst form of bounty, and it amounted to a prohibitive duty, whether it was fifteen francs or six francs. Why should the delegates of Great Britain have urged incessantly, not the abolition, but the diminution of the surtax, thereby admitting the principle? We occupy in this connection a position similar to that of the cat with the chestnuts in the fable, and our delegates have acted, not in the interests of Great Britain, but in the interest of France against the cartel system of Germany-Germany was not likely to give way to. France at her mere request, and therefore France most ingeniously employed the British delegates to plead for a reduction of the surtax and to make that a sine quâ non in the signing of the Convention. It is impossible to explain the action of the British delegates in any other way. This country has agreed to afford no preference to Colonial sugar

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as against sugar coming from the contracting States. I protest against such an instance of a self-denying ordinance as our agreement to a surtax against cane sugar, while binding ourselves not to give any preference to the advantage of our own cane sugar. If bounties are prejudicial to the interests of this country, if it is impossible for sugar to be grown in the West Indies or refined in England because it is exposed to all the dangers of foreign subsidies, it surely follows that we should not enter into a Convention which while purporting to do away with these subsidies, prevents our doing anything for the benefit of our Crown Colonies and for those who are dependent on the sugar industry.
It is very interesting to note the attitude of Germany with regard to the surtax, which fully justifies me in saying that the surtax is solely directed against the cane sugar industry. Speaking in the Reichstag on Saturday, March 1st, when the Report of the Budget Committee on the revenue from the sugar tax was under consideration, the Secretary of State for the Imperial Treasury, Baron von Thielmann, said—
"A surtax of six francs would lie entirely adequate to protect the production of German sugar front the inroads or foreign sugar."
It would he impossible to he more frank and candid than the German Minister was in this statement. The surtax was originally fifteen francs. In consenting to its reduction to six francs, Germany says it is quite adequate to exclude English sugar from German markets. I do not think any further comment is necessary to show the absurdity of our action.
Now, my Lords, I pass to Article XII., which enables the ratification of the Convention without Italy, Spain, and Sweden. I have shown that these Powers have been allowed, so to speak, to contract out of the Convention, but supposing that they choose at the time of the ratification not to ratify it, the Convention will be equally valid with or without their signatures. The Treaty is unique as to the conditions of ratification and the power given to certain Powers who have already signed it to withdraw their names. Let me recall for a moment the Powers who signed the two last Conventions. The Convention of 1888 was signed by Great Britain, Germany,
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Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Brazil, Spain, Italy, Holland, and Russia. Egypt notified her intention to adhere; and France added the following declaration in the Protocol—
The Government of the French Republic adheres in principle to the Convention of August 30th, 1888, respecting the suppression of bounties."
France accepted the principal condition in the Convention. Therefore it was signed by all the great Powers, and it contained no such clause as I have called attention to, giving special freedom to Italy, Spain, and Sweden. The Convention of 1902 is signed by Great Britain, Germany, Austria - Hungary, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, Holland, and Sweden. Spain, Italy, and Sweden are to be entitled to withdraw from the. Treaty whenever they like, and that is not to affect the Treaty in any way whatever. Russia is not a party to the Convention, and was not represented at the Conference. I am afraid he would be a very sanguine man, indeed, who entertained the hope that this Convention would prove a success.
The other Question I wish to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is whether, in view of Article IV. of the Brussels Convention, His Majesty's Government is prepared at once to introduce the same Bill as in February 1889, which enacted that—
"Where in pursuance of Article VII. of the said Convention, the fact of the existence in any country out of the United Kingdom of a system involving open or disguised bounties on sugar is established by the decision of a majority of the signatory Powers of the said Convention, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen, by Order in Council, to direct that all sugar coming front the said country shall lie prohibited to he imported or brought into the United Kingdom exe-pt in transit, and to make such regulations as appear to Her Majesty necessary for giving effect to the said prohibition."
And whether the Secretary of State will lay all the Papers relating to the recent negotiations at Brussels, together with the Convention, on the Table of the House. I take a lively interest in the answer to this Question, because I have a distinct recollection that, after all the negotiations had been successful in 1888, and the Convention signed, I had the honour of introducing the enabling Bill into the House of Commons in February, 1889, which was read a first time, but for some

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occult reason, which, perhaps, will never be disclosed, the Second Reading never took place. The Bill was afterwards dropped, and with it the Treaty died. I hope this will not be the fate of any measure to give effect to the Treaty of 1902. Its infancy is, I am afraid, sickly, but I trust there will be no infanticide at the hands of the, parents of the measure. The same question which I am now putting to the noble Marquess was put in the French Chamber the other day by M. Ribot to M. Caillaux, Minister of Finance, and he replied that this Convention, which suppressed all bounties on sugar, was a question he could not now discuss, but front the point of view of the general interests of the country it was long since any measure so salutary had been adopted. The Foreign Office would, he said, shortly publish all the documents of the Conference, but the Bill to give effect to it would certainly not be introduced till after September, 1903. Those who are in any way acquainted with French politics will not be astonished at the delay in dealing with this measure, as they are on the eve of a general election, in the result of which the sugar-producing districts are a very important factor. France does not intend to introduce legislation till September, 1903. I hope we shall not follow the example of France. There is no doubt that we are suffering from the bounties; there is no possible objection to their removal; and if after nine attempts to arrive at an international agreement there is still a failure to be recorded, there is only one policy for us to adopt. It is a policy of "splendid isolation." We must show the world that England is strong enough alone to defend her own commercial interests.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOINNE: The noble Lord who has brought this subject before the House has, for many years past, made it a subject of study; and I can well understand the close, and I might almost say jealous, interest with which he has watched the course of the recent negotiations. But I must say that the intensity of his interest has led him to adopt a course which has not been altogether convenient to your Lordships House. The Brussels Convention was signed last
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Wednesday. The text of the Convention —the original, as he says, is in French—is not as yet in your Lordships' hands, although it will be distributed this evening.
LORD PIRBRIGHT: It has been published in the Press and circulated extensively three days ago.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: Surely in a matter of such great importance the noble Lord does not expect us to rely on the casual translation of this document as published in the newspapers. It is in French, and the noble Lord has read extracts from the Convention in that language. It would have been more convenient if he had waited till the authorised English version was laid on the Table of the House. The noble Lord suggests that we should present Papers. We are at this moment considering what Papers can be communicated to Parliament. For these reasons I somewhat deprecate a general discussion of the policy of this Convention at this moment; but I am quite ready to notice one or two points upon which the noble Lord laid most stress during the course of his statement. In the first place, he asked me why it was that, instead of securing the complete abolition of the surtax, we had been content with a reduction of it to six francs per 100 kilogrammes. The surtax as the noble Lord knew it when he was concerned with the Convention of 1888 was a very different thing from the surtax of today. Two things have happened since that time. The surtax has been enormously increased, and, in the next place, there has grown up in close connection with it a gigantic system of trade combinations known as cartels, under which huge profits have been made by the members of the sugar rings. When we had to consider the instructions to be given to our representatives at Brussels, we came to the conclusion that it was useless to deal merely with the question of bounties unless the surtax—by which I mean, of course, the difference between the Customs and Excise duties—was brought within moderate limits. We took the best advice which we could obtain, arid we came to the conclusion that with six francs per 100 kilogrammes there would be no room left for these trade combinations, these cartels, to which

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I have referred. We, therefore, made it a sine quâ non that the surtax should be brought down to that figure, but we did not think it necessary to insist ore its complete abolition. Our impression was that the Conference, like its predecessors, would have resulted in failure if we had insisted on that.
Then the noble Lord has spoken for some time as to the effect on the British Colonies of the Convention. Let me state in a few words the effect of the Convention on the Colonies. The Crown Colonies, under the Convention, will not be permitted to give any bounties, direct or indirect, on sugar either in their own markets or any other markets. As to the self-governing Colonies, as the noble Lord is aware, under Article XI. they are excluded from the Convention; but it is open to them to give their adhesion to it if they desire to de so, and if they give their adhesion they will assume a position to all intents and purposes identical with that of the high contracting parties.
LORD PIRBRIGHT: I cannot find in Article XI. this exemption.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The exemption is clear in the copy of the Convention I have, but this is another illustration of the inconvenience of discussing these subjects without having the documents before us. The general enactment with regard to the Colonies binds us not to give any preference to Colonial sugar over sugar originating from the countries of the high contracting parties; and it is obvious that we could scarcely have asked the other Powers to accept an arrangement under which they would be absolutely precluded from giving bounties while we retained our complete freedom to give bounties to sugar originating in our own Colonies.
Then the noble Lord pointed out that it was open to the Powers mentioned in Article VI. to withhold their ratification at the last moment. I am bound to say, supposing that were to happen, although I should sincerely regret it, it does not seem to me that it would be in any way fatal to the Convention or deprive it of its good effects. None of the Powers mentioned in the Article are exporters of sugar, and therefore there would
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be no question of their flooding the markets in other countries with bounty-fed sugar under conditions which would render the competition of that sugar with other sugar unfair.
I pass to the Question which the noble Lord has placed on the notice Paper. The noble Lord desires, to know whether the three Powers, not four, as has been said, mentioned in Article VI. will remain free to give bounties on their own sugar in their Own markets, and whether, if they retain that liberty, the result will not be to preclude the competition of any other sugar in those markets. It is quite true that under the Convention, Spain, Italy, and Sweden will be at liberty so long as they are not exporters of sugar to give bounties on, their own sugar in their own markets. It is quite conceivable that they might do this to such an extent as to render it difficult for other sugars to compete in those markets; but, while I make that admission, I do not in the least admit that such a result would frustrate the operation of the Convention. The general scheme of the Convention is to prevent any Power by bounty or surtax from stimulating the manufacture of sugar within its own limits to such a point as to enable it to export sugar under conditions which would enable it to compete unfairly with other sugars in the markets of the world. That is why I insist so much on the words "so long as they do not export sugar." It is laid down by the Convention, however, that the moment any of these Powers becomes an exporter of sugar it shall be liable to all the obligations of the Convention in the same way as the other Powers. The noble Lord is under the impression that the three Powers are to enjoy exemption from Articles I., III., and IV., but the Articles they are to enjoy exemption from are I., II., and III. The noble Lord has asked me a further question about the legislation which will be necessary to give effect to the Convention. Well, the Convention was only signed four days ago, and it is a little previous to ask the Government to exhibit now the exact text of the Bill, which at the proper time will be laid before Parliament. The delay which the noble Lord anticipates as likely to take place on the part of the French Government, who,

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he said, would not bring in their Bill until the autumn of 1903, is not likely to take place, inasmuch as the ratification of the Convention is to be made before February 1st, 1903. We shall inform Parliament of the legislative measures which may seem to us to be necessary for this purpose. I hope that at an early date I shall be able to lay Papers on the Table of the House. When those Papers are before the noble Lord, I hope he will he convinced that the Convention, far from beng a capitulation on our part, or a series of mischievous concessions made by our delegates, is, on the contrary, the most hopeful attempt that has yet been made to bring to a satisfactory conclusion this much vexed question, which has occupied the public for over forty years, which all of us have desired to solve, and which up to the present, for various reasons, we have not been able to deal with satisfactorily.
EARL SPENCER: I do not propose to enter into this subject tonight, for I fully share the views the noble Marquess that the discussion is introduced at an unhappy and premature moment. I understand that there will be some Papers explaining the conduct of our delegates and the history of the Convention. There may be very important points involved in this matter which will require discussion, and to some of which, perhaps, exception may be taken—for instance, the clauses with regard to retaliation. I will postpone any remarks, however, that it may be thought proper to make from this side of the House, until we have further information.
House adjourned at twenty minutes past Six o'clock till tomorrow at quarter past Four o'clock.