Lords Sitting of 28 March 1901

The Duke of Wellington sat first in Parliament after the death of his brother.
The Viscount Bangor took the Oath.

PRIVATE BILL BUSINESS.
Private Bills, for petitions respecting, see page
The LORD CHANCELLOR acquainted the House that the Clerk of the Parliaments had laid upon the Table the Certificate from the Examiners that the further Standing Orders applicable to the following Bill have been complied with—Worcester Tramways [H.L.]; and also the Certificate that the Standing Orders applicable to the following Bills have not been complied with—Rodgers' Patent (Petition for Bill).
The same were ordered to lie on the Table.

SOUTH EASTERN AND LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAYS BILL [H.L.]
Petition for additional provision, of the South Eastern Railway Company, the London, Chatham and Dover Railway Company, and the South Eastern and Chatham Railway Companies Managing Committee; together with the proposed clauses and Amendments annexed thereto; read, and referred to the Examiners.
KING'S NORTON AND NORTHFIELD URBAN DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
AIRE AND CALDER NAVIGATION BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
SHIELDS BRIDGE BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
CHRIST'S HOSPITAL (LONDON) BILL [H.L.]
  ALERETON CAS BILL [H.L.]
  Reported with Amendments.
OMAGH GAS BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
BOURNEMOUTH CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Reported from the Select Committee with Amendments.
BETHLEM HOSPITAL BILL [H.L.]
  BRIDEWELL HOSPITAL BILL [H.L.]
LOWESTOFT CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
Committed. The Committee to be proposed by the Committee of Selection.
ARLESEY GAS BILL [H.L.]
  NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE AND GATESHEAD GAS BILL [H.L.]
    FOLKESTONE CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
    Read 3a, and passed, and sent to the Commons.
WARKWORTH HARBOUR BILL [H.L.]
  PORTMADOC, BEDDGELERT, AND SOUTH SNOWDON RAILWAY BILL [H.L.]

    NEWPORT (ISLE OF WIGHT) GAS BILL [H.L.]
    WISBECH WATER BILL [H.L.].
    HARPENDEN DISTRICT GAS BILL [H.L.].
    LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    SOUTH-EASTERN AND LONDON, CHATHAM, AND DOVER RAILWAYS BILL [H.L.].
    SOUTH-WESTERN AND ISLE OF WIGHT JUNCTION RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    LEEDS CORPORATION (GENERAL POWERS) BILL [H.L.].
    Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills, viz.:—

    E. Albemarle,

    E. Lauderdale (chairman),

    E. Verulam,

    V. Hutchinson (E. Donoughmore),

    L. Lilford.

    Agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly; the Committee to meet on Tuesday the 23rd of April next,
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    at Eleven of the clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.

MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD BILL [H.L.]
  MERSEY DOCKS AND HARBOUR BOARD (CANADA DOCK WORKS, ETC.) BILL [H.L.]

    MANCHESTER CORPORATION BILL [H.L.]
    MANCHESTER (MARKET STREET AREA) IMPROVEMENTS BILL [H.L.].
    MANCHESTER AND LIVERPOOL ELECTRIC EXPRESS RAILWAY BILL [H.L.].
    STOCKPORT CORPORATION WATER BILL [H.L.].
    Report from the Committee of Selection, That the following Lords be proposed to the House to form the Select Committee for the consideration of the said Bills, viz.:—

    E. Tankerville,

    V. Falkland (chairman),

    V. Bangor,

    V. Frankfort de Montmorency,

    L. Wrottesley.

    Agreed to; and the said Lords appointed accordingly; the Committee to meet on Tuesday the 23rd of April next, at Eleven of the clock; and all petitions referred to the Committee, with leave to the petitioners praying to be heard by counsel against the Bills to be heard as desired, as also counsel for the Bills.

WATFORD AND DISTRICT TRAMWAYS BILL.
Order of the day for the Second Reading, read.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(The Chairman of Committees).
LORD EBURY: My Lords, when this Bill was before the Standing Orders Committee, I understood my noble friend the Chairman of Committees to tell the promoters that in regard to a very material, and, from my point of view, a very objectionable part of the Bill, the Standing Order had not been complied with and it could not be dispensed with in their behalf. In the very brief epitome of the proceedings before the

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Standing Orders Committee which was distributed to your Lordships, it seemed to me that that decision of my noble friends—in the absence of which, as he is aware, I should have felt it to be my duty to enter an emphatic protest against the Second Reading—was very inaccurately expressed. I have gathered incidentally that before this Bill goes to a Committee some of its most objectionable features will have to be expunged. Meanwhile, however, it comes before your Lordships in an unamended form, and if it were now read a second time without comment or explanation the inevitable result would be much local misunderstanding, much needless expense, and much prejudice to the case of those who, at a later stage of the present session, or in a future session, may desire to oppose the Bill. In these circumstances I have felt justified in troubling my noble friend with the question that stands in my name—namely, Whether he will state the circumstances under which it is proposed to read the Bill a second time. I shall be quite satisfied if he is able to tell me that that portion of the Bill, in regard to which the Standing Orders have not been complied with, will not be submitted during the present session to a Committee of your Lordships' House.
THE CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (The Earl of MORLEY): I think I can give my noble friend the assurance he desires. The tramway proposed in the Bill consisted of three parts. One part went through the urban district of Watford, another through the rural district of Watford, and the remaining mile-and-a-half through the urban district of Rickmansworth. The two urban districts had consented to the Bill, but the rural district of Watford, through which the longer length of the tramway was marked out, had not consented. The consequence was that under your Lordships' Standing Orders the Examiners reported a non-compliance. The promoters desired that the Standing Order should be dispensed with. The position I took up was that that portion of the tramway which went through the Watford rural district, and in respect of which the local authority had refused their consent, should be excluded altogether from the Bill; but I said that if the promoters thought it worth their while to proceed with the Bill including only the tramways going through the
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districts that had given their consent I should not oppose it. They said, at the time, that probably it would not be worth while going on with the Bill, but I now see that they desire to do so. On the distinct understanding that the Bill should be amended I allowed it to proceed. These are the circumstances under which the Bill now comes before your Lordships for Second Reading.
LORD EBURY: I am quite satisfied with my noble friend's explanation.
On Question agreed to, Bill read 2a accordingly.

RETURNS, REPORTS, ETC.

  TRADE REPORTS (ANNUAL SERIES).
  No. 2566. United States (Chicago and District).
  No. 2567. Chili (Coquimbo).

  BOARD OF EDUCATION.
  Code of regulations for Day Schools; with schedules and appendices.
  Presented (by command), and ordered to lie on the Table.

  PRIVATE LEGISLATION PROCEDURE (SCOTLAND) ACT, 1899.
  Amending General Order for the regulation of proceedings under and in pursuance of the Act.
  FACTORY AND WORKSHOP (MANU FACTURE OF EARTHENWARE AND CHINA).
  Amended special rules for the manufacture of earthenware and china.

  TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION ACTS.
  Minutes sanctioning the subjects to be taught under Clause 8 of the Technical Instruction Act, 1889, for the—

  1. County Borough of South Shields (4th minute);

  2. County of Glamorgan (10th minute).

  Laid before the House (pursuant to Act), and ordered to lie on the Table.

POLLING ARRANGEMENTS (PARLIAMENTARY BOROUGHS) BILL [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the day for the Second Reading, read.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, the, object of this measure and of the Polling-Districts (County Councils) Bill, which is also down for Second Reading, is to remove certain anomalies which have arisen. Having regard to the constitutional severance of Peers from anything to do with elections or polling districts, I feel that in having a Bill of this nature entrusted to me I am rather in the position of a nun who had undertaken some alteration in the marriage laws. But I suppose I shall be allowed to move its Second Reading. Similar Bills were brought in in 1897, 1898, and 1899. In the latter year nothing was done, because it was expected that some provision would be inserted in the Local Government Act of last year, which would affect the question. Such, however, did not turn out to be the case. The Home Secretary, in reply to a communication from the London County Council, said he had no observations to offer with regard to the Bill, and we therefore assumed that his silence gave consent. As your Lordships are probably aware, the authorities who arrange the polling districts differ, and the effect of this Bill will be to make the county councils all over England the sole authority for settling the polling districts in Parliamentary electoral divisions just as they are in county council electoral divisions.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ribblesdale.)
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (The Earl of HARDWICKE): In the absence of the noble Lord who represents the Home Office, I am asked to state that my right hon. friend Mr. Ritchie has no objection to offer to the Bill; but he wishes it to be clearly understood that he can give no guarantee to support it.
On Question, agreed to: Bill road 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

POLLING DISTRICTS (COUNTY COUNCILS) BILL [H.L.]
[SECOND READING.]
Order of the day for the Second Reading read.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: My Lords, this Bill hangs almost entirely on the
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previous one. As I explained a moment ago, the County Council polling districts are fixed by the County Council, but, in the opinion of Sir Edward Clarke and Sir Robert Finlay, when once they are fixed they cannot possibly be altered. This may lead to all sorts of difficulties, for a place which is very convenient at one cycle of years may become, owing to the circumstances of population, very inconvenient at another. The object of this Bill is to give county councils the power of altering any polling district from time to time.
Moved, That the Bill be now read 2a.—(Lord Ribblesdale.)
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: This Bill concerns the Local Government Board as well as the Home Office, and I am asked to state that neither body offers any objection to the Bill, but they cannot give any pledge to support it.
LORD RIBBLESDALE: Are we to understand from that that they oppose it?
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: At this stage they do not oppose it, but I do not know what they may see fit to do at a future stage.
On Question, agreed to, Bill read 2a accordingly, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

TRANSVAAL CONCESSIONS COMMISSION.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: My Lords, I beg to ask whether the Report of the Transvaal Concessions Commission will be presented to Parliament; and, if not, to move for the production of that part of the Report which refers to the Transvaal railways. It will be in your Lordships' recollection that some months ago His Majesty's Government appointed a Commission to inquire into concessions in the Transvaal. That Commission has, I believe, concluded its labours, and either has reported or is on the point of reporting; and in the present condition of affairs in South Africa it is very important that Parliament should be possessed as soon as possible of the conclusions of this Commission. There are two classes of concessions in the Transvaal, the ordinary concessions, such as the dynamite

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monopoly, and, secondly, the railways. The question of the railways is of special interest to this country at the present moment. A year ago I called your Lordships' attention to this subject, and I obtained certain Returns which showed the nature of the property of these railways. It was very clear, even at that time, that on the solution of the question of the railways would depend the solution of the most important points in the South African difficulty. That is much more evident now. In the early future we shall have to inquire very closely into the transactions of the Transvaal Railway Companies, and certain very important questions will have to be discussed, to which I have no doubt attention will be called in this House.
During the war we have had to contend with no less than three belligerents—the two Republics and also the Netherlands Railway Company. When I call the Netherlands Railway Company a belligerent I do so advisedly, for the injury which has been done by that railway, when it comes to be measured, will be found to be very great indeed. When I make such a bold statement as to call that railway a belligerent, I do so on unimpeachable authority that of the General Manager. All the letter books of the Netherlands Railway were supposed to have been destroyed, but, fortunately, the General Manager had written letters to his Board and to private persons, which came into the possession of the Commission. Writing on 28th April, 1900, to two of his co-directors in Holland, the General Manager said—
"Dear Sirs,—Your remarks with regard to the strict neutrality of the Netherlands South Africa Railway are not refreshing to me, especially as they come now that the chances have turned against the Boers. If it should come to the worst, and the English become masters here, I am afraid that we have hopelessly compromised ourselves, in deed, word, and writing. We have made cannon and ammunition; we have sold material to the Republic; we have blown up bridges on English territory, and have not discharged our staff on commando. We have assisted the Orange Free State with advice, and, indeed, with persons and material. There are in existence letters, telegrams, and living witnesses that we have strongly supported the Government in its defence. I have everything covered as much as possible by orders, but I have never yet attempted the appearance that we object to carrying out all of them. On the contrary, there are proofs that we have been only too willing to do everything that is in the interest of the Republic. How could it be
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otherwise? We have always sounded it—how we serve the interests of the State, and how the Government could always reckon on us in difficult circumstances. Yes; how we always were plus royal que le roi. Everybody knows that, and I can well understand that our Holland gang is not beloved in London."
It may be argued that they were asked under coercion and could not help themselves, as, under Article 22 of the Concession, the Government of the Transvaal had the power to make use of all the railways. But, later on in this letter, the General Manager says—
"We have, it is true, done things that we were not obliged to do according to the letter of the Concession. For instance, I might have said, 'Our workshops cannot make or repair cannon, we cannot shoe horses, make any tents, any ammunition, etc., we have no one who can work with dynamite.' We were not obliged to lend men to the Orange Free State. I could have said, 'We are not going to pay our men on commando.' We were not obliged to exploit railways outside the State, and our neutrality prohibits us from entering into agreements to that effect. I could have said, 'I have no material for this or that commando; our oil is finished, and now we cannot run,' etc. I would like to know how soon I would then have gone the way of the manager of the Pretoria-Pietersburg line, who was immediately put over the border when be tried to maintain his neutrality. I would also, then, have liked to hear your judgment—you who were proud of it when you heard of the Z.A.S.M. (Netherlands Railway) deed of heroism in the destruction of bridges, etc.—you who wished for further data in order to make mention in your yearly report of the active part we took in the defence of the country. The adversities of the Republics must have sorely touched you in order to make you all of a sudden so anxiously neutral."
Your Lordships will see that the General Manager clearly implicates himself. He not only implicates himself, but his board also. In a private letter, dated 13th February, he said—
"Confirming my telegram of even date, I must inform you that it is my intention to assist the Government of the Orange Free State as much as possible by exploiting the railways in Cape Colony, and that we must, therefore, provide Van Eelde, whom they have charged with it, with a good set of men."
Your Lordships must remember that this is a private railway in the Transvaal Republic, which turns itself into an active belligerent and takes part in the fighting in the Orange Free State. Writing on 28th February—the day of the relief of Ladysmith—the General Manager said—
"We have withdrawn our railway servants at Modder Spruit, and taken the rolling-stock

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back to Glencoe. All cannon also brought over. All bridges and culverts between Modder Spruit and Elandslaagte have been destroyed. Westenberg
(one of the chief engineers), with his destruction staff, forms the rear guard."
That was, the rear guard of the Boor Army. All this has appeared in evidence, and it is clear that the board are implicated. They had attacked us in Natal, had blown up bridges in Natal, had fought against us in the Transvaal, had made cartridges and cannon for use against us, and had actively assisted the Boers in every way; and when finally our troops reached Standerton the Railway Company actively opposed us by destroying engines. Ultimately nearly the whole of the railway staff were driven from the Transvaal and exported from Delagoa Bay as undesirables. Is there such another instance in history where a private company has attacked a foreign Power with which it had nothing to do, not limiting itself to defending the country in which its property lay, but invading outside territory and doing all the damage possible? What we desire to know is the extent of the damage done by the company and the amount of the indemnity they will be required to pay. For that information it is essential to have the Report of the Commission, and I hope that it will be laid before Parliament with as little delay as possible. It may be said that there are innocent shareholders of the company in various parts of the world. The point we urge is that the shareholders have nothing whatever to do with the matter. The question is the responsibility and liability of the Board of Directors. Your Lordships will no doubt be troubled with the matter again, but for the present I will content myself by asking the question standing in my name.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of ONSLOW): The noble Lord began his remarks by saying that the Report of the Commission either had been, or was about to be, presented. The latter is the correct recital of the facts. The Report has not yet been seen, even in draft, by the Secretary of State or myself, but within the last few moments I have obtained information from the Chairman of the Commission that the Report is in
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the printers' hands and likely to be ready for the Secretary of State in the course of a week or so. The noble Earl will agree with me that, as the Report has not yet been seen by the Secretary of State, it is impossible to say whether it can be presented to Parliament or not, but the remarks of the noble Earl, on which I do not propose to follow him, will, of course, engage the attention of the Secretary of State.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWN: I would suggest, as the Report will probably be of considerable length, that, if it should be decided to lay it before Parliament, it may be well to divide it into two parts, separating the Report upon the railway from other matters.
THE EARL OF ONSLOW: The suggestion of the noble Earl shall receive consideration.

CHINA—PRESENT POSITION AND POLICY.
EARL SPENCER: My Lords, I beg to ask the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can communicate to the House the latest information as to our position in China, stating especially—

1. Whether military operations have been concluded, and if there is prospect of the Allies withdrawing their forces at an early date.

2. What is the present state of the negotiations with the Government of China, and whether the Powers are agreed in their demands.

3. Whether the Anglo-German agreement applies to Manchuria, and, if not, whether there was any understanding, verbal or otherwise, at the time of negotiation which excluded Manchuria from the agreement.

4. Whether, since Sir C. Scott's despatch of 6th February, 1901, there has been any convention between Russia and China, and, if so, whether the terms of such convention can be made known.

5. Whether the large interests held by British in the two railways from Shan-hai-Kwan to Neu-chwang, and from Shan-hai-Kwan to Tientsin, are being duly protected.

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6. Whether any further control of railways in Mongolia has been granted by the Chinese Government to Russia, and, if so, what attitude His Majesty's Government have taken in regard to this question.

I do not propose to do more than offer a few remarks as preface to the questions standing in my name; but I feel I ought to explain how it is I put these somewhat numerous questions to the noble Marquess. I shall not attempt to go into the whole question of our position in China, whore matters of a most momentous kind have happened within the last two years. I will only briefly refer to what has occurred since last summer. In the interval very grave events have happened. There have been serious conflicts between European and Chinese troops, not only with rebels called Boxers, but I fear it is almost clear that conflicts have occurred with troops of the Chinese Government. There has been a siege of the Legations at Peking, and an heroic defence of those Legations by those who were there with very few soldiers or Marines, the defenders showing an amount of resource, bravery, energy, and ability which will long remain on record as one of the most eventful sieges of the present era. Besides this, there have been severe conflicts on the Chinese frontier between Russian and Chinese forces; there have been murders of missionaries and others in various parts of the Chinese Empire and great destruction of private property belonging to British and other nations. Moreover, the Chinese Government has fled from Peking, and we have practically no Chinese Government to deal with at this moment. All these events have led to very serious political complications, and to great disturbances of the peaceful pursuance of commerce.
I need hardly say that the deepest anxiety has prevailed in this country with regard to all these matters on account of the very great and deep interest our people have in China. We have very little information in regard to these matters. No doubt, there are certain Blue-books, but these, if I am not mistaken, do not carry the history of these affairs beyond 30th September last. In this House we have not had a debate on these subjects since last summer. Some incidental remarks were made last autumn and at the opening of this
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session by the Prime Minister, but I am sure of this—that since the noble Marquess has held the seals of the Foreign Office he has not been asked a single question with regard to foreign affairs. We on this Bench have been reluctant to bring forward any question upon this difficult and tangled subject that might in any way embarrass His Majesty's Government. At the same time, there have been in another place questions asked and, in a certain degree, answered; and at Berlin the Minister for Foreign Affairs has, on one occasion if not more, made a long and serious speech in reference to China. We feel, therefore, we cannot remain without giving an opportunity to the noble Marquess of stating the most recent facts which he is able to state with regard to what is going on in China, and the policy of His Majesty's Government. I will go further and say that Parliament and the country have a right to the fullest information on this subject, upon which our interests are so gravely affected. I ought to say, perhaps, that there was one question asked last week with reference to incidents at Tientsin. I have put down a long string of questions. The noble Marquess, when I mentioned the subject to him, hoped I should be able to tell him the points on which I desired information, and I thought it better to be explicit, even if I ran into length, than to put a general question, and to amplify that general question in the course of my speech. This is the history of the somewhat lengthy questions of which I have given notice.
A few words on the general policy of the Government. First of all, His Majesty's Government desire to obtain redress for outrages committed upon British subjects at our Legation, and the punishment of those who so grossly violated international law. They also wish to obtain security for life and property in the future, but, so far as I know, the two paramount principles guiding His Majesty's Government are these:—To maintain un-diminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire; that is the first point, and I am not quite sure that if we examine the events that have taken place we can say that His Majesty's Government have been altogether successful. But I do not stay to dilate on this. The other point is to see that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China remain open to international trade and legitimate purposes

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of commercial activity. These are, I think, the two cardinal supports upon which His Majesty's Government base their policy in China. I am quite aware that there are other questions affecting China to which some people attach even greater importance than those I have put on the Paper. There is the question of the yang-tsze Valley and our influence there, and the Peking-Hankow Railway; the questions of Canton and the West River, in which we have great interest. There is also the serious question of Korea and Japan, and what are the relations between Russia and Japan with regard to it. I only refer to these matters now in order that if the noble Marquess should make a comprehensive statement with regard to China he may be willing to give us some information, and if he is able to do so it will give great satisfaction to Parliament and the country. We on this Bench, and I believe every one in the country, trust that we shall hear that there is good feeling and co-operation among all the different Powers now operating and working together in China, and I sincerely trust the good feeling between Russia and this country, which apparently brought about the satisfactory conclusion of the incident of Tientsin which seemed at one time so dangerous, will be typical of the goodwill and good feeling which prevail among all the nations now engaged in China.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, I readily concede that the noble Earl has a perfect right to question His Majesty's Government upon this important subject, and I admit the forbearance which he has shown in postponing this discussion until the present time. I will endeavour to reply to the questions which he has put to me. The noble Earl asked in the first place whether military operations had been concluded, and if there were a prospect of the Allies withdrawing their forces from China at an early date. As he told your Lordships, the British forces went to China for the purpose of bringing about the relief of the Legations. I may be allowed to express my concurrence with what was said by the noble Earl as to the heroic character of that defence—a brilliant and ever memorable chapter in the history of this country. That purpose has fortunately been
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achieved, and at this moment, so far as I am aware, no military operations, no new movement of troops, are in progress or in contemplation.
Your Lordships are aware that from the first the Government have laid it down clearly that it was not their desire that British forces should be employed in military operations in the remoter parts of China, and to that policy we adhere. A short time ago we became aware that Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee had issued an order to the forces under his command to hold themselves ready for fresh operations. The scope of these operations was, very properly, not divulged. All it was necessary for us to do in those circumstances was to instruct General Gaselee that before taking part in thorn he should refer homo to His Majesty's Government. There is another purpose for which it seems to me that—for a time, at any rate—the presence of a British force in Northern China is indispensable. If your Lordships have carried in your minds the joint Note which was presented by the allies to China, you will remember that, at the conclusion of the document, it was stated that—
"Until the Chinese Government have complied with the above conditions to the satisfaction of the Powers the undersigned can hold out no expectation that the occupation of Peking and Pe-chi-li by the allied forces could be brought to a conclusion."
I think we are hardly yet in a position to say that the compliance of the Chinese Government has been of such a character as to justify the withdrawal of the allied forces. But I need not assure the House that it will be our earnest endeavour to press on the negotiations; and we have every hope that, before long, it may be possible for us to withdraw, or, at any rate, largely diminish the number of British troops now serving in that part of China.
My Lords, the noble Earl questioned me with regard to the progress of the negotiations. I am afraid we must admit that that progress has been slow. That is a matter for regret, but scarcely a matter for surprise. I do not suppose that, in the history of diplomacy, there have ever been negotiations carried on under conditions less calculated to bring about an expeditious settlement. I would ask your Lordships to consider what these conditions are. You have,

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on the one hand, China. The Chinese Government is used to methods of diplomacy which are not entirely in accord with those to which we are accustomed and which do not, perhaps, conduce greatly to rapid and satisfactory progress. But, at this moment, as the noble Earl told the House, China is, I will not say without a central Government, but her Government is a refugee Government established in a remote provincial town; and we have to negotiate as best we can—sometimes with that Government, sometimes with plenipotentiaries at Peking, sometimes through the medium of other high Chinese officials. On the other hand, you have, not a single Power, but no fewer than eleven Powers, with eleven representatives sitting in conference at Peking. It is surely not a matter for surprise that amongst those Governments and those representatives there should be room for divergences of opinion, which naturally tend to prolong the course of negotiations.
There is also to be considered the difficultly of the subjects which are under discussion at Peking. They are numerous and full of complexity. The representatives of the Powers have to deal with the reparation to be exacted from China; with the measures necessary to prevent the recurrence of these unfortunate events; with the indemnification of the Governments and private persons who have been put to expense and loss during the recent incidents; and last, but not least, with the financial measures which will be necessary in order to provide the revenues required for the satisfaction of the demands which will be made. When we consider the conditions I have described, I think we can scarcely be astonished that the negotiations should not have proceeded with very great rapidity. In these circumstances we may, at any rate, find some consolation in the reflection that on certain broad questions of policy there is practical unanimity among the Powers. Those principles are, I take it, that we are not at war with China; that we desire to derive no territorial advantages from these events; that we recognise as binding all existing treaty obligations; and with regard to commercial and economical questions, that we desire to observe what is commonly known as the policy of the open door, and that within those particular spheres where preferential rights have been accorded to certain
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Powers there should be equality of opportunity for all other Powers concerned.
With regard to the negotiations, the House will remember that in the last days of last year the Allies agreed to the joint Note which I quoted a moment ago. That Note was accepted by the Chinese Government, and we have since been negotiating with regard to the measures necessary in order to secure compliance with the conditions embodied in the Note. It would be quite impossible for me, in reply to the question of the noble Karl, to review those negotiations in detail. But I can give him some information with regard to a few of the more interesting points. There is, in the first place, the controversy that has arisen with regard to the punishment of certain highly-placed officials who wore responsible for the outrages committed at Peking and elsewhere. The Note places on record the view of the Powers that the severest punishment, in proportion to their crimes, is due to those persons. We should have preferred that the Note should have placed on record that these persons deserved not merely the severest punishment, but the death penalty; we believe that that, and that only, was the appropriate penalty in such eases. In deference, however, to the views of his colleagues, our representative accepted the formula I have just quoted, but, on the understanding that in the most flagrant cases "the severest punishment," in proportion to their crimes, meant the infliction of the death penalty.
Up to the present time, out of eleven persons who were referred to in the Note, I find that death sentences have been passed on three and carried out in two cases, that three other persons have been, in accordance with the custom of the country, permitted to put an end to their own existence, and that, in the case of three more, the sentence of punishment and degradation has been passed. I cannot, of course, say whether these latter sentences have been actually enforced. Then, my Lords, there is the clause with regard to the Legation guards and the occupation of certain posts to secure communication between Peking and the sea. As to that, considerable progress has been made. I do not detect any very material difference between the views which have been expressed by the representatives of the

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different Powers. Our instructions to our representative have been that he should be moderate in his demands: we have told him that it is not our desire that Peking should be turned into a sort of fortress or cantonment, but that we wish the strength of the Legation guards to be sufficient only for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the Legations in case of sudden emergency or disorder.
The question which, I think, is at this moment most engaging the attention of the Conference in Peking is the extremely difficult question of the indemnities. These, of course, fall under two heads. There are the national indemnities which the Powers will require in satisfaction of the expense to which they have been put by these military operations, and there are the private claims put forward by individuals, companies, associations, missionaries, and so on, who have suffered loss. We have to determine how much is to be claimed under these different heads. When we have ascertained that, we shall have to decide whether the whole or only a part of the demands is to be pressed. And then will arise the question of the sources from which China is to obtain the necessary revenue in order to satisfy the interest on any debt which she may be obliged to incur for the purpose of meeting the claims. I can only indicate in general terms the principles which we are endeavouring to follow. We think that in regard to the war indemnities our claims should be limited to the actual cost incurred in these operations, and in the case of the private claims we also desire to exclude what are usually described as indirect or consequential claims. The Committee of the Representatives in Peking have reported as to the principles upon which it is thought desirable to proceed, and their Report is under our consideration at this moment. There has also been a small committee appointed, under the immediate direction of the British Legation, to examine and classify the claims put forward by British subjects. We have expressed our opinion that, when these claims have been examined they should be presented to the Chinese Government, not by each Power individually, but by the Powers acting collectively.
With regard to the sources from which the Chinese Government might obtain the necessary increase of revenue for the
20
purpose of meeting these indemnities, we have obtained a good deal of evidence from experts as to the possibility of tapping new sources of revenue. Here again I should like to say that our opinion is that we should avoid imposing upon China a burden which could properly be described as of a crushing or overwhelming nature. Our policy has been to respect the existence of China as a Power; and we think that we should be setting to work in a wrong way to give effect to that policy if we were to impose upon China a burden heavier than it was possible for her to bear. One of the sources of new revenue which has been most considered is the Maritime Customs. The Maritime Customs, imposed under the Treaty of Tientsin and the earlier Treaty of Nanking, contemplated a tariff of 5 per cent., ad valorem. These ad valorem duties have been converted, or at any rate largely converted, into specific duties, and at the present values the actual payment which is made represents not 5 per cent., but a very much smaller per centage. We think, therefore, that the duties might be readjusted so as to produce a real 5 per cent. instead of the smaller per centage which they actually yield. There are also, it appears, a considerable number of articles which pass duty free, and we see no reason why these should not be made subject to duty.
But, my Lords, when we attempt to go further, and consider whether the Customs tariff should be very largely increased in connection with the payment of the indemnities, we feel that we cannot proceed with too great caution. We have to bear in mind several considerations. In the first place we have to remember that of the whole external trade of China over 60 per cent. belongs to this country, while of the shipping which carries that trade 84 per cent. is British. Well, it is quite clear that if we were to agree to a very large increase in the Customs tariff we should, on the one hand, stand to gain a few millions in the shape of an increased indemnity, but we might do so at the risk of greatly crippling and interfering with the important British commerce that is now being carried on with the Chinese Empire. That is not all, because it is also evident that largely increased Customs duties might operate as a kind of protection for Chinese industries, and

21
we should be face to face with this possibility—that new industries, using, no doubt, European machinery and managed by Europeans, but employing Chinese labour, might be established under the shelter of the new tariff in China, greatly to the detriment of, and most unfairly to, our own industries here.
There is a third consideration which seems to me, if possible, more important still, and it is this. In the 11th article of the joint Note it is provided that the Chinese Government is to negotiate in regard to amendments of the treaties of commerce and navigation considered useful by the Powers, and also as to other subjects connected with commercial relations with the object of facilitating them. We hope that when the time comes for giving effect to that clause we may find it possible to make alterations in our commercial relations with China which will be largely advantageous to the commerce of this country. We look forward in particular to relieving that commerce of some of those extremely irksome and corruptly administered inland duties which are familiar to your Lordships under the name of likin. Now, if likin is ever to be dealt with, that will mean that you will withdraw from the provincial administrations of China the greater part of the income on which they now depend. It is the income upon which they depend, not only for their civil, but for their naval and military administration; and it will therefore be necessary to put in the place of any provincial income that may be thus taken away from the provinces some other available source of revenue. We think that if the question of the Customs tariff is ever to be taken in hand on a large scale, it should certainly be in connection with a well-considered scheme of financial reform, and with a general revision of the commercial arrangements existing between us and China.
There is another observation which I should like to make in passing. It is that we do not desire to take advantage of this opportunity in order to impose upon China a number of internal or domestic reforms. We do not think that that is our business. It is sometimes suggested to us that we should require the wholesale dismissal of Chinese officials, and a general reorganisation of the internal government of the Empire My Lords, the regeneration of an empire numbering, I believe, over 300,000,000 of people, and covering
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about one-twelfth of the land surface of the globe, is not a task to be undertaken light-heartedly. At any rate, I should be very sorry to contemplate the idea of insisting upon such a reform and retaining British troops in China until such time as it has been carried out. At the same time, I should be sorry to have it understood that we despair of seeing reforms in China. I feel, personally, very confident that China is capable of better things. We sometimes hear the Chinaman spoken of as if he was either a Boxer and a barbarian, or the Chinaman with whom we are familiar on the stage or in the works of American humorists. Those who know Chinamen really, and have lived in China, will tell you that the Chinaman as a soldier, if he is properly led, is one of the most fearless soldiers in the world. They will tell you that as a merchant he keeps faith scrupulously, that as a workman he is laborious and frugal beyond anything to which our ideas can attain. And I think it is a remarkable feature in the present condition of China that throughout all these recent incidents, in spite of the disappearance of the central Government, the provincial Governments have maintained the even tenor of their way, and have apparently succeeded in administering their districts with success. That has been due in great measure to some of those more enlightened Chinamen like the two Yang-tsze Viceroys, whose steady influence has had such a salutary effect during the last few months, with whom we have been in not infrequent communication, and whom we desire to support and encourage to the best of our ability.
The noble Earl has asked me several questions with regard to international agreements in existence, or supposed to be in existence, between China and other Powers. I should like to say one word with regard to the manner in which agreements of this kind are to be construed and interpreted. I think we are rather too apt to talk about them as if they were Acts of Parliament or legal instruments drawn up in the Temple or Lincoln's Inn. Those agreements have not got the sanction of a Court of law behind them. They depend, not upon material guarantees, but upon the good faith of the parties who have contracted under them, and it does not shock me to find that in documents of this kind there should not be the same precision of language

23
as that which you would expect to find in a statute or in a legal document.
There is, in the first place, the agreement entered into between this country and Russia in the year 1899. I mention that because it touches very closely the question of the Northern railways, of which the noble Earl spoke. My Lords, in that Anglo-Russian Agreement it was laid down that Great Britain would not seek on her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and was not to obstruct directly or indirectly applications for railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government. And there was a corresponding engagement that Russia should not interfere with British railway concessions in the basin of the Yang-tsze. That was a perfectly equal engagement as between the two Powers, but a somewhat important exception was made in favour of the Northern Chinese Railway, to which the noble Earl referred. Part of that railway lies beyond the Great Wall, and would consequently naturally fall within the Russian sphere; but it was expressly provided by a supplemental Note of the same date that the line north of the Great Wall, that is the line from Shan-hai-Kwan to Neu-chwang, was to remain a Chinese line under the control of the Chinese Government, and should not be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company. In December, 1898, the Tsung-li-Yamên had assured us that none of the lines then under contract were to be alienated to any foreign Power. Her Majesty's Government took note of that assurance as a binding engagement, and it was accordingly embodied in the supplemental Note which I quoted to your Lordships just now. We regard this engagement distinctly as being still in force, and we do not admit that the temporary disturbance of existing arrangements which has taken place in that part of China in any way modifies the binding nature of the agreement. The whole of the Northern line was, as the noble Earl will remember, occupied by Russian troops at the time when the disturbances were going on; but we have been distinctly assured by the Russian Government that that occupation was a temporary occupation and without prejudice to the proprietary and financial interests involved. That part of the line which lies inside the
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Wall has been actually surrendered to Field Marshal Count von Waldersee, who has placed it in the hands of the British military authorities. The extra-mural portion still remains in Russian hands; but we have been assured that the occupation is to be regarded as a temporary measure justified by military exigencies. I hope I have convinced the noble Earl that we have not in any way derogated from our rights in the railways in question, and that the interests of British shareholders to which he especially referred have not been ignored.
Then the noble Earl asks me a question with regard to another agreement—that of October, 1900, commonly known as the Anglo-German Agreement. He asks me whether that agreement applies to Manchuria. I must ask your Lordships to consider, before I answer that question, the exact wording of the Anglo-Gorman Agreement. The first clause of that agreement recites that—
"it is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction, and the two Governments agree on their part to uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they can exercise influence."
Your Lordships will notice that in that clause there are two most important limitations. It applies, in the first place, only to the ports on the rivers and littoral of China, and to those ports only in so far as the contracting Powers have influence within them. I call your Lordships' particular attention to the expression "influence," because it is clear that "influence" is a somewhat elastic expression, and that influence can hardly be regarded as a constant factor in the consideration of such an agreement. I have made inquiries with regard to what took place when this agreement was under negotiation, and I am told that the German Government did give us to understand that in their view Manchuria was snot a place within which they considered that they had influence. I must say, however, that I do not think that that point is one which deserves too much attention, because the Anglo-German Agreement certainly did not in any way diminish the rights of the Powers to use any treaty port the use of which had previously been granted to them by the

25
Treaty of Tientsin. The only two treaty ports which I am aware of in Manchuria are the important ports of Neu-chwang and Ta-lien-wan; and, in regard to Ta-lien-wan, we have been distinctly assured by Russia that she intends to keep that port open, while with regard to Neu-chwang, in the same way, there is no question of its being treated otherwise than an open port. The assurances of the Russian Government on that point are perfectly explicit.
When you come to the second clause of the Anglo-Gorman Agreement the language used is different, and there are not the same reservations. In that clause it is said that the two Governments agree not to "make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions," and that they will "direct their policy towards maintaining unimpaired the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire." In our view, that clause applies to the whole of the Chinese Empire, and therefore to Manchuria, which forms a part of the Chinese Empire. I have seen it stated in the newspaper reports that a speech delivered by Count von Bülow in Germany suggests the idea that the German Government possibly interprets the second clause of the agreement in a different sense from that in which we interpret it. But here, again, I ask your Lordships to consider whether the point is really a very material one, because the whole of the Powers, including Germany, have repeatedly declared that their policy is that the integrity of the Chinese Empire shall be maintained. We know that the German Government has warned the Chinese Government against entering into separate treaties with other Powers affecting her possessions. It surely does not very much matter to us whether Germany has arrived at that conclusion by a consideration of the Anglo-German Agreement or whether she has been led to it by considerations of general policy.
The noble Earl has also referred to another agreement which is commonly spoken of as the Manchurian Agreement, with regard to which we hear so many conflicting rumours from day to day. The noble Earl asks me whether such a convention between Russia and China has been entered into.
I am afraid it is impossible for me to answer that question. We know that there have been
26
negotiations. We have seen a great many different versions of this alleged agreement, some of them apparently having the appearance of
authenticity. But we cannot take upon ourselves to say that any of these versions represent correctly, either the offer made by China, or the demand made by Russia; and therefore I am quite unable to pass any final opinion upon the matter. With regard to this question of Manchuria, I should like to say that we are very far from taking an exaggerated view of our interests in that part of the Chinese Empire. We have already entered into an agreement with Russia under which we recognise that, so far as railway enterprise is concerned, that part of China is within the Russian sphere, taking into consideration what is called the "gravitation" of certain parts of the Chinese Empire. We also know that in Manchuria there have been collisions between Russian and Chinese troops; that Russia has been obliged to occupy parts of that province in force; and it seems to us perfectly natural that Russia should insist, before withdrawing her troops, upon making conditions with regard to the terms upon which those troops should be withdrawn. Therefore, we should certainly not criticise in a carping or pedantic spirit the arrangement made about Manchuria between Russia and China, if it were clear that the arrangement was what it purported to be—that is a temporary arrangement of the kind usually described as a modus vivendi.
On the other hand, I am bound to admit that if some of the versions which have been published and which have come into our hands represent even approximately the provisions of the agreement, it would appear to contain covenants which are not limited to Manchuria, which are not of a temporary or provisional character, and some of which are apparently derogatory to our treaty rights in the Chinese Empire. It is suggested that these versions of the alleged agreement may be ballons d'essai launched by ambitious local officials, or, again, that they may be the inventions of evilly-disposed persons who desire to sow disunion between the Powers. I am perfectly content to assume that there may be something in either of these theories. But, my Lords, if that is so I have only to add that

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nothing would give us greater pleasure than to take part in exposing so unworthy an artifice, and that if Russia would only, by communicating to us what the real text of this agreement is, enable us to put an end to these misconceptions, we should be delighted to co-operate with her for that purpose. What has militated against any such solution as this has been the mystery in which those negotiations have been shrouded.
Your Lordships are, of course, aware of the action which His Majesty's Government took with regard to this matter. We instructed our Ambassador at St. Petersburg to mention to Count Lamsdorff the difficulty in which we were placed by these apparently well-authenticated rumours. I do not think anything could be more correct or more satisfactory than the language with which Count Lamsdorff met the approaches of our Ambassador. He told us that it was the object of the Russian Government—
"to arrange with the local civil authorities the terms of a modus vivendi between them for the duration of the simultaneous presence of Russian and Chinese authorities in Southern Manchuria, the object being to prevent the recurrence of disturbances in the vicinity of the Russian frontier and to protect the railway from the Russian frontier to Port Arthur."
And he added that his Government had—
"no intention of seeking this guarantee in any acquisition of territory or of an actual or virtual protectorate over Manchuria."
All I can say is that, if the agreement really falls within the language used by Count Lamsdorff to Sir Charles Scott, we should certainly not object to it, and that we should freely admit that we could have no right to raise any objection to it. Nobody would be more relieved than His Majesty's Government if we could be satisfied that there was no occasion for apprehension on this point. But until these uncertainties have been removed we feel we cannot do otherwise than adhere to the view which we have expressed and which we have intimated to the Chinese Government—namely, that it is not desirable that China, at a time when she is negotiating with the whole of the Powers at Peking, should simultaneously enter into private and separate arrangements, involving her territorial and her financial condition, with any individual Power. That is the language we have used to the Chinese Government,
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and I am glad to say it is almost precisely the language that has been used by the German Government. Your Lordships will remember Count von Billow's speech in the Reichstag, in which he said—
"China is in the position of a debtor to the Powers, who owes them a very large sum, and she is a debtor who is arranging with her creditors, but has not yet got a settlement. The creditors have an interest in seeing that the debtor does not give away too much in fraudem creditorum."
That is exactly our position. Count von Billow proceeded to use these words—
"The German Government adhered to the principle of having all mutters affecting China decided by the concert of the Powers, and that not in the way of negotiation between Cabinet and Cabinet, but by the conference of their representatives in Peking."
He went on to say—
"The Government of His Majesty the German Emperor has, therefore, no intention of initiating any other form of treatment in the case of the question raised by the Chinese Minister, or of putting itself in the place of the concert of the Powers. The German Government accordingly recommends the Chinese Government to submit all its suggestions to the diplomatic conference at Peking."
That seems to us perfectly sound advice, and our advice to the Chinese Government has been couched in the same terms.
I think I have now dealt with all the points raised by the question. I have occupied the time of your Lordships so long that I will not attempt to travel into Korea, or into other matters not covered by the question of the noble Earl.
EARL SPENCER: There is one other point in the question—with reference to Mongolia.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: The noble Earl's question, I take it, is whether Mongolia, under the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement, falls within the Russian railway sphere.
EARL SPENCER: Whether there has been any arrangement between Russia and China with regard to railways in Mongolia.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: In some of the versions of the alleged agreement it was stated that the agreement had reference not only to Manchuria, but to Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. We lave since heard that that clause has been

29
expunged from the text of the agreement. I cannot say whether the rumour is correct, but I hope it may be so. I have only to say, in conclusion, that we fully recognise the very great difficulties which confront us in China. We shall spare no pains to surmount them. We shall strive to uphold the interests of this country. We shall certainly be tenacious in matters of principle; but in matters of detail we recognise that we must not expect always to have our own way. We shall, at any rate, use our best endeavours to bring these negotiations to a close, and to terminate a situation which is certainly inconvenient, if not fraught with danger, to those who are concerned in the present negotiations.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships have listened with great interest to the
full statement which the noble Marquess has given in answer to the question put to him by my noble friend behind me. My noble friend placed the question on the Paper, not for the purpose of embarrassing the Government, but for the bonâ fide purpose of eliciting information, and we have every reason to thank the noble Marquess for his reply. I will not go in detail into the delicate points which the noble Marquess has referred to, but I was extremely gratified to hear the language he used with regard to our relations with Russia. I am glad that the noble Marquess has not encouraged those who view Russia as a necessary bogey to us in Asia. I am glad that he has encouraged the idea that after all there is plenty of room for both Russia and us in Asia, and that we can arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the relations between us by friendly negotiations and representations, without the necessity for any more violent methods. I think that in that respect we have reason to congratulate ourselves on the manner in which the little storm at Tientsin has passed away. I am glad, too, that we are in the position of saying ditto to Count von Bülow with regard to his representations to China as to the undesirability at this moment of making territorial concessions to any of the Powers interested in China.
It appears to me that, until this question of indemnity has been cleared up, we have a right to demand that China shall hold her territory inviolate, so that we, as creditors, may have the greatest possible
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security for whatever claims we may have to make. I think, too, it was very satisfactory to hear the views of the Government with regard to their reluctance to enter upon inland expeditions in China. We have had our experience of expeditions into wild, roadless countries during the last eighteen months, but the difficulties of expeditions in South Africa would be infinitely magnified if we proposed to make expeditions into the heart of China. For European Powers to enter upon expeditions into that country would seem to me most hazardous and undesirable. I think we have reason to be pleased that there is absolute unanimity among the Powers upon the four points mentioned by the noble Marquess. The policy of Europe in China has been well defined from an American source. It is laid down in that definition that it should be—
"to seek a solution which may bring permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, to protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and to safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade in all parts of the Empire."
I think that aptly sums up a sound European policy towards the Empire of China. The only question is, how can that policy be best carried into effect? When we consider that question, we must also take into consideration the circumstances in which our present difficulties have arisen. We must consider whether the Powers have in any way contributed, either by acts of commission or omission, to the state of affairs which has prevailed in China for the last eighteen months, and in my opinion they cannot be freed from all blame in the matter. It seems to me that we were very slow indeed to act. In 1898 and 1899—particularly in 1899—we had sufficient proof of the unrest that existed in China. We had reports of the piratical outrages on the West River, the attacks on the missions in Central Se-chuen, the murders of native Christians in that province, the anti-foreign rioting at Kien-ning, the anti-foreign placards posted at Foo Chow, and the murder of Mr. Brooks in Shantung. There was the demand put forward by the Powers for the suppression of the Boxers, which was flatly refused by the Chinese; and after that flat refusal a proposal was put forward by the Powers

31
that a naval demonstration should take place, but that demonstration was vetoed by the noble Marquess the late Foreign Minister as being premature and unnecessary.
Then, again, we have to consider how far the action of the Powers themselves may have had influence in stirring up the Chinese to take violent action. I do not think it could have been very pleasant to Chinamen, whether in high or low position, to see the German occupation of Kow-Chow, the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, our own occupation of Wei-hai-wei, the abandonment of the Province of Shantung to the Germans, the demands of the French in Southern China, and our own occupation of territory in the neighbourhood of Hong Kong. All these things, I think, must have done a great deal to exacerbate Chinese feeling towards the European Powers, and must have made the rulers in China only too anxious to grasp at any weapon that came near their hand by which the intruding foreigner might have his career checked. Some excuse may, therefore, be found for the original sympathy hold out by the Chinese Government to the Boxers and the insurrectionary forces that accompanied them. We should take these facts into consideration when we ask for the punishment of ringleaders and the payment of an indemnity.
I think, also, that some set-off to the crimes of the Chinese may be found in the conduct of some of the European troops during the recent operations. I do not know whether the noble Marquess can give any information about the conduct of our own troops. I think that the sufferings
that have been inflicted on the Chinese have to some extent wiped out some of the crimes which were committed by Chinamen themselves. I was glad to hear the noble Marquess say that the indemnities to be exacted were not to be of too crushing a character, and that they were to be collectively claimed by the Powers. The noble Marquess said there was no intention on the part of this country, or of the Powers, to insist on any internal reforms in China.
THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE: I spoke entirely for myself. I have no right to commit the other Powers.
LORD TWEEDMOUTH: The noble Marquess said there was no intention on
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the part of this country to insist on any internal reforms in China. It seems to me, however, that if there is to be reform of likin it involves considerable reform of the administration of China itself. At present likin is exacted at every barrier on the waterways and highways of China, and it is too often exacted corruptly for the benefit of the local Mandarins, who are practically paid by the sums which they can thus improperly exact. It seems to me that there can be no reform of likin until you make some reform of the Mandarin administration in China. It will, I think, be necessary to see that the Mandarins no longer carry on their administration in a corrupt manner, and that they are sufficiently paid to enable them to maintain their position without having to resort to illegal practices. These are the principal points on which I rose to make a few observations. I would suggest that probably no better way of improving the trade relations between Europe and China can be discovered than by opening up the waterways of China. A great deal was thought to have been done in that direction in 1898, but owing to the manner in which the arrangements then made have been carried into operation in China, the advantages that would have been gained by the Agreement of 1898 have been greatly diminished. We were very glad to hear the statement the noble Marquess made, and I hope that the result of the policy which the Government is now entering upon will be to secure in China an early peace and the early withdrawal of our troops.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: My Lords I do not rise for the purpose of entering into the question of reforms in China, but as the Indian troops in China are under the instructions of my noble friend the Secretary of State for India, I would ask your Lordships' attention for a few moments while I deal with the troops, both of which subjects have been referred to. A convention was entered into by the German and Russian military authorities on 4th January, 1901, in abrogation of the previous convention of 13th October,
1900. This new convention contains in its first article the declaration that—
"The agreement has in view as sole object to regulate the military use of the line in the

33
interests of all the allied Powers, and in no way affects any proprietary claim."
On 22nd February Count von Waldersee handed over the line to the British military authorities. There has been some misunderstanding on that point. The line was not handed over to Mr. Kinder, the official of the railway company, but to the British military authorities, who employed Mr. Kinder to work the line under their instructions. When the line was handed over Major Bauer, the German railway representative, declared that the Russo-German transfer document, dated 18th January, showed that the Russians had no plan and were ignorant of the limits of the railway boundary. When Major Bauer took over the line the Russians had made no claim to the plot of land at Tientsin which has recently been in question, and had not put up certain flags and boundary marks which have since been the subject of discussion.
It was on 5th March that the Russian claim to land at Tientsin was heard of for the first time. A Russian named M. Batouieff claimed to have purchased from the Chinese the land required for the railway siding. It appears that eighteen acres of this land have been for many years in the possession of the railway, while another valuable piece of land four and a half acres in extent, with a frontage on the Peiho river, was bought by the railway a few years ago. The English officer in command at Tientsin, General Lorn Campbell, at once sent an officer to explain these facts to M. Batouieff, and the interview was apparently a friendly one, as M. Batouieff thanked him and explained that he had not been aware of the existence of any prior claim to the land. The title deeds, unfortunately, appear to have been mislaid during the Russian occupation of the railway system prior to the new convention. On 6th March Colonels Macdonald and Swan called upon General Wogack and discussed the matter with him. He declared that the question of the land claimed by M. Batouieff was one for the Russian Consul's consideration. Colonel Macdonald then pointed out the necessity of constructing, in the interests of the allied forces, an extra siding on the railway. General Wogack admitted the utility of such a siding, but adhered to his opinion that the question of its construction was not one for his decision. Colonels Macdonald
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and Swan, in order to make sure of the validity of the railway's title to the land claimed by M. Batouieff, in so far as that was possible in the unfortunate absence of the title deeds, called upon Mr. Campbell, His Majesty's Consul-General at Tientsin, and they were assured by him that the title was indisputable, as the land had been bought by the Chinese Government for the railway, and was therefore part of the mortgaged property. At Colonel Macdonald's request Mr. Campbell informed the Russian Consul-General that the land was railway property, and was required for the military service of the railway; and this notification was made in compliance with a previous Russian proclamation to the effect that claims to ownership of land at Tientsin should be put in by 7th March.
Apparently no further' negotiation on this question took place, and the matter in dispute was considered settled, as, all the facts having been reported to General Gaselee and orders having been received from him that the Madras sappers and pioneers were to commence work on the siding, no protest was raised by M. Batouieff, the Russian Consul, or the Russian General when the work was commenced on 7th March. Indeed, it is obvious that General Gaselee did not anticipate any friction, as on 11th March he left Peking on a tour of inspection of the British and Indian troops in China. At daybreak on 15th March a Russian guard appeared at the head of the siding, with the result that a continuance of the work was pre vented. General Barrow, who had remained at Peking, reported on 16th March the situation at Tientsin to Colonel Schwartzhoff, the German Chief of the Staff. He accepted a suggestion made by General Barrow that Count von Waldersee should request both parties to withdraw from the disputed ground. On the evening of 20th March, Count von Waldersee and General Wogack both arrived in Peking. Next day—the
21st—General Barrow met them in consultation, and an amicable settlement was reached. It was agreed that the work should not be continued until the question of ownership was settled, or a special arrangement made between the respective Governments. On 22nd March, at 5 a.m., the Russian and British sentries were simultaneously withdrawn. Before parting from this incident, I shall only be praising those to whom praise is due if I commend, in the warmest

35
manner, the tact and self-control displayed by the British officers on the spot.
With regard to the conduct and bearing of our troops in China, Sir Alfred Gaselee speaks in the highest terms of their discipline, and their humanity has been unquestionable. Hardly any outrage has been committed, and in proof of this he has pointed to the very few instances of courts-martial or of summary awards of punishment. He has referred to the friendly attitude of the native population to his men, who appear to have received a welcome wherever their duties have taken them. Many small detachments of troops have been sent to isolated districts, and the men have all been on friendly terms with the natives. Also, Sir Alfred Gaselee states that our patrols were never fired at. I think, my Lords, these facts speak for themselves, and there is no doubt that Sir Alfred Gaselee is proud of the conduct of all troops under his command. Though no orders, so far as I am aware, have been issued by the Field-Marshal Commander-in-Chief, I understand that he has on more than one occasion expressed the highest admiration of their conduct and discipline.
As regards looting, about which there appears to have been some misapprehension, in the first instance it was absolutely prohibited by Sir Alfred Gaselee, but the temptation to the men was great, inasmuch as that which troops under his command were not allowed to loot was left to be looted by anyone choosing to take advantage of the opportunity. General Gaselee, in these circumstances, issued orders that looting under proper control might be permitted from abandoned and derelict houses within the areas allotted to British occupation; that is to say, the areas known in Peking and Tientsin as the British quarter; and he ordered that whatever was so collected should be sold by auction and the proceeds placed in a prize fund for the benefit of all his troops. I may add that articles of value belonging to the State have been kept in safe custody, with a view to restoration when a stable Chinese Government is re-established. Your Lordships may be interested to learn that the health of the troops has been remarkably good. The total deaths from all causes in this expedition up to the present time have been—British troops, 42; native troops,
163; followers, 108; total, 313; and the percentage of sick in
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hospital from all causes on 1st January, the date of the last Report received, was only 3·5. These figures sufficiently indicate the good health of the forces and the efficiency of the hospital arrangements.
LORD STANMORE: May I ask the noble Earl what is the meaning of "looting under proper control"? It is a phrase I have never heard before.
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: I thought I explained it. Looting, in the ordinary sense of the word, was absolutely prohibited; but where houses had been abandoned and were empty, armed parties were allowed to go to those houses and remove property, which was afterwards put up for auction and the money divided among the troops.
THE EARL OF DUNMORE: Has the noble Earl any evidence that looting had taken place before then?
THE EARL OF HARDWICKE: General Gaselee issued this order because he saw that it was unfair not to allow our men to loot when that which they did not take was left to be looted by others.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE.
Standing Order No. XXXIX. to be considered to-morrow, in order to its being suspended for that day's sitting.
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS OF SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.
Message from the Commons that they have appointed a Committee, to consist of five Members, to join with a Committee of this House to consider the various charitable agencies now in operation, and the funds available for relieving widows and orphans of soldiers and sailors, with a view to ensuring that the funds supplied by local and private benevolence are applied to the best advantage in supplementing a scheme of Government pensions for widows and orphans of soldiers and sailors who have lost their lives in war; and to request this House to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the Members of their House; the said Message to be taken into consideration to-morrow.

PRESENCE OF THE SOVEREIGN IN PARLIAMEMT.
Message from the Commons that they have appointed a Committee, to consist of

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five Members, to join with a Committee of this House to consider the accommodation available in the House of Lords when the Sovereign is personally present in Parliament, and the advisability of substituting Westminster Hall on such an occasion for the House of Lords, and to request this House to appoint an equal number of Lords to be joined with the Members of their House; the said Message to be taken into consideration to-morrow.
House adjourned at twenty-five minutes before Seven of the clock, till to-morrow, half-past Ten of the cock.