*THE MARQUESS OF GRANBYMy Lords, in rising to move that an humble Address be presented by your Lordships in reply to the gracious Speech from the Throne, I would venture to remind your Lordships that there is one custom which always obtains in this House, whether these benches be occupied by those who support the present Government or by noble Lords who sit on the other side, and it is that you invariably extend your kind indulgence to anyone placed in the position which I occupy at this moment. I hope you will continue that indulgence to me. I would point out to your Lordships that the gracious Speech which you have just heard read is the last Speech from the Throne that will be made during the present century. Usually the Speech from the Throne touches upon a great variety of subjects, and extends over a large field of foreign and domestic affairs, but in the present case it deals practically with only one subject, which is contained in the following paragraph:
The state of affairs in South Africa has made it expedient that my Government should be enabled to strengthen the military forces of this country by calling out the Reserve.That is, in itself, a very momentous statement, and I venture to think that it is many years since the gracious Speech from the Throne has contained matter of more vital and serious import to your Lordships and to the country at large. The mere fact that Parliament has been 4 summoned at this period of the year is also a sign that there is a position of some gravity for the consideration of the country, and I think the brevity of the gracious Speech is more than counterbalanced by the gravity of the matter which it contains. What is the state of affairs in South Africa to which reference is made? It is war—war between the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State and the Empire of Great Britain. That is a state of things which has been brought about not by the action of Her Majesty's Government, but by the deliberate action, at the last moment, of the Governments of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. I had hoped that it would have been possible for me, when I should have the honour of addressing your Lordships, to have said that there was still some faint chance of peace being preserved between these countries, and that it was within the bounds of possibility that the dread arbitrament of war would be averted. But that was not to be, and war has been forced upon us not by any action of this country, but by that of others. It is perfectly well known to your Lordships that these difficulties in South Africa, which have culminated in the present condition of affairs, have been accumulating for years past. They are not the mere accidents of a day. Ever since the Transvaal had self-government restored to it by England in 1881, the state and condition of British subjects in that country have been steadily going from bad to worse. We cannot help feeling that the grip of the Boer administration has been very steadily tightening on the throat of the Uitlander population in the Transvaal. It would not be proper for me to attempt to go deeply into the causes which have led up to the present condition of affairs in the Transvaal, nor shall I weary your Lordships by attempting to recapitulate at any length the grievances under which it has been proved the Uitlander population and the British subjects in the Transvaal labour. But I must venture, very briefly, to allude to one or two of the disabilities under which the Uitlander population suffer. Your Lordships are perfectly well aware that the Uitlander population in the Transvaal, amongst whom are a large number of Her Majesty's subjects, are at this moment not permitted to have a vote. The education of their children is only 5 allowed under restrictive conditions which make it almost impossible for them to be educated at all. They are not allowed to bear arms, they are taxed to an enormous and disproportionate extent, and I am afraid we must say they are bullied and persecuted by the Boer police. Although, by their exertions, they supply a very large amount of the annual revenue of the Transvaal, the Uitlanders are denied any direct share in the management and administration of the country, and I do not think your Lordships will consider that to be a condition of affairs which can be allowed to continue. Were such a state of things to exist in any country with which England had no direct connection, I almost think your Lordships would consider it to be intolerable; but it is all the more so when you remember that these grievances exist in a territory to which self-government was only restored by this country in 1881 under conditions the most important of which was that there should be equal burgher rights as between British subjects and the Boers, which, after all, means that there should be equal rights between all white men in the Transvaal. For many months past—I may say for years past—negotiations have been going on between the British Government and the Government of the Transvaal with the object of placing the status of the Uitlander population upon a more satisfactory footing, and of ameliorating, by all peaceful means, their condition. I regret, my Lords, that these negotiations have been unsuccessful. It is not for me to attempt to give any reasons for that failure, but I firmly believe that all possible means have been taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about a peaceful issue of these numerous negotiations. Two years ago one of the ablest of Englishmen—Sir Alfred Milner—was sent out to South Africa as High Commissioner, and he has fully considered, and thoroughly inquired into, every question that has been brought before him with regard to the wrongs of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal. After two years of anxious investigation, of anxious thought, and of anxious care on his part, what is his verdict? In his own words, he says: "The case for intervention is overwhelming." Under these circumstances Her Majesty's Government, on the receipt of the communication in which that sentence was 6 included, went still further, and a Conference took place between the High Commissioner and the President of the Transvaal Republic. Your Lordships will deeply regret that all the negotiations which took place at that Conference proved barren and useless. Every attempt on the part of Sir Alfred Milner to get the President of the Republic to agree to effect reforms—chiefly franchise reforms—was either met by a stolid refusal, or was clogged by such conditions as to absolutely stultify the granting of the proposed reforms. One may fairly say that the matter ended there, for although since then Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of peace, have gone as far as I believe any Government in any country have ever gone to promote peace, it has been impossible for them to go further. In fact, any other steps were rendered impossible by the ultimatum which the Boer Government sent to this country within the last ten days. The terms of that ultimatum were of such a nature that no Government with one atom of self-respect, or one grain of interest in the welfare of those over whom it was placed, either here or abroad, could by any possibility have accepted. It is difficult to say whether the ultimatum is characterised more by audacity or by insanity. I think every one will admit that Her Majesty's Government have done all they possibly could to secure a peaceful issue in the present crisis. I have heard it suggested outside that there has not been that keen desire on the part of the Government to bring this matter to a peaceful issue that there might have been; but I do not believe this, and I am certain your Lordships will agree with me. It must not be forgotten that the desire for peace may be pushed too far; if it is pressed beyond a certain point the word peace becomes a synonym for weakness; and I would remind your Lordships that a noble Lord, who was a distinguished Member of this House, has written that there was such a thing as "a peace that was full of wrongs and shames. "I am confident your Lordships would not wish peace to be obtained on such terms as those. I have said nothing yet about the Orange Free State and their action in the matter. I confess frankly that that Government have taken up what I should have thought was an incredible line of action. As far as I am aware, we have been at peace with the 7 Orange Free State. We have had no quarrel with them, but as they have chosen to take a certain line, they must take the consequences. But it is impossible not to have some faint suspicion that the action of the Orange Free State in joining hands with the Transvaal at such a juncture as the present had its origin in some deeper scheme which has lurked in the minds of these two Governments for some time past; in some scheme—not aided, I trust, by Dutch Afrikanders outside the Republics—to weaken seriously by joint movement the power of Great Britain in South Africa. I believe that upon one point there is an absolute consensus of opinion amongst noble Lords on both sides of this House, and in the country at large—that there must be no juggling with the fact that there can only be one paramount Power in South Africa, and that that Power must be Great Britain. It is utterly impossible to conceive any other Power being supreme there. Were our interests to be seriously weakened in South Africa, it would imperil our welfare in many other parts of the world. Impelled by no desire for unnecessary and unjustifiable conquests, but by a determination to restore liberty to British subjects in the Transvaal, the British Government have taken the only course possible to effect this object and to maintain supreme the safety, honour, and welfare of Her Majesty's subjects. I thank your Lordships for the kind manner in which you have listened to me, and I now beg to move:That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty in reply to the Gracious Speech from the Throne.
§ *LORD BARNARDMy Lords, I rise to second the motion which has been made by the noble Marquess, and in doing so I feel confident that I may also appeal to your Lordships to grant me that indulgence which I know, from my experience of this House, is always granted to those who stand in the position which I occupy to-day. The occasion on which we are met together is so exceptional that my task is, perhaps, more difficult than that which usually falls to the lot of the seconder of the Address. There is but one subject, as the noble Marquess has observed, which can be brought under the consideration of your Lordships, and that is the warlike condition of affairs in South Africa. I am sorry for many 8 reasons, but I am glad that it should be so under present circumstances, that I have no personal connection of any kind whatever with South Africa. I regret that I have never been there, and any remarks I make may therefore be treated as only on a par with those of "the man in the street. "But I believe my opinion is shared by a great number of British subjects placed similarly to myself. There is a very general consensus of opinion that the state of affairs in South Africa has reached such an intolerable pitch that the course which Her Majesty's Government have thought fit to advise Her Majesty to take is justified to the fullest possible extent. The situation with which we are faced arises from the fact that there are in South Africa two white races holding different and widely divergent opinions on many matters. It is our duty to try and reconcile those divergencies, and, if possible, amalgamate the two races. That is one of the duties of empire with which the British nation is well qualified to deal. In considering this subject I cannot help remembering that we and all the people of this nation are practically the product of the amalgamation of two great races—the Normans and the English—and when we come to consider the extraordinary differences which existed from the latter part of the eleventh to the beginning of the twelfth century, and how absolutely those differences have disappeared, and that the result has been the creation of the greatest Empire the world has ever seen, I think we need not fear of being able to effect a similar amalgamation in South Africa in due course. I have the honour to reside in the county of Durham, the people of which are perhaps as intelligent and industrious as any class of Englishmen, and form an important part of the constituents of this Empire; and I have been constantly impressed by their very great keenness in maintaining and improving their political rights. I am confident that when it is once brought home to them, and to the country generally, as it must be by those whose duty it is to lay before them the views of the Government, that there exists in South Africa a race of men—industrious working men like themselves—to whom all political rights are denied, their sympathy will go out to those people, and the whole British nation will rise like one man to support the claim of the Uitlanders to 9 political liberty. I am bound to confess that there are always two sides to every question. It is quite possible that some of those who are now opposing us may have some belief that they are defending their rights under treaties and conventions, but even assuming that they do consider they have such rights, they cannot find a single apologist in this country who can believe that their Government is a just and honest one. It has been the pride of this country, the chief corner-stone, one might say, of the British Empire, that representation and taxation go hand in hand. If I read accurately, the very reverse is the case in the Transvaal Republic, for the taxes are placed on those who have no political power whatever. This, my Lords, in itself, if the people concerned were not, many of them, our fellow-subjects, would be a serious grievance, and one which should call for the interference of the British nation, I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my strong concurrence with the remarks which have fallen from the noble Marquess who moved the Address as to the desire of this nation to promote peace. I, for one, realise what horrible injury and suffering will be caused to both parties by war, but at the same time I admit that a state of affairs has been reached which nothing but war can remedy. There are, I am sorry to say, many people in this world who, unfortunately, are not to be convinced that there are two sides to a question unless the other side hold their own views. That is the position of President Kruger and his associates. They have, as your Lordships are aware, and as this country is aware, agreed to grant certain reforms providing certain concessions, which they consider right, are made, including the renunciation of the suzerainty of this country, and because we declined to make those concessions they say they must be in the right and we are in the wrong. That remains to be seen. Before I sit down I should like to allude to the calling out of the Reserves, and to say that in my opinion the efficacy and efficiency with which that process has been effected will go far to strengthen and establish the British power, and in strengthening and establishing the British power I feel that we are promoting the cause of civilisation throughout the world, for I believe I am correct in saying that the one great 10 reason why the Dutch population of South Africa have such a rooted objection to British rule is that they are not allowed to treat the black races as slaves and as tools and implements for getting money. They know that the principle adopted by this nation of giving as far as possible equal rights to all men, whatever be their colour, must act injuriously to them, and they are determined to use every means in their power to defeat us. I thank your Lordships for listening so attentively to the few remarks I have made, and I now beg to second the Address.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYMy Lords, I am sure I shall be supported by everyone in this House when I say that we have all heard with much pleasure the two speeches which have been delivered this evening by the Mover and Seconder of the Address; but I may venture to add that there are many in this House who will feel a special interest in the first appearance in this House as a speaker of the noble Marquess who moved the Address. He is the son of the noble Duke whom I see opposite to me, one of the oldest and most respected members of this House. I venture to congratulate him upon the appearance of his son on this occasion. I also had great pleasure in hearing the remarks made by my noble friend Lord Barnard, and I hope that he and the Marquess of Granby will be heard again in your Lordship's House. My Lords, as was said by the Mover of the Address, we are summoned together on this occasion for no common reasons, and we are summoned at that which is always a great and solemn moment in the history of a nation—namely, when it finds itself engaged in a serious war. With us it is the more solemn as we are in some respects engaged in what partakes of the character of a civil war. I say in some respects, because this is a war in which the feelings and the interests of a considerable number of our fellow-subjects, not of our own race, are deeply engaged. This is, no doubt, one of the most serious and one of the most anxious elements of the conflict. I will come at once to the main question raised in the Speech from the Throne, and that is the necessity of calling out the Reserves and of asking Parliament for the necessary supply for the war, which I fear I must say is now proceeding. Upon that point I wish, for 11 my part, to speak with no doubtful voice, and I feel sure that that will be the voice of everyone whom I now address—namely, that, whatever may be our opinion as to the mode in which the negotiations have been conducted or as to the past history of this melancholy question, we are as ready as the supporters of the Government on the other side of the House to give all our support to whatever measures are necessary to vindicate the honour and support the interests of this country. There can be, to my mind, no question upon this. If ever there could have been a question it has been solved, against the action of ourselves, by the extraordinary ultimatum presented to this country by the Government of the South African Republic, and, I grieve to say, supported by the Government of the Orange Free State. My Lords, such an ultimatum could not possibly meet with any response but that which has been made by Her Majesty's Government. No nation could receive such an ultimatum as that, even from the most powerful nation in the world, without at once replying to it in a manner which could leave no doubt that it was prepared to defend the territories which were attacked, and show that its interests would be duly protected in the future. There is another subject that was touched upon by the noble Lord who seconded the Address, which, I am happy to say, I think we may view with unmixed satisfaction, and that is the way in which the Reserves have responded to the call made upon them. This is a matter for congratulation on the part of everyone who has the interests of the country at heart; because it is upon the Reserves and the system of maintaining Reserves that, we must mainly depend when an emergency of this kind arises. Therefore it is to me a matter of greatest pleasure to see how patriotically and how faithfully the men of the Reserves are responding. This must, I think, strengthen our belief that in the main our military system, though it has not without reason been severely criticised, is at last placed on a firm and solid basis. I have no doubt that your Lordships' strongest sympathies and good wishes are going forth with the men whom we are sending to South Africa to fight the battle of their country. Our thoughts will be with them. I have a confident opinion as 12 to the ultimate result, and that we may trust our soldiers to do their duty now as well as in the times past and add to the credit which this country has gained in so many conquests. I have now said all that I need say upon that most essential part of the subject; but I should not be discharging my duty if I did not say that there are points in the history of the negotiations which have led us to this result which we cannot view with any amount of satisfaction. It is, of course, difficult upon an occasion of this kind, and indeed I do not think that it would be advisable, to enter upon any detailed criticism of the negotiations; but I think we should be misunderstood, and our attitude misconstrued, if I did not, to a small extent, point out where we think these negotiations have not been conducted in a prudent and certainly not in a successful manner. In the first place, we have witnessed what I suppose is an introduction of that which is generally termed "the new diplomacy. "I am a very old-fashioned person indeed, particularly as regards diplomatic matters, and I quite fail to understand the advantages of this new mode of conducting negotiations which are fraught with danger and difficulty. What is to be said for the manner of conducting a negotiation which is practically coram populo? I am aware that in this democratic age it is more necessary than formerly to take the nation into your confidence, but it is also necessary that we should not depart from the sound principle that when a nation has appointed men to conduct its affairs they should not endanger difficult negotiations by premature disclosures and constant and unwise public reference to what is going on. It has been the custom always in times past, in making announcements in Parliament when questions have been asked as to perilous negotiations, to state that, however much the Government would be glad to place before the country the position of affairs, the interests of the country demanded silence. These negotiations have been conducted in a wholly different manner. In the first place, nothing could be more unfortunate—I would almost say disastrous—than the publication of that famous telegram of April 5 from Sir Alfred Milner. I am not disposed to find fault with Sir Alfred Milner. He was perfectly justified, nay, more, it was his duty to inform his chief unreservedly of his views with regard to 13 the state of affairs in South Africa; but to my mind only one course could be taken by a responsible Minister in the then state of the negotiations, and that was to treat that despatch for the time as confidential, and not to publish it, especially seeing that it contained expressions—I am not blaming Sir Alfred Milner—especially with regard to the loyal population of South Africa, calculated to do the greatest possible harm. That is the first criticism I think it worth while to make. The next point is that a great portion of these negotiations has turned upon the reassertion, shall I call it, of the claim to suzerainty over the Transvaal State. I am as much responsible as any man for the introduction of that term suzerainty, but I am also responsible for the interpretation, which will be found in the Blue Book, which I gave to it, and which I still hold. The only interpretation I ever attached to it was that it was thought by us—I think wrongly—to be a convenient mode of expressing generally that certain stipulations existed in the Convention which limited the sovereignty of the Transvaal State, and that to the extent of those limitations contained in this particular provision of the Convention of 1881 there was what constituted what might be called generally a suzerainty. But in the present case it seems to me that the word has been used in order to set forth some vague and undefined claim, and the result has been to my mind a fertile cause of the unfortunate suspicion which the Transvaal Government has fallen into throughout as to our intentions. I believe the intentions of Her Majesty's Government were to obtain a peaceful settlement of the question, but if you wish to obtain a peaceful settlement from a people naturally suspicious, and, perhaps, not without some cause when you remember that most unhappy, nay, criminal, Raid made by those who accompanied Dr. Jameson—I say that when you have to deal with a people naturally suspicious of some attack upon their independence, you ought carefully, in your negotiations, to avoid anything that might have the appearance of confirming those suspicions. I do not think it was unnatural that suspicion should be aroused by the reassertion of the suzerainty. I am not going to trouble your Lordships with an academical discussion as to the precise interpretation of the two Conventions. I grant you that by 14 a fine-drawn argument the word suzerainty may be preserved, but if it be so the general scope of the statements made in this House by Lord Derby, the then responsible Minister, and the whole course of the affair, must have led, it seems to me, the Boer Government to suppose that in point of fact the word suzerainty, and what might lie under it, were abandoned, except so far as by the conditions of the Treaty of 1884 they were confirmed. It was not necessary, it appears to me—it was highly impolitic—to brandish the word suzerainty in the face of the Boers. It was sure to provoke irritation and suspicion, and, in my opinion, it was needless. Why do I say needless? Because it seemed to me that there was a safe and unassailable foundation for our claim to interfere on behalf of British subjects, and that was the right which every State possesses to protect its subjects in another State from wrong. That was a right which we possessed in an unusual degree in South Africa owing to the peculiar position of the country—a country where there were two races side by side, both of them determined in their opinions, with a history of their own, and jealous of their independence. Perhaps independence is not the right word to use. I mean, rather, jealous of the equality of their rights. I agree with Her Majesty's Government that it was impossible that such a state of things could be left long to continue—a state of things which caused such unrest throughout the dominions of the Queen in South Africa as to be a serious danger; but I say there was no reason whatever for bringing forward the word suzerainty. The case should have rested on the general right of every country, especially a country placed as we are, to see that no such disabilities were inflicted on their fellow-countrymen. That is what I have to say as to the introduction of the word suzerainty, and I think it is one of the most unfortunate circumstances in the negotiations. Besides that, I deprecate many of the speeches made by the negotiator from time to time—speeches made by an admirable, forcible, and incisive speaker—but incisive speaking in public is contrary to every principle upon which negotiations should be conducted. I should be surprised indeed if I ever heard the noble Marquess conducting negotiations with a foreign country and, during the negotiations, making incisive speeches. 15 It may frequently happen—and at times it may be unavoidable—that it may be necessary in negotiations to use strong language to the negotiator on the other side, but if such language were held in public to a proud and independent nation it would lead to war. Negotiators know well enough that those negotiations, so long as there is a hope of peace, are held to be confidential and carefully kept back from the public view. But in this case, in speech after speech, words were used, some concerning the President of the Transvaal Republic himself, the very incisiveness of which, the eloquence with which they were spoken, the manner in which they were received by the admirers of the Minister, conduced to make the negotiations less likely to succeed. I am sure I am speaking to many men conversant with business and diplomacy who will agree with, me when I say that there is only one maxim to be observed in the conduct of negotiations—namely, that everything you do and everything you say must be subordinate to the one end you have in view if your negotiations are to have a peaceful solution. I admit there comes a time—there certainly was a time in the difficult negotiations, which I need only allude to, with a great Power who is a neighbour of ours—when the Government are perfectly right in speaking out plainly and decisively to the country and appealing to them. But that can only be at the close of negotiations, when they have arrived at a point when either there must be an agreement or you have to resort to the alternative of an open quarrel. I might, but I do not think it would be convenient or wise at this time, go into details on this matter and trace out the course of the negotiations from the beginning to the end. I prefer not to do that. I have merely indicated generally the objection which I feel to the mode in which many parts of the negotiations have been conducted, but I cannot conclude this part of my remarks without adding one word which is not intended in the least degree, though it might appear to be so, as a kind of side-blow to some other Minister. I mean that I acknowledge, and fully acknowledge, the calmness and moderation of the tone in which the last, and perhaps the most important, communication of the Government was conducted. I conclude, as I began, by saying that, how- 16 ever much we may deplore the result, however much we on our side may, as we do, divest ourselves entirely of all responsibility in regard to it, we, with, I believe, the great mass of the people of the country, will be one and all with the Government in carrying out this war vigorously and, I trust, to a speedy and prosperous end.
§ THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)My Lords, I concur with the noble Earl opposite in mentioning, as he has done, though I may not be able to do so in such graceful language, the satisfaction which we feel in welcoming amongst those who take part in the debates of this House the eldest son and heir of a Minister who is still present with us, and who is tied to us by recollections of many a long political conflict, in which, whatever side he took, he always left us with an increasing admiration of his charm of temper and manner. I am very glad to recognise the ability which my noble friend Lord Granby has displayed; but, while coinciding with the noble Earl in hoping that it may not be the last exhibition of his powers, I am forced with sadness to confess that year after year we have expressed that hope at this table hardly ever with the result that our wishes have been confirmed. The speech of Lord Barnard—careful, clear, philosophical—we have listened to with great pleasure. I will only remind your Lordships that he is to us the representative of one long distinguished in diplomacy and politics—the late Duke of Cleveland. The first part of the speech of the noble Earl opposite filled me with despair, because I felt that I had to speak after him as his opponent, and I found that on every subject he said exactly what I would have wished to say. It was quite a relief when he came to deal with and attack modern diplomacy, because I felt that there at least was something on which I might join issue with him. I need not reiterate the observations he has made. The Boer Government have been pleased to dispense with any explanation on our part of the cause or justification of the war. They have done that which no provocation on our part could have justified, even if we had displayed any such quality. They have done that which the strongest nation has never in its strength 17 done to any opponent whom it challenged. They have issued a defiance so audacious that I can hardly depict it adequately without using stronger words than are suited to this Assembly, and they have, by so doing, liberated us from the necessity of explaining to the people of England why we are at war. Whether if that defiance had not been issued we should now have been at war I cannot say. There were subjects of the gravest difference between us—subjects on which we were bound and pledged to arrive at an issue consistent with the duty which Her Majesty owes to her subjects, consistent with the desire we have always entertained of supporting equal rights among all the white inhabitants of Africa. They were very grave questions indeed, but up to this time the modes we had suggested of settling them had not been successful. The spirit in which we had been met had not been encouraging. We had little hope that the future would reserve for us a better fate, but yet hope was not entirely abandoned. Now all question of possible peace, all question of justifying the attitude that we have assumed, or of pointing out to our countrymen the errors and the grave oppressions of which the Transvaal Government have been guilty—all these questions have been wiped away in this one great insult, which leaves to us no other course to pursue than that which, with the assent of the whole nation, we have felt it our duty to pursue. It is not necessary for me to insist upon that on which both we and the noble Earl opposite agree. I will only say that it is one of the most satisfactory parts of our policy in these later days that when a question arises in which vital interests and the evident honour of this country are concerned there are no distinctions of party among us, and that no individual ambition, no opportunity of diminishing the influence of an adversary, will tempt English politicians on either side to make use of the difficulties of their country in order to promote their party ends. Sometimes, when we read of the earlier constitutional experiences of this country, as we have been led to do of late by an eloquent hand, we may congratulate ourselves, at all events, that, so far as this is concerned, the present representatives of the Liberal Party are more than creditable representatives of Charles James 18 Fox. Now as to the modern diplomacy. In the principles the noble Earl opposite lays down everybody, of course, must agree. No negotiation is conducted under favourable terms, every negotiation runs a great chance of being wrecked, if the opinions on either side are exposed during its progress to the exaggerated influence of popular discussion. We do not always get in this world what we desire. We get what we have to take, and the constitutional conditions under which we live, enormous as is the strength which they give us in certain circumstances, greatly as they magnify the power of England in any real danger, undoubtedly furnish us with conditions which make the conduct of negotiations very much more difficult than formerly. Open diplomacy is not selected out of mere gaiety of heart. It is much more difficult and much more thorny than the older system. But there are occasions on which you cannot observe absolute secrecy without sacrificing a great source of power. What is this controversy which we have had to adjust or at least to deal with in South Africa? It is a controversy, no doubt, between two races nearly balanced in power, one of which races is naturally devoted to this country, and the other is divided—many of them being by conviction, by observation, and by experience firm and devoted adherents and subjects of the Queen, many of them still haunted with the vision of some future return of Dutch supremacy. Well, when you have to interfere in such a conflict as that, when you have to sustain in the main the British side of the contention, and to struggle for the rights and claims and authority of the Queen, you have to look around you and see what forces you have at your back. An English Minister is not an organ of a despotic power, who has merely to give the word of command, upon which the policy he selects will be unflinchingly carried out. He has to look, almost at every moment, for the amount that he can command of that popular support which is the breath of life to all political movements in this age; and the British Minister who has to consider the state of affairs at the Cape, and to sustain the cause of British supremacy, has to conciliate, to retain, to encourage, to push forward as much of that loyalty to Her Majesty as he can command; and he cannot afford by secrecy, by neglecting 19 the feelings of those to whom he has to look for suppor—he cannot afford to leave their attention uncalled, their feelings unappealed to; he is bound to seek support in their feelings, and by placing before them a full exposition of the case on behalf of which he invokes their aid, to give them such information as will place at his disposal and range behind him all the moral and all the physical force which those who are devoted to the English side can confer upon him. If that were necessary, if he could not afford to allow British interests in the Cape by apathy or by ignorance to fall away from the Crown, how is it possible that he could proceed with the carefully secret methods of the older diplomacy? I am not doubting the superiority of the older system; but if you have to appeal for popular support the older diplomacy will not do. That seems to me to sum up the essence of the policy which has been undoubtedly pursued. We always have to consider the loyal population wherever we are dealing with a country in which the loyal population is separated from those that are not loyal. But the noble Lord dwelt very much upon the virtue of silence. I entirely agree with him. I should have been very glad to have cultivated it, even on the present occasion. I do not doubt that the system, which I think Lord Granville used to pursue, and which had great advantages in it, of absolutely refusing to make any speeches while negotiations were going on, had, on the side of diplomacy, very considerable advantages; but, after all, you can only conduct a policy, or the measures to which diplomacy must give rise, with the help and approval of Parliament and the cordial support of the electors, and, again, to obtain their help you must inform their minds, you must lay before them the real facts of the case; and if you refuse to do that, and wrap yourself up in your own virtues, and will not appeal to the sentiments and the loyalty which are ready to your hands, the result is, that instead of support and enthusiasm, you get nothing but apathy and neglect. I do not understand that the Minister responsible for conducting great negotiations can afford either to ignore the feelings of the British party on the spot, or to keep them in ignorance, and, therefore, deprive of the opportunity of assisting him those who 20 are willing to sustain the policy of this country. Those two necessities are drawbacks to the constitutional system. The most splendid successes always have their drawbacks, and, until the noble Lord can get rid of the heritage of 1688, of which these necessities are the necessary result—unless he goes back to a state of government which I am sure is very alien to his sympathies and his desires—he will never escape the necessity of consulting, to a certain extent, the opinion of those on whose support he depends for carrying out any policy he has in hand. That is my view in respect to the question which the noble Lord raised. At the same time, I am bound to say that I think a great deal too much has been made of the supposed provocation contained in the language of the despatch referred to by the noble Lord. There may have been certain details in that despatch of Sir Alfred Milner which have been misunderstood. I will not dwell upon that, as I have not got the despatch before me, but my impression is that upon the whole of that class of argument the most exaggerated value has been placed. The theory appears to be that President Kruger is an amiable but very sensitive old man—sensitive to every word that may excite suspicion, or may suggest any future political constitution for his country other than that which he desires, and, so far as these feelings are concerned, he sustains them, and expresses them with a fervour and a restlessness more becoming a hysterical young lady than the President of a great Republic. I have always been greatly surprised by this view of President Kruger's character. My impression is, or was, certainly that he was a sort of man who would say that hard words would break no bones, and, if he got the kind of policy he wanted, he would not be much troubled by the English phraseology in which it was wrapped up. But I take an entirely different view, and I hope, not an uncharitable one. My belief is that the desire to get rid of that word suzerainty, and the realities which it expresses, has been the dream of President Kruger's life. Long before the treaty of 1881 was negotiated, it was his main desire. It was for that he set on foot the negotiations of 1884, and in order to get that hateful word out of his Convention he made considerable territorial 21 and other sacrifices. The noble Marquess [the Marquess of Ripon] will, I think, remember a certain memorandum which he wrote giving an account of President Kruger's wishes, in which great prominence was given to that intense desire to get rid of that word suzerainty, and now my belief as to the real secret of his policy during these last years has been that he has seen in the Uitlander population beneath him somebody whom he can oppress, somebody in whose sufferings we are interested; and he has used the oppression of the Uitlander population as a screw by which to obtain some concession on the subject of the suzerainty from us. I can point out phrases from recent negotiations which would amply sustain that idea. It may be that the word suzerainty has no meaning. As that view has been suggested by the noble Earl to whom, I believe, we owe the word, it is deserving of consideration. But my impression is not that it does not mean absolutely nothing, but that it means a number of things from which you can take your choice. I entirely agree with the noble Lord that it is a word wholly unnecessary for our present purpose. Situated as Great Britain is in South Africa towards the Transvaal and the Uitlander population, who are our subjects in the Transvaal, we have a paramount power and duty which has nothing whatever to do with any conventional suzerainty. I do not think that is the opinion of President Kruger. The word to him was a magic word, and he would do anything in order to get rid of it, and, though it may be perfectly true—I maintained that opinion at the time—that the word in itself has no distinct or special meaning, it is still true that, having been put into the Treaty, it has obtained an artificial value and meaning which prevents us from entirely abandoning it. We cannot drop it and restore things to the condition in which they were before the word suzerainty was adopted. If we were to drop it we should be intimating that the ideas which have come to be associated with it are ideas which we repudiate and abandon altogether. Of course that is a position we cannot adopt. I believe it is largely due to President Kruger—I do not say it as blaming him—it is largely due to his peculiar character and to the idea which he has pursued that the moment has arrived for deciding whether the future of 22 South Africa is to be a growing and increasing Dutch supremacy or a safe, perfectly established supremacy of the English Queen. To the state of things established by the Convention of 1881 or 1884, whatever it may have been, we can never return. We can never consent, while we have the strength to resist it, to be put into the same position which we have held in South Africa for the last seventeen or eighteen years. With regard to the future there must be no doubt that the Sovereign of England is paramount; there must be no doubt that the white races will be put upon an equality, and that due precaution will be taken for the philanthropic and kindly and improving treatment of those countless indigenous races of whose destiny, I fear, we have been too forgetful. Those things must be insisted upon in the future. By what means they will be obtained I do not know; I hope they may be consistent with a very large autonomy on the part of a race which values its individual share in the government so much as the Dutch people do. But with that question we have no concern at present. We have only to make it clear that the great objects which are essential to the power of England in Africa, to the good government of the country, and to the rights of all races are the objects which the British Government, with the full support of the nation without distinction of party, are now pursuing, and which they will thoroughly pursue and preserve to the end.
§ *LORD LOCHMay I venture to ask the indulgence of your Lordships while I make a few remarks upon the question now before the House? I do not propose to refer to the criticisms of the negotiations prior to the breaking out of hostilities, but there is no better time than the present to prove to the Boers that all parties in this country are united in the opinion that we are the paramount Power, and intend to remain the paramount Power in South Africa. The noble Marquess said it was unnecessary now to enter into the details of the causes which have led to the war, but I venture to think that there is considerable misapprehension in this country and abroad with regard to what has been the cause of the war. Many people consider that it is due to the refusal on the part of the South African Republic to grant a five years franchise 23 to the Uitlanders. I believe that if that were to be regarded as the cause of the war, many would hesitate to consider that we were justified in going to war on such an issue. But there are other causes—causes to which the noble Marquess has alluded—which I venture to think are sufficient to justify the course that has been pursued, and which it was inevitable the Government would have to adopt. Those who have studied the history of South Africa, and especially that period of the history of South Africa that relates to the Boer Republic, will see that it was impossible that the state of the relations between the Government of the South African Republic and this country could long continue. I will not refer to many of the details, but I may mention a few. Your Lordships are aware that the Convention of 1884 required that the Government of the South African Republic should do their utmost to restrain their people from going across the boundaries of the Republic for the purpose of occupying land—boundaries which were mentioned in the Convention. The ink was scarcely dry on that Convention when the Boers entered Swaziland—Zambaan's and Umbegeza's territories with the knowledge and later with the full approval of the Government of the Transvaal Republic. Your Lordships well know of the invasion of Bechuanaland, which led to the Warren Expedition, but perhaps your Lordships are not so well aware that shortly after Her Majesty's Government had placed the Chartered Company in possession of the country they held under their charter, two treks were formed, one of over 4,000 men, to occupy that territory, and another to enter the Protectorate; this was another proof of the absence of friendly relations between the Government of the South African Republic and this country. The Government of the Republic repudiated all knowledge of these "treks" until a regiment was sent to Mafeking and were informed that the various drifts of the Crocodile and Limpopo Rivers were armed and garrisoned, and on that they yielded. I have had many meetings with President Kruger, and I venture to agree with the noble Marquess in thinking that the object of President Kruger and his advisers was to rid themselves of that control, slight as it was, which was exercised by this country over the independence of the Transvaal. Every 24 time I met President Kruger there was an endeavour on his part to obtain rights which were inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of the Convention of 1884. It was this state of things, added to the Uitlander difficulties, which, I believe, led ultimately to the action adopted by his Government and by the Government of the Orange Free State. We know that the unfortunate Raid united the Dutch, or large sections of the Dutch, in their feeling of sympathy with the Transvaal Government, and it afforded to President Kruger an opportunity of arming the country and raising forts at Pretoria and Johannesburg and in other parts of the Transvaal. Against whom were the country arming, and against whom were those forts raised? Why, my Lords, against the Power which, in a moment of generosity, had restored to President Kruger and his people the country which they have so much misgoverned. No one can regret more deeply than I do that war has been forced upon this country; no one knows better than I do the misery that it will cause. Where there has been inter-marriage and long years of friendship, there will now be brothers against brothers, and husbands against their brothers-in-law, and I know of several instances where fathers are now pitted against their sons. No one can feel more deeply than I do as to the necessity which has arisen for this country entering upon these hostilities with the South African Republic, but I confess I do not think that the Government had any other alternative than the one they have adopted. I could not go altogether with them in all the negotiations which took place prior to these hostilities, but I recognise the need of supporting the Government upon this occasion. No one throughout this country who had read that arrogant message from President Kruger could for a moment doubt the absolute necessity and duty of teaching the Boers—and, my Lords, not only the Boers, but the natives and those who are enjoying the privileges of British citizenship in our colonies, and who are yet sympathising with, and doing somewhat more than sympathising with, the Republics—that we are determined to maintain our rightful position as the dominant Power in South Africa. I am glad that Her Majesty's Government appears to have 25 sent a large, I may say an overwhelming, force to South Africa. On the ground of humanity I congratulate the Government, because I believe it is quite possible that, when the Boers realise that this large number of troops are on the way to the Transvaal they will also realise the impossibility of resisting them. I know of many Boers who did not believe that England had a larger force of troops than the three or four regiments existing in South Africa, and the majority of the Boers have gone to the war with a light heart, ignorant of what they had undertaken, and of what was before them. I hope that when they see the impossibility of holding out they may be prepared to endeavour to come to terms. But, if I may venture to say so, I trust that if they ask for terms prior to our thorough occupation of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State all terms will be rejected. May I say that one of the conditions which should be imposed upon the Republics should be total disarmament? We cannot leave the Boers armed and ready to menace us again when the troops are withdrawn. And I venture to think, if I may express an opinion, not only that the Boers should be disarmed, but that both the Republics should be annexed to the Empire. We should deal liberally with them, and give them—what they refused to the Uitlanders—the franchise equally with the Uitlanders. Under a strict and strong Imperial executive I believe that such an arrangement would in a very short time be viewed with satisfaction, and would bring about a federation which would do more than anything else to promote the welfare and happiness of South Africa. There is one very pleasing aspect of this sad war, and that, my Lords, is the loyalty which has been expressed by all our colonies in offering troops to assist us, and I rejoice to think that those offers have been accepted. I thank your Lordships for the way in which you have listened to my observations. There were many details which I could have wished to have entered upon, but it is undesirable to do so at this moment. I wish to express my full sense of approval of the course which is now being adopted by Her Majesty's Government. The only exception I would take is that I wish a larger number of troops had been sent out earlier, so that we might have been relieved from all causes of anxiety with regard to Mafeking, 26 Kimberley, and the upper portion of the Protectorate. I have every confidence, however, that these places will successfully resist all the attacks made upon them. Mafeking is garrisoned by a body of men well able to meet the Boers in the field in their own tactics, well able to defend Mafeking from behind the fortifications that have been raised there, and well able to maintain the honour of this country at all hazards to themselves. I am certain, also, that the arrangements made at Kimberley are quite sufficient to resist successfully three or four times the number of Boers that will be brought against our force there. I thank your Lordships for so patiently listening to me, but having been so recently in South Africa, and having occupied the position of High Commissioner and Governor, I felt it to be my duty to say those few words in support of the motion which is now before the House.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNMy Lords, I desire to offer a very few remarks to the House, but at the same time I wish to apologise to your Lordships for intruding on this occasion. I am well aware of the practice of your Lordships' House, and if Parliament were meeting, under ordinary circumstances, and to consider an ordinary state of affairs, it would be easy to postpone any remarks that one might have to make until some more suitable occasion. But, my Lords, I am afraid this is the only occasion we shall have of expressing our opinions with regard to this matter, and therefore I am compelled to trespass upon your Lordships' patience for a very few moments. The general tone of the debate hitherto must, I think, give satisfaction to every lover of this country. It is most satisfactory to know, although we might have been sure that it would be so, that all parties in this House desire to offer Her Majesty's Government all the support which it is in their power to give. The ultimatum has done away with all party feeling for the moment, and has united the whole country, because it proves the accuracy of the suspicion which has been entertained for a long time, and which is very widely entertained, that President Kruger never intended to give to the Uitlanders any privileges that were really deserving the name, and that this move on his part has been a move not so much against the 27 Uitlanders as against British authority in South Africa. I feel sure he has been grossly deceived in this matter. There is some reason to think he is under the impression that he will obtain support from abroad. He will probably be soon undeceived on that head. But that this move on his part has for its intention the abrogation of British authority in South Africa is shown by the series of circumstances which appear throughout the Papers, and with most of which your Lordships are already acquainted. For what purpose has been the armament of Pretoria? For what purpose have hundreds of thousands of rifles been brought into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, far more than are required for all the Boers in those two States? For what purpose has been the offensive and defensive alliance with the Orange Free State? The Uitlanders, who have lately been making representations to Her Majesty's High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner, have pointed out to him, in language which is well deserving of your Lordships' attention that they believe this is in reality a move directed against the whole power of this country. It is not necessary to say anything further on the general question, but the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition pointed out to your Lordships that some of Mr. Chamberlain's methods and plans of action had not been, in his opinion, what they ought to have been. The noble Earl first of all told us that his tongue was to some extent tied, but he then proceeded to untie it and to go into the very details which I understood him to say he deprecated. I must confess I do not see any objection to the course he finally adopted. I am only sorry he did not pursue it a little further. The opinions of Mr. Chamberlain, and the action of Mr. Chamberlain, after all, do not go to the root of the question. They are matters of secondary importance. Upon the determination of this country to maintain our power in South Africa we are one and all agreed, and on that point there is no difference whatever. But, in view of the criticisms which have been directed against some of Mr. Chamberlain's methods and actions, I would like to ask the noble Earl the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies a question or two. Your Lordships will recollect that at one time Mr. Chamberlain—at the end of July, I think it was—offered 28 to the Transvaal Government a Joint Inquiry as to whether the provisions of their law, giving a seven years franchise, were such as would efficiently carry out their reported intention. In reply to that the Transvaal Government raised objections to a Joint Inquiry, and made an alternative proposal of a law which should give a five years franchise; but they attached certain conditions with regard to the suzerainty and other matters. This they asked Mr. Chamberlain to accept as a substitute. It was not at all surprising that Mr. Chamberlain declined to accept the proposal accompanied by such conditions. The conditions with regard to the suzerainty were in diametrical opposition to the opinions he had already expressed in despatches. The Transvaal Government then asked that Mr. Chamberlain should revert to the Joint Inquiry into their seven years franchise, but the right hon. Gentleman declined, and said matters had gone beyond that point. The question I would address to the noble Earl the Under Secretary is, What were Mr. Chamberlain's reasons for so declining? There is another question I wish to address to the noble Earl. Objection has been raised that Mr. Chamberlain increased his terms, and, instead of this inquiry with regard to a seven years franchise, insisted that there must be a five years franchise without any conditions at all. I admit that any careful person who has read the Blue Books will have seen that Mr. Chamberlain insisted from the first on a five years franchise, but great fault has been found with him for his action. Mr. Chamberlain said he felt sure President Kruger, if once there was a Joint Inquiry, would agree to the variation of certain of the conditions proposed, and one of those conditions mentioned was the duration of the franchise, which President Kruger asserted at that time was to be for seven years. There is one further remark I wish to make, and it is with regard to the suzerainty. The noble Marquess at the head of the Government observed that the term had been invented by the noble Earl the Earl of Kimberley.
§ THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURYI said it was inserted in the Convention by Lord Kimberley.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNAt all events, the noble Earl was indirectly responsible for it. If I had not seen it written I would not have believed it, There is no person in this House who is more remarkable for accurate ideas and, generally speaking, for accurate language than the noble Earl who leads the Opposition, but I venture to say that the drafting of the Conventions of 1881 and 1884 does anything but credit to their authors, whoever they may have been. What is really important to consider is not the word suzerainty, nor what Mr. Chamberlain meant by suzerainty, but what President Kruger meant by it; and what he means is to be found in the despatch of May 9 of the present year, when Mr. Reitz, on behalf of the Transvaal Government, wrote—
Inasmuch as the Convention of 1881 was entirely abrogated and superseded by that of 1884, in which alone certain limited and specified rights were guaranteed to Great Britain without there being any fresh mention of self-government, it follows of itself that the now existing right of absolute self-government of this Republic is not derived either from the Conventions of 1881 or 1884 but simply and solely from the inherent right of this Republic as a Sovereign International State.From that interpretation the Transvaal has never receded in the least. No one who reads the Blue Books which relate to this matter since 1881 can fail to come to the conclusion that it is the position of the Transvaal as a sovereign independent State to which President Kruger attaches great importance at the present moment. If Mr. Chamberlain had allowed that thing to pass uncontradictedhe would have done his very best to get this nation into trouble, possibly at a future time, when the trouble would be of greater consequence. At the time when the Transvaal Government proposed to make an alternative offer to Her Majesty's Government of a certain scheme in lieu of a Joint Inquiry, the State Attorney, Mr. Smuts, had a conversation with the British Agent, and I would point out, by reading to you two passages from what Mr. Smuts said to Mr. Conyngham Greene in conversation, how it was entirely and fundamentally altered when it was translated in a despatch. In a conversation it was said that Her Majesty's Government were to agree, in return for a five years franchise, that the present intervention was not to form a 30 precedent for future similar action, and that in future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic would take place. But when we get to the despatch, how does it appear? The despatch contains these words—In future Her Majesty's Government are not to interfere in the internal affairs of the South African Republic.If that had been assented to by Mr. Chamberlain, what would have been the result? Not only would Her Majesty's Government have undertaken not to interfere, whether as suzerain or otherwise, in the internal affairs of the Republic, but they would have gone so far as to undertake to give up that international right which they possess of looking after the interests of their subjects in the Transvaal State. The next condition was—Further, Her Majesty's Government will not insist on the assertion of suzerainty, the controversy on this subject being tacitly allowed to drop.There was enough danger in that, as written in the original telegram, but this is the way in which it appears in the despatch—Not to insist further on its assertion of the existence of suzerainty.The language in the despatch is entirely different from the conversations, and, if the conditions had been accepted, Her Majesty's Government would have given up that right which Mr. Chamberlain has said on more than one occasion he would not surrender under any circumstances whatever. There was another condition, that—As soon as the franchise scheme has become law, arbitration, from which the foreign element is to be excluded, is to be acceded.If that condition had been accepted in the words in which it stands, Her Majesty's Government would have bound themselves to agree to arbitration on all matters. They would have agreed to arbitrate not only on the interpretation of terms in the Convention, but on all matters, and thereby they would have placed the Transvaal on equality with themselves as a free and sovereign independent State. Indeed, traps have been laid for Her Majesty's Government by the Transvaal from the beginning to the end of the negotiations, and if Mr. 31 Chamberlain had given way, and not insisted on maintaining the supremacy of this country, whether it is described as suzerainty or paramountcy, he would have failed most grossly in his duty to his Sovereign and his country.
§ THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (The Earl of SELBORNE)My Lords, before I answer the question which the noble Earl has put to me, I would like, with the permission of the noble Earl the Leader of the Opposition to make a reference to one or two of his remarks. We have heard an argument from the two noble Lords most qualified to take part in this Debate as to the respective merits of various systems of diplomacy. I would not dare to give any expression of opinion in the presence of such experts, but the Leader of the Opposition, in criticising the Government for repeatedly publishing at an early date the despatches and telegrams they had sent, entirely forgot one thing—namely, that, apart altogether from any action of Her Majesty's Government, the other parties to the negotiations, the Transvaal Republic, were perpetually publishing accounts themselves, but with this great difference—that on every occasion the version they published was inaccurate.
§ THE EARL OF SELBORNEI did not understand the noble Earl to confine his criticism to that telegram only. Suppose the Government had published their Blue Book, and had introduced this subject to the country and to Parliament without any expression of opinion from the High Commissioner, the first thing the noble Earl opposite would have asked would have been, "What does your High Commissioner think?" Would it have been possible to conduct a debate in Parliament and conceal the views of the High Commissioner?
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI took exception to the time the telegram was published, not to its being ultimately published.
§ THE EARL OF SELBORNEWe were bound to publish the views ex- 32 pressed by the High Commissioner, and I am certain no one would have criticised us more severely than the noble Earl if we had withheld from Parliament and the country the views of Sir Alfred Milner. I must, with your Lordships' permission, touch once more on the question of suzerainty, which was raised by the noble Earl. The noble Earl made it a subject of very severe criticism of Mr. Chamberlain that he had so arranged the controversy as to turn it upon a reassertion of the claim of suzerainty, and that this had produced in the mind of President Kruger, and in the minds of the Boers, a fertile cause of suspicion. This is all a complete misconception. We never raised the question of suzerainty at all in connection with the franchise controversy. If you look through the whole of the correspondence, beginning with the despatch of May 5 in answer to the petition of the Uitlanders, you will not find the word suzerainty used once until Her Majesty's Government had to answer questions and conditions submitted by President Kruger in the telegrams of August 19 and 21. The fact is, whatever opinion may be held as to what is called the suzerainty controversy, that controversy was absolutely finished and concluded before the franchise controversy began, and it was President Kruger, and President Kruger only, who dragged into the franchise controversy the question of the suzerainty. I think I can show your Lordships, very briefly, how that was. "Why," it is asked, "did Her Majesty's Government raise the suzerainty controversy at all?" That is a fair question to ask, and one which it is my duty to answer. When the present Government came into power they inherited a controversy which had begun under their predecessors—a controversy connected with the submission of Treaties. Under Article IV. of the Convention of Pretoria, no treaty made by the South African Republic is valid unless by the consent of Her Majesty. A controversy arose as to the particular form in which Her Majesty's assent was to be signified, or, rather, as to the particular stage in the completion of the Treaty at which it was to be held as concluded. This controversy ran on into the middle of 1897, when the South African Republic, in a despatch of the 7th of May, refused to accept our interpretation of the meaning of the Convention, and brought forward a pro 33 posal to submit the interpretation of the Convention and the manner of exercising Her Majesty's powers to foreign arbitration. That was a most important step on their part, and one which it was quite impossible for Her Majesty's Government to pass over in silence, because it was only a repetition of their old proposals, which were scouted by Lord Derby. Throughout the whole of these negotiations and controversies between successive Governments in this country and Pretoria, the one abiding object of the Government of Pretoria has been to assert equality with Her Majesty. They have left no opportunity untried to obtain a recognition of equality. It was with that object, and no other, that in 1883 they asked Lord Derby to make a treaty, and the cardinal feature of it was that any points of difference of interpretation in future were to be referred to a foreign arbitrator as between two equal Powers. Lord Derby absolutely repudiated this as a proposal which neither in form nor in substance the Government could consider. Just as Lord Derby was compelled, in emphatic terms, to assert the position of Her Majesty, so the present Government felt that it would be a vital mistake to let these assertions go by unnoticed, and that nothing was more false in diplomacy, in relation to such a question, than not to assert plainly but in unaggressive language what the facts were. And so it came to pass that in October, 1897, a despatch was written which merely restated exactly the relative positions of Her Majesty and the South African Republic. It asserted that the Conventions were not treaties between equal Powers, and it defined the relations existing. It was in defining those relations that the word suzerainty was used. That was in October, 1897. A long and very slow correspondence followed. I do not propose to argue the question of suzerainty. The point I want to impress upon your Lordships is this that this controversy had practically dropped before the franchise controversy began. I can prove that that was so. I will read to your Lordships a quotation from the despatch of Her Majesty's Government to the Acting High Commissioner, dated December 15, 1898—
What the substance of suzerainty is was described by Lord Kimberley in his despatch of March 31, 1881, as quoted by the State Secretary in paragraph 5 of his note—namely, 34 'superiority over a State possessing independent rights of government, subject to reservations with reference to certain specified matters.' These words appear to Her Majesty's Government accurately to describe the existing relations between Her Majesty and the South African Republic. Her Majesty's Government have taken note of the assurance, once more repeated at the commencement of Dr. Leyds's note, that the Government of the South African Republic are prepared in every respect to abide by the stipulations of the Convention of 1884. These stipulations undoubtedly include 'reservations with reference to certain specified matters.' There is thus no controversy as to the essential point in the relations between the two Governments, which gives to Great Britain a position of superiority; and, having regard to this position and to their determination not to permit the interference of any foreign Power between Great Britain and the South African Republic, Her Majesty's Government are unable to alter their decision not to submit to the arbitration of a foreign Power questions relating to the interpretation or infringement of the Conventions between them.
§ THE EARL OF SELBORNEYes, c. 9507. This despatch was sent in December of last year, and the answer was dated May 9 this year. It was the answer in which the Government of the South African Republic asserted their status as that of Sovereign International State. Her Majesty's Government sent no elaborate reply, but the last word in the controversy was contained in the despatch of July 13, in the same Blue Book, in which Her Majesty's Government declare that "they have no intention of continuing to discuss this question." Therefore it is absolutely proved that, except for this, the whole of this controversy was concluded before the franchise controversy began. It could not, moreover, have had any particular effect on President Kruger's mind when the franchise controversy commenced, because, when he went to Bloemfontein to discuss the franchise with Sir Alfred Milner, although he mentioned several subjects which interested his Government, he never mentioned the word suzerainty, which was not introduced into this question at all until it was suddenly put in as a condition in the telegrams of August 19 and 21 from the Government of Pretoria. Therefore I say emphatically that it is not accurate to assert that Mr. Chamberlain was most unfortunate in making this 35 controversy turn on a reassertion of the claim to suzerainty. I do not wish to detain your Lordships long, but I should like to be allowed to say a word on a point which the noble Lord who spoke last has raised, and which has been a very fruitful subject of criticism in the speeches that have been made against the Government in the country. I refer to the question as to why, after having invited the Government of the South African Republic to an examination of their franchise law of July, Her Majesty's Government practically withdrew that invitation six weeks later. I am afraid I must ask your Lordships to follow the details of the negotiations closely. On July 27 the Government telegraphed proposing a Joint Inquiry into the details of the law of July, not into the one detail of seven years' qualification, but into the whole franchise law.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNIt is quite true that the despatch was written on the 27th July, but it was held back, for certain reasons, and delivered some day in August, I believe the 23rd.
§ THE EARL OF SELBORNEThe written despatch was sent off on the 27th July. It was not delivered, it is quite true, till the middle of August, but a telegraphic summary was sent the same day. The very next day after the telegram was written the proposal was before the Government of Pretoria at full length. On August 15 the British Agent telegraphed that as the Government of Pretoria were anxious to avoid this Joint Inquiry, which they regarded as derogatory to their independence, they were prepared to make certain alternative proposals. On August 17 Her Majesty's Government telegraphed as follows—
If the South African Republic Government should reply to the invitation to a Joint Inquiry put forward by Her Majesty's Government by formally making the proposals described in your telegram, such a course would not be regarded by Her Majesty's Government as a refusal of their offer, but they would be prepared to consider the reply of the South African Republic Government on its merits.On August 19 and 21 the Government of the South African Republic telegraphed their formal offer; and on September 5, after receiving the reply of Her Majesty's Government to that offer, they withdrew their proposal. It is said, my Lords, that 36 the British Agent, Mr. Conyngham Greene, had promised to recommend the proposals which were made for the acceptance of Her Majesty's Government, and it is also said that the whole drift of his negotiations with the State Attorney, and the answers sent by Her Majesty's Government, would naturally lead the Government of Pretoria to think that their proposals were going to be accepted. But, as the noble Earl has pointed out, there were very great and important distinctions between the proposals which Mr. Conyngham Greene said he was prepared to recommend and the proposals which were actually made. I will give you one instance. The first telegram from Mr. Conyngham Greene was on August 15. It was initialled by the State Attorney, and therefore its correctness was absolutely proved. In that telegram it was stated that—The simple details of the Franchise Law to be discussed with British agent. He may have his own legal adviser. Any other points which may arise to be discussed in the same way.But when it came to the despatch, the allusion to this branch of the subject was as follows—Government of the South African Republic will always be prepared to take into consideration such friendly suggestions regarding the details of the Franchise Law as Her Majesty's Government, through the British Agent, may wish to convey to it.I am not going to dwell on the misunderstanding which unfortunately arose between the State Attorney and the British Agent. All I have to say is, that the British Agent is a trained diplomatist who has for many years proved his ability on many fields, and it is at least unlikely that he should have, to any great extent, misunderstood what the State Attorney said to him. It is necessary to draw attention to the very remarkable conflict of statement on the part of the South African Republic. On the one hand, the accusation made against Mr. Conyngham Greene, and against Her Majesty's Government, by no less a person than the President of the Orange Free State, is that the South African Republic were led on to make these proposals, and were induced at the pour-parlers to believe that their proposals would be accepted. This is, in fact, an accusation of bad faith 37 against the Government, founded on what is supposed to have passed between Mr. Conyngham Greene and Mr. Smuts. But what does Mr. Smuts say in the Blue Book which has just been published? Your Lordships will remember that the accusation of bad faith is founded upon his conversation with Mr. Conyngham Greene, and yet on page 24 of the Blue Book is a letter from Mr. Smuts to Mr. Greene, dated August 25, in which he makes the following extraordinary statement—I am very sorry that this misunderstanding should have arisen and produced an apparently wrong impression on the minds of Her Majesty's Government. I never intended these conversations to be conveyed to your Government, and would have spoken in such terms as to have removed all possible cause of misunderstanding from your mind.The principal answer I have to make in regard to this part of the negotiations is, twofold. In the first place, any reference to the Blue Book will show that the answers Her Majesty's Government gave to the conditions about non-interference and suzerainty were the exact answers that Mr. Conyngham Green had told the Government of Pretoria would be given. Therefore, when they made their offer they knew what the answer would be, and the statement that they withdrew their offer because of the answer they received will not bear examination. I am asked why, after that offer was withdrawn, we did not go back into an examination of the law of July. In the interval that law had been carefully examined by competent legal critics in South Africa, and if your Lordships will only consult the analyses of that law to be found in the Blue Book published in August, you will see that no law that can possibly be imagined would be less calculated to carry out the object the Government had in view—namely, to obtain an immediate and substantial representation for the Uitlander population—than that law. It is no exaggeration to say that the law was drafted for the express purpose of taking away from the Uitlanders that franchise which it pretended to give to them. It is simply a travesty of the truth to contend that that law could have offered any solution for the object which Her Majesty's Government were pursuing. Having found out, in the meantime, that there was no good to be got out of that law, and six 38 weeks having been wasted by the alternative offer of the Government of Pretoria—an offer which, as I have already said, they withdrew because an answer was given them which they knew beforehand would be given—Her Majesty's Government thought it would be trifling with a great crisis to go back at the end of the period to an examination of a law which had been shown to be quite impossible to work. Therefore, upon both these two points the answer is quite conclusive. I believe the solution of all these conundrums is that which the noble Lord [Lord Loch] and the noble Marquess at the head of the Government have given us. I do not believe the Government of the South African Republic ever intended to give the franchise to the Uitlanders, and the reason is this—that they and those who sympathise with them in the Orange Free State—and this is a key to the otherwise inexplicable attitude of the Orange Free State—have had an ideal before their minds, quite honourable in itself, and one they were entitled as free men to cherish if they chose, yet which had this unfortunate and deadly blot in its conception, that it was absolutely incompatible with the ideal of the British people. That ideal was that the future development of South Africa should be on Dutch and not on British lines—that if South Africa should be federated in the future it should be outside and not within the orbit of the British Empire. It is simply a conflict of two ideals which are incompatible, and the whole attitude of the South African Republic in this controversy has, I believe, been actuated by their determination to do everything in their power to render their ideal less difficult to attain. This is not a war about the letter "s," or any small distinction between five and seven years franchise. It is a war brought about because two people, who ought to be kindred and who ought to be friends, have, unfortunately for themselves, cherished and aspired to two different ideals. Regretful, sad, and distressed as we are that we should be brought into conflict with the Dutch in South Africa, yet, when we were confronted with this question as to whether the paramountcy, the predominance of British influence was to be for ever asserted in South Africa or not, there could be no hesitation or doubt as to the line the Government should take.
THE EARL OF CAMPERDOWNI should like to remind the noble Earl that there was one question I put to him which he has inadvertently omitted to answer. Mr. Chamberlain has been accused of having increased his terms to five years.
§ THE EARL OF SELBORNEIn reply to that, I would point out that Sir Alfred Milner began at Bloemfontein by asking for five years, and that the final offer of Her Majesty's Government was five years.
Address agreed to, nemine dissentiente, and ordered to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lords with White Staves.