UGANDA. (Hansard, 3 March 1898)

§ *LORD STANMORE
My Lords, I need not say how deeply I regret the cause which prevents my noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from being in his place to-day, but as I am informed that the noble Duke the Lord President of the Council is ready to answer the Questions which I have put on the Paper, I shall proceed to ask them. The time has not arrived at which a full discussion upon the events which have recently occurred in the Uganda Protectorate can be undertaken with advantage. Operations are still going on there of a warlike nature. The information which has reached us is 434 scanty and imperfect, and we are not in a position rightly to apportion praise or blame, if praise or blame be deserved. I therefore shall not enter into any discussion of the general state of things in Uganda, and I think it is a matter for regret that a Debate upon that subject should be taking place in the other House of Parliament at this time, but as that is, owing to circumstances, now inevitable, I think it is highly desirable that we should know whether the Government is in possession of any information beyond that which is contained in the despatches published in the Parliamentary paper largely circulated. The points which I have enumerated in my Questions are points most essential to attaining any real grasp of the subject at issue—possibly the Government may have the information I ask for. If so, I hope they will not withhold it from us; but it is very possible that they may have no information beyond that contained in the despatches which have been published. In that case, I hope they will admit that there is a strong reason for inquiry into the points which I have mentioned, and, with regard to which they say they have no information. Now, the first Question which I propose to put is— Whether, during the time that the Soudanese mutineers remained at the Eldoma Ravine Station, any attempt was made to block their road to Uganda, or to secure the arrival there of Major Macdonald's force before that of the mutineers. This seems so obvious a precaution that one can hardly suppose it can possibly have been neglected. It may not have been neglected. I hope it was not; but there is nothing in the Parliamentary paper to show that any such precaution wits taken. On the contrary, what one would judge from the Parliamentary paper is rather to the effect that no such precaution was taken. My second Question is— Whether, prior to the departure of the mutineers from the Ravine Station, any warning as to the gravity of the situation was given to the authorities at Kampala or Entibbi. There, again, the despatches printed in the Parliamentary paper are absolutely silent. The earliest intimation of any 435 warning being given from Major Macdonald's force to the authorities at Kampala is a letter, dated the 27th of September, a letter which, by the way, is not printed among the papers in the Blue Book. That was several days after the gravity of the situation was apparent. If we are to look at the Blue Book only, we should say that no such warning was given. Then I want to know— Whether any explanation has been given of the causes which led to the march of the pursuing force from Mumias to Lubwas occupying so long a time—from the 11th to the 18th October. There may have been excellent reasons for that. I daresay there were; but there are none given. There are none assigned in the Blue Book, and my reason for asking is that the Waganda Force, with the missionaries who accompanied it, went over another part of the same road, which is of exactly the same character, and presenting no greater facilities of transit, and made the march of a very little shorter length in the course of 48 hours. Where so much was at stake one would have thought that every effort would have been made to reach Lubwas before the mutineers. There is no explanation whatever of the long delay. My last two Questions are— Whether, on the arrival of the pursuing force before Lubwas, any, and what, efforts were made to effect the release of Major Thurston, and Mr. Wilson"; and Whether, on the 18th October, or after the fight on the following day, any inducements were held out to the mutineers to release Major Thurston, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Scott. The Blue Book on that subject, again, is absolutely silent; no such effort is recorded. It is not stated whether any effort was made to prevent the murder of these gallant gentlemen—one of them an officer, having a record of very considerable merit. The matter is mentioned casually, just as the loss of so many baggage animals might be mentioned. It is not surprising that in these circumstances the relatives of these officers and gentlemen are deeply pained, and, I may say, highly indignant, and ready to credit all manner of wild stories that may come in private letters from Uganda. If Her Majesty's Government has any information on these points, I 436 hope that information wall be given to the House. If the Government has not got the information, I hope it will recognise the necessity for inquiry. There have been a series of unfortunate circumstances throughout the whole affair. In the first place, it was unfortunate that instructions were sent to attach the Soudanese force to Major Macdonald's expedition. The dispatch in which those instructions were conveyed to the authorities in Uganda is not given in the Parliamentary Papers that have been printed. It would be interesting to know whether those instructions to the Uganda Government were absolute, or whether they left a discretion with them. If they were absolute, it was, I think, unfortunate not to have taken into account the possible change of circumstances that might have occurred in a country at such a distance away, and with which the difficulties of communication are so great. If they did leave a discretion, it is most unfortunate that the Uganda authorities did not exercise that discretion, for the condition of the country, between the time when the order was given here and the time when it was received there, had completely changed. From being in a peaceable and safe condition, the country had become a prey to disturbances throughout its whole extent. Next, it was unfortunate that these particular companies of Soudanese were selected to go with Major Macdonald's force. They were the companies which, for eight months past, had been perpetually on the move. They had been doing very hard service, and had been employed against the rebels in different parts of Uganda, and their request that other companies, which had not been exposed to similarly harassing duties, should be employed instead of them seems to me to have been a most reasonable request. It is also unfortunate that they were employed along with other negro troops receiving pay just four times as much as their own. That was not calculated to sooth discontented people. It was also very unfortunate, I think, that foolish suggestions for altering their uniform and depriving them of the fez—to them the badge of Islam—should have been entertained, and created suspicion among them. It was unfortunate they were ordered to a region they had 437 stipulated they should not be sent to, and under a leader whom they did not trust. Most of all, it was unfortunate, that when they came to state their grievances, those grievances should not have been listened to, and that they were fired upon—a proceeding which it is evident from Sir Arthur Hardinge's dispatch he entirely diapproved and disliked. I hope Her Majesty's Government will be able to give some information in reply to my Question. If they are not able to do so, I shall give notice that at some future date, when the matter is settled, and when we are better able to apportion blame or praise, I shall bring the matter again before the House, with a Motion attached.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Duke of DEVNONSHIRE)
My noble Friend, in his concluding observations, has, I think, travelled somewhat beyond the scope of the Questions which he has put upon the Paper, and has discussed, though I admit not very fully, a part of the whole Question which he began by stating he thought was at the present time premature. However that may be, I am afraid that I am unable to follow my noble Friend in any of those general observations which he has made. I must confine my reply to the terms of the Questions. He has asked whether the Government have any information in addition to that which is contained in the Papers that have been presented. In reply to that, I have only to state that all the information on the points referred to in the five Questions is contained in the dispatches, and that anything which may have been received since adds nothing to the information which the Government possesses on these points. I am unable, however, quite to agree with my noble Friend when he stated that on these five points the Papers are absolutely silent. The information which they contain may not be very full, and will, doubtless, be supplemented by more complete information when it is received; but I think that upon every one of the Questions which have been placed on the Paper, I can refer my noble Friend to certain passages in the Papers which throw some light upon them. His first Question is— Whether, during the time that the Soudanese, mutineers remained at the Eldoma Ravine 438 Station, any attempt was made to block their road to Uganda, or to secure the arrival there of Major Macdonald's force before that of the mutineers. If my noble Friend will refer to page 21 of the "Papers Relating to Recent Events in the Uganda Protectorate," he will find that Mr. Jackson reports that he had informed Captain Bagnall of the state of affairs, and had instructed him to do everything in his power to prevent the Soudanese mutineers from passing towards Uganda. Continuing, he says— I am, myself, hurrying forward by the old caravan road (Gaash Ngishm) accompanied by Major Macdonald's column to Mumias, where I shall be in close touch with Uganda and Nandi, and be in a position to take such steps as may be necessary.

§ *LORD STANMORE
Will my noble Friend pardon me? I am perfectly aware of that passage, but it has nothing whatever to do with the point. What I was referring to was Major Macdonald's force—the large force that was at the Ravine with the mutineers. Was an attempt made by that large force to block the way?

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
That every effort was made to stop the advance of the mutineers is shown by a passage on page 28, in Mr. Jackson's dispatch to Lord Salisbury. Mr. Jackson says— In continuation of my dispatch of the 26th ultimo, from the Ravine Station, I regret to have to report to your Lordship that I have heard from Captain Bagnall that the arrangements I had made to confine the mutineers to the Mau district were going on satisfactorily until the 25th or 26th ultimo, when the half of No. 4 Company, under Jadin Effendi, then garrisoning the Nandi Station, rose and took possession of the fort. Mr. Jackson says further on— In the event of my not arriving at Mumias before then, I have taken steps to prevent them crossing the Nile into Uganda, should my arrangements for preventing them from crossing the Nzoia River, in Kavirondo, now probably in flood, prove unavailing. I may add that I have also sent instructions to Mr. G. Wilson at Kampala to take the necessary steps for insuring the safety of the ladies now in Uganda, but in such a way as not to cause needless alarm. I hope to be in Kavirondo in five days from to-day. In reply to my noble Friend's question as to whether, prior to the departure of 439 the mutineers from the Ravine Station, any warning as to the gravity of the situation was given to the authorities at Kampala or Entibbi, I will ask him to refer to page 42, on which he will find a despatch from Mr. Wilson to Lord Salisbury. It is dated "Kampala, October 12th, 1897," and in it Mr. Wilson says— I received to-day a communication from Mr. Jackson, of the 27th September, informing me of the details of the mutiny at the Ravine, which, to some extent, confirmed the native rumours, and, though it minimised the numbers of the mutineers, it did not allow of the relaxation of the precautions already taken.

§ *LORD STANMORE
I feel it is bad manners to interrupt the noble Duke again, but I hope he will pardon me. May I observe that it is not my question he is answering? My question was whether, previous to the mutineers leaving the Ravine Station, any warning as to the gravity of the situation was given to the authorities at Kampala or Entibbi. The 27th of September was after they had left the Ravine.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
Then I understand my noble Friend's question is: Was information of the mutiny given before it took place?

§ *LORD STANMORE
No, no. That is not so. I asked whether, previous to the departure of the mutineers from the Ravine Station, any warning was given as to the gravity of the situation. The noble Duke says that, after they had left, warning was sent.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
I am quoting from the dispatches. If my replies are not satisfactory to my noble Friend, I am afraid I cannot supply the deficiency. With regard to the question as to whether any explanation has been given as to the causes which led to the march of the pursuing force from Mumias to Lubwas occupying so long a time, there is a paragraph on page 32, which appears to bear on that question. The paragraph is as follows— Lieut. Fowler, at Port Victoria, also took steps to defend his fort and to cut the bridges over the Sio River, but he was only able to partially carry out this step. On hearing that Lieut. Fowler was in danger, Mr. Jackson and 440 I (Major Macdonald) advanced to his assistance with all the men we could raise. Major Thurston had meanwhile proceeded to Lubwas to assist Mr. N. A. Wilson there. He had a garrison of about 60 Soudanese, and sent the steam-launch to Port Alice for a Maxim and some ammunition, but was hopeful that his influence over the troops would be sufficient to induce them to surrender. He, however, asked us to come on at once. As I understand it, the first step taken by Major Macdonald was to relieve Port Victoria, where danger was supposed to be greatest at the time. The other Questions asked by my noble Friend are— Whether, on the arrival of the pursuing force before Lubwas, any, and what, efforts were made to effect the release of Major Thurston, and Mr. Wilson? Whether, on the 18th October, or after the fight on the following day, any inducements were held out to the mutineers to release Major Thurston, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Scott? In answer to those Questions I refer my noble Friend to page 32 again. In Major Macdonald's despatch, dated Lubwas Hill, Usoga, October 22nd, he says— On our arrival at this point, the mutineers at once sent out two companies to attack us, but when they already saw us posted in a strong position they retired. I would not allow any firing, as I hoped to secure the release of the European prisoners by negotiations. On the morning of the 19th instant the mutineers, to the number of 300, assisted by some 150 Waganda Mahommedans, attacked our camp. Then follows an account of the engagement which ensued, and so far as I am able to ascertain from that account, there was no opportunity of subsequently communicating with the mutineers, or of taking any steps to obtain the release of the prisoners. I do not by any means wish to assert that the information which is contained in these papers is full and complete, but in answer to my noble Friend. I have only to say that they contain all the information which is, at present, in the possession of the Government upon the matter, and that there is nothing more to be added to what they contain.