Lords Sitting of 24 February 1898

Preamble
THE LORD CHANCELLOR THE LORD CHANCELLOR took his seat on the Woolsack at a quarter past Four of the clock.

BAIL BILL.
*THE LORD CHANCELLOR (The Earl of HALSBURY): In asking your Lordships to read this Bill a second time I think it is necessary to say a word or two on the subject of it, because, by reason of the very few lines which are contained in it, it might seem to be an unimportant matter. I believe that although the change is a very small one which is asked to be made in the law, it is a change which is fraught with very important consequences. My Lords, the history of bail in this country has been a somewhat singular one. The necessity and expediency of admitting prisoners to bail is hardly doubted now, yet, for some reason or other, the magistrates throughout the country have thought it right, almost as a rule, to refuse bail. They are under the impression that they are entitled to treat the period which elapses between the committal for trial and the actual trial as a period during which they might partly punish the accused persons by refusing them bail. My Lords, the inexpediency of that practice has now become very manifest, and it has, in a great measure, rather hampered the administration of justice in the case of persons awaiting trial at Quarter Sessions. A great many of Her Majesty's Judges are under the impression, and act upon it, that they have no jurisdiction to allow any person to remain in gaol when they come to deliver the gaol. They have perhaps taken a more constitutional view than the Legislature itself.
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On more than one occasion a miscarriage of justice has arisen in consequence. Another obvious reason for the Bill is that there is no reason why a great number of persons who are earning their own living, and can be permitted out on bail, should be supported at the expense of the country. For some reason which I am unable to understand, the magistrates throughout the country have exhibited very strong reluctance to admit to bail. I am told by those who ought to know that it has arisen from a belief that the facilities for railway travelling, etc., aid the escape from justice of persons, if allowed out on bail, but I believe that our improved system of police and the electric telegraph make it almost impossible for poor persons to escape. As I understand it, the excuse put forward for this extraordinary reluctance on the part of magistrates to admit prisoners to bail is that under the present law their discretion is greatly hampered. The Bill which I present, with a view to getting rid of this excuse, leaves everything to the discretion of the justices. It can be in future never suggested that the justices have not the power, if they think proper, to admit to bail any accused person, even on his own recognisances. Over and over again Her Majesty's judges have pointed out that many persons have been sent to gaol who ought to have been admitted to bail. Every judge who has to sentence a prisoner who has been a long time in gaol naturally and justly takes into consideration, in passing sentence, the period of his detention, but when he does that everybody doss not know the ground upon which he has pronounced, perhaps, a comparatively small sentence. We have seen unfavourable comment with regard to such cases, but in passing sentence the learned judge has been alive to the fact that the accused has been in gaol for many months. There can be no doubt that there has been an undue and unreasonable reluctance to admit to bail. I propose to get rid of the excuse by giving the magistrates unfettered discretion, except in certain cases, such as treason, to admit to bail any persons whom they have reason to believe will submit to take their trial, and for that reason I ask your Lordships to give this Bill a Second Reading.
LORD HERSCHELL: I entirely approve of the Bill, which my noble and learned Friend has introduced, and I hope it will pass into law.
Read a second time accordingly.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE BILL.
*THE LORD CHANCELLOR: My Lords, I beg to move the Second Reading of this Bill. It requires but little explanation. It is a Bill to enable the Record Office to ged rid of useless documents, and is similar in character to the one passed some time ago. The question here is the altering of the date which was fixed in the last Bill.
Read a second time accordingly.

EVACUATION OF THESSALY.
LORD WANTAGE: My Lords, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, with a view to facilitating the operations of the agents of the relief committee who are now distributing supplies to the distressed families in Thessaly, every effort will be made by Her Majesty's Government to secure the early payment of the indemnity due to Turkey from the guaranteed loan in order that the evacuation of Thessaly by the Turkish troops may at once commence and be completed within the period of four weeks stipulated by the Treaty of Peace made between the Sultan and the King of the Hellenes? The announcement that the Treaty of Peace was signed by the Greeks and the Turks was received with very great satisfaction and congratulation by this House, but up to the present time, my Lords, we have heard nothing of the evacuation of Thessaly by the Turkish troops. It was, I believe, understood that the evacuation was to take place within four weeks of the action of Russia and France and England in the matter of guaranteeing the loan, and I think it would be greatly to our advantage if some announcement could be made to the effect that the Powers do not only guarantee the loan, but also the evacuation of Thessaly by the Turkish troops. At present the Thessalian peasants are debarred from returning to their homes, and the Turkish troops are equally debarred from going back to their holdings, and at a season of the year like
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the present, when it is of the utmost importance that they should be able to do so. It may be said that in a matter of this sort England is hardly called upon to intervene, but remembering that we are one of the guarantors of the loan, I think we should intervene. There are thousands of English people who take the deepest interest in this matter, and who have contributed large sums of money through the Thessalian Relief Committee and the Red Cross Society to alleviate the misery of the victims of the war, and who are anxious that something should be done without delay, for at the present time the efforts of the relief associations are paralysed. It is well known that Lady Egerton, the wife of Her Majesty's Minister at Athens, has been doing a great deal, and has saved the lives of many from absolute starvation in the district of Thessaly. If we could only by some means obtain from the Sultan the withdrawal of his troops now in Thessaly, we should be doing a great service. I read this morning in the Standard—
"The British and French Ministers have notified the consent of their Governments to the scheme of control and the arrangement with the creditors. According to a telegram from Paris, the Financial Delegates of France, Russia, and Great Britain met recently, in consequence of a request from the Greek Government for the settlement of the Loan question. It is announced to-day that a satisfactory result has been achieved with regard to the guarantee of the Indemnity Loan by those Powers, and that some capitalists in Paris have even taken up a loan of one million sterling, asked for by the Hellenic Government for the regulation of the floating Internal Debt. The news has caused general rejoicing, especially among the Thessalians, who at last see the day of deliverance at hand."
If Her Majesty's Ministers can bring this matter before his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, and induce him, now the loan is guaranteed, to withdraw his troops, the greatest service to humanity will arise.
THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The MARQUESS of SALISBUBY): My Lords, I understand the private diplomatic condition of this affair is that Turkey has undertaken to evacuate Thessaly as soon as the loan for the payment of the indemnity has been duly published. Long negotiations have been necessary in order to ascertain and agree

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upon the particular portions of the Greek revenues which were to be the security for the loan. That having been done, the three Powers to whom the existence of Greece is due—namely, England, Russia, and France—have agreed to guarantee a considerable amount of that loan. But that is a matter of business which has required much discussion and many arrangements, in order to bring the views of the three Powers precisely into harmony and so enable the guarantee to take effect. I believe it is on the very point of taking effect, and I hope that the issue of the loan will be the speedy result. When the loan has been issued and the money is paid, I do not doubt but that the indemnity will be paid to the Sultan at once; but even before that, as soon as the loan is announced and offered on the market, the liability of the Sultan to evacuate Thessaly will have begun. Of course, I am bound to assume that his Imperial Majesty will fulfil the engagement into which he has entered. I heard a word of evil omen drop from the mouth of my noble Friend, which I feel bound to notice as I pass. He not only said that we were guaranteeing the loan, but also that we have guaranteed the execution of the Treaty of Peace. I can assure him that we have done nothing of the kind, and I should be very sorry to be a party to placing any such burden upon this country. Up to the present, though the mechanism has worked very slowly, no real impediment has occurred; and when we have allowed for the proverbial tardiness of the East, we have every reason to believe that a state of things will now very speedily arise when the Sultan will be under the obligation of evacuating the Thessalian plains. I quite agree with the noble Lord that that is a consummation most devoutly to be wished, because I fear that the sufferings of these poor people during the interval—the unavoidable interval—whilst these business matters were being arranged have been something terrible to realise.

MILITIA BALLOT.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: My Lords, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for War if he will define an "emergency"; and state how long it would be if the ballot law, as it now stands, were put in force, before a single raw recruit could thus be got for service in the Militia; also to ask whether, inasmuch as he has stated that "the machinery for putting the ballot in motion is of a somewhat ancient date, and would probably require revision," he will undertake forthwith to bring in a Bill for this purpose. Those of your Lordships who were present in this House on Friday last, and heard the speech of the Secretary of State for War on this subject will admit that these questions grow as naturally out of the speech of my noble Friend as a plant grows from its seed. What did we hear from my noble Friend on Friday? I was pressing the importance of having our Home Defence in an efficient state, and contending that this should be done by reviving the old constitutional power of compulsory service. My noble Friend, I was glad to hear, did not repudiate possessing this power. He said, on the contrary, that it was a most valuable power, and one which he would be very sorry to part with. He also said it was a power which should only be used in an emergency. Now, my Lords, this is a phrase which is very frequently used when the War Office is pressed upon a matter of this kind. They always say—
"Wait until an emergency arises. We shall be equal to the occasion, and the law will be put in force."
But my fear is, my Lords, that your "not yet" will some day read "too late." Therefore, I think it is very desirable that we should come to a clear understanding as to what "emergency" precisely means, and whether it will give you time to put your law in force, and to catch your hare and cook it, and be ready, should occasion demand; that is to say, whether it will give you time to get your soldiers drilled and fit for action before it is too late. I want a definition of the word "emergency." There is a dictionary view of the word, and a statesmanlike view. In Murray's dictionary, dated 1891—your Lordships will

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see it is up to date, as it were—the word is defined as follows—
"A juncture that turns up unexpectedly. A state of things demanding immediate action."
Then I go to find out what "immediate" means. Murray has not got so far as "I," but Webster's dictionary can tell me. The definition of "immediate" which is given in Webster's dictionary is—
"Something instant, pressing; without intervention of time."
So much for the dictionary view. Let us now look back to the history of our own times, in which many emergencies have occurred. I should call it an emergency if the Secretary of State for War, having passed his proper estimates for the service of the year, came suddenly to Parliament and asked for an extra force. That would be meeting an emergency. It is exactly what my noble Friend would do. He would come down here and say that the emergency had occurred, and that it was necessary to enforce the ballot. I look to contemporary history, and it furnishes me with many cases which illustrate my point. Going back to 1847, we have the Duke of Wellington's famous letter to Sir John Burgoyne, in which he hopes he may not be the witness of the tragedy which he could not persuade his contemporaries to take measures to avert. The Militia Act followed in 1852. It was, no doubt, the outcome of the letter of the Duke of Wellington. Let us now come to the Crimean War. What happened then? That was an emergency, and the Militia were embodied, and did excellent service. Again, in 1859 you have the Franco-Italian War, which resulted in the writing of the letter that led to the formation of the Volunteer force. There was an emergency. In 1878 we had the Russo-Turkish War. What was the result? Why, 50,000 men were suddenly added to the Army. In 1882 there was a war in Egypt. That was most unexpected; it was certainly an emergency, and 6,700 men were added to the Army. In 1884–85, in consequence of the Russia and Indian frontier difficulties, 5,000 men were added to the Navy, and the year after, 9,300 men were added to the Army in India. Even in this year 1898 you are engaged in the Soudan and on
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the North-West Frontier of India in wars that were unexpected, and the result is that your Army is in such a state that you cannot meet the demand upon it. You have a Committee of the House of Commons considering the subject of our military organisation, and the Government is proposing to add 15,000 or 20,000 men to the Army. I stand on this, that an emergency is a thing you ought to be prepared to meet at once. If the present law affecting the Militia ballot is not put in force, it is worthless for an emergency. When an emergency occurs you want to be able to fill your ranks at once; you do not want to have to net your men and train them after the emergency has occurred. The law of ballot is absolutely worthless at the present moment while it is allowed to remain in abeyance. My noble Friend said on Friday—
"The machinery for putting the ballot in motion is of a somewhat ancient date, and would probably require revision."
He accepts the evil of the situation, but he proposes to do nothing to remedy the evil. In 1871 Mr. Cardwell brought in his Army Regulation Bill, one of the main points of which, as I showed on Friday, was to deal with the Militia. Mr. Cardwell made a statement in explanation of his Bill, in which he expressed the same opinion as my noble Friend the present Secretary of State for War—namely, that the ballot law is antiquated and obsolete. It was therefore necessary that Mr. Cardwell should, in his Bill, introduce clauses which would bring the Militia law up to date, and put it on a proper footing, but he met with considerable opposition to the purchase abolition provisions of his Bill. It was thought that what he proposed with regard to purchase, was an entirely secondary matter, and we did all we could to resist the Bill in this particular. I well remember a very heroic oratorial performance was achieved by Lord Galloway with regard to this Bill. It was about the dinner hour, and the Bill would have gone with a rush if someone had not got up and spoken upon it. I went to my noble Friend and informed him of this, and he instantly rose in his place and spoke without stopping for two hours. I am

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bound to say I consider that a very heroic achievement. No doubt he derived great help from Blue Books, into which he dived deeply, and from which he read freely. Mr. Cardwell, indeed, gave up the ballot position of his Bill, but he stands in a better position in this respect than my noble Friend. He endeavoured to remedy the existing admitted evil, but my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War, while admitting the antiquated and obsolete character of the present Militia Ballot Law, does nothing to put it right. Mr. Cardwell, on the other hand, felt so strongly on the matter that he inserted in his Army Bill 10 clauses and 44 provisions in order to put the present ballot law in a satisfactory condition. From that time nothing has been done. Now, my Lords, I venture to think that this is not a proper state of things. If Mr. Cardwell's Bill had been passed with all these clauses in it, what would have been the result so far as our position to meet an emergency is concerned? Parliament, if not sitting, was to be called together, and would have been asked to affirm the necessity of enforcing the ballot, and when all that was done 30 days at least would have elapsed before you could have got a single raw recruit for service in the Militia. To say that even that is a satisfactory way to meet a national crisis or emergency is folly. We We must be armed cap-à-pie. Therefore, I want to ask my noble Friend if he will define the word "emergency," and state how long it would be, if the present ballot law were put in force, before a single raw recruit could thus be got ready for service. I also want to ask him whether, inasmuch as he has stated that the machinery for putting the ballot in motion will require revision—I say it is absolutely worthless at the present time—he will undertake forthwith—I mean immediately, not letting the matter stand over for another Session—to bring in a Bill for this purpose. I am not asking him to apply the ballot; I am only asking him to amend the law so as to have the means of speedily applying the ballot when necessary. Mine is a modest request. I ask for no more than that. Turning to another, though cognate subject, I wish to refer to the age of Militiamen and
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soldiers. In a calculation I made I said that if you deducted casualties from your Infantry Militia, and all under 19 years of age, you would not have above 30,000 men to put into the held. My noble Friend took exception to my scoring out 19-year-old Militia youths. But he certainly would not send lads of 19 to preserve his pheasants, and I am sure he himself does not ride three-year-olds across the Cricklade country, and be assured that none but well-grown, well-seasoned troops will ever be sent against this country. Now, since I spoke, and since my noble Friend spoke, on this subject, I have obtained, quite by accident, some curious figures with reference to the age of enlistment in the Army. A chief constable of a county police force, whom I happened to meet, told me of some extraordinary experiences he had had with reference to the ages of young men who had served in the Army, and who were seeking admission into the county police force. The facts are so curious that, perhaps, my noble Friend will allow me to read the letter. The chief constable I refer to, says—
"I enclose a deserter's report against a certain George Ward, whose real name was Herbert Hayes. This nursery warrior was at the time under 13 years of age. The age can be verified without difficulty, and in that same year he is stated to have enlisted five other times. I enclose a letter just lately received from a would-be policeman. He is not yet 19, and has served nearly three years in the Army. I have had at least two other constables serving under me—one is still serving, and one has been dismissed—who joined the. Army under 16 years of age. In evidence in 1894, before a Parliamentary Committee on the employment of discharged soldiers, I gave evidence that 18 soldiers who had been taken on as policemen were at the time of their enlistment under 18 years of age. Their ages were all verified by certificates of birth."
I should like to know if George Ward, or, as he should be called, Herbert Hayes, appears six times on the return of enlistments for that year. I fancy he will appear in that return as six soldiers. I hope it is not a case of ex uno disce omnes, but you may be sure that if these cases occur in one county, similar cases occur in other counties. Here is the letter from the would-be policeman referred to in the above letter; it reads—
"Sir,—I respectfully beg to offer myself as a candidate for employment in your force. I am

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the oldest son of the late Sergeant James Houston, and I am 18 9–12 years of age, and 5ft. 10½in. high. On the 10th instant I was discharged upon purchase from the 3rd Hussars, after 2 10–12 years' service, with a very good character. I am desirous of obtaining employment as early as possible, to enable me to assist my mother.—I am, Sir, Yours obediently,
"JAMES BURNE HOUSTON."
That letter is dated February 12, 1898. I strongly advise my noble Friend to communicate with the chief constables of the various counties, to ascertain whether what I have said with reference to the boyhood upon which we trust our nation's honour is not the case in other counties than the one I have mentioned. I think that the last matter I have referred to, though it is incidental, is, at any rate, ad rem. You will find your Army and your Militia always 20,000 or 30,000 below their strength, and it is necessary that we should act differently and more energetically in this matter of our home defence than my noble Friend the Secretary of State for War appears to be disposed to do at the present time.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The Marquess of LANSDOWNE): My Lords, the unwritten rules of your Lordships' House allow a considerable amount of latitude to noble Lords who take part in our discussions. I think the noble Earl on the Cross Benches allows himself a large amount of that latitude, when, after putting on the paper three specific questions with regard to the Militia, he allowed himself to wander off towards the close of his remarks into a discussion of the age at which we admit recruits to the Line. The noble Earl mentioned two or three cases which had come to his knowledge of lads of a very immature age—one, I think, he said was not more than 13 years of age—who had enlisted in the Army. I think that story an extremely improbable one, but if the noble Earl will give me particulars, I have no doubt I shall be able to trace the case, and inform him whether or not this information is correct.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: It is absolutely correct.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Of course, it is perfectly well known that a certain number of recruits do join the Army
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below 18, but those recruits have to satisfy the medical officers that they have what is known as the physical equivalents of a man of 18, and, although no doubt some contrive to pass themselves off as 18 when they are younger, I doubt extremely whether any cases can be substantiated of youths of 13 years of age being passed. Now, my Lords, I will answer the three questions which the noble Lord has put to me. He asks me, in the first place, whether I am prepared to give him a definition of the word "emergency." Now, the word "emergency" is one which, as the noble Earl well knows, occurs not infrequently in the Acts of Parliament which concern the Army. It occurs in the Reserve Forces Act and in the Militia Acts, and in none of these Acts is there any attempt made to define the meaning of the term. I must say that in my opinion it is a wise thing not to attempt such a definition. If a definition were attempted you might have endless controversies as to whether the circumstances complied in all respects with the language of the definition, and I submit to your Lordships that it is much better that it should be left to the common sense of the Government of the day to decide whether an emergency does or does not exist, and to the common sense of Parliament to approve or to disapprove the action of the Government. The noble Earl evidently is under a misapprehension as to the sense in which I used the word when I was addressing your Lordships last week. The noble Earl told us just now, in effect, that Her Majesty's Government contemplated recourse to the ballot for meeting, at the last moment, a serious or unexpected national peril, and he says, very naturally, that if a sudden emergency arose and you had not taken the necessary steps beforehand, you would find that the ballot would not help you. Of course it would not help you. The ballot would be of no use for purposes of that kind unless you put it in force long before the emergency arose, and unless you had raised and trained the men whom you were expecting to raise under the ballot.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Hear, hear! That is my point.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: The noble Earl asked me how long it would take before a single raw recruit could be obtained under the ballot for service in the Militia.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Under the present law.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: Under the present law I find, on reference to a work which the noble Earl doubtless knows, Clode's "Military Forces of the Crown," a calculation was made to determine that point, and it is suggested that it would take five weeks to obtain your recruit—not to train him, but to actually get him. And, of course, as the noble Earl has said, that would be a raw recruit, whom you could not think of putting into the field against the organised forces of an enemy, but I never intended to suggest that we should rely on the ballot for the purpose of meeting an unexpected invasion of these shores. Nothing which fell from me was intended to suggest, or did in fact suggest, any such idea. And when the noble Earl asks me whether I am ready to prepare a Bill for the purpose of improving and simplifying the machinery of the ballot, I have to remind him that were the machinery ever so much simplified, were you able to get your recruit, not in five weeks, but in five days, the ballot still would be useless to you if it were put in force on a sudden emergency.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: I quite agree.
*THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR: On the other hand, we hold that the ballot would be a very valuable reserve of power to us in case of an emergency of a very different kind—I mean such an emergency as would arise supposing we found we were unable to obtain by voluntary enlistment sufficient men to fill the Army; or, supposing again, this country being involved in war, hostilities were begun, and we were unable to keep the ranks of the Army filled, for a purpose of that kind the ballot would be most valuable to us. The machinery of the ballot is to be found partly in the Order in Council, which, as I told the House on Friday, was issued in 1852, and partly in various Acts of Parliament. I imagine there would be no difficulty whatever in preparing a new Order in Council, varying
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the quotas which are at present laid down and which are certainly not applicable to the present distribution of population of the United Kingdom. As for the Acts of Parliament, they are very numerous, and, I am sorry to admit, somewhat involved, but I have to say to the noble Earl that the Government do not at this moment feel that any good result could come from an attempt to pass through Parliament a Bill consolidating and amending the Militia Law. The attempt was made by Mr. Cardwell, and he apparently abandoned it for the reason which induces the Government not to take the matter up at present, the task being one which it was not worth attempting until we were nearer the time when recourse to the ballot would be necessary. These are the only answers I can give to the noble Earl's questions.
*THE EARL OF WEMYSS: Mr. Cardwell abandoned that part of his Bill simply because there was so much opposition to the part which he wished most to pass. The Duke of Devonshire will probably bear me out in that statement. As the Secretary of State for War does not propose to introduce a Bill, and as I think the question is urgent, I now, with your Lordships' permission, present a Bill to improve the machinery of the ballot. This Bill of mine is simply taking out of Mr. Cardwell's Army Regulations Bill the clauses that refer to the Militia. I beg to move the First Reading of this Bill.
Read a first time accordingly.

THE LOAD LINE.
LORD MUSKERRY: My Lords, I rise to ask Her Majesty's Government if they will cause special instructions to be given to the Board of Trade Marine Surveyors to report any vessels coming into or leaving English ports with their propellers insufficiently immersed? When I had the honour last week of moving a Resolution relating to the insufficient ballasting of steamers I withdrew it on the suggestion of the noble Earl the Secretary of the Board of Trade; but since that time I have received so many communications asking me to bring this

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matter again before your Lordships' House that I felt it was my duty to do so. The noble Earl, in his reply to me last week, said he wished to associate himself with my desire that every possible means should be taken of ensuring the lives of our British shipping community, and I am perfectly sure, my Lords, that when I show—as I hope to be able to—the risks that are incurred through sending steamers to sea with insufficient ballast, the noble Earl will be a warm advocate for remedial measures being taken. There are many dangers and many risks at sea, my Lords, which it is beyond the power of man to either prevent or guard against, but this one special danger is well within our power to prevent. Although the noble Earl said preventive regulations would harass the great mass of shipping owners unjustifiably, yet I say, and I think, my Lords, you will agree with me, that when it is a question of human lives being at stake no other consideration whatever should be allowed to have any weight. The noble Earl stated in his speech last week that it could not be said with much accuracy that any system was in vogue at the present time of sending ships to sea from our ports with insufficient ballast; if that is so, I fail to see how the mass of the shipping owners are to be harassed. It cannot harass them just to put two extra coats of paint on their vessels. They are obliged by law to paint the load line, and when they do that they surely could paint a ballast mark as well. If, on the other hand, the mass of the shipping owners will be harassed, and by that I presume the noble Earl means they will be harassed by having to put in a sufficient quantity of ballast to render their ships seaworthy, it only shows how very much needed this ballast mark is. My Lords, I think I shall be able to show you that there is a risk, and a very great risk, of life in sending steamers to sea with very little ballast and with their propellers half out of the water. I should like to say a few words about the masters of these steamers. They are men who have under their care property, in the shape of vessels and cargoes, of a very large monetary value; they take this property to all parts of the world, and very seldom have any loss. When a loss does occur, I think you will generally find that it is
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not the fault of the master or his officers. Nobody on shore, I think, or very few people indeed, realise the anxiety and the strain of mind which even, under favourable circumstances, a shipmaster has to undergo; in fact, to fully realise it one should be in charge of a vessel himself. But when you send a shipmaster to sea in a big steel tank, with her nose sticking out of the water and only half her propeller immersed, you unjustifiably increase his anxiety and the strain on his mind. In fact, the only wonder is that you can find men who are able to stand it, and that you have not more ships reported missing. They only bring them through by good seamanship and good handling. The noble Earl stated that, so far as the records at the Board of Trade were concerned, he had not been able to find more than a very few instances in which any accident had occurred owing to the lack of sufficient ballast. I do not know if the noble Earl refers to shipwrecks only. Any other accident I can conceive the Board of Trade not hearing of. Anything short of actual shipwreck the Board of Trade might not hear of. Surely, my Lords, the Board of Trade are not to wait until some steamer is lost from want of ballast to adopt measures for safety of these vessels. When a steamer is missing, no one on shore thinks of speculating as to what trim that vessel was in. Three months ago, I was talking to a captain of a very large English steamer in Bordeaux. He had just come from the Pacific. We were talking over this question, and he told me that just before he left his port for Bordeaux there was a very large steamer—in fact, one of the largest steamers afloat—which was going to cross the Pacific with only half her screw covered. My friend told the master of that vessel that it would be, in his opinion, unsafe for her to cross the Pacific in that trim, and that he would not think of taking her across in such a condition. The answer he got from the captain was, that he knew it would be unsafe. He also detailed the scrapes he had got into through this vessel before, but he said he had to go. If he did not he might lose his berth. That steamer sailed, and she has never been heard of since. Now, my Lords, I will give you a case of a steamer on a voyage from Cardiff to Newcastle, with her propeller

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not having sufficient hold in the water. The ship's head fell off, and the vessel lay in the trough of the sea; the tarpaulins on the hatches were washed overboard, and a large quantity of water got into the hold, which might easily have resulted in the loss of the ship. I think that was rather risky.
THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF TRADE (The Earl of DUDLEY): What was the name of the ship?
LORD MUSKERRY: The Eddystone I have another case here of a ship on a voyage from Antwerp to the Tyne, which was four days in the North Sea, owing to being unmanageable. I have a letter from a captain, who speaks of another steamer, which left Bury in company with him. There was a strong westerly wind, and they were only making six points. This steamer had to put back while the vessel under the command of the writer of the letter I have here was able to make her course, as her propeller was altogether submerged, while that of the other steamer was not. He says he has passed many steamers at sea without sufficient ballast, and which have required the whole of the English Channel to themselves for safe navigation. I think, my Lords, those cases will prove that there is a danger in sending ships to sea insufficiently ballasted. I do not see how the Board of Trade can say that such cases are not frequent. Anybody who is on our shores can see these steamers constantly going down Channel with their propellers insufficiently immersed. Now, my Lords, I have a lot of cases, but I do not know whether I should take up your Lordships' time by reading them. However, I will read one or two.
"Draft, leaving all available tanks run up 9ft. forward, 12ft. 10in. aft (her load draft is 22ft. 2in. mean) with some 190 (bunkers raise her aft) tons of bunkers. All went fairly well until south of Manilla, approaching the Palawan passage, when the monsoon stiffening, with frequent rain squalls and fairly high seas, she soon became unmanageable, tearing off on either tack, until wind and sea were abeam, rolling just 'dredful,' and 'compass chasing round like a cat at play'—drifting fast towards the reef by good hap. Enough daylight was left me, by wearing and running back, to make the passage round the north end of Palawan Island."
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"I arrived here last Monday with a cargo of grain from Baltimore, not an enviable trade to be in at any time, and especially at this season, entailing as it does a long run in ballast. I always make a point of going well south, as I consider it is the very height of folly to attempt the great circle track in the winter time with a light ship. She is not fit to contend, and utterly helpless against the enormous seas and westerly gales which prevail nine-tenths of the time."
All these are from seamen. There is not a single one of them who would not tell you that the ships as they are going out now—these tramps—are perfectly unfit to put to sea, and they are certainly not fit to risk men's lives. I will ask your Lordships to think who are the most lifted to pass judgment on what constitutes a seaworthy ship, and who are the most interested in having seaworthy ships. I venture to say that there can be no other answer but the shipmasters. They are the men who have to navigate them, who are responsible for them, and who have the whole trouble. It is their profession. I told you last week, my Lords, that the opinion of the shipmasters was that an overladen ship was much safer than a light one with too little ballast, and I am very proud to find, my Lords, that what I said on that occasion has been considered and approved of by those men who are most interested. You may remember, my Lords, that individual shipmasters are debarred from making any grievance by fear of losing their employment. If you could guarantee shipmasters against loss of work, I am sure an inquiry would elicit facts which would very much astonish your Lordships, and very much astonish the Board of Trade. And now, my Lords, I urge on Her Majesty's Government to direct the Board of Trade to have the low ballast line mark on all tramp steamers, and thereby to add another safeguard, and a very necessary safeguard, to the lives of our merchant seamen. My Lords, I now beg to put the Question that stands in my name—namely, whether the Government would cause special instructions to be given to the Board of Trade Marine Surveyors to report any vessels coming into, or leaving, English ports with their propellers insufficiently immersed?
THE EARL OF DUDLEY: The Marine Surveyors of the Board of Trade have already, as I intimated to my noble

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Friend the other day, specific instructions to report, and, if necessary, detain any vessel which is from any cause unsafe, and it appears to the Board of Trade scarcely advisable to issue further and special instructions in regard to the particular point mentioned in the Question, covering, as it does, only one of the many ways in which a vessel may be in an unsafe condition. Still, if the Board of Trade should have information, either from my noble Friend or otherwise, as to any cases in which vessels have left British ports so light as to be a danger to life and property, they will at once take steps to inquire thoroughly into such cases, and, upon verification, will communicate generally with their Surveyors as to this source of danger. My noble Friend has given me a new instance: the Eddystone, which left Cardiff in the state which he described. That case will be inquired into, and if the noble Lord will furnish us with a "lot of cases" they also will receive similar inquiry. I may remind my noble Friend of what I mentioned to him the other day. Cases of vessels leaving Baltimore are not of much use, because we have absolutely no power to prevent vessels from leaving ports in foreign countries.
LORD MUSKERRY: The practice is to go out from England in ballast, so as to fetch back full cargoes.
VISCOUNT CLIFDEN: I am very sorry to hear the answer of the noble Earl. He did not seem to think that a few lives lost would signify very much.
THE EARL OF DUDLEY: I beg the noble Lord's pardon if I conveyed that impression by my answer. As far as the Board of Trade knows, not a single life has ever been lost from this cause.
VISCOUNT CLIFDEN: I should rather take my noble Friend's statistics, and anybody who knows anything about ships knows that vessels in ballast are very often in danger, and I think that the Board of Trade ought to do everything in their power, even if it is not very often the case, to prevent danger to life. As my noble Friend has said, we all know, and I think it does not take a sailor to
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know that, that the risks attending seafaring men are very often inevitable. I think that that being the case, it makes it more incumbent upon us to see that any risk that may be prevented should be prevented. Now, I cannot imagine what the objection to this ballast line can be. What can be the objection to an inspection by the Board of Trade agents of incoming vessels or outgoing vessels? It seems to me that it is only a little additional trouble, but I cannot help thinking that the lives of our sailors are worth that additional trouble. I do not like the reply, as I said before, of the noble Earl. He does not seem to think that the lives of the sailors are worth taking too much trouble about. I desire, of course, to exonerate the noble Earl himself, because of course he merely gave us the reasons of the Board of Trade; but I think it is a very unfeeling answer to what my noble friend has brought forward.
LORD NORTON: I have no doubt that the noble Lord who puts this Question has serious subjects in his mind—namely, whether ships cannot be as un-seaworthy by being too light as by being too deep in the water, but I think he must deal with this point, and with many others which he may from time to time find out, not by putting questions to the Government, asking them to cause instructions to be given to the Board of Trade to make suggestions to their surveyors; he must introduce a short Bill for the purpose of meeting the cases in his mind. The surveyors of the Board of Trade have powers to stop unseaworthy ships going out, but when you come to specific tests of particular kinds of unseaworthiness, that cannot be put into the hands of surveyors; it must be defined in an Act of Parliament. I can recollect perfectly well myself, in the Merchant Shipping Act which I had to pass 30 years ago, the difficulty with which I placed the maximum load line with the very embarrassing co-operation of Mr. Samuel Plimsoll; but if another kind of load line is required that must be dealt with in a similar manner by Act of Parliament. I can quite fancy myself that a line which should only be

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above water may be necessary to place at the side of a ship as a line which should only be below water, but that can hardly be a specific rule in the Board of Trade surveying without its being carefully considered. I should hardly feel myself competent to know what shipowners would say to such a proposal or what the opinion of the Board of Trade would be; but, whether right or wrong, I think specific tests of unseaworthiness must be matters of Acts of Parliament, and the general discretion of the surveyors of the Board of Trade cannot be left without any rule or guidance whatsoever. I should suggest to the noble Lord, if he would place the proposal which he has indicated in the form of a Bill we should be able to discuss it in a manner more worthy the importance of the subject, and I think that will be the right way to introduce such a Measure as he proposes.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN WEST AFRICA.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY: Before the House adjourns, I should like to ask the noble Marquess whether he is able to give us any further information as to the state of affairs in West Africa?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I have a telegram from Sir Edward Monson which does not carry us much further, but I think it is more distinct and more free from ambiguity than that which I read to the House before. The telegram says—
"My note of Feb. 21 has been replied to by M. Hanotaux, who, referring to our conversation of the same day, confirmed, on the authority of the Minister of the Colonies, the insurance he had previously given that no French force has entered either Sokoto or Argungu, and that no French expedition has been sent to these regions."
The House adjourned at 5.55 till to-morrow at 4.15.