HL Deb 01 August 1898 vol 63 cc649-59
THE EAEL OF KIMBERLEY

My Lords, I rise to ask the Prime Minister what steps Her Majesty's Government propose to take to safeguard British interests as regards railways in, the provinces bordering on the Yang-tse Kiang. I think the noble Marquess will not be surprised, considering the amount of anxiety which appears to prevail very generally in regard to the concessions for railways in China, that I should, before the House separates, give him the opportunity of making any statement he may think desirable on the subject. My Lords, the course of affairs in China seems to me to have been very much in one direction. Our original policy, which we all agreed upon—that of the open door—seems now to be very little more than a council of perfection, and with rapid strides it seems to me that China is being parcelled out into spheres of influence. No one can have read what has taken place in regard to Manchuria without seeing that the Russians are taking the most effective and rapid measures to appropriate the entire control of that country, and to exclude, as far as they can, any foreigners—by which I mean those who are not Russians—from any participation in railway projects in that very important region of China. We are supposed to have a very important sphere of influence in the provinces bordering on the great river Yang-tse-Kiang; and, so far as the use of the river is concerned, I believe we have obtained considerable concessions with regard to navigation from the Chinese Government, which, of course, are very valuable indeed. But it seems to me of importance, as regards commerce in China, that the future will lie chiefly with those who are able to establish a network of railway communications throughout that Empire, and unless the information which reaches us from China is extremely at fault, it would seem as if other Powers are making the most strenuous efforts to obtain the command of the railway communication, even into the Yang-tse-Kiang region. We have heard of a concession which is said to have been made to Belgium. Of course, there is no reason why we should be jealous of the Belgians, if they should embark their capital in useful works in China. But I confess to have considerable suspicions that Belgium will not be alone, and that other Powers will be found to have a finger in the pie. If that should not be so, so much the better. My Lords, the concession to Belgium is, I believe, for a railway from Pekin to Han-kau, which will pass through a most important part of China, and must be regarded as a trunk railway of the first importance. My Lords, there are also rumours, which may have no foundation, that the Germans are contemplating obtaining some concession in the same direction. But perhaps the most remarkable statement of all is one which appeared two or three days ago in the Times newspaper—namely, that a British company, having desired to obtain a concession to make a railway from Kau-Lung to Canton, the French Government remonstrated against the concession on the ground that the province of Kwang-tung lies within then-sphere of influence. Now, it certainly does seem to me, looking at our long connection with that part of China, that the contention that this great province, which includes the city of Canton, should be exclusively the hunting-ground for concessions for one great Power only is one of the most extravagant propositions I ever heard of. Possibly it may have no foundation, for I have, of course, no special information on the subject. But what I wish to point out is that there is never smoke without fire; and the amount of smoke which appears to be passing through these regions in regard to railway concessions must lead anyone to conclude that there is a great deal of fire at the foundation. There cannot be the smallest doubt that Russia and other great Powers are making the most strenuous and determined efforts to appropriate as far as they can the right to use the Chinese Empire for the construction of great railway works. Of course, it may be said that it will be a long time before such great works can be constructed; but I believe that if we do not exert ourselves strenuously now, and see that we are not ousted from our fair share—for we ask for no more—of these great enterprises, we may find, as we have found in other quarters of the world, that we have been supplanted, or that we may have to face the difficulty when there would be more danger and more friction in the position than there is at the present time. My Lords, of course, it may be said that, looking to the traditions of our Government, it is extremely difficult for us to fight with the same weapons as are employed by other Governments. But in a matter of this kind, so deeply affecting the commercial prospects of this country, I cannot but feel that we may be compelled to depart from our usual practice, and I feel quite certain that the noble Marquess and Her Majesty's Government must be sensible of the gravity of these affairs, and must be anxious to do everything in their power to reassure the public mind on this subject. I do not, of course, ask the noble Marquess to reveal to me any diplomatic secrets, or to make any statement which would prejudice any action that Her Majesty's Government may be engaged in; but, nevertheless, I think it may be in his power to indicate in some clear way the policy which Her Majesty's Government are pursuing, and are intending to pursue. My Lords, there is no doubt that the Chinese Government, being extremely weak, is at the mercy of, such great Powers as may not be very scrupulous as to the pressure or even other means that they may use to influence it. We heard when Wei-hai-Wei was acquired that it might be regarded, at all events, as a means of showing the Chinese Government that we were not disposed to be left out in the cold; and if you reflect upon the enormous share of trade still possessed by us in those regions, if you reflect upon the whole history of our connection with China, where we have played a far greater part than any other Power, I think that Her Majesty's Government has a right to expect that the Chinese Government will listen to their remonstrances; and I should hope that such pressure may be applied, if necessary, as may prevent the Chinese from making concessions to other Powers which are obviously directed against British interests. I need not mention the great efforts which are made to prevent Englishmen being employed on such works. But all these things are indications that no means will be left untried, be they fair means or foul means, to damage our interests and establish other Powers in regions where we, at all events, have the right to exercise great influence and to have a larger share. We have had numerous discussions in regard to China, and there is no necessity, therefore, to repeat the general arguments over again. I will therefore conclude by simply asking the noble Marquess the Question of which I have given notice.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OP STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (The Marquess of SALISBURY)

My Lords, I listened to the noble Earl with great interest, because he is a man with a very clear head, and I hoped I should trace in his speech an apprehension of the confusion which commonly attends the discussion of these matters. The noble Earl was, in effect, making an arraignment, though in all moderate language, of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government. I was very anxious to see what he thought it was the duty of Her Majesty's Government to do. My belief—and, I imagine, his belief also'—is that the duty of the Government in foreign countries is to give protection, and, so far as in their power lies, assistance to all British subjects who have commercial or other enterprises to conduct, and to take care that they are not treated with injustice or illegality. What a different conception has animated much of the discussion we have had on this Chinese question! The impression seems to be—and I am not satisfied that the noble Earl is free from it—that it is part of the duty of Her Majesty's Government to trace out plans for railways in that foreign country, to construct railways, to find capitalists and undertakers, and to provide the capital. If that is the impression of the noble Earl, I can only say that I do not share it. And that my view is not entirely imaginary as to the doctrines which prevail, I will merely cite the utterances of some commercial bodies. I have received addresses from Worcester, Waddington, Stockton, and, I think, two or three other places, in which they urge that Her Majesty's Government—I will quote their own words—should lose no time in insisting upon a concession for a railway from the Burmese frontier to the Yang-tse-Kiang River, with a branch line to Canton, and a line connecting Canton with Han-kau. So far as I can see, that means, at least, 2,000 miles of railway as the crow flies, and probably considerably more. Then the London China Association has to-day published a letter impressing upon us with scarcely less emphasis that it would be immeasurably preferable that important trunk lines should be laid by China herself with foreign capital, and suggesting that Parliament might be invited to protect British interests by a British guarantee. If we came to a discussion of this question, I think I could show grounds for thinking that such a policy would be unwise. But what I wish, as a preliminary step, to insist upon is that as the tradition of the English Government has been for generations in the opposite direction, and its conduct in such matters is well known, it would not be fitting, it would not be tolerable, for the Executive Government of the country to undertake an entire reversal of the traditional policy of the country without giving to Parliament some opportunity of expressing its opinion thereupon. I am bound to say that I see in no authoritative quarter any indication of a support of such a policy. Perhaps I ought to accept the language of the noble Earl to-night; but he spoke very vaguely, and I cannot fasten on him such a policy without a more distinct avowal. But there has been no resolution, no Vote of Parliament, no avowal of policy, from any person of political authority or position of any party, which would justify the adoption of such a line of action as that which is recommended to us by these commercial bodies. I do not, therefore, believe that it is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to make railways in China, or to find the money for making them; and I wish to state that quite clearly, that I may not seem, by silence or avoidance, to admit such an extraordinary extension of the duties of the-diplomatic profession. But then, perhaps, the noble Earl will say to me, "I quite agree that it is your duty to help British subjects in their commercial enterprises, and to protect them, but why do not you help British subjects in undertaking to make railways in this foreign country?" My answer, which I might put in a proverbial form, is that there are no British subjects to help. There is one railway—I must not mention names or go into details—but there is one railway for which, I believe, up to a certain point, a British syndicate has sought, and has obtained, a preliminary concession. But even in regard to that the terms are not settled. With respect to other railways, I have never heard anything on the side of English capitalists, except the claim that on account of the general importance of Chinese trade the British Government should guarantee the railway capital necessary to construct the important trunk lines in China. Now, of course, we may be indulging in premature discussion. It is quite possible that British capitalists may come forward, and if they come forward the noble Earl may be certain that Her Majesty's Government will do all in their power to obtain for them concessions for the work they undertake, and I think we may claim that we have, for the purpose of persuading the Chinese Government, a diplomatist of singular ability and success in Sir Claude MacDonald, and that all that can be done will be done by him to obtain just and equal treatment for British applicants for concessions to make railways in China. But until applications are made, and until the concessions are asked for, of course his intervention will be of no use. I am speaking, of course, with respect to the Yang-tse-Kiang Valley, because that is the matter to which the noble Earl has specially pointed my attention. I shall come in a moment to another matter that he raised, with respect to the Canton railway, which is not in the Yang-tse-Kiang Valley, but which undoubtedly deserves our attention. Now, I maintain that it is not our duty to make railways until we are masters of a country, which could only happen after a successful war. We cannot force the Chinese Government to give concessions, but we can, I think, urge upon them such arguments that in a general way would induce them to give proper treatment to the applications of British subjects when they are made. The Chinese Government we have hitherto found certainly well-intentioned to this country, and though I think they have a shrewd view of their own interests, and are very anxious that the possession of railways shall not be made a means of taking the government, of their country out of their hands, I believe they are exceedingly well disposed towards British applications. But there is one apprehension which I think I traced in the speech of the noble Earl, and which I have frequently heard; it lies at the bottom of all the uneasiness of this matter. It is not that people deny the right of the Chinese Government to settle this matter for themselves, if they are left alone, but it is, I believe, that they are threatened by other Powers into giving undue advantages to those Powers to the detriment of English applications. It is very difficult to know how far that impression is correct. There are a good many things stated in the papers for which I cannot find any foundation. But no doubt the Russians—the diplomatists of other countries are skilful in all the arts of persuasion, and some of the arts of persuasion which they employ I think belong to that category which the noble Earl alluded to when he said it was not open to us with our traditions to adopt. But as regards the matter of threatening to take aggressive action if a concession is granted to a British applicant, that is a point upon which we have a clear right to be heard, and have a power to interpose; and we therefore, about a fortnight ago, communicated to Sir Claude MacDonald this instruction— You are authorised to inform the Chinese Government that Her Majesty's Government will support them in resisting any Power which commits an act of aggression on China on account of China having granted permission to make or support any railway or public work to a British subject. Well, that is the utmost we can do. We are willing to repeat that, and act upon it. It is obvious that it is the utmost we can do. We will support China if there is any attempt to bully or drive her into refusing British applications. My belief is that we shall gain our full share of profitable railways, but our capitalists are very good men of business, and I do not think they are in the least inclined to risk their money in unprofitable railways. One railway of which I hear very much is the railway from the borders of Burma to the Yang-tse-Kiang. It looks to me as if it would be a railway of exceedingly doubtful value. It passes over most impracticable country, and a country much of which is very sparsely populated. But I think you must bear in mind that in all new countries English capital has hitherto not entered upon railway enterprise, you may say generally without the assistance of a Government guarantee. In India, populated, wealthy, orderly as it is, every railway of importance has been made with a Government guarantee. In South America, where there is an enormous mass of British capital invested in railways, in almost every case the undertaking was begun by a concession, or the promise from the Government whichever it was, of a Government guarantee. You will get no Government guarantee of that kind from China; in the first place, because they do not very much wish for railways; and, secondly, because I do not think they have the money. But you cannot, without departing from every tradition that you have hitherto observed, supply its place by offering that guarantee yourself. That consideration, no doubt, hinders the application of British capital to the construction of railways in China. I do not think it will hinder it entirely. I think it is probable that we shall have some profitable parts, but I believe that our nerves must prepare themselves for witnessing the bestowal of unprofitable concessions upon our rivals and our neighbours. No doubt a great noise will be made at the time that those concessions are granted; there is something almost morbid in the tendency to believe that no bargain can go on with China on the part of any Power without its being really a concealed bargain on the part of Russia. As far as our information goes, derived both from China and from Belgium, we have no doubt whatever that it is a complete mistake to imagine that this Pekin-Han-kau railway is in the hands of Russia; it is in the hands of a number of Belgian syndicates and firms, who obtained the first promise of the concession some 15 or 18 months ago. I have endeavoured to indicate to the noble Earl the extent to which, and the means by which, we think it our duty to intervene in this matter of railway concession in China. I have only one thing more to which I should like to direct his attention—has he satisfied himself that the construction of a railway in a country will give you political power in that country? I do not know on what precedent that very popular doctrine is founded. We have an admirable railway, the chairman of which is a well-known Member of this House—the Smyrna Railway. I believe that is one of the few Turkish lines which pay; but I never heard that the construction of that line by British capital, or its officering by British directors, has given to England the slightest influence or control over the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan. The lines in Eastern Roumelia were made by Baron Hirsch; but I have never heard that Austria has obtained from that success on Baron Hirsch's part the slightest influence in the management of Eastern Roumelia. If you come to examine it in detail, I do not see how the liberty to make a railway and to run a railway can give to any foreign country a political power over China. I quite admit that if the concession is allowed to run in such a form as to give an unequal right to Russia, if they can exclude or hamper in any degree our trade—I quite agree we should be very deeply wronged and that it would be a substantial breach of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, on which we rely, and which we shall resist to the very utmost of our power. But my own inclination is to say that, granted that sufficient care is taken that there is no undue favouritism in the administration of the railway, if other Powers are disposed to make railways which our capitalists do not choose to undertake, then it is rather a matter for congratulation to us than for lamentation. At all events, it would not be possible for us to adopt, as a last alternative, that which was addressed to us in one sentence of the noble Earl's speech, which I think he must have expressed unintentionally, and that is, if we could not make the railway ourselves we should prevent anybody else making it.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I certainly did not intend to convey that. I may have used language which conveyed it, but that was not the intention which was in my mind.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I am very glad to hear that disclaimer. That is a policy which it would be perfectly impossible for us to pursue. If our capitalists are able and willing to make railways in the Yang-tsze Valley, or anywhere else, we will give them the utmost possible support, but if they cannot we will not try to deprive the Chinese people of the benefits of railway construction. My Lords, that is the only answer I have to make to the Question of the noble Earl.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

The noble Marquess said he would refer to the action of the French Government with reference to the proposed railway I mentioned—the railway from Kau-Lung to Canton.

THE PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I cannot believe that the French Minister has done anything so ill-advised. It is an intolerable pretension, and we are bound to support China against any Power who makes the grant of commercial facilities to a British subject the ground of aggressive action. I will only say our object is to maintain the open door, and I still declare that we have done so. Our object is that our rights under the Treaty of Tien-tsin shall be in no way invalidated or invaded, and that object we will pursue to the best of our ability. But, whether capital should be found to make railways in China, and whether that capital should be English capital, or capital of other nations, that is a thing which will depend more upon the action of others than Her Majesty's Government, and is a matter for which Her Majesty's Government are not responsible.