THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY, on rising to call attention to the statement made (25th February) by the noble Marquess the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the policy intended to be pursued with respect to Crete, was received with Opposition cheers. He said: My Lords, I am so deeply sensible of the exceeding gravity of the crisis in the affairs connected with Crete at this moment that even if I were disposed to make, which I am not, any attack on the Government, I certainly should refrain from it. I need hardly assure the noble Marquess that I have not the smallest desire in any way to embarrass the Government in the conduct of the most difficult affairs in which they are engaged—[cheers.]—but I think it is fitting that, upon the statement made by the noble Marquess the other night, some observations—prudent observations I trust—should be made. Before, however, I proceed, I have a word to say arising out of the Blue-book which has been presented to Parliament upon Cretan affairs. I have not had the advantage of studying that Blue-book, as a copy of it has not yet reached me, but through the extracts 1418 published in the public Press I have been able to read some of the important documents contained in it. There is only one to which I desire to advert, and that is the answer given by the noble Marquess to the communication of July 27, last year, from the Austro-Hungarian Government, and I think I shall have general concurrence when I say I believe that answer will have been universally read with the greatest satisfaction. [Cheers.] I think I shall be correct in assuming that the noble Marquess, however strong may be his desire—his natural and just desire—to act in harmony with the other Powers of Europe, will not allow himself to be forced into any Measures which may be repugnant to the feeling which prevails generally throughout this country. As to the statement itself I, of course, am not aware—the noble Marquess will probably tell us—whether what may be termed, I suppose, the proposals of Her Majesty's Government were entirely accepted by the other Powers; but I may assume that, to a very large extent at all events, they represent an agreement which has now been arrived at. At any rate, the statement contains the policy which Her Majesty's Government desired to pursue. One thing, happily, appears to be irrevocably decided by the Powers—namely, that in no circumstances shall Crete return under the direct domination of the Sultan of Turkey. [Cheers.] That I apprehend is the solid basis which has been laid for whatever settlement may ultimately be arrived at; but, speaking for myself only—though I believe that there are not a few who agree with me—putting aside all feeling of sympathy with the Greeks, concerning which I shall say something presently, as a mere cold question of policy, it would have been wiser and safer to have joined Crete to the kingdom of Greece. ["Hear, hear!"] My Lords, perhaps no more unfortunate event occurred some 60 years ago, or rather more, than the refusal of the Powers to unite Crete to the then newly-formed independent kingdom of Greece, and anyone who will refer to the remarkable correspondence which passed between Prince Leopold, the Earl of Aberdeen, and the Duke of Wellington at that time, will see that Prince Leopold in point of fact prophesied all the evils which have arisen by leaving Crete under the domination of the Porte, and not adding it to 1419 Greece. His words might be adopted by anyone at the present time. I believe it would have been a wiser course; but however, the Powers have determined upon what is termed "autonomy." Now autonomy is a very blessed word; something like the well-known blessed word "Mesopotamia;" but everything depends upon what autonomy means. Now, in the first place, I suppose we all agree that that autonomy which is to be, as I understand, under the sovereignty of the Sultan should be complete and clearly defined. There is an example, which has been often quoted, of the autonomy of Samos, but I desire to point out that the circumstances of the island of Samos differ largely and essentially from the conditions of the island of Crete, because in Samos there are scarcely any Mussulmans amongst the population. I have been told there are some twenty; but, no matter what the number may be, the population is almost entirely Christian. On the other hand, in Crete there is a considerable body—I forget the exact proportion—of Mussulmans, and it is obvious that, whilst in Samos it is easy, no doubt, to govern a population which is homogeneous, or nearly entirely Christian, in Crete, unless there be a strong controlling power, it would be exceedingly difficult to govern such a population as there exists; and that is one of the reasons; why I, personally, think it would have been well to have placed Crete under Greece. What I dread is this, that the Powers may have decided upon autonomy in principle, but have formed no scheme as to the manner in which that autonomy is to be carried into effect, or as to the precise nature of the autonomy which is to be established. If that be so, and if they are about to proceed to summon the Greeks to retire, or have proceeded, perhaps, already at this moment to summon the Greeks to retire from Crete, it seems to me that there may ensue great confusion, great further disturbance and difficulties, the end of which it is hard to foresee. It is quite obvious that there must be some means of preserving order in Crete until the new Government is entirely established, and upon that I find that the noble Marquess, in the statement he made, added some observations which I 1420 must confess filled me with considerable alarm. He said:—
It does not follow that, certainly in the case of Turkey, all the troops can be withdrawn immediately. Mere questions of police would prevent such a result as that.I ask myself can it be intended, after the withdrawal of the Greek troops, to use the Turkish troops for the purpose of policing the island. Surely if any such attempt be made, it will only prolong the conflict between the insurgents and the Turks, and lead to disasters as great as, if not greater than, any which have hitherto occurred. The insurgents, finding that they have no longer the assistance of the Greek troops, will probably commit some of the crimes natural in a civil war, and, alas! we know too well what has taken place in other parts of Turkey, and, to some extent, in Crete itself. We know that in such circumstances the Turkish troops are not likely to be subject to much restraint. For these reasons, it seems to me that it is almost absolutely necessary that there should be organised a means of keeping order in the island before there is a withdrawal of the troops; and, further than that, it seems to me both policy and justice require that the withdrawal of the Turkish and Greek troops should practically be simultaneous. [Opposition cheers.] That, I think, would have a very pacifying effect upon the insurgents, and I believe, whatever you may think—and I have my own opinion, which I will express presently, as to the proceeding of the Greek Government in sending troops into the island—it would be wiser, now that the Greek troops are there, to make use of them rather than to aggravate the state of things which exists by peremptorily withdrawing them from the island, probably by the exercise of force. A further statement made by the noble Marquess with regard to the Turkish troops was that their withdrawal "is a necessary condition of administrative autonomy." It may be proper, he said, to keep, as in the case of Samos, and now for many years in the case of Servia, some troops—some few troops, no doubt, is meant—as an indication simply of sovereignty. The Samian Constitution states positively in terms that no Turkish troops are to remain in the island; but I believe there is some guard of honour to the Governor. Whether 1421 that be so or not, I have no information which enables me precisely to say; but to me it seems that it would be far safer if no Turkish troops remained in Crete, and I cannot understand why it should be necessary as an indication of sovereignty, because no doubt there will be stipulations that some tribute be paid to the Turkish Government, and there will be other indications which will clearly show-that the sovereignty of the Sultan over the island continues. However that may be—and I do not attach must importance to the point, but merely mention it because the noble Marquess referred to it—what I insist upon is this, that until the Turkish troops are withdrawn from the island, there will be no security whatever that there will be order and peace in the island, and the sooner, therefore, they can be withdrawn the better. My Lords, I have made these observations, which I have strictly confined to the statement made by the noble Marquess; but there is one further statement besides that as to autonomy which undoubtedly and necessarily is of the gravest character—namely, that as to the determination of the Powers to summon both the Turks and the Greeks to withdraw their troops from the island, and if either of them refuse, to compel them by force to do so. If we are to believe what we read in the newspapers, the summons may have been presented to Greece. If it is not presented at this moment, no doubt it will be presented very shortly. I do not, of course, know what the terms of that summons may be; but we have been told that the Russian Government laid great stress upon the summons being to retire within three clays. I should be glad if the noble Marquess is in a position to give any information as to the precise nature of the summons which has been delivered to the Greek Government. The newspapers also contain a document which, according to the statement I have read, has been actually presented to the Greek authorities. It is said that it was communicated to the Greek Chamber by one of the Ministers, and caused a great sensation, at which I am not surprised. It is the notification of the foreign Admirals—I quote from The Times—as to the measures that they will take. The words are:—The admirals do not allow the Greek fleet to bombard the occupied fortresses and towns. 1422 They forbid any attack by Greek troops on the fortresses aforesaid. They do not permit the landing of guns or of ammunition. They forbid any attack on the Turkish ships on the part of the Hellenic fleet. They do not permit the troops of Colonel Vassos to advance into the interior of the island. Any attempt on the part of the Greeks to infringe these orders will be repelled by the combined fleets.
*THE PRIME MINISTERI think I shall save the noble Earl from unnecessary argument if I say that I never heard of the document. ["Hear, hear!"]
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYVery likely. I am glad to hear it; but the noble Marquess will admit that it is exceedingly natural that I should make this comment upon it—namely, that, undoubtedly, it is quite within the power of the fleet to do all that; but one is a little puzzled to see how, unless forces are landed, you can prevent the Greeks from advancing into the interior of the island.
THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYIf force is to be applied to compel the Greek troops to retire from the island, military forces must be employed in the island itself, and I should doubt whether the Powers contemplate that. I read that extract because I wished to get the explanation which the Prime Minister has been good enough to give us. With regard to the-summons itself, I certainly sympathise strongly and deeply with the Greeks in the action they have taken. My feeling is this, that they alone have forced the Powers to act with decision in this matter, and it is due to Greece really that Crete will be emancipated from Turkish rule. Otherwise months more might have passed of massacre and turmoil, and the result might have been as distant now as it is in regard to the unfortunate Armenians, for whom, in point of fact, nothing has been done. I say, all honour to the Greeks—["hear, hear!"]—for what they have done. It is said that they have violated international law. I am not an international jurist, but I never yet heard that an act of war on the part of a regular Government was a violation of international law. No one can doubt that the invasion of Crete by Greek 1423 troops, Crete being a Turkish possession, was a distinct act of war, and one which the Turkish Government would have been entirely justified in treating as an act of war. I have heard it spoken of as a filibustering expedition; but if that be the case, there are few governments which have not been engaged in filibustering expeditions. [Laughter.] However that may be, the Greeks deserve warm sympathy for what they have clone. But, my Lords, in circumstances so exceedingly grave and so critical, involving questions reaching so far, I certainly could not, as far as my humble voice goes, take upon myself the responsibility of offering any counsel to Greece at the present moment to take any step which might endanger her safety or prejudice her hopes for the future. [Cheers.] She has already done much for the freedom of her Hellenic countrymen in Crete, and I believe that it is not too sanguine to expect that, at no very distant date, although she may be again disappointed, as she was in 1829, Crete will be united with Greece under one Greek Government. [Cheers.]
*THE PRIME MINISTERwho was received with cheers, said: I have nothing to complain of in the tone adopted by the noble Lord. He is too familiar with the difficulties with which foreign administration has to contend to have said anything to embarrass the Government in his remarks. But naturally there is much in what he has said to which I cannot consent. I will begin by saying that he is right in his conclusion that the policy which I explained by reading the telegram on Thursday night is a policy that has, on the whole, been accepted by the Powers. But I am compelled to put in a word of reservation, because I think it is right that I should say that that part of my statement which referred to the withdrawal of the Turkish troops has not been received without considerable demur on the part of many of the Powers. In fact, the one thing desired by the noble Lord is the one thing that they apprehend. I do not think that they were as unreasonable as it may have seemed at first sight, but the point which I have mostly to defend in their action, so far as it is incumbent on me to defend it, is in the decision that Crete should not form part of the Hellenic Kingdom. I do not 1424 admit that that is doing any violence to Crete. We have no grounds for thinking so. Before this crisis arose we had no evidence that there was on the part of the Cretan population, as a whole, a desire to be united to Greece. We know now that to the Mussulman part of the population it would be intensely distasteful. Whether it would be agreeable to the others at this moment it is impossible to say. I put aside the notion that you can trust the announcements of the leaders of insurrections, of politicians whose position is depending upon the success of the enterprise which they have sustained. Such evidence is of no value at all for declaring what the fixed and permanent and steady view of the population may be. I think that our experience of some 30 or 40 years ago may dispose of any inclination to apply the machinery of a plébiscite to ascertain a similar result. If I were to decide this question in the interests of Crete alone, without reference to any larger question or to the desire of any other Power, I should still say that it was a rash and hazardous, and, perhaps, an unjustifiable step to force Crete into a union with Greece at a moment when it is impossible that a sober and deliberate determination of the people can genuinely be ascertained. ["Hear, hear!"] The noble Lord has indulged in eulogies of Greece, and that, no doubt, is part of his case; and if I were contesting with him before a tribunal part of my case would be exactly the reverse, but in the position in which I stand I cannot develop that view. It is, however, but fair to ask whether you have a right to rush on the union of a separate island and a people like the Cretans with people on the mainland with whom they have really no community of interest and only a community, if it be such, of race, and a certain community of language. I ask whether you have a right to rush that union on without considering—without taking some precautions to ascertain—what their wishes are in that respect. If, when some years have passed, they should be of opinion that—looking at the financial position of Greece, looking upon its success in past years in maintaining public order, looking upon the character of its administration, and the salient features of its political history—an alliance with Greece, a closer union with Greece, is one that 1425 the Cretan population ought to desire, I am exceedingly sceptical that the majority of the Great Powers would offer any opposition to such a result. But I say, for the sake of the Cretans themselves, it is right that matters should be deferred until a more quiet and deliberate consideration of the question is possible, when they should really have an opportunity of giving a sincere and reflecting opinion as to the effects of the union with Greece on their future destinies. But, my Lords, I have said this assuming that I am arguing about Crete alone. Of course, everybody knows that I am not. There are other considerations of the most potent character which have weighed with the Powers in the decision to which they have come. Some of them are territorial questions which will readily occur to the mind of the noble Lord, and he will forgive me for not entering upon them. But to others I may advert, and they are most important. There is no feeling which I have found so strong among the Powers with whom I have been in communication as the belief that if this enterprise of Greece, which they stigmatise as illegal—and they use stronger language than that—is to be allowed to result in the attainment of a great territorial advantage to the Greek Government, the example will spread, the signal will be given, the fire of civil war will be lit where there is peace now. All men are familiar with the fact that, if the lire of civil war is lit on the Continent of Europe and in the Turkish Empire, it will not be civil war alone with which we shall have to deal. These are grave considerations, and we have been struck with the intensity with which they have presented themselves to the minds of the other Powers. I have also been struck with the utter neglect which they have received from public opinion here. I should say that the dominant feeling with the other Powers is this—we sympathise with the Cretans, we are earnestly desirous to serve them, to prevent and to bring to an end oppression; but if it is to be a question whether the arrangements which have gone on are to continue with only slow and general amelioration, or whether the whole of Europe is to be plunged into a cauldron of civil war, we say that the interests of vast masses of populations are superior to those of the few who appear in the forefront of the present crisis, and that it is our duty to maintain 1426 the existing state of things until we can see a safe and peaceful issue. ["Hear, hear!"] Of course, in using the phrase the existing state of things," I refer to the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and not to the question of autonomy which we are all content to give. Therefore, my Lords, in judging of the position of the Powers that Crete is not to form part of the Hellenic Kingdom you must in the first place consider the interests of the Cretans themselves; you must ask yourselves whether you have any sufficient and adequate reasons for supposing that the Cretans themselves desire or that they would be better for it; and you must further give your sympathies to those wider views which are in favour of the preservation of the paramount blessings of European peace which have weighed heavily with all the great nations in the decision to which they have come. ["Hear, hear!"] The noble Lord pressed the question of the Turkish soldiery very strongly. The question of the Turkish soldiery is one with which I am very familiar. When I am here or with my colleagues in the other House we hear of nothing but of the necessity of turning the Turkish soldiers out of Crete, but when I am at the Foreign Office I hear of nothing but the expediency of not interfering with the Turkish soldiery unnecessarily. The belief which the Powers entertain is that the Turkish soldiery in Crete are not to be feared for the purposes of any prospective action such as the noble Lord has in his mind. By all accounts they have—I mean the regular Turkish soldiers in Crete—behaved extremely well during the present crisis, and there is really no ground to apprehend that they will disobey the orders of their officers in the future. But may mention that I believe that a combined representation has been addressed to the Porte pointing out that the withdrawal of the Turkish soldiery must be a necessary consequence of autonomy—I am speaking from memory—and that it ought to be conducted as expeditiously as the circumstances of the situation permit, and that as soon as possible the Turkish soldiers should be gathered into those parts of the island where, being side by side with the European troops, there will be no danger of any contest or conflict between them and the islanders. I hope that the Porte will take that view— 1427 I think that would be very desirable; but I am bound to say that the proposal to remove them immediately seems to me not practicable. There is no police. A gendarmerie was established and money for it was begun to be provided, but the enterprise of the Greek Kingdom has stopped the raising of the loan and has stopped the payment of the gendarmerie, with the result that the gendarmes, taking a very natural view of their own interest, declined to serve merely upon promises. Major Bor is there, but I am not sure that he has any gendarmes under him, and he only holds by a temporary title. He is unfortunately a British subject, and therefore some of the other Powers would rather like to see him displaced by an officer of some neutral Power. I am told that there is a very excellent Belgian officer who is willing to hold the position, but I am not sure that the arrangement has arrived at a condition of maturity. The noble Lord will therefore see that the question of an efficient gendarmerie in Crete is not sufficiently before us. I think that I heard some words dropped which sugested that the police should be maintained by the Powers.
*THE PRIME MINISTERThat is a very different matter, and it is a reasonable request. A very learned person with whom I was discussing this matter yesterday informed me that two centuries ago, when the Turks took possession of the island, they found an army of 250,000 men necessary to keep order—["hear, hear!" and a laugh]—and therefore I am not certain that the bluejackets detailed by different vessels would be adequate for the purpose. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.]
*THE PRIME MINISTERThe case is certainly one of extreme difficulty. For my part I should not be jealous—and I am speaking only for myself—if any one of the Great Powers would undertake to police Crete. But that duty has not been undertaken by them yet, and therefore we must work with such materials as we have. It appears to me, and I believe that it appears to all the Powers, that it would be a rash act to at once withdraw 1428 the Turkish troops, who are really our only safeguard against disorder, until we get something in their place. That they are ultimately to be withdrawn is undoubted, but that they shall be withdrawn at the same time as the Greek troops, whom some of the Great Powers look upon as mere invaders, is, I think, an unreasonable demand. But I hope that, if the Porte is content to leave the Turkish troops, under the supervision of European troops, to protect them from the suspicion of the noble Lord—I hope we shall be able to use them for all useful purposes without running the risk of any great dangers which he apprehends. But these are matters of detail. I cannot go more closely into detail, because I dare not answer for the consent of the Great Powers which I have not yet obtained. I can only assure the noble Lord that upon this point we are resolved—that is, on effective autonomy for Crete, and by effective autonomy I mean an effective withdrawal of Crete from the arbitrary power of the Sultan. Without saying a word which is inconsistent with international comity, I think that it can be said without rashness that the arbitrary power of the Sultan has not hitherto succeeded in securing the well-being and peace of his Christian subjects—and that is the main object we have in view. But the Powers are firmly resolved that Crete shall not for the present time form part of the Hellenic Kingdom, and if the Hellenic Kingdom chooses to take issue with the Powers upon that point it must abide the consequences. The feeling upon that point is unanimous amongst the Powers. The feeling, as the noble Lord said, is strong among some people in favour of Greece, but the feeling in other parts of Europe is strong against them as having needlessly disturbed the peace of Europe, and as having risked a general conflagration, and as having brought the sanctions and obligations of international law to a certain extent into contempt, and as having placed us in a crisis which, if she had had somewhat more self-control and somewhat more patience, we should have been able successfully and peacefully to surmount. [Cheers.]
§ House adjourned at a quarter past Five o'clock, to Thursday next, a quarter past Ten o'clock.