HOME DEFENCE AND THE VOLUNTEERS.

HL Deb 11 February 1897 vol 46 cc131-40

*THE EARL OF MINTO

rose to ask the Lord President (the Duke of Devonshire) whether, in the existing scheme for utilising the naval and military forces of the Crown, the Volunteer Force formed part of the plan for home defence; and whether the recent increase of expenditure, whereby the Navy had been strengthened and augmented, rendered it in the opinion of her Majesty's Government less necessary to maintain the Volunteer Force? He explained that the origin of the question was a statement made by the noble Duke when speaking on the subject of Imperial defence at the meeting of the British Empire League in December last. Very great importance had been attached to that statement as denoting an entirely new departure in regard to our home defence, and as affecting the question of the maintenance of our Volunteer Force, which had always been looked upon hitherto as a very important factor in the defence of the country. The noble Duke's statement amounted to this, that the Imperial defence of our Empire should be based on our sea supremacy, that the Admiralty had accepted all responsibility for the same, and that, though certain points might be liable to predatory raids carried out by the landing of a few thousand men, local defences should be generally sufficient to meet such attacks, and that on the conditions accepted by the Admiralty it was practically needless to consider the possibility of invasion by a large force. Upon that statement an interpretation had been put which he trusted was not correct. Critics and experts of some recognised authority had taken the view that this statement meant that we were on the eve of an entirely new departure in regard to home defences, that a great deal of the organisation of past years had been a mistake, that much of our expenditure had been money thrown away, and that in future the country need fear nothing beyond the predatory raids of small cruisers, invasions on a large scale being out of the question. If a statement of that kind were allowed to pass without some authoritative explanation it might have a serious effect upon the Volunteer Force, which had been formed to repel invasion. It was the fear of invasion on a large scale, and not the fear of the predatory raids of cruisers, that had brought the force into existence. When a volunteer joined the force he did so with the idea that some day he might have to defend his hearth and home. It was the thought of the possibility of invasion that induced him to join, and if that possibility was no longer to be contemplated the raison d'être of the force would disappear in the opinion of a large number of the rank and file. There were, of course, other reasons for the continued existence of the force besides the remote chance of invasion. It fostered a, military spirit in the country, and in times of great emergency might prove a useful feeder to the Army. Such reasons, however, by themselves, would not, he thought, be sufficient incentives to recruiting. They ought to remember what had occurred in past times. At the end of the last century, and at the beginning of the present, there was a great fear of an invasion by Napoleon, and the Volunteer Force of those days sprang into existence. About 1803–4 it had risen to 460,000 men. Then came Trafalgar, and the hostile fleets were swept from the seas. The fear of invasion disappeared for the time, and the Volunteer Force began to dwindle, and in a few years had ceased to exist altogether, But he did not think that they could afford at the present time to belittle our Volunteer Army. They were justified in remembering that they had not yet had their second Trafalgar, nor, as far as he knew, had they got their second Nelson; therefore, we should do well to recognise the value of the Volunteer Force, and not let it go down too easily. They ought also to remember the composition of the force. It was entirely unpaid; it was supported very largely by Government grants, which maintained its efficiency, but neither officers nor men received anything in the shape of direct money payment. Nevertheless, they received a form of pay which they valued very much—the estimation which they earned from the public for their capability as soldiers. If they lowered that public estimation they would lower the pay, and as a natural result would obtain hereafter an inferior article. The standard of officers and men would gradually become lower. He knew very well that the Volunteer Force varied in efficiency in different parts of the country. At the same time a great deal had been done by the War Office of late years to improve its organisation, not in the matter of small details, but to organise it with the idea of forming a useful part of a large field army. The Volunteer Force had been told off in brigades; it had been divided into garrisons and mobile brigades, which had been told off to certain positions. He believed that the brigade which he had the honour to command was intended in case of great national emergency to join the field army at Dorking—a place with rather an unfortunate name. If they were on an entirely wrong tack, if the critics and experts were right, and there was no more use for a large defensive army, then the Volunteer Force ought to be told so, and the Government of the day should put the force on some sound footing of organisation, where by the Volunteers might feel that they could do some good to their country. He wished it to be distinctly understood that, he did not believe any soldier who had thought over the question of imperial defence would fail to understand the paramount necessity to this country of the supremacy of sea power, and he did not believe any money spent in that direction could be possibly thrown away. At the same time, he did not think that the nation ought to be compelled to put all its eggs into one basket; and, therefore, it seemed to him that the nation was justified in having a second string to its bow, in having a large Army for Home Defence, with the idea that if an invasion on a large scale was attempted against this country, that army might be capable of meeting it. If the noble Duke found himself able to say that in the opinion of the Government the Volunteer Force still formed a valuable part of such an army, it might go far to dispel the harm which had been done by some of the careless criticisms to which so much publicity had been given.

THE LORD PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL (The Duke of DEVONSHIRE)

I am very much indebted to my noble Friend for giving me the opportunity of saying a few words to correct some of the misapprehensions which have arisen in consequence of the speech which I made a short time, ago at the meeting of the British Empire League, and at the same time of disavowing some of what appeared to be the most extraordinary conclusions which had been drawn from that speech. I was on that occasion speaking of the advantage which I thought might be derived from a repetition of such colonial conferences as the conference which was held some time ago in this country. I was instancing as a subject which might be discussed at such a conference the conditions upon which the naval agreement with the colonies of Australia, the term of which will shortly expire, might be renewed. I went on to speak of some of the principles which the home Government hopes that some of the colonies are adopting, and will continue to adopt, in the way of preparations for their own defence. In the course of those observations I referred to a Memorandum which has been for some years in existence, and which has been in the possession of all the colonial Governments for some time. It is a Memorandum which had hitherto been treated as a confidential document, and which is, as regards some of its details, still confidential in character, but I was permitted to refer to it as far as related to the general principles underlying colonial defence. From that Memorandum I quoted words some of which have been referred to by my noble friend. These were the words of the Memorandum:— The maintenance of sea supremacy has been assumed as the basis of the system of Imperial defence against attack from over sea. This is the determining factor in shaping the defensive policy of the Empire, and is fully recognised by the Admiralty, who have accepted the responsibility of protecting all British territory abroad against organised invasion from the sea. The Memorandum went on to point out that complete freedom and independence of action was an essential condition of the efficiency of the Navy, but the presence of the fleet could not therefore be insured at all times at any particular point. The colonies could not therefore be guaranteed against predatory attacks which might be made upon them by a force either of cruisers or of a small squadron of battleships. It went on further to point out the measures by which it was considered possible and desirable for the colonies to place themselves in a position to secure themselves against attacks of that character. Now, I think the statement contained in that Memorandum which I quoted may be open to comment on the ground that perhaps if places too great a responsibility on the Navy, and that it attributes to the Admiralty the assumption of a responsibility which it has perhaps hardly to the fullest extent ever undertaken. But it is perfectly clear in what sense that statement was addressed to the colonial Governments. The evident intention of that statement was to limit the responsibility of the Imperial Government and to point out clearly to the colonies against what risks the home Government could not undertake to protect them, and that it was necessary, if they should be protected, they should undertake to protect themselves. This statement, as my noble Friend has said, has been treated in some quarters as the announcement of an absolutely new policy of defence, and of a policy of defence applicable not only to the colonies of which I am speaking, but to the United Kingdom also. But there is absolutely nothing new in the statement which I made on that occasion, although I fully admit that some extremely new deductions have been drawn from it. ["Hear, hear."] In the first place, the statement which I made applied only to the colonies and to colonial defence. I did not conceive that any sane Government ever imagined for a moment that the defence of our possessions abroad against naval attack upon a large scale could depend upon anything except the supremacy of our Navy. [Cheers.] No statesman, no soldier, and no sailor has ever, I conceive, imagined that a serious attack by a great maritime Power on one of our colonial possessions could be resisted by any fortifications, by the enlistment of any forces, or by any maritime provisions within the power of the colony itself to make, and that their security against an attack of that character could depend upon anything except the supremacy of the Imperial Navy. But certain critics have fastened upon this truism, which, as I have explained, is borrowed from a Memorandum long in existence of the Colonial Defence Committee, and have exposed it to a most remarkable treatment. Some of my critics have found fault with it because it referred only to our possessions beyond the sea, and not to the United Kingdom also; while other critics have commented upon it as if it referred to the defence of the United Kingdom as well as to the colonics, and, having drawn the conclusion from it that our Navy is, as it ought to be, strong enough to resist organised invasion either of our colonial possessions or of our own shores, have inferred that then any expenditure or any energy applied to the erection of fortifications, of defensive works, or to the provision of adequate military establishments which are not of a mobile character, are so much expenditure and so much energy thrown away. I have no intention of entering at this time upon a discussion of the principles of Imperial defence. All I desire to do is to protest against the assumption that in that speech or at any other time I have advanced any new principles of defence either as concerns our colonies or the United Kingdom. I was not authorised to make any announcement of any such new departure, and had not the slightest intention of doing it. The various additions which have been made to the Navy by the present, and also by former Governments to increase the strength of the Navy and to insure our sea supremacy—these efforts all testify to the paramount importance which is attached not only by the present but by former Governments to the maintenance of our sea supremacy—[Opposition cheers]—which we look upon not only as our first line of defence but as our main security against attack. [Opposition cheers] I confess that, personally, I should have very little confidence in any defence organisation which was based on the probability of our permanently losing command of the sea; but between the permanent loss of the command of the sea; and the possibility of a temporary reverse which might expose some portion of our coast to the risk of invasion there is a very wide interval, and, as far as I know, no Government has ever contemplated, and certainly this Government has never contemplated, the neglect of any precautions which might tend to the diminution of such risk. [Opposition cheers.] Another consideration which might appeal, I should have thought, even to those who rely most exclusively for our security upon the supremacy of our sea power, is that, as I have already pointed out, one of the most essential elements in the strength of our Navy is the freedom and independence of its action—[Opposition cheers] and the more you can guarantee the safety of vital points either abroad or at home without requiring the actual and immediate pretence of the fleet, the more you add to that freedom and independent; of its action which constitute one of the chief elements in its strength. Therefore, under these circumstances, I think that no Government either has been or can be indifferent to the necessity of making adequate provision, either by means of fortifications or defensive works, or by the provision of adequate military establishments in order to garrison them, and if necessary, to take part in field operations in their support. No Government has ever neglected or can be indifferent to the necessity of such preparations. The question addressed to me by my noble Friend refers only to the Volunteers. As regards the Volunteers, I have no hesitation in assuring him that the Government consider that the Volunteer forces form an essential and indispensable part of our defensive arrangements. The measures which were proposed to Parliament by my noble Friend last year for strengthening the financial position of the Volunteers testify to the interest and appreciation of the services of that force by the Government, and I am informed that in the present year there will be a considerable addition asked for to the Volunteer Vote caused by the increased number of efficients—an increase which I believe is partly due to the assistance which was given to them last year. "The Volunteers, who are represented on this occasion by my noble Friend, need be under no apprehension whatever that the importance of maintaining both their numbers and their efficiency is in no way neglected or discouraged by the Government. I trust that after the explanation which I have been able to give, the Volunteers will agree with me that any apprehensions which have been felt that their services are not held at their proper value by the Government are due not to anything which I have said on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but, to the totally unauthorised construction which has been placed on certain statements which I have ma le, and for which, in my humble opinion, there was absolutely no warrant or foundation. I hope this answer may be satisfactory both to my noble Friend and to the Volunteers.

THE EARL OF KIMBERLEY

I have heard with very great satisfaction and no surprise the explanation given by the noble Duke, because I was for a long time connected with the Colonial Department and had opportunity of seeing documents at that time with reference to colonial defence, and I very well indeed remember the document to which the noble Duke referred in his former speech. It is no new principle which is laid down in that document. It has invariably been the opinion of Governments of this country, with reference to colonial defence, that the Navy, if it is to do its duty—which it cannot do unless it is free—must be supported by the colonies in such a manner as to make predatory attacks upon them capable of resistance without the presence of the fleet. That has been a constanty observed condition. With regard to home defence, I have read with great interest and extreme surprise various effusions implying that the trust which this country must always mainly put in its Navy for the protection of our coasts exempts us from the nee essity of making any other preparations. I am in no way qualified to speak upon questions either of naval or military tatics, but I should have supposed that if our Fleet is to be perfectly free to engage the enemy at a distance from our shores, it might possibly happen that at some given moment it might not be available at some particular point. Suppose we suffered some minor reverse to some squadron which was not so powerful as our main fleet, might it not easily happen that an enemy might make a serious attack upon one of our dockyards? The protection of our dockyards against any such sudden attack seems to be a matter of extreme consequence to the interests of the nation. I merely instance that because no person could conceive it was a safe thing to leave our dockyards unprotected against any sudden attack. Instances might be multiplied; and it seems to me that some preparations as regards fortifications—though I should not say very extensive fortifications—are very desirable, and that some preparations for fortifying important points, places where ships are built and where coal stores are accumulated for the use of the fleet, are absolutely indispensable. The meaning of that is not that you rely upon those fortifications or even the military preparations to meet an invasion, but that they are necessary supports for your first line of defence and indispensable to the free action of the Fleet. Speaking with some knowledge of the views of previous Governments, I can most entirely confirm every word which has been so clearly and thoroughly stated by the noble Duke.

House Adjourned at Half-past Five o'clock, till To-morrow, a Quarter past Four o'clock.