INDIAN FAMINE. (Hansard, 8 February 1897)

LORD KINNAIRD

asked the following questions, of which he had given private notice to the Government: 1st. Whether Her Majesty's Government were in a position to affirm or contradict the statement telegraphed on the 2nd inst by Renter's agent from Raipur, in the Central Provinces, that many deaths from starvation had already taken place, that many persons were on the brink of starvation, and that the district, with a population of one and a-half millions, was almost without food supplies? 2nd. In the worst districts of each of the affected provinces, what was now the selling price of grain in common use, (a) in the towns, (b) in the remote interior? 3rd. What did Her Majesty's Government consider to be the retail selling price of such grain which could not be passed without the speedy exhaustion of the cultivation and artisan classes, by which is meant classes above the unskilled wage-earning labourer? He said that the statement of the Secretary of State in another place on Friday last reminded the country of an awful possibility. If the loss of life was estimated at 5,800,000 in 1877–8, out of a population of 27,000,000, what was the possibility of this famine, affecting an area with a population of 40,000,000? If the same ratio of lives were lost the number would reach the appalling total of over eight millions. He had carefully read over the Government's answer to the questions he addressed to them last Monday, and he considered they wholly failed to answer the facts and figures which he ventured to put forward, as he believed, making out a case that the time had arrived when they must on a large scale store grain, and if necessary, import it from Burma and elsewhere. They were not working in the dark, without precedent to guide them. Of the principal famines of this century only one was successfully grappled with, and that was by Lord Northbrook and Sir Richard Temple, and the other officers working under them, and they were only 1530 able to avert horrible destruction of human life by a large importation of grain. The crux of the whole matter was, would private trade do what was necessary? Would it supply grain to even get-at-able districts at a possible price? This necessary help must, as the Lieut.-Governor of Bengal had said, come by grain imported from across the sea. The optimistic prophecies and promises of the Government that they would prevent loss of life had already been falsified. He believed it was now admitted that the situation in the Central Provinces was serious. Reuter's Agency telegraphed the serious news that an area of 12,000 miles and a population of 1,500,000 people was almost without food supply. He was introduced to a gentleman that day who had been 38 years in India, 32 of which were spent in the Government service. He left Bombay on December 14, and he admitted that planters, merchants, importers and others who knew the country well, estimated that up to November 14 there had been 250,000 deaths from practically starvation throughout the famine area. In the Central Provinces there was another burning question, the supply of seed grain, which neither landlords nor tenants were able to get. Did the Government intend to provide seed for the next harvest under the Famine Code? Papers-dated January 13 from Calcutta gave an account of a meeting of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. The Committee of that body said:— Having regard to the widespread effect of the present scarcity, the Committee have been impressed by the high range of prices throughout the Province of Bengal. Even in places where the crop has not wholly failed, prices of food stuffs are far in excess of anything marking the beginning of scarcity in 1874 or in 1866. This high range of wholesale prices means a very considerably higher retail price to the people, so that the effect of the demand for food in the afflicted tracts, and in the tracts where the crops have notoriously failed, has led the Committee to infer that stocks throughout the country are low. The British Indian Association, which always spoke with authority, had also expressed dissatisfaction that steps had not been taken to secure an adequate store of grain which could be utilised at short notice. This, they believed, could only be done by the Government, so that, in the event of a crisis, it might be used in outlying districts. With reference to questions 2 and 3, he ventured to think 1531 an assurance was required from the Government that, whenever the rate rose to 18lbs. per rupee, direct orders should be given that imported grain would be brought into the district; for it was an established fact in famine history, that it was impossible for the rate to be 18lbs. per rupee of grain in common use for long without the death of millions, as in Orissa and Southern India. Private trade was sure to be busy about and in seaports and the main lines of railway, and might possibly do all that was wanted there. It did so in Behar, sending in to the distressed parts 50,000 tons a month. This fact showed how futile all the assertions were that the Government by their importing largely—altogether about 500,000 tons—crushed out of activity private trade. It imported again in Southern India, when it threw into the distressed parts of Madras and Bombay 100,000 tons a month; but that grain never got into the remote parts. The prices prevailing along the line of rail were high enough to enable traders to make a profit, and all they could bring was greedily absorbed on the main line. Traders, therefore, had no mind to face the difficulties and risks of the further journey into the remote parts. This was no conjecture, for he had seen private letters from the Central Provinces which arrived last week, speaking of terrible scenes and deaths from starvation. He had received a letter speaking of a district some miles from a town or railway, in which the distress was very acute throughout the villages. At present there were no relief works in those villages, and no possibility of getting Government assistance. The action of the Government in discouraging private charity had made it difficult to collect funds, and the Mansion House Fund was entirely, it was believed, in the hands of the Government for disposal. The difficulty was that the Government either had no information or thought it well to follow the advice of the Leader of the Opposition, that the Indian Government should have a free hand and not be interfered with or troubled with questions. He was not making any complaints against any officials, who were doing most self-denying hard work and using every endeavour to save life. 1532 He only hoped that many would not give way under the strain, as one noble worker had done—a Deputy-Commissioner who died of brain fever from the strain put on him by the famine, constantly saying, "These people are dying, and I cannot save them." What the country would require of the Government was, not assurances and promises, but facts justifying the statements put forward, that the Government of India was never in so favourable a position for combating famine. Many high authorities took the opposite view, for prices had been for some years at an exhausting figure, and now the scarcity and increased dearness were more widespread than ever bad been the case before. Stocks were not coming forward as expected, and the landlords and people with wealth were clinging to their supplies.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA (the EARL of ONSLOW)

The noble Lord has not confined himself to asking questions, but has given your Lordships a certain amount of information and has passed some criticism on the action of the Viceroy and his Government, and perhaps your Lordships will forgive me if, before I address myself to answering the questions of the noble Lord, I deal for a moment with what he has said. In the first place, I am not aware that the Government of Lord Elgin has at any time made any promise or statement that the Government would be able to prevent entirely loss of life. I think the statement made was that the Government had recognised that it should be in such a position that no persons need of necessity lose their lives; and I would point out that there is a considerable difference between the two propositions. The noble Lord has said that he has been informed that in one particular district there have been 250,000 deaths from famine. I am not in a position to contradict the assertion made by the noble Lord, but I can say this—that if it should hereafter prove to be corroborated and shown to be correct, I should be very much surprised, because it is quite in opposition to all the information we have received; and when the noble Lord asks me whether Her Majesty's Government can affirm or contradict what has been reported by Renter's 1533 agent at Raipur, I can only assure him that it is quite contrary to the information we have received. I am not myself in a position to say what the number of deaths at Raipur may have been, but the Secretary of State has communicated with the Government of India by telegraph, and I shall be glad to hand to my noble Friend a copy of the reply as soon as it is received. The noble Lord bars asked me a number of other questions, sonic of which it is not easy to answer in a general way. The noble Lord asks me what Her Majesty's Government consider to be the retail selling price of grain which cannot be passed without the speedy exhaustion of the cultivator and artisan classes, by which is meant classes above the unskilled wage-earning labourer. If the noble Lord will refer to the Report of the Famine Commissioners he will see that the actual price of grain in a particular district is not really controlled by the necessities of the population or the power of the population to purchase. The Commissioners say that it is a well-ascertained fact that prices which will be regarded as indicating a state of famine in one part of the country are quite compatible with a state of undisturbed prosperity in another. As to what are the prices now obtaining in different parts of India, I can only answer that by referring to the prices in the particular district to which the noble Lord has referred. On December 31, 1896, rice and wheat were obtainable in Raipur at the rate of 10 seers per rupee, while on the same date in 1805, before famine prices existed, rice was obtainable at the rate of 16 seers per rupee, and wheat at the rate of 16½ seers per rupee; so that the noble Lord will see that the price has risen from 16 seers to the rupee to 10. Before I sit down I should like to read part of a telegram received from the Viceroy to-day, which, I think, will go a long way to allay the apprehensions of the noble Lord as to the supplies being insufficient for the wants of India to-day. The Viceroy says:— Our latest information is generally reassuring. Steady prices generally, and fall which has now begun in Punjab and N.W. Provinces, and sufficiency of visible supplies for daily requirements, are favourable indications. Punjab prices reported 15 to 20 per cent. lower than two months ago. Apprehension of failure of stocks would be indicated by rise of prices. Spring crops promise well in Northern India 1534 and Hindustan, and ought to add considerably to existing stocks. Sufficiency of existing stocks for all probable emergencies not capable of precise quantitative answer, but no reason to doubt correctness of policy affirmed in your dispatch No. 10 of Jan. 15, that trade as a whole can supply food demand better and more effectively than Government. I think that in that answer I shall have given the noble Lord some assurance that the Government of India are satisfied that the policy they have adopted and intend to carry out is one which will meet the necessities of the situation.