VISCOUNT DE VESCIrose to ask the Secretary of State for War whether it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government to lay before Parliament proposals for an increase in the strength of the Army, and, if so, in what arms; by what number of battalions it was proposed to increase the strength of the infantry; whether it was proposed to add to the Brigade of Guards, and in what manner; and whether, if, the strength of the Brigade of Guards was increased, it was proposed to place the brigade on the roster for foreign service in time of peace, and under what conditions. He congratulated the Secretary of State for War on the brighter prospects of the military measures of the Government this Session as compared with last, when the Bills brought in were, he might say, almost muddled out 1244 of existence in the arrangements made for public business. But even at the beginning of this Session the Government did not seem to appreciate thoroughly the importance of this question, for in the Speech from the Throne only a very cursory hint was given that these military measures were to be introduced. How ever, a change bad now supervened, and there was some prospect that the measures introduced in another place would be perfected in the course of the present Session. The organisation of the infantry as it at present existed was, it would he remembered, first initiated in a memorandum of the illustrious Duke, the late Commander-in-Chief. Under that organisation territorial regiments were formed out of the existing two battalion regiments of the Army, and by linking together the then existing single-battalion regiments. Depots were also formed of two companies from each battalion. The scheme was that one battalion should always be abroad and one at home. This supposed symmetrical system was now out of joint, and practically was nowhere in working order. There might have been some numerical miscalculation as to the military needs and requirements of India and the Colonies, or it might be that those needs and requirements had increased since the establishment of the system. But the fact remained that it no longer worked. The Committee presided over by Lord Wantage, in 1892, called attention to the fact that, since 1888, there had been an average of about 11 battalions in excess abroad; and, in the following year, a work was published, under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and edited by General Good-enough, which stated that, out of the 141 battalions of the Army, 76 were then abroad, 52 being in India. In regard to the territorial system, his noble Friend would no doubt explain what was now the number of infantry battalions at home and abroad, and by what number of battalions it was intended to increase the infantry. The latter part of the question standing in his name on the Paper was of peculiar interest to many Members of their Lordships' House who had served in the Brigade of Guards. It was reported that the Secretary of State proposed to add two battalions to the Guards' Brigade, making nine in all. 1245 Many of them would agree that that would be a distinct advantage, for he believed that in a very short time, with the reinforcements which they would receive from the Reserve, it would be possible to put in to the field two efficient brigades of three battalions each. It was also reported that the Secretary of State proposed to relieve the strain on the battalions of the infantry of the line by putting the Guards on the roster for foreign service in the time of peace. In considering this subject it was necessary to remember the present condition of enlistment and service in the Guards. Most men were enlisted for three years with the colours and nine years with the Reserve. This system had succeeded in tilling the ranks with a class of men who for efficiency and appearance, and in every other respect, were fully equal to any men he had ever known. The Guards were quartered in London, Windsor, and Dublin, and their duties were finding "guards," and what was known as "sentry go." The work was very onerous and trying to health. Now, when they considered the foreign service which was open to the Brigade, they found that it was only India, Egypt, and the Mediterranean stations to which they could be sent. As far as India was concerned, the whole system of recruiting the Brigade would have to be altered, for the men would have to go on the long-service system. But apart from that consideration, he should be glad if a Brigade of Guards were stationed in India. It would be very advantageous to have a brigade permanently stationed there, so that the men might become acclimatised, and inured to the conditions of Indian service. The advantage would be realised in the event of any great war in our Eastern Empire, when reliefs would be required. But as to the Mediterranean garrisons, it should be remembered how heavy were the duties there of finding guards, and of sentry work in the fortresses. It was the same kind of heavy work that the Guards had to perform at home. There would be no prospect or means of giving the men military field instruction in Malta or Gibraltar. To all these questions he had no doubt his noble Friend had given due consideration; and he would conclude by asking him to remember how necessary it was that the ranks of the Brigade at home should be kept 1246 full of thoroughly efficient men. ["Hear, hear!"]
§ THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (The MARQUESS of LANSDOWNE)My Lords, I believe it has been pretty-well understood for some time past that the Government had it in contemplation to add to the strength of the Army, and I am therefore quite ready to give my noble Friend the information for which he asks. I hope it will not be disappointing to him, because I have observed that of late there have been current statements attributing to us the intention of increasing the Army very far beyond what we believe to be the necessities of the case, and very far beyond what, considering the already very large expenditure for the purposes of Imperial defence, we think would be either proper or desirable. I think the nature and extent of the difficulty with which we have to deal is very well known. It is quite clear that it is well known to my noble Friend from what fell from him during the course of his speech. If I had to describe that difficulty in a single sentence I should say that it would be found in the inability of that portion of the Army which is at home to support that portion of it which is abroad. I wish in the few words which I have to say to confine myself mainly to that part of the case. Of course I am aware that there are many other important questions which may fairly be debated in this connection. There may be a difference of opinion as to the merits of the short service system as we know it here, there may be a want of agreement as to the force which we ought to be able to put into the field for home defence or for expeditionary purposes, there may be people who hold that the efficiency of our home Army is unduly sacrificed to the exigencies of the Army abroad, and who doubt the wisdom of relying so greatly on the Reserve for rendering the home Army fit for war. I shall be quite prepared, if your Lordships should desire it, to discuss these questions at the proper time, but in the few words which I wish to address your Lordships to-night I would rather limit myself to a more restricted aspect of the case, and to ask you whether, given an Indian Army of its present strength, given colonial garrisons of the strength at which our advisers tell us they ought to stand, given the withdrawal of a 1247 certain number of troops for special services in different parts of the world, have we left at home enough men to support the force which is thus continually absent from the United Kingdom? The answer must, I think, he in the negative. I believe it has been evident for some time, not only to military experts, that our present system of Army organisation has been worked under conditions which absolutely precluded the possibility of its success. If I may borrow an expression used by my noble Friend, I would say it has been evident for some time that our system has got a little out of joint. What was the fundamental principle of the short-service system introduced 25 years ago by Lord Cardwell, and accepted by successive Governments? That principle was that each of the double-battalion regiments of which the Army is composed would, under ordinary circumstances, always have one battalion abroad and another battalion to support it at home. That is the bed rock of the system. It ought to give us a battalion abroad at full strength and in a high state of efficiency, and another battalion at home on a lower strength, and containing a large proportion of young soldiers. A battalion whose first duty it is in time of peace to supply the linked battalion abroad with the necessary drafts, but which in time of war is completed for service by the addition of men from the Army Reserve The system contemplates and provides for the temporary absence of the home battalion whenever its services may be required out of the United Kingdom. The regimental depôt is then expanded to dimensions sufficient to enable it to supply the drafts required by the two absent battalions, both of which for the time have to depend upon the depôt. It cannot, however, be too clearly understood that this arrangement is intended to provide only for a temporary state of things, and is not appropriate for the purpose of supplying a chronic deficiency in the home establishment. It has numerous disadvantages. It causes, in the first place, that irregularity in the flow of recruits which was so strongly deprecated by the Wantage Committee. Recruits cannot be so effectively trained at a depôt as with a battalion. It supplies our foreign requirements at the expense of our effective home garrison. It entails the separation of the home 1248 battalion from the reserve which is vital to its efficiency for war. I have no hesitation in saying that the process of sending home battalions abroad and substituting expanded depôts, is one which can only be justified as a temporary expedient. My conclusion, therefore, is, if it can be shown that there is a permanent deficiency in the number of our home battalions, that deficiency should be met by a permanent increase in the Army. If this be so, it follows clearly that our normal condition should be one of equilibrium between the home and the foreign establishments. Our complaint is that this salutary rule has been ignored, and that at no time since 1872 has that condition of equilibrium been really maintained. I will not occupy the time of the House in explaining how this has come to pass. The requirements of the Empire have grown, special calls have been made upon the Army, troops have been sent abroad for temporary purposes and have not been restored to the home establishment, with the result that, instead of having maintained equality between the home establishment and the establishment abroad, we have at this moment a deficiency of no less than 11 battalions on the home establishment. We have now in all 141 battalions of infantry of the Line; of these India claims 52, while the already authorised garrisons of our coaling stations, some of which are in our opinion below their proper strength, absorb 18 more. In addition to this we have three battalions in Egypt and three extra battalions in South Africa. Your Lordships will see that these figures show that we have now 76 battalions abroad to 65 at home, or, in other words, a total deficiency of 11 battalions. This is a condition of things in which we are unable to acquiesce. It may, no doubt, be fairly assumed that some of the battalions now abroad are only temporarily absent, and pending their withdrawal, or until it is clearly shown that their absence is a permanent one, we may continue to provide for them by those temporary expedients which I explained just now. But in our belief the demand of the military authorities for some steps to be taken to improve the state of the account as between the home and the foreign establishment is irresistible. It is a demand which has been pressed 1249 upon us by the late, as well as by the present, Commander-in-Chief, by the whole of our present military advisers, and, I am almost tempted to add, by the opinion of everyone. whether soldier or civilian, who has ever paid serious attention to these questions. We have determined to do something to meet that demand, and we have considered, having regard to considerations of economy as well as of efficiency, in what manner it would be most advantageous to strengthen the home establishment. One proposal in particular has attracted our attention. It is not a new one, for it was put forward five years ago by the Committee presided over by Lord Wantage. I refer to the proposal that to the seven existing battalions of the Guards two new battalions should be added, and that of the nine battalions three should be stationed abroad. The advantages of such an arrangement are obvious. From the point of view of the Guards themselves, the increase is certainly in itself desirable. The present organisation of the brigade is faulty from the military point of view. If the number of the battalions be increased from seven to nine each regiment will have the same number of battalions, and the Guards will be strong enough, which they are not now, to send out for active service a division of six battalions, leaving three battalions at home. On the principle that you cannot have too much of a good thing, no one will, I take it, dispute that, if to the existing magnificent force which the brigade provides we are able to add some 2,000 officers and men, the brigade itself and the Army will be the gainers. It must, however, be clearly understood that we are able to recommend this increase and to justify the expenditure which it involves only upon condition that we are allowed to make use of the brigade to help us in overcoming our difficulties, and to require from it a reasonable contribution towards the relief of the present strain on the Army system. I say "a reasonable contribution" because we recognise that the position and traditions of Her Majesty's Guards are, exceptional, and that it is not desirable to place them in respect to liability to service out of the United Kingdom upon the same footing as the rest of the Army. Our 1250 proposal, then, is that of the nine battalions of the Guards three shall be abroad. We propose that their tour of service out of England shall be a short one. The exact details are not yet settled. We shall spare no pains to settle them so as to disturb existing arrangements as little as possible, and to leave unimpaired the conditions and efficiency of the brigade. But on one or two points I can be more explicit. If the tour of foreign service is to be a short one it is desirable that the part of the brigade to be employed out of the United Kingdom should not be taken far from home, and we propose that it should be stationed in the Mediterranean. As to the length of the tour, it is obvious that if of every three battalions one battalion is always to be abroad, what-ever the length of the tour may be, each battalion must spend one-third of its time away from home. The actual duration of the tour will require careful examination and adjustment, particularly with reference to the effects on recruiting, and on the men engaged for three years' service, of whom there are a large number in the brigade; and, must obviously depend to some extent on the station selected. Our idea is—and here we are doing what we have been given to understand will be most agreeable to the Guards themselves—that the three battalions should be stationed together, under a brigadier of the Guards, and we propose Gibraltar, in the first instance, as in these circumstances the most convenient station. It is clear, however, that subsequent experience may, even in the interests of the brigade itself, render a reconsideration of this point desirable. We propose this year to send one battalion only. That battalion we intend to relieve next year. We shall have ample time in which to consider the detail of the scheme before it is fully carried out, and I have no doubt that many useful suggestions will occur to the military authorities in the meantime. The result of bringing into use three Guards battalions for foreign service will be that three Line battalions now abroad will be brought home, and that three other Line battalions abroad will no longer be in the position of having no home battalions to support them. In other words, we shall diminish our 1251 account of foreign battalions of the Line by three, and increase our home establishment by the same number. The addition of two new battalions to the Guards will therefore enable us, in so far as the disparity between the home and the foreign establishments is concerned, to diminish the deficiency in the former to the extent of no less than six battalions, or, to put it in another way, if we had endeavoured to arrive at the same result by creating new battalions of the Line, we should have to create three new pairs of battalions, of which half would have been abroad and the other half at home. If we had adopted this course the cost to the public would have been very largely increased. I am assured that the extra annual charge would be about £200,000, and besides this an expenditure of about half-a-million for additional barrack accommodation would have been inevitable. It would be mere affectation on my part to deny that in some quarters the change which we propose to make is regarded with a certain amount of apprehension. I have heard it said that it will be detrimental both to the officers and to the men of the Brigade of Guards, and that we may expect a marked deterioration in both. As for the officers already serving in the Guards, I feel convinced that if this measure can be shown, as I believe it can, to be desirable in the interests of the Army as a whole, they will cheerfully submit to the sacrifice—[cheers]—if, indeed, it be one which they are required to make; and I readily admit that if they look askance; at our proposal it is for no selfish reason, but because they honestly believe it to be detrimental to the efficiency and smartness of the brigade in which they take a just and pardonable pride. [Cheers.] We confidently look for their loyal and unhesitating assistance in securing the success of a measure intended to benefit the Queen's Army as a whole. With regard to the statement that this new liability will deter officers of the class who now serve in the brigade from joining it, I must confess that I am profoundly incredulous. We have heard such gloomy anticipations before. I recollect that, when open competition for commissions in the Army was first introduced, we were assured that the whole race of British officers would rapidly and disastrously deteriorate. We all know that nothing 1252 of the kind happened. If comparison is to be made, the present generation of officers has nothing to fear from it. I am convinced that the young men who join the Guards are animated by the same pride in their profession as the officers of other branches of the Army. Here and there we may find some gilded youth whose affection for the society or for the sports of his own country will be such that he may be unable to screw his courage up to join the brigade owing to the prospect of a banishment of a few months in the Mediterranean, but I am confident that in the long run, in spite of these gloomy forebodings, the Guards will continue to get the same sort of officers as they have obtained up to the present time. I ascribe greater weight to the arguments which are used with regard to the possible result of the change on the men of the brigade. I know that some high authorities hold that the prospect of service out of England may increase the difficulty of obtaining recruits of the proper stamp. On the other hand we have some grounds for thinking that the prospect of a little foreign service may prove even an attraction to many of the class from which the Guards are recruited. Time only can show which of these views is correct. Let me, however, say unhesitatingly that we should not propose this step if we believed that it would result in a permanent lowering of the standard of the height or the general physique of the Guards. The standard of height has been of late higher than it has ever been. We have had to raise it on account of the large number of recruits presenting themselves for engagement. The standard has always fluctuated, and must always fluctuate, according to the, state of the labour market, but we believe that we shall be able to procure the additional number of recruits which will be required without lowering it below the normal level. I am strengthened in my hope that this result may not follow by the knowledge that the step we propose to take was recommended by the Committee of which Lord Wantage, himself a Guardsman, was chairman; while among its members were General Sir E. Bulwer and General W. Fielding (also a Guardsman), of whom the former had held, and the latter actually held at the time when the report was signed, the responsible office of Inspector-General 1253 of Recruiting. Then there is the argument that the foreign battalions will have their efficiency and smartness seriously impaired by a prolonged stay in a Mediterranean fortress. It is true that troops stationed at a place like Gibraltar must be at some disadvantage in respect of training and of practice in field firing, and that is no doubt a strong argument against keeping a battalion there for any length of time. We shall bear this point, the importance of which I fully recognise, carefully in mind. Another objection which has been freely urged is this. I have heard it said that our proposals will result in this depletion of the home battalions of the Guards in order to keep up the battalions which will be stationed in the Mediterranean. It is apprehended that the home battalions of the Guards will find themselves in the same position as the home batta-of the Line, which are subjected to a heavy and constant drain for the purpose of supplying the necessary drafts to their linked battalions abroad, and which consequently contain a very large proportion of young soldiers, and are, without their Reservists, unfit to take the field. I hope it will be understood that the case of the Guards and the Line is by no means the same. In the case of the Line the length of the foreign tour is 16 years, and during that time the home battalion is constantly pouring its best men into the foreign battalion at the rate of from 150 to 200 a year. The foreign tour of the Guards will, as I have already said, be short, and the burden, which in the case of the Line falls upon a single home battalion, will, in the case of the Guards, be divided between the two home battalions. ["Hear, hear!"] What will be the extent of this burden? I think we may say confidently that it will not be unduly heavy, or of a kind likely to impair the efficiency of the home battalions. I wish, however, to state as distinctly as I can that, while I fully understand the objection which one battalion of a regiment may feel to undergoing wholesale depletion for the sake of another, I cannot for a moment admit that in no circumstances, even when the exigencies of the service require it, are two battalions of the same regiment to help one another by a mutual exchange of men. I do not regard an exchange of that kind as a depletion in the proper 1254 sense of the word. It is strictly an exchange. Let me illustrate my meaning. When a Guards battalion is sent to the Mediterranean, it will always have to leave behind a certain number of men, who, either because they have lately joined, or because they are within a few months of the end of their time, are unable to go abroad. How are these men to be disposed of? Obviously, they must be taken over by the home battalions in exchange for other men who do not labour under the same disqualifications. The transaction is in the nature of an exchange, or it may be in some cases a loan; but it is not one which can properly be described as a serious depletion of the home battalions. I will only say one word more before I lease this part of the subject, and it is this—that we do not take this step without previous consultation with those whom we had a right to regard as able to advise us with the highest authority as to the effects of the measure upon the efficiency of the brigade. Their opinion—I am, of course, not speaking of matters of detail—gave us the strongest encouragement to believe that our scheme was in principle a sound one. Before leaving this subject I desire most emphatically to state that nothing can be further from our intention than to do anything which will permanently affect the traditional characteristics of the Brigade of Guards. ["Hear, hear!"] We desire on the contrary, to maintain their status and efficiency. I need not repeat that we do not believe that the steps we contemplate will have the injurious effects attributed to them; but the House may rest assured that we shall watch carefully and narrowly the results of these changes, and if the result should be other than what we expect, we shall most certainly consider ourselves bound to reeonsider the position. ["Hear, hear!"] I will now leave the Guards, and mention another point at which it seems to us that an increase in the present establishment of the Army is called for. The House is aware that there are at this moment altogether 141 battalions of infantry, which give us 70 pairs of linked battalions and one odd battalion. The regiment which occupies this singular position is the Cameron Highlanders, which is the only one-battalion regiment in the Service. When it is out of the 1255 country it has no home battalion to support it. When, on the other hand, the battalion is at home, it has no battalion abroad to feed. We therefore propose to add a second battalion to this regiment, and therefore to increase by one the line battalions of the Army. The House will observe that the effect of these changes in regard to infantry will be that, whereas we have now 76 line battalions abroad to 65 at home, we shall have 73 abroad to 69 at home. That still leaves a deficit of four battalions; but that deficit, we think, may be fairly attributed in a measure to temporary circumstances, and we do not intend to provide for it at present by permanent measures. I wish now to say a few words on another subject. Our attention has very emphatically been called by the Standing Committee, which has for some years past advised the Government with regard to the strength of our colonial garrisons, to what the Committee regard as the weakness of some of the garrisons of the fortresses and coaling stations which we hold for the Navy. Their opinion is shared by our military advisers, and we have been recommended to make a slight addition to the strength of those garrisons. We propose a small increase at one or two stations in the infantry of the Line. We propose to add another battalion to the West India Regiment—a body of troops which have done most admirable service for the Empire under very trying conditions of climate; also another battalion of Malta Militia. But the deficiency is mainly in garrison artillery, and in order to carry out the views of the Committee, we propose to add to the strength of this branch of the artillery 3,600 men. I will not, on this occasion, enter at any length into the reasons upon which the Committee has based its recommendation. I can indicate them in general terms. There are certain points at which we have, from various causes which the House will scarcely expect me to discuss, become more vulnerable than of old. Then there is the fact that, in many of our defended ports, the conditions of defence have been altogether changed, owing to recent improvements in the science of artillery. The adoption of a new system of fire control and position finding, and the introduction of guns of an entirely new type, particularly 1256 quick-firing guns, which appear destined to play so large a part in future warfare, have rendered it necessary that we should reconsider the strength of the forces engaged in holding and defending these places. There is another point to which much attention has been paid by the Committee and by her Majesty's Government—I mean the undesirability of imposing upon the Navy, on a sudden outbreak of war, the duty of conveying reinforcements to our coaling stations and naval bases. It is this which leads us to the conclusion that the garrison of these places should be kept at their full strength in time of peace. I should like to say one word as to the policy by which we are guided in this matter. This point has been much controverted. I observe that there are two extreme schools of thought. There is the view of those who insist on the necessity of our maintaining the absolute supremacy of the sea, and who believe that, if our fleets are sufficiently strong for that we need take little or no thought for the land defences of the Empire at home or abroad. There is, on the other hand, the view of those who, in their anxiety that land defence should be properly provided for, seem to leave almost out of account the part which the fleet should take in warding off a naval attack upon our possessions. We cannot entirely accept either of these extreme views. I think it is clear that it is not part of our duty to increase the defences of these places up to a point sufficient to resist an attack from a large hostile squadron carrying with it a considerable expeditionary force; against such an attack it is the business of the fleet to protect them. If the fleet is not there, it is, presumably, because it is already watching or engaging the enemy's fleet elsewhere. The enemy's fleet, however, could not be at one and the same time watching or engaging our fleet and delivering an attack in force upon one of our coaling stations. On the other hand, there is no reason for ignoring altogether the question of land defence. The highest naval authorities hold, and no doubt rightly, that, our first object being to keep or to obtain the command of the sea, all other things must be subordinated to that object, and our admirals left free to use their forces as they find best for 1257 the purpose. Since this is the case, our coaling stations and colonial fortresses should be able to stand alone against any attack which is likely to be directed against them during the temporary absence of the fleet. I venture to sum up in the following propositions what appear to me to be the principles by which we should be guided. Let us maintain, above all things, our supremacy at sea. Let us next insist upon the mobility of our fleets, and impose upon them no duty which might restrict the freedom of their movements. Let us recognise, that during their absence our coaling-stations will be exposed to what is commonly called a "cruiser attack" from the enemy. Let us, therefore, give them defences sufficient to insure their safety against any such attack. I must not forget to add one word with regard to field artillery. We propose to increase that arm by one new battery. We shall then have 45 batteries, or the full complement for the three army corps which we have been authorised to provide for home defence. I may sum up the increases which I have endeavoured to lay before the House. They consist of two new battalions of the. Guards, one battalion of Cameron Highlanders, one battalion of West Indian troops, one battalion of Malta militia, 3,600 garrison artillery, and one battery of field artillery. It only remains for me to say that we do not propose that these increases should be carried out in their entirety at once. Your Lordships must be well aware of the objections to sudden alterations in the establishment of the Army. Sudden increases are not only costly, but most detrimental to recruiting. A sudden influx of recruits at one moment is followed by a sudden efflux at another, and thereby we depart from the sound maxim laid down by Lord Wantage's Committee, that we should endeavour to maintain a constant and regular flow of recruits into the Army. We propose that the increases should be carried out during a period of three years. I have now stated what the proposals of the Government are, and I can only commend them to your Lordships' best consideration. [Cheers.]
§ LORD WANTAGEsaid he desired to take the earliest opportunity available to him in the Debate to say that the proposal to increase the strength of the 1258 Infantry of the Line, and the proposal to add to the strength of the Brigade of Guards, commended itself to his judgment. He wished specially to say a few words with regard to the latter proposal. He would go so far as to congratulate the Guards upon the proposed augmentation of their battalions, which showed the high value in which they were held. The privileges of the Guards had been from time to time greatly curtailed—indeed, he might say that they had, with one exception, entirely disappeared. But, although those privileges had been withdrawn, the efficiency of the Guards remained as great now as it ever had been in the past. The double rank, formerly borne by the officers of the Guards, and which was conferred upon them by a grateful country and an admiring Sovereign for distinguished services in great and victorious battles, had now been abolished, and the Guards and the Line, so far as officers' rank was concerned, were now on a precisely similar footing. But, although the Guards had no privileges of that nature over and above the Line, yet the duties of each branch of the Service and their establishments differed widely, because they were called upon to fulfil different functions. The duties of home battalions of the Line—and he referred specially to the duties of the officers and non-commissioned officers—were most onerous, and he would even say they were thankless. They were constantly engaged in the, self-denying process of sending out heavy drafts of their best men to maintain the strength of their link battalions in India and elsewhere, and, although he had never heard an officer commanding a home battalion complain publicly of this self-denying and somewhat thankless task, he had often heard them in private lament the necessity of a process which left them in many cases little better than commanders of depôts of Recruits. The Secretary of State for War had referred in his excellent Speech to the case of India. England had deliberately put aside all proposals which had been made for the establishment of two separate armies—one to be Her Majesty's Army in India, complete in itself, with its training and recruiting establishments in England—and the other, Her Majesty's Army for Home and Colonial Service. Although this 1259 scheme bad the sanction of many thoughtful persons, and had many obvious advantages attending it, yet he was convinced that its adoption would be by no means for the benefit of Her Majesty's Service generally. But the country, having elected to have one Army only for service—both in India and at home—must be prepared to accept the drawbacks and difficulties thereby entailed. The first and most obvious of these was that the linked battalions at home were merely nurseries for the battalions in India, and as such, quite unfit—as had been stated in evidence by the leading soldiers of the day—to undertake any fighting duties without being strengthened by men called up from the Reserve. Since Cardwell's scheme, framed in 1872, the Army in India had been from time to time permanently increased, and Egypt had been occupied and garrisoned by English troops, without any augmentation of the cadres at home. In this way the machinery which was intended to provide that every battalion abroad should have a corresponding linked battalion at home as a feeder, had been dislocated, and the utmost difficulty had been experienced in providing the accessory drafts which have to be sent out to keep up the Indian Establishment. The difficulty respecting drafts to India became most pressing in 1892, when Mr. Stanhope appointed a committee to propose remedies. At that time there were, and he believed at the present time there were 11 battalions abroad which ought properly to be at home. India was a hard mistress, and demanded her drafts to be regularly supplied, although the battalions at home might be quite unable to furnish them. Now the present proposal to send three battalions of Guards to the Mediterranean would greatly relieve the existing difficulty, and this plan was proposed in 1892, amongst other things, by the Wantage Committee. It would relieve the difficulty, because three battalions of the Line will be brought home, and will take their place in the proper position allotted to them. He would endeavour to explain in what manner a further advantage will be obtained. The three battalions of the Line that come home from the Mediterranean would then become feeding battalions, 1260 if he might use such an expression, instead of absorbing battalions—battalions requiring to be kept up by drafts from England, thus counting, to use a Parliamentary phrase, six in a Division. They had, therefore, the increase of two battalions of the Guards on the one side, against six battalions of the Line on the other—the financial balance in favour of the Guards scheme over the Line scheme showing a saving of £197,000 a year. The numbers of troops who were, from various causes, tied to the Militia, the Volunteers and the Yeomanry—home defence—as compared with these who were mobile, and available for immediate and active service abroad, were quite out of proportion; they had an abundance of the one and not enough of the other. That state of things required effective dealing with, and the proposal to add to the Guards was an important and decided step in that direction, and should, as such, be welcomed. The duties of the Guards, as he had already indicated, were fundamentally different from those of the Line. The former were relieved from all obligations of maintaining linked battalions abroad. The disastrous process of an annual depletion of their best men was spared them, and the consequence was, that the seven battalions of the Guards were the finest that could possibly be seen, fit, alone among Her Majesty's troops to go anywhere at the shortest possible notice. Lord Wolseley, speaking before the Wantage Committee of the young Line battalions not being fit for service, said:—
But I make one great exception, and that is in the ease of the Guards. I think it is almost a necessary corollary to any short service system for our Army to have, say, nine battalions of the best troops always ready to do what you like with. The Guards are as well fitted for work now as I can ever remember, but there are only seven battalions of them. But I do not think it is possible to have in any army of the world a liner body of men.He goes on to say he attaches the greatest importance to having battalions of specially superior troops for emergency. He says:—I have long urged the advisability of adding two battalions more to the Guards, making three battalions for each regiment, by which means we should always have nine battalions of the finest troops possible to do anything with on a sudden emergency.1261 Having shown the superiority of the regiments of Guards over all other battalions of the Army at home, the course to be adopted seemed plain. The Commander-in-Chief, having obtained the sanction of Government for increasing the Army, naturally desired to select for augmentation those troops that most completely fulfilled the requirements for which they were needed. He therefore proposed to add to the Guards first, because they were the best troops we possessed; secondly, because they were the most mobile, and, therefore, most suited for immediate emergency, and he proposed to place one brigade of this augmented force at the entrance of the Mediterranean, as the spot where they would be more readily available. One great blot on our existing army system was that, with all our expenditure we could not, without having recourse to the Reserve, send out any number of Corps on a sudden emergency, the one exception being the battalions of the Brigade of Guards. While speaking of the Reserve, he should like to be allowed to quote from the Report of the Committee that went by the name of the "Wantage Committee." What were the functions of a Reserve? They were—First, to raise units from peace to War establishment. Secondly, to take the place in the ranks of those men who being recruits are not fully grown. Thirdly, to replace in the ranks those men who are found to have become medically unfit for service in the field, fourthly, after fulfilling the above requirements, to retain sufficient men in reserve in the second line, to till up casualties occurring at the front, until such time as the recruits left behind are themselves ready to take their places in the fighting line.The reserve was obviously never intended to be transferred at once into the fighting Line at the commencement of hostilities, which would be a necessity in the present condition of the home battalions of the Line. Having proved the special advantages attending an augmentation of the Brigade of Guards, they must, in his opinion, also accept that which followed, namely, the necessity and desirability of quartering a portion of the brigade away from the immediate proximity of the Sovereign. There was neither place nor requirement for additional battalions of Guards either at Windsor, London, or Aldershot. The privilege of the Guards to be the special guard of the Sovereign should, he thought, be interpreted in the 1262 broad sense of including not only Her Gracious Majesty the Queen, but also the State. This, he thought was established by the circumstance that when war broke out, the first troops ordered on service were invariably Her Majesty's Guards. But it was undoubtedly the privilege of the Guards, when at home, to be usually quartered in London or at Windsor, as the case might be. However much this privilege might be valued, and it was quite right it should be valued, it was not this in itself that had given the Guards their pre-eminence amongst other regiments. That the Guards had been enabled to inscribe on their colours the record of almost every great battle in which England had been engaged was due to the fact that they had always been on the spot, ready and prepared for action. In sending a portion of the Guards to Gibraltar, they would be practically or even more on the spot, in case of war, than they would be if quartered in England. Someminor objections had been raised to sending the Guards to Gibraltar, such as the want of rifle ranges and deficiency of drill ground; but if these existed—which he doubted very much—they applied equally to the Line, and ought in any case to be surmounted without loss of time. The proposal, therefore, which was now being discussed amounted to this, that the Government, amongst other things, proposed to augment the Guards from seven to nine battalions on the ground that they were the best troops we possessed, the best suited to their purpose, because their augmentation remedied the defects in the Cardwell scheme. He could not doubt, from his knowledge of the Guards, that when this proposal was shown to be for the advantage of the Army and the country, that a complete and cordial acceptance of the change would be accorded to it. He apologised to their Lordships for having dwelt on a portion only of this somewhat large question. But arguments which had occurred to him had been already made use of in the clear and admirable statement of the Secretary of State for War, which he was thereby relieved from alluding to. He saw in his place the noble Lord (Lord Methuen) who commanded the Brigade of Guards. No one was better fitted than he to speak on this subject, and he hoped he 1263 might not be unwilling to address their Lordships. There was one point on which he was sure the noble Lord would be at one with him, namely, in appealing to the Secretary of State for War to safeguard effectually the Brigade of Guards from being rendered less efficient than they now were by any undue depletion for the purpose of maintaining in full force the battalions serving abroad. [Cheers.]
LORD METHUENsaid he need not apologise for addressing their Lordships on the present occasion, because his position as Commander of the Brigade of Guards gave him, he might say, the right to give his views on this matter. When the Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief were good enough to ask him his opinion, he answered that, whatever feelings he had as Commander were subservient to those which affected the interests and the welfare of Her Majesty's Army. [Cheers.] They could, however, sympathise with him, and with those officers of the Guards who had devoted their lives to maintaining the Guards in the state of efficiency in which they had been left by their predecessors, in regard to the anxiety which they felt. When they read the evidence of the present Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, and the late Commander-in-Chief regarding the efficiency of the seven battalions of the Guards and the attenuated state of the Line, surely they might have some feeing of anxiety with regard to the Measure now before their Lordships. In olden days the Line were told very clearly that nothing was to be done that would do them harm, and he would ask them whether the home army now was in the same condition as it was. But he had no wish to dwell on the efficiency or non-efficiency of the Army. He only wished that those officers and civilians who had been so liberal in their opinions, both verbal and in writing, had made themselves masters of the evidence given before Lord Wantage's Committee. Unless they had studied that mine of military information, he did not think their opinion could be of any great value. He recognised the kind feeling which the Secretary of State had shown, both when he had consulted him and in the speech which he had now made. Any scheme for the increase of the Army, 1264 if it was to be followed by any decrease in the efficiency of the Brigade of Guards, would be evil and not good. He did not for one moment say that the measures proposed were not likely to be advantageous to the Brigade of Guards. He held the opinion, and had received it also from others, that it would be distinctly to the advantage of the Brigade of Guards if they could send six battalions into the field, and they would also have a better chance of seeing service. But that advantage, he had always said, should not be obtained at the expense of efficiency. There were three dangers which occurred to them, and he spoke not merely for himself but also for the three commanding officers of regiments who had given him their able and admirable advice. He should deprecate any scheme which had for its object the tearing out of the vitals of the six battalions of England in order to put life into those which were at Gibraltar. Any depletion of the battalions in England would be fatal to the Brigade of Guards, As to the training of these battalions at Gibraltar, if he was told that in one and a-half years three battalions could be as efficient, or very little less efficient, as they were when they went out, what was the good of all the teaching they had received when they were told that if they were to be equal to European nations in the exigencies of modern warfare, they should be exercised throughout the year in all the practical work which really formed a soldier? He was entirely in favour of having Gibraltar as a quarter for one year or a year and a-half, and he did not think that a battalion coming back at the end of a year and a-half, at any rate, dangerously inefficient. But, he urged, let them have six efficient battalions in England and one thoroughly efficient battalion in Gibraltar. There were three evils in Gibraltar which existed in a greater degree than they did in London; the first was drunkenness, the second disease, and the third heavy duty. The question of recruiting was one with which he had nothing to do, but he did hope that if any difficulty was found in getting recruits, and if the Brigade of Guards was in consequence losing it present fine physique, some steps might be taken to stop any deterioration. It was by no means clear that these difficulties could 1265 not be got over, but whilst helping the Secretary of State in every way he could to carry out this Measure, he felt that he should not be acting rightly, either to the Secretary of State or to the Brigade of Guards, for whose efficiency he was responsible, if he did not point out clearly, on behalf of himself and of the officers, past and present, the dangers and difficulties in the way. ["Hear, hear!"] The Brigade of Guards were a body of troops that at all times had gained the respect and admiration of the country; they had always done their duty when called upon, and he felt sure their services would not be forgotten. He wished to disabuse the Secretary of State of the idea that there was any feeling amongst the officers of the Brigade of Guards adverse to going abroad. There were no officers whom be knew who would not as willingly serve their country in India or elsewhere as in England if called upon. [Cheers.] The only danger he foresaw was the loss of efficiency.
LORD MONKSWELLsaid he rose to ask the noble Marquess one or two questions with reference to the statement he had just made, and also with reference to the statement made in the House of Commons the other day by the Under Secretary. He was particularly gratified to hear the noble Marquess bestow such high praise on the policy of abolition of purchase. Everyone must agree that it was very desirable to make the system of linked battalions as effective as possible; but he was not quite certain that the proposals of the Government would have that effect, because it seemed even now that the number of battalions abroad would still be permanently four in excess of the number of battalions at home.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI said particularly that we did not regard the deficit as composed of battalions which would necessarily be permanently absent, and, therefore, we do not propose to provide for it by any permanent measures.
LORD MONKSWELLAt any rate there would be a considerable deficit for the present, and it seemed to him that, with the forward frontier policy which was being pursued by the Government, it was exceedingly unlikely that the system of linked battalions would be 1266 absolutely effective, even after the increase the noble Marquess proposed. But he came to what was really a great difficulty in the way of the noble Marquess, and that was recruiting. A note of alarm was raised as to that matter in a letter in The Times of last Saturday. The statement in the letter was to the effect that the Brigade of Guards was now under its establishment, that trade was improving, and that the probability was that, if guardsmen were made liable in the future to garrison duty abroad, it would, to a great extent, put a stop to recruiting in the Brigade. That raised another question. He would like to ask the noble Marquess whether or not he considered that it would be a breach of faith to send the present rank and file, without their consent, to serve in Gibraltar; whether it was fair that men enlisted for three or seven years under the present system should be so called upon? There was another matter connected with recruiting. The noble Marquess proposed to increase the garrison artillery by 3,600. He was told that the artillery was now considerably under its establishment, and that there was the greatest possible difficulty in getting recruits; he therefore would like to know how the noble Marquess proposed to raise these additional men. Then with regard to the Cameronian Highlanders. He was told that there was also great difficulty in recruiting for that regiment, and that the regiment was at present not a Highland regiment at all, but was recruited largely from London and other places. There were one or two minor points in connection with the speech of the Under-Secretary. It was proposed, it seemed, to incur large expenditure in building and enlarging barracks; and with reference to that a note of warning as to the system at present pursued was raised in the House of Commons by Sir John Colomb, who suggested that the Royal Engineers were sometimes employed in connection with the construction of barracks, in duties for which their training did not qualify them. They were called upon sometimes to act as clerk of the works—a post for which, he was told, their training did not qualify them. He did not intend to say anything in disparagement of the corps. Every officer in the Engineers must be a highly-educated and cultivated man, but 1267 he ought not to be put to perform highly technical duties in which he had had no experience. Possibly the House might wish to have a little more information with regard to the proposed fortifications of London. The suggestion came from the late Mr. Stanhope, and the scheme was carried on by the late Government; but even if two Governments had combined in thinking it a right suggestion, he did not know that that was absolutely conclusive in its favour. Although the Under Secretary said that these fortifications had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief and the Adjutant-General, he did not say that they had been approved by the Inspector-General of Fortifications, He hoped the noble Marquess would tell the House whether that was so. Then the noble Marquess proposed to take a large area of land on Salisbury Plain for encampment and manœuvres. Sir John Colomb suggested in the House of Commons that it would be preferable to acquire lands on the coast, so that manœuvres might be carried out in conjunction with the naval forces.
§ THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNEI would venture to point out that the matter which the noble Lord discussed towards the close of his speech would more appropriately be brought before the House when the Military Works Loan Bill, now before the House of Commons, comes here. The speech of the Under-Secretary was delivered in bringing in that Bill, and it seems to me that any criticism upon it might well be deferred until it arrives in your Lordships' House. ["Hear, hear!"] With regard to the defences of London, I may, perhaps, be allowed to say that we are not adopting any new plans for this purpose. We are merely carrying out certain works of a very modest order which were first initiated in the Government of which Mr. Stanhope was a member—works which were very fully explained in Parliament by Mr. Stanhope, which were carried on by the late Government, and 1268 which are being still further carried on by the present Government. I wished to make that observation because there seems to be in some quarters an impression that a new and startling departure has been made in this direction. With regard to Salisbury Plain, if the noble Lord will tell me in confidence of any area possessing advantages at all corresponding to those which Salisbury Plain offers, and which also has the advantage of being on the sea coast, and therefore suitable for combined naval and military operations, I shall be extremely obliged to him, [Laughter.] But my inquiries have not led me to expect the discovery of any such terra incognita. As to the other questions of the noble Lord, I do not consider there would be any breach of faith in employing Guardsmen in service in the Mediterranean. As the noble Lord himself knows, they all engage for general service, and are therefore already liable for service out of the United Kingdom. Then the noble Lord asked me a question with regard to our anticipations as to the possibility of obtaining a sufficient number of recruits for the garrison artillery. I have no reason to suppose that those recruits, who will be procured gradually during the next three years, will be impossible to obtain. The last question the noble Lord asked me had reference to the proposal to create a second battalion of Cameron Highlanders. I am free to confess that I am a little sceptical as to the Highland character of the men of whom that second battalion might possibly be composed; but I must tell the House that rumours have reached me that the men now serving in the existing battalion are not all of unimpeachably Scottish origin—in fact I have heard it said that not a few of them are enlisted at no great distance from the House in which your Lordships are sitting at this moment. [Laughter.]
§ House adjourned at a Quarter past Six o'clock, till To-morrow at a Quarter past Four o'clock,