THE EARL OF KIMBERLEYI desire to ask the noble Marquess at the head of the Government—to whom I have given private notice of the Question—whether he is able to give us any further information as to the peace negotiations between Turkey and Greece, and also as to the condition of affairs in Crete. I hope, from what we see in the public prints, that there may be some progress visible in that which has now been going on so long that I should think most people, and even the noble Marquess himself, must find their patience very sorely tried. If, as is reported, the question of the German bondholders has been arranged, one may hope that that alone will advance matters one stage. But I am free to say that, even when I hear that an agreement has been come to, I shall not believe the Turkish troops to have left or to be leaving Thessaly until I know positively that they are actually on the move. As to Crete, I fear it is not very likely that any satisfactory information can be given, and I venture to express a strong hope that, if the other negotiations should be brought to a successful termination, Her Majesty's Government will use all their influence to bring about some amelioration of affairs in that unhappy island. I feel this the more because I would not put the importance of a settlement of Cretan affairs merely as a question of humanity. I feel strongly the necessity for a satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the island in the interests of the peace of Europe; because Crete has long been, as every one knows, a point of great danger. And if, at the present time, some arrangements should be patched up of an unsatisfactory nature, I think every one will foresee that probably no long time may elapse before there will be further difficulties and disturbances. One can hardly hope that an island which has been so turbulent will all at once find itself in a condition of peace, but if in the future there should 50 be further agitation and difficulties there, the great object is to disconnect it with the affairs of the Ottoman Empire, so that if there should be any movement there it should not be liable to lead to far-reaching consequences such as to be even dangerous to the peace of Europe generally. I will say no more. I do not wish to initiate a discussion, but I thought that before Parliament is prorogued the noble Marquess should have an opportunity of making a statement on the subject.
§ * THE PRIME MINISTER (The Marquess of SALISBURY)I am not in the least surprised at the desire of the noble Earl for information on this subject, and I think many persons must feel that they are in the position which the noble Earl assigned to me of having their patience sorely tried by the length of the negotiations which are going on. But there is only one matter in excuse for the delay which I must urge. The peace which we are trying to arrange is not the ordinary arrangement between the conqueror and the conquered country. If it were so, probably a settlement would have been arrived at before now, but the territory which has been conquered by the Turkish Army is a territory which was assigned to Greece by international arrangements, and therefore other Powers besides Greece have something to say in respect to its disposal. That introduces the complexity and multiplicity of negotiations which may account, to some extent at least, for the length of time which has elapsed. The Powers from the first all proposed to themselves this general line of action—that Thessaly was not to be retroceded to Turkey; and that, speaking in the most general manner, Greek communities which had not been under Turkish rule were not to be placed under Turkish rule. On the other side it was recognised that the Sultan had a right to some security against incursions, and provocations similar to those which brought on the present war, and that a rectification of the frontier in a strategic sense was a very reasonable demand. The object of the Powers has been to reconcile those two aims, and at present I believe we have arrived at the point—though I share a little of the scepticism of the noble Earl as to accomplished facts which are not really accomplished—we have, I say arrived at this point, that the Ottoman Government has accepted the strategic 51 line that has been traced by the Military Attaches of the various Embassies acting together, and has consented to relinquish Thessaly to Greece. That, so far as the permanent disposal of the controversy goes, is a satisfactory issue. But there is also a temporary portion of the controversy. According to many modern precedents the Turkish Government has a right to an indemnity for a war which they undoubtedly did not bring on; and, on the other hand, the payment of such an indemnity by Greece is accompanied by many difficulties, which the noble Earl will readily understand. Therefore there is some scruple on the part of the Turkish Government and some tendency to demand that, apart from the territorial arrangements which will be pronounced by the ultimate treaty of peace, there shall be a reservation of strategic points to be held until the indemnity has been paid. I say that this is the proposal of the Turkish Government. I cannot at present say what the determination of the Powers will be. The matter is still, to a certain extent, under controversy, and that is the precise point at which we are arrived in respect to the territorial arrangement. In regard to the indemnity, no one doubts that Greece must pay an indemnity, but the extent to which she is competent to pay it is a matter of considerable controversy. And there comes in that mysterious and difficult question to which the noble Earl alluded, namely, the question of the German bondholders. I do not think any international duty lies on Europe to provide for the payment of the German bondholders. But, on the other hand, it is necessary to admit that so long as the German bondholders are not paid the credit of Greece in the European market will be exceedingly small. We have to deal with these two conflicting considerations. Some form of control, I imagine, of the Greek sources of revenue will be inevitable, if the money is to be provided which will satisfy the just claims upon the Greek Exchequer, but I cannot say that any negotiation in that direction has advanced very far, and I freely admit that it may be the cause of very considerable delay. However, I think we are in sight of a probable issue, in which by some arrangement or other Greece will have to provide sufficient money to satisfy the indemnity which the 52 Powers should consider just, and when that is done I hope all the Greek communities of Thessaly will, up to the strategic line, return under Greek dominion. I do not like to speak more definitely than that, for I wish in what I say not to go beyond that which I believe to be established. With respect to Crete, the general feeling of the Powers has been that it is very little use making definite arrangements in respect to that island, or even entering into negotiations as to arrangements, until the more important controversy between Greece and Turkey hag arrived at an adjustment. The attitude at present of the Cretan Christians is not unfavourable. They have formed for themselves a, sort of organisation, which appears to be of a pacific character; and if we had only them, to deal with, or only the Moslems to deal with, our difficulties would be very slight indeed. But I am afraid that the prospect of agreement between these two sections is no nearer than it has been for many decades; indeed, for many centuries. If it were possible to dig a ditch across the island, with the Christians on one side and the Moslems on the other, I think we should arrive at a satisfactory solution; but I am afraid I see no probability of so drastic an arrangement as that. I can only say that it is our earnest object to set up an autonomy which we have promised, and to take care that it is an autonomy which is just to both sections of the population. We are not inclined to admit that because the Moslems are in a minority therefore their interests are to be neglected. Both they and the Christians have an equal right upon our care. All our desires would be satisfied if we could provide any arrangement which would open to us the prospect of their living together in some tolerable harmony in the years before us; but how far we shall attain to that end I dare not prophesy. I quite agree with the noble Earl that Crete is in a dangerous position; but the danger of the position does not arise from its being mixed up in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It arises from that terrible division, more of creed than of race, which has cursed Crete, and which may require a great deal more power than the power of all the 53 Sovereigns of Europe together permanently to banish. All I can promise in respect to Crete is that we shall fulfil the promise we have given, and that we shall do our best to secure peace and equal rights to all in that island before we turn our backs to it and abandon it. (Cheers.)